CHIEF MANAGER, PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK & ANR.V. ANIT KUMAR DAS versus ANIT KUMAR DAS on 3 November 2020

[2020] 9 S.C.R. 925

CHIEF MANAGER, PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK & ANR.v.

ANIT KUMAR DAS

(Civil Appeal No.3602 of 2020)

NOVEMBER 03, 2020

[ASHOK BHUSHAN, R. SUBHASH REDDY ANDM. R. SHAH, JJ.]

Service Law:

Appointment/ Selection – To the post of Peon in Bank –Entitlement – Eligibility criteria for the post as per the circularsissued by the Bank was 12[th] class pass – It was specifically mentionedin the advertisement that the candidate should not be graduate –Respondent-candidate mentioned his qualification as 12[th] pass –Appointment letter issued – During scrutiny it was found by Bankthat the candidate was graduate and hence not eligible for the post– Candidature cancelled – Writ Petition – Single Judge of HighCourt directed the Bank to allow the candidate to discharge hisduties as peon as per the appointment order – In writ appeal, DivisionBench of High Court affirmed the order of Single Judge – Appealto Supreme Court – Held: A conscious decision was taken by Bankproviding eligibility criteria/ educational qualification – It is forthe employer to determine the relevance and suitability of thequalification for any post – Courts are not fit instruments to assessthe expediency/ advisability/ utility of such prescription ofqualifications – The candidate having not challenged the eligibilitycriteria/ educational qualification in the advertisement and havingparticipated in the recruitment process, it is not open for him tocontend that higher qualification cannot be a disqualification –The candidate cannot claim right to appointment having suppressedthe material information and/ or giving false information – Impugnedorder is therefore set aside.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The appointments to the post of subordinate staff/Peons were required to be made strictly in accordance with theeligibility criteria mentioned in the Circular letter No. 25 of 2008

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Adated 06.11.2008 and the selection of the Peons was required tobe made as per Circular letter No. 6 of 2016 dated 04.3.2016.[Para 5.1][934-C-D]

2. In the advertisement itself, it was specifically mentionedthat a candidate should have passed 12[th] class or its equivalentBwith basic reading/writing knowledge of English and should notbe a graduate as on 01.01.2016. The original writ petitioner neverchallenged the eligibility criteria/educational qualificationmentioned in the advertisement. He participated in therecruitment process on the basis of the advertisement, withoutchallenging the eligibility criteria/educational qualificationCmentioned in the advertisement. Therefore, once havingparticipated in the recruitment process as per the advertisement,thereafter it is not open for him to contend that acquisition ofhigher qualification cannot be a disqualification and that too whenhe never challenged the eligibility criteria/educational qualification Dmentioned in the advertisement. [Paras 5 and 6][933-G;935-F-H]

3. A conscious decision was taken by the bank providingeligibility criteria/educational qualification that a graduatecandidate shall not be eligible for the post of Peon/subordinateEstaff, looking to the nature of the post. Recruitment to publicservice should be held strictly in accordance with the terms ofadvertisement and the recruitment rules, if any. Deviation fromthe rules allows entry to ineligible persons and deprives manyothers who could have competed for the post. [Paras 6 and7.1][935-F; 936-B-C]FYogesh Kumar v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2003) 3SCC 548 : [2003] 2 SCR 662 – relied on.

4. It is for the employer to determine and decide therelevancy and suitability of the qualifications for any post and it isGnot for the Courts to consider and assess. A greater latitude ispermitted by the Courts for the employer to prescribequalifications for any post. There is a rationale behind it.Qualifications are prescribed keeping in view the need andinterest of an Institution or an Industry or an establishment asthe case may be. The Courts are not fit instruments to assessH

expediency or advisability or utility of such prescription ofqualifications. However, at the same time, the employer cannotact arbitrarily or fancifully in prescribing qualifications for posts.In the present case, prescribing the eligibility criteria/educationalqualification that a graduate candidate shall not be eligible andthe candidate must have passed 12[th] standard is justified and it isa conscious decision taken by the Bank which is in force since2008. Therefore, the High Court has clearly erred in directingthe appellant-Bank to allow the respondent-original writ petitionerto discharge his duties as a Peon, though he as such was noteligible as per the eligibility criteria/educational qualificationmentioned in the advertisement. [Para 7.3][939-D-G]

J. Rangaswamy v. Government of Andhra Pradesh(1990) 1 SCC 288; Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. ImtiyazAhmad (2019) 2 SCC 404 : [2018] 14 SCR 1082 –relied on.

Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission (2010)15 SCC 596; State of Punjab v. Anita (2015) 2 SCC170 : [2014] 14 SCR 819 – referred to.

5. In the application/bio-data, the respondent-original writpetitioner did not mention that he was a graduate. He suppressedthe material fact and declared his qualification as H.S.C. Anemployee is expected to give a correct information as to hisqualification. The original writ petitioner failed to do so. He wasin fact over-qualified and therefore ineligible to apply for the job.In fact, by such conduct on the part of the respondent –originalwrit petitioner, one another righteous candidate has suffered forhis mischievous act. Had it been known to the bank that he wasa graduate, he would not have at all been considered for selectionas a Peon in the bank. A candidate having suppressed the materialinformation and/or giving false information cannot claim right tocontinuance in service. Thus, on the ground of suppression ofmaterial information and the facts and as the respondent – originalwrit petitioner even otherwise was not eligible as per the eligibilitycriteria/educational qualification mentioned in the advertisementwhich was as per Circular letter No. 25 of 2008 dated 06.11.2008.The bank rightly cancelled his candidature and rightly did not AB

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Apermit him to resume his duty. The High Court ought not to haveallowed the writ petition when it was a clear case of suppressionof material fact by the original writ petitioner. [Para 8][940-A-F]

Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Ram Ratan Yadav(2003) 3 SCC 437 : [2003] 2 SCR 361 - relied on.BState of Orissa v. Bibhisan Kanhar (2017) 8 SCC 608– referred to.

6. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the DivisionBench of the High Court and the judgment and order passed byCthe Single Judge of the High Court directing the appellant Bankto allow the respondent – original writ petitioner to discharge hisduties as a Peon as per appointment order is unsustainable anddeserves to quashed and set aside. [Para 10][941-A-B]

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Case Law Reference

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3602of 2020.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.11.2019 of the High Courtof Orissa at Cuttack in Writ Appeal No. 278 of 2019.

Rajesh Kumar-I, Anant Gautam, Nipun Sharma, Abhinav Agrawal,Rajesh Kumar, Advs. for the appearing parties.H

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. R. SHAH, J.

1. Leave granted.

Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 22.11.2019 passed by the Division Bench of the HighCourt of Orissa at Cuttack in Writ Appeal No. 278 of 2019, by which theDivision Bench of the High Court has dismissed the appeal preferred bythe appellant herein and has confirmed the judgment and order dated13.03.2019 passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in W.P.(C) No. 19261 of 2016, by which the learned single Judge allowed thesaid writ petition preferred by the respondent herein and directed theappellant Bank to allow the respondent herein – original writ petitionerto discharge his duties as a Peon as per the appointment order dated03.10.2016, the employer – Punjab National Bank has preferred thepresent appeal.

2. Applications were invited by the appellant Bank for the post ofPeon by publishing an advertisement in the local newspaper. The eligibilitycriteria mentioned in the said advertisement was that a candidate shouldhave passed 12[th] class or its equivalent with basic reading/writingknowledge of English. It specifically provided that a candidate shouldnot be a Graduate as on 01.01.2016. A candidate was also required tosubmit the bio-data as per the prescribed format. The respondent herein,though a Graduate, applied for the said post. However, neither in theapplication nor in the bio-data, he disclosed that he was a graduate. Atthis stage, it required to be noted that the eligibility criteria and theeducational qualification prescribed above was as per the Circular LetterNo. 25 of 2008 dated 06.11.2008 issued by the Human ResourcesDevelopment Division (for short “HRD Division”) of the Bank specifyingthe guidelines for recruitment of staff in subordinate cadre in the bankand prescribing the eligibility criteria. That on the basis of the informationprovided by the applicants in their applications, a list of eligible candidateswas prepared on the basis of the marks obtained in 10[th] Class and 12[th]Class. As per Circular dated 04.03.2016 issued by the HRD Division ofthe Bank, the selection of the peons was required to be made on thebasis of the percentage of marks obtained by the candidates in 10[th]standard and 12[th] standard. That so far as the respondent herein – originalwrit petitioner is concerned, based on the information provided by him in A

