VINOD KUMAR & ORS. versus DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU & ORS. on 7 July 2023

VINOD KUMAR & ORS.

v.

DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 5107 of 2022)

JULY 07, 2023

[B. R. GAVAI AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]

National Highways Authority Act, 1956: s. 3H – Deposit andpayment of amount – Compulsory acquisition – Apportionment ofcompensation – Land of the appellants acquired for public purpose– Determination of the compensation payable to landowners by theSpecial Land Acquisition Officer-SLAO – Dispute by respondentsregarding the apportionment of the compensation betweenthemselves and the appellants – Competent authority, SLAOdetermined the shares of parties in the subject land and theappellants were satisfied with the same – However, the respondentschallenged the same before the District Magistrate by invoking s.3G(5) – District Magistrate granted higher shares in favour of therespondents – Writ application by the appellants – Dismissed byHigh Court – Correctness of – Held : When it comes to resolvingthe dispute relating to apportionment of the amount determinedtowards compensation, it is only the Principal Civil Court of originaljurisdiction which can do so – Principal Civil Court means the Courtof the District Judge – Dispute being of the nature triable by theCivil Court that the law steps in to provide for that to be referred tothe decision of the Principal Civil Court – Thus, the order passedby the District Magistrate is quashed and set aside – SLAO to referthe dispute to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction inaccordance with sub-clause (4) of s. 3H of the Act.

Interpretation of Statutes – Rule of interpretation – Literalrule – Explained.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 In the instant case, the High Court seems tohave completely misread the provisions of the National HighwaysAuthority Act, 1956. It fell into error as it failed to apply the wellsettled principle of law that for construing a legal provision, the

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Afirst and foremost rule of construction is the literal construction.All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does theprovision state. If the provision is unambiguous and from theprovision the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not callinto aid the other rules of construction of statute. The other rulesof construction are called into aid only when the legislative intentBis not clear. [Para 24][402-B-C]

1.2. The first and foremost principle of interpretation of astatute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule ofinterpretation. The other rules of interpretation, the mischief rule/purposive construction, etc. can only be resorted to when theCplain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligibleresults or if read literally would nullify the very object of thestatute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear andunambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles ofinterpretation other than the literal rule. The language employedDin a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent.The legislature is presumed to have made no mistakes. Thepresumption is that it intended to say what it has said. Assumingthere is a defect or an omission in the words used by thelegislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency.[Para 25][402-C-F]E

1.3. There is a fine distinction between determining theamount to be paid towards compensation and the apportionmentof the amount. The legislature has thought fit to confer powersupon the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to determinethe dispute arising as to the apportionment of the amount. ThereFis a reason, why the legislature has thought fit to confer suchpower to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction withinthe limits of whose jurisdiction is land is situated. [Para 26][402-F-G]

1.4. The question of apportionment of compensation is notGfree from difficulties. In apportioning the compensation, the Courthas to give to each claimant the value of the interest which hehas lost by compulsory acquisition. So stated, the propositionmay appear simple, but in its practical application numerouscomplicated problems arise in apportioning the compensationH

awarded. The difficulty experienced is due to the nature of avariety of interests, rights and claims to land which have to bevalued in terms of money. The compensation awarded forcompulsory acquisition is the value of all the interests which areextinguished and that compensation has to be distributedequitably amongst persons having interest therein and the Courtmust proceed to apportion the compensation so that theaggregate value of all interests is equal to the amount ofcompensation awarded. But in the valuation of competinginterests, which from its very nature is dependent upon indefinitefactors and uncertain data, considerable difficulty is encountered.Indisputably, in apportioning compensation the Court cannotproceed upon hypothetical considerations but must proceed asfar as possible to make an accurate determination of the value ofthe respective interests which are lost. The Court must, in eachcase, having regard to the circumstances and the possibility of aprecise determination of the value having regard to the materialsavailable, adopt that method of valuation which equitablydistributes the compensation between the persons entitledthereto. [Para 27][402-H; 403-A-D]

1.5. The only general principle is that apportionment undersub clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956 is not a revaluationbut a distribution of the value already fixed among the severalpersons interested in the land acquired in accordance with thenature and quantum of the respective interests. In ascertainmentof those interests, the determination of their relative importanceand the manner in which they can be said to have contributed tothe total value fixed are questions to be decided in the light ofthe circumstances of each case and the relevant provisions oflaw governing the rights of the parties. The actual rule forapportionment has to be formulated in each case so as to ensurea just and equitable distribution of the total value or compensationamong the persons interested in the land. [Para 28][403-E-F]

1.6. In the said circumstances, the legislature thought fitto assign such function to none other than the Principal CivilCourt of original jurisdiction. [Para 29][403-G]

1.7. The submission that the dispute between the partiesis not one of apportionment but the same is with regard to giving ABC

