RANBIR SINGH versus SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE CORP. OF INDIA & ANR. on 27 April 2022

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R. 986

[2022] 10 S.C.R.

RANBIR SINGH

A

v.

SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE CORP. OF INDIA &ANR.

(Miscellaneous Application No.1150 of 2019)

B

In

(Contempt Petition (Civil) No.1921 of 2017)

In

(Civil Appeal No. 6950 Of 2009)

C

APRIL 27, 2022

[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, SURYA KANTAND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]

DLabour Laws – Absorption – Of persons engaged by LifeInsurance Corporation of India as temporary/badli/part-timeworkers – Claim for regularisation of workers employed from 20May 1985 till 4 March 1991 – Dogra Report – Objections of LIC tothe Dogra report – Tulpule and Jamdar Awards – Srivastav award– Validity of verification in the Dogra Report – Palpable conflictEbetween decisions of the Supreme Court – Held: The conflict mustbe harmonised by taking recourse to jurisdiction under Art.142 ofthe Constitution – Directions accordingly issued in the facts andcircumstances of the case – Service Law.

Service Law – Public employment – Equal opportunity andFfairness in public employment – Held: LIC as a statutory corporationis bound by the mandate of Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution – Asa public employer, the recruitment process of the corporation mustmeet the constitutional standard of a fair and open process –Allowing for back-door entries into service is an anathema to publicGservice – A public employer such as LIC cannot be directed to carryout a mass absorption of over 11,000 workers on flawed premiseswithout following a recruitment process which is consistent with theprinciples of equality of opportunity governed by Arts. 14 and 16of the Constitution – Such an absorption would provide the veryback-door entry, which negates the principle of equal opportunity H

and fairness in public employment – Constitution of India – Arts.14 and 16.

Labour Laws – Absorption – In Life Insurance Corporation– Interplay between the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and s.48 ofthe LIC Act 1956 – Discussed – Held: Mere fact that a person isappointed in a temporary capacity by LIC, does not entitle such aperson ipso jure to seek absorption merely by virtue of or only byreason of such an appointment – Life Insurance Corporation Act,1956 – s.48 – Life Insurance Corporation of India (StaffRegulations), 1960 – Regulation 8 – Industrial Disputes Act 1947 –– Service Law.

Practice and Procedure – Precedent – Conflicting judgmentsof different Benches – Two-judge Bench not at liberty to take afinal view at variance with binding decisions of a larger Bench andof a co-ordinate Bench – In case of difference of opinion, it had torefer the matter to a larger Bench.

Disposing of the Writ Petitions, the Court HELD: 1. None of the Counsel appearing on behalf of theworkers in the present batch of cases disputed the factual position,asserted on behalf of LIC, that the judgment of the two-judgeBench in TN Terminated Employees Association affirming thevalidity of the Srivastav Award contains no reference whatsoeverto the final order dated 7 February 1996 in the batch of civilappeals arising from the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards in LIC v.Their Workmen. The interim order dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v.Their Workmen, which forms the basis of the judgment in TNTerminated Employees Association, was passed in the backdrop ofa compromise which was arrived between LIC and eight out ofthe nine Unions and Associations representing the workers. Sincethe appeals were pending at that stage, the Court granted libertyto the parties to the compromise to implement its terms as aninterim measure, without prejudice to the contentions of the ninthUnion which had not entered into the compromise. But noticeably,there is a clear omission on the part of the Court in TN TerminatedEmployees Association to refer to the admitted position thatsubsequently on 7 February 1996, this Court in LIC v. TheirWorkmen accepted the submission of LIC that since eight out of A

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Athe nine unions (representing nearly 99 per cent of the workersin Class III and Class IV posts) had accepted the compromise,there was no justification for the ninth Union to object. The Courtheld that it would be in the interest of industrial peace that theninth Union should also fall in line and act on the terms of thecompromise. The civil appeals in LIC v. Their Workmen wereBdisposed of in terms of the above order dated 7 February 1996.The terms of compromise clearly envisaged that the managementand the workers had agreed that the awards of the NIT dated 17April 1986 (Tulpule Award) and 26 August 1988 (Jamdar Award)“be substituted by the terms and conditions of compromise inCrelation to the question of regular employment of the workmenconcerned in the said references”. Once the awards weresubstituted by the terms of compromise, it would be animpermissible interpretation of law to hold that the awardscontinued to be operative and binding, notwithstanding the finalorder of this Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen.DThe final order dated 7 February 1996 has not been adverted toby the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association.The factual finding is based only on the interim order dated 1March 1989. The final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v.Their Workmen had a crucial bearing on the special leave petitionsEarising from the judgment of the Delhi High Court setting asidethe Srivastav Award. [Para 53][1044-E-H; 1045-A-E]

2. The two-judge Bench in TN Terminated EmployeesAssociation opined that the scheme which was framed in EPrabavathy was the outcome of an order which was passed in writFpetitions filed by the workers and not in the course of theadjudication of an industrial dispute. On this ground, the Courtheld that the decision in E Prabavathy would not come in the wayof an adjudication by the CGIT or NIT while deciding a referenceunder Section 10 of the ID Act. The decision in E Prabavathy wasrendered on 23 October 1992 in a batch of civil appeals whichGwas being considered by a three-judge Bench. During thependency of the civil appeals, the Court called upon LIC toformulate a scheme for the regularisation of workers who hadbeen granted ad hoc employment for at least 85 days from time H

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to time. The three-judge Bench held, after assessing the termsof the scheme proposed by LIC, that it was reasonable andcommended itself for acceptance. The scheme proposed by LICwas approved by this Court with a specific observation that theclauses of the scheme extracted in the order would form a part ofthe order of this Court. The decision of three Judges in EPrabavathy was thereafter interpreted by a two-judge Bench inits order dated 22 November 2001 in G Sudhakar. Noticing thatthe scheme which has been accepted in E Prabavathy governedworkers of the Tamil Nadu Division of LIC, the Court held thatthe scheme would be equally applicable to the workers of alldivisions of LIC in the country. The Court therefore held that itwas not necessary to evolve a fresh scheme for a different groupof workers, in that case under the directions of the AndhraPradesh High Court. As a matter of fact, it is also material tonote that in paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award itself there wasa specific finding that though the E Prabavathy group of workershad been impleaded in the reference and had filed a statement ofthe claim, having regard to the fact that the order of this Courtdated 23 October 1992 was between the same parties, theworkers had no valid ground to challenge the legality of thisCourt’s order before the tribunal. Despite the clear observationsin the Srivastav Award, the judgment of the two-judge Bench inTN Terminated Employees Association has come to the conclusionthat the order of the three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy wouldnot preclude an industrial adjudication by the tribunal. The two-judge Bench which delivered the judgment in TN TerminatedEmployees Association was bound by the order in E Prabavathy ,which was of a larger Bench of three judges, and the interpretationwhich was placed on it by another two-judge Bench in G Sudhakar.If the two-judge Bench differed, it had to refer the matter to alarger Bench but it was not at liberty to take a final view at variancewith binding decisions of a larger Bench and of a co-ordinateBench. [Para 54][1045-E-H; 1046-A-F]

3. There cannot be any dispute over the principle that thejudgment in TN Terminated Employees Association, followed bythe order in review dated 9 August 2016, are between the present A

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Aparties and finality has attached to them. LIC is, however, beforethis Court urging that as a statutory entity with a nationwidepresence, it is faced with a situation involving conflicting directionsof this Court. LIC has submitted that while on the one hand, theTulpule and Jamdar Awards were substituted by the terms ofcompromise on 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen, thisBwas preceded by the order dated 23 October 1992 of a three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy which accepted the scheme ofabsorption proposed by LIC and followed by the order dated 22November 2001 of a two-judge Bench in G Sudhakar whichinterpreted the decision in E Prabavathy as being applicable toCall divisions of LIC. The impact of the judgment in TN TerminatedEmployees Association is to substitute and supplant the schemeswhich were evolved before this Court for providing absorptionon specified terms. The essence of the schemes which wereaccepted by this Court was that those temporary, badli and part-time workers who fulfilled the requirement of the threshold periodDof service would be eligible to be considered for the grant of thepermanency, subject to certain conditions. The orders passed bythis Court envisage that these workers would be considered forthe grant of permanency in the course of a recruitment process.The impact of the judgment of the two-judge Bench in TNETerminated Employees Association is that while on the one handthe Court’s orders dated 23 October 1992, 7 February 1996 and22 November 2001 continued to hold the field, on the other handthe restoration of the Srivastav Award brings in place a regime inconflict with what has been accepted by this Court in these orders.Faced with this predicament, it is necessary for this Court toFstep in and to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice caused bythe decision in TN Terminated Employees Association which hasbeen urged to be per incuriam. The consequence of not doing sois serious. [Para 56][1047-B-G]

4. The Court is now confronted with claims on behalf of theGworkers that the principle which has been enunciated in theSrivastav Award and which has been restored by the two-judgeBench in TN Terminated Employees Association must apply to allworkers subsequently engaged by applying Section 18(3)(d) readwith Section 17A of the ID Act. Hence, a balance will nowH

have to be drawn by this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdictionunder Article 142 of the Constitution, which while on the onehand factors in the finality which has attached to the judgment inTN Terminated Employees Association but on the other hand alsofactors in the essential concerns which have been expressedbefore this Court by LIC. LIC had been restrained, due to theinterim orders which were passed in the course of the variousproceedings, from taking recourse to recruitment through theopen market. LIC having been restrained by judicial orders frompursuing an open recruitment process, the situation which hasnow arisen is that unless a balance were to be drawn, absorptionof part-time and badli workers would become a substitute for arecruitment process based on sanctioned posts, consistent withthe principles of reservation and pursued on the basis of astructured recruitment which gives equal opportunities to allapplicants. Such a consequence is a serious detriment toconstitutional parameters and to the duty of LIC as a publicemployer to follow a process which is fair and in consonance withArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. An open and competitiveprocess for recruitment will enable LIC to recruit the best amongthe available talent. Substituting this by a back-door entry will bedetrimental to the interests of the corporation which is governedby statute. [Para 57][1047-H; 1048-A-C, E-G]

5. The Dogra Report eventually concludes that the groupof workers, who are governed by the order of this Court in EPrabavathy, would also be eligible for absorption. By consideringthe workers who are governed by the order in E Prabavathy tobe eligible for absorption, the Dogra Report has fallen into a clearerror. The report has considered those workers who were clearlyoutside the ambit of its remit since they were governed by aspecific order of this Court. That apart, it is evident that the DograReport has proceeded on a generalised assumption that a majorityof workers had produced documents are eligible for absorption(having drawn a negative inference from LIC’s non-productionof documents). In this backdrop, it would be necessary to bringabout a proper verification before the claims of the workers canbe truly considered. The deficiency of the Dogra Report in carryingout a proper verification stands clearly established. [Para60][1051-D-G]

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A6. Section 48 of the LIC Act confers a rule making poweron the Central Government. Clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) ofSection 48 was introduced by Act 1 of 1981 with effect from 31January 1981. Simultaneously by the Amending Act, sub-Sections(2A), (2B) and (2C) were introduced into Section 48. By virtue ofsub-Section (2A), the regulations governing the terms andBconditions of service of the employees and agents of LIC whichwere in force immediately before Amending Act 1 of 1981, aredeemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-Section (2)and have effect subject to the other provisions of the Section. Bya deeming fiction of law, the regulations which were in existenceCon the date of the Amending Act in relation to the terms andconditions of service are given the status of rules framed underclause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of Section 48. The effect of sub-Section (2C) is that the provision of clause (cc) of sub-Section (2)and any rules made under it with retrospective effect, shall alsobe deemed to have had effect from that date notwithstanding anyDjudgment, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authorityand notwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act, or in anyother law or any agreement, settlement, award or otherinstrument for the time being in force. The rules which are framedunder Section 48(2)(cc) operate with a non-obstante clause whichEprevails, inter alia, notwithstanding anything contained in the IDAct. The vires of the Amending Act was upheld in a judgment ofa three-judge Bench of this Court in A V Nachane. Earlier theemployees were governed by the regulations framed by LICunder Section 49 as well as by the provisions of the ID Act. Hence,it was open to the workers to enforce their rights and remediesFin terms of the regulations framed under the LIC Act or inaccordance with the provisions of ID Act. However, after theamendments which were introduced by Parliament in Section 48,the employees of LIC would not be entitled to the protection ofthe ID Act to which they were entitled before the enforcement ofGthe amendment. [Para 61, 62, 63 and 67][1051-G-H; 1052-B,G-H; 1053-A-C; 1056-G-H; 1057-A-B]

7. It becomes necessary at this stage to advert to theprovisions of Regulation 8 of the Life Insurance Corporation ofIndia (Staff Regulations), 1960. Regulation 8(1) deals withHtemporary staff and is prefaced with a non-obstante provision.

Clause (1) of Regulation 8 is an enabling provision empoweringLIC to employ staff in Classes III and IV on a temporary basis,subject to such general or specific directions which may be issuedby the Chairperson from time to time. Clause (2) of Regulation 8stipulates that no person who is appointed under Regulation 8(1)is, only by reason of such appointment, to be entitled to absorptionin the service of LIC or to claim preference for recruitment toany post. The expression “shall only by reason of suchappointment be entitled to absorption” in this sub-clause (2) iscrucial. What the expression postulates is that a person who isappointed on a temporary basis can nether claim an entitlementto absorption or a preference in recruitment merelyby havingbeen appointed on a temporary basis. In other words, Regulation8(2) does not postulate an absolute bar to a claim for absorptionbut it stipulates that absorption cannot be claimed merelyon theground that a person was engaged on a temporary basis.Regulation 8(2), for instance, will not preclude a claim forabsorption being made in terms of a scheme which is propoundedby LIC, so long as the scheme contains provisions which facilitateabsorption on stipulated terms and conditions. But the mere factthat a person is appointed in a temporary capacity by LIC, doesnot entitle such a person ipso jure to seek absorption merely byvirtue of or only by reason of such an appointment. [Para70][1058-B-F]

8. The impact of the provisions of clause (cc) of sub-Section(2), sub-Section (2A) and sub-Section (2C) of Section 48 on theclams of the workers appointed after 4 March 1991 must now beconsidered. The workers who have worked as temporary, badlior part-time workers after 4 March 1991, seek to assert theirclaims on the basis of Section 18(3)(d) of the ID Act. Section 18specifies the person on whom settlements and awards are binding.Section 18(3)(a) stipulates that a settlement or award would bindall the parties to the industrial dispute. Further, clause (d)specifies that where a party to the dispute is composed of workers,the settlement and award binds not only persons who areemployed in the establishment to which the dispute relates onthe date of the dispute but all persons who subsequently becomeemployees in that establishment or a part of it. Section 18(3)(d),in other words, extends the applicability of a settlement or award ABC

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Abeyond the workers who were engaged on the date of the disputeto all persons who subsequently become employees in theestablishment. Regulation 8 of the Staff Regulation expresslypermits the engagement of temporary workers and clause (2)contains a provision to the effect that a person who engaged underits clause (1) shall not, only by reason of such appointment, beBentitled to absorption or to claim a preference for recruitment onany post. The effect of sub-Section (2A) of Section 48 is thatRegulation 8 is deemed to be a rule which is framed under clause(cc) of sub- Section (2) of Section 48. Moreover, the provisionsof Section 48(2C) postulate that a rule which is made under theCclause shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained inthe ID Act. Hence, the workers who have been recruited post 4March 1991 cannot make a claim for absorption ipso jure underSection 18(3)(d) of the ID Act, as a result of the overridingprovision which is contained in sub-Section (2C) of Section 48.[Para 71][1051-F-H; 1059-A-D]D9. In structuring the relief in present proceedings, it isessential to recapitulate the key legal findings that will governthe determination of rights and equities, which are as under:

(i) On 7 February 1996, a two-judge Bench of this Court inELIC v. Their Workmen had accepted the terms of compromisewhich was arrived at on 1 March 1989 between the managementof LIC and eight Unions, and imposed them upon the ninth Unionas well. In addition, the two-judge Bench of this Court had issuedcertain directions; F(ii) On 23 October 1992, a three-judge Bench of this Court,while disposing of the civil appeals in E Prabavathy, specificallyaccepted the scheme formulated by LIC for regularising theworkers who were engaged on a temporary basis. The schemewas also specifically incorporated as a part of the order. The three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy held that the scheme proposed byGLIC is reasonable and that: (a) the regularisation will be byselection for appointment; and (b) the above clauses of the schemewould constitute a part of the order of this Court;

(iii) On 22 November 2001, a two-judge Bench of this Courtin G Sudhakar directed that though the order dated 23 OctoberH

1992 in E Prabavathy applied to the workers of the Tamil Nadudivision, the scheme would equally be applicable to the workersof all divisions of LIC in the country;

(iv) The judgment of the two-judge Bench of this Courtdated 8 March 2015 in TN Terminated Employees Association failedto notice that as a result of the final order dated 7 February 1996in LIC v. Their Workmen, the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards hadbeen substituted by the terms of compromise. The two-judgeBench of this Court overlooked the final order dated 7 February1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen and while adverting only to theinterim order dated 1 March 1989, it arrived at a palpablyerroneous conclusion that the Jamdar and Tulpule Awards werestill operative and binding; and

(v) Though the petition seeking review of TN TerminatedEmployees Association and the curative petition stand dismissed,LIC is confronted with a situation in which it is equally bound bythe earlier decision of the three-judge Bench dated 23 October1992 in E Prabavathy, the judgment of the two-judge Bench dated7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen dealing with the appealsarising out of the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards and the judgmentof the two-judge Bench dated 22 November 2001 in G Sudhakar.[Para 73][1059-F-G; 1060-B-C, H; 1061-A-F]

10.1. There is a palpable conflict between the two judgeBench decision in TN Terminated Employees Association dated18 March 2015 on the one hand and the earlier binding decisionof a larger Bench in E Prabavathy on 23 October 1992 and ofsubsequent Benches. This conflict must be harmonised by takingrecourse to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of theConstitution. In arriving at a conclusion, this Court finds that:

(i) The remit of the CGIT which resulted in the DograReport was confined to the process of verification, as distinctfrom an adjudication of rights and liabilities;

(ii) The Dogra Report is flawed because: (a) The reportfailed to carry out an accurate verification of only those Class IIIworkers who had put in at least 85 days of work in a period of twoyears and Class IV workers who had put in 70 days of work in a A

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Aperiod of three years; (b) The lists which are appended to thereport contain patent inconsistencies and errors as a consequenceof a failure to carry out an adequate verification; and (c) The reportaccepted the claims for absorption of those workers who werespecifically governed by the decision of this Court in E Prabavathy,in spite of an express stipulation to the contrary in the order ofBthis Court dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy as well as inparagraph 75 of the Srivastav Award;

(iii) A public employer such as LIC cannot be directed tocarry out a mass absorption of over 11,000 workers on such flawedpremises without following a recruitment process which isCconsistent with the principles of equality of opportunity governedby Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such an absorptionwould provide the very back-door entry, which negates theprinciple of equal opportunity and fairness in public employment.[Para 74][1061-G-H; 1062-A-F]

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10.2. The dispute is now of an antiquity tracing back tonearly four decades. The claims of those workers who are dulyfound upon verification to meet the threshold conditions ofeligibility should be resolved by the award of monetarycompensation in lieu of absorption, and in full and final settlementEof all claims and demands. Directions accordingly issued. [Para75][1062-F-H]

Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time Temporary LICEmployees Association v. Life Insurance Corporationof India (2015) 9 SCC 62 : [2015] 5 SCR 806 – heldFper incuriam.

