PRIYANKA MISHRA & ORS versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR. on 8 May 2023

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2023] 5 S.C.R.

APRIYANKA MISHRA & ORS.

v.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR.

(Criminal Appeal No.1545 of 2023)

BMAY 8, 2023

[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND AHSANUDDINAMANULLAH, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing ofFIR – Complaint filed by Respondent no.2-wife against appellantsC(sister-in-law, mother-in-law and father-in-law) and her husbandfor offences punishable u/s.498-A and s.34, IPC and s.4, DowryProhibition Act – Petition filed by appellants u/s.482 for quashing,dismissed – On appeal, held: FIR in question as far as appellantsare concerned, is an abuse of the process of the Court – RespondentDNo.2 resided for less than three weeks in the matrimonial home fromthe date the marriage was solemnised – She then lived with herhusband at Hyderabad for some time and, finally moved to Londonand then Sweden – Subsequently, upon returning to India, she filedthe criminal case in question – While living with her husband inSweden, respondent no. 2 had filed a divorce petition, hence, thereEwas no occasion per se for her after coming from Sweden to visitthe matrimonial home, much less reside there – Moreover, the husbandof Respondent No.2 having emailed a complaint to theSuperintendent of Police, 3 days prior to the wife lodging hercomplaint, with regard to threat received from Respondent No.2 toFimplicate him and his family members, is clearly indicative that thecharges, against the appellants were an afterthought – Impugnedjudgment set aside – FIR quashed qua the appellants – Penal Code,1860 – ss.498-A, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act – s.4.

Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v State of Bihar (2022)G6 SCC 599 – relied on.

Rajesh Sharma v State of Uttar Pradesh (2018) 10 SCC472 : [2017] 9 SCR 529; State of Haryana v BhajanLal 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR259; Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCCH309 : [1998] 1 SCR 746; Mahendra K C v State of

Karnataka (2022) 2 SCC 129; Central Bureau ofInvestigation v A Ravishankar Prasad (2009) 6 SCC351 : [2009] 9 SCR 1025; S Mahaboob Basha v Stateof Karnataka (2014) 10 SCC 244 : [2014] 13 SCR1266; Rupali Devi v State of Uttar Pradesh (2019) 5SCC 384 : [2019] 6 SCR 577 – referred to.

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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal AppealNo.1545 of 2023.

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From the Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2019 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in MCRC No.6054 of 2019.

Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, Sr. Adv., Karan Mamgain, PraveenEGaur, Ms. Banni Khanna, Vikrant Singh Bais, Yogesh Tiwari, Ms. Neema,Advs. for the Appellants.

Gopal Jha, Akshay Sahay, Rohil Bansal, Lzafeer Ahmad B. F.,Advs. for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was passed by F

AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. Leave granted.

3. The present Appeal is directed against the Final Judgment andOrder dated 30.04.2019 (hereinafter referred to as the “ImpugnedJudgment”) passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench atGwalior (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) in MiscellaneousCriminal Case No. 6054 of 2019 by which the petition filed by theappellants under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

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A(hereinafter referred to as the “Code”) praying to quash First InformationReport viz. Crime No. 139 of 2018 registered at P.S. Mahila Thana,District Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh has been dismissed.

THE FACTUAL PRISM:

4. The Appellants before us, respectively, are the sister-in-law,Bmother-in-law and father-in-law of the Respondent No.2. As per thecomplaint filed by Respondent no.2 before the police, the Appellants andthe husband of the Respondent No.2 were made accused for offencespunishable under Section 498-A and Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”) and Section 4 of the DowryCProhibition Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). As per theallegations, the accused including the appellants and other family membersdemanded INR 50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs) cash and fifteen tolasgold ornaments. As per the complaint, the Respondent No.2 was marriedto the son of the Appellants No.2 & 3 on 03.02.2014 at Gwalior, MadhyaPradesh. As per the demands of the Accused-Appellants, RespondentDNo.2’s father gave about INR 5,00,000/-(Rupees Five Lakhs) cash, fifteentolas gold jewellery, a diamond ring worth INR 50,000/-, clothes worthINR 60,000/- for the husband, apart from household articles and overallINR 30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Lakhs) was spent in the marriagefunctions.E

5. It is alleged that after marriage, the Appellants started physicallyand mentally harassing Respondent No.2 demanding dowry and startedtaunting her that her husband would have fetched INR 1,00,00,000/-(Rupees One Crore) as dowry. It is stated that in April, 2014 theRespondent No.2 got a job in Hyderabad, Telangana, where her husbandFwas employed and she became pregnant there. It is further stated thatthe Appellants and husband of Respondent No.2 started abusing herthat if a child was born, expenses would increase and the father ofRespondent No.2 had already cheated them. It is also alleged that theaccused, inter alios, forcibly got an abortion performed on RespondentNo.2 at Hyderabad. And when the Appellant No.1 was to be engaged,Gthe Appellants again started harassing her and in March, 2016 she wastaken by her father to her parental home.

6. After moving to Hyderabad in April, 2014, Respondent No.2and her husband worked and lived at Hyderabad between April-September, 2014 and after that her husband left for London for anHassignment, and she followed suit to London, but in December, 2014

only. Thereafter, the husband of Respondent No.2 got a job in Swedenin March, 2015 and the wife/Respondent No.2 joined him in May, 2015.

7. The Respondent No.2 later filed a criminal case against herhusband and the appellants. This prompted the Appellants to move beforethe High Court of Madhya Pradesh through Miscellaneous Criminal CaseNo. 6054 of 2019 for quashing the same under Section 482 of the Code.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANTS:

8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that already adivorce case has been instituted in Sweden. It was submitted thatRespondent No.2 hardly lived at the matrimonial home as she was marriedon 03.02.2014 and in April, 2014 moved to Hyderabad and lived with herhusband and also worked there. In March, 2015 Respondent No.2’shusband moved to Sweden and in May, 2015, she too joined him inSweden.

9. It was submitted that the Appellants No.2 & 3 hardly stayed atthe matrimonial home at Rewa, Madhya Pradesh, as Appellant No. 3was working at Raigarh and living in company accommodation therewith his wife (Appellant No. 2) and that the Appellant No.1 was workingin Pune being employed with Wipro Infotech Limited.

10. Learned counsel contended that there is no specific allegationagainst any of the appellants. Furthermore, it was canvassed that theRespondent No.2, having lived with her husband at Hyderabad andbecoming pregnant, shows cordial relations between husband and wife.It was submitted that the allegation of forced abortion at Hyderabad is acomplete falsehood for the reason that if such a serious incident hadactually occurred, the Respondent No.2/her family members woulddefinitely have a complaint lodged before some authority. It was alsourged that moving of Respondent No.2 alongwith her husband to Swedenafter receiving employment, and; living there also indicates that she hadno grievance against her husband and against the appellants. It wassubmitted that the Appellants have, at no point of time, tried to interferein the personal lives of the couple.

11. Learned counsel submitted that Respondent No.2 and herhusband had, in fact, filed an application seeking divorce in Stockholm,Sweden on 09.07.2018. Respondent No.2, upon her return to India fromSweden, started threatening her husband and the Appellants to withdrawthe divorce case afore-noted, else a criminal case would be lodged against AB

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Aall the family members. It was submitted that the same is borne out fromthe fact that the husband of Respondent No.2 made a complaint to theSuperintendent of Police, Gwalior on 18.09.2018, and only thereafter didthe Respondent No.2 submitted her complaint, 3 days later, on 22.09.2018.

12. Learned counsel drew the attention of the Court to theBdiscrepancy(ies) in the statements of Respondent No.2, under Section161 of the Code before the police and under Section 164 of the Codebefore the learned Magistrate inasmuch as in the complaint, she hasstated that her father brought her to the parental home, whereas in thestatement before the learned Magistrate, she has stated that she wasforcibly sent to her parental home by the accused persons.C

13. Learned counsel also drew the Court’s attention to the orderpassed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gwalior dated 26.11.2018, bywhich anticipatory bail was granted to the appellants in which it hasbeen noted that no documents had been appended with the case-diarywith regard to any injury(ies) suffered by the complainant/RespondentDNo.2, and also that she was living in Sweden.

14. Reliance was placed on Rajesh Sharma v State of UttarPradesh, (2018) 10 SCC 472, in which taking into consideration themisuse of Section 498-A of the IPC, the Court had issued certaindirections. The submissions urged was that the same were not followedEin the present case.

15. It was submitted that a perusal of the FIR and the chargesheet along with the documents appended thereto, revealed that noevidence/material was made out on its face value and that the presentcriminal prosecution was an abuse of the process of law.F

SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2

16. Learned counsel for Respondent No.2, who has also filed acounter-affidavit, submitted that the allegations have been duly provedduring investigation and cognizance has been taken by the learnedMagistrate against all the accused, including the Appellants. RelianceGwas placed on the decision by this Court in State of Haryana v BhajanLal, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335, wherein, submitted learned counsel, ithas been held that if looking at the FIR, it cannot be said that primafacie no case is made out against the applicants, and that veracity of theallegations cannot be gone into at the stage of investigation, which is toHbe established by evidence to be produced before the learned trial court.

17. The decision in Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, (1998)3 SCC 309 was also relied upon, where at Paragraph 18 the Courtnoticed that on account of not satisfying the demand of goods, right fromthe next date of marriage, the wife was repeatedly taunted, maltreatedand mentally tortured by being called ugly and thus, there cannot begreater mental torture and harassment of any bride. Similar reliancewas placed on Mahendra K C v State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC129, where it was stated that under Section 482 of the Code, the test tobe applied by the High Court is as to whether the allegation(s) in thecomplaint as they stand, without adding or detracting thereto, primafacie establish the ingredients of the offence(s) alleged.