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Aeffect to the order passed by the Civil Court in the Civil Suitcannot be accepted. What is perhaps sought to be argued is thatthe shares in the land acquired should be determined on the basisof some order passed by the Civil Court. Thus, if the privaterespondents want to rely upon the order passed by the Civil Court,they can do so before the Court of the Principal Judge of originalBjurisdiction. The District Magistrate has no power or jurisdictionin regard to the apportionment of the amount. [Para 30][403-H;404-A-B]

1.8. It cannot be understood on what basis the High Courtin its impugned order observed that the District Magistrate isCcompetent to examine the order passed by the Special LandAcquisition Officer and decide the dispute as to the apportionmentof the amount. When it comes to resolving the dispute relatingto apportionment of the amount determined towardscompensation, it is only the Principal Civil Court of originalDjurisdiction which can do so. Principal Civil Court means theCourt of the District Judge. [Paras 31 and 33][404-C; 409-C]

1.9 If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of theamount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same orany part thereof is payable, then, the competent authority shallErefer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court oforiginal jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction theland is situated. The competent authority possesses certainpowers of the Civil Court, but in the event of a dispute of the saidnature, the summary power, vesting in the competent authorityof rendering an opinion in terms of sub section (3) of Section 3H,Fwould not serve the purpose. The dispute being of the naturetriable by the Civil Court that the law steps in to provide for thatto be referred to the decision of the Principal Civil Court oforiginal jurisdiction. The dispute regarding apportionment of theamount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same orGany part thereof is payable, would then have to be decided bythat Court. [Para 34][409-D-F]

1.10 The order passed by the District Magistrate is quashedand set aside. In view of the dispute between the parties asregards apportionment of the amount of compensation, the SpecialHLand Acquisition Officer would now refer the dispute to the VINOD KUMAR & ORS. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU &ORS.

Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in accordance withsub clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956. [Para 35][409-G]

Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M. Bharucha,(1956) 60 Bom LR 1208 – approved.

Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar 2003 MhLJ Online (S.C.)23 : AIR 2003 SC 942 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

AIR 2003 SC 942

referred toPara 32

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.5107of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.02.2020 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in WC No.7310 of 2020.

Gaurav Agrawal, Shubhranshu Padhi, Ashish Yadav, Ms. RimjhimAgnihotri, Ms. Rajeshawari Shankar, Niroop Sukrithy, Jay Nirupam,Advs. for the Appellants.

Sharan Singh Thakur, AAG, V. K. Shukla, Mrs. Garima Prashad,Sr. Advs., Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Divyanshu Sahay, Ashiwan Mishra,Kamlendra Mishra, Arvind Kumar Shukla, Ms. Reetu Sharma, ShantanuShukla, Tushar Swami, Sarvesh Kumar Dubey, Nishit Agrawal, Advs.for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

J. B. PARDIWALA, J.

This appeal is at the instance of unsuccessful original writpetitioners and is directed against the order passed by a Division Benchof the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 28[th] February, 2020in Writ-C No. 7310 of 2020 by which the High Court rejected the writapplication filed by the appellants taking the view that the DistrictMagistrate is competent to look into the legality and validity of the orderpassed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (for short, ‘SLAO’)under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Authority Act, 1956 (forshort ‘the Act 1956’).

FACTUAL MATRIX

2. The Central Government issued a notification dated 23.01.2015in exercise of power under Section 3A(1) of the Act 1956 proposing to A

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Aacquire few parcels of land situated in the District Mau for the purposeof four lane widening of the National Highway No. 29. The saidnotification included the land bearing Gat Nos. 158, 160 and 161 resplyof the village Ahirani Bujurg, District Mau (UP).

3. In the aforesaid context, a further notification dated 21.01.2016Bwas issued under Section 3D of the Act 1956 declaring that the land asaforestated would be acquired for the public purpose. Upon issuance ofsuch notification, the land vested in the Central Government.

4. The competent authority i.e. the Special Land Acquisition Officervide award dated 28.11.2016 passed under Section 3G of the Act 1956Cdetermined the compensation to be paid to the landowners (parties beforeus) for the acquired land. The relevant portion of the award passed bythe competent authority reads thus:-

“By assuming the rate of Rs.4,50,00,000.00 as the stamp ratedetermined for the transferable land as basis, compensationDof the land measuring 3.269 hec. situated in village AhiraniBuzurg which is being acquired comes out toRs.14,71,05,000.00, double amount of which happens to beRs.29,42,10,000.00 and compensation of the structure andtree comes at Rs.8,01,582.00, total double amount of whichcomes out at Rs.15,29,06,582.00. Amount of 100% SolatiumEamount on this amount comes out to Rs.30,00,11,582.00.Additional Compensation of Rs.3,16,66,953.00 is payable atthe rate of 12% from the last publication of Section 3A dated6th March, 2015. Thus, total compensation amount comes outto Rs.63,16,90,117.00 (Rupees sixty three crores sixteen lakhsFninety thousand one hundred and seventeen only), I regardto which I declare the Award. By recovering land acquisitionexpenses of Rs.6,31,69,012.00 at the rate of 10% of the totalamount of compensation and 100 times of registered value ofless land revenue which comes out at Rs.7476.00 from theAcquiring Authority, same be got deposited in the prescribedGAccount Head. Accordingly, Notice be sent to the concernedTehsil for proceedings of making entry. While making onecopy of the Award Order to Indian National HighwayAuthority, Gorakhpur, letter be sent for making available theentire amount covered by the Award in question.”