Life Insurance Corporation of India v. RaghavendraSeshagirirao Kulkarni, (1997) 8 SCC 461 : [1997]4 Suppl. SCR 207; LIC of India v. G Sudhakar [Decisionof Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No 2104 of 2000]; A VGNachane v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 205 : [1982]2 SCR 246; M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC,Machilipatnam, (1994) 2 SCC 323 : [1994] 1 SCR 433and E Prabavathy v. Life Insurance Corporation of India[Decision of Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No 10393 of1992] – referred to.

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INHERENT JURISDICTION : Miscellaneous ApplicationNo.1150 of 2019. In Contempt Petition (Civil) No.1921 of 2017. In CivilAppeal No.6950 of 2009.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.03.2007 of the High Courtof Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No.690 of 2004.

CDEF

With

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E. M. Sudarshan Nachiyappan, Pallav Sishodia, Dr. ManishFSinghvi, A. N. S. Nadkarni, R. Singaravelan, Salman Khurshid, Dr. P.Ravishankar, Sr. Advs., Yadav Narender Singh, P. Mahadevan, P. V.Yogeswaran, M. A. Chinnasamy, Ms. C. Rubavathi, M. Veeraragavan,C. Raghavendran, V. Senthil Kumar, P. Rajaram, Ashish Upadhyay, B.K. Pal, Vishal, Arun Mishra, Rajiv Kumar, Shailesh Madiyal, Krishna

M. Singh, Ajay Amrit Raj, Ashish Prakash, Sanjeev Gupta, Vaibhav ManuGSrivastava, Bankey Bihari Sharma, Mrs. Anjani Aiyagari, D. K. Devesh,Ram Lal Roy, Ashok Panigrahi, Ms. Geetanjali Das Krishnan, NababSingh, Salvador Santosh Rebello, Arzu Paul, Ms. Deepti Arya, AdirajBali, V. N. Subramaniam, Ms. Anzu K. Varkey, Ms. Aiswariya Gupta,Randhir Kumar Ojha, S. Nandakumar, Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, AnandH

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCECORP. OF INDIA

Murthi Rao, M. S. Saran Kumar, Srinivasa Rao, P. Vasu, Naresh Kumar,Raktim Gogoi, G. Ananda Selvam, Samarth Shandilya, Ms. LakshmiRamamurthy, Ms. Lubna Naaz, Ms. Sommya Chaturvedi, MayilsamyK., Aayush Kumaran Natarajan, S. Vinayak, P. Soma Sundaram, VivekSharma, Ms. Resmitha R. Chandran, Biju Joseph, Hardik Vashisht, Ms.Pooja Rohatgi, Pramod P., Anand Dilip Landge, Rakesh Shukla, Ms.Sumita Hazarika, Karunakar Mahalik, A. Venayagam Balan, V. N.Raghupathy, C. B. Gururaj, Vishnu Shankar Jain, Ms. Khyali Singh, S.K. Roshan, M. M. Singh, Jitendra Kumar, Anurag Bhardwaj, RameshwarPrasad Goyal, Dhirendra Kumar Mishra, P. B. Reddy, Mrs. KawaljitKochar, Utkarsh Vats, Deepanshu, Kusum Chaudhary, Advs. for theappearing parties.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.

This judgment has been divided into sections to facilitate analysis.They are:

DAIntroduction............................................................... 7*BDogra Report.......................................................... 23*

CLIC’s objections to the Dogra Report .................... 30*

DThe E Prabavathy Group ....................................... 32*

EESequel to E Prabavathy .......................................... 37*FSubmissions ............................................................ 41*

GPrelude – Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, and theirAftermath ............................................................... 52*

HSrivastav Award and the Judgement of this Court . 57*FIValidity of the verification in the Dogra Report...... 69*

JThe Interplay between the Industrial Disputes Act1947 and Section 48 of the LIC Act 1956.............. 74*

KStructuring the Relief ............................................. 84*

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A Introduction

1. This litigation has a long and chequered history. The dispute, afamiliar terrain in service jurisprudence, pertains to the claim for absorptionof persons who were engaged by the Life Insurance Corporation of

* Ed. Note : Pagination is as per the original Judgment H

AIndia[1] as temporary/badli/part-time workers. Section 23(1) of the LifeInsurance Corporation Act 1956[2] enables LIC to employ such numberof persons as it thinks fit to discharge its functions. Pursuant to clauses(b) and (d) of Section 49(2), LIC has framed the Life InsuranceCorporation of India (Staff Regulations) 1960[3]. Regulation 8 empowersLIC to appoint persons on a temporary basis in Class III and Class IVBposts. After an amendment which was notified on 7 August 1971,Regulation 8 provides as follows:

“8.Temporary Staff:-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Regulations theManaging Director or Executive Director (Personnel), a ZonalCManager or a Divisional Manager may employ staff in classes IIIand IV on a temporary basis, subject to such general or specialdirections as may be issued by the Chairman from time to time.

(2) No person appointed under sub-regulation (1) shall only byreason of such appointment be entitled to absorption in the servicesDof the Corporation or claim preference for recruitment to anypost.”

2. On 31 January 1981,Sections 48 and 49 were amended to impartstatutory force to the Staff Regulations. According to LIC, its staff andemployees are governed by the parent enactment and fall outside theEpurview of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947[4]. The validity of theamendment to Sections 48 and 49 has been upheld by this Court in AVNachane v. Union of India[5].

3. On 13 August 1982, an industrial dispute was raised by theWestern Zonal Insurance Employees Association alleging that LIC hadFbeen engaging in unfair labour practices by employing temporary, badliand part-time workers and was restricting their employment to shorttenures to deprive them of the claim for permanency.

4. On 20 May 1985, the dispute was referred for adjudication bythe Central Government to the National Industrial Tribunal[6], BombayG1 “LIC””

2 “LIC Act”

3 “Staff Regulations”

4 “ID Act”

5 (1982) 1 SCC 205 (“AV Nachane”). See also: M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager,LIC, Machilipatnam, (1994) 2 SCC 323; and Life Insurance Corporation of Indiav. Raghavendra Seshagirirao Kulkarni, (1997) 8 SCC 461H6 “NIT”

presided over by Justice RD Tulpule[7], a former Judge of the BombayHigh Court. The terms of reference were as follows:

“What should be the wages and other conditions of service ofbadli, temporary and part-time workmen of the Life InsuranceCorporation of India as well as the conditions of their absorptioninto regular cadre?”

5. On 15 January 1986, the Tulpule Tribunal issued an interimorder restraining LIC from recruiting regular employees and fromterminating the services of the ad hoc workers working with LIC.

6. On 18 April 1986, the Tulpule Tribunal passed an award[8] whichwas gazetted on 7 June 1986 stipulating that those ad hoc workers whowere in employment between 1 January 1982 and 20 May 1985 will beentitled for absorption. The award, inter alia, stipulated that:

(i) Workers claiming absorption in Class III posts should haveworked for 85 days in a period of two years; and

(ii) Workers in Class IV posts should have worked for 70 daysin a period of three years.

The calculation of the number of days worked was to be upto thedate of the reference. The award contemplated that in the future therewould be no occasion for LIC to employ workers in temporary andbadli categories, save and except for occasional and temporary work.

7. On 1 June 1987, LIC issued circulars for implementing theTulpule Award. These circulars were disputed by the Unions andAssociations representing the workers. Following this dispute over theLIC circulars, the Central Government referred the Tulpule Award forinterpretation under Section 36-A of the ID Act to another NIT presidedover by Justice MS Jamdar[9], a former Judge of the Bombay High Court.The terms of reference were:

“Can the Award dated 17/4/1986 special reference to paragraph44,45,46, 48, 49, 51,52,54,56,57,60,64 and 66 and the interim orderdated 14/3/1986 be interpreted to mean that the central office ofthe Life Insurance Corporation of India is empowered to issue instructions/ guidelines, as contained in their circulars issued in 7 “Tulpule Tribunal”

8 “Tulpule Award”

9 “Jamdar Tribunal”

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1002SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Athis behalf to implement the directions of the Award. If not whatcould be the correct interpretation of various directions coveredby the said paragraphs in the circumstances of the case? Whetherthe term ‘absorption’ referred to at various places in the Awardcan be interpreted to mean ‘recruitment’?”

B8. By an interim order dated 29 June 1987, the Jamdar Tribunalprohibited LIC from recruiting persons to Class III and Class IV postsfrom the ‘open market’ during the pendency of the proceedings. LIChas argued before this Court that on account of the restraint imposed onit from recruiting regular employees (through the interim orders dated15 January 1986 of the Tulpule Tribunal and 29 June 1987 of the JamdarCTribunal), a large number of ad hoc workers were appointed to carryout the day-to-day administration of LIC all over India.

9. The Jamdar Tribunal rendered its award on 26 August 1988[10]and it was notified in the gazette on 1 October 1988. It held that theabsorption contemplated in the Tulpule Award did not imply recruitment.DLIC challenged the interpretation rendered by the Jamdar Award underArticle 136 of the Constitution. This Court granted leave in theproceedings[11]. During the pendency of the proceedings, terms ofcompromise were arrived at between LIC and all the Unions representingthe workers, save and except the Akhil Bharatiya Jeevan Bima NigamEChathurthi Sreni Karmachari Sangh[12]. The terms of compromiseenvisaged that the Jamdar and Tulpule Awards should be substituted bythe terms and conditions of the compromise “in relation to the questionof regular employment of the workmen concerned in the said references”.The terms of compromise which were filed before this Courtare extractedbelow:F

“TERMS OF COMPROMISE

1. The Management and the workmen agree that the Awardof the National Industrial Tribunal presided over by Mr.Justice R.D. Tulpule, in Reference No.NTB-1 of 1988,published on 7[th] June 1986, and the Award of the NationalIndustrial Tribunal presided over by Mr. Justice M.S. Jandar,dated 26[th] August 1988 in Reference No. NTB-1 of 1987, G

10 “Jamdar Award”11SLP (Civil) No14906 of 1988, which was numbered as Civil Appeal No1790 of 1989on the grant of leaveH12 “Karmachari Sangh”

published on 1[st] October 1988, be substituted by the Termsand Conditions of Compromise set out hereinafter in relationto the question of regular employment of the workmenconcerned in the said Reference.

2. The Management agrees to consider the temporary/part-time/badli workmen employed by the petitionerfor 85 days in any two years in a Class III post and for70 days in any three years in a Class IV post in any ofits establishments during the period 1.1.82 to 20.5.85,for regular employment on the basis and in the mannerstated hereinbelow. The temporary/part-time/badliworkmen who had made applications for regularemployment on or before 7.7.86 or those temporary/part-time/badli workmen whose applications had been receivedafter 7.7.86 but before 6.3.87 and had been rejected onaccount of late submission, shall be eligible for considerationfor regular employment. The selection of the candidateshall be made on the basis of the followingqualifications, age test, interview and also havingregard to the number of days worked by thecandidates.A panel of selected candidates shall bemade and the selected candidates shall be appointedin regular employment from the panel in the order ofmerit prospectively from the dates to be notified asand when vacancies in sanctioned posts for regularemployment are filled in from time to time :-

(i) QUALIFICATIONS – As per Circular No.Per/A/2D/492/ASP/79, dated 27.11.79, prescribed for Class III employeesubject to relaxation only in regard to percentage of marks,required as per the qualifications as may be decided by theManaging Director of the Petitioner-Corporation.

Per/A/2D/526/ASP/81, dated 24.6.1981 subject torelaxation in the matter of basic qualifications as may bedecided by the Managing Director of the Petitioner-Corporation.

(ii) AGE – As per Regulation No. 18 of (Staff)Regulations,1960, made by the Petitioner.

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A(iii)TEST – As per Circular dated 27.11.1979, for Class III aswell as Class IV workmen and, in addition, as per Circulardated 4.6.1981 for Class IV workmen only.

(iv) INTERVIEW – As per Circular dated 27.11.79 for bothClass III and Class IV workmen.

B

3. The temporary/part-time/badli workmen who had alreadyqualified in the written test held earlier for considerationfor eligible workmen for regular employment, will not berequired to appear again for test and they shall be consideredfor interview on the basis of the test already held.

C4.The test and interview for regular employment to be heldfor the purpose of selection of the temporary/part-time/badliworkmen aforementioned, shall be commenced within onemonth of the order of this Hon’ble Court in terms of thisCompromise. The selected candidates shall be appointedDin regular employment in accordance with the panel ofselected candidates till it is exhausted. The petitioner shall,however, be entitled to made recruitment straightwaywherever vacancies are more than the candidates in anyDivision in view of the necessity or expediency for suchrecruitment.

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5. The recruitment of the temporary/part-time/badli workmenin the categories of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe, shallbe considered first and if any vacancy may remain unfulfilledin that category, the petitioner shall be entitled to maderecruitment in accordance with its usual procedureFaccording to its requirements.

6. In view of the abovementioned Terms of Compromise nodispute in relation to the workmen concerned, as referredin Clause 1 hereinabove, survives in regard to the mattercovered by this Compromise between the parties and theGrespective rights and obligations of the parties in relation toregular employment of the said workman concerned shallbe determined and given effect accordingly, if anycontroversy may arise.”

(emphasis supplied)

H

The terms of compromise were accepted by an interim order of atwo-judge Bench of this Court in LIC v. Their Workmen[13] on 1 March1989. The order is extracted below:

“Special leave is granted. It appears that out of nine Unions eightUnions said to berepresenting about 99% of the workers haveentered into a compromise with the Management. In thecircumstances pending the final disposal of the appeal, wepermitthe Management and the members of the said eight Unions toimplement the terms of compromise by way of interim measurewithout however, any prejudice to the rights and contentions ofthe members of the other Union, who have not entered into suchcompromise with the management.”

10. On 7 February1996, the above civil appeal in LIC v. TheirWorkmen (supra)was disposed of. This Court accepted the contentionof LIC that since eight unions had already accepted the compromise,the ninth union (Karamchari Sangh) should fall in line and act on theterms and conditions of the compromise in the interest of industrial peace.Since the litigating workers in Class IV posts were unable to take thetest during the pendency of the proceedings, LIC was directed to exemptClass IV workers from appearing for the test and interview, if themanagement had power to do so under the regulations or the instructionsgoverning their conditions of service.The Court observed that in the eventthat the management had no such power, it had “no doubt”that the testprescribed for the workers would be of a lower standard than what hadbeen prescribed under the two circulars mentioned in the compromise.Pursuant to the compromise, LIC appointed 1875 persons to Class IIIposts and 1324 persons to Class IV posts in various divisions.

11. The genesis of the present dispute relates to a demand raisedby the Unions on 4 March 1991, pertaining to the claim for regularisationof those workers who were employed from 20 May 1985 till the date ofreference on 4 March 1991. Acting on the demand, the CentralGovernment made the following reference to the Central GovernmentIndustrial Tribunal[14 ]under Sections 10(1)(d) and 2A of the ID Act:

“Whether the action of the Management of Life InsuranceCorporation of India in not absorbing badli/temporary and part- 13Civil Appeal No1790 of 1989 (1 March 1989) (“LIC v. Their Workmen”)

14 “CGIT”

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Atime workmen employed in the establishment of LIC after20.05.1985 is justified? If not, to what relief the workmen areentitled?”