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Ahis application, his name appeared in the selected candidates of BalsarDistrict. That an order of appointment was issued. It appears that whilescrutiny of the documents was going on, the appellant Bank came toknow about a graduate certificate showing that the respondent – originalwrit petitioner was a graduate since 2014. Thus, it was noticed andfound that he was not eligible as per the advertisement and the CircularsBand that the respondent deliberately, wilfully and intentionally suppressedthe fact that he was a graduate. Therefore, his candidature was cancelledand he was not allowed to join the bank in subordinate cadre. That,thereafter, the respondent filed the writ petition before the High Court,being Writ Petition (C) No. 19261 of 2016, for an appropriate order toCallow him to discharge his duties as Peon as per the appointment orderdated 03.10.2016 and to further direct that his appointment may not becancelled on the ground that he has possessed higher qualification. Thatthe said petition was opposed by the bank by filing a detailed affidavit-in-reply. It was specifically pointed out that the eligibility criteria and theeducational qualification was fixed as per the Circular letter No. 25 ofD2008 dated 06.11.2008 issued by the HRD Division of the Bank. It wasalso pointed out that on 04.03.2016 the HRD Division issued anotherCircular letter No. 6 of 2016 pursuant to the decision of the Bank’sBoard in their meeting dated 29.02.2016, by which it was decided thatthe selection of the Peons will be made on the basis of the percentage ofEmarks obtained by the candidates in 10[th] standard and 12[th] standard. Itwas also submitted that the respondent deliberately, wilfully andintentionally suppressed the material fact that he was a graduate. It waspointed out that had it been known to the bank that he was a graduate,he would not have at all been considered for selection as a peon in thebank. Despite the above, the learned single Judge of the High CourtFallowed the said writ petition solely relying upon the decision of theAllahabad High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 69034 of 2019 [PankajKumar Dubey v. Punjab National Bank], in which the Allahabad HighCourt referring to the judgment and order passed by this Court in CivilAppeal No. 1010 of 2000 dated 11.02.2000 [Mohd. Riazul Usman GaniGv. District and Sessions Judge, Nagpur) held that a candidate cannotbe denied the appointment solely on the ground that he is possessing ahigher qualification. The learned single Judge directed the bank to allowthe respondent herein to discharge his duties as a Peon as per theappointment order dated 03.10.2016.

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2.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and orderpassed by the learned single Judge allowing the aforesaid writ petitionand directing the bank to allow the respondent –original writ petitioner todischarge his duties as a Peon as per the appointment order dated03.10.2016, the appellant Bank preferred the writ appeal before theDivision Bench of the High Court. By the impugned judgment and order,which as such is a non-speaking and unreasoned order, the DivisionBench of the High Court has dismissed the appeal and has not interferedwith the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge. Hence,the present appeal.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Bank hasvehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case,more particularly, when in the advertisement it was specifically mentionedthat a candidate should not be a graduate as on 01.01.2016 and that itspecifically provided that a candidate should have passed 12[th] class orits equivalent with basic reading/writing knowledge of English and theeducational qualification/eligibility criteria mentioned in the advertisementwas as per Circulars dated 06.11.2008 and 04.03.2016 issued by theHRD Division of the Bank and admittedly the respondent – original writpetitioner was a graduate as on 01.01.2016 and therefore not eligibleeven to apply, both, the learned single Judge as well as the DivisionBench of the High Court have materially erred in directing the appellantBank to allow the original writ petitioner to perform his duties as a Peonpursuant to the appointment order dated 03.10.2016.

