LOK PRAHARI, THROUGH ITS GENERAL SECRETARY S.N. SHUKLA versus ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA & ORS. on 26 September 2018

LOK PRAHARI, THROUGHITS GENERAL SECRETARY S.N. SHUKLA

v.

ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA & ORS.

(Writ Petition (Civil) No.330 of 2016)

SEPTEMBER 26, 2018

[DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND

DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – s.8 – Disqualificationu/s.8 on conviction for certain offences – Stay of conviction by theAppellate Court – Effect of – Held: Upon the stay of a convictionu/s. 389 of Cr.P.C., the disqualification u/s.8 will not operate – TheAppellate Court has power, in an appropriate case, to stay theconviction u/s.389 of Cr.P.C. besides suspending the sentence –The power to stay conviction is by way of an exception – Before, itis exercised, the Appellate Court must be made aware of theconsequence which will ensue if the conviction were not to be stayed– Once the conviction has been stayed by the Appellate Court, thedisqualification under sub-sections 1, 2 and 3 of s.8 of the Act willnot operate – In other words, the disqualification which operatedas a consequence of the conviction cannot take or remain in effect– Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.389 – Penal Code, 1860 –ss. 353, 504 and 506 – Constitution of India – Arts.102(1)(e) and191(1)(e).

An erstwhile member of the State Legislative Assemblywas convicted u/ss. 353, 504 and 506 of IPC and was sentencedto imprisonment. In appeal, District Court stayed the executionof the sentence and of the conviction. The Petitioner filed PILbefore the High Court seeking declaration that MLA wasdisqualified u/s.8 of the Act notwithstanding the stay granted bythe Sessions Judge. PIL dismissed by the High Court. Hence,the present writ petition.

Dismissing the Writ petition, the Court

HELD: 1. The Supreme Court has settled the position onthe effect of an order of an appellate court staying a conviction

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Conclusion

Apending the appeal in its various judgments. Upon the stay of aconviction under Section 389 of Cr.P.C., the disqualificationunder Section 8 of Representation of People Act, 1951 will notoperate. The decisions in Ravi Kant Patil and Lily Thomasconclude the issue. Since the decision in Rama Narang, it hasbeen well-settled that the appellate court has the power, in anBappropriate case, to stay the conviction under Section 389 ofCr.P.C. besides suspending the sentence. The power to stay aconviction is by way of an exception. Before it is exercised, theappellate court must be made aware of the consequence whichwill ensue if the conviction were not to be stayed. Once theCconviction has been stayed by the appellate court, thedisqualification under sub-sections 1, 2 and 3 of Section 8 of theRepresentation of the People Act 1951 will not operate. UnderArticle 102(1)(e) and Article 191(1)(e) of the Constitution, thedisqualification operates by or under any law made by Parliament.Disqualification under the above provisions of Section 8 followsDupon a conviction for one of the listed offences. Once theconviction has been stayed during the pendency of an appeal, thedisqualification which operates as a consequence of theconviction cannot take or remain in effect. In view of theconsistent statement of the legal position in Rama Narang and inEdecisions which followed, there is no merit in the submissionthat the power conferred on the appellate court under Section389 does not include the power, in an appropriate case, to staythe conviction. Clearly, the appellate court does possess such apower. Moreover, it is untenable that the disqualification whichensues from a conviction will operate despite the appellate courtFhaving granted a stay of the conviction. The authority vested inthe appellate court to stay a conviction ensures that a convictionon untenable or frivolous grounds does not operate to causeserious prejudice. As the decision in Lily Thomas has clarified, astay of the conviction would relieve the individual from sufferingGthe consequence inter alia of a disqualification relatable to theprovisions of sub-sections 1, 2 and 3 of Section 8 of the 1951 Act.[Para 14] [181-D-H; 182-A-B]

Lily Thomas v. Union of India(2013) 7 SCC 653 :[2013] 10 SCR 1130 ; Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang H

LOK PRAHARI, THR. ITS GEN. SECY. S.N. SHUKLA v.ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA

(1995) 2 SCC 513 : [1995] 1 SCR 456 ;Ravikant SPatil v. Sarvabhouma S Bagali(2007) 1 SCC 67 :[2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 1156– relied on.

