ALOK KUMAR VERMA versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR. on 8 January 2019

[2019] 1 S.C.R. 100

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2019] 1 S.C.R.

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ALOK KUMAR VERMA

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UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1309 of 2018)

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JANUARY 08, 2019

[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI, SANJAY KISHAN KAUL ANDK. M. JOSEPH, JJ.]

Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 – ss.8(1)(a), (d)and 11 – Competence of the CVC and the Government of India toCdivest the Director, CBI of all his powers, functions, duties,supervisory role etc. without obtaining the prior consent of theCommittee constituted under s.4A(1) of DSPE Act to makerecommendations for appointment of the Director, CBI – Held: Thelong history of evolution has shown that the Institution of the CBIDhas been perceived to be necessarily kept away from all kinds ofextraneous influences so that it can perform its role as the premierinvestigating and prosecuting agency without any fear and favourand in the best public interest – The head of the Institution, namely,the Director, naturally, therefore, has to be the role model ofindependence and integrity which can only be ensured by freedomEfrom all kinds of control and interference except to the extent thatParliament may have intended – Such intendment would require allAuthorities to keep away from intermingling or interfering in thefunctioning of the Director – In a situation where such interferencemay at all be called for, public interest must be writ large againstthe backdrop of the necessity – The relevance and adequacy of theFreasons giving rise to such a compelling necessity can only be testedby the opinion of the Committee constituted under s.4A(1) of theDSPE Act in whom the power to make recommendations forappointment of the Director has been vested by Parliament – Thisalone can provide an adequate safeguard to ensure theGindependence of the office keeping in view the legislative intent –Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – ss.4(1), 4A, 4B –Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013.

CBI – Brief history of CBI – Origin of CBI – Police force inthe country was initially governed by the Police Act, 1861 – DSPEHAct was enacted in 1946 to carve out an exception to the Police Act, 1861 – It is the DSPE brought into existence by DSPE Act,1946 which today is known as the CBI.

CBI – Role of CBI – Investigation of anti-corruption cases;economic offences and ordinary crimes of special importance havecome to be vested in the CBI which exercises its jurisdiction in theterritory of all States and Union Territory with consent of StateGovernments.

Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – s.4A ands.4B – Legislative intent of – Held: The clear legislative intent inbringing s.4A and s.4B to the statute book is for the purpose ofensuring complete insulation of the office of the Director, CBI fromall kinds of extraneous influences, as may be, as well as forupholding the integrity and independence of the institution of theCBI as a whole – If the legislative intent would have been to conferin any authority of the State a power to take interim measures againstthe Director, CBI thereby affecting his functioning, surely, thelegislation would have contained enabling provisions to that effectand consequently would have been differently worded and drafted –Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.

Disposing of the Writ petitions and IAs, the Court

Conclusion

Disposing of the Writ petitions and IAs, the Court HELD: 1. There is no manner of doubt that the enactmentof the CVC Act, 2003 and the amendments made by the saidenactment, inter alia, in the DSPE Act (by Section 26 of the CVCAct, 2003) are a sequel to the operative directions of this Courtin paragraph 58 of Vineet Narain. The mode and manner ofappointment of Central Vigilance Commissioner and VigilanceCommissioners as well as that of the Director, CBI as spelt outby this Court in Vineet Narain has been scrupulously followed byParliament. Parliament has also on its own in amending Section4A of the DSPE Act by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013(Act No. 1 of 2014) has gone a step further to give effect to thedirections of this Court made in Vineet Narain inasmuch as theobject for change of the Committee for making recommendationsfor appointment of the Director, CBI has been stated to be thenecessity “to provide a High Power Selection Committee forselection of Director of the Delhi Special Police Establishment”.[Para 32][123-F-H; 124-A-B]

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102SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2019] 1 S.C.R.

AVineet Narain and others v. Union of India and another(1998) 1 SCC 226 : [1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595 – reliedon.