3.1 It is further submitted on behalf of the appellant Bank that inthe present case the original writ petitioner did not challenge the eligibilitycriteria/educational qualification mentioned in the advertisement. Henever challenged the circular prescribing the educational qualification/eligibility criteria. It is submitted that once having not challenged theeligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the advertisement,and thereafter having participated in the recruitment process, it is notopen for him to contend that he cannot be denied appointment on theground of having higher qualification.

3.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the appellant Bank that the High Court has clearly erred inrelying upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court, in which thedecision of this Court in Mohd. Riazul Usman Gani (supra) was reliedupon. It is submitted that in the case of Mohd. Riazul Usman Gani AB

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A(supra) this Court has specifically stated in Para 21 that the said decisionis on the facts of the case in hand and should not be understood as layingdown a rule of universal application.

3.3 It is submitted that even otherwise it is required to be notedthat the said Circulars dated 06.11.2008 and 04.03.2016 were issuedBprescribing the eligibility criteria/educational qualification on the basis ofthe decision approved by the Board of the Bank and considering thenature of the post – Peon/subordinate cadre and a conscious decisionwas taken by the bank that a candidate having the qualification ofgraduation shall not be eligible and the candidate who passed in 12[th]standard or its equivalent with basic reading/writing knowledge of EnglishCshall only be eligible. It is submitted therefore apart from the fact thatthe original writ petitioner did not challenge the eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the advertisement, once a consciousdecision was taken by the employer – bank prescribing a specificqualification, thereafter unless it is found to be most arbitrary, the sameDcannot be the subject-matter of a judicial review. Reliance is placed onthe decisions of this Court in the cases of J. Rangaswamy v.Government of Andhra Pradesh (1990) 1 SCC 288, Yogesh Kumarv. Government of NCT of Delhi (2003) 3 SCC 548 and a recent decisionof this Court in the case of Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. Imtiyaz Ahmad(2019) 2 SCC 404.E

3.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the appellant Bank that even otherwise on the ground that therespondent – original writ petitioner deliberately and willfully suppressedthe material fact of having been graduate and did not disclose the sameeven in the bio-data which was required to be submitted in the prescribedFform, the High Court has materially erred in directing the appellant Bankto allow the respondent – original writ petitioner to perform his duties asa Peon as per the appointment order dated 03.10.2016 which, as such,was already cancelled. Reliance is placed on the decisions of this Courtin the cases of State of Orissa v. Bibhisan Kanhar (2017) 8 SCC 608Gand in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Ram RatanYadav (2003) 3 SCC 437. It is submitted that had it been known to thebank that he was a graduate, he would not have at all been consideredfor selection as a Peon in the bank. It is submitted that based on the bio-data and the application submitted by him, in which he gave the particularsof having passed 12[th] standard, his candidature was accepted. It isH

submitted that before he was permitted to resume/join the duty, the bankcame to know that he was a graduate since 2014 and therefore was noteligible at all and thereafter his candidature was cancelled and he wasnot allowed to join the duty. It is submitted that therefore the High Courthas erred in directing the appellant bank to allow the respondent – originalwrit petitioner to discharge his duties as Peon as per the appointmentorder dated 03.10.2016.

4. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by the learned counselappearing on behalf of the respondent – original writ petitioner. It isvehemently submitted on behalf of the respondent – original writ petitionerthat as rightly held by the High Court relying upon the decision of thisCourt in the case of Mohd. Riazul Usman Gani (supra) and the decisionof the Allahabad High Court in the case of Pankaj Kumar Dubey(supra), the higher qualification cannot be a disqualification. It is submittedthat in the case of Mohd. Riazul Usman Gani (supra), this Court hasdeprecated the criteria of maximum qualification for the post of Peon.It is submitted that therefore, as such, the High Court has not committedany error in directing the appellant Bank to permit the respondent –original writ petitioner to discharge his duties as a Peon pursuant to theappointment order dated 03.10.2016. It is submitted that the appointmentof respondent – original writ petitioner was cancelled mainly/solely onthe ground that he was having a higher qualification. It is submitted thatin the present case the eligibility criteria/educational qualificationmentioned in the advertisement was 12[th] standard and cannot be said tobe a maximum educational qualification and therefore merely becausethe respondent-original writ petitioner was having a higher qualificationthan 12[th] standard, his candidature could not have been cancelled.