B R Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu(2001) 7 SCC 231 :[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 191 ;P V Narasimha Rao v.State (CBI/SPE)(1998) 4 SCC 626 : [1998] 2 SCR870 ;Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab AIR 2007SC 1003 : [ 2007] 1 SCR 1143 ; State of Tamil Nadu v.A. Jaganathan(1996) 5 SCC 329 : [1996] 3 Suppl.SCR 572 ;K.C. Sareenv CBI, Chandigarh(2001) 6SCC 584 ;State of Maharashtra v. Gajanan (2003) 12SCC 432 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil)No. 330 of 2016.

Maninder Singh, ASG, R. Balasubramanian, Nalin Kohli, PrabhasBajaj, Ms. Aarti Sharma, Ankit Roy, Indra Jeet Singh, Mukesh KumarMaroria, Mohit D. Ram, Ms. Monisha Handa, S. S. Shamshery, AmitSharma, Ankit Raj, Ms. Indira Bhakar, R. C. Kohli, Nishant RamakantraoKatneshwarkar, Ms. Deepa M. Kulkarni, Ms. Suvarna Ganu, Advs.for the Respondents.

Petitioner-in-person.

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AThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. 1. Thepetitioner, Lok Prahari, is a society registered under the Societies’Registration Act 1860 with objects pertaining to public governance andadministration. It has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article32 of the Constitution, in the present Public Interest Litigation through itsGeneral Secretary, who appeared in person. The following amongst otherreliefs have been sought:

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1 “Declare that since the law does not provide for stay ofconviction, even in case of stay of conviction by the appellatecourt for an offence attracting disqualification under Section 8 ofRP Act, 1951, any such stay order does not have the effect ofwiping out the disqualification and reviving the membership withretrospective effect and consequently, the seat of the concernedmember is deemed to have beome vacant with effect from thedate of conviction in terms of Article 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) ofthe Constitution.

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2 Declare that as a consequence of the declaration as per 1above, any member of Parliament of State legislature whobecomes subject to disqualification mentioned in Article 102(1)(e)or 190(1)(e) shall be liable to penalty under Article 104/193notwithstanding any order of the appellate/ revisional courtpurporting to stay his conviction for an offence attractingdisqualification mentioned in Section 8 of RP Act, 1951....

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3 issue a writ, order of direction in the nature of Mandamus tothe respondent no. 1 to issue within 24 hours of receipt of certifiedcopy of the judgment and order regarding sentence the notificationregarding disqualification and consequent vacancy of the seat ofthe concerned MP/MLA/MLC with effect from the date of his/her conviction as a result of his/her disqualification for an offenceunder Section 8(1)(2) and (3) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951.

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4 issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus to therespondent no. 1 to ensure action for filing the vacancy of theseat of a member of Parliament/State legislature as per Section151 of the RP Act, 1951 disregarding any order of the appellate/

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revisional court purporting to stay of conviction for an offenceattracting disqualification mentioned in Section 8 of RP Act,1951....”

2. An erstwhile member of the Legislative Assembly in the Stateof Uttar Pradesh was convicted of offences under Sections 353, 504and 506 of the Penal Code and was sentenced to imprisonment. In appeal,the District Court stayed the execution of the sentence and of theconviction.

3. The petitioner instituted a Public Interest Litigation before theLucknow Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, seeking a declarationthat the MLA stood disqualified notwithstanding the stay granted by theSessions Judge. The PIL was dismissed by the High Court on the groundthat since the appellate court stayed the conviction, the disqualification,which would otherwise stand attracted, would not operate from the dateon which the conviction has been stayed.

4. The petitioner urges that the seat held by a Member ofParliament or of the State legislature becomes vacant upon adisqualification being incurred under Article 102 or Article 191,respectively. According to the petitioner, once the disqualification isincurred under Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act 1951read with Article 102(1)(e) or Article 191(1)(e), the seat becomesvacant effective from the date of conviction. Relying on the decision ofthis Court in B R Kapur v State of Tamil Nadu[1],the petitionercontends that under Section 389 of Cr.P.C. the appellate court does nothave the power to stay conviction and can stay only the execution ofsentence.

