JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA versus STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. ETC on 12 November 2021

[2021] 11 S.C.R. 9

JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA

v.

STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. ETC.

(Criminal Appeal Nos 1328-1333 of 2021)

NOVEMBER 12, 2021

[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD ANDB V NAGARATHNA, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

s. 482 – Inherent powers of High Court – Exercise of – Onfacts, dispute over title of land – FIR registered against respondentsu/ss 465, 467, 468 and 120B IPC by the appellant – Respondentsnos. 2 to 7 filed petitions u/s 482 before the High Court for quashingof FIR – Interim order by the High Court that investigation to becontinued but charge-sheet to be filed only with its permission –Draft charge-sheet placed before the High Court for offencespunishable u/ss. 385, 389, 418, 477, 506(2), 120B and 34 IPC –Draft charge-sheet also arraigned respondents nos. 8 and 9 – HighCourt quashed the FIR except for the allegations against respondentsnos. 4 and 5 u/s. 385 IPC – On appeal, held: High Courttransgressed the limitations on the exercise of its jurisdiction u/s.482in quashing the FIR and all consequential proceedings, and byrestricting the police from submitting the charge-sheet before themagistrate and by further perusing the contents of the draft charge-sheet in the proceedings before it – High Court cannot place relianceon a “draft charge-sheet” which is yet to be placed before themagistrate to quash the criminal proceedings u/s 482 – High Court’sdirection to not submit report to Magistrate prior to placing thesame before it was devoid of any reasoning – Interim directionamounted to an unnecessary interference in the investigative processenvisaged under the CrPC – Furthermore, allegations in the FIRprima facie indicate that respondent nos 6 and 7 entered intochampertous agreements with the legal heirs of SB and were allegedto be involved in the extortion of money from the appellant – HighCourt held that the allegations on their face disclose that respondentnos 4 and 5 committed the offence of extortion u/s 385 IPC anddirected that the investigation be continued against them – However,

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Athe High Court completely failed to examine the allegation of criminalconspiracy qua the other accused – Thus, when a specific role wasattributed to the accused, the High Court could not have quashedthe FIR u/s.482 – As regards, respondent nos. 8 and 9 who werenamed as accused in the draft charge-sheet and not in the FIR,instituted quashing petitions, before the draft charge-sheet wasBplaced before the High Court and the High Court proceeded toentertain their petitions u/s.482 – Interference by the High Court inthe investigation against respondent nos. 8 and 9 was at a prematurestage and not warranted – There has been a clear abuse of theprocess – Thus, the order passed by the High Court set aside.

Cs. 482 – Inherent powers of High Court – Exercise of – Held:Inherent powers by High Court must be exercised sparingly andwith circumspection – Inherent powers do not confer arbitraryjurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim and caprice– Inherent powers cannot be invoked to sidestep statutory provisionsD– High Court can neither direct an investigating agency to submitthe investigation report before it nor can it quash a criminalproceeding u/s. 482 relying on such report when the report has notbeen submitted to the Magistrate.

Allowing the appeals arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos 5736-39Eof 2019 and dismissing the appeals arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos5734 and 5735 of 2019, the Court HELD: 1. The High Court must exercise its inherentpowers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedurre,1973 sparingly and with circumspection. The inherent powers doFnot confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to actaccording to whim or caprice. The inherent powers of the HighCourt cannot be invoked to sidestep statutory provisions. [Para20][29-F-H]

Conclusion

Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi (2009) 14 SCCG683 : [2009] 10 SCR 857; Simrikhia v. DolleyMukherjee (1990) 2 SCC 437 : [1990] 1 SCR 788;Pratibha v. Rameshwari Dev (2007) 12 SCC 369 :[2007] 9 SCR 1038 – referred to.

2.1. The police have a statutory right to investigate acognizable offence under sections 154 and 156 of the CrPC. Sub-H

Section 2(i) of section 173 of the CrPC provides that after thecompletion of investigation, the police officer in charge of thepolice station shall forward the final report to the magistrate whois empowered to take cognizance of the offence alleged in thereport. Before taking cognizance of the offence, the magistratehas to apply their own mind and is not bound by the conclusionsdrawn by the police. The High Court can neither direct aninvestigating agency to submit the investigation report before itnor can it quash a criminal proceeding under s. 482 relying onsuch a report when the report has not been submitted to theMagistrate. [Para 20][30-C-E]

2.2. The High Court in its interim order dated 2 May, 2016,allowed the investigation to continue against the accused butdirected that the final report cannot be submitted to the magistratewithout its permission. The direction was not supported by anyreasoning whatsoever. Even at the interim stage, the High Courtmust demonstrate an application of mind and furnish reasons forissuing any interlocutory direction, which is capable of beingtested before this Court in an appropriate case. The interimdirection amounted to an unnecessary interference in theinvestigative process envisaged under the CrPC. The High Courttransgressed the scope of powers conferred upon it by restrictingthe police from submitting the charge-sheet before the magistrateand by further perusing the contents of the “draft charge-sheet”in the proceedings before it. [Para 20][31-D-F]

2.3. A distinct position arises when the charge-sheet hasbeen filed before a magistrate and proceedings u/s 482 arepending before the High Court. In such cases, the High Courtmust take into consideration the material collected during theinvestigation. However, the High Court cannot place reliance ona “draft charge-sheet” which is yet to be placed before themagistrate to quash the criminal proceedings u/s 482. [Para 21][31-G-H; 32-A]

Kaptan Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh CriminalAppeal No. 787 of 2021; Mahendra KC v. State ofKarnataka Criminal Appeal No. 1238 of 2021 - referredto.