4.1 Making the above submission it is prayed to dismiss the presentappeal.

5. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of therespective parties at length. The appellant Bank invited the applicationsfor the post Peon by giving an advertisement in the local newspaper. Inthe advertisement itself, it was specifically mentioned that a candidateshould have passed 12[th] class or its equivalent with basic reading/writingknowledge of English and should not be a graduate as on 01.01.2016.Thus, as per the eligibility criteria mentioned in the advertisement, acandidate who was having qualification of graduate was not eligible evento apply. From the counter filed on behalf of the Bank before the High AB

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ACourt, it appears that the educational qualification mentioned in theadvertisement was as per Circular letter No. 25 of 2008 dated 06.11.2008issued by the HRD Division of the bank. The relevant portion of theCircular letter No. 25 of 2008 dated 06.11.2008 reads as under:

“Age Minimum – 18 yearsBMaximum – 24 years with applicable relaxations.

Education: Pass in 12[th] Standard or its equivalent with basicreading/writing knowledge of English (Graduates are not eligible)”

5.1 It appears that thereafter on 04.03.2016 the HRD Division ofCthe Bank issued another Circular Letter No. 6 of 2016 indicating thereinthat the process of conducting interviews for recruitment of posts insubordinate cadre has since been discontinued, the Bank’s Board in itsmeeting 29.02.2016 has approved an alternative mechanism in lieu ofinterviews for recruitment of Peons in subordinate cadre selection onthe basis of percentage of marks obtained by the candidates in 10[th]Dstandard and 12[th] standard. Therefore, the appointments to the post ofsubordinate staff/Peons were required to be made strictly in accordancewith the eligibility criteria mentioned in the Circular letter No. 25 of 2008dated 06.11.2008 and the selection of the Peons was required to bemade as per Circular letter No. 6 of 2016 dated 04.3.2016.

E5.2 It is not in dispute that pursuant to the said advertisement,respondent herein – original writ petitioner applied for the post of Peon.However, in the application/bio-data, he did not disclose that he is agraduate from 2014. He only mentioned his qualification as 12[th] pass.On the basis of the information provided by him in his application, hisFapplication was entertained and he was selected on the basis of themarks obtained in 10[th] class and 12[th] class. Therefore, the respondent –original writ petitioner deliberately, wilfully and intentionally suppressedthe fact that he was a graduate. Had it been known to the bank that hewas a graduate, he would not have at all been considered for selectionas a Peon in the bank. That thereafter and before the original writGpetitioner was permitted to resume his duty pursuant to the appointmentorder dated 03.10.2016, the bank came to know that he was a graduate.That thereafter when scrutiny of the document was going on, the originalwrit petitioner produced the graduate certification showing that he wasa graduate since 2014, the bank found that he was not eligible as he didnot fulfill the criteria mentioned in the advertisement, and that heH

suppressed the material fact that he was a graduate, his candidaturecame to be cancelled and he was not allowed to join the bank in thesubordinate cadre/Peon.

5.3 The learned Single Judge of the High Court by the judgmentand order allowed the writ petition preferred by the respondent anddirected the appellant Bank to allow the original writ petitioner to dischargehis duties as a Peon as per appointment order dated 03.10.2016 on theground that as held by the Allahabad High Court in the case of PankajKumar Dubey (supra), in which the decision of this Court in the case ofMohd. Riazul Usman Gani (supra) was relied upon, the higherqualification cannot be the qualification for the post of Peon. Decision ofthe learned Single Judge has been continuing by the Division Bench byimpugned non-speaking and unreasoned order. Therefore, the shortquestion which is posed for consideration of this Court is whether in thefacts and circumstances of the case and despite the fact that there wassuppression of the material fact by the respondent – original writ petitionerin not disclosing in the application/bio-data that he was a graduate, theHigh Court is justified in directing the appellant Bank to allow therespondent – original writ petitioner to discharge his duties as a Peon asper appointment order dated 03.10.2016 which, as such, was cancelled?