Article 102 of the Constitution provides thus:

“102. (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, andfor being, a member of either House of Parliament—

(a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of Indiaor the Government of any State, other than an office declared byParliament by law not to disqualify its holder; (b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competentcourt;

(c) if he is an undischarged insolvent;

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(d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily acquired thecitizenship of a foreign State, or is under any acknowledgment ofallegiance or adherence to a foreign State; (e) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament.

[Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause] a person shall notbe deemed to hold an office of profit under the Government ofIndia or the Government of any State by reason only that he is aMinister either for the Union or for such State. 2 [(2) A personshall be disqualified for being a member of either House ofParliament if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule.]”

Article 191 of the Constitution provides a disqualification in similarterms for membership of a legislative assembly or legislative council ofa state.

The relevant provision in Section 8 of the Representation of thePeople Act 1951 reads thus:

“8. Disqualification on conviction for certain offences.—

[(1) A person convicted of an offence punishable under—

(a) section 153A (offence of promoting enmity between differentgroups on ground of religion, race, place of birth, residence,language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance ofharmony) or section 171E (offence of bribery) or section 171F(offence of undue influence or personation at an election) or sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 376 or section 376A orsection 376B or section 376C or section 376D (offences relatingto rape) or section 498A (offence of cruelty towards a woman byhusband or relative of a husband) or sub-section (2) or sub-section(3) of section 505 (offence of making statement creating orpromoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes or offencerelating to such statement in any place of worship or in anyassembly engaged in the performance of religious worship orreligious ceremonies) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); or (b) the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (22 of 1955), whichprovides for punishment for the preaching and practice of“untouchability”, and for the enforcement of any disability arisingtherefrom; or

(c) section 11 (offence of importing or exporting prohibited goods)of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962); or

(d) sections 10 to 12 (offence of being a member of an associationdeclared unlawful, offence relating to dealing with funds of anunlawful association or offence relating to contravention of anorder made in respect of a notified place) of the Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967); or (e) the Foreign Exchange (Regulation) Act, 1973 (46 of 1973); or (f) the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985(61 of 1985); or (g) section 3 (offence of committing terrorist acts) or section 4(offence of committing disruptive activities) of the Terrorist andDisruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (28 of 1987); or (h) section 7 (offence of contravention of the provisions of section3 to 6) of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act,1988 (41 of 1988); or

(i) section 125 (offence of promoting enmity between classes inconnection with the election) or section 135 (offence of removalof ballot papers from polling stations) or section 135A (offence ofbooth capturing) or clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 136(offence of fraudulently defacing or fraudulently destroying anynomination paper) of this Act; 1 [or]

[(j) section 6 (offence of conversion of a place or worship) of thePlaces of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991], [or]

[(k) section 2 (offence of insulting the Indian National Flag or theConstitution of India) or section 3 (offence of preventing singingof National Anthem) of the Prevention of Insults to NationalHonour Act, 1971 (69 of 1971) 4 [or];]

[(l) the Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987 (3 of 1988); or (m) the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988); or (n) the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (15 of 2002),]

[shall be disqualified, where the convicted person is sentencedto—

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A(i) only fine, for a period of six years from the date of suchconviction;

(ii) imprisonment, from the date of such conviction and shallcontinue to be disqualified for a further period of six years sincehis release.]

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(2) A person convicted for the contravention of—

(a) any law providing for the prevention of hoarding or profiteering;or (b) any law relating to the adulteration of food or drugs; or C(c) any provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 6 [1961 (28 of1961);], and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months, shallbe disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continueto be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release.]

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(3) A person convicted of any offence and sentenced toimprisonment for not less than two years [other than any offencereferred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)] shall be disqualifiedfrom the date of such conviction and shall continue to bedisqualified for a further period of six years since his release.]”