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5. On 11.12.2019, the respondents herein raised a dispute regardingapportionment of the compensation between themselves and theappellants herein. With respect to the three parcels of land, the respondentsclaimed half share of compensation in Gat No. 158 and 1/3[rd] share ofcompensation in Gat Nos. 160 and 161 respectively, while the appellantsherein claimed 5/8[th] share in the compensation in Gat No. 158 and 13/16[th] share in Gat Nos. 160 and 161 respectively.

6. In accordance with the legislative scheme i.e. Section 3H(3) ofthe Act 1956, the competent authority is required to determine the sharesof the landowners in the compensation. In such circumstances, thecompetent authority called for a report from the revenue authorities.The revenue authorities vide its report dated 11.04.2019 reported theshare of the appellants and respondents herein. This report was in favourof the appellants. The relevant portion of the report reads thus:- “4. That on the basis of copy of Khasra No. 1353, Gata No.213 is mentioned which is having present No. 232/ 51 min.and present No. of Gata No. 213 B is 232 Min./183 and presentNo. of 213 is 232 min./ 519. Similarly present No. of GataNo. 233 is 214/ 644 acres and type of land is mentioned as“Bagh Digar”. Apart from it, present No. of Gata No. 208 is227 / 1.440 acres in which “Bagh Digar” is mentioned, whichis correct.

5. That names of Mahadav Shahi, son of Sitaram Shahi andBholanath, son of Ganga and Saryu, son of Brijrnohan, CasteKandu are recorded in Khata No. 46 of Copy of Khatauni forthe crop year 1348, Ahirani Buzurg, in which Gata No. 232acres is recorded and name of Mahadev, son of Sitaram Shahiand Bholanath, son of Ganga and Saryu, son of Brijmohan,Caste Kanu is recorded in respect of Gata No. 128 for thecrop year 1348. Gata No. 232/0.284 acres is mentioned in itand names of Mahadev, son of Sitaram Shahi and Bholanath,son of Brij Mohan, Caste Kandu are recorded in Khata No.92. Gata No. 232/0.539 and Gata No. 233/0.644 two Gatasadmeasuring 1.163 acres are mentioned in it, which is correct.On the basis of the crop year 1348, which has been mentionedas Jamman 12. On its basis, ½ equal share in Gata No. 227 /1.440, equal share of Salum in Gata No. 232 min./ 0.551,232/ 0.183, 232/ 0.539 and 233/ 1.624 have been determined, AB

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Awhich road is situated on both sides of Hashiya Doharighatto Gazipur, in which Applicant has got 1/3[rd] share in GataNos. 232 and 233 and Applicants have got ½ share in GataNo. 227 / 1.440 acres and present Gata No. 158, in regard towhich according to the order passed by the Additional CivilJudge, Azamgarh on 31.05.1976, Applicants Suresh andBothers have got 1/8[th] share in Gatas No. 232, 233 i.e. in presentGata No. 158 measuring 0.583 and 1/16[th] share in Gatas No.160 and 161.”

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7. The respondents herein objected to the aforesaid report. Boththe parties were given opportunity to file their documents. An opportunityCof hearing was also given to the parties and thereafter the competentauthority i.e. SLAO, Mau proceeded to determine the shares of thevarious parties in the land in question vide order dated 11.12.2019. Thisorder was passed under Section 3H(3) of the Act 1956. The SLAOrelied upon the earlier judgment of the Civil Court dated 31.05.1976. It isDthe case of the appellants that the SLAO has correctly determined theshares between the parties. The relevant portion of the order passed bythe competent authority/SLAO reads thus:- “Above parties have been heard and evidences available inthe file have been duly perused. Khatauni for the crop yearE1348 produced by the Objector in his support as evidencehave been examined. Present Khatauni for the crop year 1423-1428, C. H. Form-41 and 45 and Form-11, previous Khatauniand order dated 31.05.1976 passed by the Hon’ble Court ofAdditional Civil Judge, Azamgarh have been perused.Hon’ble Court of Additional Civil Judge in its very passedForder has mentioned the pedigree of the family, which hasbeen mentioned by Tehsildar, Ghosi while perusing all thedocuments. This pedigree and share mentioned in it confirmsthe submission of the report. The Hon’ble Civil Court hascategorically spoken on the issue of share in the suit whileGframing issue No.1 “Whether the Plaintiff is co- owner andin the possession over the trees of list Ka to the extent of the1/4[th] and list Kha 1/8[th] and 1/12[th] of the list Ga as alleged inthe plaint?” While deciding the above mentioned issue as wellas others, Hon’ble Court of Additional Civil Judge, Azamgarhhas clearly mentioned in its order “In view of the above H