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A2.4. The allegations in the FIR prima facie indicate thatthe sixth and seventh respondents entered into champertousagreements with the legal heirs of SB and were alleged to beinvolved in the extortion of money from the appellant. In theimpugned judgment, the High Court held that the allegations ontheir face disclose that the fourth and fifth respondents committedBthe offence of extortion u/s 385, IPC and directed that theinvestigation be continued against them. However, the High Courtcompletely failed to examine the allegation of criminal conspiracyqua the other accused where it has been alleged that they werealso privy to such extortion. Thus, in such circumstances, whenCa specific role was attributed to the accused, the High Court couldnot have quashed the FIR under s. 482 of the CrPC. [Para 23][33-F-H; 34-A]

2.5. During the course of its impugned judgment, the HighCourt noted that certain persons (the eighth and ninthDrespondents) who were named as accused in the draft charge-sheet had instituted quashing petitions, evidently before the draftcharge-sheet was placed before the High Court. In this backdrop,there is substance in the submission on behalf of the appellantthat the proceedings before the High Court have followed anunusual, if not extraordinary course. The High Court proceededEto entertain petitions for quashing under s. 482 at the behest ofpersons who were not named in the FIR purely on the basis oftheir names appearing in the draft charge-sheet. A draft charge-sheet was placed before the High Court by the investigatingofficer only in order to seek its permission, pursuant to the interimForder, for submitting the charge-sheet to the competent court.Knowledge in regard to what has transpired during the course ofthe investigation is obtained by the accused once a copy of thechargesheet is made available under Section 207 of the CrPC.Evidently, the persons whose names were mentioned in the draft charge-sheet had already moved the High Court in proceedingsGunder Section 482 at a point of time anterior to the investigatingofficer submitting the charge-sheet to the High Court for seekingits permission to submit it before the competent court inaccordance with law. The draft charge-sheet records filing of thepetitions for quashing in the High Court which would indicateHthat even before the charge-sheet was brought to the notice of the High Court, petitions for quashing had already been filed.The High Court ought to have taken note of these development.The appellant has submitted both in the course of the oral andwritten submissions that these developments indicate that theaccused were complicit with the police. The High Court shouldhave been alive to the abuse of its process. [Para 24][34-A-E;35-A-B]

2.6. While the apprehension of arrest may have led to thefiling of an application for anticipatory bail before the SessionsJudge, this could not furnish the basis of a petition for quashingunder Section 482 at the behest of persons who were not namedin the FIR and who, as stated earlier, had instituted proceedingsfor quashing even before the draft charge-sheet came to besubmitted before the High Court. The judgment of the High Courtindicates that while analyzing the case set up before it by theapplicants in various quashing petitions, it has proceeded to quashthe FIR and draft charge-sheet in respect of applicants who werenot even arraigned as accused in the FIR. The interference bythe High Court in the investigation against the eighth and ninthrespondents was at a premature stage and was not warranted.[Para 25][35-C-E]

2.7. During the course of oral arguments, it was urged onbehalf of the respondents that a prior complaint had beenregistered against the appellant which had resulted into thesubmission of a charge-sheet. The respondents ought to havedrawn the attention of this Court to the fact that on July 8, 2021,the High Court in Criminal Misc. Application No 10523 of 2021had quashed the prior complaint as well as the charge-sheet andall consequential proceedings at the behest of the appellant, afact which emerged out of the written submissions filed on behalfof the appellant. Another submission which was urged on behalfof the respondents is that the appellant had arrived at acompromise in respect of some of the accused and the entireFIR was quashed. On this aspect, the appellant in the writtensubmissions has recorded that the memo of Criminal Misc.Application No 10529 of 2021 was filed by two persons (the fourthand fifth respondents) in respect of whom proceedings weredirected to be continued. In this backdrop that the order dated AB

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A9 July 2021 records that the entire FIR stands quashed. TheFIR against all the accused except the said two persons stoodquashed as a result of the impugned order dated 8 January, 2019.Hence, order dated 9 July 2021 only quashed the FIR againstthe remaining two accused with whom there was a subsequentcompromise. In this backdrop, the appellant stated that SLP (Crl)BNos 5734 and 5735 of 2019 are not being pressed. The respondentto the above SLPs are the legal heirs of the seller of the landfrom whom the appellant and his family members purchased theland and their spouses. The other accused are allegedly thepersons who had executed champertous agreements or aided inCtheir execution (eighth respondents) and who are alleged to havebeen party to the extortion of money from the appellant. Hence,the High Court transgressed the limitations on the exercise ofits jurisdiction under s. 482 of the CrPC in quashing the FIR andall consequential proceedings. There has been a clear abuse ofthe process before the High Court. Thus, the impugned judgmentDand order of the High Court are set aside. [Para 26, 27][35-F-H;36-A-E]

Case Law Reference

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal AppealNos. 1328-1333 of 2021.

FFrom the Judgment and Order dated 08.01.2019 of the High Courtof Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Crl.M.A. Nos.9885, 10534, 10612 and 10651of 2016 and S.Crl.A. Nos.10140 and 5859 of 2016.

Nikhil Goel, Jay M. Thakkar, Ms. Naveen Goel, Vinay Mathew,Advs. for the Appellant.G

Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, SomeshChandra Jha, Rahul Narang, Karan Bharihoke, Siddhant Sharma,Ms. Neha Sahai Bharihoke, Khilan Chandrani, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H

DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.

1. This batch of appeals arises from a judgment and order dated8 January 2019 of a Single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat. The HighCourt quashed an FIR[1 ]which was registered against the privaterespondents under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973[2],except for the allegations against the fourth and fifth respondentsunderSection 385 of the Indian Penal Code 1860[3], in respect ofwhich theinvestigation has been permitted to continue.

2. On 13 April 2016, an FIR[4 ]was registered against the privaterespondents under Sections 465, 467, 468 and 120B of the IPC by theGandhigram Police Station, Rajkot on a complaint made by the appellant.The contents of the FIR are elucidated below.

3. A property located in Village Veja at Rajkot is alleged to havebeen allotted to Shamjibhai Jesabhai Koli by the government on accountof his service in the Army. The appellant has alleged that he and hisbrother purchased the property for a consideration of Rs 7,75,000 andan agreement to sell was executed in their favour by Shamjibhai beforea notary. An irrevocable power of attorney was allegedly executed infavour of the appellant and his brother for clearing the title to the landand for obtaining the sanction of the government. The appellant allegedthat in 1999, he paid an amount of Rs 4,00,000 by a demand draft andRs 4,00,000 in cash to the vendor. Shamjibhai is alleged to have registereda sale deed on 19 May 1999 in favour of the appellant, his father and hisbrothers. Shamjibhai is alleged to have also executed a power of attorneyin favour of the appellant and his father-in-law on the same date. Thepower of attorney mentioned that Shamjibhai had accepted theconsideration for the land and had handed over possession to the appellantand his family. Shamjibhai is alleged to have executed another agreementmentioning that an amount of Rs 2,00,000 was due to be paid to him. On9 January 2006, the Government of Gujarat granted permission for thesale of the land and a premium of Rs 13,76,000 was allegedly paid by theappellant and his family. As the power of attorney holder, the appellant’sfather-in-law sold the land to Om Prakash Kotecha, Mukul Kotecha,Ketan Kotecha and his wife Deepaben and registered a sale deed in this 1 FIR No I-124 of 2016

2 “CrPC”

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1 FIR No I-124 of 2016

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3 “IPC”

4 FIR No I-124 of 2016

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Aregard. The appellant claims that he has been in possession of the propertysince 1999.