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5. It has been contended by the petitioner that there is noprovision in the Constitution or in the Representation of the People Act1951 to the effect that upon a subsequent stay of conviction by theappellate or revisional court, the disqualification shall stand wiped outretrospectively and that the membership of a convicted Member ofFParliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Council shall get reviveddespite the vacancy having occurred from the date of conviction. It hasbeen urged that in the absence of any constitutional or statutoryprovision, stay of conviction can only operate prospectively to enable aperson to contest an election again since membership of the legislatureterminates instantly from the date of conviction.G

6. In response to the present proceedings, a counter affidavit dated10 April, 2015 has been filed on behalf of the Election Commission ofIndia stating that:

i) The Election Commission of India supports the first prayer in thepresent Public Interest Litigation;

ii) The Election Commission of India has issued instructions on 13October 2015 by which it has required the Chief Secretaries toissue appropriate instructions to the department dealing withprosecutions in States and Union Territories to ensure that casesof conviction of sitting Members of Parliament or of the Statelegislature are brought to the notice of the Speaker or Chairmanof the House and the Chief Electoral Officer of the State alongwith the order of conviction within seven days of the order;

iii) In the decision of this Court in Lily Thomas v Union of India[2]it was observed that there is an automatic disqualification uponconviction and there is no question of postponing the effect of thedisqualification on the ground of giving the member of thelegislature an opportunity to exhaust the remedy of appeal and asubsequent stay of conviction cannot retrospectively cure thedisqualification; and

iv) For the purpose of filling the seat which has fallen vacant, itwould not be necessary to await the decision of the President orGovernor under Articles 103 and 192. No decision by thePresident or Governor is required on the question ofdisqualification arising out of conviction. In view of the decision inPV Narasimha Rao v State (CBI/SPE)[3],only a ‘disputed’question of disqualification is to be referred to the President orGovernor.

7. The Union government has opposed the petition. In the counteraffidavit which has been filed on behalf of the Union of India throughthe Secretary in the Department of Justice, Ministry of Law and Justice,it has been submitted that the issues raised in the present petition havealready been considered and decided in the decision of this Court in LilyThomas(supra). Moreover, it has been submitted that no challenge hasbeen addressed in the present petition to any provision of the Act or theRules made under it. The petitioner has only relied on the provisions oflaw and on judicial pronouncements on the subject of disqualification onconviction.

2 (2013) 7 SCC 6533 (1998) 4 SCC 626

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A8. In response to the Counter affidavit filed by the firstRespondent, a Rejoinder dated 20 February 2017 has been filed by thepetitioner stating that:

i) The role of the Election Commission commences immediatelywith the conviction of a sitting legislator. The EC need not awaitBthe receipt of a notification regarding the disqualification and ofthe vacancy in the seat by the Secretariat of the legislative body;and

ii) There exists no legal requirement of a notification regarding thevacancy in the seat in view of the categorical provision in Article101(3)(2) and Article 190(3)(a) of the Constitution that the seatCbecomes vacant upon conviction.9. In response to the Counter affidavit filed by the secondRespondent, a Rejoinder dated 10 November 2017 has been filed bypetitioner submitting thatrevival of membership retrospectively after aconviction is stayed, will open a floodgate with convicted MPs/ MLAs/DMLCs approaching the appellate/ revisional court to get a stay onconviction enabling them to continue even without the protection ofSection 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act 1951.

10. Section 389[4 ]Section of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,empowers the appellate court, pending an appeal by a convicted person4 Section 389 provides as follows :E“Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail.(1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons tobe recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealedagainst be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or onhis own bond.

(2) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate Court may be exercised alsoFby the High Court in the case of an appeal by a convicted person to a Court subordinatethereto.

(3) Where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he is convicted that heintends to present an appeal, the Court shall,-

(i) where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a term notexceeding three years, or

(ii) where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one, and heGis on bail, order that the convicted person be released on bail, unless there are specialreasons for refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient time to present theappeal and obtain the orders of the Appellate Court under sub- section (1); and thesentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to besuspended.