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pedigree and the documents, the share of Ganga, father ofBhola and Sukdeo was 1/4[th] in the grove of plot No. 208 (newnumber 158). “Further, “In view of what has been discussedabove, I arrived at the irresistible conclusion that Bhola had1;sth share in Plot No. 208 (Old 227), 1/32[nd] share into treesof plot No. 213 and 214 (232 and 233 old) and 1/16[th] sharein tree of Doharighat - Ghazipur Road.” In the above judicialorder, partition of trees with land and shares finds mention,but balance of convenience is falling in favour of theRespondent Vinod. In my view, all the people who are presentin the joint tenureship/co- tenureship their share is to bedecided on the basis of pedigree. Therefore, when the pedigreehas been decided by a competent Civil Court against whichthe Defendants have never appealed, hence judicial estoppelalso in the same. Accordingly, the claim of Mr. suresh Guptais not justified. Even earlier also, report was sought fromTehsil Ghosi in the present case in regard to objection on thedetermination of the share, on which while granting sufficientopportunity of hearing to both the parties, same was furnishedby Tehsildar Ghosi while determining the share. Even byappearing before the Court, both the parties have expressedthe consent in regard to this fact that Suraj, Ganga, BaldevSalik and Radhakrishan were the children of Shri Brijmohan,in which Baldev died without children and thus, all of themshall have 1/4[th] share in the property of Brijmohan. Gangahad two children namely Bholanath and Sukt1dev. ApplicantSuresh is the heir of Shri Dwarika, son of Parag, who hadbought the property from Bholanath in the auction.Accordingly, Bholanath can auction out that much only ofwhich he is an owner lawfully. It shall also be pertinent tomention this fact also that consolidation proceedings havealready been conducted in village Ahirani Buzurg, only afterwhich, present records CH Form 11, 23, 41 and 45 have beenprepared and Khatauni has been formed on their basis.Applicant Suresh Gupta or any member of his family hasneither raised any objection in this regard before the Courtnor has produced any evidence of initiating any proceedingsin the Court, therefore, he is barred by Section 49 of theConsolidation of Holding Act.

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AORDER

Thus, in pursuance of the evidence available on the file,present Khatauni, report of the then Tehsildar, Ghosi andorder of Hon’ble Court of Additional Civil Judge, shareproduced on the file are satisfactory and correct. Accordingly,Bby preparing file for payment of compensation, same beproduced. After doing needful, file be consigned to RecordRoom.

Sd/- illegible

(Atul Vats)

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Competent Authority/ SLAO

Mau11.12.2019"

8. The respondents, being dissatisfied with the order datedD11.12.2019 passed by the SLAO referred to above, challenged the sameby filing a petition before the District Magistrate, Mau invoking Section3G(5) of the Act 1956. It is the case of the appellants herein that theDistrict Magistrate, Mau without any jurisdiction and further withoutgiving any opportunity of hearing to the appellants proceeded to pass anEorder dated 16.01.2020 granting higher shares in favour of the respondentstowards compensation. The operative portion of the order passed by theDistrict Magistrate, Mau reads thus:- “ORDER

On the basis of the above examination, order datedF11.12.2019 of the competent Officer/Special Land AcquisitionOfficer, Mau is set aside. File is remanded back to thecompetent Officer with this direction that while duly examiningthe records produced by the above parties, keeping in viewthe ownership of the land acquired by the ancestors of theGobjectors in the auction and according to the separatepedigrees of Khatedar, share of Khatedars be determined andalso produce the proposal from Tehsil for taking action againstthe officials/employees who produced erroneous report.”

9. The appellants herein, being dissatisfied with the order passedby the District Magistrate, Mau referred to above, challenged the sameH

before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by filing Writ-C No.7310 of 2020. The said writ application came to be rejected by a DivisionBench of the High Court vide its order dated 28.02.2020. The orderpassed by the High Court reads thus:- “1. Heard Sri Yadvendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel forpetitioners and learned Standing Counsel for respondents.

2. Writ petition is directed against order dated 16.01.2020passed by District Magistrate, Mau in purported exercise ofpower under Section 3(G)(5) of National Highway Act, 1956(hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1956”) whereby he has setaside order passed by Special Land Acquisition Officer, Maupassed on 11.12.2019 and remanded the matter forredetermination.

3. Learned counsel for petitioners submitted thatdetermination was already made but could not dispute thatDistrict Magistrate was competent to examine the order passedby Special Land Acquisition Officer and take appropriatedecision in accordance with law and order impugned inpresent writ petition is not without jurisdiction. No otherwiseerror could be shown in the impugned order.

4. Writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed.”

10. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants camebefore this Court by filing the special leave petition. This Court videorder dated 31.08.2020 issued notice and stayed the operation of theorder passed by the District Magistrate, Mau dated 16.01.2020. Later,leave was granted and the appeal came to be admitted.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

11. Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, the learned counsel appearing for theappellants, vehemently submitted that the High Court committed a seriouserror in passing the impugned order. He submitted that the order whichcame to be passed by the competent authority dated 11.12.2019 couldbe said to be under Section 3H(3) of the Act 1956. If the respondentshad any grievance in regard to the order passed by the competentauthority the remedy available in law to them was to approach thecompetent authority so that the competent authority could have referredthe matter to the Civil Court. According to the learned counsel, suchprocedure is laid down under Section 3H(4) of the Act 1956.

