VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LR versus THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR (F/R) AND ANOTHER on 10 May 2022

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 3 S.C.R.

AVEENA SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LR

v.

THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR (F/R)AND ANOTHER

(Civil Appeal No. 2929 of 2022)

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MAY 10, 2022

[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, A. S. BOPANNAAND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]

Registration Act, 1908:C

ss. 35, 72, 73, 74 – Execution and registration of sale deed –Agreement to sell certain land between the appellant and the secondrespondent – Execution of sale deed by the appellant in favour ofsecond respondent, however, during registration of said sale deed,the appellant denied its execution – However, no denial on the partDof the appellant in signing the sale deed and having placed herthumb impressions/fingerprints on the documents – Appellant alsoasserted commission of fraud and undue influence by the secondrespondent – Refusal of registration of the sale deed by the Sb-registrar in terms of s. 35(3)(a) – However, in appeal u/s. 72, theEDistrict Registrar ordered registration of the sale deed – Said orderupheld by the High Court – On appeal, held: Sub-Registrar havingspecifically denied registration in terms of s. 35(3)(a), the orderwas not amenable to an appeal u/s. 72, however, the Registrar, inthe course of entertaining the appeal, instead took recourse to thepowers entrusted u/s. 73 – Mis-labelling of an application u/s. 73Fas an appeal u/s. 72 would by itself not vitiate the proceedingsbefore the Registrar – Execution happens when a person’s signatureon the document is accompanied by their full consent to the contentsof the document, which they have understood before signing it –“Execution” of a document does not stand admitted merely becauseGa person admits to having signed the document – Thus, admissionof one’s signature on a document is not equivalent to admission ofits execution – High Court conflated the mere signing of the saledeed with its execution – Such an approach is completely erroneousand cannot be upheld – Thus, the order of the Single Judge of theHigh Court and that of the District Registrar set aside.H

ss. 35, 72-77 – Power of the Sub-Registrar/Registrar and theirprocedures under – Explained.

Words and phrases: Expression ‘execution’ – Meaning of, incontext of the Registration Act, 1908.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 From the objections filed before the Sub-Registrar by the appellant, it is clear that she did not deny havingsigned the sale deed. The essence of her grievance was that hersignatures were taken forcibly; the sale deed did not reflect theintent of the parties in terms of the area which was intended tobe sold; the sale consideration was undervalued; the consequenceof the sale deed was that even the residential house of theappellant would be sold, contrary to her understanding; and thesale deed had been procured by fraud. The order of the Sub-Registrar makes it abundantly clear that the appellant was notready to register the sale deed, which was claimed to have beenexecuted in a fraudulent manner and whose execution was thusbeing denied. Registration was, therefore, refused by the Sub-Registrar in terms of Section 35(3)(a) of the Registration Act.[Para 32][765-A-C]

1.2 If a person by whom the document is purported to beexecuted denies its execution and registration is refused on thosegrounds, an appeal against the order of the Sub-Registrar denyingexecution would not be maintainable under Section 72 of theRegistration Act. Section 72 clearly stipulates that an appeal willlie against an order of Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a documentto registration “except where the refusal is made on the groundof denial of execution”. [Para 33][765-C-E]

1.3 In the instant case, the Sub-Registrar having specificallydenied registration in terms of Section 35(3)(a), the order wasnot amenable to an appeal under Section 72. However, theRegistrar, in the course of entertaining the appeal, instead tookrecourse to the powers entrusted under Section 73. Section 73empowers the Registrar where the Sub-Registrar has refused toregister a document on denial of its execution by a personpurporting to have executed it. Subsequently, the Registrar A

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Aappears to have followed the procedure which is emphasized inSection 74. Upon such an enquiry under Section 74, Section 75enables the Registrar to order the document to be registered ifit is found that: (i) the document has been executed; and (ii) therequirements of the law have been complied with. Section 75(4)also allows the Registrar to summon and enforce the attendanceBof witnesses to properly conduct the enquiry under Section 74.[Para 34][765-E-H]

1.4 Undoubtedly, the power of the Registrar while dealingwith an application under Section 73 are wider than the powerswhich are entrusted to the Sub-Registrar under Section 35. UnderCSection 35(1)(a), the registering officer shall register thedocument if all the persons executing the document appear inperson before the officer and admit the execution of the document.Section 35(2) empowers the registering officer to examine anyonepresent in the office, for the purpose of satisfying himself thatDthe persons appearing before him are the persons they representthemselves to be. In contrast to sub-Section (1) of Section 35,sub-Section stipulates that once execution is denied by theperson who purports to have executed the document, theregistering officer shall refuse to register it. On the other hand,under Sections 73 and 74, the Registrar is entrusted with theEduty to enquire whether the document has been executed andwhether all the requirements of the law for the time being havebeen complied with. For the purposes of this enquiry, Section75(4) provides the Registrar with the power to summon andenforce the attendance of witnesses. Thus, while the Sub- FRegistrar under Section 35(3)(a) has to mandatorily refuseregistration when the execution of a document is denied by theperson purported to have executed the document, the Registraris entrusted with the power to conduct an enquiry on anapplication under Section 73 by following the procedure underSection 74. [Para 35][766-A-E]G

1.5 In the instant case, the appeal before the Registrar wasnot maintainable under Section 72. Indeed, the appellant, inresponse to the memo of appeal filed by the second respondent,specifically pleaded in her objections that “hearing the appealunder Section 72 of the Registration Act or to deliver any judgmentH

will be against law”. At the same time, however, the appellantalso pleaded that she “had full right for argument under Section75(4) of the Registration Act and under the CPC from thewitnesses and the appellant”. The Registrar is empowered tosummon witnesses under Section 75(4) for the purpose of anenquiry under Sections 73 and 74. It thus, emerges that theparties proceeded on the basis that the proceedings would bedecided on the basis of an enquiry under Section 73, and theenquiry was conducted with reference to the provisions of Section74. The appellant herself understood this to be the position inher objections filed to the appeal filed by the second respondent,since she invoked her rights under Section 75(4), which appliesto enquiry proceedings under Section 74. The appeal against theSub-Registrar‘s order was not maintainable under Section 72.The remedy of the second respondent, where the Sub-Registrarrefused registration on the ground that the appellant deniedexecution of the document, was under Section 73. The Registrarconducted an enquiry under the provisions of sections 73 and74. Both parties participated in the enquiry. [Para 36][766-E-H;767-A-B]

1.6 The mis-labelling of an application under Section 73 asan appeal under Section 72 would by itself not vitiate theproceedings before the Registrar. This becomes especially truewhen proceedings before the Registrar, in substance, wereproceedings under Section 73 itself and both the partiesacknowledged them to be so, explicitly or by their conduct. Thisis clearly what has happened in the present case as well, as isevident from the appellant‘s reference to Section 75(4) and herparticipation in the enquiry proceedings before the DistrictRegistrar. Therefore, the second respondent’s mis-labelling oftheir application as an appeal under Section 72 will not vitiate theproceedings which led to the District Registrar‘s order. [Para38][767-F-G; 768-A-B]

1.7 Section 35(1)(a) of the Registration Act uses theexpression “admit the execution of the document”, while Section35(3)(a) uses the expression “denies its execution”. Similarly,Section 72(1) has adopted the expression “denial of execution”,while Section 73(1) uses the expression “denies its execution”.

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AHowever, the word “execution” itself is not defined by theRegistration Act. [Para 39][768-C-D]

Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (ThomsonReuters, 2009) pgs 649-650; Words and Phrases(Permanent Edition) (Thomson Reuters, 2020); JusticeBK Kannan, Mulla’s The Registration Act (LexisNexis,2012) pg 416 – referred to.

1.8 “Execution” happens when a person’s signature on thedocument is accompanied by their full consent to the contents ofthe document,which they have understood before signing it. ThisCunderstanding of the phrase “execution” is also adopted bytextbooks in relation to the law of evidence. Section 68 of theEvidence Act 1872 prescribes the requirement for proving thata document has been executed. The proviso to s. 68 stipulatesthat it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness to provethe execution of a document if it has been registered under theDAct, provided that its execution is not specifically denied by theperson who is purported to have executed it. The “execution” ofa document does not stand admitted merely because a personadmits to having signed the document. Such an interpretationaccounts for circumstances where an individual signs a blankEpaper and it is later converted into a different document, or whenan individual is made to sign a document without fullyunderstanding its contents. Adopting a contrary interpretationwould unfairly put the burden upon the person denying executionto challenge the registration before a civil court or a writ court,since registration will have to be allowed once the signature hasFbeen admitted. In giving meaning to the expression “execute”in the provisions of the Registration Act, it is necessary to adopta purposive construction to protect, facilitate and achieve theobject of registration. [Paras 42, 43, 57, 58][771-A-B, B-C; 772-B; 780-C-E]GSuraj Lamps and Industries Private Limited v. State ofHaryana & Another (2009) 7 SCC 363 : [2009] 9 SCR1048; Bharat Indu and Ors. v. Hakim Mohammad HamidAli Khan 1920 SCC OnLine PC 37 – referred to.

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S P Sen Gupta, Commentaries on the Registration Act,1908 (Kamal Law House, 2017) pgs 617-618; SudiptoSarkar and Dr. H R Jhingta, Sarkar: Law of Evidence–In India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Ceylon,Malaysia & Singapore: Volume 1 (LexisNexis, 2016);N Vijayraghavan and Sharath Chandran, Ratanlal &Dhirajlal: The Law of Evidence (LexisNexis, 2021) –referred to.

1.9 The Registration Act exists so that information aboutdocuments can be put into the public domain, where it can beaccessed by anyone in order to prevent forgeries and fraud, andso that individuals can be aware of the status of properties. If theinterpretation conflating signing with execution is adopted, it wouldensure that the Sub-Registrars/Registrars will continuously endup registering documents whose validity will inevitably be thendisputed in a civil suit or a writ petition. While the suit or writproceedings continue, the document would remain on the publicrecords as a registered instrument, which has the potential tocause more disruption. Hence, such an interpretation should notbe adopted. However, while adopting the current interpretation-that the admission of one‘s signature on a document is notequivalent to admission of its execution- it is important to considerthe power of the Sub-Registrar/Registrar and their proceduresunder the Registration Act. [Paras 60, 61][781-E-H]

1.10 The decision of the Registrar in ordering documentto be registered, or for that matter in refusing to register adocument, is not conclusive and is amenable to judicial review.Therefore, in a situation where an individual admits their signatureon a document but denies its execution, the Sub-Registrar isbound to refuse registration in accordance with Sections 35(3)(a)of the Registration Act. Subsequently, if an application if filedunder Section 73, the Registrar is entrusted with the power ofconducting an enquiry of a quasi-judicial nature under Section74. If the Registrar passes an order refusing registration underSection 76, the party presenting the document for registrationhas the remedy of filing a civil suit under Section 77 of the A

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[2022] 3 S.C.R.

ARegistration Act, where a competent civil court will be able toadjudicate upon the question of fact conclusively. [Para 63,64][784-G-H; 785-A-C]

1.11 In the instant case, where Sub-Registrar had in thefirst instance declined to order the registration of the documentBand the order of the Sub-Registrar was questioned in an appealunder Section 72 filed by the second respondent. The Registrar,in the course of the appellate proceedings, purported to hold anenquiry of the nature contemplated under Section 74 of theRegistration Act and concluded that the execution of the saledeed had been established and it was liable to be registered. TheCRegistrar was evidently seized of a case where the Sub-Registrarhad declined to order registration on the ground that theexecution of the document was denied by the appellant underSection 35(3)(a). While exercising the jurisdiction pursuant tothe invocation of the remedy under Section 72, the Registrar Drelied on the statements of the scribe of the sale deed and theattesting witnesses to the effect that the sale deed had beensigned by the appellant and that the appellant had also affixedher fingerprints on it. However, as rightly pointed out by theappellant, the signing of the sale deed by her and the affixation ofher fingerprints is not in dispute. The real issue is whether thereEwas due execution of the sale deed by the appellant. The appellantin the course of her objections specifically pleaded fraud. Theplea of the appellant, that the purported sale deed though signedby her was procured by fraud and undue influence, was a matterwhich raised a serious substantive dispute. In support of her Fcontentions, the appellant has also adduced the inspection reportby the Sub-Registrar and the Naib Tahsildar. However, this courtcannot decide on the merits of the dispute at this stage, since theRegistrar clearly exceeded his jurisdiction by adjudicating on theissue of fraud and undue influence. [Para 67][788-E-H; 789-A-B,D-F]GSatya Pal Anand v. State of M.P. (2016) 10 SCC 767 :[2016] 12 SCR 26 – distinguished.

1.12 The Registrar purported to exercise the powersconferred under Section 74 and arrived at a finding that the saleHdeed had been duly signed by the appellant and was therefore liable to be registered. However, the objections of the appellantraised serious issues of a triable nature which could only havebeen addressed before and adjudicated upon by a court ofcompetent civil jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, during the courseof the hearing, this Court has been apprised of the fact that inrespect of the remaining area of 1000 square meters in the frontportion of the land, a suit for specific performance has beeninstituted by the second respondent, resulting in a decree forspecific performance. As regards the subject matter of the saledeed, the second respondent instituted a suit for possessionbefore the Civil Judge, where certain proceedings are pending.In view thereof, the Registrar acted contrary to law by directingthe sale deed to be registered. [Para 68][789-F-H; 790-A-B]

1.13 In the impugned judgment, the Single Judge of theHigh Court observed that registration does not depend upon theconsent of the executant but on the Registrar‘s finding that theexecutant had actually signed the document. The High Court heldthat having found in the course of the enquiry that the sale deedwas duly prepared by a scribe, that the attesting witness had statedthat the sale deed was signed by the appellant and she also placedher fingerprints in their presence, it was open to the Registrar todirect registration in spite of a denial of its execution by theappellant. In doing so, the Single Judge of the High Court has,with respect, conflated the mere signing of the sale deed with itsexecution. Such an approach is completely erroneous and cannotbe upheld. The impugned judgment and order of the Single Judgeof the High Court as also the order passed by the DistrictRegistrar is set aside. [Paras 69, 70][790-B-E]

Rajendra Pratap Singh v. Rameshwar Prasad (1998) 7SCC 602 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 444; N.M.Ramachandraiah v. State of Karnataka 2007 SCCOnLine Kar 192; Banasettappa Laljichikkanna v.District Registrar 1965 SCC OnLine Kar 132;Sayyapparaju Surayya v. Ramchandar Prasad Singhand Others 1949 SCC OnLine Mad 227; JogeshPrasad Singh & Others v. Ramchandar Prasad Singhand Others 1950 SCC OnLine Pat 31; Ebadut Ali v.

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AMuhammad Fareed AIR (3) 1916 Pat 206:35 Ind. Cas.56; Mohima Chunder Dhur v. Jugul Kishore BhuttaCharji, ILR Volume VII Calcutta; Smt. Uma Devi v.Narayan Nayak 1984 SCC OnLine Ori 94; BhutkaniNath v. Smt. Kamaleswari Nath, AIR 1972 Assam andNagaland 15; Puran Chand Nahatta v. Monmotho NathBMukherji and Others 1927 SCC OnLine PC 100;Ghasita Ram Bajaj v. Raj Kamal Radio Electronic 1973SCC OnLine Del 109; Kamlabai v. Shantirai 1980 SCCOnLine Bom 152; S. Ramamurthy v. JayalakshmiAmmal 1990 SCC OnLine Mad 501; Union Bank ofCIndia v. Dhian Pati 1996 SCC OnLine HP 90; In ReKuttadan Velayudhan 2001 SCC OnLine Ker 14; Bankof Baroda v. Shree Moti Industries 2008 SCC OnLineBom 486; Smt. Raisa Begam v. District Registrar,Saharanpur and Anr. 2011 SCC OnLine All 2335 –referred to.D

Case Law Reference

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2929Fof 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 31.05.2018 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in Writ-C No. 24928 of 2012.

Pradeep Kant, Sr. Adv., Rohit Kumar Singh, Simranjeet SinghGRekhi, Advs. for the Appellant.

V. K. Shukla, Sr. Adv., P. H. Vashishtha, Divyansh Tiwari,Ms. Parul Shukla, Pradeep Kumar Yadav, Vishal Thakre, Aryan P. Nanda,Sanjeev Malhotra, Advs. for the Respondents.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A

DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.

This judgment has been divided into sections to facilitate analysis.They are:

AIntroduction ......................................................................3*BBSubmissions of Counsel ................................................. 13*

CAnalysis.......................................................................... 18*

C.1 Statutory Framework of the Registration Act .......... 18*

C.2 Validity of the recourse by the Second Respondent..27*C

C.3 Meaning of “execution” .......................................... 33*

DConclusion ...................................................................... 61*

A Introduction

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1. This appeal has arisen from a judgment dated 31 May 2018 ofa Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. By theimpugned judgment, the High Court dismissed a petition under Article226 filed by the appellant, seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari forquashing an order dated 31 March 2012 of the District Registrar/Additional Collector (Finance and Revenue), Bareilly[1], who is the firstrespondent in the present appeal. During the pendency of this appeal,the appellant has passed away and has been substituted by her legalheir, by an order of this Court dated 9 December 2021.

2. At the heart of this dispute is a certain piece of land admeasuring3,793 square yards, situated at 110-B, Civil Lines, Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh,which was owned by one C P Singh. During his life time, he had alienatedapproximately 415 square yards of the land to four distinct persons.After his death, the appellant, who is his spouse, together with her twodaughters, namely Nita Singh and Neelam Singh, and son, Pradeep Singh,became joint owners of the property. A power of attorney was executedon 17 April 2010 in favour of the appellant by her daughters and son,which is stated to have been cancelled on 27 September 2011.

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3. The appellant is alleged to have entered into two agreementswith a developer – Gujral Associates, who is the second respondent in 1 “District Registrar”*Ed. Note: The pagination is as per the original judgment.

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Athe present appeal: (i) the first was allegedly a development agreementin respect of an area admeasuring 1000 square meters in the front portionof the land. It is important to note that the nature of this agreement isdisputed by the second respondent (who alleges that it was instead anagreement to sell), but that dispute is not before this Court in the presentappeal; and (ii) the second was an agreement to sell for an areaBadmeasuring 839.4 square meters in the rear portion of the land for asale consideration of Rs 1.6 crores, which was executed on 22 October2010. On the other hand, the second respondent contends that thisagreement to sell was for an area admeasuring 1839.4 square meters. Itis also important to note that the stamp duty in the amount of Rs 39,61,000C(according to counsel for the second respondent) was paid on theagreement on the basis of the circle rate of the land, i.e., Rs 6,11,53,000.

4. Between October 2010 and 3 January 2011, the secondrespondent allegedly paid the appellant a sum of Rs 93 lakhs in twelveinstalments. A cheque for the remaining sum of Rs 67 lakhs was handedDover to the appellant by the second respondent on 20 June 2011. Theappellant has stated that she did not encash this cheque upon realisingthat a fraud had been committed upon her. On the same date, a saledeed was purported to have been executed by the appellant in favour ofthe second respondent based upon the agreement to sell and upon thepayment of the remaining sale consideration. The execution andEregistration of this sale deed forms the bedrock of the dispute in thepresent appeal.

5. On 5 December 2011, the second respondent filed an applicationseeking permission to execute the sale deed. Thereafter, on 15 December2011, they presented the sale deed for registration before the Sub-FRegistrar-I, Bareilly. In response to a notice from the Sub-Registrar, theappellant appeared before the Sub-Registrar on 17 February 2012 andsubmitted an objection in writing, with a request not to execute theincomplete and forged sale deed in favour of the second respondent.The appellant stated that she was 78 years of age, “a chronic patient ofGdepression, heart ailment and hypertension” under medical treatmentand that her son was an alcoholic who was incapable of taking anydecision on his own. The appellant stated that the second respondenthad been harassing her into forcibly signing the sale deed in respect ofher property. The appellant further stated that the second respondentfurnished her with misleading and false information in order to ger her toH

sign the papers, all the while even forcing her to hide the transactionfrom the members of her own family. Specifically in relation to the twotransactions in regards the front and rear portion of the land, the appellantalleged as follows:

“(A) Details of 100 sq. meter agreement with m/S GujralAssociates having a market value of not less than Rs.5 Croreshowing a meagre sale consideration of Rs.1,30,00,000/- on22.10.2010 forming part of 110-B Civil Lines, Bareilly, stipulatingto have paid a sum of Rs.18,00,000/- to me including a sum ofRs.90,00,000/- in cash and a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- through chequeNo.111681 dated 03.06.2009 Bank of Baroda, which in fact wasnever paid to me and the cheque referred to above stands creditedin someone else account and not in my account. According to meand the Law the agreement becomes NULL and VOID as theintention of the party is to do a fraud by illegal measures.

(B) Details of 1839.48 Sq. meter agreement with M/s GujralAssociates having a market value of not less than Rs.7 Croreshowing a meagre sale consideration of Rs.1,60,00,000/- on22.10.2010 forming part of 11-B Civil Lines, Bareilly, stipulatingto have paid a sum of Rs.83,00,000/- including a sum ofRs.8,00,000/- shown to have been paid in cash, which in fact hasnever been paid to me (Mrs. Veena Singh). According to me andthe Law the agreement becomes NULL and VOID as the intentionof the party is to do a fraud by illegal measures.”

The appellant further stated:

“That the time within which sale deed was allegedly agreed to beexecuted was period of eight months which too has expired on22.06.2011 and to avoid legal consequences they obtainedsignature on INCOMPLETE SALE DEED dt. 20.06.2011 fromme under misleading and false information when they werepressurizing me to quickly sign the papers before the registry officecloses and didn’t give a chance to read the papers before signing,my granddaughter entered the room and enquired about the doing.She asked if the papers had been read by one to which I repliedNO. So she asked a photo copy of the documents so that ourLawyer could go through them. It was at that moment that thisfact came to light that whatever was undergoing was wrong and A

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Amisleading, M/ s Gujral Associates people and his lawyer Mr. AnilKu. Agarwal was shocked when my granddaughter asked for aphoto copy as she was scared to see me surrounded by 5 peoplein my Room and then when we realized that they manipulated theland area and they were taking my manipulated the land area andthey were taking my HOUSE also illegally, so I am against thisBSALE deed as they have done a fraud.”

The appellant further claimed that:

(i) The boundaries which were set out in the deed for 1839.48square meters were erroneous and did not clearly reflectwhat was to be sold. Further, the second respondent hadmanipulated the actual land area by also including within itthe appellant’s house, where she was residing for over fivedecades, though it was not her intention to alienate it; C

(ii) The sale deed itself was incomplete, but the secondrespondent forcibly made her sign it on the pretext of a rushto file the sale deed within time for registration; and D

(iii) The second respondent himself was aware that there wasno partition between the co-sharers of the land, yet wentahead with the sale deed.

EHence, based on her above contentions, the appellant requestedthe Sub-Registrar to take action for the forgery which had been committedby the second respondent and prevent the second respondent from gettingthe incomplete sale deed registered for an area admeasuring 1839.48square meters.F6. By an order dated 17 February 2012, the Sub-Registrar declinedto register the sale deed after recording the following statement of theappellant:

“I was alone, my signature was forcibly taken on this sale deed, Ido not remain well, and I take Alprex also, I am diabetic also, IGr4emain under Hypertension also. Many persons who were 4-5in number by reaching there, got my signature forcibly. Otherpaper was read to me, and signature was taken on other paper. Ilive alone. They trouble me from day to today. The land not so inquantity which they have written. As per them, they try to occupythat house also which is mine. I do not want to execute this saleHdeed. I be let live comfortably.”

Relying upon her statement, the Sub-Registrar held as follows:

“On the basis of the aforesaid statement as Smt. Beena is notready to register the aforesaid sale deed which she tells to beexecuted fraudulently and cheatingly. Therefore, the registrationof the sale deed is denied under Section 35(3)A of the IndianRegistration Act and under Rule 249 of the Registration Manual,Part -2.”

7. The Sub-Registrar having refused to order the registration ofthe sale deed, the second respondent instituted an appeal[2] under Section72 of the Registration Act 1908[3] on 2 March 2012. The appellant objectedto the maintainability of the appeal under Section 72, besides supportingthe order of the Sub-Registrar on the ground that the sale deed in disputehad not been executed by her.

8. By an order dated 31 March 2012, the District Registrar, whileentertaining the appeal, proceeded to follow the procedure prescribedby Section 74 of the Registration Act to determine whether the saledeed had been executed by the appellant. The District Registrarsubsequently held that the appellant had admitted her signature on thedocument and that the second respondent was entitled to get the saledeed registered. In arriving at the conclusion, the District Registrar reliedon the statements made on solemn affirmation by the scribe of the saledeed and by the witnesses to the sale deed, to the effect that the documenthad been executed by the appellant in their presence without any pressure.The District Registrar also noted that prior to the sale deed, an agreementto sell had been registered on 22 October 2010 in terms of which theappellant received an amount of Rs 93 lakhs by cash and cheque, astoken money towards the sale consideration of Rs 1.6 crores. The receiptof the consideration by cheque in pursuance of the agreement to sellwas stated to not be in dispute. Further, the District Registrar noted thatduring the period of about one year and two months, between theregistration of the agreement to sell and the presentation of the saledeed on 15 December 2011, the appellant had not lodged any complaintalleging fraud. The District Registrar also observed that the signaturesand thumb impressions/fingerprints of the appellant on the agreement tosell and sale deed had been examined by a handwriting expert, and werefound to be identical. Based on these findings, the District Registrar set 2 Appeal No 01 of 2012

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Aaside the Sub-Registrar’s decision and ordered the registration of thesale deed presented on 15 December 2011. Consequently, the sale deedwas registered on 16 April 2012.

9. Crucially, the appellant has adverted to certain developmentswhich took place after the order of the District Registrar. According toBthe appellant, the Assistant Inspector General, Registration, Bareillyordered a spot inspection by the Sub-Registrar of the land covered bythe sale deed. In his report dated 30 April 2012, the Sub-Registrarconcluded that the actual area covered by the deed was 1341.73 squaremeters, out of which 740.73 square meters was the area of the appellant’shouse. Further, the Sub-Registrar noted that while the northern andCwestern boundaries were present as according to the sale deed, thesouthern and eastern boundaries at the spot did not match with theboundaries mentioned in the sale deed. Later, pursuant to therecommendation of the Sub-Registrar, a further spot verification wasalso carried out by the Naib Tahsildar. In a report dated 26 May 2012,Dthe Naib Tahsildar stated that the boundaries mentioned in the sale deedwere completely incorrect. Further, it was stated that the actual area onthe spot was 849.12 square meters, as opposed to the area of 1839.48square meters shown in the sale deed. The report noted that if the areaof 1839.48 square meters was taken as the area of the sale deed, itwould partly cover the residential house of the appellant, garden areaEsituated in front of the house and three properties which had beenpreviously sold by the deceased husband of the appellant. Therefore,the Naib Tahsildar concluded that the registered sale deed was completelyincorrect.

10. At this stage, it would also be material to note that a firstFinformation report[4] was filed by the appellant on 4 May 2012 at PSKotwali, Sub-District Sadar, Bareilly against the proprietors of the secondrespondent for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471and 506 of the Indian Penal Code 1860. Subsequently, a final report wasfiled in the FIR by the Investigating Officer. A protest petition filed byGthe appellant against the final report has since been dismissed by theMagistrate by an order dated 20 September 2013[5], against which theappellant’s revision remains pending.

4 FIR No 192 of 2012; Case Crime No 1118 of 2012H5 Misc Case No 225 of 2013

11. Along with these developments, the appellant challenged theorder dated 31 March 2012 of the District Registrar before the HighCourt of Judicature at Allahabad in proceedings under Article 226 of theConstitution. In adjudicating the appellant’s writ petition by the impugnedjudgment dated 31 May 2018, a Single Judge of the High Court framedthe following questions for consideration:

“38. The question to be considered by this Court in facts andcircumstances of this case and in the light of arguments made bythe counsel for the parties can be summarized thus: Whether theWrit Petition was maintainable in the form and manner it hadbeen filed? What is the scope of power exercised by the DeputyRegistrar under section 35(3)(a) of the Act? Whether the denialof execution of Sale Deed by the petitioner was correctlyinterpreted by the Deputy Registrar to exercise power underSection 35(3)(a) and refuse registration? Whether the DistrictRegistrar could have considered, the appeal filed by RespondentNo. 2 as a representation and exercise power as an originalAuthority and not as an Appellate Authority? Whether Sale Deedwhich was Registered on 16.04.2012 before this Court passed itsinterim order can be set aside by this Court by holding that it waswrongly registered?”

The Single Judge then observed:

The Single Judge then observed:

(i) In terms of this Court’s judgment in Satya Pal Anand v.State of M.P.[6], the Sub-Registrar under Sections 34 and35 of the Registration Act has no quasi-judicial power toconduct an enquiry regarding the validity of the title orlegality of the transaction in a sale deed, but only has toascertain whether the provisions of the Registration Acthave been complied with. Questions regarding the validityof the title or legality of the transaction can only be decidedby a competent civil court; and

(ii) The Sub-Registrar, in the present case, had denied theregistration of the sale deed under Section 35(3)(a) of theRegistration Act since the appellant had, while admittingthat she had placed her thumb impressions/fingerprints andsignatures on the sale deed, objected to the registration on 6 (2016) 10 SCC 767 (“Satya Pal Anand”)

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the ground that her signatures had been taken in a fraudulentmanner by representing to her that she was selling only 839square meters of land whereas the area shown in the saledeed was 1839 square meters. However, it was held thatthe Sub-Registrar under Section 35 did not have the powerto conduct an inquiry regarding the execution of the saledeed, and could have only recorded the denial of executionby the appellant. On the other hand, it was noted that awider power is entrusted to the Registrar under Section74(a) of the Registration Act to determine whether thedocument has been executed. On these premises, the SingleJudge held:

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“55…The registration does not depend upon the consentof the executant, but on the Registrar finding that theexecutant had actually signed the document concerned,but now was requesting that it may not be registered forreasons other than its execution. The registrar is requiredunder Section 74 to conduct an inquiry. If the Registrarfinds that the document was duly prepared by the Scribe/Deed Writer and the attesting witnesses to suchdocument also deposed that the document was signedand the thumb and finger print impressions were madethereon by the vendor in their presence, and on inquiryfrom the vendor it comes out that indeed such facts werecorrect, the Registrar can direct registration of adocument in spite of denial of execution before him bythe person aggrieved if such registration of such a D

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Fdocument is compulsory under the Act.”

12. The Single Judge also observed that the writ petition had beeninstituted after the registration of the FIR by the appellant, prior to whichthe order of the District Registrar dated 31 March 2012 had alreadybeen complied with by the registration of the sale deed on 16 April 2012.GThe Single Judge noted that initially, the appellant had pleaded beforethe High Court that her signatures and thumb impressions/fingerprintshad not been placed on the sale deed, but had been forged by the secondrespondent. However, the Single Judge noted that this was animprovement from the appellant’s story as detailed in the FIR dated 4May 2012, where it was stated that the appellant willingly put herH

signatures and thumb impressions/fingerprints on the sale deed and onlylater did her granddaughter realise the incorrect figure of the area in thesale deed. In any case, the High Court observed that whether thesignatures and thumb impressions/fingerprints of the appellant had beenforged by the second respondent raised a disputed question of fact whichcould only be resolved on the basis of evidence before a competent civilcourt. Holding that the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdictioncould not render a finding either way, the writ petition was dismissed bythe Single Judge while leaving it open to the appellant to move the civilcourt for a declaration that the sale deed had been obtained by fraud andwas a nullity.

B Submissions of Counsel

13. We have heard Mr Pradeep Kant, learned Senior Counselappearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr V K Shukla, learned SeniorCounsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent.

14. Mr Pradeep Kant, learned Senior Counsel submitted that:

(i) An appeal under Section 72 of the Registration Act lies to theRegistrar against an order of the Sub-Registrar refusing toadmit a document to registration exceptwhere the refusal ismade on the ground of denial of execution. In the presentcase, the execution of the sale deed had been denied by theappellant and the Sub-Registrar refused registration on thatground under Section 35(3)(a). Hence, no appeal would bemaintainable under Section 72;

(ii) In any event, in an appeal under Section 72, it is not open tothe Registrar to pursue an enquiry under Section 74. Theprocedure under Section 74 has to be followed only when anapplication is filed under Section 73. Under Section 74, a personwho had applied under Section 73 challenging the non-registration of a document, of which execution is denied byany person by whom it purports to have been executed, mayapply to the Registrar to establish his right to have thedocument registered. In the present case, the secondrespondent having filed an appeal under Section 72, theprovisions of Sections 73 and 74 could not have been attracted;

(iii) The appellant does not deny having signed the sale deed andhaving placed her thumb impressions/fingerprints on the A

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Adocuments. However, the execution of a document cannotbe conflated with its mere signing. The appellant admittedher signatures but objected to registration on the ground offraud and undue influence. Hence, the question of provingher signature on the sale deed was never an issue. Pertinently,neither the Registrar nor the High Court has recorded a findingBthat the appellant understood the contents of the sale deed orshe was made to understand the obligations which were beingassumed by her with respect to the subject matter of the sale,including the boundaries and area of the land, at the time whenshe placed her signatures and thumb impressions/fingerprintsCon the documents. Therefore, the mere fact that the witnessesproved the signatures of the appellant on the sale deed cannotlead to the conclusion that the appellant had duly ‘executed’the sale deed or that there could not have been any denial ofexecution; D(iv) The specific objection of the appellant is that the sale deed isfraudulent and contrary to the agreed terms since:

(a) The area reflected in the sale deed is almost double the areaagreed upon between the parties; and (b) The area reflected in the sale deed includes a public way onEthe northern side as well as a part of the appellant’s residentialhouse; and

(v) In sum and substance, the submission for the appellant is that:

(a) The appeal itself was not maintainable before the RegistrarFunder Section 72 of the Registration Act; (b) The appellant does not deny her signatures or thumbimpressions/fingerprints on the sale deed. Hence, theRegistrar’s reliance on the statements of the two witnessesand handwriting experts to prove the appellant’s signature onthe sale deed, while concluding that it was thus duly ‘executed’Gby appellant, is misplaced;

(c) There has been no finding in regards to the due execution ofthe sale deed by the appellant, which is the matter in dispute;and H

(d) There could have been no ‘execution’ by the appellant whenthere is a serious dispute between the parties over the areareflected in the sale deed and what had been agreed earlier.

15. On the other hand, Mr V K Shukla, learned Senior Counselappearing on behalf of the second respondent submitted that:

(i) The appellant has admitted to the execution of the sale deedboth in her objections before the Sub-Registrar and in theFIR which was lodged on 4 May 2012, where the appellantadmits that the sale deed was signed by her. If an instrumentis signed by both the parties, it is presumptive of the factthat both of them have executed it, though the presumptionis rebuttable. In the present case, the sale deed having beensigned by the parties and attested by the two witnesses, ithas to be regarded as having been validly ‘executed’;

(ii) Under the Registration Act, the Registrar is vested with aduality of powers:

(a) An appellate power under Section 72; and (b) A power under Section 73 read with Section 74 todetermine upon enquiry whether a document has beenexecuted and can be registered; Since the Registrar has an independent power under Section73 and Section 74, the mere mentioning of a wrong provision(Section 72) by the second respondent and the Registrarwill not invalidate the proceedings;

(iii) A document, once it is registered, can be cancelled or setaside only by a civil court of competent jurisdiction. Uponthe registration of the sale deed on 16 April 2012, theregistration authorities are rendered infructuous and wouldhave no power to cancel registration even on the ground offraud or other irregularities;

(iv) The following conduct of the appellant has disentitled her torelief:

(a) The appellant placed her signature and thumb impressions/fingerprints on each page of the sale deed as well as thephotocopies totaling over 340 pages; A

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A(b)The appellant received all the payments towards the saleconsideration of Rs 1.6 crores, except the last cheque of Rs67 lakhs which she has deliberately not encashed in orderto resist registration;

(c) The appellant has instituted a civil suit[7] claiming to be anBowner of the entire 3,172 square meters of land, despite herhusband having sold portions nearing 300 square meters tothird parties during his lifetime; (d)The appellant has executed gift deeds dated 4 October 2011and 22 October 2011 in favour of her granddaughter, inCrespect of land which has been registered in the name ofthe second respondent under the sale deed; and (e)The sale deed was preceded by an agreement to sell, whichis also a registered document executed by the appellant.The registered agreement to sell dated 22 October 2010Dwas also used by the handwriting/fingerprint expert for thepurpose of comparing the appellant’s signatures on the saledeed, which was found to be identical.

16. The rival submissions would now fall for analysis.

C AnalysisE

l7. There are two broad issues which arise in the present civilappeal:

(i) Whether the recourse by the second respondent to Section72 of the Registration Act, against the order of the Sub-Registrar refusing registration on the basis of the appellant’sFdenial of execution, would deprive them of any remedywhatsoever; and

(ii) Whether the appellant’s admission of her signatures andthumb impressions/fingerprints on the sale deed alsoamounts to an admission of its “execution”.G

However, before proceeding with a discussion of these issues, itis important to understand the statutory framework of the RegistrationAct.

H7 Suit No 727 of 2012

C.1 Statutory Framework of the Registration Act

18. Section 17 of the Registration Act stipulates which documentsare compulsorily registrable. Among them, in clause (b), are non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare,assign, limit or extinguish a right, title or interest to or in immoveableproperty of a value higher than Rs 100. Section 23, which deals with thetime for presenting documents, stipulates that subject to Sections 24, 25and 26, no documents other than a will shall be accepted for registrationunless presented to the proper officer within four months from the dateof its execution.

19. Section 32 then entails that every document, to be registered,shall be presented at the registration office by: (a) person executing orclaiming under the document; or (b) a representative or assign of such aperson; or (c) the agent of such a person, or their representative orassign, duly authorized by a power of attorney executed and authenticatedin the manner provided.

20. Section 34[8 ]stipulates that, subject to the provisions referred toin it, no document shall be registered unless the person executing such a 8 “34. Enquiry before registration by registering officer.—(1) Subject to theprovisions contained in this Part and in Sections 41, 43, 45, 69, 75, 77, 88 and 89, nodocument shall be registered under this Act, unless the persons executing such document,or their representatives, assigns or agents authorized as aforesaid, appear before theregistering officer within the time allowed for presentation under Sections 23, 24, 25and 26:

Provided that, if owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident all such persons donot so appear, the Registrar, in cases where the delay in appearing does not exceed fourmonths, may direct that on payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of theproper registration fee, in addition to the fine, if any, payable under Section 25, thedocument may be registered.

(2) Appearances under sub-section (1) may be simultaneous or at different times.(3) The registering officer shall thereupon—(a) enquire whether or not such document was executed by the persons by whom itpurports to have been executed;(b) satisfy himself as to the identity of the persons appearing before him and allegingthat they have executed the document; and(c) in the case of any person appearing as a representative, assign or agent, satisfyhimself of the right of such person so to appear.(4) Any application for a direction under the proviso to sub-section (1) may be lodgedwith a Sub-Registrar, who shall forthwith forward it to the Registrar to whom he issubordinate.

(5) Nothing in this section applies to copies of decrees or orders.”

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Adocument or their representative, assign or agent authorized, appear beforethe registering officer within the time allowed for presentation. Theprovision also outlines the duties of enquiry placed upon the registeringofficer once a document is presented before them within the time limitprescribed.

B21. Section 35 entails that the registering officer shall register thedocument if:

(i) All the persons executing the document appearing personally,are personally known to the registering officer, or if theregistering officer is otherwise satisfied that they are theCperson they represent themselves to be and all of them admitthe execution of the document;

(ii) A person appearing by a representative, assign or agentadmits the execution to the registering officer; and

(iii) Where the person executing the document is dead, theirDrepresentative or assign appears before the registeringofficer and admits its execution.

On the other hand, sub-Section (3)(a) of Section 35 stipulates,inter alia, that if a person by whom the document purports to be executeddenies its execution, the registering officer will refuse to register theEdocument. Section 35 is extracted below:

“35. Procedure on admission and denial of executionrespectively.—(1) (a) If all the persons executing the documentappear personally before the registering officer and are personallyknown to him, or if he be otherwise satisfied that they are theFpersons they represent themselves to be, and if they all admit theexecution of the document, or (b) if in the case of any person appearing by a representative,assign or agent, such representative, assign or agent admits theexecution, or G(c) if the person executing the document is dead, and hisrepresentative or assign appears before the registering officerand admits the execution, the registering officer shall register the document as directed inSections 58 to 61, inclusive.

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(2) The registering officer may, in order to satisfy himself that thepersons appearing before him are the persons they representthemselves to be, or for any other purpose contemplated by thisAct, examine any one present in his office.

(3) (a) If any person by whom the document purports to be executeddenies its execution, or (b) if any such person appears to the registering officer to be aminor, an idiot or a lunatic, or

(c) if any person by whom the document purports to be executedis dead, and his representative or assign denies its execution, the registering officer shall refuse to register the document as tothe person so denying, appearing or dead:

Provided that, where such officer is a Registrar, he shall followthe procedure prescribed in Part XII:

Provided further that the State Government may, by notificationin the Official Gazette, declare that any Sub-Registrar named inthe notification shall, in respect of documents the execution ofwhich is denied, be deemed to be a Registrar for the purposes ofthis sub-section and of Part XII.”

22. The above provisions indicate that the registration of a documentby the Sub-Registrar must be preceded by:

(i) Presentation of the document by a proper person within thetime allowed for presentation; and

(ii) Admission of the execution of the document.

23. Section 58 provides for the particulars to be endorsed on thedocuments admitted to registration. Section 58(2) provides that “[i]f anyperson admitting the execution of a document refuses to endorse thesame, the registering officer shall nevertheless register it, but shall at thesame time endorse a note of such refusal”. Section 59 stipulates that theendorsements are to be dated and signed by the registering officer.Section 60 provides that once the requirements of Sections 34, 35, 58and 59 have been complied with, the registering officer shall endorse thedocument with a certificate of registration.

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A24. Section 71[9 ]requires the Sub-Registrar who refuses to registera document, except on the ground that the property to which it relates isnot situated within his sub-district, to make an order of refusal and recordhis reasons, and endorse the refusal of registration on the document.Further, the Sub-Registrar is required to furnish a copy of the reasonsrecorded, to any person executing or claiming under the document.B

25. Section 72 provides for an appeal to the Registrar from anorder of the Sub-Registrar refusing registration on a ground other thanthe denial of execution. Section 72 is in the following terms:

“72. Appeal to Registrar from orders of Sub-RegistrarCrefusing registration on ground other than denial ofexecution.—(1) Except where the refusal is made on the groundof denial of execution, an appeal shall lie against and order of aSub-Registrar refusing to admit a document to registration (whetherthe registration of such document is compulsory or optional) tothe Registrar to whom such Sub-Registrar is subordinate, ifDpresented to such Registrar within thirty days from the date ofthe order; and the Registrar may reverse or alter such order.

(2) If the order of the Registrar directs the document to beregistered and the document is duly presented for registrationwithin thirty days after the making of such order, the Sub-RegistrarEshall obey the same, and thereupon shall, so far as may bepracticable, follow the procedure prescribed in Sections 58, 59and 60; and such registration shall take effect as if the documenthad been registered when it was first duly presented forregistration.”

FIn terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 72, an appeal lies to theRegistrar against an order of the Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a 9 “71. Reasons for refusal to register to be recorded.—(1) Every Sub-Registrarrefusing to register a document except on the ground that the property to which itrelates is not situate within his sub-district, shall make an order of refusal and record hisGreasons for such order in his Book No. 2, and endorse the words “registration refused”on the document; and, on application made by any person executing or claiming underthe document, shall, without payment and unnecessary delay, give him a copy of thereasons so recorded.

(2) No registering officer shall accept for registration a document so endorsed unlessand until, under the provisions hereinafter contained, the document is directed to beHregistered.”

document to registration, except where the refusal is made on the groundof a denial of execution.

26. Section 73 provides for an application to the Registrar wherethe Sub-Registrar has refused to register a document on the ground of adenial of execution. Section 73 provides thus:

“73. Application to Registrar where Sub-Registrar refusesto register on ground of denial of execution.—(1) When aSub-Registrar has refused to register a document on the groundthat any person by whom it purports to be executed, or hisrepresentative or assign, denies its execution, any person claimingunder such document, or his representative, assign or agentauthorized as aforesaid, may, within thirty days after the makingof the order of refusal, apply to the Registrar to whom such Sub-Registrar is subordinate in order to establish his right to have thedocument registered.

(2) Such application shall be in writing and shall be accompaniedby a copy of the reasons recorded under Section 71, and thestatements in the application shall be verified by the applicant inmanner required by law for the verification of plaints.”

In terms of Section 73, where a Sub-Registrar refuses registrationon the ground that the person by whom it purports to be executed (ortheir representative or assign) denies execution, any person who claimsunder the document (or a representative assign or authorized agent)may apply to the Registrar within thirty days “in order to establish [their]rights to have the document registered”. Such an application has to be inwriting, accompanied by the reasons recorded under Section 71. Thestatements in the application have to be verified in the manner requiredby law for the verification of plaints.

27. On such an application being preferred, the Registrar has tofollow the procedure which is spelt out in Section 74. Section 74 stipulatesas follows:

“74. Procedure of Registrar on such application.—In suchcase, and also where such denial as aforesaid is made before aRegistrar in respect of a document presented for registration tohim, the Registrar shall, as soon as conveniently may be, enquire—

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A(b) whether the requirements of the law for the time being inforce have been complied with on the part of the applicant orperson presenting the document for registration, as the case maybe, so as to entitle the document to registration.’’

In terms of the above provision, the Registrar in such a case, andBalso where a denial of execution is made before the Registrar, has toenquire:

(i) Whether the document has been executed; and

(ii) Whether the requirements of law for the time being in forceChave been complied with on the part of the applicant or person presentingthe document for registration.

28. Section 75[10] provides that if the Registrar finds that thedocument has been executed and the requirements under the law havebeen complied with, the Registrar shall order the document be registered.DThereafter, if the document is duly presented for registration within thirtydays of the order of the Registrar, the registering officer has to obey theorder and, as far as may be practicable, must follow the procedure inSections 58, 59 and 60. The registration then takes effect as if thedocument has been registered when it was first presented for registration.Pertinently, under sub-Section (4) of Section 75, the Registrar may, forEthe purpose of an enquiry under Section 74, summon and enforce theattendance of witnesses, and compel them to give evidence, as if theRegistrar were a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908[11].

10 “75. Order by Registrar to register and procedure thereon.—(1) If the RegistrarFfinds that the document has been executed and that the said requirements have beencomplied with, he shall order the document to be registered.

(2) If the document is duly presented for registration within thirty days after themaking of such order, the registering officer shall obey the same and thereupon shall, sofar as may be practicable, follow the procedure prescribed in Sections 58, 59 and 60.(3) Such registration shall take effect as if the document had been registered when it wasGfirst duly presented for registration.

(4) The Registrar may, for the purpose of any enquiry under Section 74, summon andenforce the attendance of witnesses, and compel them to give evidence, as if he were aCivil Court, and he may also direct by whom the whole or any part of the costs of anysuch enquiry shall be paid, and such costs shall be recoverable as if they had beenawarded in a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).”H11 “CPC”

29. Section 76[12 ]provides for that the order of refusal by theRegistrar under Sections 72 or 75 has to be reasoned, and the Registraris required to furnish a copy of the reasons recorded to any personexecuting or claiming under the document. It further provides that noappeal shall lie against such an order of refusal.

30. In the event of a refusal by the Registrar, a suit can be filed bya party in terms of the provisions of Section 77[13] before a civil court,praying for a decree directing the document to be registered. On theother hand, an order of the Registrar directing the registration of adocument is amenable to a challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution.While seeking a writ of certiorari, the person moving the petition beforethe High Court would be entitled to establish whether the registrationhas been ordered in breach of the statutory provisions and is contrary tolaw. The mere existence of the remedy available before a civil court,under Section 9 of the CPC to avoid the document or to seek a declarationin regard to its invalidity, will not divest a person, who complains that theorder passed by Registrar for the registration of the document wascontrary to statutory provisions, of the remedy which is available in theexercise of a court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.Undoubtedly, whether a writ should be entertained lies at the discretionof the court and in a given case, the High Court may decline to do so on 12 “76. Order of refusal by Registrar.—(1) Every Registrar refusing—(a) to register a document except on the ground that the property to which it relates isnot situate within his district or that the document ought to be registered in the officeof a Sub-Registrar, or (b) to direct the registration of a document under Section 72 or Section 75, shall makean order of refusal and record the reasons for such order in his Book No. 2, and, onapplication made by any person executing or claiming under the document, shall, withoutunnecessary delay, give him a copy of the reasons so recorded.

(2) No appeal lies from any order by a Registrar under this Section or Section 72.”

13 “77. Suit in case of order of refusal by Registrar.—(1) Where the Registrarrefuses to order the document to be registered, under Section 72 or Section 76, anyperson claiming under such document, or his representative, assign or agent, may,within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal, institute in the Civil Court,within the local limits of whose original jurisdiction is situate the office in which thedocument is sought to be registered, a suit for a decree directing the document to beregistered in such office if it be duly presented for registration within thirty days afterthe passing of such decree.

(2) The provisions contained in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 75 shall, mutatismutandis, apply to all documents presented for registration in accordance with anysuch decree, and, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the document shall bereceivable in evidence in such suit.”

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Athe ground that disputed questions of fact arise. However, it needs to beemphasized that in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction, it would be opento the High Court to determine as to whether the statutory provisionswhich guide the power of the Sub-Registrar or, as the case may be, theRegistrar to order the registration of the document have been duly fulfilled.Even where a decree is passed by the civil court for the cancellation ofBany instrument, sub-Section (2) of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act1963 provides that:

“31. When cancellation may be ordered.— [...]

(2) If the instrument has been registered under the IndianCRegistration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send acopy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrumenthas been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy ofthe instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.’’

C.2 Validity of the recourse by the Second RespondentD

31. The Sub-Registrar before whom the sale deed was submittedfor registration declined to order the registration of the sale deed by anorder dated 17 February 2012. The order of the Sub-Registrar wasprefaced by the statement of the appellant, which stated that her signatureson the sale deed had been taken forcibly. Before the Sub-Registrar, theEappellant had filed an objection when the sale deed was presented forregistration. The appellant, in the course of her objections before theSub-Registrar specifically adverted to following grievances, namely that:(i) the second respondent had furnished false and misleading informationto her; (ii) the market value of the land admeasuring 1839.48 squaremetres was not less than Rs 7 crores and the sale consideration of RsF1.6 crore was meagre; (iii) the time stipulated in the sale deed hadexpired; (iv) the signatures of the appellant had been obtained on anincomplete sale deed; (v) the signatures of the appellant were takenwithout furnishing to her a chance to read or peruse the papers, andwhen she was surrounded by five persons; (vi) the land area havingGbeen manipulated under the sale deed, her residential house would alsobeen taken away by fraud; (vii) the boundaries mentioned in the saledeed were incorrect and did not clearly reflect the land which was agreedto be sold; (viii) the sale deed was incomplete and all the co-sharers hadnever entered into any partition; (ix) the sale deed would attract a capitalgains tax which would be in excess of the sale consideration; and (x) anHactive forgery had been committed by the second respondent.

32. As is evident from the objections filed before the Sub-Registrarby the appellant, it is clear that she did not deny having signed the saledeed. The essence of her grievance was that her signatures were takenforcibly; the sale deed did not reflect the intent of the parties in terms ofthe area which was intended to be sold; the sale consideration wasundervalued; the consequence of the sale deed was that even theresidential house of the appellant would be sold, contrary to herunderstanding; and the sale deed had been procured by fraud. The orderof the Sub-Registrar makes it abundantly clear that the appellant wasnot ready to register the sale deed, which was claimed to have beenexecuted in a fraudulent manner and whose execution was thus beingdenied. Registration was, therefore, refused by the Sub-Registrar in termsof Section 35(3)(a) of the Registration Act.

33. If a person by whom the document is purported to be executeddenies its execution and registration is refused on those grounds, anappeal against the order of the Sub-Registrar denying execution wouldnot be maintainable under Section 72 of the Registration Act. Section 72clearly stipulates that an appeal will lie against an order of Sub-Registrarrefusing to admit a document to registration “except where the refusal ismade on the ground of denial of execution”.

34. In the present case, the Sub-Registrar having specifically deniedregistration in terms of Section 35(3)(a), the order was not amenable toan appeal under Section 72. However, the Registrar, in the course ofentertaining the appeal, instead took recourse to the powers entrustedunder Section 73. As noted earlier in this judgment, Section 73 empowersthe Registrar where the Sub-Registrar has refused to register a documenton denial of its execution by a person purporting to have executed it.Subsequently, the Registrar appears to have followed the procedure whichis emphasized in Section 74. Section 74 provides for a procedure wherethe Registrar has a two-fold function of determining: firstly, whether thedocument has been executed; and secondly, whether the requirementsof the law for the time being in force have been complied with by theapplicant or the person presenting document for registration, so as toentitle them to have the document registered. Upon such an enquiryunder Section 74, Section 75 enables the Registrar to order the documentto be registered if it is found that: (i) the document has been executed;and (ii) the requirements of the law have been complied with. Section75(4) also allows the Registrar to summon and enforce the attendanceof witnesses to properly conduct the enquiry under Section 74.

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A35. Undoubtedly, the power of the Registrar while dealing with anapplication under Section 73 are wider that the powers which areentrusted to the Sub-Registrar under Section 35. Under Section 35(1)(a),the registering officer shall register the document if all the personsexecuting the document appear in person before the officer and admitthe execution of the document. Section 35(2) empowers the registeringBofficer to examine anyone present in the office, for the purpose ofsatisfying himself that the persons appearing before him are the personsthey represent themselves to be. In contrast to sub-Section (1) of Section35, sub-Section (3) stipulates that once execution is denied by the personwho purports to have executed the document, the registering officerCshall refuse to register it. On the other hand, under Sections 73 and 74,the Registrar is entrusted with the duty to enquire whether the documenthas been executed and whether all the requirements of the law for thetime being have been complied with. For the purposes of this enquiry,Section 75(4) provides the Registrar with the power to summon andenforce the attendance of witnesses. Thus, while the Sub-Registrar underDSection 35(3)(a) has to mandatorily refuse registration when the executionof a document is denied by the person purported to have executed thedocument, the Registrar is entrusted with the power to conduct an enquiryon an application under Section 73 by following the procedure underSection 74.E

36. In the present case, the appeal before the Registrar was notmaintainable under Section 72. Indeed, the appellant, in response to thememo of appeal filed by the second respondent, specifically pleaded inher objections that “hearing the appeal under Section 72 of the IndianRegistration Act or to deliver any judgement will be against law”. At theFsame time, however, the appellant also pleaded that she “had full rightfor argument under Section 75(4) of the Indian Registration Act andunder the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 from the witnesses and theappellant”. The Registrar is empowered to summon witnesses underSection 75(4) for the purpose of an enquiry under Sections 73 and 74. Itthus emerges that the parties proceeded on the basis that the proceedingsGwould be decided on the basis of an enquiry under Section 73, and theenquiry was conducted with reference to the provisions of Section 74.The appellant herself understood this to be the position in her objectionsfiled to the appeal filed by the second respondent, since she invoked herrights under Section 75(4), which applies to enquiry proceedings underHSection 74. The appeal against the Sub-Registrar’s order was not maintainable under Section 72. The remedy of the second respondent,where the Sub-Registrar refused registration on the ground that theappellant denied execution of the document, was under Section 73. TheRegistrar conducted an enquiry under the provisions of sections 73 and74. Both parties participated in the enquiry.

37. Mulla’s commentary on The Registration Act analyses asituation where an application under Section 73 is wrongly labelled as anappeal under Section 72, in the following extract[14]:

“If a refusal is made on the ground of denial of execution, appealwould not lie under s 72 of the Act. When the refusal is denied onthe execution, remedy is to file an application under s 73 of theAct. The mere fact that an application is wrongly headed as anappeal and an erroneous section of the statute is mentioned thereinis immaterial, if in fact and in law it is an application under s 73 ofthe Registration Act.”

Similarly, in S P Sen Gupta’s commentary on the RegistrationAct, it is stated[15]:

“4. Proceeding erroneously described as “appeal” or vice versa.-A proceeding under sec. 72 is an appeal whereas a proceedingunder sec. 73 is not an appeal; it is merely an application beforethe Registrar in order to establish the applicants right to have thedocument registered. It is not always easy for the aggrieved partyor even by the Registrar to decide which of the two sections –sec. 72 or sec. 73, would apply on a given facts circumstances.Law is meant for doing justice. As such the substance of theproceeding, and not its form, before the Registrar should be takeninto account. As such it would not be fatal if an appeal under sec.72 is filed as an application under sec. 73 and vice versa.”

38. Thus, it is clear that the mis-labelling of an application underSection 73 as an appeal under Section 72 would by itself not vitiate theproceedings before the Registrar. This becomes especially true whenproceedings before the Registrar, in substance, were proceedings underSection 73 itself and both the parties acknowledged them to be so, 14 Justice K Kannan, Mulla’s The Registration Act (LexisNexis, 2012) pg 416 (“Mulla’sThe Registration Act”)

15 S P Sen Gupta, Commentaries on the Registration Act, 1908 (Kamal Law House,2017) pgs 617-618 (“S P Sen Gupta Commentary”)

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Aexplicitly or by their conduct. This is clearly what has happened in thepresent case as well, as is evident from the appellant’s reference toSection 75(4) and her participation in the enquiry proceedings before theDistrict Registrar. Therefore, we hold that the second respondent’s mis-labelling of their application as an appeal under Section 72 will not vitiatethe proceedings which led to the District Registrar’s order dated 31BMarch 2012. Hence, for the purpose of these proceedings, we will nowproceed to analyse as to whether the District Registrar validly passedthe order directing the registration of the sale deed.

C.3 Meaning of “execution”

C39. Section 35(1)(a) of the Registration Act uses the expression“admit the execution of the document”, while Section 35(3)(a) uses theexpression “denies its execution”. Similarly, Section 72(1) has adoptedthe expression “denial of execution”, while Section 73(1) uses theexpression “denies its execution”. However, the word “execution” itselfis not defined by the Registration Act. Before us, two possibleDinterpretations have been urged by the parties:

(i) First, that “execution” is tantamount to “signing” a document.Hence, once a person admits to their signature on a document,they admit to having executed it; and E(ii)Second, that “execution” cannot be equated with merelysigning a document. Hence, even if a person’s signature onthe document admitted, they can still deny its execution ifthey did not agree to or understand the contents of thedocument while signing it.

FWe must now decide which of these two interpretations shouldbe adopted by this Court.

40. The first interpretation of “execution” is supported by thedefinition provided in the Stamp Act 1899[16]. Section 2(12) defines“executed” and “execution” in the following terms:

G“(12) Executed and execution.—”Executed” and “execution”,used with reference to instruments, mean “signed” and “signature”and includes attribution of electronic record within the meaning ofSection 11 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000);”

However, since the Registration Act has been enacted for apurpose different from the Stamp Act, the definition under Stamp Act isnot conclusive.

41. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the expression “execute”and “executed” thus[17]:

“execute, vb. (14c) 1. To perform or complete (a contract orduty) <once the contract was fully executed, the parties owed nofurther contractual duties to each other>…3. To make (a legaldocument) valid by signing; to bring (a legal document) into itsfinal, legally enforceable form <each party executed the contractwithout a signature witness>…

executed, adj. (16c) 1. (Of a document) that has been signed<an executed will>…

“[T]he term ‘executed’ is a slippery word. Its use is to be avoidedexcept when accompanied by explanation...A contract is frequentlysaid to be executed when the document has been signed, or hasbeen signed, sealed, and delivered. Further, by executed contractis frequently meant one that has been fully performed by bothparties.” William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract26 n.* (Arthur l. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919).”

The expression “execute” has been further defined in Words andPhrases in the following terms[18]:

“To complete as a legal instrument; to perform what is required togive validity to.”

The definitions in both these dictionaries seem to once again suggestthat the signing of a document can be equivalent to its execution. However,these definitions are by no means definitive and cannot be taken out ofcontext, since they also do seem to suggest that executing an agreementis making it fully valid and legally enforceable.

42. Mulla’s The Registration Act (supra) notes the followingin relation to the meaning of “execution”[19]:

“Admission of Execution

17 Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (Thomson Reuters, 2009) pgs 649-650

18 Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) (Thomson Reuters, 2020)

19 Supra at note 15, pgs 254-256

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A…It is submitted that the mere proof or admission that aperson’s signature appears on a document cannot by itselfamount to execution of the document...Where a person hadsigned a document after being aware of the nature of the document,he has executed the document, and, it is submitted, the Registrarcannot go into the question whether the document has beenBobtained by coercion; but when a signature has been obtainedby false representations and the ostensible executant didnot sign with the intention of being bound by the terms ofthe document, such a person cannot be said to haveexecuted the document.”

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Similarly, S P Sen Gupta Commentary (supra) sets out thefollowing position[20]:

“A document is liable to be set aside or declared inoperative by aDcivil court when it was not voluntarily executed. But that is analtogether different consideration nor coming within the jurisdictionof Registering Officer. The correct legal position seems tobe that though the Registering Officer cannot take anydecision as to the legality and validity of an instrument whichhas been presented for registration, there cannot be anyEadmission of execution when the plea taken by theexecutant before the Registering Officer, if found true,would invalidate the deed. An execution does not meanmerely signing but signing by way of assent to the termsembodied in the document. When the executant admits hisFsignature on the document but takes a further plea that hissignature was taken by force after detaining him in a roomor fraud was practised upon him in obtaining his signatureson the deed or he was duped to sign on blank papers etc,and there is no material before the Registering Officer torebut the plea of the executant, then there cannot be anyG“admission” within the meaning of sec. 35(1)(a) of the Actbecause the mind of the signer did not accompany thesignature…”

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While the above extract deals with the power of the registeringofficer under Section 35(1)(a), it does suggest that “execution” happenswhen a person’s signature on the document is accompanied by their fullconsent to the contents of the document, which they have understoodbefore signing it.

43. This understanding of the phrase “execution” is also adoptedby textbooks in relation to the law of evidence. Section 68[21] of the IndianEvidence Act 1872[22] prescribes the requirement for proving that adocument has been executed. The proviso to Section 68 stipulates that itshall not be necessary to call an attesting witness to prove the executionof a document if it has been registered under the Registration Act,provided that its execution is not specifically denied by the person who ispurported to have executed it. In relation to this provision, Sarkar’sLaw of Evidence notes[23]:

“The term “execution” is not defined in any statute. It meanscompletion, i.e., the last act or acts which complete a documentand in English law this is known as “signing, sealing and delivering.”The ordinary meaning of executing a document is signing it as aconsenting party thereto.

[...]

[s 67.4] Meaning and Proof of “Execution”

[...]

Execution consists in signing a document written out and readover and understood and does not consist of merely signing aname upon a blank sheet of paper...”

21 “68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested.—If adocument is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until oneattesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, ifthere be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capableof giving evidence:

Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of theexecution of any document, not being a will, which has been registered in accordancewith the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless itsexecution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specificallydenied.”

22 “Evidence Act”

23 Sudipto Sarkar and Dr. H R Jhingta, Sarkar: Law of Evidence–In India, Pakistan,Bangladesh, Burma, Ceylon, Malaysia & Singapore: Volume 1 (LexisNexis, 2016)

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[2022] 3 S.C.R.

ASimilarly, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s treatise on the law of evidencestates as follows[24]:

“[s 67.3] Execution of Document — Meaning [...]

BExecution of a document is something different from mere signingof the document. The term execution is not defined...The ordinarymeaning of executing a document is signing it as a consentingparty thereto...Execution of the document means that theexecutant must have signed or put his thumb mark/impression,only after the contents of the document have been fully statedCand read by the executant before he put his signature thereon.Mere admission of the initial by the executant would not betantamount to an admission of execution of the document.”

44. If we are to now look at the relevant precedent on the subject,in Rajendra Pratap Singh v. Rameshwar Prasad[25], the validity of aDdecree of the eviction under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)Control Act 1982 was in question before a two-judge Bench of thisCourt. This Court, while considering the provisions of the third paragraphto Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, noted that it requiredthat a registered instrument for the lease of an immovable property hadEto be executed both by the lessor and lessee. While elaborating on themeaning of “executing”, this Court held:

“11…An instrument is usually executed through multifarious stepsof different sequences. At the first instance, the parties mightdeliberate upon the terms and reach an agreement. Next, the termsFso agreed upon would be reduced to writing. Sometimes one partyalone would affix the signature on it and deliver it to the otherparty. Sometimes both parties would affix their signature on theinstrument. If the document is required by law to be registered,both parties can be involved in the process without perhapsobtaining the signatures of one of them. In all such instances, theGinstrument can be said to have been executed by both partiesthereto. If the instrument is signed by both parties, it ispresumptive of the fact that both of them have executed it, 24 N Vijayraghavan and Sharath Chandran, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: The Law of Evidence(LexisNexis, 2021)H25 (1998) 7 SCC 602

of course it is only rebuttable presumption. Similarly, if aninstrument is signed by only one party, it does not mean that bothparties have not executed it together. Whether both parties haveexecuted the instrument will be a question of fact to be determinedon evidence if such a determination is warranted from the pleadingsof the particular suit. Merely because the document shows onlythe signature of one of the parties, it is not enough to concludethat the non-signing party has not joined in the execution of theinstrument.’’

In view of the above enunciation, the Court held when thedefendant in that case had not disputed in his written statement that thelease had been validly made, it was not be open to him to raise a contentionsubsequently that the instrument was void since it had not been executedboth by the lessor and the lessee. The decree for eviction was thusupheld. However, as a general principle, the above extract from thedecision of this Court, though in a different statutory context, emphasisesthat while the signing of an instrument by both the parties is presumptiveof the fact that both of them have executed it, yet this is rebuttablepresumption.

45. In N.M. Ramachandraiah v. State of Karnataka[26], a SingleJudge of the Karnataka High Court, while construing power of theRegistrar under Section 74 of the Registration Act, observed:

“8. The answer to these questions revolve round the scope ofenquiry as contemplated u/s. 74 of the Act. In an enquiry u/s.74 of the Act, the Registrar should enquire whether thedocument had been executed, and whether therequirements of the law has been complied with, so as toentitle the document to registration. The Registrar shouldnot only be satisfied that the party in question has signedthe document, but he should also come to the conclusionthat the signature has been affixed by the party afterunderstanding the contents and the terms of the document.The Registrar should summon witnesses required by thepetitioner to prove execution. The enquiry under the A

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Asection should be made by the Registrar himself and onceafter such enquiry, he is satisfied that the document notonly bears the signatures of the executant, but it is alsoduly executed by the executant, after understanding thecontents and terms of the document, he may order thedocument to be registered. In the said enquiry he has no powerBto enter into probabilities and surrounding circumstances. He ismerely to find out whether the document tendered actually is inthe state in which it was executed by the parties to it. The scopeof enquiry contemplated under Section 74 have been explained invarious judgments, in particular, the meaning of the wordC“executed”.”

In adopting this view, the Single Judge adverted to variousjudgments of the Karnataka High Court, as well as other High Courts,Dwhich we shall now note.

46. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in BanasettappaLaljichikkanna v. District Registrar[27] held:

“5…Section 74 enjoins upon the District Registrar to hold anEenquiry and come to the conclusion as to ‘whether a documenthas been executed.’ In the present case all that the DistrictRegistrar has stated is that he was satisfied that the petitioner hadsigned the sale deed. He should have come to the conclusionthat the signature had been affixed by the petitioner afterFunderstanding the contents and the tenor of the document.Execution does not mean merely signing, but signing byway of assent to the terms of the contract of alienationembodied in the document.”

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47. In Sayyapparaju Surayya v. Ramchandar Prasad Singhand others[28], a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, while 27 1965 SCC OnLine Kar 132H28 1949 SCC OnLine Mad 227

construing the provisions of Section 35(1)(a) and (b) of the RegistrationAct, observed:

“The admission required therefore is admission of the executionof the document…It is not enough for the person, who is theostensible executant, to admit his signature on a paper on which,it may be, the document is ultimately engrossed. The identity ofthe papers on which the signature occurs is not sufficient. If aman says that he signed a blank paper on the representation thatit was required for presenting a petition, as in the present case orif a man signs a completed document on the representation thathis signature or thumb impression is required as an attesting witness,that admission of the signature or thumb impression in thosecircumstances cannot be construed to be an admission of theexecution of the document. Far from its being an admission, it is aclear and unambiguous denial of the execution of the document.He must admit, in order to attract the provisions of S. 35(1) thathe signed the document…The admission of execution thereforemust amount to an admission that the person admitting enteredinto an obligation under the instrument; in other words, that hehad executed the document, signed it as a sale deed, mortgagedeed, or a lease deed, as the case may be.”

48. In Jogesh Prasad Singh & others v. Ramchandar Prasad Singh and others[29], a Division Bench of the Patna High Court notedthat the meaning of the phrase “execution” of a document had been wellsettled by another Division Bench of the High Court in Ebadut Ali v.Muhammad Fareed[30]. The decision of the Division Bench in EbadutAli (supra), which was cited with approval in Jogesh Prasad Singh(supra), held:

“In our view, execution consists in signing a document written outand read over and understood, and does not consist of merelysigning a name upon a blank sheet of paper. To be executed adocument must be in existence; where there is no document inexistence, there cannot be execution…Where an executant clearlysays that he signed on blank paper and that the document whichhe had authorised is not the document which he contemplated,the statement is a denial not an admission, of execution.”

29 1950 SCC OnLine Pat 31 (“Jogesh Prasad Singh”)

30 AIR (3) 1916 Pat 206 : 35 Ind. Cas. 56 (“Ebadut Ali”)

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A49. Adverting to the above decisions and to the views of theCalcutta[31], Orissa[32] and Assam High Court[33], the Single Judge of theKarnataka High Court in N.M. Ramachandraiah (supra) emphasizedthat the execution of the document does not mean merely signing it, butsigning it after having understood its contents in their entirety:

B“15. Therefore, the law is well settled. Execution of a documentdoes not mean merely signing, but signing by way of assentto the terms of the contract embodied in the document.Execution consists in signing a document written out andread over and understood, and does not consist of merelysigning a name upon a blank sheet of paper. It is a solemnCact of the executant who must own up the recitals in theinstrument and there must be clear evidence that he putthe signature after knowing the contents of document fully.To be executed, a document must be in existence; where there isno document in existence there cannot be execution. Mere proofDor admission that a person’s signature appears on a documentcannot by itself amount to execution of a document. Registrationdoes not dispense with the necessity of proof of execution whenthe same is denied. Thus, execution of document is not mere signingof it.”

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50. The understanding of the Karnataka High Court in N.M.Ramachandraiah (supra) is consistent with precedents emanating fromthe Privy Council and various High Courts in India. In Privy Council’sdecision in Puran Chand Nahatta v. Monmotho Nath Mukherji andFOthers[34], Viscount Sumner, while construing the provisions of Section35 of the Registration Act, observed:

“By section 35 of the Registration Act registration is directed whencertain persons have appeared, have been duly identified, andhave admitted the execution of the document propounded, andGthe necessary persons are “the persons executing the document”.The appellant contends that in these words executingmeans and means only “actually signing”. Their Lordships 31 Mohima Chunder Dhur v. Jugul Kishore Bhutta Charji, ILR Volume VII Calcutta 32 Smt. Uma Devi v. Narayan Nayak, 1984 SCC OnLine Ori 94

33 Bhutkani Nath v. Smt. Kamaleswari Nath, AIR 1972 Assam and Nagaland 15H34 1927 SCC OnLine PC 100

cannot accept this. A document is executed, when those whotake benefits and obligations under it have put or have caused tobe put their names to it. Personal signature is not required, andanother person, duly authorized, may, by writing the name of theparty executing, bring about his valid execution, and put him underthe obligations involved. Hence ‘the words person executing” inthe Act cannot be read merely as “person signing”. They meansomething more, namely, the person, who by a valid executionenters into obligation under the instrument. When the appearancereferred to is for the purpose of admitting the execution alreadyaccomplished, there is nothing to prevent the executing personappearing either in person or by any authorized and competentattorney in order to make a valid admission. Their Lordships havefailed to find in the scheme of the Act anything repugnant to thisconstruction. Any other would involve risk of confusion and mighteven defeat the statutory procedure by multiplying the persons,who have to be traced and induced to attend, either by themselvesor by some representative.”

51. In Ghasita Ram Bajaj v. Raj Kamal Radio Electronic[35], aSingle Judge of the Delhi High Court, while differentiating betweensignatures on ordinary documents and documents stamped in accordancewith the law relating to negotiation of instruments, observed that in thecase of ordinary documents:

“8…The meaning of execution of a document ordinarily impliesthat a person making his signature by way of execution knew orshould have known the nature of the document which he wassigning…”

52. In Kamlabai v. Shantirai[36], a Division Bench of the BombayHigh Court, in the context of Section 68 of the Evidence Act, held:

“30…In Sarkar’s Evidence Act, page 639, the meaning and theproof of the word “execution” has been set out. It says“Executed” means completed. ‘Execution’ is the last actor series of acts which completes it. Execution consists insigning a document written out and read over and 35 1973 SCC OnLine Del 109

36 1980 SCC OnLine Bom 152

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Aunderstood and does not consist of merely signing a nameupon a blank sheet of paper. To be executed, a documentmust be in existence; where there is no document inexistence, there can be no execution”.

31. It seems to us plain that a person cannot be said to execute aBdocument where he does not do so with the intention of making it.This may appear to be simple, but it is clearly, in our opinion, fullof meaning and import. The word “execution” in a sensemeans the making of a document, and a person can be saidto have made or authorised a document where with theintention and knowledge of bringing into existence aCparticular kind of document he prepares or gets prepared,such a document and signs it in token of his having acceptedthat document, with a desire to bring it into existence. Meresigning of a document without the intention of bringing thatdocument into existence, meaning thereby giving effect toDit would not properly speaking attract the expression“execution”…”

53. In S. Ramamurthy v. Jayalakshmi Ammal[37], a Single Judgeof the Madras High Court, while interpreting Section 35 of the RegistrationEAct, observed:

“11. Let us first examine the meaning of “admission of theexecution of a document for the purpose of section 35 of theRegistration Act,” The execution of a document is not mere signingof it. It is a solemn act of the executant who must own up theFrecitals in the instrument and there must be clear evidence that heput his signature in a document after knowing fully its contents.The executant of a document must, after fully understanding thecontents and the tenor of the document, put his signature or affixhis thumb-impression. In other words, the execution of a documentGdoes not mean merely signing but signing by way of assent to theterms of the contract of alienation embodied in the document.”

54. In Union Bank of India v. Dhian Pati[38], a Single Judge ofthe Himachal Pradesh High Court had to determine whether a deed of 37 1990 SCC OnLine Mad 501H38 1996 SCC OnLine HP 90

mortgage had been validly executed. Since the Indian Contract Act 1872and the Registration Act did not define “execution”, the Single Judgededuced the meaning of the phrase in dictionaries, legal lexicons andprecedent. Thereafter, the Single Judge concluded:

“21. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid meaning of the words“execution of document” it only signifies that the person executingsuch a document should sign such a document with free consent.The execution of a document would be complete in case theexecutant had signed the document voluntarily, without any duress,knowing the contents of the document.”

55. While interpreting the provisions of the Evidence Act, In ReKuttadan Velayudhan[39], a Division Bench of the Kerala High Courtdetermined whether the admission of signature on a document wastantamount to admission of its execution. After perusing the decisions ofthe Kerala High Court and other High Court across India, the DivisionBench held:

“9. To sign means to affix the signature. But when it comes tothe signing of a written instrument, it implies more thanthe act of affixing a signature. It implies more than the clericalact of writing the name. The intention of the person signingis important. The person should have affixed the signatureto the instrument in token of an intention to be bound byits conditions. It has been said that for a signing consists of boththe act of writing a person’s name and the intention in doing thisto execute, authenticate or to sign as a witness. The execution ofa deed or other instrument includes the performance of all actswhich may be necessary to render it complete as a deed or aninstrument importing the intended obligation of every act requiredto give the instrument validity, or to carry it into effect or to give itthe forms required to render it valid. Thus, the signature is anacknowledgment that the person signing has agreed to theterms of the document. This can be achieved only if a personsigns after the documents is prepared and the terms areknown to the person signing. In that view of the matter,mere putting of signature cannot be said to be execution ofthe document.”

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A56. In Bank of Baroda v. Shree Moti Industries[40], a SingleJudge of the Bombay High Court, in the context of proving a documentunder the Evidence Act, noted:

“21…The term “execution” is not defined in any statute. It meanscompletion, i.e. the last act or acts which complete a documentBand in English Law this is known as “signing, sealing anddelivering”. The ordinary meaning of executing a document issigning it as a consenting party thereto.”

57. The “execution” of a document does not stand admitted merelybecause a person admits to having signed the document. Such anCinterpretation accounts for circumstances where an individual signs ablank paper and it is later converted into a different document, or whenan individual is made to sign a document without fully understanding itscontents. Adopting a contrary interpretation would unfairly put the burdenupon the person denying execution to challenge the registration before acivil court or a writ court, since registration will have to be allowed onceDthe signature has been admitted.

58. In giving meaning to the expression “execute” in the provisionsof the Registration Act, it is necessary to adopt a purposive constructionto protect, facilitate and achieve the object of registration. In SurajLamps and Industries Private Limited v. State of Haryana &EAnother[41], Justice R V Raveendran, speaking for a two-judge Benchof this Court, highlighted the purpose of registration:

“18. Registration provides safety and security to transactionsrelating to immovable property, even if the document is lost ordestroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documentsFthereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactionsand execution of documents. Registration provides information topeople who may deal with a property, as to the nature and extentof the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. Inother words, it enables people to find out whether any particularGproperty with which they are concerned, has been subjected toany legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person(s)presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It givessolemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people maysee the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars areand as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regardto them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovableproperty can rely with confidence upon the statements containedin the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full andcomplete account of all transactions by which the title to theproperty may be affected and secure extracts/copies dulycertified.”

59. In Bharat Indu and ors v. Hakim Mohammad Hamid AliKhan[42], Lord Philimore, speaking for the Privy Council, emphasized thepurpose of the provisions of the Registration Act in the following terms:

“The provisions of the Registration Act are very carefully designedto prevent forgeries and the procurement of conveyances ormortgages by fraud or undue influence, and though it may seemsomewhat technical to insist upon exact compliance with theprovisions of the Act, it is necessary so to do. Their Lordshipshave already given their sanction to the necessity of strictcompliance with these forms in the case which was referred to atthe Bar, Jambu Parshad v. Muhammad Aftab Ali Khan [L.R. 42I.A. 22 : s.c. I.L.R. 37 All. 49; 19 C.W.N. 282 (1914).].”

60. The Registration Act exists so that information about documentscan be put into the public domain, where it can be accessed by anyone inorder to prevent forgeries and fraud, and so that individuals can be awareof the status of properties. If the interpretation conflating signing withexecution is adopted, it would ensure that the Sub-Registrars/Registrarswill continuously end up registering documents whose validity willinevitably be then disputed in a civil suit or a writ petition. While the suitor writ proceedings continue, the document would remain on the publicrecords as a registered instrument, which has the potential to causemore disruption. Hence, such an interpretation should not be adopted bythis Court.

61. However, while adopting the current interpretation – that theadmission of one’s signature on a document is not equivalent to admissionof its execution – it is important to consider the power of the Sub-Registrar/Registrar and their procedures under the Registration Act.

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A62. In Smt. Raisa Begam v. District Registrar, Saharanpurand Anr.[43], a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court observed:

“33. Section 35 requires for satisfaction of the Registrar aboutexecution of the document. If a document is properly presentedand its execution is admitted by the competent person, asBprescribed in statute, the Registrar has no option but to registerthe document. The purpose of Registration Act was to mitigatelitigation in regard to property which in the absence of anydocumentary evidence was creating lot of administrative andotherwise problem to the then Government. It neither conferstitle upon the concerned person nor validates it but only recognizesCexecution of document relating to a transaction pertaining toproperty of the person concerned and acts like evidence to provesuch transaction in the manner it is written in the document andregistered with the Registrar.”

The Single Judge then adverted to the UP Registration Manual,Dmore particularly paragraphs 285, 304, 305, 306 and 307. Paragraphs285 and 304, which are extracted in the judgment of the Single Judge,are reproduced below:

“285. When a document is presented for registration the pointsrequiring the attention of the registering officer may be summarizedEas follows:

(1) Whether he has jurisdiction to register the document?

(2) Whether the document is time-barred?

(3) Whether the document is free from the objections in sectionsF19, 20 and 21?

(4) Whether the document is properly stamped?

(5) Whether the document is presented by a proper person?

(6) Whether the document was executed by the persons by whomGit purports to have been executed?’’

[...]

304. When a document is accepted for registration the prescribedfees should be levied and the necessary entries made in the fees

book. The counterfoil receipt should then be prepared and thereceipts for the document and the fees delivered to the presenter.The registering officers should then, with as little delay as possible,enquire whether the document was executed by the allegedexecutant, and satisfy himself as to the identity of the personappearing before him to admit execution. He should also satisfyhimself that the person admitting execution has read andunderstood the contents of the document and should if the personis illiterate or cannot read and understand the document will explainthe nature and contents to him. If the presenter be the executant,or his representative, assign or agent, and if such executant,representative, assign or agent be present, the registering officershall make the necessary enquiry at once. When the registeringofficer is not personally acquainted with executants, he shall requirethem to produce persons to testify to their identity. Such personsshall, if possible, be persons known to the registering officerpersonally, or failing these, persons of apparent respectability.Witnesses who are unknown to the registering officer shall havetheir thumb impressions recorded as in the case of executants(vide Rule 308, so far as it is applicable). Any distinctive physicalpeculiarity or marked deformity in a party or witness should benoted in the endorsement. But a descriptive roll need not berecorded except in suspicious cases. This procedure must be inaddition to, and not take the place of, the procedure required bysection 34, that the registering officer shall satisfy himself of theiridentity. Such descriptive rolls afford in themselves no proofidentity.”

The Single Judge held that where a serious question of fraud andmanipulation was raised in a summary proceeding, such as the proceedingbefore the District Registrar, it would not have been a substitute to decidea serious civil dispute which has the effect of transferring an immoveableproperty from its owners to others. Hence, when the document was notpresented by the proper person before the Sub-Registrar and theexecutant denied its execution, it was held that the remedy lay in filing acivil suit for declaration and specific performance, and not in the summaryproceedings under Sections 72 and 73 of the Registration Act.

63. Section 73 of the Registration Act envisages that an applicationmay be submitted to the Registrar by a person in order to establish their AB

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Arights to have a document registered, in a situation where the Sub-Registrar has refused to register the document on the ground that theperson by whom it purports to have been executed has denied itsexecution. Section 74 then lays down the procedure which is to befollowed by the Registrar, which contemplates an enquiry by the Registrarinto whether the document has been executed and whether requirementsBof law for the time being in force have been complied with on the part ofthe applicant or the person presenting the document for registration.When the twin requirements of clauses (a) and (b) of Section 74 arefound by the Registrar to have been fulfilled, sub-Section (1) of Section75 provides that the Registrar shall order the document be registered.CSub-Section (4) of Section 75 stipulates that for the purpose of the enquiryunder Section 74, the Registrar may summon and enforce the attendanceof witnesses and compel them to give evidence as if he is a civil court.The Registrar is also empowered to impose the obligation of paying thecosts of the enquiry on a party, and such costs are to be recovered as ifthey have been charged in a suit under the CPC. Thus, sub-Section (4)Dof Section 75 incorporates a deeming fiction from two perspectives –first, in empowering the Registrar to summon and enforce the attendanceof witnesses and for compelling them to give evidence “as if he were acivil court”; and second, in awarding costs which become recoverable“as if they have been awarded in a suit” under the CPC. The processEwhich is conducted by the Registrar for the purpose of an enquiry underSection 74 cannot be equated to the powers of the civil court, thoughcertain powers which are entrusted to a civil court are vested with theRegistrar by the provisions of Section 75(4). A quasi-judicial function isentrusted to the Registrar for the purpose of conducting an enquiry underSection 74. Where the Registrar refuses to register a document underFSections 72 or 76, no appeal lies against such an order. Section 77, however,provides that when the Registrar refuses to order the document to beregistered, any person claiming under such document or its representative,assign or agents may institute a suit before the civil court within thestipulated time for a decree directing that the document shall be registered.GIt is thus clear that the Registrar, when he conducts an enquiry underSection 74, does not stand constituted as a civil court. The enquiry beforethe Registrar is summary in nature. The decision of the Registrar inordering document to be registered, or for that matter in refusing toregister a document, is not conclusive and is amenable to judicial review.

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64. Therefore, in a situation where an individual admits theirsignature on a document but denies its execution, the Sub-Registrar isbound to refuse registration in accordance with Sections 35(3)(a) of theRegistration Act. Subsequently, if an application if filed under Section73, the Registrar is entrusted with the power of conducting an enquiry ofa quasi-judicial nature under Section 74. If the Registrar passes an orderrefusing registration under Section 76, the party presenting the documentfor registration has the remedy of filing a civil suit under Section 77 ofthe Registration Act, where a competent civil court will be able toadjudicate upon the question of fact conclusively.

65. Finally, our attention has been drawn to Section 58(2) of theRegistration Act, which stipulates as follows:

“58. Particulars to be endorsed on documents admitted toregistration.— […]

(2) If any person admitting the execution of a document refusesto endorse the same, the registering officer shall neverthelessregister if, but shall at the same time endorse a note of suchrefusal.”

It is submitted on behalf of the second respondent that aboveprovision must be read along with paragraph 241 of the UP RegistrationManual, which provides:

“241. Registering officers not concerned with validity ofdocuments. Registering officers should bear in mind that theyare in no way concerned with the validity of documents broughtto them for registration, and that it would be wrong for them torefuse to register on any such grounds as the following: (1) thatthe executants was dealing with property not belonging to him;(2) that the instrument infringed the rights of third persons notparties to the transaction; (3) that the transaction was fraudulentor opposed to public policy; (4) that the executants had not agreedto certain conditions of the document; (5) that the executants wasnot acquainted with the conditions of the document; (6) that theexecutants declared that he had been deceived into executing;(7) that the executants is blind and cannot count. These and suchlike are matters for decision, if necessary, by competent courts oflaw, and registering officers, as such, have nothing to do withthem. If the document be presented in a proper manner, by a AB

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Acompetent person, at the proper office, within the time allowed bylaw, and if the registering officer be satisfied that the allegedexecutants is the person the represents himself to be, and if suchperson admits execution, the registering officer is bound to registerthe document without regard to its possible effects. But theregistering officer shall make a note of such objections of theBkinds mentioned in grounds (1) to (7) above, as may by brought tohis notice in the endorsement required by Section 58.”

Reliance has been placed on the above provisions of the UPRegistration Manual to highlight that an individual’s refusal predicatedupon any of the above-mentioned seven grounds shall not impact itsC“execution” but shall only require an endorsement under Section 58(2).We are inclined to disagree with this submission. For the reasons alreadymentioned in the judgment, we are inclined to accept the interpretationof the term “execution” to mean that a person has signed a documentafter having fully understood it and consented to its terms. Hence, sinceDparagraph 241 and Section 58(2) only come into the picture whenexecution is admitted, they are not relevant at the present stage.

66. At this stage, it would be material to refer to a judgment of thisCourt in Satya Pal Anand (supra), where the three-judge Bench wasconstituted following a difference of opinion between two Judges. InEthat case, the mother of the appellant had been allotted a plot of land bya registered deed by a cooperative society. After her death, thecooperative society executed a deed of extinguishment unilaterallycancelling the allotment of the plot and executed a registered deed infavour of the fifth respondent. The appellant objected to the transaction,following which a tripartite deed of compromise was reached with theFsociety and the fifth respondent. Notwithstanding this, the appellant movedthe Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies. During the pendency ofthe dispute, the society permitted the transfer of the plot to the sixth andseventh respondents. The appellant then moved an application beforethe Sub-Registrar for cancelling the registration of the deed ofGextinguishment and the two subsequent deeds, but this application wasrejected by the Sub-Registrar, inter alia, on the ground that he had nojurisdiction to cancel the registration of a registered document. Theappellant then moved the Inspector General of Registration under Section69 of the Registration Act, who rejected the application. The writ petitionfiled by the appellant before the High Court under Article 226, seeking aH

declaration of the nullity of the deed of extinguishment and the twosubsequent deeds, was also dismissed by the High Court. In this backdrop,Justice A M Khanwilkar, speaking for the three-judge Bench, observedthat the appellant had entered into a deed of compromise and acceptedvaluable consideration, in spite of which he had instituted a dispute underthe Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act 1960. Further, pendingthe dispute, an application was filed by the appellant before the Sub-Registrar seeking the same relief of cancellation of the registration ofthe deed of extinguishment and the subsequent deeds in favour of thethird party. In view of these circumstances, this Court held that the HighCourt was justified in declining to entertain a writ petition at the instanceof the appellant:

“25. It is a well-established position that the remedy of writ underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India is extraordinary anddiscretionary. In exercise of writ jurisdiction, the High Court cannotbe oblivious to the conduct of the party invoking that remedy. Thefact that the party may have several remedies for the same causeof action, he must elect his remedy and cannot be permitted toindulge in multiplicity of actions. The exercise of discretion toissue a writ is a matter of granting equitable relief. It is a remedyin equity. In the present case, the High Court declined to interfereat the instance of the appellant having noticed the above clinchingfacts. No fault can be found with the approach of the High Courtin refusing to exercise its writ jurisdiction because of the conductof the appellant in pursuing multiple proceedings for the samerelief and also because the appellant had an alternative andefficacious statutory remedy to which he has already resortedto…”

Having held that the writ petition before the High Court was notmaintainable for the above reasons, this Court also observed that therole of the Sub-Registrar stood discharged once the document had beenregistered, since there is no express provision in the Registration Actwhich empowers him to recall the registration. This Court held:

“34. The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands discharged,once the document is registered (see Raja Mohammad AmirAhmad Khan [State of U.P. v. Raja Mohammad Amir AhmadKhan, AIR 1961 SC 787] )…There is no express provision in the1908 Act which empowers the Registrar to recall such registration.

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AThe fact whether the document was properly presented forregistration cannot be reopened by the Registrar after itsregistration. The power to cancel the registration is a substantivematter. In absence of any express provision in that behalf, it is notopen to assume that the Sub-Registrar (Registration) would becompetent to cancel the registration of the documents in question.BSimilarly, the power of the Inspector General is limited to dosuperintendence of Registration Offices and make rules in thatbehalf. Even the Inspector General has no power to cancel theregistration of any document which has already been registered.”

This Court observed that Section 35 of the Registration Act doesCnot confer a quasi-judicial power on the registering officer, who is notexpected to evaluate title or irregularity in the document. As such, thevalidity of the registered deed of extinguishment could be placed in issueonly before a court of competent jurisdiction. On the above facts, thisCourt upheld the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, with anDopportunity being granted to the appellant to pursue a remedy inaccordance with law. Therefore, the decision in Satya Pal Anand (supra)has held that once a deed of extinguishment had been registered by theregistering officer, the registering officer had no power to recall it norwas it amenable to the supervisory control of the Inspector General ofRegistration under Section 69 of the Registration Act.E

67. The aforesaid decision does not deal with a situation such asthe present case, where Sub-Registrar had in the first instance declinedto order the registration of the document and the order of the Sub-Registrar was questioned in an appeal under Section 72 filed by thesecond respondent. The Registrar, in the course of the appellateFproceedings, purported to hold an enquiry of the nature contemplatedunder Section 74 of the Registration Act and concluded that the executionof the sale deed had been established and it was liable to be registered.The Registrar was evidently seized of a case where the Sub-Registrarhad declined to order registration on the ground that the execution of theGdocument was denied by the appellant under Section 35(3)(a). Whileexercising the jurisdiction pursuant to the invocation of the remedy underSection 72, the Registrar relied on the statements of the scribe of thesale deed and the attesting witnesses to the effect that the sale deed hadbeen signed by the appellant and that the appellant had also affixed herfingerprints on it. However, as rightly pointed out by the appellant, theH

VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL.COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

signing of the sale deed by her and the affixation of her fingerprints isnot in dispute. The real issue is whether there was due execution of thesale deed by the appellant. The appellant in the course of her objectionsspecifically pleaded fraud, submitting that:

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(i) The area which was reflected in the sale deed which waspresented for registration was at variance that what hadBactually been agreed between the parties;

(ii) The boundaries as reflected in the sale deed did notcorrespond with the land agreed to be sold;

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(iv) The purported sale deed was resulting not only in the transferof excessive land but also the residential house which wasin occupation of the appellant after the death of her husband;and

(v) The full consideration payable under the terms of thetransaction had not been received by the appellant.

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The plea of the appellant, that the purported sale deed thoughsigned by her was procured by fraud and undue influence, was a matterwhich raised a serious substantive dispute. In support of her contentions,the appellant has also adduced before us the inspection report by theSub-Registrar and the Naib Tahsildar. However, we are inclined to holdthat we cannot decide on the merits of the dispute at this stage, since theRegistrar clearly exceeded his jurisdiction by adjudicating on the issueof fraud and undue influence.

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68. The Registrar purported to exercise the powers conferredunder Section 74 and arrived at a finding that the sale deed had beenduly signed by the appellant and was therefore liable to be registered.However, the objections of the appellant raised serious issues of a triablenature which could only have been addressed before and adjudicatedupon by a court of competent civil jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, duringthe course of the hearing, this Court has been apprised of the fact that inrespect of the remaining area of 1000 square meters in the front portionof the land, a suit for specific performance[44] has been instituted by thesecond respondent, resulting in a decree for specific performance dated16 November 2018. As regards the subject matter of the sale deed, the F

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Asecond respondent has instituted a suit for possession before the CivilJudge, Senior Division Fast Track Court[45], where certain proceedingsare pending. In this view of the matter, we are clearly of the opinion thatthe Registrar in the present case acted contrary to law by directing thesale deed to be registered.B69. In the impugned judgment, the Single Judge of the AllahabadHigh Court has observed that registration does not depend upon theconsent of the executant but on the Registrar’s finding that the executanthad actually signed the document. The High Court held that having foundin the course of the enquiry that the sale deed was duly prepared by ascribe, that the attesting witness had stated that the sale deed was signedCby the appellant and she also placed her fingerprints in their presence, itwas open to the Registrar to direct registration in spite of a denial of itsexecution by the appellant. In doing so, the Single Judge of the HighCourt has, with respect, conflated the mere signing of the sale deed withits execution. For the reasons mentioned earlier in this judgment, suchDan approach is completely erroneous and cannot be upheld.

D Conclusion

70. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside theimpugned judgment and order of the Single Judge of the High Court ofJudicature at Allahabad dated 31 May 2018 in the appellant’s writ petition.EThe order passed by the District Registrar on 31 March 2012 shall, inthe circumstances, stand set aside. However, it is clarified that the presentjudgment shall not affect any of the civil/criminal proceedings that arepending in respect of the subject matter of the transaction. In thecircumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.F71. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Nidhi Jain(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

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