12. On 18 June 2001, the CGIT which was presided over by ShriKS Srivastav, pronounced the award[15] by directing the absorption of theBtemporary/badli workerson the same terms as the Tulpule and JamdarAwards, with some modifications. The Srivastav Award held that:

“88. In view of the fact I am of the definite view that such type ofworkmen belonging to temporary/badly/ part time categories inclass III and Class IV service of the corporation who wereCemployed after following the procedure and were allowed tocontinue service beyond the qualifying period and were eligibleand suitable to every respect should be given absorption in theservice from date of the vacancy in the service in which theycould have been absorbed. It will also apply to these employeeswhose service were terminated by the corporation.”D

13. In its ultimate directions, the Srivastav Award directed thatthe temporary, badli and part-time workers who were employed after20 May 1985 should be granted absorption on the same terms andconditions as was stipulated in the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards (in respectof workers who were employed from 1 January 1982 to 20 May 1985).ELIC was directed to publish a notice in the newspapers for invitingapplications from individual workers for absorption. If no regular vacancywas available, the award directed supernumerary posts to be created.Paragraph 94 of the Srivastav Award is extracted below:

“94. In view of the matter I find and conclude that the action ofFcorporation denying the absorption of these temporary/badli/parttime workmen as dealt with above in the body of this award andemployed after 20-05-85 is not justified. I further find that theseworkmen employed after 20-5-85 should be given absorption intheir job on the same terms and conditions as laid down in theGaforesaid two awards namely Hon’ble Mr Justice R.D. Tulpuleand of Hon’ble Mr Justice M.S. Jamdar in respect of the workmenemployed with effect from 1-1-82 to 20-05-85 and dealt with byme as above. It is directed that the corporation shall take intoconsideration for the absorption of the workmen, on their eligibility H15 “Srivastav Award”

and suitability as dealt with above in the award. The case of thoseworkmen belonging to the category of temporary, badli, part-timewho had become eligible for their absorption in their job aftercompleting the qualified period of working and were suitable inevery respect but their services were terminated and they wereturned out of the job by the corporation should also considered forthe absorption of such terminated workmen of the corporationshall publish a notice in the daily newspaper having wide circulationthroughout India and if in compliance of the notice the workmanconcerned consent in writing within stipulated period which couldbe given in the said notice the case of such workman should alsobe considered for their absorption in the regular vacancy thenexisting. At the time of the consideration of absorption of suchworkmen if it is found that no regular vacancy is available to suchworkmen, supernumerary posts should also be created and suchworkmen should be given absorption in it. It is also directed thatthe cases of these workmen for absorption in existing vacanciesshould be taken for consideration first irrespective of the regularrecruitment if taken. The case of the contractual workmen forabsorption shall be taken into consideration as per observationmade in the body of the award and on the basis on conditions asstated above.”

14. The Srivastav Award was challenged by LIC in a writ petition[16]before the Delhi High Court. By a judgment dated 15 April 2004, aSingle Judge of the Delhi High Court set aside the award and held thatthe decisions of this Court in E Prabavathy v. Life InsuranceCorporation of India[17]and LIC of India v. G Sudhakar[18]directingLIC to formulate a scheme for regularisation were binding on the CGIT.The judgment of the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court was the subjectmatter of a batch of Letters Patent Appeals[19] preferred by six Unions/Associations. The appeals were dismissed on 21 March 2007 by theDivision Bench. The Division Bench also issued directions for agerelaxation and weight age of past service to the workers:

16 WP No 4346 of 2001 (High Court of Delhi)17SLP (Civil) No 10393 of 1992 (“EPrabavathy”)

18Civil Appeal No 2104 of 2000 (“G Sudhakar”)

19 LPA 678 of 2004 with LPA 690 of 2004, LPA 710 of 2004, LPA 722 of 2004, LPA1023 of 2004 and LPA 1165 of 2004

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A“20. In that view of the matter, while dismissing the appeals filedby the appellants, we issue directions in the following manner:

(a) for the next three years whenever an advertisement is madeby the respondent corporation for filling up vacancies inClass III and Class IV posts, an opportunity shall be givenBto the appellants to submit their applications, which, ifsubmitted, shall be considered along with all other candidatesbut giving age relaxation to the appellants and also givingdue weightage to the past services rendered by theappellants.

C21. In terms of the aforesaid order, the appeals stand disposedof.”

15. The judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Courtwas assailed in a batch of Special Leave Petitions[20] filed by six Unionsand Associations representing the workers. In the meantime, LIC beganDthe process of implementing the judgment of the Division Bench of theDelhi High Court on 21 March 2007 by issuing an advertisement forrecruitment of Assistants, by allowing age relaxations and weightage fortemporary workers to compete with candidates from the open market.On11 February 2008, this Court directed the maintenance of status quo.The civil appeals were eventually disposed of by a two-judge Bench ofEthis Court on 18 March 2015 in Tamil Nadu Terminated Full TimeTemporary LIC Employees Association v. Life InsuranceCorporation of India[21] which concluded that the Srivastav Award wasbinding. While restoring the Srivastav Award, the judgment of this Courtdirected LIC to implement its directions and set aside the judgment ofFthe Delhi High Court.

16. Following the judgment of this Court, LIC issued anadvertisement on 21 July 2015 calling for applications from workerswho were employed as badli/temporary/part-time workers in itsestablishment from 20 May 1985 to 4 March 1991, in terms of the eligibilitycriteria determined by the award. This led to the institution of contemptGproceedings before this Court on the ground that by restricting the eligibilityfor recruitment to workers who were engaged between 20 May 1985

20Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No15269 of 2007 with SLP(Civil) No 18943 of 2007,SLP(Civil) No 19958 of 2007, SLP(Civil) No 20058 of 2007, SLP(Civil) No 22712 of2007 and SLP(Civil) No 23623 of 2007H21 (2015) 9 SCC 62 (“TN Terminated Employees Association”)

and 4 March 1991, LIC was in breach of the directions of this Court inTN Terminated Employees Association (supra). LIC also institutedreview petitions against the judgment in TN Terminated EmployeesAssociation (supra). The review petitions and the contempt petitionswere directed to be heard together. On 9 August 2016, the review soughtby LIC was partially allowed[22] by restricting the award of back-wagesto 50 per cent. The relevant part of the directions of this Court isreproduced below:

“The temporary and badli workers of LIC, who are entitled forregularisation as permanent workmen in terms of the impugnedjudgment and order dated 18.03.2015 passed by this Court, byapplying the terms and conditions of the modified award dated26.08.1988 passed by Justice Jamdar, are held to be entitled tofull back wages as well. However, keeping in mind the immensefinancial burden this would cause to LIC, we deem it fit to modifythe relief only with regard to the back wages payable and therefore,we award 50% of the back wages with consequential benefits.The back wages must be calculated on the basis of the grosssalary of the workmen, applicable as on the date as per theperiodical revisions of pay scale as stated supra. The computationmust be made from the date of entitlement of the workmeninvolved in these cases, that is, their absorption, till the ageof superannuation, if any concerned workman has attained theage of superannuation as per the regulations of the reviewpetitioner-LIC, as applicable to the concerned workman.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. The curative petitions instituted by LIC challenging thejudgment in review were rejected on 22 February 2017. In March 2017,LIC sorted out and distributed the applications which had been receivedin pursuance of its notice dated 21 July 2017 through its zonal offices forimplementation of the decision in TN Terminated EmployeesAssociation (supra). On 16 May 2017, LIC issued directions to theZonal Managers to implement the Srivastav Award and the order of thisCourt in the review of TN Terminated Employees Association(supra). The circular prescribed the following norms of eligibility forabsorption:

(i) The worker should have been engaged between 20 May1985 and 4 March 1991;22 (2016) 9 SCC 366

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A(ii)The name of the worker should figure in the list submittedby the Unions to the CGIT in the industrial reference;

(iii) Class III workers ought to have been engaged for at least85 days in two calendar years whileClass IVworkers shouldhave been engaged for at least 70 days in three calendarByears;

(iv) The Union or theAssociation should have been an appellantbefore the Supreme Court;

(v) The claimant worker should have submitted a biodata inpursuance of the notice issued by the LIC on 21 July 2015Cfor recruitment in regularised positions; and

(vi) The worker should have been engaged in accordance withthe rules prevalent in LIC.

18. In 2017, various divisions of LIC found 245 workmen to beDeligible and they were offered absorption by the Zonal Offices. This ledto the initiation of contempt proceedings[23] by the Unions who sought theabsorption of alltemporary, part-time and badli workers and daily wagerswho were engaged after 20 May 1985till date.

19. On 11 May 2018, a two-judge Bench of this Court[24] directedthe petitioning Unions in the contempt proceedings to submit materialEdocuments to show the engagement of the workers between 20 May1985 and 4 March 1991. This Court also directed LIC to nominate asenior official to scrutinise the documents and to take a final decision inaccordance with the prescribed conditions. Consequently, LIC receivedabout eighty-three thousand representations. Upon scrutiny, LIC foundFseventy-six workers to be eligible for absorption. By an order dated 7September 2018, a two-judge Bench of this Court[25] directed the CGITat New Delhi to decide upon the eligibility of the claims made by theUnions, Associations and individual workers within a period of threemonths. However, the Court found that there was no breach of thejudgment dated 18 March 2015 in TN Terminated EmployeesGAssociation (supra). The order of this Court is extracted below:

23 Contempt Petition (Civil) 1921 of 2017 in Civil Appeal 6950 of 200924Ranbir Singh v. S K Roy, Chairman, LIC, Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of 2009 (11 May 2018)25Ranbir Singh v. S K Roy, Chairman, LIC, Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 ofH2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of 2009 (7 September 2018)

“The crucial dispute in these proceedings is regarding thebeneficiaries of the Award dated 18.06.2001 in I.D. No.27 of1991 of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (CGIT), NewDelhi.

The Award has been finally upheld by this Court in the judgmentrendered in Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time Temporary LICEmployees Association v. Life Insurance Corporation of Indiaand Others, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 62.

Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India appearingfor the respondents/LIC, submits that for want of documents/materials, the LIC is not in a position to verify as to who are theactual beneficiaries of the Award. Learned counsel appearing forthe Union(s) and the individual workers, however, would submitthat despite producing the records and despite availability of theoriginal records with the LIC, no positive decision is taken by it.

Faced with such a situation, we are of the view that the CGIT,New Delhi should look into the matter with regard to the claimsmade by the Union(s)/individual workmen, regarding entitlementto the benefits under the Award and submit a report to this Court.Accordingly, we direct the CGIT, New Delhi to look into the claimsmade by the Union(s)/individual Workmen and submit a report tothis Court within three months.

There is also a dispute raised by some of the respondents that thebenefit of Award should be made available to those who havebeen engaged as Badli workers after 4.3.1991. That is a matterfor interpretation by this Court. For the time being, CGIT, NewDelhi would limit its enquiry only to the claims of the Badli workersbetween 20.05.1989 and 04.03.1991, as already indicated by thisCourt in the order dated 11.05.2018.

We do not find that it is a case of contempt. Therefore, thecontempt notices are discharged. However, the applications/petitions be kept pending for the purpose of necessary assistanceto the Court.”

On 10 September 2018[26], the above order was modified by thesame two-judge Bench in the following terms:

26Ranbir Singh v. S K Roy, Chairman, LIC, Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of 2009 (10 September 2018)

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A“There is also a dispute raised by some of the respondents thatthe benefit of Award should be made available to those who havebeen engaged as Badli/Part-time/Temporary workers after4.3.1991. That is a matter for interpretation by this Court. For thetime being, CGIT, New Delhi would limit its enquiry only to theclaims of the Badli workers between 20.05.1985 andB04.03.1991, as already indicated by this Court in the order dated11.05.2018.”

(emphasis supplied)

20. Thereafter, on 12 December 2018[27], while dealing with theCbatch of contempt petitions, a two-judge Bench of this Court directedthe CGIT, in terms of this Court’s previous directions dated 7September2018 in the same contempt proceedings, to “look into the matter withregard to the claims made by the Union(s) individual workmen”. TheCGIT was directed to submit its report within four months, ascontemplated by the order dated 7 September 2018 and modified on 10DSeptember 2018 in the contempt proceedings. Between October 2018and 16 May 2018, the CGIT issued notice to the Unions and individualsin the earlier industrial reference to submit their claims. As many as15,500 claims were submitted on behalf of the Unions, Associations andindividual workers claiming absorption and the benefit of the SrivastavEAward dated 18 June 2001. LIC submitted its responses before the CGIT.The CGIT submitted its report on 31 May 2019[28] to this Court. Thereport ofthe CGIT will be referred to as the Dogra Report, adopting thename of the presiding officer.

B Dogra Report

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21. Before the presiding officer of the CGIT, LIC set up the pleathat only those workers whose names were mentioned in the originalcertified list in the industrial reference were entitled to the benefit of theSrivastav Award. LIC argued that this was also the direction issued bythe Supreme Court in the contempt proceedings arising out ofa reviewGof TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) on 10 September2018 and reiterated on 12 December 2018. On the other hand, the Unionsrepresenting the workers, as well as the individual workers, claimed thatthey were entitled to the benefit of the award irrespective of whether27Ranbir Singh v. S K Roy, Chairman, LIC, Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of 2009 (12 September 2018)H28 “Dogra Report”

their claim found place in the original list as certified before the CGIT inthe industrial reference. Dealing with this aspect, the Dogra Reportconcluded that though the order dated 10 September 2018 required theCGIT to verify the list which was already on the record, this did notimply that only those workers whose names figured in the certified listwere entitled to absorption, to the exclusion of others. Paragraphs 24and 25 of the Dogra Report have a bearing on the present proceedingsand are hence extracted below:

“24. To my mind, answer to this question has to be given in thelight of backdrop of the circumstances which culminated intopassing of the Award in ID case No.27 of 1991 which wasadmittedly upheld by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment dated18/3/2015 reported as (2015) 9 SCC 62 – Tamil Nadu TerminatedFull Time Temporary LIC Employees Vs. Life InsuranceCorporation of India. No doubt, Hon’ble Apex Court in its orderdated 10/9/2018 has observed that this Tribunal will verify the listwhich is available on record. But this does not mean that onlysuch workmen whose names are mentioned in the original/certifiedlist attached with the reference, are liable to be considered forabsorption, to the exclusion of other workmen. This Tribunal hasto keep in mind that contempt petitions were earlier filed bymembers of Various Unions before Hon’ble Supreme Court andLIC had also filed contempt petitions in High Court of Delhi againstRegional Labour Commissioner. During pendency of said petition,E. Prabhavati and others were impleaded as party at the instanceof LIC vide order dated 25/9/2008. Thereafter, memo of partieswas filed by LIC by adding Terminated Full Time Temporary LICEmployees Welfare Association as Respondent No.47. In viewof this, the contention of the LIC that members of E. Prabhavati& others or Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC EmployeesWelfare Association are not entitled to any relief, is not tenable,when the said Association has been held to be necessary party.There is not even a whisper in any of the judgment/order ofHon’ble High Court or Hon’ble Supreme Court that only workmenwhose names are mentioned in the certified/original list of CGITAward are to be granted relief. An overall examination of theorder dated 10/9/2018 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court shows thatthis Tribunal is required to verify the list available on record butthere is no direction to exclude members of other Union/workmen

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inasmuch as Hon’ble the Apex Court while considering the claimsof contempt petitioners has ordered this Tribunal to consider theclaims of those workers who were employed as Badli workerswith the Management of LIC during the period from 20/5/1985 to4/3/1991 subject to fulfilment of number of days as mentioned inthe Award.

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25. It is settled principle of law that while considering the order/judgment of Constitutional Court, this Tribunal is required to keepin mind entire spectrum of the orders as well as background ofthe case. It is not proper to cull out a single para or a sentencefrom the order/judgment so as to defeat the very purpose of theCorder so passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court. If the orders dated11/5/2018, 7/9/2018 and 10/9/2018 are taken into consideration, itis crystal clear that claims of all such workmen and Union/s whoworked as Badli workers during the period from 20/5/1985 to 4/3/1991 are required to be considered by this Tribunal. Although IDam in full agreement with the submission made on behalf of theManagement/LIC that initial onus is always upon the workmenconcerned to prove that they were in the employment of theManagement at the relevant time, however this Tribunal cannotignore the fact that UC has not filed on record any document/record relating to employment of various workmen rather hasEsimply taken a plea that same being old record is not traceable.”

22. The Dogra Report noted that LIC had admitted that 321workerswere found to be eligible for absorption in terms of the SrivastavAward. The report found fault with LIC for making contradictory claimsthat 321 workers were eligible for absorption when the records of workersFwere allegedly old and not traceable. The Dogra Report drewan adverseinference against LIC for having failed to maintain the records inpursuance of the burden cast upon it by Section 25-D of the ID Act,particularly when the reference was pending since 1991. Paragraph 29of the report is extracted below:

Conclusion

G“29) During the course of arguments as well as in the reply filedon behalf of the Management/LIC, it is clear that Managementhas admitted that till date 321 Nos. of employees were found tobe eligible in terms of the Award and they were considered eligiblefor absorption. It is not understandable tothis Tribunal as to whatHwere the basis for the Management/LIC for coming to the conclusion that only 321 Nos. of workmen/employees were foundto be eligible and covered by the Award of CGIT in ID caseNo.27/1991, when the Management has come up with a plea thatrecord relating to the workmen being old record is not traceable.It is worthwhile to mention here that Section 25-D of the ID Actspecifically provides that it is the duty of every Employer tomaintain a muster roll and to provide for the making of entriestherein by the workmen who may present themselves for work atthe establishment. This Tribunal has to keep in mind a vital factthat since the reference bearing ID No.27/1991 is pending beforevarious Courts since 1991, the Management/LIC was/is requiredto keep the record in safe custody when the case of such a hugemagnitude was pending before the Courts. In such circumstances,this Tribunal is constrained to draw adverse inference against themanagement.”