(4) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for a term or toimprisonment for life, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded inHcomputing the term for which he is so sentenced.”

and for reasons to be recorded in writing to order that the execution of asentence or order appealed against, be suspended. In the decision inRama Narang v Ramesh Narang[5], a Bench of three judges of thisCourt examined the issue as to whether the court has the power tosuspend a conviction under Section 389 (1). This Court held that anorder of conviction by itself is not capable of execution under the Codeof Criminal Procedure, 1973. But in certain situations, it can becomeexecutable in a limited sense upon it resulting in a disqualification underother enactments. Hence, in such a case, it was permissible to invokethe power under Section 389 (1) to stay the conviction as well. ThisCourt held:

“19. That takes us to the question whether the scope of Section389(1) of the Code extends to conferring power on the AppellateCourt to stay the operation of the order of conviction. As statedearlier, if the order of conviction is to result in some disqualificationof the type mentioned in Section 267 of the Companies Act, wesee no reason why we should give a narrow meaning to Section389(1) of the Code to debar the court from granting an order tothat effect in a fit case. The appeal under Section 374 is essentiallyagainst the order of conviction because the order of sentence ismerely consequential thereto; albeit even the order of sentencecan be independently challenged if it is harsh and disproportionateto the established guilt. Therefore, when an appeal is preferredunder Section 374 of the Code the appeal is against both theconviction and sentence and therefore, we see no reason to placea narrow interpretation on Section 389(1) of the Code not to extendit to an order of conviction, although that issue in the instant caserecedes to the background because High Courts can exerciseinherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code if the powerwas not to be found in Section 389(1) of the Code.”

11. In Navjot Singh Sidhu v State of Punjab[6]a Bench of twolearned judges of this Court held that a stay of the order of conviction byan appellate court is an exception, to be resorted to in a rare case, afterthe attention of the appellate court is drawn to the consequences whichmay ensue if the conviction is not stayed. The court held:

“The legal position is, therefore, clear that an appellate Court cansuspend or grant stay of order of conviction. But the person seeking 5 (1995) 2 SCC 5136 AIR 2007 SC 1003

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Astay of conviction should specifically draw the attention of theappellate Court to the consequences that may arise if the convictionis not stayed. Unless the attention of the Court is drawn to thespecific consequences that would follow on account of theconviction, the person convicted cannot obtain an order of stay ofconviction. Further, grant of stay of conviction can be resorted toBin rare cases depending upon the special facts of the case.”

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12. The above position was reiterated by a Bench of three judgesof this Court in Ravikant S Patil v Sarvabhouma S Bagali[7], afteradverting to the earlier decisions on the issue, viz. Rama Narang vRamesh Narang(supra),State of Tamil Nadu v A. Jaganathan[8], K.C.CSareen v CBI, Chandigarh[9], B.R. Kapur v State of T.N. (supra) andState of Maharashtra v Gajanan.[10 ]This Court concluded as follows:- “It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of convictionis not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare casesdepending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of theDsentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But wherethe conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction willnot be operative from the date of stay. As order of stay, of course,does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative.Be that as it may. Insofar as the present case is concerned, anEapplication was filed specifically seeking stay of the order ofconviction specifying that consequences if conviction was notstayed, that is, the appellant would incur disqualification to contestthe election. The High Court after considering the special reason,granted the order staying the conviction. As the conviction itselfis stayed in contrast to a stay of execution of the sentence, it isFnot possible to accept the contention of the respondent that thedisqualification arising out of conviction continues to operate evenafter stay of conviction.”

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13. In Lily Thomas(supra),it was urged that in the absence ofSection 8(4), a Member of Parliament or of the State Legislature wouldGbe left without a remedy even if the conviction was “frivolous”. Rejectingthe submission, this Court held (relying on Ravi Kant Patil(supra):

7(2007) 1 SCC 6738(1996) 5 SCC 3299(2001) 6 SCC 58410(2003) 12 SCC 432

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“In the aforesaid case, a contention was raised by the respondentsthat the appellant was disqualified from contesting the election tothe Legislative Assembly under sub-section (3) of Section 8 ofthe Act as he had been convicted for an offence punishable underSections 366 and 376 of the Penal Code and it was held by thethree-Judge Bench that as the High Court for special reasons hadpassed an order staying the conviction, the disqualification arisingout of the conviction ceased to operate after the stay of conviction.Therefore, the disqualification under sub-sections (1), (2) or (3)of Section 8 of the Act will not operate from the date of order ofstay of conviction passed by the appellate court under Section389 of the Code or the High Court under Section 482 of theCode.”[11]

