THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITTEE BANGALORE versus THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS on 22 March 2022

1. As common question of law and facts arise in this group ofappeals and as such are between the same parties, all these appeals aredecided and disposed of together by this common judgment and order.B

2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order in respective writ appeals preferred by the appellant herein –the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee, Bangalore (hereinafterreferred to as the “APMC”), by which the Division Bench of the HighCourt has dismissed the said writ appeals and confirmed the commonCjudgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge passed inrespective writ petitions preferred by the private respondents herein –original land owners and declared that the acquisitions of the lands inquestion has lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensationand Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and ResettlementDAct, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 2013”), the APMC,Bangalore has preferred the present appeals.

3. The facts leading to the present appeals in a nutshell are asunder: - 3.1 That the lands in question were acquired in three parts. TheEfirst acquisition was in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas of land owned byrespondent No.4 – Jamanlal Bajaj Seva Trust (for short “Trust”). Secondacquisition was in respect of 104 acres 5 guntas of land owned by veryrespondent No.4 – Trust and the third acquisition was in respect of 3acres 34 guntas of land (which is not the subject matter of appeals beforeFthis Court).

3.2 The relevant facts in respect of first and second acquisitionsare as under: - In respect of 172 acres 22 guntas (First Acquisition)G3.2.1 That a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the G3.2.1 That a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of theLand Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1894”)on 03.09.1994 in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas of land owned byrespondent No.4 herein – Trust in Srigandadakaval Village,Yeshwanthpura Hobli, Bengaluru for establishing a mega market by theappellant – APMC, Bangalore.H

3.2.2 One Rajajinagar House Building Co-operative Societychallenged the notification issued under Section 4(1), before the HighCourt of Karnataka by way of Writ Petition No.28988/1994. It was thecase on behalf of the said society that the land should be acquired forthem and not for APMC. The said writ petition came to be dismissed bythe High Court vide order dated 23.12.1995.

3.3.3 Thereafter a notification/declaration under Section 6 of theAct, 1894 was issued on 10.10.1996 and published on 13.10.1996. Adraft award was prepared in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas of land on12.08.1998.

3.3.4 On the instructions given by the Land Acquisition Officer,the appellant – APMC deposited Rs.9,14,14,873/- on 19.08.1998 towardsapproximate cost of the acquisition.

3.3.5 It appears that the aforesaid Rajajinagar House BuildingCo-operative Society filed another writ petition being W.P. No.6880/1997 before the High Court, before the acquisition of 172.50 acres ofland at Srigandadakaval Village could be completed. The High Courtgranted an ex-parte order of stay of acquisition proceedings vide interimorder dated 16.09.1998. Thereafter respondent no.4 – original land ownerfiled Writ Petition No.3884/1998 before the High Court, challenging theacquisition proceedings. Vide interim order dated 08.02.1999, the HighCourt ordered stay of dispossession.

In respect of 104 acres 5 guntas (Second Acquisition)

3.4 That a notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4)of the Act, 1894, dispensing with the requirement of hearing was issuedon 13.04.1999 in respect of 104 acres 5 guntas of land owned byrespondent No.4 – Trust in Herohalli Village, Yeshwanthpura Hobli,Bangalore North Taluk, for establishing a mega market by the appellant– APMC. A final notification under Section 6(1) read with Section 17(1)to 17(4) was issued in respect of 100 acres 11 guntas out of 104 acres 5guntas which had been notified under Section 4(1) on 13.04.1999, leavingan area of 3 acres 34 guntas out of acquisition. An enquiry under Section5A was dispensed with.

3.4.1 That one Vishwaneedam Trust filed Writ Petition No.708/2000 before the High Court challenging the said acquisition. The HighCourt granted stay of dispossession in respect of 35 acres out of the 100acres 5 guntas situated in Herohalli Village.

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3.4.2 Respondent No.4 – Trust – original land owner filed WritPetition No.37140/2000 challenging the notifications dated 13.04.1999and 26.10.1999 in respect of the lands at Herohalli Village.