23. Based on the above hypothesis, the report proceeded to decide“prima facie” the claims of the Unions and individual workers. Whiletaking up the claims made by the All India Life Insurance EmployeesAssociation and its affiliate, Life Insurance Employees Association, Delhi,the report notes that 6998 claims had been filed (as contained in AnnexureA). Upon scrutiny, LIC drew the attention of the CGIT to the fact that3592 duplicate entries were found in the claims which were submitted(as contained in Annexure A-1). Noting that the “Unions have not seriouslydisputed the same”, the Dogra Report concludes that “such claimantsare to be given benefit of absorption only once”. The Dogra Report alsonotes that workers who had started working beyond the cut-off date of4 March 1991 would not be covered in the enquiry. This observation inthe Dogra Report was in view of the order of this Court in the contemptproceedings arising out of the review of TN Terminated EmployeesAssociation (supra) on 7 September 2018, which had specificallyobserved that whether the benefit of the Srivastav Award should begiven to those who had been engaged as badli workers after 4 March1991was a matter for interpretation by this Court. Hence, for the timebeing, CGIT had been directed to limit its enquiry only to the claims forthe period between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991 (as contained inAnnexure A-2).In this context, the Dogra Report held that those workerswho had commenced work after 4 March 1991 would not be coveredby its enquiry.

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A24. The Dogra Report accordingly found the following workersto be entitled to absorption:

a)The All India Insurance Employees Association Calcuttaand Western Zone Insurance Employees Association hadfiled a claim on behalf of 3337 workers as part of the listBcontained in Annexure B.LIC argued that in this list of 3337workers, 3332 workers did not find mention in the originalcertified list. The Dogra Report perused the documents andfound that all3337 workers were entitled to the benefit ofabsorption; Cb)All India LIC Employees Association had filed claims onbehalf of 97 workers as a list contained in Annexure C.The Dogra Report found that all 97 workers (except onewho commenced work post 4 March 1991) were entitledto absorption and LIC’s argument of fabrication ofdocuments was baseless when considered against theDgeneral practice of the Branch Managers at LIC;

c)National Organization of Insurance Workers filed a claimon behalf of workers as a part of Annexure D. The DograReport found that all 401 workers in accordance withAnnexure D were eligible for absorption;E

d)The All India National Life Insurance Federation Bombayfiled two claims on behalf of 1674 workers of the NagpurAssociation (Annexure E) and 371 workers of theHyderabad Association (Annexure F). The NagpurAssociation conceded that approximately 84 entries wereFblank, and 38 workers who had worked after 4 March 1991and three who worked prior to 1 January 1982 would notbe entitled to any benefit. Thus, the 1590 remaining workersof the Nagpur Association were found to eligible forabsorption (contained in Annexure E-1). The legal heirs ofGtwo deceased workers were held to be entitled to monetarybenefit in lieu of service. As regards the 371 workers ofthe Hyderabad Association, the Dogra Report excludes thosewho had either worked prior to 20 May 1985 or after 4March 1991 and those eligible for absorption were detailedout in Annexure F-1; H

e)The Akhil Bhartiya Jivan Nigam filed claims on behalf ofA890 workers as a part of a list contained in Annexure G. Itwas admitted thatof the 890 workers, 692 were engagedafter 4 March 1991, there were 8 repeat entries and2workerswere engaged prior to 1985. Consequently, aftercarrying out the exclusions, Annexure G-1 represented theBlist of eligible workers identified by the Dogra Report forabsorption; A

f)The Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time Temporary LICEmployees Welfare Association filed claims on behalf of376 workers in Annexure H. After excluding those whohad worked prior to or after the cut-off date, a list of eligibleCemployees was tabulated by the Dogra Report in AnnexureH-1. Workers who had reached the age of superannuationwere held entitled to receive all consequential benefits fromLIC; and g)Annexure I contained the names of a group of workers,described as the “E- Prabhavati workmen”[29] containing1333 workers. After excluding those who had worked lessthan the requisite number of days for absorption and thosewho had been engaged after 4 March 1991, the DograReport found the remaining workers to be eligible forabsorption and their claims were tabulated in Annexure I(A).The specific case of the E Prabhavati group of workerswill be dealt with in the course of the present judgment. Atthis stage, it is be material to note that LIC had contendedthat this batch of workers had been specifically excludedby paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award. Notwithstandingthis, the Dogra Report has held that this batch of workerswould also be entitled to absorption.

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25. Apart from the persons named in the annexures mentionedabove, the Dogra Report has concluded that the following claims by theUnion for absorption would have to be allowed:

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(i) Annexure J filed on behalf of 36 workers by the LICWorkers Union Kanpur– where 35 workers were allowedabsorption (except 1 worker recruited after the cut-offdate); 29 Interchangeably referred as “EPrabavathy”

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[2022] 10 S.C.R.

A(ii)Annexure K filed on behalf of 17 workers by the LICWorkers Union, Gujarat Unit –where 4 out of the 17workers were held eligible;

(iii) Annexure L filed on behalf of 119 workers from the JodhpurDivision of LIC –where all were held eligible for absorptionB(while it was noted that 1 worker’s name appeared twice);

(iv) Annexure M – 22 workers were held entitled to absorption;

(v) Annexure N – 2 workers out of the 54 were held entitled toabsorption since only these two worked during the relevantperiod;(vi)Annexure O – 1 out of 9 workers wasCheld entitled to absorption, since the others had beenemployed after the cut-off date of 4 March 1991;

(vii) Annexure P –4 workers were held entitled to absorption;

(viii) Annexure Q –workers in this list were held not entitled toDthe benefit of absorption as they had worked after the cut-off date of 4 March 1991; and

(ix) Apart from the above annexures, the Dogra Reportscrutinized the claim of several individual workers anddetermined whether they were entitled to absorption.

EC LIC’sobjections to the Dogra Report

26. Broadly speaking, LIC has urged the following objections tothe Dogra Report:

(i) The CGIT was not entrusted with the task of adjudicationbut of verification; F

(ii) The orders passed by this court in the contempt proceedingsarising out of the review of the decision in TN TerminatedEmployees Association (supra) on 11 May 2018, 7September 2018 and 10 September 2018 indicate that:

G(a)In the course of verification, CGIT was not entitledto travel beyond the Srivastav Award dated 18 June2001; (b)The CGIT had to verify only those claims where theworkers were engaged between 20 May 1985 and 4March 1991; andH

(c) The verification by CGIT was to be confined only tothose badli, temporary and part-time workers whosenames were contained in the original certified list inthe reference leading to the Srivastav Award dated18 June 2001;

(iii) The CGIT was duty-bound to verify only the documentsproduced by LIC to determine whether the workers wereworking during the specified period.The Dogra Report hasfound that almost all the names of workers submitted bythe Union were eligible without due verification;

(iv) A total of 15,465 claims were submitted, which include:

(a) Persons who were engaged beyond the stipulatedperiod between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991; (b)Persons whose names were not in the certified listbefore the CGIT in the industrial reference; and

(c) Persons from the E Prabhavati group who were notcovered by the Srivastav Award, as expressly setout in paragraph 75 of the award;

(v) During the course of the verification by LIC, it was foundthat the documents/material produced by several workerswere fabricated and there was a duplication of names; and

(vi) Though paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award hadcategorically held that the group of workers described asthe “E Prabhavati” group were not entitled to relief, theDogra Report held them to be entitled for absorption. LIChas also submitted objections to the certification which hasbeen carried out in respect of certain workers whose namesare set out in the annexures to the Dogra Report.

27. At this stage, it would be material to note that the originalcertified list of workers in the reference contained the names of 4024workers. According to LIC, if the certification exercise carried out inthe Dogra Report were to be accepted,about11,780 workers would be entitled to absorption.

D The E Prabavathy Group

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28. The Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001 details the historypertaining to this group of workers. Paragraphs 19-20 and 75 of theAward are extracted below:

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“19. Thereafter the employees employed as temporary, badli andpart time after 20[th] May 1985 raised demand for their absorptionregularising too in the regular service. When their demands werenot accepted by the corporation several writ petitions in this respectwere filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Madras. These writpetitions were filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Madrasbetween the years 1989 to 1991.The writ petition No.10367/89filed was between the terminated full time temporary LIC WelfareAssociation and Senior Divisional Manager, LIC, Khanjawar. Thiswrit petition alongwith other writ petitions total 18 writ petitionswere listed for hearing before the full bench of Hon’ble HighCourt of Madras. After hearing the parties of all the writ petitionsthe Hon’ble High Court of Madras gave judgment which isreported as 1993(1) LLJ 1030 between terminated full temporaryemployees welfare association and Senior Divisional Manager,LIC, Khanjawar. All the writ petitions were dismissed by theHon’ble High Court of Madras.

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20. Parties had then preferred civil appeal before the Hon’bleESupreme Court of India against judgment of the Hon’ble HighCourt of Madras. These civil appeals were numbered as SLP (C)10393 to 10413/92 E. Prabhawati and others Vs. LIC of Indiaand others. It appears that in the said civil appeal on the directionsof the Hon’ble Supreme Court Corporation had framed a schemefor the regularization of the employees who were granted ad hocFappointments for 85 days at intervals from time to time was placedbefore the Hon’ble Supreme Court. After hearing the parties bymeans of interim order dated 23-10-92 found the scheme asreasonable and was approved to the existence of the schemecontained in clauses (a) and (d) of paragraph 1 and the corporationGwas directed to proceed to regularise the employees eligible inaccordance with the scheme. The clauses of (a) and (d) of thescheme have been reproduced in the order by the Hon’bleSupreme Court of India. With the aforesaid direction all the civilappeals were disposed of by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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[…]

75. Now as regard the binding effect of the order dated 23-10-92 passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in SLP No.10393-10411/92 E. Prabhawathy and others Vs. Life InsuranceCorporation of India and another confirming the scheme ofabsorption/regularisation as argued on behalf of the corporationin my view can be well accepted. The order passed I find isbetween the same parties. E. Prabhawathy and other is the partyin this proceeding being impleaded at the subsequent stage of theproceeding. Statement of claim has been filed in the present caseby the aforesaid workmen. The said order dated 23-10-92 ofHon’ble Supreme Court is thus between same parties of the caseand in view of the circumstances. I find that workmen has noground to challenge the legality of the said order dated 23.10.92.The conditions of the workmen made in this regard are notaccepted.”

29. At this stage, it would be material to note that on 23 October1992, a three-judge Bench of this Court specifically dealt with the abovegroup of workmen in E Prabavathy (supra). The judgment of this Courtis extracted below in its entirety:

“ORDER

Special Leave granted.

In State of Haryana & Ors. etc. etc. v. Piara Singh & Ors. etc.etc., (JT 1992(5) S.C. 179), this court indicated how regularizationof adhoc/temporary employees in Government and Public SectorUndertakings should be effected. While laying down the guidelinesin this behalf, this court observe in paragraph 43 as under:-

“The normal rule, of course, is regular recruitment through theprescribed agency but exigencies of administration maysometimes call for an adhoc or temporary appointment to bemade. In such a situation, effort should always be to replacesuch an adhoc/temporary employee by a regularly selectedemployee as early as possible. Such a temporary employeemay also compete along with others for such regular selection/appointment. If he gets selected, well and good, but if he doesnot, he must give way to the regularly selected candidate. The A

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[2022] 10 S.C.R.

appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot bewithheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an adhoc/temporary employee.”

The LIC was asked to work out a scheme for the purpose ofregularization of employees who were granted adhoc appointmentsfor 85 days at intervals from time to time. The learned counsel forthe LIC has placed before us a Scheme for regularization of suchadhoc employees. We have given our anxious consideration tothe Scheme proposed by the LIC and have also heard both Mr.Ramamurthy and Mr. Salve at length and we are of the opinionthat the Scheme proposed by LIC is a reasonable one andcommands acceptance, save and except the fact that therecruitment scheduled for November, 1992 will be postponed bynot less than six weeks to enable the eligible adhoc employees tocompete with others for selection at the said recruitment. We areof the opinion that the relaxation granted to these adhoc employeesfor having worked with the LIC in the past in the matter of ageand qualification suffices. The further provision that if such anadhoc employee has worked between 20th May, 1985 and tilldate for 85 days in any two consecutive calendar years, is areasonable stipulation for eligibility for regularization. We are ofthe opinion, the scheme is in consonance with the guidelines which we have laid down in paragraphs 43 to 49 of Piara Singh’sjudgment. Mr. Salve, the learned counsel for the LIC, also informedus that in regard to future adhoc appointments/regularization theLIC is in the process of making a scheme consistent with theguidelines laid down in Piara Singh’s case so that this device ofemployment for 85 days which has not been approved may not beresorted to in future. The Scheme contained in Clauses (a) to (d)of paragraph 1, which is as under, is approved subject to thepostponement of the recruitment scheduled in November, 1992by at least six weeks and the LIC will proceed to regularize theemployees eligible under the Scheme; (a) All those temporary employees who have worked for 85days in any two consecutive calendar years with the LifeInsurance Corporation between 20th May, 1985 uptill date andwho confirmed to the required eligibility criteria for regularrecruitment on the dates of their initial temporary, appointment will be permitted to compete for the next regular recruitmentto be made by the Life Insurance Corporation after the regularrecruitment for these posts currently scheduled for November,1992.

(b) These candidates will be considered on their merits with allother candidates who may apply for such appointments,including those from the open market.

(c) These candidates will be given an age relaxation for applyingfor regular recruitment provided that they were eligible on thedate of their first temporary appointment for securing regularappointment with the Life Insurance Corporation.

(d) If these candidates are otherwise eligible, they can applyfor regular recruitment in the normal course.

This regularization will, in the circumstances, be by selection forappointment. We make the above clauses of the Scheme as partof our order.

Mr. Ramamurthy, the learned counsel for the petitioners, furthersubmitted that certain questions of law in regard to theinterpretation of section 84 of the LIC Act, 1956, as amended bythe LIC Amendment Act, 1981, and Section 2(oo) (bb) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947, arise for consideration in the presentcase in view of the judgment of the Madras High Court. We maystate that we express no opinion on the said questions of law asthey do not survive in view of the scheme which LIC has workedout and which we have approved.It is not necessary for us to gointo those questions and we leave them open for decision in anappropriate case in future.

The Civil Appeals will stand disposed of accordingly with no orderas to costs.”

30. The above order of the three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy(supra) indicates that LIC had been directed by the Court to work out ascheme for the purpose of regularising workers who were granted adhocappointment for a period of 85 days from time to time. A scheme wasprepared by LIC. The three-judge Bench had given “its anxiousconsideration to the scheme proposed by the LIC” and having heardboth counsel for the workers and for LIC, held that it was “of the opinion

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Athat the scheme proposed by LIC is reasonable one and commandsacceptance”. The only modification was a postponing of the recruitmentwhich was scheduled on 1 November 1992 to allow eligible ad hocworkers to compete with others for selection at the recruitment. ThisCourt affirmed the relaxation of age and qualifications granted by thescheme to eligible ad hoc workers who had worked between 20 MayB1985 “till date” in any two calendar years. This Court accepted thescheme which was proposed by LIC, subject to the modification notedabove. This Court held that regularisation would be by selection forappointment. The clauses of the scheme were incorporated as a part ofthe order dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra). In thisCbackdrop, paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award specifically excludedthe claims of the E Prabavathy workers who were governed by theorder of this Court dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra).The grievance of the LIC isthat despite this, the Dogra Report concludesthat this group of workers would be eligible for absorption in terms ofthe Srivastav Award.DE. Sequel to E Prabavathy

31. Following the order of this Court dated 23 October 1992 in EPrabavathy (supra), LIC framed the Life Insurance Corporation of India(Employment of Temporary Staff) Instructions 1993. A contempt petitionwas moved before this Court alleging that the scheme which was notifiedEby LIC on 28 June 1993 was not in accordance with the order in EPrabhavathy (supra). The contempt petition was dismissed by this Courton 12 July 1993.

32. In 1998, a batch of writ petitions was filed in the High Courtof Andhra Pradesh seeking the relief of absorption on a permanent basis.Among the petitions was a petition instituted by G Sudhakar and others.FA Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissed thepetition, placing reliance on the decision in E Prabavathy (supra). On 3November 1998, the Division Bench of the High Court directed LIC toframe a scheme for regularisation. LIC preferred a Special Leave Petitionagainst the judgment of the Division Bench in G Sudhakar (supra) whichGwas allowed by this Court[30] on 22 November 2001. A two-judge Benchof this Court held in G Sudhakar (supra) that the scheme approved in EPrabavathy (supra) shall govern the absorption of all adhoc workers inthe country. This Court’s order dated 22 November 2001 in G Sudhakar(supra) is extracted below:H30 Civil Appeal No 2104 of 2000

“This appeal is by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (forshort “the Corporation”) against the Division Bench Judgment ofthe Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Respondents filed a WritPetition praying for a mandamus to the corporation for theirabsorption on permanent basis which stood dismissed.