4. The appellant has alleged that the second and third respondents,who are daughters of Shamjibhai, instituted a suit[5 ]in 2011 for cancellationof the sale deed executed by Shamjibhai in favour of the appellant. TheBcivil court by its order dated 8 February 2013 granted an interim injunctionrestraining the appellant from alienating, transferring or assigning theproperty during the pendency of the suit.

5. It is alleged that the second and third respondents executed apower of attorney in favour of the seventh respondent in relation to theCproperty, for a consideration of Rs 5,51,000. A Memorandum ofUnderstanding[6] was also executed stipulating that the land is to be soldfor Rs 2 crores. The second and third respondents are alleged to haveexecuted another power of attorney and MoU with the sixth respondent,against a payment of Rs 5,00,000.

D6. On 20 March 2015, prior to the FIR which was registered atthe behest of the appellant, an FIR[7 ]was registered against the appellantand the members of his family on a complaint lodged by the secondrespondent for offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 420, 465,467, 471, 447, 34, 114 and 120B of the IPC at DCB Police Station,Rajkot alleging that the property had been obtained by the appellantEwithout payment of the entire consideration. The appellant has contendedthat the second respondent did not disclose that a payment of Rs 4,00,000was made by the appellant by a demand draft which was deposited inthe account of Shamjibhai.

7. The appellant has further alleged that the fourth respondentFwho is the spouse of the second respondent called him to the office ofan advocate to pressurize him to enter into a compromise. A sum ofmoney running into crores of rupees is alleged to have been demandedfrom the appellant, stating that the lands had been sold to land mafias.The fifth respondent, the spouse of the third respondent,is also alleged toGhave demanded money from the appellant to arrive at a compromise.The fourth and fifth respondents are alleged to have acted as witnessesto the powers of attorney and deeds executed by the second and thirdrespondents with third parties.

5 Civil Suit No 157 of 20116 "MoU”H7 FIR No I-11 of 2015

8. The appellant lodged a complaint with the Gandhigram PoliceStation against the respondents and a FIR[8] was registered on 13 April2016 for offences punishable under Sections 465, 467, 468 and 120B ofthe IPC. The second to seventh respondents filed petitions[9 ]before theHigh Court under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the FIR[10 ]registeredat the behest of the appellant against them.By an interim order dated2 May 2016, the High Court directed that the investigation may continuebut the charge-sheet be filed only with its permission.

9. The eighth and ninth respondents were not named in the FIR.Apprehending arrest, they sought and were granted anticipatory bail bythe Sessions Court, Rajkot. Thereafter, they also filed petitions[11 ]forquashing of the FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC.

10. A draft charge-sheet was placed before the High Court foroffences punishable under Sections 385, 389, 418, 477, 506 (2), 120Band 34 of the IPC. The draft charge-sheet also contains allegations againstthe eighth and ninth respondents. It is alleged that the eight respondentwho is an advocate, helped the other accused in drafting false documents– the powers of attorney and MoUs. The ninth respondent is alleged tohave entered into a settlement with the second respondent on 25 February2015 against a payment of Rs 41,51,000.

11. The petitions for quashing the FIR were allowed by the HighCourt by its impugned judgement dated 8 January 2019 save in respectof the investigation for offences punishableunder Section 385 of the IPCagainstthe fourth and fifth respondents. The conclusion of the High Courtis extracted below:

“10.4 The upshot of the foregoing analysis and observations isthat prima facie, it appears that the offence under section 385 ofattempt to commit extortion is said to have been established againstKaranbhai Gordhanbhai Solanki and Maganbhai Devabhai Vaghela(applicants of Criminal Misc. Application No. 10534/2016). Hence,the investigation shall proceed further for the offence under section385 against them. No offence as alleged in the FIR and draft 8 FIR No I-124 of 2016

9 Crl. M.A. No 9885 of 2016, Crl. M.A. No 10534 of 2016, Crl. M.A. 10612 of 2016and Crl. M.A. No 10651 of 2016

10 FIR No I-124 of 2016

11 S. Crl. A No. 10140 of 2016 and S. Crl. A. No. 5859 of 2016

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charge sheet is said to have been established against the rest ofthe accused. Necessary report shall be filed in this regard asexpeditiously as possible.”

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The High Court has held that an offence under Section 385 of theIPC is prima facie made out against the fourth and fifth respondentsBwho are alleged to have demanded money from the appellant to enterinto a compromise. The High Court observed thus:

“9. 1 In the present case, the contents of the FIR reveal that thedaughter of Shamjibhai namely Ritaben and Savitaben haveexecuted various powers of attorneys with other accused in orderto jeopardize the right and title of the land belonging to the firstinformant for the purpose of extorting money. It is also allegedthat before three months, the husband of Ritaben @ Ramabenhad called him at the office of one advocate Mr. B.B. Mehta, forcompromise, and informed him that he has already executed thetitle of land to land mafias and has taken the money from them,and if he wants to compromise, he will have to give crores ofrupees. After, one or two days, Kalubhai called him and told thatKaranbhai has informed him (Kalubhai) that the husband ofSavitaben, i.e Maganbhai has demanded money in order to enterinto compromise. It is also alleged that before one and half years,Karan had visited at his hotel Europine along with his broker friendPuneet Koli, and had demanded five crores from him, and alsotold, if does not do so, he will lodge a complaint against him and hewill have to go to jail. Both these persons Magan and Karan havesigned as witness in the power of attorney documents.

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FThe first informant has alleged that Karanbhai Gordhanbhai(Applicants Solanki and Maganbhai Devabhai Vaghela ofApplication No. 10534/2016) had contacted him and have saidthat the land has been transferred to land mafias and if he wantsto compromise he has to part with corers of rupees. The demandof money by way of compromise will satisfy the ingredients ofGsection 385. The foregoing analysis and observations, prima faciereveal that there is an attempt to extort money from the firstinformant by Karanbhai Gordhanbhai Solanki (Applicant no. 1 ofCri. Misc Application No. 10534/2016) husband of Ritaben @Ramaben and Maganbhai Devabhai Vaghela (Applicant No. 2 of H

Cri. Misc. Application No. 10534/2016), who is the husband ofSavitaben.”