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3.4.3 According to the appellant, possession was taken and handedover to the APMC by the Land Acquisition Officer vide an OfficialBMemorandum of Possession dated 06.10.2000 in respect of 65 acres 19guntas of the lands at Herohalli Village.

3.4.4 That an award was made by the State Land AcquisitionOfficer (SLAO) on 22.05.2002, referring to a Government order dated26.03.2002, in respect of 100 acres 11 guntas covered by Section 6Cnotification dated 26.10.1999. The award provided for payment ofcompensation to respondent No.4 – Trust after excluding 34 acres 14guntas of acquired land treating the same as Phut Kharab belonging tothe Government and further excluding 35 acres in respect of the writpetition filed Vishwaneedam trust in which an order of stay ofdispossession had been passed by the High Court. The said compensationDwas accepted by respondent No.4 under protest. Respondent No.4 –Trust – original land owner filed a Land Acquisition Case No.1/2003seeking enhancement of compensation which seems to be pending.

3.5 Thus, Writ Petition No.3884/1998 filed by respondent No.4 –original land owner was in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas of land. WritEPetition Nos.37140-37146/2000 was in respect of 100 acres of land andWrit Petition No.708/2000 was filed by Vishwaneedam Trust in respectof second acquisition (part).

3.6 A common statement of objections was filed by the appellant– APMC to all the writ petitions.F

3.7 That the APMC filed IA No.01/2007 in W.P. No.37140/2000,to permit APMC to hand over 9 acres of land out of 65 acres 11 guntasto the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and 4 acres to theBangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB). That videorder dated 21.03.2007, the learned Single Judge allowed the said IAGNo.01/2007 and granted permission to the APMC as prayed.

3.8 At this stage, it is required to be noted that in respect to thelands in question and other lands owned by respondent No.4 – Trust,proceedings were pending before the Land Reforms Tribunal, BangaloreN. Taluk. At this stage, it is required to be noted that it was the specificHcase on behalf of the State and the APMC that unless the proceedings under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (KLR Act) are disposed of, thecompensation is not required to be deposited as, if ultimately it is heldthat the land acquired is excess vacant land under the provisions ofKLR Act, in that case, the said land would vest with the State Governmentand therefore, no compensation would be payable. Therefore, since theGovernment was not proceeding with making of awards or offeringcompensation on the ground that proceedings were pending before theLand Reforms Tribunal, by the same order dated 21.03.2007 the learnedSingle Judge directed the Tribunal to dispose of application No.LRF 2099/74-75 under Section 66 of the KLR Act, within three months.

3.9 The order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 21.03.2007granting permission to the APMC to hand over 9 acres of land to BDAand 4 acres of land to BWSSB was challenged before the Division Benchof the High Court by way of Writ Appeal No.1011/2007. The DivisionBench of the High Court stayed the order of the learned Single Judge.The said appeal along with some companion appeals came to be disposedof by the Division Bench vide order dated 28.06.2012, directing learnedSingle Judge to decide all the connected writ petitions finally and continuedthe interim stay granted by the Division Bench until the final disposal ofall the petitions.

3.10 Thereafter APMC filed IA No.03/2008 seeking permissionto build a wall around 65 acres of land, which came to be allowed videorder dated 12.02.2009. It is reported that thereafter APMC has completedthe fencing work.

Proceedings before the Land Reforms Tribunal 3.11 That the Land Reforms Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as“the Tribunal”) passed an order dated 12.01.2010 in the proceedingsunder the KLR Act holding that 213 acres 20 guntas of respondent No.4– Trust’s land was excess land under the said Act.

3.11.1 The order passed by the Tribunal was challenged beforethe High Court in Writ Petition No.4311/2010. The High Court vide orderdated 24.03.2014 remitted the proceedings to the Tribunal with directionsfor a fresh consideration.

3.11.2 On remand the Tribunal passed a fresh order dated22.09.2015 and declared that 265 acres 24 guntas of land held byrespondent No.4 – Trust was excess land. That the order passed by theTribunal dated 22.09.2015 was challenged before the High Court and AB

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Athe High Court vide order dated 02.05.2017 set aside the order passedby the Tribunal dated 22.09.2015 and once again remitted the matter tothe Tribunal.