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A12. The learned counsel further submitted that the DistrictMagistrate, Mau who is an arbitrator appointed by the CentralGovernment does not have any jurisdiction to decide the apportionmentof the compensation. He is empowered only to decide the quantum ofcompensation under Section 3G(5) of the Act 1956 as an arbitrator.B13. The learned counsel submitted that challenge before the District A

13. The learned counsel submitted that challenge before the DistrictMagistrate, Mau was to the order dated 11.12.2019 passed by thecompetent authority which he could not have entertained. The orderpassed by the District Magistrate dated 16.01.2020 could be said to bewithout jurisdiction.

14. In the last, the learned counsel submitted that even otherwiseCthe impugned order passed by the District Magistrate, Mau, could besaid to be without jurisdiction as no notice or any opportunity of hearingwas given to the appellants.

15. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counselprayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowedDand the order passed by the District Magistrate, Mau dated 16.01.2020be quashed and set aside and the writ application filed by the appellantsbefore the High Court be allowed.

SUMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.

1 – DISTRICT MAGISGRATE, MAU AND THEERESPONDENT NO. 2 - COMPETENT AUTHORITY/SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, MAU

16. Shri V.K. Shukla, the learned senior counsel appearing for theDistrict Magistrate, Mau (respondent No. 1) and Competent Authority/Special Land Acquisition Officer, Mau (respondent No. 2), very fairlyFsubmitted that the High Court committed an error in rejecting the writapplication filed by the appellants herein. Shri Shukla submitted that theDistrict Magistrate, Mau could not have entertained any petition filed atthe instance of the respondents seeking to challenge the order passed bythe competent authority dated 11.12.2019 under Section 3H(3) of theAct 1956. In such circumstances referred to above, Shri Shukla submittedGthat appropriate relief be granted in favour of the appellants.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NOS.4, 6 AND 16

17. Shri Arvind Kumar Shukla, the learned counsel appearing forHthe respondent Nos. 4, 6 and 16, submitted that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the HighCourt in passing the impugned order. He submitted that the dispute, insubstance, is not one of apportionment but is in respect of the share inthe subject land. In such circumstances, the District Magistrate, Mauhad the jurisdiction and competence to look into the order passed by thecompetent authority by relying upon the order dated 31.05.1976 passedby the Principal Civil Judge, Azamgarh in Civil Suit No. 63 of 1970. Insuch circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed thatthere being no merit in the present appeal, the same may be dismissed.

ANALYSIS

18. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the partiesand having gone through the materials on record, the only question thatfalls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed anyerror in passing the impugned order.

19. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on eitherside, we must look into few relevant provisions of the Act 1956.

20. Section 3A reads thus:-

“3A. Power to acquire land, etc.—(1) Where the CentralGovernment is satisfied that for a public purpose any land isrequired for the building, maintenance, management oroperation of a national highway or part thereof, it may, bynotification in the Official Gazette, declare its intention toacquire such land.

(2) Every notification under sub-section (1) shall give a briefdescription of the land.

(3) The competent authority shall cause the substance of thenotification to be published in two local newspapers, one ofwhich will be in a vernacular language.”

21. Section 3C provides for hearing of objections. Section 3Dprovides for declaration of acquisition. Section 3E provides for power totake possession. Section 3G is with respect to determination of amountpayable as compensation. Section 3G reads thus:- “—3G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.(1) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall bepaid an amount which shall be determined by an order of thecompetent authority.

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(2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of aneasement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shallbe paid an amount to the owner and any other person whoseright of enjoyment in that land has been affected in anymanner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amountcalculated at ten per cent, of the amount determined undersub-section (1), for that land.

(3) Before proceeding to determine the amount undersub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the competent authorityshall give a public notice published in two local newspapers,one of which will be in a vernacular language inviting claimsfrom all persons interested in the land to be acquired.

(4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land andshall require all personsinterested in such land to appear inperson or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to insub-section (2) of section 3C, before the competent authority,at a time and place and to state the nature of their respectiveinterest in such land.

(5) If the amount determined by the competent authority undersub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to eitherof the parties, the amount shall, on an application by eitherof the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointedby the Central Government.

(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of theArbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shallapply to every arbitration under this Act.

(7) The competent authority or the arbitrator whiledetermining the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section(5), as the case may be, shall take into consideration—

(a) the market value of the land on the date ofpublication of the notification under section 3A; (b)the damage, if any, sustained by the personinterested at the time of taking possession of theland, by reason of the severing of such land fromother land;

(c) the damage, if any, sustained by the personinterested at the time of taking possession of theland, by reason of the acquisition injuriouslyaffecting his other immovable property in anymanner, or his earnings; (d)if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land,the person interested is compelled to change hisresidence or place of business, the reasonableexpenses, if any, incidental to such change.”