On an appeal being carried, the Division Bench of the High Courtdisposed of the appeal with a direction to the corporation to framea scheme for regularisation of the employees and regularise theirservices in accordance with such scheme. It is this direction ofthe High Court which is the subject matter of challenge in thisAppeal.

Mr. Salve, the learned Solicitor General appearing for theCorporation stated that, in fact, in the case of E. Prabhavathy &Ors. v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. (CivilAppeals arising out of SLPs Nos. 1039-10413/1992), this Courtwas in seisin of a similar problem and during the hearing of thatappeal, a tentative scheme was produced before this Court andthe Court framed the terms of those schemes as a part of theorder and disposed of the appeal in terms of the said scheme on23rd October, 1992. The four clauses of the said scheme whichformed a part of the order are quoted hereinbelow in extenso :- “Scheme :

(a) All those temporary employees who have worked for 85 daysin any two consecutive calendar years with the Life InsuranceCorporation between 20th May, 1985 uptill date and whoconformed to the required eligibility criteria for regular recruitmenton the dates of their initial temporary appointment will be permittedto compete for the next regular recruitment to be made by theLife Insurance Corporation after the regular recruitment for theseposts currently scheduled for November, 1992; (b) These candidates will be considered on their merits with allother candidates who may apply for such appointments, includingthose from the open market.

(c) These candidates will be given an age relaxation for applyingfor regular recruitment provided that they were eligible on thedate of their first temporary appointment for securing regularappointment with the Life Insurance Corporation;

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(d) If these candidates are otherwise eligible, they can apply forregular recruitment in the normal course.

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According to the learned Solicitor General, since a scheme is inexistence, it is no longer necessary to evolve a fresh scheme forthese employees who were the parties before the Andhra PradeshHigh Court. He also stated that in the meantime, a set of instructionshave been framed called the “Life Insurance Corporation of India(Employment of Temporary Staff) Instructions, 1993” which takescare of such employees who were continuing for a fairly longperiod without being regularised.

B

Mr. Krishnamurthy, the learned Senior Counsel, on the other hand,contended that the aforesaid instructions will not govern the caseof the employees who were there before the High Court, as theywere the appointees between 1986 and 1993. He further contendedthat a similar matter, in the case of The Management of the LICof India v. Their Workmen (C.A. Nos. 1790/89) a Bench of thisCourt has disposed of with a direction to consider the case ofregularisation considering the suitability at a lesser standard by itsjudgment dated 7th February, 1996 and, therefore, there is noinfirmity with the impugned direction of the High Court.

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Having examined the judgment dated 7th February, 1996 of thisECourt in C.A. Nos. 1790/89, we find that the earlier 3 judge benchdecision dated 23rd October, 1992 has not been noticed. Theaforesaid three-judge bench decision unequivocally makes theprovisions of the scheme as a part of the order. Necessarily,therefore, the case of regularisation of the employees of theFcorporation could be dealt with in accordance with the said schemeand it would not be necessary to evolve a fresh scheme for agroup of employees. Mr. Krishnamurthy further contended thatthe E. Prabhavathy’s case (supra) relates to the employees ofTamil Nadu division. But, it is not disputed that they are theemployees of the Corporation. If the Corporation has evolved aGscheme assuming for the Tamil Nadu division, then the same couldbe equally applicable to the employees of all Divisions in thecountry. That being the position, the scheme which has beenapproved and formed a part of the order of this Court dated 23-10-1992 should govern the case of these respondents who werewrit petitioners before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh H

Needless to mention, in the earlier decision of this Court dated23-10-1992 this Court has not limited the applicability of the schemeonly to the employees of the Tamil Nadu Division. In the aforesaidcircumstances, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was not justifiedin issuing the impugned direction to the Corporation to evolve anew set of scheme to govern the case of the employees who hadfiled writ petitions in the High Court. We, therefore, set aside theimpugned direction of the Division Bench of the High Court andsubstitute the same with the direction that the case of regularisationof these respondents shall be considered in accordance with thescheme which formed a part of the order of this Court dated 23-10-1992, if not already considered. This appeal accordingly standsdisposed of.”

33. The above judgment of this Court in G Sudhakar (supra) laysdown that:

(i) The order dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra)made the scheme as a part of its order. Necessarily, thecase for the regularisation of the workers of LIC would bedealt with in accordance with the scheme. Hence, it wasnot necessary to evolve a fresh scheme for a different groupof workers;

(ii) Though E Prabavathy (supra) dealt with workersof theTamil Nadu Division, the scheme which was evolved byLIC would equally be applicable to workers of all divisionsin the country;

(iii) The decision in E Prabavathy (supra) has not limited theapplicability of the scheme only to the workersof the TamilNadu division; and

(iv) The Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradeshwas not justified in evolving a new scheme to govern theworkers who had filed a Writ Petition and its judgmentaccordingly stands set aside.

34. The decision of a two-judge Bench of this Court dated 7February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) arising out the Jamdarand Tulpule Awardsh as notnoticed the earlier decision dated 23 October1992 of a three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra). Subsequently, on A

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A18 January 2011 in LIC v. D V Anil Kumar[31],a two-judge Bench ofthis Court disposed of the appeal by accepting the terms of the schemeframed by LIC for the absorption of Class IV workers. The attention ofthis Court has also been drawn to an order dated 20 October 2016 ofthis Court in Hashmuddin v. LIC[32]followed by an order dated 15January 2020, which accepted a scheme formulated by LIC for workersBwho had rendered service for more than sixteen years.

F Submissions

35. On behalf of LIC, Mr ANS Nadkarni, Senior Counsel, madethe following submissions:

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(i) As a consequence of the Dogra Report, LIC would berequired to regularise about 11,780 workers who claim tohave worked for a limited number of days. No verificationof these claims has been done either by the LIC or by theCGIT in the Dogra Report. This would amount to an illegalDbackdoor entry, which would be contrary to the statutoryregulations framed by the LIC. Further, LIC would alsoface the issue of a lack of sanctioned postsfor theseworkers;

(ii) The Tulpule Award dated 17 April 1986 and the JamdarEAward dated 26 August 1988 directed the regularisation ofpersonsworking between 1 January 1982 and 20 May 1985who:(a) had worked as Class IV workers for a minimumperiod of 70 days in any three calendar years; or (b) hadworked as Class III workers for a minimum period of 85days in any two calendar years. However, these awardsFwere substituted by a settlement which was arrived at inthe civil appeals before this Court in LIC v. TheirWorkmen (supra), which were finally adjudicated upon byan order dated 7 February 1996;

(iii) Both the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards directed regularisationGand absorption without verifying the existence of sanctionedposts. During the pendency of the litigation, LIC wasinjuncted from making fresh recruitment till the awards werepronounced. As a result of the interim orders dated 15

31Civil Appeal Nos 953-968 of 2005 (“LIC v. D V Anil Kumar”)H32Civil Appeal No 2268 of 2011

January 1986 and 29 June 1987, LIC could not pursue anAopen, competitive and transparent process for selection onthe basis of an advertisement followed by a writtenexamination and interview. The last recruitment processtook place in 1984, andtill 1993 there was no freshrecruitment. This necessitated the making of temporaryBappointments between 1985 and 1991 to operate LIC’s 2048branches across India; A

(iv) The Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001 arose out of areference dated 4 March 1991,which required the tribunalto adjudicate whether LIC’s action of not absorbing badli/Ctemporary/part-time workers employed after 20 May 1985was justified. The award directed the absorption of “theconcerned workmen”, i.e., those employed after 20 May1985 (and thus not covered by the Tulpule and JamdarAwards) who had worked as Class III workersfor aminimum of 85 days in two calendar years or who hadDworked as Class IV workers for a minimum of 70 days inthree calendar years. The award directed that if regularvacancies did not exist to accommodate these persons,supernumerary posts would have to be created by LIC.Such a direction would be contrary to the principles whichEhave been enunciated in the decision of this Court in ONGCv. Krishan Gopal[33]. LIC as a statutory corporation isgoverned by its regulations, and no appointment beyond thevacancies in sanctioned posts can be made; D

(v) The LIC Act was amended by Act 1 of 1981. Theamendment to Section 48(2A) stipulates that the regulationswhich have been framed prior to 1981 are deemed to berules framed under Section 48(2)(cc). Further, Section48(2C) stipulates that the rules framed under Section48(2)(cc) would override the provisions of the ID Act. Theprovision has been held to be constitutionally valid by thisCourt in M. Venugopal v. LIC[34]; F

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(vi) Though LIC is bound by the judgment of this Court in TNTerminated Employees Association (supra) which has 33 2020 SCC OnLine SC 150

34 (1994) 2 SCC 323 (“M. Venugopal”)

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[2022] 10 S.C.R.

Arestored the Srivastav Award (subject to its modification inthereview petition in regards the quantum of back wages),it is also bound by:

(a) The order dated 23 October 1992 of a three-judgeBench of this Court in E Prabavathy(supra) whichBupheld the scheme formed by LIC for absorption ofad hoc workers; (b)The order dated 22 November 2001 of a two-judgeBench of this Court in G Sudhakar (supra)whichheld that the scheme which was accepted in EPrabavathy (supra) would not be limited only to theworkers in that case but would be applicable to allthe workers of LIC in all its divisions across India;and C

(c) The settlement which substituted the Tulpule andJamdar Awards, which was recorded by this CourtDwhile disposing of the civil appeals by its final orderdated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen(supra);

(vii) On 16 May 2017, LIC issued instructions under Regulation4 of its Staff Regulations to all Zonal Managers to implementEthe Srivastav Award and this Court’s orders. Consequently,245 workers were offered absorption after being foundeligible;

(viii) In terms of the order of this Court dated 18 January 2011 inLIC of India v. DV Anil Kumar (supra), LIC framed aFscheme to regularise Class IV workers who were engagedfor 5 years or more and consequently, 4770 persons wereappointed on regular posts;

(v) Following the order of this Court dated 11 May 2018 in thecontempt proceedings[35], LIC received 8300 representationsGfrom individuals claiming to be covered by the SrivastavAward, which were then scrutinised by a senior officer.Subsequently, 76 claimants were found to be eligible forabsorption in addition to the 245 individual claimants whohad been absorbed earlier; H35 Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of 2009

(vi) By the order of this Court dated 7 September 2018 in thecontempt proceedings arising out a review of TNTerminated Employees Association (supra), it wasexpressly made clear that:

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(a) The question whether the benefit of the SrivastavAward should be made available to those who wereBengaged as badli and temporary workers after 4March 1991 is a matter for interpretation before thisCourt; (b)The CGIT would limit its inquiry only to the claims ofthe workers who were employed between 20 MayC1985 and 4 March 1991; and

(c) No case in contempt had been established;

(vii) The above position is further clarified by this Court’s orderdated 10 September 2018 in the contempt proceedings arisingout the review of TN Terminated EmployeesAssociation (supra), in terms of which CGIT was directedto verify the list which was available on its record. Thus,the CGIT was required to scrutinise the applications claimingthe benefit of the award against the list of workers whowere before the CGIT in the Srivastav Award. Hence, LICscrutinized the claims of only those who were part of thecertified list before the CGIT in the Srivastav Award andhad worked between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991; D

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(viii) All India Life Insurance Employees Association and LifeInsurance Employees Association (R6 and R2 in the DograReport), All India Insurance Employees Association andWestern Zone Insurance Employees Association (R3 andR4 in the Dogra Report), National Organisation of InsuranceWorkers (R7 in the Dogra Report) and All India NationalLife Insurance Employees Federation (R9 in the DograReport) were all signatories to the compromise whichsubstituted the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards and was notedin this Court’s interim order dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v.Their Workmen (supra). Further, by the order of this Courtdated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra),the Karamchari Sangh (R10 in the Dogra Report) was also F

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Adirected to follow the terms of compromise. Hence, theseUnions and Associations who had entered into thecompromise substituting the Tulpule and Jamdar Awardsare governed by its terms;

(ix) The scrutiny which was envisaged by the order of this CourtBrequired the CGIT to: firstly, check the presence of thenames of the claimants in the CGIT list in the SrivastavAward; and secondly, conduct a verification of documentssuch as appointment letters, extension letters and relievingletters to scrutinise whether the claimants were actuallyemployed for 70/85 days for three/two years respectively.CBased on this scrutiny, the 321 eligible workers (245+76)who were beneficiaries of the Srivastav Award have alreadybeen absorbed, and any other claims by the workersindividually or through the ten Unions are not maintainable;

(x) The Dogra Report has erroneously held that theDcompromise which was arrived at between the parties wasin addition to the rights declared in the Tulpule and JamdarAwards.To support its reasoning, the Report relies on thefindings of this Court at paragraph 39 to 41 of its judgmentdated 18 March 2015 in TN Terminated EmployeesEAssociation (supra).However, those observations haveonly adverted to the interim order dated 1 March 1989ofthis Court in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), and not itsfinal order dated 7 February 1996;

(xi) Instead of carrying out the task of verification, the DograFReport only takes a prima facie view and has merely statedthat the majority of the workers were eligible for absorptionwithout carrying out the process of verification;

(xii) Though the Unions have admitted that they do not possesseither the residential addresses or other particulars of theGclaimants situated in various regions, the Dogra Report hasfound 1452 workmen to be eligible across the country; and

(xiii) In summary, the Dogra Report is flawed because it:

(a) Does not consider the CGIT certified list of theSrivastav Award, as directed in the order of this CourtHdated 10 September 2018; RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE1033CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.](b)Ignores that it was not carrying out an adjudicatoryAfunction but only a verification exercise;

(c) Initially states that the claimants who had joined after4 March 1991 are not being scrutinised, yet the finaldirections consider many such claims; and B

(d) Ignores paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award andgives benefit to persons who are governed by thescheme accepted by this Court in E Prabavathy(supra).

36. On behalf of the Unions, Associations and workers, argumentshave been addressed by Dr Manish Singhvi, Mr Pallav Sishodia, Mr RSingaravelan, Mr V Prakash and Mr Salman Khurshid, Senior Counsel.In addition to the submissions of Senior Counsel, we have heard MrNandakumar, Mr Rakesh Shukla andMr Shailesh Madiyal. In addition,Counsel appearing on behalf of the workers in various MiscellaneousApplications have been furnished with an opportunity of being heard inseriatim. The submissions which have been urged on behalf of theworkers are summarised below:

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(i) The present proceedings in the Miscellaneous Applicationspertain to the implementation of the Srivastav Award dated22 June 2001. The Srivastav Award has been upheld in thedecision of this Court in TN Terminated EmployeesAssociation (supra); E

(ii) The review petitions arising from the decision in TNTerminated Employees Association (supra) weredismissed by the judgment in TN Terminated Full TimeFTemporary LIC Employees Assn. v. LIC[36 ]and thecurative petition was also dismissed on 22 February 2017.Thus, the Srivastav Award has attained finality subject tothe modification thatthe quantum of back-wages has beenreduced to fifty per cent. The doctrine of res judicataapplies between the parties and at this stage, it would notGbe open to set aside or alter the contents of the award;

(iii) Though the contempt petitions were disposed of, the CGITwas directed to look into the implementation of the Srivastav H

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Award. The Dogra Report dated 31 May 2019 has beenprepared by the CGIT in pursuance of the mandate of thisCourt; A

(iv) Four grounds have been advanced on behalf of LIC to assailthe Dogra report:

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(a) No documents were produced to establish that theworkers had worked for 85 days and 70 days acrossa period of two and three years respectively; (b)The Dogra Report had to consider only the CGITcertified list which was part of the referenceproceedings; C

(c) The Srivastav Award would not apply to workerswho commenced work after 4 March 1991; and (d)The Dogra Report also permits the absorption of theworkers governed by the judgment of this Court in EPrabavathy (supra); D

(v) In response to the above grounds, it is submitted that theDogra Report has correctly drawn an adverse inferenceagainst LIC for not producing the records which were intheir possession, while approving the lists. Further, the reportEduly notes that a majority of the workers had produceddocuments, which have been accepted after verification;

(vi) In the event, however, that this Court is inclined to remitthe proceedings back for proper verification of the workerswho are covered by the Srivastav Award, the followingFmethodology should be adopted:

(a) LIC has now stated before this Court that its divisionalofficesare in possession of the records. LIC mustproduce in the first instance the records availablewith it for the purpose of verification; and G

(b) The verification to be carried out under the directionsof this Court should not be confined to any particulardocument and the primary onus must lie on LIC toshow whether the workers have actually workedduring the relevant period; H

(vii) The Srivastav Award did not only deal with the cases ofAworkers who had actually filed cases in the industrialreference. The award specifies that it would apply to allworkers, and consequently directed that an advertisementbe issued for that purpose. If the award was intended to belimited to the CGIT certified list, there was no occasion toBdirect a verification to be carried out by the CGIT since thecertified list was already available with LIC.Hence, thedirection in the order of this Court dated 10 September 2018in the contempt proceedings arising out of the review ofTN Terminated Employees Association (supra), thatthe verification would be carried out of the CGIT list, cannotCbe read out of context.Consistent with the principles ofcollective bargaining under the ID Act, all workers whowere beneficiaries of the Srivastav Award should be grantedabsorption;

(viii) The plea that workers employed after 4 March 1991 areDnot entitled to relief under the Srivastav Award is contraryto the provisions of Section 18(3)(d) of the ID Act. Thepurpose of Section 18(3)(d) is to ensure that an awardgoverns not only those who are in service when it is madebut to subsequent workers as well. In any event, at leastEthose workers who were in employment on 18 June 2001,when the award was made, should be granted relief; D

(ix) The applicability of the orders of this Court in E Prabavathy(supra) and G Sudhakar (supra) has been considered inthe judgment of this Court in TN Terminated EmployeesAssociation (supra), and that interpretation has attainedfinality. Hence, those orders ought not to become the basisto reopen the present proceedings; F

(x) As a matter of fact, the Dogra Report suffers from under-inclusion since the claims of workers who were engagedafter 4 March 1991 have not been considered, though theymay have applied in pursuance of the advertisement issuedby the LIC to implement the Srivastav Award; G

(xi) The compromise which was arrived at before this Court,as noted in its orders dated 1 March 1989 and 7 February H

1996, indicates that it was confined to persons who workedfrom 1 January 1982 to 20 May 1985. Hence, it has norelevance to the Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001, whichrelates to persons who were engaged after 20 May 1985; A

(xii) The terms of reference which resulted in the SrivastavBAward related to the employment of badli, temporary andpart-time workers after 20 May 1985. Consequently, thereis no warrant for restricting the operation of the award tothe period upto 4 March 1991 (which was the date ofreference). The benefit of the award must enure not onlyto the workers who were engaged as temporaries or badlisCafter 20 May 1985 till the date of reference but the sameprinciple must also apply to workers who have been engagedthereafter; and(xiii) The judgment of this Court has directedthe payment of fifty per cent back-wages. For the periodafter the date of the Srivastav Award, full back-wages shouldDbe granted to those who have been absorbed. Back-wagescannot be granted only for the period of 70/85 days, and atthe rates which were made applicable to the badli workers.

37. The rival submissions would now fall for analysis.

G Prelude –Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, and their AftermathE

38. The Tulpule Award dated 17 April 1986 was made in thecontext of a reference to the NIT pertaining to the absorption of badli/temporary/part-time workers as regular employees of LIC. The awardheld that all workers who had worked in any capacity, temporary, badlior part-time, between 1 January 1982 till 20 May 1985, should beFconsidered as eligible for absorption provided that: (a) Class IV workersought to have worked for 70 days in any three calendar years; and(b)Class III worker sought to have worked for 85 days in any two calendaryears.

39. The Jamdar Award dated 26 August 1998 clarified the meaningGof the Tulpule Award dated 17April 1986.The award discussed the objectof the earlier reference, and indicated that LIC had engaged badli/temporary/part-time workers on a large-scale and restricted theiremployment to a particular number of days in order to prevent themfrom gaining the status of permanency on the basis of the number ofdays worked. Hence, it held that the object of the reference was to putH

an end to such unfair legal practices, to regularise the employment ofpersons who would have been ordinarily absorbed but for such practicesand to reduce to aminimum the disproportionately large contingent ofsuch employees who had been deprived of security of service. TheJamdar Award noted that the Tulpule Award did not contemplate that incomputing the number of work days only the days worked in two/threeconsecutivecalendars year should be taken into consideration. Further,it noted that when the Tulpule Award spoke of “absorption”, it did notmean “recruitment”.

40. The Tulpule and Jamdar Awards were the subject matter of achallenge before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in LICv. Their Workmen (supra).On 1 March 1989, this Court while grantingleave to appeal recorded that eight out of the nine Unions, representingabout 99 per cent of the workers, had entered into a compromise withLIC. It was in this backdrop that, pending the disposal of the civil appeals,this Court permitted LIC and these eight Unions to implement the termsof compromise, without prejudice to the rights of the ninth Union. Theterms of compromise envisaged that it would operate in substitution ofthe Tulpule and Jamdar Awards on the question of the regular employmentof the workers concerned in those references. The terms of thecompromise adopted the norm of employment for 85 days in any twoyears for Class III workers and employment for 70 days in any threecalendar years for Class IV workers between 1 January 1982 and 20May 1985. Temporary, part-time and badli workers who had madeapplications before a stipulated date were held eligible to be consideredfor regular employment. The compromise envisaged that the selectionof candidates shall be made on the basis of qualifications, age, writtentest and interview, and also having regard to the number of days worked.According to the compromise, initially a list of selected candidates wasto be drawn up, from which regular employment would be offered inorder of merit prospectively from the dates notified, as and when vacanciesin sanctioned posts for regular employment were filled up from time totime. Further, as a result of the compromise, the process of recruitmentfor these candidates would be subject to certain relaxations. Finally, itwas envisaged that the dispute in relation to the workers concerned,which had resulted in the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, would no longersurvive, and the rights and obligations of the parties in relation to regularemployment would be governed only by the compromise.

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A41. The compromise was ultimately adopted in the final order ofthis Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra),which disposed of the civil appeals. In the order, this Court accepted thesubmission of LIC that since eight out of nine Unions (representing anoverwhelming majority of workmen) had accepted the compromise, theninth Union must also act on the basis of its terms and conditions. TheBCourt, however, directed that LIC shall exempt Class IVworkers (whomthe ninth Union was representing) from a test and interview, if it had thepower to do so under the regulations and instructions governing theirconditions of service. In the alternative, if there was no such power, itdirected that the test which was prescribed for these workers should beCof a lower standard than the test prescribed in the two circulars mentionedin the compromise.

42. There is absolutely no manner of doubt that the compromisewhich was arrived at by eight out of nine Unions indicated that the Tulpuleand Jamdar Awards would stand substituted by the terms of theDcompromise. The compromise clearly stipulated that the workers whofulfilled the requisite days of work in Class III or, as the case may be,Class IV posts would be eligible. As and when vacancies would arise,they would be offered regular appointment.

43. Prior to the final order of this Court in the civil appeals arisingEfrom the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, the litigation in the E Prabavathybatch was settled by the order dated 23 October 1992.In the order, theCourt found that the scheme for absorption which was propounded byLIC was reasonable. The scheme envisaged that all temporary workerswho had worked for 85 days in any two consecutive calendar yearswith LIC between 20 May 1985 and 23 October 1992 and who conformedFto the required eligibility criteria for regular appointment on the date oftheir initial appointment, would be permitted to compete at the next regularrecruitment to be made by LIC. These candidates would be consideredon their merit as against the other candidates who applied for theseposts, including from the open market. They would also be given an ageGrelaxation while applying for a post, if they were eligible for it on thedate of their first temporary appointment. This scheme was approved,subject to the postponement by at least six weeks of a recruitmentscheduled for November 1992, in orderto enable all eligible adhocworkers to compete with others for selection at that recruitment. Thedecision in E Prabavathy (supra) was evidently not noticed in this Court’sHorder dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra).

44. The order of a two-judge Bench of this Court dated 22November 2001 in G Sudhakar (supra) noted that in E Prabavathy(supra), a Bench of three-judges had embodied the clauses of the schemeas a part of their order. Hence, the order in G Sudhakar (supra)expressly clarified that though the scheme before this Court in EPrabavathy (supra) was evolved in relation to a case from the TamilNadu Division of the LIC, it would be equally applicable to the workersof all divisions of LIC in the country. Consequently, in G Sudhakar(supra), it was held that the scheme would apply to workers who werebefore the High Court of Andhra Pradesh as well, and there was nooccasion for the High Court to direct that a new scheme should beframed by LIC.

45. It is important to note that the orders of this Court dated 23October 1992 (in E Prabavathy (supra)) and 7 February 1996 (disposingthe civil appeals challenging the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards) pre-datethe Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001. On the other hand, the order inG Sudhakar (supra), which was dated 22 November 2001, was evidentlypassed after the Srivastav Award.

H Srivastav Award and the Judgement of this Court

46. The reference before the tribunal leading up to the SrivastavAward was made on 4 March 1991. The reference was in relation tothe justification ofLIC’s non-absorption of persons recruited as temporary,badli and part-time workers after 20 May 1985. The Srivastav Awardcontains an observation that LIC was not guilty of unfair labour practicesby continuing persons recruited as temporary, badli and part-time workersas non-regular employees. The above observation in the award was inview of the submission of LIC (which was not refuted by the workers)that the workers were continuing in their positions on the basis of injunctionorders issued by tribunals and the court, and due to the pressure of theUnions. However, the award also noted that the terms of the referencedid not encompass this aspect and the tribunal was not recording a finding.

47. Paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award referred to the order ofthis Court dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra) whichgoverned the scheme of absorption/regularisation for that batch ofworkers. It noted that the E Prabavathy group of workers were impleadedto the proceedings leading to the award, and had filed a statement ofclaim. However, the award concluded that since the order dated 23October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra) was between the same parties, AB

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Athe legality of the order of this Court could not be challenged by theworkers before the tribunal. Hence, the contention of the workers inthat regard was not accepted.

48. In paragraph 88, the Srivastav Award concluded:

“88. In view of the fact, I am of definite view that such type ofBworkmen belonging to temporary and part time categories in classIII and class IV service of corporation who were employed afterfollowing the procedure and were allowed to continue servicebeyond the qualifying period and were eligible and suitable in everyrespect should be given absorption in the service from date of thevacancy in the service in which they could have been absorbed.CIt will also apply to those such employees whose services were terminated by the corporation”

The award finds that LIC was not justified in denying absorptionto those temporary/badli/part-time workers who were employed after20 May 1985, and that they should be given absorption on the terms andDconditions which werestipulated in the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards (whichwere in respect of workers employed between 1 January 1982 to 20May 1985). LIC was directed to take into consideration their claim forabsorption on the basis of their eligibility and suitability, as dealt with inthe Srivastav Award. Thus, all the badli, part-time and temporary workerswho have rendered the qualifying period of service and were suitableEwould also have to be considered for absorption by LIC by publishing anotice in the newspaper. The Srivastav Award directed that in case noregular vacancy was available, supernumerary posts shall be created byLIC for the purpose of absorption and that the case for absorption againstexisting vacancies would be considered first, irrespective of regularFrecruitment.

49. The Srivastav Award was set aside by the Single Judge of theDelhi High Court. The Division Bench affirmed the judgment of theSingle Judge. Eventually, the dispute travelled to and resulted in thedecision of this Court in TN Terminated Employees AssociationG(supra).

50. The judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association(supra), dated 18 March 2015, arose from concurring judgments of aSingle Judge and of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court bywhich the Srivastav Award had been set aside. In appeal, the principalissue which came for consideration before this Court was:H

“34.1. (i) Whether the setting aside of the award passed by CGITdated 18-6-2001 by the learned Single Judge by placing relianceupon compromise reached between the parties in SLP No. 14906of 1988, which was filed against the award of Justice Tulpule,which award was clarified and affirmed by Justice SM Jamdar,legal and valid?”

The next issue, in relation to the workers’ claim for relief, wasconsequential in nature. After noticing the interim order dated 1 March1989 passed by this Court in the proceedings arising out of the Tulpuleand Jamdar Awards in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), Justice GopalaGowda, speaking for the two-judge Bench, observed:

“40. From the perusal of the above order of this Courtin LIC v. Workmen [ SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988, order dated 1-3-1989 (SC)] , nowhere has it been stated in the terms of thecompromise between the parties that the award of Justice R.D.Tulpule dated 17-4-1986 which was clarified upon reference madeby the Central Government under Section 36-A of the Act byJustice Jamdar, is either set aside by this Court or substituted thecompromise terms in the place of the award except the orderreferred to supra passed in the above SLP No. 14906 of 1988. Infact, on the other hand it is clearly stated that the compromiseterms are between the parties to the said SLP and that it shall notprejudice the respective rights and obligations in relation to themembers of the other union. Therefore, the effect of the awardof Justice R.D. Tulpule with regard to the direction given to theCorporation regarding absorption of badli, temporary employeesas permanent employees has not been substituted by terms andconditions of the compromise.”

In the above extract, the Court referred to the interim order ofthis Court dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) bywhich, pending the disposal of the appeals,eight out of the nine Unionswho had entered into terms of compromise with LIC were permitted toimplement it as an interim measure, without prejudice to the rights andcontentions of the remaining Union which had not entered into acompromise. Relying exclusively on the interim order of this Court, itwas held:

“41. The award of Justice R.D. Tulpule dated 17-4-1986 reiteratedby way of clarification in the award passed by Justice Jamdar A

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Adated 26-8-1988, in the dispute subsequently has been operativeeven after the compromise arrived at between the parties to thecompromise in LIC v. Workmen [ SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988,order dated 1-3-1989 (SC)] before this Court. Therefore, thecontention of the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of theCorporation that the said awards are not in operation and thatBonly the terms and conditions of compromise and orders of thisCourt are binding upon the workmen concerned in these appealsis both not factually and legally correct. This abovesaid argumentof the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Corporation is nottenable in view of the categorical statement made by this Court inCits orders passed in SLP referred to supra, wherein, this Courthas permitted the management and members of the said 8 unionsto implement the terms of compromise by way of interim measurewithout any prejudice to the rights and contentions of the membersof other union who have not entered into compromise with themanagement of the Corporation. It is not the case of theDCorporation in these appeals either before CGIT or before theHigh Court or in these proceedings the workmen concerned havealso accepted the said terms and conditions of the compromisearrived at between the parties in SLP No. 14906 of 1988. ThisCourt in the order passed in the abovesaid SLP which is extractedEhereinabove has made it very clear that the said compromise wasentered into between unions therein, but it does not prejudice therights and contentions of the workmen concerned whose disputesare in relation to their absorption in their respective posts whowere appointed after 20-5-1985. Further, even if some of theworkmen are bound under the said compromise that arose out ofFSLP No. 14906 of 1988, this in no way deters their right to raisean industrial dispute and get the same adjudicated vide order ofreference by the appropriate Government to CGIT. The award ofCGIT was concluded after rightly examining the facts,circumstances of the case and the legal principles laid down inGthe awards passed by Justice Tulpule and Justice Jamdar. Moreimportantly CGIT award was passed after rightly appreciatingthe points of dispute referred to it and on the merits of the case.”

The interpretation of the interim order which has been placed bythe Court emerges from the following extract:H

“46. Further, by a careful reading of the said orderin LIC v. Workmen [ SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988, order dated 1-3-1989 (SC)] , it has been made clear that the awards passed byNIT (by Justice Jamdar and Justice Tulpule) after adjudicatingthe points of dispute in the industrial dispute raised by similarlyplaced workmen is not disturbed by substituting the terms andconditions of compromise between the parties therein in SLP No.14906 of 1988. Therefore, the awards in relation to the absorptionof the workmen as permanent workmen in the Corporation havegot statutory force. This is what is stated by CGIT in its awarddated 18-6-2001 on the basis of pleadings and evidence on record,which was erroneously set aside by the High Court by assigningerroneous reasons which is sought to be justified by the SeniorCounsel on behalf of the Corporation by placing reliance upon theorders and the Scheme framed in E. Prabavathy [E.Prabavathy v. LIC, SLP (C) No. 10393 of 1992, order dated 23-10-1992 (SC)] and G. Sudhakar [ Civil Appeal No. 2104 of 2000,order dated 22-11-2001 (SC)] cases which Scheme has noapplication to the case of the workmen concerned involved inthese appeals referred to supra.”

51. The Court proceeded to hold that both the award of JusticeTulpule, reiterated by way of the clarificatory award of Justice Jamdar,are operative and they have not been terminated by either of the partiesas provided by Section 19(6) of the ID Act. The Court held that theterms of compromise and the scheme formulated in E Prabavathy (supra)and G Sudhakar (supra) do not result in the substitution of the awardsmade by Justice Tulpule and Justice Jamdar. The Court held that theSrivastav Award would have to be observed by LIC until it was replacedby another settlement in relation to the service conditions of the workersunder Section 12 read with Section 18(3) of the ID Act or by anotheraward following the termination of the awards which are in operation.The judgment of this Court concluded that:

(i) The Tulpule and Jamdar Awards continue to remainoperative;

(ii) The Awards do not stand substituted by the interim orderof this court dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v. TheirWorkmen (supra); A

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A(iii)The orders of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra) and GSudhakar (supra) would not stand in the way of anadjudication by the Industrial Tribunal; and

(iv) Unless the awards are substituted either by another awardor settlement, the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards continue toBremain operative and binding.

52. On this basis, the Court concluded that the Srivastav Awardwas legal and valid and shall be implemented by LIC by absorption ofthe workers concerned in permanent posts. The operative direction whichwas issued by this Court is extracted below:

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“54. It is needless to mention that since we are of the view thatthe award passed by CGIT in ID No. 27 of 1991 is legal and valid,it shall be restored and implemented by the Corporation byabsorbing the workmen concerned in the permanent posts and ifthey have attained the age of superannuation, the CorporationDwill be liable to pay all consequential benefits including themonetary benefits taking into consideration the pay scale andrevised pay scale from time to time by the Corporation.”

53. None of the Counsel appearing on behalf of the workers inthe present batch of cases disputed the factual position, asserted onEbehalf of LIC, that the judgment of the two-judge Bench in TNTerminated Employees Association (supra) affirming the validity ofthe Srivastav Award contains no reference whatsoever to the final orderdated 7 February 1996 in the batch of civil appeals arising from theTulpule and Jamdar Awards in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra). Theinterim order dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra),Fwhich forms the basis of the judgment in TN Terminated EmployeesAssociation (supra), was passed in the backdrop of a compromise whichwas arrived between LIC and eight out of the nine Unions andAssociations representing the workers. Since the appeals were pendingat that stage, the Court granted liberty to the parties to the compromiseGto implement its terms as an interim measure, without prejudice to thecontentions of the ninth Union which had not entered into the compromise.But noticeably, there is a clear omission on the part of the Court in TNTerminated Employees Association (supra) to refer to the admittedposition that subsequently on 7 February 1996, this Court in LIC v. TheirWorkmen (supra) accepted the submission of LIC that since eight outH

of the nine unions (representing nearly 99 per cent of the workers inClass III and Class IV posts) had accepted the compromise, there wasno justification for theninth Union to object. The Court held that it wouldbe in the interest of industrial peace that theninth Union should also fallin line and act on the terms of the compromise. The civil appeals in LICv. Their Workmen (supra) were disposed of in terms of the aboveorder dated 7 February 1996. The terms of compromise clearly envisagedthat the management and the workers had agreed that the awards of theNIT dated 17 April 1986 (Tulpule Award) and 26 August 1988 (JamdarAward) “be substituted by the terms and conditions of compromise inrelation to the question of regular employment of the workmen concernedin the said references”. Once the awards were substituted by the termsof compromise, it would be an impermissible interpretation of law tohold that the awards continued to be operative and binding, notwithstandingthe final order of this Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. TheirWorkmen (supra). The final order dated 7 February 1996has not beenadverted to by the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated EmployeesAssociation (supra). The factual finding is based only on the interimorder dated 1 March 1989. The final order dated 7 February 1996 inLIC v. Their Workmen (supra) had a crucial bearing on the specialleave petitions arising from the judgment of the Delhi High Court settingaside the Srivastav Award.

54. That having been said, it is necessary to also advert to theinterpretation which was placed on the decisions of this Court in EPrabavathy(supra) and G Sudhakar (supra). The two-judge Bench inTN Terminated Employees Association (supra) opined that thescheme which was framed in E Prabavathy (supra) was the outcomeof an order which was passed in writ petitions filed by the workers andnot in the course of the adjudication of an industrial dispute. On thisground, the Court held that the decision in E Prabavathy (supra) wouldnot come in the way of an adjudication by the CGIT or NIT while decidinga reference under Section 10 of the ID Act. The background of thedecision in E Prabavathy (supra) has already been noticed earlier. Thedecision was rendered on 23 October 1992 in a batch of civil appealswhich was being considered by a three-judge Bench. During the pendencyof the civil appeals, the Court called upon LIC to formulate a scheme forthere gularisation of workers who had been granted ad hoc employmentfor at least 85 days from time to time. The three-judge Bench held, after AB

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Aassessing the terms of the scheme proposed by LIC, that it was reasonableand commended itself for acceptance. The scheme proposed by LICwas approved by this Court with a specific observation that the clausesof the scheme extracted in the order would form a part of the order ofthis Court. The decision of three Judges in E Prabavathy (supra) wasthereafter interpreted by a two-judge Bench in its order dated 22BNovember 2001 in G Sudhakar (supra).Noticing that the scheme whichhas been accepted in E Prabavathy (supra) governed workers of theTamil Nadu Division of LIC, the Court held that the scheme would beequally applicable to the workers of all divisions of LIC in the country.The Court therefore held that it was not necessary to evolve a freshCscheme for a different group of workers, in that case under the directionsof the Andhra Pradesh High Court. As a matter of fact, it is also materialto note that in paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award itself there was aspecific finding that though the E Prabavathy group of workers hadbeen impleaded in the reference and had filed a statement of the claim,having regard to the fact that the order of this Court dated 23 OctoberD1992 was between the same parties, the workers had no valid ground tochallenge the legality of this Court’s order before the tribunal. Despitethe clear observations in the Srivastav Award, the judgment of the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) hascome to the conclusion that the order of the three-judge Bench in EEPrabavathy (supra) would not preclude an industrial adjudication by thetribunal. The two-judge Bench which delivered the judgment in TNTerminated Employees Association (supra) was bound by the orderin E Prabavathy (supra), which was of a larger Bench of three judges,and the interpretation which was placed on it by another two-judge Benchin G Sudhakar (supra). If the two-judge Bench differed, it had to referFthe matter to a larger Bench but it was not at liberty to take a final viewat variance with binding decisions of a larger Bench and of a co-ordinateBench.

55. A plea has been urged on behalf of the workers that thejudgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) hasGattained finality following the dismissal of the review petition on 9 August2016 (save for the modification by which the quantum of back-wageswas reduced to fifty per cent) and the subsequent dismissal of a curativepetition. We are cognizant that the ground, submitting that the decisionignored the final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their WorkmenH(supra), was specifically pleaded in review. The only observation in the judgment in review is that LIC has not submitted anything on record toindicate that the judgment suffers from an error apparent in law. However,having regard to the immense financial burden, the quantum of back-wages would be reduced to fifty per cent.

56. Now, there cannot be any dispute over the principle that thejudgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), followedby the order in review dated 9 August 2016, are between the presentparties and finality has attached to them. LIC is, however, before thisCourt urging that as a statutory entity with a nationwide presence, it isfaced with a situation involving conflicting directions of this Court. LIChas submitted that while on the one hand, the Tulpule and Jamdar Awardswere substituted by the terms of compromise on 7 February 1996 inLIC v. Their Workmen (supra), this was preceded by the order dated23 October 1992 of a three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) whichaccepted the scheme of absorption proposed by LIC and followed bythe order dated 28 November 2001 of a two-judge Bench in G Sudhakar(supra) which interpreted the decision in E Prabavathy (supra) as beingapplicable to all divisions of LIC. The impact of the judgment in TNTerminated Employees Association (supra) is to substitute andsupplant the schemes which were evolved before this Court for providingabsorption on specified terms. The essence of the schemes which wereaccepted by this Court was that those temporary, badli and part-timeworkers who fulfilled the requirement of the threshold period of servicewould be eligible to be considered for the grant of the permanency, subjectto certain conditions. The orders passed by this Court envisage thatthese workers would be considered for the grant of permanency in thecourse of a recruitment process. The impact of the judgment of the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) isthat while on the one hand the Court’s orders dated 23 October 1992, 7February 1996and 22 November 2001 continued to hold the field, on theother hand the restoration of the Srivastav Award brings in place a regimein conflict with what has been accepted by this Court in these orders.Faced with this predicament, it is necessary for this Court to step in andto correct a manifest miscarriage of justice caused by the decision inTN Terminated Employees Association (supra) which has been urgedto be per incuriam. The consequence of not doing so is serious.

57. The Court is now confronted with claims on behalf of theworkers that the principle which has been enunciated in the Srivastav A

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AAward and which has been restored by the two-judge Bench in TNTerminated Employees Association (supra) must apply to all workerssubsequently engaged by applying Section 18(3)(d) read with Section17A of the IDAct. Hence, a balance will now have to be drawn by thisCourt, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of theBConstitution, which while on the one hand factors in the finality whichhas attached to the judgment in TN Terminated EmployeesAssociation (supra) but on the other hand also factors in the essentialconcerns which have been expressed before this Court by LIC. Theformula of providing absorption to part-time, badli or temporary workerswho have put in 85 days in any two calendar years in a Class III postCor70 days in any three calendar years in a Class IV post will, unless abalance were to be drawn, become an avenue for disregarding the needfor an open and transparent process of recruitment by a public sectorcorporation governed by therule of law and the mandate of Articles 14and 16 of the Constitution. The judgments of this Court, in the context ofDpublic employment, lay stress on providing equality of opportunity. Aswe have recorded earlier in the course of the statements of facts, LIChad been restrained, due to the interim orders which were passed in thecourse of the various proceedings, from taking recourse to recruitmentthrough the open market. LIC having been restrained by judicial orders Efrom pursuing an open recruitment process, the situation which has nowarisen is that unless a balance were to be drawn, absorption of part-timeand badli workers would become a substitute for a recruitment processbased on sanctioned posts, consistent with the principles of reservationand pursued on the basis of a structured recruitment which gives equalopportunities to all applicants. Such a consequence is a serious detrimentFto constitutional parameters and to the duty of LIC as a public employerto follow a process which is fair and inconsonance with Articles 14 and16 of the Constitution. An open and competitive process for recruitmentwill enable LIC to recruit the best among the available talent. Substitutingthis by a back-door entry will be detrimental to the interests of theGcorporation which is governed by statute.

I Validity of the verification in the Dogra Report

58. Mr ANS Nadkarni, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf ofLIC, assailed the Dogra Report on the ground that the remit before theH

CGIT was only to verify and not to adjudicate. There is no doubt aboutthe premise that the task which was entrusted to CGIT by the order ofthis Court dated 7 September 2018 in the contempt proceedings arisingout of the review of TN Terminated Employees Association (supra)was of verification. But it becomes necessary to consider whether theremit to the CGIT was only confined to the certified list of workers inthe industrial reference. It is true that by the order of this Court dated 10September 2018, the CGIT was directed to verify the list on the record.However, an isolated sentence in the order of this Court cannot be readtorn from its context. Paragraph 94 of the Srivastav Award requiredLIC to also consider the case of those workers who belonged to thetemporary, badli and part-time category, who had completed the qualifiedperiod of working and were suitable in every respect but whose serviceshad been terminated. LIC was directed to publish a notice in the dailynewspapers so as to enable such workers to lodge their claims forabsorption. LIC issued a public notice in the newspapers on 21 July2015.Each applicant was required to submit a form for being consideredfor absorption, of which item 10(b) required a disclosure of the details ofthe petition before the CGIT including whether the applicant was apetitioner in the industrial reference. The crucial aspect, however, is thatthe verification which was carried out by the CGIT was not specificallyrestricted to the certified list of workers. The judgment of this Court inthe course of the proceedings in review, records the following submissionsbeing made on behalf of LIC:

“6. The learned Attorney General further submits that as on 31-3-2015, LIC had 55, 427 Class III employees and 5190 Class IVemployees. If LIC is directed to consider the absorption of theworkmen to the advertisement, then the number of Class IIIemployees will increase by 11.14% and Class IV employees by56.65% and the same will affect the employee’s ratio in additionto the increase in its financial burden and that the same will becontrary to the interests of the policy-holders. The learned AttorneyGeneral estimates the financial liability for implementing the orderof this Court at approximately Rs 7087 crores, with the annualliability at around Rs 728 crores per year and that this will be ahuge financial burden for LIC to bear.”

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59. This having been said, it is evident that the Dogra ReportCsuffers from clear and manifest errors. As we have already noted earlier,LIC had drawn the attention of the Presiding Officer to the fact that theclaims which had been submitted by the Unions, Associations andindividual workers during the course of the verification contained duplicateentries. LIC has produced a chart containing details of various workers Dand claimants.For convenience of reference, the chart is extracted below:

C Net 3332 96 1293 1549 347 856 272 187 34 5 219 8190 ALess Name not found in certified lists 3332 94 1184 1543 339 0 61 186 34 5 219 6997 received from CGIT Less Engaged less than 85 days 0 0 9 1 0 11 90 0 0 0 0 111 (CIII)Less Engaged less than 70 days 0 0 7 1 6 6 36 0 0 0 0 56 B(CIV)D Net 0 2 93 4 2 839 85 1 0 0 0 1026 Less Party in E.P & 0 0 0 0 0 839 83 0 0 0 0 922 Ors E Net 0 2 93 4 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 104 Less Documents not submitted to 0 0 26 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 32 prove eligibilityCriminal Case Less pending0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 CFabricated Less 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 DocumentsG Found eligible, 0 0 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 Absorbed Note:- 2 Individual Petitioners Sl.no. 29 & 31 have now submittedtheir claim through INTUC-BNP, however no substantiating documentshave been submitted”

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60. The Dogra Report eventually concludes that the group ofworkers, who are governed by the order of this Court in E Prabavathy(supra), would also be eligible for absorption. By considering the workerswho are governed by the order in E Prabavathy (supra) tobe eligiblefor absorption, the Dogra Report has fallen into a clear error. The reporthas considered those workers who were clearly outside the ambit of itsremit since they were governed by a specific order of this Court. Thatapart, it is evident that the Dogra Report has proceeded on a generalisedassumption that a majority of workers had produced documents areeligible for absorption (having drawn a negative inference from LIC’snon-production of documents). In this backdrop, it would be necessaryto bring about a proper verification before the claims of the workers canbe truly considered. The deficiency of the Dogra Report in carrying outa proper verification stands clearly established.

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J The Interplay between the Industrial Disputes Act 1947and Section 48 of the LIC Act 1956

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61. Section 48 of the LIC Act confers a rule making power on theCentral Government. Clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of Section 48 wasintroduced by Act 1 of 1981 with effect from 31 January 1981. Underclause (cc), the Central Government is empowered to frame rules dealingwith the following matters:

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A“(cc) the terms and conditions of service of the employees of theCorporation, including those who became employees of theCorporation on the appointed day under this Act;”

62. Simultaneously by the Amending Act, sub-Sections(2A), (2B)and (2C) were introduced into Section 48. These Sections provide asBfollows:

“(2A) The regulations and other provisions as in force immediatelybefore the commencement of the Life Insurance Corporation(Amendment) Act, 1981, with respect to the terms and conditionsof service of employees and agents of the Corporation includingCthose who became employees and agents of the Corporation onthe appointed day under this Act, shall be deemed to be rulesmade under clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and shall, subject to theother provisions of this section, have effect accordingly.

(2B) The power to make rules conferred by clause (cc) of sub-Dsection (2) shall include-

(i) The power to give retrospective effect to such rules; and

(ii) The power to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal,the regulations and other provisions referred to in sub-section (2A),with retrospective effect, from a date not earlier than the twentiethEday of June, 1979.

(2C) The provisions of clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and sub-section (2B) and any rules made under the said clause (cc) shallhave effect, and any such rule made with retrospective effectfrom any date shall also be deemed to have had effect from thatFdate, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court,tribunal or other authority and notwithstanding anything containedin the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or any other lawor any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for thetime being in force.”G63. By virtue of sub-Section (2A), the regulations governing theterms and conditions of service of the employees and agents of LICwhich were in force immediately before Amending Act 1 of 1981, aredeemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) and haveeffect subject to the other provisions of the Section. By a deeming fictionof law, the regulations which were in existence on the date of theH

Amending Act in relation to the terms and conditions of service aregiven the status of rules framed under clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) ofSection 48. The effect of sub-Section (2C) is that the provision of clause(cc) of sub-Section (2) and any rules made under it with retrospectiveeffect, shall also be deemed to have had effect from that datenotwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, tribunal orother authority and notwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act, orin any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrumentfor the time being in force. The rules which are framed under Section48(2)(cc) operate with a non-obstante clause which prevails,inter alia,notwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act. The vires of theAmending Act was upheld in a judgment of a three-judge Bench of thisCourt in AV Nachane (supra). Justice AC Gupta, speaking for himselfand Justice RS Pathak (as the learned Chief Justice then was), repelledthe challenge to the validity of the Amending Act based on Article 14 ofthe Constitution. The Court also rejected the submission that sub-Section(2C), which was introduced into Section 48 by the Amending Act, sufferedfrom the vice of excessive delegation. While upholding the AmendingAct, the Court held:

“8. The contention that Article 14 is infringed arises on theprovision of sub-section (2-C) of Section 48 that any rule madeunder clause (cc) of sub-section (2) of that section touching theterms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporationshall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in theIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is true that after rules are maderegarding the terms and conditions of service, the right to raise anindustrial dispute in respect of matters dealt with by the rules willbe taken away and to that extent the provisions of the IndustrialDisputes Act will cease to be applicable. It was argued that therewas no basis on which the employees of the Corporation could besaid to form a separate class for denying to them the protection ofthe Industrial Disputes Act. The reply on behalf of the Union ofIndia and the Life Insurance Corporation was that the remunerationthat was being paid to Class III and Class IV employees of theCorporation was far in excess of what was paid to similarlysituated employees in other establishments in the public sector.Some material was also furnished to support this claim thoughthat were certainly not conclusive. The need for amending theLife Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 as appearing from the A

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preamble of the Amendment Act and the Ordinance is as follows:“... for securing the interests of the Life Insurance Corporation ofIndia and its policy-holders and to control the cost of administration,it is necessary that revision of the terms and conditions of serviceapplicable to the employees and agents of the Corporation shouldbe undertaken expeditiously.” Referring to the preamble of theAct the Attorney-General appearing for the Union of India andthe Corporation submitted that the problem of mounting cost ofadministration led to the making of the impugned law. He addedthat it was felt that no improvement in the situation was possibleby the process of adjudication and a policy decision was takenthat in the circumstances the proper course was legislation andthat is why the Amendment Act was passed and the impugnedRules were framed. The learned Attorney-General submitted thatit was for Parliament to decide whether the situation wasremediable by adjudication or required legislation. According tohim the Life Insurance Corporation Act as amended and the Rulesmade after amendment placed the Corporation in the same positionas other undertakings, that the advantages being enjoyed by theemployees of the Corporation which were not available to similarlysituated employees of other undertakings have been taken awayremoving what he described as discrimination in favour of theemployees of the Life Insurance Corporation. We have alreadysaid that the material produced on behalf of the Union of Indiaand the Corporation to show that the terms and conditions ofservice of the employees in several other undertakings in the publicsector compared unfavourably to those of the Corporationemployees was not conclusive. But the burden of establishinghostile discrimination was on the petitioners who challenged theAmendment Act and the Rules. It was for them to show that theemployees of the Life Insurance Corporation and the employeesof the other establishments to whom the provisions of the IndustrialDisputes Act were applicable were similarly circumstanced tojustify the contention that by excluding the employees of theCorporation from the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act theyhad been discriminated against. There is no material before us onthe basis of which we can hold that the Amendment Act of 1981and the Rules made on February 2, 1981 infringe Article 14. Wedo not think that on the facts of this case Express

Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1958 SC 578: 1959 SCR 12 : (1961) 1 LLJ 339] , and Moti RamDeka v. General Manager [AIR 1964 SC 600 : (1964) 5 SCR683 : (1964) 2 LLJ 467] relied on by the petitioners, have anyapplication.”

64. The Court, however, held that Rule 3 of the Life InsuranceCorporation of India Class III and Class IV Employees (Bonus andDearness Allowance) Rules 1981[37 ]could not nullify the effect of a writissued by this Court in its earlier decision in LIC v. D.J. Bahadur[38],which directed LIC to give effect to the industrial settlement relating tobonus until superseded by a fresh settlement, award or legislation. Holdingthat the Amending Act of 1981 and the Bonus Rules were relevantlegislation, the Court held that these would operative prospectively fromthe date of the publication of the rules. There was also a concurringopinion of Justice O Chinappa Reddy. While dealing with the constitutionalvalidity under Article 14, the main judgment notes that after rules aremade regarding the terms and conditions of service, the right to raise anindustrial dispute in respect of matters dealt with by the rules is takenaway and to that extent the provisions of the ID Act will cease to beapplicable.

65. In the subsequent decision of another Bench of three-judgesof this Court in M Venugopal (supra), the impact of the Amending Actof 1981 on the application of the ID Act came up for consideration. Theservices of the appellant, who was a probationary Development Officerin LIC, were terminated on his failure to fulfil the targets assigned. Awrit petition challenging the termination was allowed by a Single Judgeof the High Court on the ground that the termination amounted to aretrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the ID Act, andthat the termination was void due to the failure to comply with Section25F. In appeal, the Division Bench held that as a result of clause (bb)which was introduced in Section 2(oo) from 18 August 1984, thetermination of a probationer would not amount to a retrenchment withinthe meaning of Section 2(oo). Regulation 14(2) of the Staff Regulationswas, as a consequence of Section 48(2A) as introduced by the AmendingAct, deemed to be rules framed under Section 48(2)(cc). Clause (4) ofRegulation 14 permitted LIC to discharge an employee during the periodof probation. Before the introduction of clause (bb) in Section 2(oo) of 37 “Bonus Rules”

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Athe ID Act, there were only three exceptions which excluded a terminationof service from the ambit of retrenchment, namely:

(i) Voluntary retirement;

(ii) Retirement on superannuation; and

(iii) Termination due to continued ill-health.

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(i) Termination as a result of the non-renewal of a contract ofemployment upon its expiry; and

(ii) Termination of a contract under a stipulation in that behalfCcontained in the contract of employment.

It was held that in this case the termination of the services of theprobationer was in terms of the contract of an employment in terms ofthe stipulation contained in Regulation 14, and hence non-compliancewith Section 25F would not vitiate the orders of termination.D

66. Justice NP Singh, speaking for the three-judge Bench, thenwent on to elucidate on the impact of Amending Act 1 of 1981, moreparticularly the insertion of clause (cc) into sub-Section (2) and theinsertion of sub-Sections (2A), (2B) and (2C) in Section 48. The Courtheld that the ID Act and the LIC Act have both been framed byEParliament, with the amendments introduced from 31 January 1981 inSection 48 containing a non-obstante clause in sub-Section (2C) makingthe intent of Parliament “apparent and obvious”. The Court held:

“The framers of the Corporation Act through the amendmentsaforesaid have given the provisions of the Corporation Act anoverriding effect over the provisions of the Industrial DisputesFAct, so far as the provisions relating to the terms and conditionsof employment, which are in conflict with the provisions of theIndustrial Disputes Act are concerned. Unless the said attempt isheld to be ultra vires being in conflict with any of the provisions ofthe Constitution it was open to the Parliament to treat the employeesGand agents of the Corporation as a separate class for purpose offixing their terms and conditions of service.”

67. The Court held that earlier the employees were governed bythe regulations framed by LIC under Section 49 as well as by theprovisions of the ID Act. Hence, it was open to the workers to enforcetheir rights and remedies in terms of the regulations framed under theH

LIC Act or in accordance with the provisions of ID Act. However, afterthe amendments which were introduced by Parliament in Section 48,the employees of LIC would not be entitled to the protection of the IDAct to which they were entitled before the enforcement of theamendment. The Court held that the validity of the amendment had beenupheld in the earlier decision in AV Nachane (supra), and concluded:

“14. The amendments introduced in Section 48 of the CorporationAct have clearly excluded the provisions of the Industrial DisputesAct so far as they are in conflict with the rules framed underSection 48(2)(cc). The result whereof will be that termination ofthe service of the appellant shall not be deemed to be a“retrenchment” within the meaning of Section 2(oo) even if sub-section (bb) had not been introduced in the said section. OnceSection 2(oo) is not attracted, there is no question of applicationof Section 25-F on the basis of which the termination of the serviceof the appellant can be held to be invalid. The termination of theservice of the appellant during the period of probation is in termsof the order of appointment read with Regulation 14 of theRegulations, which shall be deemed to be now Rules under Section48(2)(cc) of the Corporation Act.”

68. Therefore, in view of the amended provisions of Section 48(2A)and (2C),the termination of the service of the appellant was held not toamount to a retrenchment even when clause (bb) had not been introducedin Section 2(oo) of the ID Act. Since Section 2(oo) would anyways notstand attracted where the services of a probationer were terminatedunder Regulation 14(4) of the Staff Regulations which, deemed to be apart of the rules under Section 48(2)(cc), hasan overriding effect overthe ID Act and would prevail.

69. The above provisions of Section 48 were specifically placedbefore the two-judge Bench of this Court, as is evident from a barereading of the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association(supra). However, the Court declined to go into the submission based onthe provisions of Section 48, holding that the Staff Regulations providedonly two types of employment:(i) Regular; and (ii) Temporary. The Courtheld that employment in the capacity of badli/part-time workers wasnot provided in the Staff Regulations, and there was no specificnomenclature of that nature in the Staff Regulations. The decision of thetwo-judge Bench evidently does not notice either the judgment in AV

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ANachane (supra) or the decision in M Venugopal (supra), both of whichhave been delivered by three-judge Benches. They are binding precedentsand could not have been brushed aside.

70. `That apart, it becomes necessary at this stage to advert tothe provisions of Regulation 8 of the Staff Regulations. Regulation 8(1)Bdeals with temporary staff and is prefaced with a non-obstanteprovision.Clause (1) of Regulation 8is an enabling provision empoweringLIC to employ staff in Classes III and IV on a temporary basis, subjectto such general or specific directions which may be issued by theChairperson from time to time. Clause (2) of Regulation 8 stipulates thatno person who is appointed under Regulation 8(1) is, only by reason ofCsuch appointment, to be entitled to absorption in the service of LIC ortoclaim preference for recruitment to any post. The expression “shall onlyby reason of such appointment be entitled to absorption” in this sub-clause (2) is crucial. What the expression postulates is that a personwho is appointed on a temporary basis can nether claim an entitlementDto absorption or a preference in recruitment merely by having beenappointed on a temporary basis. In other words, Regulation 8(2) doesnot postulate an absolute bar to a claim for absorption but it stipulatesthat absorption cannot be claimed merely on the ground that a personwas engaged on a temporary basis. Regulation 8(2), for instance, willnot preclude a claim for absorption being made in terms of a schemeEwhich is propounded by LIC, so long as the scheme contains provisionswhich facilitate absorption on stipulated terms and conditions. But themere fact that a person is appointed in a temporary capacity by LIC,does not entitle such a person ipso jure to seek absorption merely byvirtue of or only by reason of such an appointment.F71 The impact of the provisions of clause (cc) of sub-Section (2),sub-Section (2A) and sub-Section (2C) of Section 48 on the clams ofthe workers appointed after 4 March 1991 must now be considered.The workers who have worked as temporary, badli or part-time workersafter 4 March 1991, seek to assert their claims on the basis of SectionG18(3)(d) of the ID Act. Section 18 specifies the person on whomsettlements and awards are binding. Section 18(3)(a) stipulates that asettlement or award would bind all the parties to the industrial dispute.Further, clause (d) specifies that where a party to the dispute is composedof workers, the settlement and award binds not only persons who areemployed in the establishment to which the dispute relates on the date ofH

the dispute but all persons who subsequently become employees in thatestablishment or a part of it. Section 18(3)(d), in other words, extendsthe applicability of a settlement or award beyond the workers who wereengaged on the date of the dispute to all persons who subsequentlybecome employees in the establishment. Regulation 8 of the StaffRegulation expressly permits the engagement of temporary workers andclause (2) contains a provision to the effect that a person who engagedunder its clause (1) shall not, only by reason of such appointment, beentitled to absorption or to claim a preference for recruitment on anypost. The effect of sub-Section (2A) of Section 48 is that Regulation 8 isdeemed to be a rule which is framed under clause (cc) of sub-Section(2) of Section 48. Moreover, the provisions of Section 48(2C) postulatethat a rule which is made under the clause shall have effectnotwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act. Hence, the workerswho have been recruited post 4 March 1991 cannot make a claim forabsorption ipso jure under Section 18(3)(d) of the ID Act, as a result ofthe overriding provision which is contained in sub-Section (2C) of Section48.

K Structuring the Relief

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72. For the reasons recorded above during the course of analysis,LIC as a statutory corporation is bound by the mandate of Articles 14and 16 of the Constitution. As a public employer, the recruitment processof the corporation must meet the constitutional standard of a fair andopen process. Allowing for back-door entries into service is an anathemato public service.

73. In structuring the relief in present proceedings, it is essentialto recapitulate the key legal findings that will govern the determinationof rights and equities:

(i) On 7 February 1996, a two-judge Bench of this Court inLIC v. Their Workmen (supra) had accepted the termsof compromise which was arrived at on 1 March 1989between the management of LIC and eight Unions, andimposed them upon the ninth Union as well. In addition, thetwo-judge Bench of this Court had issued certain directions:

(a) LIC should exempt Class IV workers from a testand interview, if the management has the power to AB

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do so under the regulations/instructions governingtheir conditions of service; and A

(b) In the event that the management of LIC does notpossess such a power, the test to be prescribed forthese workers would be of a lesser standardcompared to other applicants from the open markettill the next regular recruitment; B

(ii) On 23 October 1992, a three-judge Bench of this Court,while disposing of the civil appeals in E Prabavathy (supra),specifically accepted the scheme formulated by LIC forregularising the workers who were engaged on a temporaryCbasis. The scheme was also specifically incorporated as apart of the order in the following terms:

“(a) All those temporary employees who have workedfor 85 days in any two consecutive calendar years withthe Life Insurance Corporation between 20[th] May 1985uptil date and who confirmed totehe required eligibilitycriteria for regular recruitment on the dates of their initialtemporary appointment will be permitted to completefor the next regular recruitment to be made by the LifeInsurance Corporation after the regular recruitment forthese posts currently scheduled for November, 1992.

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(b) These candidates will be considered on their meritswith all other candidates who may apply for suchappointments, including those from the open market.

(c) These candidates will be given an age relaxation forapplying for regular recruitment provided that they wereFeligible on the date of their first temporary appointmentfor securing regular appointment with the Life InsuranceCorporation.

(d) If these candidates are otherwise eligible, they canapply for regular recruitment in the normal course. Thisregularisation will, in the circumstances, be by selectionfor appointment. We make the above clauses of thescheme as part of our order.”

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will be by selection for appointment; and (b) the above clauses of thescheme would constitute a part of the order of this Court; A

(iii) On 22 November 2001, a two-judge Bench of this Court inG Sudhakar(supra) directed that though the order dated23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra) applied to theworkers of the Tamil Nadu division, the scheme wouldequally be applicable to the workers of all divisions of LICin the country; B

(iv) The judgment of the two-judge Bench of this Court dated 8March 2015 in TN Terminated Employees Association(supra) failed to notice that as a result of the final orderCdated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra),the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards had been substituted bythe terms of compromise. The two-judge Bench of this Courtoverlooked the final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v.Their Workmen (supra)and while adverting only to theinterim order dated 1 March 1989,it arrived at a palpablyDerroneous conclusion that the Jamdarand Tulpule Awardswere still operative and binding; and

(v) Though the petition seeking review of TN TerminatedEmployees Association (supra) and the curative petitionstand dismissed, LIC is confronted with a situation in whichit is equally bound by the earlier decision of the three-judgeBench dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra),the judgment of the two-judge Bench dated 7 February 1996in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) dealing with the appealsarising out of the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards and thejudgment of the two-judge Bench dated 22 November 2001in G Sudhakar (supra).

EF

74. The position as it now stands, results in a palpable conflictbetween the two-judge Bench decision in TN Terminated EmployeesAssociation (supra) dated 18 March 2015 on the one hand and theearlier binding decision of a larger Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) on23 October 1992 and of subsequent Benches. This conflict must beharmonised by taking recourse to the jurisdiction of this Court underArticle 142 of the Constitution. In arriving at a conclusion, this Courtfinds that:

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A(i)The remit of the CGIT which resulted in the Dogra Reportwas confined to the process of verification, as distinct froman adjudication of rights and liabilities;

(ii) The Dogra Report is flawed because:

(a) The report failed to carry out an accurate verificationBof only those Class III workers who had put in atleast 85 days of work in a period of two years andClass IV workers who had put in70 days of work ina period of three years; (b)The lists which are appended to the report containCpatent inconsistencies and errors as a consequenceof a failure to carry out an adequate verification; and

(c) The report accepted the claims for absorption of thoseworkers who were specifically governed by thedecision of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra),inspiteof an express stipulation to the contrary in the orderof this Court dated23 October 1992 as well as inparagraph 75 of the Srivastav Award; D

(iii) A public employer such as LIC cannot be directed to carryout a mass absorption of over 11,000 workers on suchflawed premises without following a recruitment processEwhich is consistent with the principles of equality ofopportunity governed by Articles 14 and 16 of theConstitution. Such an absorption would provide the veryback-door entry, which negates the principle of equalopportunity and fairness in public employment, which hasFbeen specifically decried by this Court in Secretary, Stateof Karnataka v. Umadevi[39].

75. The dispute is now of an antiquity tracing back to nearly fourdecades. Finality has to be wrung down on the dispute to avoid uncertaintyand more litigation. Nearly thirty-one years have elapsed since 1991.GWe have come to the conclusion that the claims of those workers whoare duly found upon verification to meet the threshold conditions ofeligibility should be resolved by the award of monetary compensation inlieu of absorption, and in full and final settlement of all claims anddemands. Thus, this Court directs the following:

H39 (2006) 4 SCC 1

H39 (2006) 4 SCC 1

(i) A fresh verification of the claims of workers who claim toAhave been employed for at least 70 days in Class IV postsover a period of three years or 85 days in Class III postsover a period of two years shall be carried out;

(ii) The verification shall be confined to persons who wereworking between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991;B

(iii) All persons who are found to be eligible on the above normshall be entitled to compensation computed at the rate ofRs50,000 for every year of service or part thereof. Thepayment of compensation at the above rate shall be in lieuof reinstatement, and in full and final settlement of all claimsand demands of the workers in lieu of regularisation orabsorption and notwithstanding the directions issued by thisCourt in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra); C

(iv) In carrying out the process of verification, the Committeeappointed by this Court shall not be confined to the certifiedlist before the CGIT and shall consider the claims of allworkers who were engaged between 20 May 1985 and 4March1991; D

(v) For the purpose of verification, LIC shall make available allthe records at the Divisional level to the Committeeappointed by this Court; E

(vi) It will be open to the workers concerned or, as the casemay be, the Unions and Associations representing them, tomake available such documentary material in theirpossession for the purpose of verification; F

(vii) The process of verification shall be carried out independentlywithout regard to the Dogra Report, which is held to beflawed;

(viii) The payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement shallbe effected by LIC within a period of three months fromthe date of receipt of the report of verification by theCommittee; and G

(ix) The task of verification shall be carried out by a Committeeconsisting of:

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A(a)Mr Justice P K S Baghel, former Judge of the AllahabadHigh Court; and (b)Shri Rajiv Sharma, former District Judge and member ofthe UPHJS.

LIC shall provide all logistical assistance to the Committee andBbear all expenses, including secretarial expenses, travel and incidentalexpenses, as well as the fees payable to the members of the Committee.Justice P K S Baghel shall fix the terms of remuneration payable to themembers of the Committee.

76. The Miscellaneous Applications and the Writ Petitions shallCbe governed by the above directions and are disposed of in the aboveterms.

77. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

DBibhuti Bhushan Bose

(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)

Writ petitions disposed of.

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G

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