3.11.3 That the Tribunal passed a fresh order dated 28.11.2017and declared that 354 acres 10 guntas was excess land. The order passedBby the Tribunal dated 28.11.2017 was again the subject matter beforethe High Court by way of Writ Petition No.55344/2017. By judgmentand order dated 30.06.2021, the learned Single Judge has quashed andset aside the Tribunal’s order dated 28.11.2017. It is reported that againstthe judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of the HighCourt dated 30.06.2021 passed in Writ Petition No.55344/2017, the StateChas preferred a writ appeal being W.A. No.1089/21, which is reportedto be pending before the Division Bench of the High Court.

3.12 That all the aforesaid writ petitions being W.P. No.3884/1998 (in respect of 172 acres of land), W.P. Nos. 37140-37146/2000 (inrespect of 100 acres of land) and others writ petitions being W.P. No.708/D2000 and 19579-19585/2001, were clubbed together. During the pendencyof the aforesaid writ petitions the Act, 2013 came into force. Therefore,the writ petitioners submitted an application dated 24.02.2014 seeking toinvoke the benefit of the Act, 2013 and urged that the benefit of provisionsof the said Act would be available to it.

E3.13 That the learned Single Judge framed the following pointsfor consideration: - a.Whether the disposal of these petitioners should be deferredpending adjudication and determination by the Land Tribunal,Bangalore North Taluk of the excess holdings or otherwiseFunder the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,1961 of the very lands which are the subject matter herein.

b.Whether the possession of a portion of the lands in questionhaving said to have been given to APMC can be said to bevalid and in accordance with law.G

c.Whether the invocation of Section 17 of the LA Act in theacquisition of a portion of the lands for the same purposewas justified.

d.Whether the acquiring authority could keeping abeyancethe mandate to pay or deposit the compensation amountH

pending disposal of the proceedings before the Land Tribunalin respect of the lands.

e.Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtueof the 2013 Act.

3.14 That though some observations were made on the proceedingsunder the Act, 1894, thereafter, without further finally deciding any otherpoint framed for consideration, as reproduced hereinabove, the learnedSingle Judge has allowed the writ petitions by holding that respectiveacquisitions have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.

3.15 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the common judgmentand order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 24.06.2014 holdingthat respective acquisitions have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act,2013, the APMC preferred writ appeals before the High Court. By theimpugned common judgment and order, the Division Bench of the HighCourt has dismissed the said appeals confirming the judgment and orderpassed by the learned Single Judge declaring that the acquisition havelapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.

3.16 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned commonjudgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court inrespective Writ Appeal No.1732/2014 and others along with accompaniedappeals, the APMC, Bangalore, has preferred the present appeals.

4. Shri V. Giri, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf ofthe appellant – APMC has vehemently contended that in the facts andcircumstances of the case the High Court has erred in holding that theacquisitions in respect of the lands in question have lapsed under Section24(2) of the Act, 2013.

4.1 It is further contended that in respect of acquisition of 172 acresland no award was declared in view of the stay granted by the High Courtin various proceedings. It is submitted that therefore sub-section (2) ofSection 24 of the Act, 2013 shall not be applicable. It is submitted thattherefore the High Court has erred in declaring that the acquisitions havelapsed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013.

4.2 It is further submitted that so far as the acquisition in respectof 100 acres of land situated at Herohalli Village is concerned, the awardin respect of 65 acres of land was declared and the possession was alsotaken over. Further, the amount of compensation was deposited and the A

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Arespondent – original land owner withdrew Rs.2.37 crores, therefore itcannot be said that the acquisition has lapsed under sub-section (2) ofSection 24 of the Act, 2013.

4.3 It is urged that the High Court has not properly appreciatedthe fact that in respect of acquisition of 172 acres and in respect ofBremaining 35 acres out of the 100 acres of land, the awards could not bedeclared in view of the stay orders granted by the High Court in variousproceedings. Therefore, for the purpose of Section 24(1)(a) of the Act,2013, being made applicable, the period during which the stay orderswere in operation have to be excluded.