(Emphasis supplied)

22. Section 3H is with respect to deposit and payment of amount.What is relevant for our purpose is sub-clause (4) of Section 3H.Sub-clause (4) reads thus:- “3H. Deposit and payment of amount.—

(4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amountor any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or anypart thereof is payable, the competent authority shall referthe dispute to the decision of the principal civil court oforiginal jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdictionthe land is situated.”

23. The scheme of the Act 1956 and the statutory provisionsreferred to above makes it very clear that once any land is acquiredunder the Act 1956, the competent authority is obliged to pay an amountby way of compensation. There is a procedure which has been prescribedunder Section 3G of the Act 1956. Sub-clause (5) of Section 3G makesit abundantly clear that if the amount determined by the competentauthority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 3G is notacceptable to either of the parties, the amount will have to be determinedby the arbitrator who may be appointed by the Central Government onthe strength of an application by either of the parties. Section 3H providesthat the amount determined towards compensation under Section 3Gwill have to be deposited by the Central Government in accordance withthe rules. It is only after such amount is deposited by the competentauthority that the possession of the land can be taken. Sub-clause (4) ofSection 3H talks about apportionment of the amount. The language ofsub-clause (4) of Section 3H is plain and simple. It provides that if anydisputes arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof, A

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Athe competent authority is obliged to refer the dispute to the decision ofthe Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whosejurisdiction the land is situated.

24. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completelymisread the provisions of the Act 1956. It fell into error as it failed toBapply the well settled principle of law that for construing a legal provision,the first and foremost rule of construction is the literal construction. Allthat the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the provisionstate. If the provision is unambiguous and from the provision the legislativeintent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of constructionof statute. The other rules of construction are called into aid only whenCthe legislative intent is not clear.

25. It may be mentioned in the aforesaid context that the first andforemost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system ofinterpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules ofinterpretation, for example, the mischief rule/ purposive construction,Detc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute areambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullifythe very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutelyclear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles ofinterpretation other than the literal rule. The language employed in aEstatute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The legislatureis presumed to have made no mistakes. The presumption is that it intendedto say what it has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in thewords used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up thedeficiency.F26. There is a fine distinction between determining the amount to F26. There is a fine distinction between determining the amount tobe paid towards compensation and the apportionment of the amount.The legislature has thought fit to confer powers upon the Principal CivilCourt of original jurisdiction to determine the dispute arising as to theapportionment of the amount. There is a reason, why the legislature hasthought fit to confer such power to the Principal Civil Court of originalGjurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction is land is situated. Weshall try to explain hereinafter.

27. The question of apportionment of compensation is not freefrom difficulties. In apportioning the compensation, the Court has to giveto each claimant the value of the interest which he has lost by compulsoryH

acquisition. So stated, the proposition may appear simple, but in itspractical application numerous complicated problems arise in apportioningthe compensation awarded. The difficulty experienced is due to the natureof a variety of interests, rights and claims to land which have to bevalued in terms of money. The compensation awarded for compulsoryacquisition is the value of all the interests which are extinguished andthat compensation has to be distributed equitably amongst persons havinginterest therein and the Court must proceed to apportion the compensationso that the aggregate value of all interests is equal to the amount ofcompensation awarded. But in the valuation of competing interests, whichfrom its very nature is dependent upon indefinite factors and uncertaindata, considerable difficulty is encountered. Indisputably, in apportioningcompensation the Court cannot proceed upon hypothetical considerationsbut must proceed as far as possible to make an accurate determinationof the value of the respective interests which are lost. The Court must,in each case, having regard to the circumstances and the possibility of aprecise determination of the value having regard to the materials available,adopt that method of valuation which equitably distributes thecompensation between the persons entitled thereto. [See : DossibaiNanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M. Bharucha, (1956) 60 Bom LR 1208]

28. Thus, the only general principle one could state is thatapportionment under sub-clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956 is nota revaluation but a distribution of the value already fixed among theseveral persons interested in the land acquired in accordance with thenature and quantum of the respective interests.In ascertainment of thoseinterests, the determination of their relative importance and the mannerin which they can be said to have contributed to the total value fixed arequestions to be decided in the light of the circumstances of each caseand the relevant provisions of law governing the rights of the parties.The actual rule for apportionment has to be formulated in each case soas to ensure a just and equitable distribution of the total value orcompensation among the persons interested in the land.

29. In the circumstances referred to above, the legislature thoughtfit to assign such function to none other than the Principal Civil Court oforiginal jurisdiction.

30. We are not impressed by the submission canvassed on behalfof the respondent Nos. 4, 6 and 16 that the dispute between the parties AB

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Ais not one of apportionment but the same is with regard to giving effectto the order passed by the Civil Court in Civil Suit No. 63 of 1970 decidedon 31.05.1976. What is perhaps sought to be argued is that the shares inthe land acquired should be determined on the basis of some order passedby the Civil Court referred to above. Thus, if the private respondentswant to rely upon the order passed by the Civil Court, they can do soBbefore the Court of the Principal Judge of original jurisdiction. We holdthat the District Magistrate, Mau has no power or jurisdiction in regardto the apportionment of the amount.