In respect of the allegations against the second and thirdrespondents, the High Court observed that the allegation that they hadexecuted powers of attorney and settlement deeds in favour of thirdparties would not constitute offences of forgery, extortion or cheating.The relevant extract of the judgement is reproduced below:

“9.2 It is not in dispute that Ritaben and Savitaben have executedvarious powers of attorney in favour of other accused. Ritabenhas also lodged FIR against the first informant on 20.03.2015.The power of attorney reveals that the same are executed to fileappropriate proceedings on their behalf in the Special Civil SuitNo. 157/11 and further to carry out legal proceedings pertainingto the suit land. One of the power of attorney dated 20.11.2012reveals that Ritaben and Savitaben are paid Rs. 5,00,000/- (RupeesFive Lacs Only) towards the cost of proceedings and further itstated that if the proceedings result in their favour, then the powerof attorney holders will have 50% share in the property. Thus,merely because the applicant Ritaben and Savitaben, daughtersof Shamjibhai have executed power of attorney and settlementdeeds with other accused, such an act will not satisfy therequirement of offence of forgery, extortion or cheating. Thevalidity of such documents can always be examined in civilproceedings.”

The High Court held that the allegations against the sixth to ninthrespondents do not constitute the offences alleged in the FIR. The HighCourt observed thus:

“10. As far as Criminal Misc. Application No 10612 of 2016 isconcerned, the applicant-accused-Ashwin Parshottambhai Lila isthe power of attorney holder of Ritaben. It is alleged that he andRitaben have also entered in to settlement deed on 07.06.2011 bywhich they have agreed to sell the land for Rupees Two Croresand an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lacs Only) is alsopaid to Ritaben.

10.1 In Criminal Misc. Application No. 10651 of 2016, applicant-accused-Kiran Parshottam Hapaliya, another power of attorneyis executed by Ritaben and Savitaben in his name and a settlement ABC

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Adeed is executed on 20.11.2012 in which it is mentioned that theyhave received an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs) bycheque and Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lacs) by cash fromone Ashwin and Ramesh Nishit. Further it is recorded in thesettlement deed that if any share of the property is effected thenthey will part with 50% of the same and if any compromise isBarrived then they will be paid 50% of the amount. Thus, in boththe aforesaid cases no offence as alleged in the FIR or the draftcharge sheet is made out against the two applicants.

10.2 In Cri. Misc. Application No. 5859/2016, the name ofapplicant-accused Jatin Hasmukh Pipaliya does not figure in theCFIR. Subsequently in the draft charge sheet he has been arraignedas an accused. It is stated that he had entered in the settlementdeed dated 25.2.2015 with Ritaben for which he had paidRs 41, 51,000/- by cheque and cash.

10.3 In Criminal Misc. Application No. 10140/16, the applicant-Daccused Babubhai Nanjibhai Bhokhodiya’s name does not figurein the charge sheet. The role attributed to him in the draft chargesheet is that have helped the other accused in making the documentsrelating to power of attorney and settlement deed. Thus, even ifthe allegations are accepted then alsono offence under sectionE385, 389, 418, 423, 477, 506(2), 120-B and section 34 areestablished against both the applicants.”

The second, third, fourth and fifth respondentsand the appellanthave apparently settled the dispute. The High Court by its order dated9 July 2021 quashed the FIR and the charge-sheet, including allFconsequential proceedings against the fourth and fifth respondents sincethe parties had settled the dispute. On account of the compromise, theappellant is not pressing the special leave petitions[12 ]against the secondto fifth respondents, who are the legal heirs of Shamjibhaiand theirspouses.

G12. On behalf of the appellant, it has been urged by Mr NikhilGoel learned counsel that:

(i) An argument of prejudice was sought to be urged against theappellant by highlighting that the earlier FIR against theappellant (which stands quashed as of date) was registered H12 SLP (Crl) No 5734 and 5735 of 2019

JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.ETC. [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

before the DCB police station and therefore, the appellantwas sent to the Gandhigram police station to register the FIR.However, as a matter of fact, it is the DCB police stationwhich has investigated the offence against the respondents; A

(ii) The investigation conducted by the DCB police station hasrevealed that:

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(a) there existed a pre-planned criminal conspiracy amongthe accused to create a dispute in relation to the title ofland by executing false MoUs; (b)the land was transferred to the appellant and his familyCmembers by Shamjibhai in 1999 through a registeredagreement to sell and a power of attorney was alsoexecuted in favour of the appellant’s father-in-law;

(c) a possession receipt was issued;

(d) a consideration of Rs 8,00,000 was received byShamjibhai; D

(e) permission for the sale of land was obtained from thegovernment in 2006 by which time Shamjibhai had passedaway; and (f)the power of attorney holder had then executed foursale deeds on the strength of the power of attorney afterthe death of Shamjibhai; E

(iii) The second respondentregistered an FIR before the DCBpolice station after a lapse of nine years. The FIR and theensuing charge-sheet have been quashed by the High CourtFon 8 July 2021 in a separate proceeding;

(iv) Certain accused, who had not been named in the FIR, hadfiled quashing petitions based on the apprehension that theymay be named in the charge-sheet. An apprehension of arrestmay give rise to an application for anticipatory bail but not toGa quashing petition at the behest of a person not named in theFIR. The fact that these accused knew that they will benamed in the draft charge-sheet gives rise to the inferencethat the accused were in collusion with the police. The HighCourt should have taken serious note of the maintainability of H

22SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 11 S.C.R.

Asuch petitions and questioned the accused on the source oftheir knowledge that they will be arraigned as accused in thedraft charge-sheet;

(v) The findings of the High Court are based on the contents ofthe FIR and do not take into consideration the final report ofBthe investigation under Section 173 of the CrPC that wasplaced before it; and

(vi) The legal heirs of Shamjibhai and their spouses were notpressured to enter into a compromise with the appellant.