C4.4 Now so far as the observations made by the High Court thatthe appellant was not ready to deposit the amount of compensation, it issubmitted that the High Court ought to have appreciated that as suchthere was a very valid reason and/or justification for the APMC not todeposit the entire amount of compensation. It is submitted that with respectto the very land in question the proceedings under the KLR Act wereDpending before the Land Reforms Tribunal and the Tribunal had to takea call and/or decision that the respondent-Trust is holding any excessvacant land or not and therefore, it was thought fit to wait till the outcomeof the proceedings under the Land Reforms Act. It is submitted that theaforesaid reason cannot be ascribed against the appellant on the groundEthat the appellant was not ready to deposit/pay the compensation.

4.5 It is further submitted that even the High Court has materiallyerred in holding that possession in respect of 65 acres of land was illegalwhich was taken by invoking urgency clause and not complying with thedeposit of 80% of compensation as required under Section 17 of theFAct, 1894.

4.6 It is further submitted that as such in the impugned judgmentand order the High Court has not at all quashed and set aside thenotifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Act, 1894 in respect of 172acres and 100 acres of lands, respectively. It is submitted that afterGsome discussion on the proceedings under the Act, 1894, the High Courthas straightway considered the applicability of the Act, 2013 and hasheld that the acquisitions in respect of both the lands have lapsed undersub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013.

4.7 Relying upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of thisCourt reported in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs.H

Manoharlal & Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129, it is submitted that the impugnedjudgment and order passed by the High Court holding that the acquisitionshave lapsed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, is notsustainable.

4.8 A number of submissions are sought to be made by Shri V.Giri, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant –APMC on repeal of the Act, 1894 in view of the enactment of the Act,2013 and the effect of the Act, 2013 on the acquisitions under the Act,1894. However, for the reasons stated hereinbelow and as the HighCourt has not at all considered any of the submissions/issues on thevalidity of the notifications issued under Section 4 and 6 and the HighCourt having considered and dealt with the applicability of sub-section(2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 and having held that the acquisitionshave lapsed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, wepropose to remand the matter to the High Court to decide the otherissues raised afresh, in accordance with law and on merits. Therefore,we have not dealt with any of the submissions made by Shri V. Giri,learned Senior Advocate and even Shri C.U. Singh, learned SeniorAdvocate appearing on behalf of the respondent – Trust on merits onother issues. Hence, we have restricted the consideration of the presentappeals to the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Courtdeclaring that the acquisitions have lapsed under sub-section (2) of Section24 of the Act, 2013.

5. Shri V.N. Raghupathy, learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe State has supported the appellant – APMC. He has stated that theWrit Appeal No.1089/21 challenging the judgment and order passed bythe learned Single Judge quashing and setting aside the order passed bythe Tribunal, is pending before the Division Bench of the High Court.Therefore, it is prayed that if this honourable Court proposes, to remandthe matter to the learned Single Judge, in that case, the aforesaid appealbe directed to be heard first by the Division Bench of the High Court.

6. All these appeals are vehemently opposed by Shri C.U. Singh,learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent – Trust– original land owner. It is submitted that in the present case respondent– Trust is undertaking various activities and running the ashram infurtherance of the object of the Trust. It is submitted that respondent –Trust is not an ordinary individual land owner. That the Trust wasestablished in the year 1960. It is submitted that the lands in question A

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Awas purchased in the year 1960 and the same is being used to carry outGandhian activities and in furtherance of the object of the Trust.

6.1 It is submitted that in the present case the High Court hasrightly observed that the State Government/APMC have no intention ofpaying any compensation for the acquisition of the subject lands andBaccordingly, chose to abandon the acquisition of the lands or to allow thesame deliberately to lapse.