18. It was canvassed that the High Court neither tests the veracityof the allegations nor proceeds as a judge conducting a trial. Likewise,reference was made to the judgment in Central Bureau of Investigationv A Ravishankar Prasad, (2009) 6 SCC 351, where though the trialof the case was at an advanced stage, the High Court had quashed thecharges. This Court reversed the decision of the High Court thereinholding the same to be an abuse of the process of court.

19. Learned counsel submitted that in S Mahaboob Basha v Stateof Karnataka, (2014) 10 SCC 244, where at Paragraph 8 it had beenheld that in a case concerning cruelty meted out to the wife, to bringhome the guilt of the accused, it was not essential to examine theindependent witnesses, as such ill-treatment and cruelty are committedin closed doors, where hardly any witness can be expected, much lessan independent witness.

20. Turning to Rupali Devi v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 5SCC 384 [a 3-Judge Bench decision, where one of us, Sanjay KishanKaul, J. also constituted the coram], reliance was placed on Paragraph16, where this Court was pleased to hold:

“16. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where thewife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from thematrimonial home on ac- count of acts of cruelty committedby the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on thefactual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain acomplaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498-A of the Penal Code.”

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

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A21. Having considered the matter in detail, this Court finds thatthe FIR in question, as far as the Appellants are concerned, is an abuseof the process of the court. From a plain but careful reading of thematerial brought on record, including the statements of Respondent No.2under Sections 161 and 164 of the Code and also of other witnesses, theallegations insofar as they relate to the Appellants seem far-fetched andBdo not inspire confidence. The facts in totality evince that RespondentNo.2 resided for less than three weeks in the matrimonial home fromthe date the marriage was solemnised, then lived with her husband atHyderabad for quite some time and, finally moved to London and thenSweden. Subsequently, Respondent No.2 upon returning to India, filedCthe criminal case in question. We think the same is a retaliatory tactic,inasmuch as the Appellants herein are concerned.

22. At this juncture, it would be relevant to note that once in Sweden,where the Respondent No.2 was living with her husband, a divorce petitionhad been filed, there was no occasion per se, for Respondent No.2 afterDcoming from Sweden to visit the matrimonial home, much less residethere.

23. Moreover, the husband of Respondent No.2 having e- maileda complaint, 3 days prior to the wife lodging her complaint, to theSuperintendent of Police, Gwalior, with regard to threat having beenEreceived from Respondent No.2 to implicate the husband and his familymembers, is clearly indicative that the charges, at least, as against theinstant appellants are an afterthought. While the principles in theprecedents cited by the Respondent No.2 hold the field, what is relevantis to see whether they come to her aid in the present factual scenario.The answer is in the negative.F

24. In a decision of recent vintage, this Court in KahkashanKausar alias Sonam v State of Bihar, (2022) 6 SCC 599, afterconsidering various precedents, held that the rejection of the prayer forquashing the criminal case against the in-laws of the complainant- wifetherein was unjustified. The appeal was allowed by quashing the FIRGagainst those appellants in the said case. The Court, while granting relief,observed as under:

“21. Therefore, upon consideration of the relevantcircumstances and in the absence of any specific role-attributed to the appellant accused, it would be unjust if the H

appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a triali.e. general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in asituation where the relatives of the complainant’s husbandare forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by thisCourt in varied instances, that a criminal trial leading to aneventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused,and such an exercise must, therefore, be discouraged.”

(emphasis supplied)

25. We are in agreement with the view aforesaid. In the presentcase, the facts are akin to the position that obtained in KahkashanKausar (supra). In light of the discussions made hereinabove, this Courtis of the firm opinion that the Appellants are to be protected againstvexatious and unwarranted criminal prosecution, and from unnecessarilybeing put through the rigours of an eventual trial.

26. The appeal stands allowed. We nip this prosecution in thebud. Accordingly, the Impugned Judgment deserves to be, and hereby is,set aside. FIR Crime No. 139 of 2018 registered at Police Station MahilaThana, District Gwalior, stands quashed qua the Appellants. Anyconsequential proceedings thereto pertaining to the Appellants shall meltinto oblivion in the eye of law.

27. Pending applications, ergo, do not subsist for considerationand are consigned to records. Costs made easy.

28. Respondent No.2, by way of a subsequent affidavit, sought tobring to our notice the later developments in the Swedish proceedings.Without expressing any view thereupon, we clarify that this judgmentshall not preclude Respondent No.2 from pursuing other lawful remedies,if so available, against the husband in India or Sweden, as the case maybe.

Divya Pandey(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

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