13. On the other hand, Mr Karan Bharihoke and Mr KhilanChandrani appearing for the sixth to ninth respondents submitted that:

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(i) The FIR only contains allegations against the sixth andseventh respondents and the eighth and ninth respondentshave not been named in the FIR;

D(ii)At the highest, the sixth to ninth respondents can be said tohave financed the litigation as noted by the High Court inits impugned judgement;

(iii) There is no allegation of extortion against the answeringrespondents; E(iv)The powers of attorney and MoUs were executed beforea notary. Thus, on the face of it, these documents cannotbe termed as false or forged;

(v) The eighth respondent has been roped in only on accountof having drafted the documents, which shows the frivolousFnature of theallegations;

(vi) The earlier FIR against the appellant gave rise to a charge-sheet which mentioned that the powers of attorney and saledeeds were forged and on the basis of such forgeddocuments, the appellant had obtained the permission toGconvert the land from new tenure to old tenure, inconnivance with revenue officers;

(vii) The request for permission to file the charge-sheet dated 9August 2017 by DCB police station merely reiterates theallegations in the FIR. Further, this document was neverHplaced on record and is an attempt by the appellant, in collusion with the police inspector, to create a documentfavouring the appellant; A

(viii) The FIR was registered with the Gandhigram police stationand DCB police had no role to play in the investigation.Thus, the request for permission to file the charge-sheet bythe DCB police station shows the influence of the appellantBand the malafide nature of the investigation conducted byDCB police station;

(ix) The draft charge-sheet was considered by the High Courtin its impugned judgement, which is evident from thediscussion of the offence of extortion, which bears noreference in the FIR. Further, the High Court has referredto statements and documents that were part of the draftcharge-sheet; C

(x) The respondents who were not named in the FIR wereharassed by the police duringthe investigation. They hadpreferred an application for anticipatory bail before theSessions Court, Rajkot, which was allowed. Thereafter, theyfiled the quashing petitions before the High Court; D

(xi) The civil court had allowed the application for interlocutoryinjunction filed by the second and third respondents. Thisorder was challenged by the appellant before the SessionsCourt,[13 ]under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of CivilProcedure 1908 but this was rejected on 22 November 2016.The appellant has moved the High Court[14] in appeal, beforewhich proceedings are pending; E

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(xii) The appellant has misled the Court by claiming thatShamjibhai had registered a sale deed in his favour in 1999.The document is not registered. The power of attorney andsale deeds are forged documents and were a subject matterof a prior FIR; G

(xiii) The dispute between the parties is essentially of a civil naturewhich has been given a criminal colour; 13 Civil Appeal No 32 of 2013

14 SCA No 5558 of 2017

A(xiv) The appellant has entered into a settlement with the fourthand fifth respondents, who were the only persons accusedof extortion. An attempt is being made to pressurize thesixth to ninth respondentsto enter into a compromise withthe help of the police machinery; B(xv)The FIR was registered after a lapse of 3 years and 6months; and

(xvi) There are no allegations against the answering respondentswhich constitute an offence.

14. The rival contentions will now be considered.C

15. Insofar as the sixth to ninth respondents are concerned, theirposition before this Court in SLP (Crl) Nos 5736-5739 of 2019 is asfollows:

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While the sixth and seventh respondents were named in the FIR,the eighth and ninth respondents were arraigned as accused in the draftcharge-sheet. The allegations against the sixth to ninth respondents areFthat as a part of a criminal conspiracy, they colluded to execute falsepowers of attorney and MoUs to jeopardize the right and title to the landbelonging to the appellant and were party to the extortion of money fromhim. It is alleged that sixth, seventh and ninth respondents executedchampertous agreements with the legal heirs of Shamjibhai to financethe civil litigation pertaining to the title of the land. The eighth respondent,Gwho is an advocate, is alleged to have helped the other accused in draftingthe powers of attorney and MoUs.

16. Before we examine whether the High Court transgressed thelimitations on the exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,it will be useful to give an overview of how the proceedings have evolved.

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17. An FIR[15] was registered at the behest of the appellant on13 April 2016 for offences punishable under Sections 465, 467, 468 and120B of the IPC. Eight persons were named as accused:

“(1) Ritaben alias Ramaben

(2) Karanbhai Gordhanbhai Solanki,

(3) Savitaben

(4) Maganbhai Devabhai Vaghela

(5) Jayaben

(6) Kiran Parshottambhai Hathaliya,

(7) Ashwin Parshottambhai Leela (Patel)

(8) Jaimingiri Magangiri Goswami”

18. Upon the registration of the FIR, petitions under Section 482of the CrPC were instituted before the Gujarat High Court. By an orderdated 2 May 2016, a Single Judge permitted the investigation to continuebut directed that no final report (under Section 173 of the CrPC) shall besubmitted without the permission of the High Court. The interim orderof the High Court records that it is based on two considerations:

(i) An earlier complaint had been lodged by the second respondentagainst the appellant. In those proceedings, a charge-sheethad been submitted against the appellant and others; and

(ii) A suit had been instituted before the Senior Civil Judge,Rajkot[16] in which an interlocutory order of injunction waspassed on 8 February 2013 protecting the second respondent.It was in this backdrop that the following interim order waspassed by the High Court during the pendency of the petitionsfor quashing the FIR :

“6. The investigation in this case shall CONTINUE. The I.O.shall bear in mind, while investigating this matter, the lodgment ofthe earlier complaint by the present petitioners, wherein, charge-sheet has been filed against present Respondent No.2 and othersand the details of the pending civil suit. Without the PERMISSIONof this Court, no final report shall be submitted. The right of 15 FIR No I-124 of 2016

16 Regular Civil Suit No 157 of 2011

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ARespondent No.2 to file reply is kept open. Direct service ispermitted.”

19. The FIR lodged by the appellant was investigated, upon whichan application was moved on 9 August 2017 by the Police Inspector,DCB Police Station, Rajkot city to the Registrar General of the HighBCourt seeking permission to file a charge-sheet. In the course of theproceedings before the High Court, submissions were advanced by theAPP, alluding to the contents of the FIR and the charge-sheet. Thecharge-sheet has been described as a “draft charge-sheet” since in viewof the interim order of the High Court, there was a restraint on thesubmission of the charge-sheet before the competent court without theCpermission of the High Court. At this stage, it becomes necessary toadvert to the submissions which were urged before the High Court bythe APP, setting out the material which had emerged during the courseof the investigation, following the registration of the FIR. The submissionshave been summarized in the judgment of the High Court and read thus:

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“6.2 Learned APP… on instructions of the Investigating officerhas submitted that so far the offences of forgery are concerned,the same are not made out against the present applicants. However,he has submitted that further investigation reveals that the offencesof extortion and cheating are prima facie established against them.EHe has placed reliance on the statement of various witnesses inthis regard.

6.3 Learned APP … has placed reliance on the various statementsof the witnesses recorded by the Investigating Officer. He hasplaced reliance on the statement of Jitulbhai Jentilal Kotecha andFLalbhai Koraiya recorded by the Investigating Officer on18.07.2016. He has stated that prior eight months from today, hehas called his advocate friend Harshadbhai on mobile phone, atthat time, his friend Harshadbhai informed him that advocateBabubhai is with him and he wanted to talk him about the disputedland, and thereafter, he talked to said advocate. The advocateGinformed him that in order to compromise, a huge money has tobe paid to Karanbhai, Maganbhai etc, and when he asked aboutthe amount, advocate Babubhai informed him that they aredemanding Rs.5,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Crores Only) in orderto enter into compromise otherwise he will enter into settlementHagreement with head strong persons.