2. The clear legislative intent in bringing Section 4A andSection 4B of the DSPE Act to the statute book are for the purpose Bof ensuring complete insulation of the office of the Director, CBIfrom all kinds of extraneous influences, as may be, as well as forupholding the integrity and independence of the institution ofthe CBI as a whole. If the legislative intent would have been toconfer in any authority of the State a power to take interimmeasures against the Director, CBI thereby affecting hisCfunctioning, surely, the legislation would have contained enablingprovisions to that effect and consequently would have beendifferently worded and drafted. It is against this backdrop thatthe words “transferred except with the previous consent of theCommittee” mentioned in Section 4B(2) of the DSPE Act has to Dbe understood. If the word “transferred” has to be understoodin its ordinary parlance and limited to a change from one post toanother, as the word would normally convey and on that basis therequirement of “previous consent of the Committee” isunderstood to be only in such cases, i.e. purely of transfer, suchan interpretation would be self-defeating and would clearly negateEthe legislative intent. In such an event it will be free for the StateAuthority to effectively disengage the Director, CBI fromfunctioning by adopting various modes, known and unknown,which may not amount to transfer but would still have the sameeffect as a transfer from one post to another, namely, cessation of Fexercise of powers and functions of the earlier post. This is clearlynot what the legislature could have intended. The long history ofevolution has shown that the institution of the CBI has beenperceived to be necessarily kept away from all kinds ofextraneous influences so that it can perform its role as the premier investigating and prosecuting agency without any fear and favourGand in the best public interest. The head of the institution, namely,the Director, naturally, therefore, has to be the role model ofindependence and integrity which can only be ensured by freedomfrom all kinds of control and interference except to the extentthat Parliament may have intended. Such intendment wouldHrequire all Authorities to keep away from intermingling or

interfering in the functioning of the Director. In a situation wheresuch interference may at all be called for, public interest must bewrit large against the backdrop of the necessity. The relevanceand adequacy of the reasons giving rise to such a compellingnecessity can only be tested by the opinion of the Committeeconstituted under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act in whom thepower to make recommendations for appointment of the Directorhas been vested by Parliament. This alone can provide anadequate safeguard to ensure the independence of the officekeeping in view the legislative intent. The status of theCommittee having undergone an upward movement by theamendment brought in by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013(Act No.1 of 2014) it cannot but be said that the legislative intentin shielding and insulating the office of the Director from anykind of extraneous influence has been foremost in the mind ofParliament which intent found manifestation in the changes inlaw brought about. [Paras 34, 36][125-C-D; 126-B-H; 127-A-B]

3. Orders dated 23[rd] October, 2018 of the CVC divestingthe powers, functions, duties, supervisory role, etc. of ‘AKS’ asDirector, CBI; of the Government of India divesting ‘AKS’,Director, CBI of his functions, powers, duties and supervisoryrole with immediate effect and until further orders; of theGovernment of India by which one MNR, IPS, Joint Director,CBI has been asked to look after the duties and functions ofDirector, CBI with immediate effect is set aside. The matter willnow be considered by the Committee under Section 4A(1) of theDSPE Act, 1946 which may be so done at the earliest. A meetingof the Committee may be accordingly convened by the competentauthority. As the issue of divestment of power and authority ofthe Director, CBI is still open for consideration by the Committee,it is deemed proper to direct that the petitioner, Director, CBI,upon reinstatement, will cease and desist from taking any majorpolicy decisions till the decision of the Committee permittingsuch actions and decisions becomes available within the timeframe indicated. The role of the Petitioner as the Director, CBIduring the interregnum and in terms of this order will be confinedonly to the exercise of the ongoing routine functions without anyfresh initiative, having no major policy or institutional implications.[Paras 39-41][127-G-H; 128-A-F]

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AShankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47 :[1991] 2 SCR 567; Jai Singh Dalal and others v. Stateof Haryana & another (1993) Supp. 2 SCC 600 : [1992]3 Suppl. SCR 816; Prakash Singh and Others v. Unionof India and Others (2006) 8 SCC 1 : [2006] 6 Suppl.SCR 473 – referred to.

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Case Law Reference

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.1309 of 2018.

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

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Writ Petition (C) No. 1315 of 2018.

K. K. Venugopal, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, P. S. Narasimha, ASG,Fali S. Nariman, Sanjay R. Hegde, Mukul Rohatgi, A. Sharan, KapilSibal, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Ms. Indira Jaising, Sr. Advs.,Subhash C. Sharma, Vishwajit Singh, Pankaj Singh, Ms. Ridhima Singh,EPrashant Bhushan R. Balasubramanian, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh,Ms. L. Charanya, B. K. Prasad, Ms. Tatini Basu, Rajat Nair, KanuAgrawal, Manan Popli, Ranvijay Singh, Sachin Sharma, V. C. Shukla,Rahul Tanwani, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Amit Anand Tiwari, Ms. ShakunSharma, Ms. Mary Mitzy, Ms. Harshal Gupta, Shashwat Singh, DevadattFKamat, Nizam Pasha, Varun Chopra, Rajesh Inamdar, Javedur Rahman,Aditya Bhat, Ms. Aisha Singh, Ashwin G. Raj, Gautam Talukdar, SunilFernandes, Ms. Nupur Kumar, Ms. Priyansha Indra Sharma, DarpanSachdeva, Paras Nath Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GRANJAN GOGOI, CJI 1. That the Rule of law is the bedrockof democracy would hardly require any reiteration. However firmlyentrenched the principle may be, it gets tested in a myriad of situationsthat confronts the courts from time to time. The present is one suchoccasion.

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2. On 23[rd] October, 2018, the Central Vigilance Commission(hereinafter referred to as “CVC”) passed an order divesting Shri AlokKumar Verma, Director, Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafterreferred to as “CBI”) of the powers, functions, duties, supervisory role,etc. vested in him as the Director of the CBI. The exercise of saidpower by the aforesaid order dated 23[rd] October, 2018, signed by theCentral Vigilance Commissioner and two other Vigilance Commissionersholding office, is stated to be under Section 8(1)(a) and 8(1)(b) of theCentral Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as “theCVC Act”) read with Section 4(1) of the Delhi Special PoliceEstablishment Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as “DSPE Act”). Thedivestment of Shri Alok Kumar Verma, Director, CBI of his functions,powers, duties and supervisory role, specifically, is in respect of allcases already registered and/or required to be registered and/or beinginquired/enquired/investigated under the Prevention of Corruption Act,1988 (hereinafter referred to as “PC Act”).

3. The aforesaid order is stated to be in the nature of an interimmeasure till completion of an inquiry into the allegations contained in acomplaint dated 24[th] August, 2018 submitted/forwarded by the CabinetSecretary by letter dated 31[st] August, 2018 to the CVC.

4. The said order dated 23[rd] October, 2018 of the CVC wasfollowed by an order of the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel,Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel & Trainingof the same date i.e. 23[rd] October, 2018 divesting Shri Alok Kumar Verma,Director, CBI of his functions, powers, duties and supervisory role inany manner as the Director, CBI with immediate effect and until furtherorders.

5. There is yet another order of the same date i.e. 23[rd] October,2018 of the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, PublicGrievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel & Training by whichone Shri M. Nageshwar Rao, IPS, Joint Director, CBI has been askedto look after the duties and functions of Director, CBI with immediateeffect.

6. The legality and validity of the aforesaid three orders is thesubject matter of challenge in Writ Petition (Civil) No.1309 of 2018 filedby Shri Alok Kumar Verma as well as in Writ Petition (Civil) No.1315 of2018 filed by Common Cause which claims to be a registered society A

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Aestablished/founded in the year 1980 by one late Shri H.D. Shourie forthe purposes of “ventilating the common problems of the people andsecuring their resolution”.

7. In addition to interference with the aforesaid three orders, inthe writ petition filed by Common Cause, further prayers have beenBmade, inter alia, seeking removal of one Mr. Rakesh Asthana, SpecialDirector, CBI (respondent no.4 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.1315 of 2018)from the CBI and for constituting a Special Investigating Team (“SIT”for short) to go into the charges of corruption against the officials of theCBI and also the FIR lodged against Mr. Rakesh Asthana, SpecialDirector, CBI, details of which are mentioned in the writ petition filed byCCommon Cause.

8. The order of the CVC dated 23[rd] October, 2018 is fairly longand elaborate. What is essentially stated therein is that a complaintdated 24[th] August, 2018 was forwarded to the CVC by the CabinetSecretary by letter dated 31[st] August, 2018 which, prima facie, revealedDcharges of corruption against the Director, CBI, Shri Alok Kumar Verma.The CVC considered it worthwhile to take note of the contents thereofand had sought the explanation/comments of the Director, CBI alongwith the relevant record(s). According to the CVC, instead of cooperatingin the matter, the Director, CBI had sought information as to the identityEof the person who had complained to the Cabinet Secretary in that regardand had gone to the extent of bringing specific allegations against theSpecial Director, CBI Shri Rakesh Asthana. Details of several cases ofcorruption wherein the Special Director, CBI was alleged to be involvedwere also brought to the notice of the CVC by Shri Alok Kumar Verma.

9. In the order of the CVC dated 23[rd] October, 2018 it is furtherFrecorded that Shri Rakesh Asthana, Special Director, CBI had also madeserious allegations against Shri Alok Kumar Verma, Director, CBI andthat, in fact, on 15[th] October, 2018, the CBI had registered RC 13A of2018 of AC III, New Delhi under Section 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d)and Section 7A of the PC Act as amended in 2018 against Shri Asthana.

GThe said RC case was stated to have been registered on the complaintof one Satish Babu Sana who is an accused in a case investigated bySpecial Director, CBI. At the same time, the CVC also took note of thefact that Mr. Rakesh Asthana, Special Director, CBI had recordedinformation received from various sources that huge amounts of bribewere given to the Director, CBI to avoid taking any action against SatishHBabu Sana.

10. It is in these circumstances, which may be in the least betermed as unfortunate, that the CVC had thought it proper to invoke itspowers under Sections 8(1)(a), 8(1)(d) and 11 of the CVC Act to passthe impugned order dated 23[rd] October, 2018 divesting the Director, CBIof his powers, functions, duties, etc., details of which have already beennoted.

11. The two further orders of the Government of India, Ministryof Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel& Training of the same date i.e. 23[rd] October, 2018 were consequentialto the order passed by the CVC, as stated above.

12. As already seen, it is the legality, validity and correctness ofthe aforesaid orders and the action spelt out therein that has beenchallenged before us in the two writ petitions as well as in the InterlocutoryApplications filed by various applicants, details of which will be noted indue course.

13. It is at the very threshold of the present discourse that a briefhistory of the organization called the CBI may be recalled.

The police force in the country was initially governed by the PoliceAct, 1861. Section 3 of the said Act had made the following provision :

“3. Superintendence in the State Government.- The superintendence of the police throughout a general police-district shall vest in and shall be exercised by the State Governmentto which such district is subordinate; and except as authorizedunder the provisions of this Act, no person, officer, or Court shallbe empowered by the State Government to supersede, or controlany police functionary.”

14. The DSPE Act was enacted in the year 1946 to carve out anexception to the Police Act, 1861. The same is evident from Section2(1) which is in the following terms:

“2. Constitution and powers of police establishment.

(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Police Act, 1861 (5 of 1861)the Central Government may constitute a special police force tobe called the Delhi Special Police Establishment for theinvestigation in any Union Territory of offences notified underSection 3.

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A15. Initially the administration of the Delhi Special PoliceEstablishment was governed by the provisions of Section 4 of the DSPEAct which contemplated the following:

“4. Superintendence and administration of SPE- B(1) The superintendence of the Delhi Special Police Establishmentshall vest in the Central Government.

(2) The administration of the said police establishment shall vestin an officer appointed in this behalf by the Central Governmentwho shall exercise in respect of that police establishment such ofCthe powers exercisable by an Inspector General of Police in respectof the police force in a State, as the Central Government mayspecify in this behalf.”

16. It is the Delhi Special Police Establishment brought intoexistence by DSPE Act, 1946 which today is known as the CBI. TheDorigin of the organization has been succinctly traced by this Court inVineet Narain and others vs. Union of India and another1 and therelevant details are available in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the report ofthis Court inVineet Narain (supra). Shortly put and as already observed,investigation of anti-corruption cases; economic offences and ordinarycrimes of special importance have come to be vested in the CBI whichEexercises its jurisdiction in the territory of all States and Union Territories(with consent of the State Governments).

17. The organization i.e. CBI has grown over the years in its role,power and importance and today has become the premier investigativeFand prosecution agency of the country. The high stature and the pre-eminent position that the institution has acquired is largely on account ofa strong perception of the necessity of having such a premier agency.Such a perception finds reflection in the conscious attempts of theGovernment of the day to introduce reforms, from time to time, so as toenable the institution to reach greater heights in terms of integrity,Gindependence and confidence. A close look at such attempts will nowbe in order.

18. In Vineet Narain (supra) such developments have alreadybeen taken note of in detail. The recommendations of the Committeeheaded by Shri N.N. Vohra constituted by Government Order No. S/7937/SS(ISP)/93 dated 9[th] July, 1993 and those of the Independent ReviewCommittee (IRC) constituted by Government Order No. 226/2/97-AVD-II dated 8[th] September, 1997 has had a major role to play in giving theCBI and the CVC their present shape and form and the pivotal role andposition that these two bodies have come to occupy in the system of lawenforcement in the country. Incidentally, the CVC had been in existenceas an administrative body on being established by Resolution No.24/7/64-AVD dated 11[th] February, 1964 issued by the Central Governmentuntil conferment of statutory status by the CVC Act, 2003 on the basisof recommendations of the IRC, summary of which with regard to theCBI and CVC may now be taken note of.

“SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

I. CBI and CVC

1. CVC to be conferred statutory status; appointment of CentralVigilance Commissioner to be made under the hand and seal ofthe President (para 4.2)

2. Constitution of a Committee for selection of CVC (para 4.3)

3. CVC to overview CBI’s functioning (para 5)

4. CBI’s reporting to Government to be streamlined withoutdiluting its functional autonomy (para 3.3)

5. CVC to have a separate section in its Annual Report on theCBI’s functioning after the supervisory function is transferred toit (para 6)

6. Constitution of a Selection Committee for identifying a panel ofnames for selection of Director CBI; final selection to be madeby ACC from such panel (para 8.2)

7. Central Government to pursue with the State Governments toset up credible mechanism for selection of Police Chief (para8.3)

8. Director CBI to have a minimum tenure of 2 years (para 8.4)

9. Transfer of incumbent Director CBI would need endorsementof the Selection Committee (para 8.5)

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A10. Director CBI to ensure full freedom for allocation of workwithin the Agency, including constitution of investigation teams(para 8.6)

11. Selection/extension of tenure of officers up to the level ofJoint Director (JD) to be decided by a Board under CentralBVigilance Commissioner; JD and above would need the approvalof ACC (para 8.7)

12. Change in the existing Tenure Rules not recommended (para8.8)

13. Proposals for improvement of infrastructure, methods ofCinvestigation, etc., to be decided urgently (para 8.9.2)

14. No need for creation of a permanent core group in the CBI(para 8.9.3)

15. Severe disciplinary action against officers who deviate fromDprescribed investigation procedures (para 9.1)16. Director CBI to be responsible for ensuring time-limits forfiling charge-sheets in courts (para 9.2)

17. Document on CBI’s functioning to be published within threemonths (para 9.4)

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18. Essential to protect officers at the decision-making levels fromvexatious enquiries/prosecutions (para 10.6)

19. Secretaries to adhere strictly to prescribed time-frames forgrant of permission for registration of PE/RC. CBI to be free toproceed if decision not conveyed within the specified time (paraF10.9)

20. Secretary of Administrative Ministry to convey a decisionregarding registration of PE/RC within 2 months of receipt ofrequest. If not satisfied with decision, Director CBI free to makefresh reference to the Committee headed by Cabinet SecretaryGwithin a period of four weeks and the latter to decide thereonwithin a period of four weeks (para 10.10)

21. Protection under the Single Directive not to cover offenceslike bribery, when prima facie established in a successful trap(para 10.12)

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22. Cases of disproportionate assets of Central Government andAll India Services Officers to be brought within the ambit of theSingle Directive (para 10.13)

23. Time-limit of 3 months for sanction for prosecution. Whereconsultation is required with the Attorney General or the SolicitorGeneral, additional time of one month could be allowed (paras10.14 and 10.15)

24. Government to undertake a review of the various types ofoffences notified for investigation by the CBI to retain focus onanti-corruption activities which is its primary objective (para 11.1)

25. Cases falling within the jurisdiction of the State Police whichdo not have inter-State or international ramifications should notbe handed over to CBI by States/courts (para 11.2)

26. Government to establish Special Courts for the trial of CBIcases (11.3)

27. Severe action against officials found guilty of high-handedness;prompt action against those officials chastised by the courts (para11.4)

28. Director CBI to conduct regular appraisal of personnel toweed out the corrupt and inefficient, and maintain strict disciplinewithin the organization (para 11.5)”

19. In paragraph 58 of the report of this Court in Vineet Narain(supra) directions under Article 142 of the Constitution of India whichwere to hold the field till such time that the necessary statutoryenactments are brought into force, came to be issued by this Court.Paragraph 58 of the report of this Court inVineet Narain (supra) insofaras CVC and CBI are concerned is in the following terms:

“58. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we hereby direct asunder:

I. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (CBI) ANDCENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION (CVC)

1. The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) shall be givenstatutory status.

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2. Selection for the post of Central Vigilance Commissioner shallbe made by a Committee comprising the Prime Minister, HomeMinister and the Leader of the Opposition from a panel ofoutstanding civil servants and others with impeccable integrity, tobe furnished by the Cabinet Secretary. The appointment shall bemade by the President on the basis of the recommendations madeby the Committee. This shall be done immediately.

3. The CVC shall be responsible for the efficient functioning ofthe CBI. While Government shall remain answerable for the CBI’sfunctioning, to introduce visible objectivity in the mechanism to beestablished for overviewing the CBI’s working, the CVC shall beentrusted with the responsibility of superintendence over the CBI’sfunctioning. The CBI shall report to the CVC about cases takenup by it for investigation; progress of investigations; cases in whichcharge-sheets are filed and their progress. The CVC shall reviewthe progress of all cases moved by the CBI for sanction ofprosecution of public servants which are pending with thecompetent authorities, specially those in which sanction has beendelayed or refused.

4. The Central Government shall take all measures necessary toensure that the CBI functions effectively and efficiently and isviewed as a non-partisan agency.

5. The CVC shall have a separate section in its Annual Report onthe CBI’s functioning after the supervisory function is transferredto it.

6. Recommendations for appointment of the Director, CBI shallbe made by a Committee headed by the Central VigilanceCommissioner with the Home Secretary and Secretary(Personnel) as members. The views of the incumbent Directorshall be considered by the Committee for making the best choice.The Committee shall draw up a panel of IPS officers on the basisof their seniority, integrity, experience in investigation and anti-corruption work. The final selection shall be made by theAppointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) from the panelrecommended by the Selection Committee. If none among thepanel is found suitable, the reasons thereof shall be recorded andthe Committee asked to draw up a fresh panel.

7. The Director, CBI shall have a minimum tenure of two years,regardless of the date of his superannuation. This would ensurethat an officer suitable in all respects is not ignored merely becausehe has less than two years to superannuate from the date of hisappointment.

8. The transfer of an incumbent Director, CBI in an extraordinarysituation, including the need for him to take up a more importantassignment, should have the approval of the Selection Committee.

9. The Director, CBI shall have full freedom for allocation ofwork within the agency as also for constituting teams forinvestigations. Any change made by the Director, CBI in the Headof an investigative team should be for cogent reasons and forimprovement in investigation, the reasons being recorded.

10. Selection/extension of tenure of officers up to the level ofJoint Director (JD) shall be decided by a Board comprising theCentral Vigilance Commissioner, Home Secretary and Secretary(Personnel) with the Director, CBI providing the necessary inputs.The extension of tenure or premature repatriation of officers upto the level of Joint Director shall be with final approval of thisBoard. Only cases pertaining to the appointment or extension oftenure of officers of the rank of Joint Director or above shall bereferred to the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC)for decision.

11. Proposals for improvement of infrastructure, methods ofinvestigation, etc. should be decided urgently. In order to strengthenCBI’s in-house expertise, professionals from the Revenue, Bankingand Security sectors should be inducted into the CBI.

12. The CBI Manual based on statutory provisions of the CrPCprovides essential guidelines for the CBI’s functioning. It isimperative that the CBI adheres scrupulously to the provisions inthe Manual in relation to its investigative functions, like raids, seizureand arrests. Any deviation from the established procedure shouldbe viewed seriously and severe disciplinary action taken againstthe officials concerned.

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A13. The Director, CBI shall be responsible for ensuring the filingof charge-sheets in courts within the stipulated time-limits, andthe matter should be kept under constant review by the Director,CBI.

14. A document on CBI’s functioning should be published withinBthree months to provide the general public with a feedback oninvestigations and information for redress of genuine grievancesin a manner which does not compromise with the operationalrequirements of the CBI.

15. Time-limit of three months for grant of sanction for prosecutionCmust be strictly adhered to. However, additional time of one monthmay be allowed where consultation is required with the AttorneyGeneral (AG) or any other law officer in the AG’s office.

16. The Director, CBI should conduct regular appraisal ofpersonnel to prevent corruption and/or inefficiency in the agency.”D20. What followed thereafter is the enactment of the CVC Act,2003. The salient features of the CVC Act, so far as the present exerciseis concerned, are to be found in Section 4 of the CVC Act which mandatesthat the appointment of the Central Vigilance Commissioner and theVigilance Commissioners shall be made by the President on theErecommendation of a Committee consisting of : (a) the Prime Minister;(b) the Minister of Home Affairs and (c)the Leader of the Opposition inthe House of the People.

Section 6 of the CVC Act contemplates the removal of CentralVigilance Commissioner and a Vigilance Commissioner only by order ofthe President on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity asFmay be found by the Supreme Court of India on a reference being madeby the President to the Court. However, under sub-section (2) of Section6 of the CVC Act there is a power in the President of suspension fromoffice pending inquiry on the reference made to the Supreme Court.Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the CVC Act also empowers the PresidentGto remove from office the Central Vigilance Commissioner or anyVigilance Commissioner in the following cases:

“(a). is adjudged an insolvent; or

(b) . has been convicted of an offence which, in the opinion of theCentral Government, involves moral turpitude; orH

(c) . engages during his term of office in any paid employmentoutside the duties of his office; or

(d) . is, in the opinion of the President, unfit to continue in office byreason of infirmity of mind or body; or (e). has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely toaffect prejudicially his functions as a Central VigilanceCommissioner or a Vigilance Commissioner.”

21. Though the Director, CBI is to be appointed by the CentralGovernment on the recommendation of a similar High Power Committee,no provision with regard to interim suspension or removal is to be foundin the DSPE Act, 1946, notwithstanding the fact that the said Act i.e.DSPE Act was amended by the CVC Act, 2003. The CVC Act, 2003and the amendments made in the DSPE Act, 1946 were clearly made tobring the provisions thereof in proximity to the directions issued by thisCourt in Vineet Narain (supra) so far as the CVC and the CBI isconcerned.

22. Section 8 of the CVC Act deals with functions and powers ofthe CVC whereas Section 11 deals with the power of the CVC withregard to inquiries. Both the powers vested by the aforesaid twoprovisions of the CVC Act i.e. Section 8 and Section 11 having beeninvoked in the present case to support and justify the impugned actions itwill be necessary to extract and notice the said provisions in extenso:

“8. Functions and powers of Central Vigilance Commission.-

(1). The functions and powers of the Commission shall be to- (a) exercise superintendence over the functioning of the DelhiSpecial Police Establishment in so far as it relates to theinvestigation of offences alleged to have been committed underthe Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), or an offencewith which a public servant specified in sub-section (2) may, underthe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged atthe same trial; (b). give directions to the Delhi Special Police Establishment forthe purpose of discharging the responsibility entrusted to it undersub-section (1) of section 4 of the Delhi Special PoliceEstablishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946):

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Provided that while exercising the powers of superintendence underclause (a) or giving directions under this clause, the Commissionshall not exercise powers in such a manner so as to require theDelhi Special Police Establishment to investigate or dispose ofany case in a particular manner;

(c) . inquire or cause an inquiry or investigation to be made on areference made by the Central Government wherein it is allegedthat a public servant being an employee of the Central Governmentor a corporation established by or under any Central Act,Government company, society and any local authority owned orcontrolled by that Government, has committed an offence underthe Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) or an offencewith which a public servant may, under the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged at the same trial; (d). inquire or cause an inquiry or investigation to be made intoany complaint against any official belonging to such category ofofficials specified in sub-section (2) wherein it is alleged that hehas committed an offence under the Prevention of CorruptionAct, 1988 (49 of 1988) and an offence with which a public servantspecified in subsection (2) may, under the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged at the same trial; (e). review the progress of investigations conducted by the DelhiSpecial Police Establishment into offences alleged to have beencommitted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of1988) or the public servant may, under the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged at the same trial;

(f) . review the progress of applications pending with the competentauthorities for sanction of prosecution under the Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988); (g). tender advice to the Central Government, corporationsestablished by or under any Central Act, Government companies,societies and local authorities owned or controlled by the CentralGovernment on such matters as may be referred to it by thatGovernment, said Government companies, societies and localauthorities owned or controlled by the Central Government orotherwise; (h). exercise superintendence over the vigilance administrationof the various Ministries of the Central Government or corporationsestablished by or under any Central Act, Government companies,societies and local authorities owned or controlled by thatGovernment:

Provided that nothing contained in this clause shall be deemed toauthorize the Commission to exercise superintendence over theVigilance administration in a manner not consistent with thedirections relating to vigilance matters issued by the Governmentand to confer power upon the Commission to issue directionsrelating to any policy matters;

2. The persons referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) are asfollows:—

(a) . members of All-India Services serving in connection with theaffairs of the Union and Group ‘A’ officers of the CentralGovernment; (b). such level of officers of the corporations established by orunder any Central Act, Government companies, societies and otherlocal authorities, owned or controlled by the Central Government,as that Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,specify in this behalf:

Provided that till such time a notification is issued under this clause,all officers of the said corporations, companies, societies and localauthorities shall be deemed to be the persons referred to in clause(d) of sub-section (1).

(c) on a reference made by the Lokpal under proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013(1 of 2014), the persons referred to in clause (d) of sub-section(1) shall also include—

(i) members of Group B, Group C and Group D services of theCentral Government;

(ii) such level of officials or staff of the corporations establishedby or under any Central Act, Government companies, societiesand other local authorities, owned or controlled by the CentralGovernment, as that Government may, by notification in the OfficialGazette, specify in this behalf:

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Provided that till such time a notification is issued under this clause,all officials or staff of the said corporations, companies, societiesand local authorities shall be deemed to be the persons referred inclause (d) of sub-section (1).

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B“11. Power relating to inquiries.-

The Commission shall, while conducting any inquiry referred to inclauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 8, have all thepowers of a civil court trying a suit under the Code of CivilProcedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and in particular, in respect of theCfollowing matters, namely:-

a. summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person fromany part of India and examining him on oath;

b. requiring the discovery and production of any document; D

c. receiving evidence on affidavits; d. requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any courtor office;

e. issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or otherdocuments; andE

f. any other matter which may be prescribed.”

23. The provisions of the DSPE Act as amended by Act No.45 of2003 (The Central Vigilance Act, 2003) and Act No.1 of 2014 (Lokpaland Lokayuktas Act, 2013) may also require a specific notice. SectionsF4, 4A and 4B introduced by the aforesaid amendments, on whichelaborate arguments have been made by the contesting parties, provideas follows:

“4. Superintendence and administration of Special PoliceEstablishment.— (1) The superintendence of the Delhi SpecialGPolice Establishment in so far as it relates to investigation ofoffences alleged to have been committed under the Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), shall vest in the Commission.

(2) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (1), thesuperintendence of the said police establishment in all other mattersshall vest in the Central Government.

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(3) The administration of the said police establishment shall vestin an officer appointed in this behalf by the Central Government(hereinafter referred to as the Director) who shall exercise inrespect of that police establishment such of the powers exercisableby an Inspector-General of Police in respect of the police force ina State as the Central Government may specify in this behalf.

4A. Committee for appointment of Director.— (1) The CentralGovernment shall appoint the Director on the recommendation ofthe Committee consisting of—

(a) the Prime Minister

— Chairperson;

(b) the Leader of Opposition

recognised as such in the House of the People or where there is no such Leader of Opposition, then the Leader of the single largest Opposition Party in that House — Member;

(c) the Chief Justice of India or

Judge Of the Supreme Court nominated

by him

— Member;

(2) No appointment of a Director shall be invalid merely by reasonof any vacancy or absence of a Member in the Committee.

(3) The Committee shall recommend a panel of officers—

(a) on the basis of seniority, integrity and experience in theinvestigation of anti-corruption cases; and (b) chosen from amongst officers belonging to the Indian PoliceService constituted under the All-India Services Act, 1951 (61 of1951), for being considered for appointment as the Director.

4B. Terms and conditions of service of Director.—(1) TheDirector shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary containedin the rules relating to his conditions of service, continue to holdoffice for a period of not less than two years from the date onwhich he assumes office.

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A(2) The Director shall not be transferred except with the previousconsent of the Committee referred to in sub-section (1) of section4A.”

24. Shri F.S. