COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE versus THE ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF ARCHITECTS (TASA) & ORS. on 14 February 2022

COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE

v.

THE ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF ARCHITECTS (TASA) & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 1320 of 2022)

FEBRUARY 14, 2022

[HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]

Architects Act, 1972: ss.21, 45; Council of Architecture(Minimum Standards of Architectural Education) Regulations, 2020– Writ petition filed by first respondent, a society registered underthe Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 having professionalarchitects as its members and seeking quashing of the Regulations,2020 circulated by Communication dated 31.10.2018 and03.12.2018 on the ground that these regulations required priorapproval of the central government u/s.45(1) of the Act and nosuch approval was obtained – Appellant before the High Court alsoquestioned the locus standi of first Respondent – High Court allowedthe writ petition and quashed the impugned communication – Hence,the present appeal – Held: The Council of Architecture may prescribeminimum standards of architectural education – It is only in caseswhere the Council choose to prescribe standards in the form ofregulations that the requirement of approval of the CentralGovernment under s.45(1) would become necessary – On thequestion of locus standi, first respondent society due to the nature ofits membership, could not have been aggrieved – The first respondentcould not have challenged the prescriptions with which they arenot in any way concerned – High Court erred in not addressingitself to these important issues – Impugned order set aside.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1 Both the communications dated 31.10.2018and 03.12.2018, impugned before the High Court, were not partof any Regulations framed by the appellant in exercise of thepower conferred by Section 45(1) of the Act. The requirementsof prior approval and the notification in the official gazette in termsof Section 45(1) of the Act, are in respect of Regulations and notin respect of communications such as the ones impugned in the

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Awrit petition. This is why an argument is advanced on the inter-play between Sections 21 and 45 of the Act. [Para 9][352-B-C]

1.2 The Council of Architecture may prescribe minimumstandards of architectural education, either by way of regulationsissued under Section 45(2) or even otherwise. It is only in casesBwhere the Council chooses to prescribe standards in the form ofregulations that the requirement of approval of the CentralGovernment under Section 45(1) would become necessary [Para15][355-C]

1.3 The 1st respondent society (writ petitioner), due to theCnature of its membership, could have been aggrieved only by theprescriptions affecting the teaching faculty. The 1 st respondentcould not have challenged the prescriptions with which they arenot in any way concerned. [Para 19][356-G]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1320of 2022.D

From the Judgment and Order dated 04.06.2019 of the High Courtof Judicature at Madras in Writ Petition No. 34676 of 2018.

Naveen R. Nath, Sr. Adv., Ms. Hetu Arora Sethi, Ms. Lalit MohiniBhat, Rahul Jain, Advs. for the Appellant.

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Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, K. M. Vignesh Ram, Rajeev KumarDubey, Kamlendra Mishra, Ashiwan Mishra, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave,Ms. Preeti Rani, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Moh. Akhil, G. S. Makker, Advs. forthe Respondents.The Judgment of the Court was delivered byF

V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. The 1[st] respondent herein which is a society registered underthe Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 and which has as itsGmembers, professional architects who claim to be teaching faculty ininstitutions imparting education in Architecture, filed a writ petition onthe file of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, praying for quashingthe “Minimum Standards of Architectural Education Regulations, 2017”circulated by the appellant herein vide communications dated 31.10.2018Hand 03.12.2018. The main and perhaps the only ground of challenge to

the Regulations was that the Regulations required the prior approval ofthe Central Government under Section 45 of The Architects Act, 1972,(in short referred to as ‘the Act’) before they are implemented and thatno such prior approval was obtained before issuing the impugnedcommunications.

3. The appellant herein took umbrage under Section 21 of theAct. The appellant also questioned the locus standi of the 1[st] respondentto challenge the impugned communications, since the communicationswere addressed to institutions teaching Architecture, none of which hadcome forward to challenge the same.

4. Taking a view that Section 21 cannot be read in isolation andthat the provisions of Section 45 are mandatory, the High Court allowedthe writ petition and quashed the impugned communications. Hence, theappellant is before us.

5. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respectiveparties.

6. Before we consider the issue that arises for consideration, wemust take note of one important subsequent development. After thisCourt ordered notice in the Special Leave Petition, a Notification bearingF.No.CA/193/2020/MSAER dated 11.08.2020 was published in theGovernment Gazette, notifying the “Council of Architecture (MinimumStandards of Architectural Education) Regulations, 2020”. TheseRegulations were directed to come into force with effect from the 1[st]day of November, 2020. These Regulations have been issued, as seenfrom the Notification, in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses(e), (g), (h) and (j) of sub-section (2) of Section 45 read with Section 21of the Act. They have been issued in supersession of the 1983Regulations.

7. Due to the above subsequent development, the question relatingto the inter-play between Section 21 and Section 45 of the Act has becomeone of mere academic importance. However, Mr. Naveen R. Nath,learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that the question oflaw is of importance and advanced arguments.

8. Admittedly, the communication dated 31.10.2018 issued by theappellant herein drew the attention of the educational institutions to therevised eligibility criteria for admission to 5 year B.Arch. degree courseand also to the Minimum Standards for Architectural Education prescribed A

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Aby the Council to be followed for the academic session 2019-20. Thesecond impugned communication was dated 03.12.2018 which was the“Approval Process” for 2019-20.

9. Both the communications dated 31.10.2018 and 03.12.2018,impugned before the High Court, were not part of any Regulations framedBby the appellant in exercise of the power conferred by Section 45(1) ofthe Act. The requirements of prior approval and the notification in theofficial gazette in terms of Section 45(1) of the Act, are in respect ofRegulations and not in respect of communications such as the onesimpugned in the writ petition. This is why an argument is advanced onthe inter-play between Sections 21 and 45 of the Act. Section 21 readsCas follows:- “21. Minimum standard of architectural education.- TheCouncil may prescribe the minimum standards of architecturaleducation required for granting recognised qualifications bycolleges or institutions in India.”DSection 45 reads as follows:- “45. Power of Council to make regulations.- (1) The Councilmay, with the approval of the Central Government, [by notificationin the Official Gazette], make regulations not inconsistent withEthe provisions of this Act, or the rules made thereunder, to carryout the purposes of this Act.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generalityof theforegoing power, such regulations may provide for—

(a) the management of the property of the Council; F

(b) the powers and duties of the President and the Vice-President of the Council;

(c) the summoning and holding of meetings of the Council andthe Executive Committee or any other committee constitutedunder section 10, the times and places at which such meetingsGshall be held, the conduct of business there at and the numberof persons necessary to constitute a quorum;

(d) the functions of the Executive Committee or of any othercommittee constituted under section 10; H

(e) the courses and periods of study and of practical training, ifany, to be undertaken, the subjects of examinations andstandards of proficiency therein to be obtained in any collegeor institution for grant of recognised qualifications; (f) the appointment, powers and duties of inspector; (g) the standards of staff, equipment, accommodation, trainingand other facilities for architectural education; (h) the conduct of professional examinations, qualifications ofexaminers and the conditions of admission to such examinations;

(i) the standards of professional conduct and etiquette and codeof ethics to be observed by architects; (j) any other matter which is to be or may be provided byregulations under this Act and in respect of which no ruleshave been made.

(3) Every regulation made under this section shall be laid, as soonas may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament,while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may becomprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions,and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following thesession or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agreein making any modification in the regulation or both Houses agreethat the regulation should not be made, the regulation shall thereafterhave effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as thecase may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulmentshall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previouslydone under that regulation.

10. It may be seen from sub-section (2) of Section 45 that it givesa list of matters for which provision may be made in the Regulations, inclauses (a) to (j). Clause (a) to (d) concern the management andadministration of the Council of Architecture and its property. It is onlyclauses (e), (g) and (h) of sub-section(2) of Section 45 which have abearing on the Minimum Standards of Education. Clause (f) relates toappointment of Inspectors and clause (i) relates to standards ofprofessional conduct and etiquette. Clause (j) is a residuary clause.

11. Interestingly, the 1983 Regulations as well as the 2020Regulations (now issued after the judgment of the Madras High Court), A

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Aare issued in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (e), (g), (h)and (j) of sub-section (2) of Section 45 read with Section 21. If thestipulation contained in Section 21 is subsumed in one of the clauses ofSection 45(2), there was no necessity for invoking the power underSection 45(2) read with Section 21 while issuing the Regulations. Inother words, if the minimum standards of architectural education areBcovered by clauses (e), (g) and (h), or at least by the residuary clause (j)of sub-section (2) of Section 45, it would have been enough for theappellant to issue the regulations in exercise of the powers conferred bySection 45(2) alone without invoking Section 21 along with it. The reasonwhy Section 21 is also invoked along with Section 45(2) is not far toCseek.

12. Clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 45 relates to standardsof professional conduct and code of ethics to be observed by architects.The substantive power to prescribe the code of professional conduct forarchitects, flows out of Section 22. It reads as follows:- D“22. Professional conduct.-(1)The Council may by regulationsprescribe standards of professional conduct and etiquette and acode of ethics for architects.

(2) Regulations made by the Council under sub-section (1) mayspecify which violations thereof shall constitute infamous conductEin any professional respect, that is to say, professional misconduct,and such provision shall have effect notwithstanding anythingcontained in any law for the time being in force.”

13. Apparently, Section 22 confers substantive power upon theCouncil to prescribe standards of professional conduct and Section 45(2)(i)Fdeals with the procedural power. But Section 22 itself makes it clearthat the prescription of standards of professional conduct and code ofethics for architects could be done only by way of regulations. This is incontrast to Section 21.

14. To put it differently, Section 22(1) confers power upon theGCouncil of Architecture to prescribe standards of professional conductand a code of ethics, only by way of regulations, though Section 45(2)(i)takes care of the procedural requirement. But Section 21 which conferssubstantive power upon the Council to prescribe minimum standards ofarchitectural education, is not couched in the same language as SectionH

22(1). In other words, Section 21 does not contain a stipulation that, “theCouncil may by regulation prescribe minimum standards of architecturaleducation”. The words “may by regulation”, found in Section 22, areconspicuous by their absence in Section 21. This is a clear indication ofthe fact, (i) that the Council is empowered to prescribe minimum standardsof architectural education, not necessarily by taking recourse to Section45(2); and (ii) that if at all, such minimum standards are issued otherwisethan through Regulations, they should not be in conflict with those foundin the Regulations.

15. It is thus clear from the scheme of the Act that the Council ofArchitecture may prescribe minimum standards of architecturaleducation, either by way of regulations issued under Section 45(2) oreven otherwise. It is only in cases where the Council chooses to prescribestandards in the form of regulations that the requirement of approval ofthe Central Government under Section 45(1) would become necessary.

16. It is interesting to see that the communications dated 31.10.2018and 03.12.2018 issued by the appellant which were put to challengebefore the High Court, were primarily aimed at streamlining the institutionsimparting architectural education. The 1[st] respondent herein whochallenged the communications, was admittedly a society, which has asits members, the teaching faculty. This can be seen from paragraph 2 ofthe writ petition filed by the 1[st] respondent herein before the High Court,the relevant portion of which reads as follows:- “The members of the Society are professionalArchitects who haveengaged themselves as teaching faculty and the society recognisesfour kinds of members, namely (1) Life Member – Professorregistered with COA and being heads of institutions with Ten yearsof teaching experience, (2) Associate /Affiliate Member–Teachersregistered with COA having less than Ten years of teachingexperience, (3) Patron/Donor Member – AccomplishedAcademicians and Renowned Teachers registered with COAinvolved in Architectural Education with Twenty years ofexperience and (4) Institutional Member –representing a collegeor school or institute of Architecture”.

17. In the counter affidavit filed by the appellant before the HighCourt, a specific objection was taken to the maintainability of the writpetition on the ground that the communications impugned in the writ AB

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Apetition were addressed to the institutions imparting architectural educationand that individuals who claim to be teaching faculty cannot challengethe same. It was also contended in the counter affidavit that the 1[st]respondent (writ petitioner) was attempting to espouse the cause of somedefaulting educational institutions which did not meet the minimumstandards. Another important issue raised in the counter affidavit filedBby the appellant herein before the High Court was that one of the membersof the 1[st] respondent Society was a member of the appellant Councilwhich approved the 2015 norms and that some of the members of the 1[st]respondent Society even acted as Inspectors and inspected theeducational institutions to find out whether minimum standards are put inCplace.

18. But the above objections were not even considered by theHigh Court. The High Court addressed itself merely to the question ofthe requirement of approval of the Central Government under Section45(1) and did not go into the question of locus standi of the 1[st] respondent.DThe High Court even overlooked the fact that none of the educationalinstitutions imparting architectural education ever chose to challenge thecommunications impugned before the High Court. In fact, the appellanthas furnished a chart extracting the provisions of the 1983 Regulationsin Column No.1, the 2017 Prescriptions in Column No.2, and the area ofdifference between the two, in Column No.3. It is seen from the saidEchart that many of the changes brought forthwith in 2018 were in relationto, (i) duration of the architecture programme; (ii) admission toarchitecture course; (iii) intake and migration; (iv) courses and periodsof study; (v) professional examination, standards of proficiency andconditions of admissions and qualifications of examiners; and (vi)Fstandards of staff, equipment, accommodation, training and other facilities.

19. If at all, the 1[st] respondent-society (writ petitioner), due to thenature of its membership, could have been aggrieved only by theprescriptions affecting the teaching faculty. The 1[st] respondent couldnot have challenged the prescriptions with which they are not in anyGway concerned. Unfortunately, the High Court did not address itself tothese important issues.

20. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be allowed and the impugnedorder is bound to be set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, theimpugned order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed H

by the 1[st] respondent before the High Court shall stand dismissed. Nocosts.

Devika Gujral and Amarendra Kumar(Assisted by : Priyanshu Agarwal, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

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