6.2 Shri Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf ofrespondent – Trust has also made elaborate submissions on the legalityand validity of the notifications under section 4 and 6 of Act, 1894 inCrespect of the acquisitions of 172 acres and 100 acres lands, respectively.However, by the impugned judgment and order the High Court has notdeclared and set aside the notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Act,1894 and has held and declared that the acquisitions have lapsed undersub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 and the High Court hasnot at all decided the other issues which were placed before it. WeDpropose not to deal with any of the submissions on other issues on whichthere is no decision by the High Court and we confine the present appealsto the decision of the High Court declaring and holding that the acquisitionshave lapsed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 and forthe other issues we propose to remand the matter to the High Court.

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6.3 Now so far as the impugned judgment and order passed bythe High Court holding and declaring that the acquisitions have lapsedunder sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, Shri Singh learnedSenior Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent – Trust has fairlyconceded that in view of the subsequent decision of this Court in theFcase of Indore Development Authority (supra), the view taken bythe High Court that the acquisitions have lapsed under sub-section (2) ofSection 24 of the Act, 2013 is unsustainable. However, he has submittedthat the learned Single Judge and even the learned Division Bench ofthe High Court were right in holding so, considering the law prevailing atthat time when the learned Single Judge decided the matters. It isGsubmitted that the learned Single Judge followed the law prevailing atthe relevant time and the learned Single Judge decided the mattersaccordingly. It is submitted that therefore no fault can be found with theview taken by the learned Single Judge.

7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of theHrespective parties at length.

8. At the outset it is required to be noted that the proceedingsbefore the learned Single Judge of the High Court by way of writ petitionNo. 3884 of 1998 was with respect to 172 acres 22 guntas of land acquired.In the writ petition No. 3884 of 1998, the original land owners prayed forthe following reliefs: - A

(i) Declare that the entire acquisition proceedings commencingwith the issue of a preliminary notification gazette on3.9.1994 marked as Annexure-A in the writ petition havelapsed on account of the award not having been made withina period of two years in terms of Section 11A of the LandAcquisition Act.

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(ii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or directionto quash Annexure-A, the preliminary notification LAQ (2)SR/32/94-95 DATED 2.9.1994 PUBLISHE DIN THKarnataka Gazette dated 3.9.1994 and Annexure the finalnotification No. RDD 21 LAQ 96 dated 10.10.1996Dpublished in the Karnataka Gazette dated 31. l 0.1996.

By way of amendment the original writ petitioners – original landowners also prayed to declare that the acquisition proceedings are deemedto have lapsed in view of the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensationand Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and ResettlementAct, 2013.

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8.1 Writ petition Nos. 37140-37146 of 2000 filed by the originalwrit petitioners – original land owners was with respect to 100 acres ofacquired land. In the said writ petitions original writ petitioners prayedfor the following reliefs: - F

(i) Issue a Writ of certiorari or any other writ or order, quashingthe impugned notification at Annexure-B dated 13.04.1999gazetted on 17.04.1999 in LAC(2) SR 2/99-2000 issued bythe second respondent and also the notification at Annexure-C dated 26.10.1999 gazetted on 18.11.1999 in No.Kam.E.68.AQ8-99 issued by the first respondent.G

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(ii) In the alternative direct the respondents to pay compensationto the petitioner in terms of the proceedings of the meetingdated 29.04.1999 Vide Annexure-D

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ABy way of amendment the original writ petitioners also prayed todeclare the acquisition proceedings having been lapsed under theprovisions of the Act, 2013.

8.2 That the learned Single Judge framed the following commonpoints for consideration: - B

a.Whether the disposal of these petitioners should be deferredpending adjudication and determination by the Land Tribunal,Bangalore North Taluk of the excess holdings or otherwiseunder the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,1961 of the very lands which are the subject matter herein.

Cb.Whether the possession of a portion of the lands in questionhaving said to have been given to APMC can be said to bevalid and in accordance with law.

c.Whether the invocation of Section 17 of the LA Act in theacquisition of a portion of the lands for the same purposewas justified.

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d.Whether the acquiring authority could keeping abeyancethe mandate to pay or deposit the compensation amountpending disposal of the proceedings before the Land Tribunalin respect of the lands.

Ee.Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtueof the 2013 Act.