JITUL JENTILAL KOTECHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.ETC. [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

6.4 Learned APP has also placed reliance on the statement ofMr.Jenish Premjibhai Motivaras recorded by the InvestigatingOfficer on 20. 05. 2016 in which he has stated that he wascontacted by one Shri Kapilbhai Kotecha, who had taken him toone shop, wherein one person was sitting and was talking aboutthe dealing to be done in some land, and thereafter, he informedhim that, if he would like to invest in the said land, he can sign onthe documents brought by him. The said persons informed himthat the land belongs to two ladies and accordingly, he has preparedthe compromise in his name on the stamp paper of Rs.100/-. It issubmitted by Mr.Jenish Premji that thereafter, he signed the saiddocuments pertaining to the compromise and accordingly, the saidperson had asked him to pay Rs.25,000/- and furtherRs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lacs Only) to be paid within a periodof three months. It is further stated by Mr. Jenish Premji that hedid not take any receipt from that unknown persons about theamount and only received business card in which his name andaddress was given. It is lastly submitted by him that that unknownperson had committed fraud of Rs.25,000/- (Rs.Twenty FiveThousand Only), however, he has not lodged any police complaintin that regard.

6.5 Learned APP has also placed reliance on the statement dated21.05.2016 taken by the Investigating Officer of one PrakashKishorbhai Jariya, who has stated that he had given Rs.90,000/-(Rupees Ninety thousand Only) to one AshwinbhaiParshottambhai Lila on 12.04.2016, but he did not take any receiptto that effect. It is submitted by him he read in the news-paperabout the incident. When he tried to contact Ashwinbhai, his mobilephone was switch off, and thereafter, he contacted Jetul Kotechaand went with him at DCB Police Station for giving statements. Itis submitted by him that Ashwinbhai had given him one compromiseon the stamp paper of Rs.100/- as well as copy of power ofattorney.

6.6 Learned APP has also relied upon one statement ofNarendrabhai Chaganbhai Nasit recorded by the InvestigatingOfficer on 21.05.2016 in which he has stated that he wasapproached by one Mr.Ashwinbhai to invest in the said land andalso demanded Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs and Fifty A

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AThousand Only) for investment and accordingly, he had paid chequeof Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lac Only) on 18.11.2012 whichwas in the name of his brother Ramesh Chagan Nasit, andthereafter, he paid cash of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lac FiftyThousand only), and thereafter, he was called on 20.11.2012 atRajkot Court to execute a compromise deed where Geetaben andBSavitaben were present with their husbands. It is stated by himthat Ashwinbhai thereafter was talking to the said farmers thatJitulbhai Kotecha is a Businessman and if we forced him, he wouldpay Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lacs Only) or Rs.1,00,00,000/-(Rupees One Crore Only), at that time, he told Ashwinbhai thatChe would not like to do such, and thereafter, went from there withhis younger brother. He has submitted that he has not signedanywhere on the compromise deed and had put a cross on thename of his younger brother and the said compromise was writtenby the Ashwinbhai after one and half months. He has furthersubmitted that he had not filed any police complaint in relation toDRs 2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs and Fifty Thousand) taken byAshwinbhai.

6.7 Learned APP has further placed reliance on the statement ofone Punit S/o. Narsibhai Udesa recorded by the InvestigatingOfficer on 09.06.2016 and he has specifically stated there was aEdispute going on between Karanbhai Solanki and Jetulbhai andone half prior, his uncle Karanbhai met Jitulbhai Kotecha atEuropine Hotel for entering into compromise, at that time, Jetulbhaihad made an offer of Rs.2,50,000/ (Rupees Two Lacs and FiftyThousand) for compromise and on hearing that, his uncle KaranFSolanki left the hotel. It is further stated that when he met hisuncle Karanbhai outside the hotel, at that time, his uncle informedthat he would not accept Rs.2,50,000/ (Rupees Two Lacs FiftyThousand) for compromise with Jitulbhai.

6.8 In view of the aforesaid statement, learned APP has submittedGthat prima facie, case of extortion is made out against the presentapplicants and hence, FIR may not be quashed at this stage.”

The above extract from the judgment of the High Court wouldmake it abundantly clear that the Single Judge was duly apprised of thestatements which were recorded by the Investigating Officer during theHcourse of the investigation on 20 May 2016, 21 May 2016 and 9 June

2016. When the High Court took up the petitions under Section 482, theInvestigating Officer upon the completion of the investigation, soughtpermission to submit the final report under Section 173 before thecompetent court. This was noted by the High Court in paragraph 9 of itsimpugned order which reads as follows:

“9.0 The impugned FI.R being C.R. I-124 of 2016 is registeredfor the offences under section 465, 467, 468, 120B and 34 of theIPC against the present writ applicants. During the pendency ofthe writ applications a draft charge sheet is produced in whichoffences are altered to section 385, 389, 418, 423, 477, 506(2),120B, 34 of IPC. Thus, this court has to examine whether thecontents of the F.I.R reveal the offence of extortion and cheatingagainst the present applicants.”

In the above extract, the High Court noted that a “draft charge-sheet” was produced before it. The High Court nonetheless proceededto formulate the issue before it as being whether the contents of the FIRrevealed that offences of extortion and cheating had been committed bythe respondents. But in its final order, the High Court quashed FIR I-124of 2016 as well as “other consequential proceedings arising out of thesame FIR” in relation to the accused under Section 482. However, theHigh Court concluded that an alleged offence of extortion punishableunder Section 385 of the IPC had been made out on the face of the FIRagainst accused Karanbhai and Maganbhai (the fourth and fifthrespondents) and the investigation was permitted to proceed against themfor the offence of extortion. No offence as alleged in the FIR and draftcharge-sheet was held to have been established against the other accused.

20. It is trite law that the High Court must exercise its inherentpowers under Section 482 sparingly and with circumspection. In thedecision in Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi,[17 ]this Court hasheld that, “[t]he inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdictionon the High Court to act according to whim or caprice.” In Simrikhia v.Dolley Mukherjee,[18] this Court in another context, while holding thatthe High Court cannot exercise its inherent powers to review its earlierdecision in view of Section 362 of the CrPC,observed that the inherentpowers of the High Court cannot be invoked to sidestep statutoryprovisions. This Court held:

17 (2009) 14 SCC 683

18 (1990) 2 SCC 437

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A“5. …Section 482 enables the High Court to make such order asmay be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code orto prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to securethe ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, as much arecontrolled by principle and precedent as are its express powersby statute. If a matter is covered by an express letter of law,Bthe court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisionsand instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherentjurisdiction.”