31. We fail to understand on what basis the High Court in itsimpugned order has observed that the District Magistrate is competentCto examine the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officerand decide the dispute as to the apportionment of the amount.

32. In the decision in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, reported in2003 MhLJ Online (S.C.) 23 = AIR 2003 SC 942, this Court had anoccasion to consider the ambit and scope of Sections 30 and 31 resply ofDthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In analyzing and interpreting theseprovisions, this Court held as under:- “23. The two provisions contemplating power of the Collectorto make reference as contained in Section 18and Section 30of the Act need a comparative study. Under Section 18theEsubject-matter of reference can be a dispute as to any one ormore of the following: (i) as to the measurement of the land,(ii) as to the amount or the quantum of the compensation, (iii)as to the persons to whom the compensation is payable, (iv)as to the apportionment of the compensation among theFpersons interested. Under Section 30 the subject matter ofdispute can be: (i) the apportionment of the amount ofcompensation or any part thereof, (ii) the persons to whomthe amount of compensation or any part thereof is payable.Though the expression employed in Section 18is ‘the amountof compensation’ while the expression employed in SectionG30is ‘the amount of compensation or any part thereof’, thisdistinction in legislative drafting is immaterial and insignificantand a dispute as to entitlement or apportionment of part ofthe compensation would also be covered by Section 18of theAct on the principle that the whole includes a part too. Thus, G

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at the first blush, it seems that Section 30 overlaps Section 18in part; but as will be seen shortly hereinafter, it is not so.

24. Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. State of Bihar (supra) is a three-JudgeBench decision of this Court wherein the scheme of the Actby reference to the power vesting in the Collector to make areference came up for the consideration of the Court. Thethree-Judge Bench by a majority of 2:1 laid down thefollowing principles :

(i) There are two provisions in the Act under which theCollector can make a reference to the Court, namely,Section 18 and Section 30. The powers under the twosections are distinct and may be invoked in contingencieswhich do not overlap. A person shown in that part of theaward which relates to apportionment of compensation whois present either personally or through a representative oron whom notice is issued under Section 12(2), must, if hedoes not accept the award, apply to the Collector to referthe matter to the Court under Section 18within the timeprescribed thereunder. But a person who has not appearedin the acquisition proceedings before the Collector may, ifhe is not served with notice of filing, raise a dispute as toapportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payableand apply to the Court for a reference under Section 30,for determination of his right to compensation which mayhave existed before the award, or which may have devolvedupon him since the award. For a reference under Section30, no period of limitation is prescribed.

(ii) It is not predicated of the exercise of the power to makea reference under Section 30 that the Collector has notapportioned the compensation money by his award.

(iii) The award made by the Collector under Section 11isnot the source of the right to compensation. An award isstrictly speaking only an offer made by the Government tothe person interested in the land notified for acquisition;the person interested is not bound to accept it and theGovernment can also withdraw the acquisition u/s 48. It isonly when possession of the land has been taken by the AB

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Government u/s 16 that the right of the owner of the landis extinguished. Therefore the appellant’s contention thattitle to compensation is derived solely from and on the dateof the award could not be accepted.

(iv) The liability of the Government u/s 31 to paycompensation to the person entitled thereto under the awarddoes not imply that only the persons to whom compensationis directed to be paid under the award may raise a disputeu/s 30. The scheme of apportionment by the Collector underSection 11is conclusive only between the Collector andthe persons interested and not among the personsinterested. Payment of compensation u/s 31 to the personsdeclared in the award to be entitled thereto discharges theState of its liability to pay compensation leaving it open tothe claimant to compensation to agitate his right in areference u/s 30 or by a separate suit.

(v) Under the Bihar Land Reforms Act the title of theappellant to the land noticed for acquisition became vestedin the State and therefore the right to compensation for theland acquired devolved upon the State. A dispute then arosebetween the State Government and the appellant “as tothe persons to whom” compensation was payable.

The State had no right to the compensation payable forthe land under a title existing before the date of theaward of the Collector and no application could bemade by it as a person interested within the meaning ofSection 18. But a dispute between the appellant andthe State as to their conflicting claims to thecompensation money was clearly a dispute which couldbe referred u/s 30 of the Act to the Court. There isnothing in Section 30 which excludes a reference to theCourt of a dispute raised by a person on whom the titleof the owner of the land has since the award, devolved.

30. The scheme of the Act reveals that the remedy of referenceu/s 18 is intended to be available only to a ‘person interested’.A person present either personally or through representativeor on whom a notice is served u/s 12(2) is obliged, subject to his specifying the test as to locus, to apply to the Collectorwithin the time prescribed u/s 18(2) to make a reference tothe Court. The basis of title on which the reference would besought for u/s 18 would obviously be a pre- existing title byreference to the date of the award. So is Section 29, whichspeaks of ‘persons interested’. Finality to the award spokenof by Section 12(1)of the Act is between the Collector on onehand and the ‘persons interested’ on the other hand andattaches to the issues relating to (i) the true area, i.e.measurement of the land, (ii) the value of the land, i.e. thequantum of compensation, and (iii) apportionment of thecompensation among the ‘persons interested’. The ‘personsinterested’ would be bound by the award without regard tothe fact whether they have respectively appeared before theCollector or not. The finality to the award spoken of by Section29is as between the ‘persons interested’ inter se and isconfined to the issue as to the correctness of theapportionment. Section 30is not confined in its operationonly to ‘persons interested’. It would, therefore, be availablefor being invoked by the ‘persons interested’ if they wereneither present nor represented in proceedings before theCollector, nor were served with notice u/s 12(2) of the Act orwhen they claim on the basis of a title coming into existencepost award. The definition of ‘person interested’ speaks of‘an interest in compensation to be made’. An interest cominginto existence post award gives rise to a claim in compensationwhich has already been determined. Such a person can alsohave recourse to Section 30. In any case, the dispute for whichSection 30can be invoked shall remain confined only (i) asto the apportionment of the amount of compensation or anypart thereof, or (ii) as to the persons to whom the amount ofcompensation (already determined) or any part thereof ispayable. The State claiming on the basis of a pre-existingright would not be a ‘person interested’, as already pointedout hereinabove and on account of its right being pre- existing,the State, in such a case, would not be entitled to invoke eitherSection 18 or Section 30seeking determination of its allegedpre-existing right. A right accrued or devolved post awardmay be determined in a reference u/s 30 depending on AB

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Collector’s discretion to show indulgence, without any baras to limitation. Alternatively, such a right may be left openby the Collector to be adjudicated upon in any independentlegal proceedings. This view is just, sound and logical as atitle post award could not have been canvassed upto the dateof the award and should also not be left without remedy bydenying access to Section 30. Viewed from this angle, Section18and 30 would not overlap and would have fields to operateindependent of each other.

37. The Collector acts as a representative of the State whilstholding proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In fact,he conducts the proceedings on behalf of the State. The awardof the Collector is not the source of the right to compensation;it is the pre- existing right which is recognized by the Collectorand guided by the findings arrived at in determining theobjections, if any, the Collector quantifies the amount ofcompensation to be placed as an offer of the appropriateGovernment to the owner recognized by the State. The offereemay accept or decline the offer. It he accepts the offer andthe Government takes possession over the land, the title ofthe offeree is extinguished and vests absolutely in theGovernment free from all encumbrances. The power to makean award under Section 11 and to make a reference underSections 18or 30 of the Act is a statutory power. The sweepof jurisdiction of Court to determine the disputes is alsostatutory and is controlled by the bounds created by Section17or 30 whereunder the reference has been made to the Court.

The power has to be exercised to the extent to which it hasbeen conferred by the Statute and on availability of pre-existing conditions on the availability of which and whichalone the power can be exercised.

38. Award made by the Collector is final and conclusive asbetween the Collector and the ‘persons interested’, whetherthey have appeared before the Collector or not, on two issues: (i) as to true area, i.e. measurement of land acquired, (ii) asto value of the land, i.e. the amount of compensation, and(iii) as to the apportionment of the compensation among the‘persons interested’ again, between the Collector and the ‘persons interested’ and not as amongst the ‘persons interested’inter se. In the event of a reference having been sought for u/s 18, the Collector’s award on these issues; if varied by CivilCourt, shall stand superseded to that extent. The scheme ofthe Act does not attach a similar finality to the award of theCollector on the issue as to the person to whom compensationis payable; in spite of the award by Collector and even onfailure to seek reference, such issue has been left availableto be adjudicated upon by any competent forum.”

33. We are of the view that when it comes to resolving the disputerelating to apportionment of the amount determined towardscompensation, it is only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdictionwhich can do so. Principal Civil Court means the Court of the DistrictJudge.

34. Our final conclusion is as under:- If any dispute arises as tothe apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person towhom the same or any part thereof is payable, then, the competentauthority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal CivilCourt of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction theland is situated. The competent authority possesses certain powers ofthe Civil Court, but in the event of a dispute of the above nature, thesummary power, vesting in the competent authority of rendering anopinion in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 3H, will not serve thepurpose. The dispute being of the nature triable by the Civil Court thatthe law steps in to provide for that to be referred to the decision of thePrincipal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The dispute regardingapportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person towhom the same or any part thereof is payable, would then have to bedecided by that Court.

35. In such circumstance referred to above, the order passed bythe District Magistrate, Mau dated 16.01.2020 is hereby quashed andset aside. The writ application No. 7310 of 2020 stands allowed. In viewof the dispute between the parties as regards apportionment of theamount of compensation, the Special Land Acquisition Officer shall nowrefer the dispute to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction inaccordance with sub-clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956.

36. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

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410SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2023] 10 S.C.R.

A37. There shall be no order as to costs.

38. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of accordingly.

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Nidhi Jain(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

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