6. It is required to be noted that the eligibility criteria/educationalqualification mentioned in the advertisement inviting the applications wasas per Circular letter No. 25 of 2008 dated 06.11.2008, the relevantportion of which is reproduced hereinabove. As stated in the counter tothe writ petition, a conscious decision was taken by the bank providingeligibility criteria/educational qualification that a graduate candidate shallnot be eligible for the post of Peon/subordinate staff. The said decisionwas taken consciously looking to the nature of the post. At this stage, itis required to be noted that the original writ petitioner never challengedthe eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in theadvertisement. He participated in the recruitment process on the basisof the advertisement, without challenging the eligibility criteria/educationalqualification mentioned in the advertisement. Therefore, once havingparticipated in the recruitment process as per the advertisement,thereafter it is not open for him to contend that acquisition of higherqualification cannot be a disqualification and that too when he neverchallenged the eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned inthe advertisement.

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7. Even otherwise, prescribing the eligibility criteria/educationalqualification that a graduate shall not be eligible to apply was a consciousdecision taken by the Bank and the same was as per the Circular letterNo. 25 of 2008 dated 06.11.2008. In the case of J. Rangaswamy (supra),it is observed and held by this Court that it is not for the court to considerthe relevance of qualifications prescribed for various posts.

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7.1 In the case of Yogesh Kumar (supra), it is observed and heldby this Court that recruitment to public service should be held strictly inaccordance with the terms of advertisement and the recruitment rules,if any. Deviation from the rules allows entry to ineligible persons anddeprives many others who could have competed for the post.

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7.2 In a recent decision of this Court in the case of Zahoor AhmadRather (supra), this Court has distinguished another decision of this Courtin the case of Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission (2010)15 SCC 596 taking the view that in a case where lower qualification isprescribed, if a person has acquired higher qualifications, such qualificationDcan certainly be stated to presuppose the acquisition of the lowerqualifications prescribed for the post. In the said decision, this Court alsotook note of another decision of this Court in the case of State of Punjabv. Anita (2015) 2 SCC 170, in which case, this Court on facts distinguishedthe decision in the case of Jyoti K.K. (supra). While distinguishing theEdecision in the case of Jyoti K.K. (supra), it is observed in paras 25 and26 as under:

“25. The decision in Jyoti K.K. [Jyoti K.K. v. KeralaPublic Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3 SCC(L&S) 664] has been considered in a judgment of two learnedJudges in State of Punjab v. Anita [State of Punjab v. Anita,(2015) 2 SCC 170 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 329] . In that case,applications were invited for JBT/ETT qualified teachers. Underthe rules, the prescribed qualification for a JBT teacher includeda Matric with a two years’ course in JBT training and knowledgeof Punjabi and Hindi of the Matriculation standard or its equivalent.This Court held that none of the respondents held the prescribedqualification and an MA, MSc or MCom could not be treated as a“higher qualification”. Adverting to the decision in Jyoti K.K. [JyotiK.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596: (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664] , this Court noted that Rule 10(a)(ii)in that case clearly stipulated that the possession of a higher F

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qualification can presuppose the acquisition of a lower qualificationprescribed for the post. In the absence of such a stipulation, itwas held that such a hypothesis could not be deduced: (Anitacase [State of Punjab v. Anita, (2015) 2 SCC 170 : (2015) 1SCC (L&S) 329] , SCC p. 177, para 15)

“15. It was sought to be asserted on the basis of the aforesaidobservations, that since the private respondents possess higherqualifications, then the qualification of JBT/ETT, they should betreated as having fulfilled the qualification stipulated for the postsof JBT/ETT Teachers. It is not possible for us to accept theaforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the privaterespondents, because the statutory rules which were taken intoconsideration by this Court while recording the aforesaidobservations inJyoti K.K. case [Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala PublicService Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S)664] , permitted the aforesaid course. The statutory rule, in thedecision relied on by the learned counsel for the private respondents,is extracted hereunder: (SCC p. 598, para 6)

‘6. Rule 10(a)(ii) reads as follows:

10. (a)(ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in theseRules or in the Special Rules, the qualifications recognised byexecutive orders or Standing Orders of Government asequivalent to a qualification specified for a post in the SpecialRules [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has beenemphasised in original.] and such of those higherqualifications which presuppose the acquisition of thelower qualification prescribed for the post shall also besufficient for the post.’

(emphasis supplied)

A perusal of the Rule clearly reveals that the possession ofhigher qualification would presuppose the acquisition of thelower qualification prescribed for the posts. Insofar as thepresent controversy is concerned, there is no similar statutoryprovision authorising the appointment of persons with higherqualifications.”

(emphasis supplied)

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26. We are in respectful agreement with the interpretationwhich has been placed on the judgment in Jyoti K.K. [JyotiK.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596: (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664] in the subsequent decisionin Anita [State of Punjab v. Anita, (2015) 2 SCC 170 : (2015) 1SCC (L&S) 329]. The decision in Jyoti K.K. [Jyoti K.K. v. KeralaPublic Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3 SCC(L&S) 664] turned on the provisions of Rule 10(a)(ii). Absentsuch a rule, it would not be permissible to draw an inference thata higher qualification necessarily presupposes the acquisition ofanother, albeit lower, qualification. The prescription of qualificationsfor a post is a matter of recruitment policy. The State as theemployer is entitled to prescribe the qualifications as a conditionof eligibility. It is no part of the role or function of judicial reviewto expand upon the ambit of the prescribed qualifications. Similarly,equivalence of a qualification is not a matter which can bedetermined in exercise of the power of judicial review. Whether aparticular qualification should or should not be regarded asequivalent is a matter for the State, as the recruiting authority, todetermine. The decision in Jyoti K.K. [Jyoti K.K. v. KeralaPublic Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3 SCC(L&S) 664] turned on a specific statutory rule under which theholding of a higher qualification could presuppose the acquisitionof a lower qualification. The absence of such a rule in the presentcase makes a crucial difference to the ultimate outcome. In thisview of the matter, the Division Bench [Imtiyaz Ahmad v. ZahoorAhmad Rather, LPA (SW) No. 135 of 2017, decided on 12-10-2017 (J&K)] of the High Court was justified in reversing thejudgment [Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. State of J&K, 2017 SCCOnLine J&K 936] of the learned Single Judge and in coming tothe conclusion that the appellants did not meet the prescribedqualifications. We find no error in the decision [ImtiyazAhmad v. Zahoor Ahmad Rather, LPA (SW) No. 135 of 2017,decided on 12-10-2017 (J&K)] of the Division Bench.”

That thereafter it is observed in para 27 as under:

27. While prescribing the qualifications for a post, the State,as employer, may legitimately bear in mind several featuresincluding the nature of the job, the aptitudes requisite for the CHIEF MANAGER, PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK & ANR. v.ANIT KUMAR DAS [M. R. SHAH, J.]

efficient discharge of duties, the functionality of a qualificationand the content of the course of studies which leads up to theacquisition of a qualification. The State is entrusted with theauthority to assess the needs of its public services. Exigencies ofadministration, it is trite law, fall within the domain of administrativedecision-making. The State as a public employer may well takeinto account social perspectives that require the creation of jobopportunities across the societal structure. All these are essentiallymatters of policy. Judicial review must tread warily. That is whythe decision in Jyoti K.K. [Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public ServiceCommission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664]must be understood in the context of a specific statutory rule underwhich the holding of a higher qualification which presupposes theacquisition of a lower qualification was considered to be sufficientfor the post. It was in the context of specific rule that the decisionin Jyoti K.K. [Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission,(2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664] turned.

7.3 Thus, as held by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, it is forthe employer to determine and decide the relevancy and suitability ofthe qualifications for any post and it is not for the Courts to consider andassess. A greater latitude is permitted by the Courts for the employer toprescribe qualifications for any post. There is a rationale behind it.Qualifications are prescribed keeping in view the need and interest of anInstitution or an Industry or an establishment as the case may be. TheCourts are not fit instruments to assess expediency or advisability orutility of such prescription of qualifications. However, at the same time,the employer cannot act arbitrarily or fancifully in prescribing qualificationsfor posts. In the present case, prescribing the eligibility criteria/educationalqualification that a graduate candidate shall not be eligible and thecandidate must have passed 12[th] standard is justified and as observedhereinabove, it is a conscious decision taken by the Bank which is inforce since 2008. Therefore, the High Court has clearly erred in directingthe appellant Bank to allow the respondent-original writ petitioner todischarge his duties as a Peon, though he as such was not eligible as perthe eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in theadvertisement.

8. Even on the ground that respondent – original writ petitionerdeliberately, wilfully and intentionally suppressed the fact that he was a AB

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Agraduate, the High Court has erred in directing the appellant Bank toallow the respondent – original writ petitioner to discharge his duties asa Peon. In the application/bio-data, the respondent-original writ petitionerdid not mention that he was a graduate. Very cleverly he suppressed thematerial fact and declared his qualification as H.S.C., whereas as amatter of fact, he was holding a degree in the Bachelor in Arts. Had itBbeen known to the bank that he was a graduate, he would not have at allbeen considered for selection as a Peon in the bank. That thereafterwhen scrutiny of the documents was going on and when the respondent– original writ petitioner produced a graduation certificate, at that time,the bank came to know that he was a graduate and therefore not eligibleCand therefore the bank rightly cancelled his candidature and he was notallowed to join the bank in the subordinate cadre. Therefore, on theaforesaid ground alone, the High Court ought not to have allowed thewrit petition when it was a clear case of suppression of material fact bythe original writ petitioner. An employee is expected to give a correctinformation as to his qualification. The original writ petitioner failed to doDso. He was in fact over-qualified and therefore ineligible to apply for thejob. In fact, by such conduct on the part of the respondent –original writpetitioner, one another righteous candidate has suffered for hismischievous act. As held by this Court in the case of Ram Ratan Yadav(supra), suppression of material information and making a false statementEhas a clear bearing on the character and antecedents of the employee inrelation to his continuance in service. A candidate having suppressed thematerial information and/or giving false information cannot claim right tocontinuance in service. Thus, on the ground of suppression of materialinformation and the facts and as the respondent – original writ petitionereven otherwise was not eligible as per the eligibility criteria/educationalFqualification mentioned in the advertisement which was as per Circularletter No. 25 of 2008 dated 06.11.2008, the bank rightly cancelled hiscandidature and rightly did not permit him to resume his duty.

9. On reading the judgment and order passed by the learned singleJudge it appears that the learned single Judge has not at all consideredGthe aforesaid aspect of suppression of material fact and information.So far as the impugned order passed by the Division Bench of the HighCourt, as such it is a non-speaking and unreasoned order, without evenstating any facts.

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CHIEF MANAGER, PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK & ANR. v.ANIT KUMAR DAS [M. R. SHAH, J.]

10. In view of the above and for the reasons state above, theimpugned order dated 22.11.2019 passed by the Division Bench of theHigh Court and the judgment and order passed by the learned singleJudge of the High Court dated 13.03.2019 in W.P. (C) No. 19261 of2016 directing the appellant Bank to allow the respondent – original writpetitioner to discharge his duties as a Peon as per appointment orderdated 03.11.2016 is unsustainable and deserves to quashed and set asideand are accordingly quashed and set aside. The appeal is allowed.However, considering the fact that the post in question was a subordinatestaff post/Peon, and despite the fact that because of the mischievousact on the part of the original writ petitioner, one candidate could not getthe job, we refrain from imposing the cost and leave the matter there.

Kalpana K. Tripathy

Appeal allowed

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