14. These decisions have settled the position on the effect of anorder of an appellate court staying a conviction pending the appeal. Uponthe stay of a conviction under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C., thedisqualification under Section 8 will not operate. The decisions in RaviKant Patil and Lily Thomas conclude the issue. Since the decision inRama Narang, it has been well-settled that the appellate court has thepower, in an appropriate case, to stay the conviction under Section 389besides suspending the sentence. The power to stay a conviction is byway of an exception. Before it is exercised, the appellate court must bemade aware of the consequence which will ensue if the conviction werenot to be stayed. Once the conviction has been stayed by the appellatecourt, the disqualification under sub-sections 1, 2 and 3 of Section 8 ofthe Representation of the People Act 1951 will not operate. UnderArticle 102(1)(e) and Article 191(1)(e), the disqualification operates byor under any law made by Parliament. Disqualification under the aboveprovisions of Section 8 follows upon a conviction for one of the listedoffences. Once the conviction has been stayed during the pendency ofan appeal, the disqualification which operates as a consequence of theconviction cannot take or remain in effect. In view of the consistentstatement of the legal position in Rama Narang and in decisions whichfollowed, there is no merit in the submission that the power conferred onthe appellate court under Section 389 does not include the power, in anappropriate case, to stay the conviction. Clearly, the appellate court doespossess such a power. Moreover, it is untenable that the disqualification A

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Awhich ensues from a conviction will operate despite the appellate courthaving granted a stay of the conviction. The authority vested in theappellate court to stay a conviction ensures that a conviction onuntenable or frivolous grounds does not operate to cause seriousprejudice. As the decision in Lily Thomas has clarified, a stay of theconviction would relieve the individual from suffering the consequenceBinter alia of a disqualification relatable to the provisions of sub-sections1, 2 and 3 of Section 8.

15. Finally, we may address the relief which has been sought inprayer clause 5 by which a direction has been sought to the UnionGovernment through the Secretary in the Department of Justice,CMinistry of Law and Justice, the second Respondent. Prayer clause 5reads as follows :

“5. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of the Mandamusto the respondent no. 2 to- D(i) issue a circular to the Registrar General/Registrars of all HighCourts to issue suitable instructions to all District and SessionsJudges to ensure that 2 certified copies of the judgments in casesattracting disqualification of a sitting MP/MLA/MLC underArticle 102/191 of the Constitution are made available to the statecounsel within 24 hours from the delivery of order regardingEsentence for submission to the concerned District Magistrate,

(ii) issue a circular to the Chief Secretaries of the States/UnionTerritories for issuing suitable instructions to District Magistratesand the District Government Counsel to send by speed post/special messenger one certified copy of the judgment and orderFregarding sentence to the Chief Election Officer of the state andthe other certified copy to the Secretary General/PrincipalSecretary/Secretary of the concerned House (Lok Sabha/RajyaSabha/Legislative Assembly/Legislative Council.”

16. No such direction can be issued by the Secretary in theGDepartment of Justice to the Registrars General of the High Courts.Moreover, following the implementation of the e-courts project, certifiedcopies of judgments are made available across all courts in astreamlined manner. The affidavit filed by the Election Commission of H

India indicates that the Commission has already issued instructions on13 October 2015 to the Chief Secretaries of all states to ensure thatnecessary steps are taken to bring to the notice of the Speaker orChairman as the case may be of the House and the Chief ElectoralOfficer of the state, an order of conviction within a period of seven daysof the passing of the order. The Election Commission is sufficientlyempowered to take appropriate steps in accordance with law. Nofurther directions are necessary in that regard.

17. The writ petition shall accordingly stand dismissed. Pendingapplication, if any, is accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order asto costs.

Ankit Gyan

Writ Petition dismissed.

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