Despite the fact that a number of issues/grounds were raisedbefore the High Court on the legality and validity of the acquisitionproceedings, the learned Single Judge decided only one issue, namely,Fwhether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013Act. Whereas a number of issues/grounds were raised and as such theoriginal reliefs sought (acquisition proceedings under Act 1894) werethe main reliefs which were required to be dealt with and considered,unfortunately, the learned Single Judge did not give findings on the otherissues/grounds and on the reliefs sought and as observed hereinabove,Gdisposed of the writ petitions considering only one relief/ground, namely,whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013Act. When a number of submissions were made on the other issues/grounds, we are of the opinion that the High Court ought to haveconsidered the other issues and ought to have given the findings on otherHissues also. Because of not deciding the other issues and deciding the matter only on one issue and thereafter when the decision on such oneissue, is held to be bad in law for the reasons stated hereinbelow, thisCourt has no other alternative but to remand the matters to the learnedSingle Judge for deciding the Writ Petitions afresh on all other issues.

8.3 By way of analogy we observe that while considering Order14 Rule 2 (as amended w.e.f. 01.02.1977), this Court in the case ofNusli Neville Wadia Vs. Ivory Properties & Ors, (2020) 6 SCC557, has observed and held that after the amendment w.e.f. 01.02.1977,though Order 14 Rule 2(2) enables the court to decide the issue of lawas a preliminary issue in case the same relates to (i) jurisdiction of courtor (ii) a bar to suit created by any law for the time being in force, adeparture has been made in amended provision whereby now it mandatesthe court to pronounce judgment on all issues notwithstanding that acase may be disposed of on a preliminary issue. It is further observedthat intendment behind this departure is to avoid remand in an appealablecase for deciding other issues.

8.4 Therefore, the courts should adjudicate on all the issues andgive its findings on all the issues and not to pronounce the judgment onlyon one of the issues. As such it is the duty cast upon the courts toadjudicate on all the issues and pronounce the judgment on all the issuesrather than adopting a shortcut approach and pronouncing the judgmenton only one issue. By such a practice, it would increase the burden onthe appellate court and in many cases if the decision on the issue decidedis found to be erroneous and on other issues there is no adjudication andno findings recorded by the court, the appellate court will have no optionbut to remand the matter for its fresh decision. Therefore, to avoid suchan eventuality, the courts have to adjudicate on all the issues raised in acase and render findings and the judgment on all the issues involved.

9. Now, so far as the impugned common judgment and orderpassed by the High Court declaring that the acquisition proceedings havelapsed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, is concerned,the same is unsustainable in view of the decision of the Constitutionbench of this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority(supra). This Court has concluded in paragraph 365 and 366 as under: - “365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune MunicipalCorpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand MisirimalSolanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is hereby A

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aoverruled and all other decisions in which Pune MunicipalCorpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand MisirimalSolanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] has beenfollowed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji NagarResidential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. Stateof T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 298] cannot beBsaid to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisionsfollowing the same are also overruled. In Indore DevelopmentAuthority v. Shailendra [Indore Development Authority v.Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 426] , theaspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whetherC“or” has to be read as “nor” or as “and” was not placed forconsideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in thelight of the discussion in the present judgment.

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366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questionsas under:

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366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the awardis not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has tobe determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

366.2. In case the award has been passed within the windowperiod of five years excluding the period covered by an interimorder of the court, then proceedings shall continue as providedunder Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if ithas not been repealed.

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366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possessionFand compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”. The deemedlapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for fiveyears or more prior to commencement of the said Act, thepossession of land has not been taken nor compensation has beenGpaid. In other words, in case possession has been taken,compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly,if compensation has been paid, possession has not been takenthen there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2) ofthe 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court.

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The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso toSection 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect tomajority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as onthe date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with theprovisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interestunder Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit ofcompensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of landacquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect tothe majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation underthe 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date ofnotification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation asprovided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to himto claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due tonon-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. Theobligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensationor who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claimthat the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2)of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treatedas part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and ascontemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possessionunder Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there isno divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, asonce possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemedlapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have faileddue to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation forfive years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in aproceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concernedas on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passedby court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.

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A366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to newcause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedingsof land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending onthe date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does notrevive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concludedproceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of modeBof taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit ofcompensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidateacquisition.”

We wish to emphasise that this Court has opined that all judgmentsrendered on the basis of Pune Municipal Corporation Vs. HarakchandCMisirimal Solanki [(2014) 3 SCC 183] are overruled in view of theinterpretation made to Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, in IndoreDevelopment Authority (supra). There has been a trend of land ownersfiling fresh cases seeking lapse of acquisition on the basis of Section24(2) of the Act, 2013, although such land owners may have earlierDunsuccessfully filed writ petitions challenging the acquisition notifications.Such land owners may have had the benefit of interim orders of stay offurther proceedings in the acquisition process or dispossession resultingin a delay in the making of the award and payment/deposit of thecompensation and consequently in taking over possession of the acquiredland. There being a delay in the passing of the award owing to interimEorders granted by the High Court or even by the civil courts, where suitsmay have been filed against acquiring bodies, the land owners cannotnow take advantage of the same so as to contend that no award hasbeen made and consequently there has been no payment or deposit ofthe compensation and that possession of the acquired land continuesFwith them. The land owners having had the benefit of interim ordersgranted in their favour in proceedings initiated by them against theacquisition cannot take benefit under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.The High Court or the civil courts which may have granted interim ordersin favour of the land owners, ought to consider the aforesaid aspectbefore applying Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 in favour of the landGowners.

10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority (supra) to the facts of the case on hand, theview taken by the High Court while declaring the acquisition proceedingshave lapsed under sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013, isH

unsustainable and is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court inthe case Indore Development Authority (supra). Even the same isalso not disputed by Shri C. U. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearingon behalf of the original writ petitioners – original land owners. Therefore,the common judgment and order passed by the High Court allowing thewrit petitions and declaring that the acquisition proceedings with respectto the lands in question have lapsed under sub-section (2) of section 24of the Act, 2013 cannot stand and the same deserve to be quashed andset aside.

11. As observed hereinabove, though a number of other issueswere raised on the legality of the acquisition proceedings under the Act,1894 and though other points for consideration were raised/framed bythe High Court reproduced hereinabove, since none of the issues areadjudicated by the High Court on merits, we have no other alternativebut to remand the matter to the learned Single Judge for deciding thewrit petitions afresh and to adjudicate on all the other issues, other thanthe lapse of acquisitions under sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act,2013. At the cost of repetition, we observe that the High Court ought tohave adjudicated on all the issues raised and ought not to have decidedand disposed of the writ petitions, adjudicating only on one issue whichhas been found to be erroneous. The Division Bench has also not appliedits mind to this aspect of the matter and has simply dismissed the appealsfiled by the appellant herein.

12. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons statedabove, all these appeals are allowed. The impugned common judgmentand order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court as well as thecommon judgment and order passed by the High Court in writ petition(s)No. 3884/1998 and Nos. 37140-37146/2000 are hereby quashed and setaside. The matters are remitted back to the learned Single Judge todecide and dispose of the aforesaid writ petitions afresh and in accordancewith law and on their own merits. The learned Single Judge to adjudicateall other issues which were framed reproduced hereinabove andpronounce the judgment on all the points framed for consideration. Theaforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of twelve monthsfrom the date of receipt of the present order.

It is made clear that we have not expressed anything on the meritsof these cases, in favour of either of the parties on other issues and it isultimately for the learned Single Judge to deal with and consider the AB

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Asame in accordance with law and on their own merits. It is also madeclear that on remand the learned Single Judge to adjudicate and pronouncethe judgment on all other issues except the issue with respect to thelapse of the acquisition proceedings by virtue of the Act, 2013. All theappeals are allowed accordingly.

BWe also observe and direct that Writ Appeal No.1089 of 2021 beheard first and to be decided and disposed of on or before 31.12.2022.There shall be no order as to costs.

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Devika Gujral

(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)

Appeals allowed.

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