(emphasis added)

CThe police have a statutory right to investigate a cognizable offenceunder Sections 154 and 156 of the CrPC. Sub-Section 2 (i) of Section173 of the CrPC provides that after the completion of investigation, thepolice officer in charge of the police station shall forward the final reportto the Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance of the offencealleged in the report. Before taking cognizance of the offence, theDMagistrate has to apply their own mind and is not bound by the conclusionsdrawn by the police. In Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi[19 ]a two-judgeBench of this Court has held that the High Court can neither direct aninvestigating agency to submit the investigation report before it nor canit quash a criminal proceeding under Section 482 relying on such a reportEwhen the report has not been submitted to the Magistrate. Justice TarunChatterjee held thus:

“18. In our view, the High Court has acted in excess of itsjurisdiction by relying on the investigation report and the HighCourt was also wrong in directing the report to be submitted beforeFit. It is now well settled that it is for the investigating agency tosubmit the report to the Magistrate…….

From a bare reading of this provision [Section 173 (2) (i)], it cannotbe disputed that after completion of the investigation, the officerGin charge of the police station shall forward the report not to theHigh Court where the proceedings under Section 482 of the Codeis pending but to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance ofthe offence on such police report. Therefore, the High Court had acted beyond its power to direct the investigating agency to filethe said report before it in the exercise of power under Section482 of the Code.

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21. Therefore, in view of our discussions made hereinabove, whileexercising power under Section 482 of the Code, it is not open tothe High Court to rely on the report of the investigating agencynor can it direct the report to be submitted before it as the law isvery clear that the report of the investigating agency may beaccepted by the Magistrate or the Magistrate may reject the sameon consideration of the material on record. Such being the position,the report of the investigating agency cannot be relied on by theHigh Court while exercising powers under Section 482 of theCode. Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court haserred in quashing the FIR on consideration of the investigationreport submitted before it even before the same could be submittedbefore the Magistrate.”

In its interim order dated 2 May 2016, the High Court allowed theinvestigation to continue against the accused but directed that the finalreport cannot be submitted to the Magistrate without its permission. Thedirection was not supported by any reasoning whatsoever.Even at theinterim stage, the High Court must demonstrate an application of mindand furnish reasons for issuing any interlocutory direction, which is capableof being tested before this Court in an appropriate case. The interimdirection amounted to an unnecessary interference in the investigativeprocess envisaged under the CrPC. The High Court transgressed thescope of the powers conferred upon it by restricting the police fromsubmitting the charge-sheet before the Magistrate and by further perusingthe contents of the “draft charge-sheet” in the proceedings before it.

21. We would like to clarify that a distinct position arises whenthe charge-sheet has been filed before a Magistrate and proceedingsunder Section 482 are pending before the High Court. In such cases, theHigh Court must take into consideration the material collected duringthe investigation, as has been held by a two-judge Bench of this Court inKaptan Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh[20], of which one of us(Justice DY Chandrachud) was a part. However, the High Court cannot A

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Aplace reliance on a “draft charge-sheet” which is yet to be placed beforethe Magistrate to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482.

22. Recently, in Mahendra KC v. State of Karnataka[21] thisCourt has reiterated the well settled test to be applied by the High Courtfor exercise of its powers under Section 482 for quashing an FIR:B

“16…the test to be applied is whether the allegations in thecomplaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from thecomplaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offencealleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity ofthe allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the mannerCthat a judge conducting a trial would, on the basis of the evidencecollected during the course of trial.”

23. In the present case, the FIR clearly mentions the role playedby the sixth and seventh respondentsin the following extract:

“…in spite of the possession of the aforesaid land being with usDsince year 1999, the daughters of Shamjibhai Jashabhai Koli i.e.Ramaben Koli, Savitaben Koli and Jayaben Koli all three of themhad executed a power of attorney on 07/06/2011 in favour of oneKaranbhai Parshotambhai Hathaliya on the stamp paper ofRs.100/- bearing No. 20942, wherein they have stated that asEthey are the owners of the said land by way of their right theyhave all kind of authority to do all kinds of work pertaining to thesaid land besides, these people had also executed one Memorandumof Understanding in favour of Kiranbhai Hathaliya, wherein itwas decided to sell this land for an amount of Rs.2 Crores besides,towards the same an amount of Rs. 5, 51, 000/- (Rupees FiveFLakhs and Fifty one Thousand Only) was paid in cash to theParty No.1 such facts were stated.

Besides, Savitaben and Ritaben had executed one another powerof attorney and Memorandum of Understanding in favour ofAshwinbhai Parshottambhai Patel and in that MemorandumGof Understanding also it was stated that an amount ofRs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Only) was paid by AshwinbhaiPatel through cheque to the executed, they have further statedthat, if they are given shares in the aforesaid property then they will get 50% of the property in their share besides, it was alsostated in the said deed that if the compromise is settled by way ofgiving cash then the said amount also fifty percent of the amountwill be in their share etc

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Thus, in this way I have purchased the above mentioned landfrom Shamjibhai Jashabhai Koli and the heirs of Shamjibhai Kolii.e. Ritaben alias Ramaben wife of Karanbhai Solanki and herhusband Karanbhai Gordhanbhai Solanki, both residing atGhanshyamnagar Kothariya road and Savitaben wife of MaganbhaiVaghela and her husband Maganbhai Devabhai Vaghela, bothresiding at HUDCO quarters, Near Janta Fatak, Jamnagar andother Kiran Parshottambhai Hathaliya, residing at 7, PatelColony, Chandreshnagar Main Road, Rajkot and AshwinbhaiParshottambhai Leela (Patel) Residing at Mota Mava TalukaDistrict Rajkot and Jaimingiri Magangiri Goswami residing atA/ 5, Samrajya Apartment, New Collegewadi, Kalavad Road,Rajkot have by hatching illegal conspiracy as a part thereofin order to grab the above stated land of my ownership bymaking the same as disputed and sub-judice before thecourt intends to obtain huge amount of money or to obtainthe said land for their economic benefit for which legallythey do not have any right by implanting false, fabricatedand forged documents and hence, this is my legal complaintagainst them as well as against those who emerges out ofthe investigation.”

(emphasis added)

The allegations in the FIR prima facie indicate that the sixth andseventh respondents entered into champertous agreements with the legalheirs of Shamjibhai and were alleged to be involved in the extortion ofmoney from the appellant. In the impugned judgment, the High Courthas held that the allegations on their face disclose that the fourth andfifth respondents committed the offence of extortion under Section 385of the IPC and directed that the investigation be continued against them.However, the High Court completely failed to examine the allegation ofcriminal conspiracy qua the other accused where it has been allegedthat they were also privy to such extortion. Thus, in such circumstances, A

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Awhen a specific role was attributed to the accused, the High Court couldnot have quashed the FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC.

24. During the course of its impugned judgment, the High Courtnoted that certain persons (the eighth and ninth respondents) who werenamed as accused in the draft charge-sheet had instituted quashingBpetitions, evidently before the draft charge-sheet was placed before theHigh Court. In this backdrop, there is substance in the submission whichhas been urged on behalf of the appellant that the proceedings beforethe High Court have followed an unusual, if not extra-ordinary course.The High Court proceeded to entertain petitions for quashing underSection 482 at the behest of persons who were not named in the FIRCpurely on the basis of their names appearing in the draft charge-sheet. Adraft charge-sheet was placed before the High Court by the investigatingofficer only in order to seek its permission, pursuant to the interim order,for submitting the charge-sheet to the competent court. Knowledge inregard to what has transpired during the course of the investigation isDobtained by the accused once a copy of the charge-sheet is made availableunder Section 207 of the CrPC[22]. Evidently, the persons whose nameswere mentioned in the draft charge-sheet had already moved the HighCourt in proceedings under Section 482 at a point of time anterior to theinvestigating officer submitting the charge-sheet to the High Court forseeking its permission to submit it before the competent court inEaccordance with law. As a matter of fact, the draft charge-sheet records 22 ‘‘207. Supply to the accused of copy of police report and other documents. In anycase where the proceeding has been instituted on a police report, the Magistrate shallwithout delay furnish to the accused, free of cost, a copy of each of the following:-

(i) the police report;

(ii) the first information report recorded under section 154;F(iii) the statements recorded under sub- section (3) of section 161 of all persons whomthe prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses, excluding therefrom any part inregard to which a request for such exclusion has been made by the police officer undersub- section (6) of section 173;

(iv) the confessions and statements, if any, recorded under section 164;

(v) any other document or relevant extract thereof forwarded to the Magistrate withthe police report under sub- section (5) of section 173: Provided that the MagistrateGmay, after perusing any such part of a statement as is referred to in clause (iii) andconsidering the reasons given by the police officer for the request, direct that a copy ofthat part of the statement or of such portion thereof as the Magistrate thinks proper,shall be furnished to the accused: Provided further that if the Magistrate is satisfiedthat any document referred to in clause (v) is voluminous, he shall, instead of furnishingthe accused with a copy thereof, direct that he will only be allowed to inspect it eitherHpersonally or through pleader in Court.”

the filing of the petitions for quashing in the High Court which wouldindicate that even before the charge-sheet was brought to the notice ofthe High Court, petitions for quashing had already been filed. The HighCourt ought to have taken note of these developments. The appellanthas submitted both in the course of the oral and written submissions thatthese developments indicate that the accused were complicit with thepolice. The High Court should have been alive to the abuse of its process.

25. On behalf of the respondents, it has been submitted that duringthe course of the investigation, the sixth to ninth respondents, who wereapprehending arrest, moved an application for anticipatory bail, whichwas allowed by the Sessions Judge, Rajkot. Hence, it has been urgedthat it was thereafter that the petitions for quashing came to be instituted.While the apprehension of arrest may have led to the filing of anapplication for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Judge, this could notfurnish the basis of a petition for quashing under Section 482 at thebehest of persons who were not named in the FIR and who, as statedearlier, had instituted proceedings for quashing even before the draftcharge-sheet came to be submitted before the High Court. The judgmentof the High Court indicates that while analyzing the case set up before itby the applicants in various quashing petitions, it has proceeded to quashthe FIR and the draft charge-sheet in respect of applicants who werenot even arraigned as accused in the FIR. The interference by the HighCourt in the investigation against the eighth and ninth respondents wasat a premature stage and was not warranted.

26. During the course of oral arguments, it was urged on behalfof the respondents by learned counsel that a prior complaint had beenregistered against the appellant which had resulted into the submissionof a charge-sheet. The respondents ought to have drawn the attentionof this Court to the fact that on 8 July 2021, the High Court in CriminalMisc. Application No 10523 of 2021 had quashed the prior complaint aswell as the charge-sheet and all consequential proceedings at the behestof the appellant, a fact which emerged out of the written submissionsfiled on behalf of the appellant. Another submission which was urged onbehalf of the respondents is that the appellant had arrived at a compromisein respect of some of the accused and the entire FIR was quashed. Onthis aspect, the appellant in the written submissions has recorded thatthe memo of Criminal Misc. Application No 10529 of 2021 was filed bytwo persons (the fourth and fifth respondents) in respect of whom C

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Aproceedings were directed to be continued. It is in this backdrop that theorder dated 9 July 2021 records that the entire FIR stands quashed. TheFIR against all the accused except the aforesaid two persons stoodquashed as a result of the impugned order of the High Court dated 8January 2019. Hence, the order dated 9 July 2021 only quashed the FIRagainst the remaining two accused with whom there was a subsequentBcompromise. The compromise has been annexed as Annexure R-1 tothe counter affidavit filed by the sixth respondent. In this backdrop, theappellant stated that SLP (Crl) Nos 5734 and 5735 of 2019 are not beingpressed. The respondents to the above SLPs are the legal heirs of theseller of the land from whom the appellant and his family membersCpurchased the land and their spouses. The other accused are allegedlythe persons who had executed champertous agreements or aided in theirexecution (eighth respondent) and who are alleged to have been party tothe extortion of money from the appellant.

27. For the above reasons we have come to the conclusion thatDthe High Court transgressed the limitations on the exercise of itsjurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC in quashing the FIR and allconsequential proceedings. There has been a clear abuse of the processbefore the High Court. We accordingly set aside the impugned judgmentand order of the High Court dated 8 January 2019 and allow the CriminalAppeals arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos 5736-39 of 2019 in terms of theEabove judgment. However, Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP (Crl)Nos 5734 and 5735 of 2019 shall stand dismissed.

28. Pending application(s), if any stand disposed of.

FNidhi Jain

Appeals disposed of.

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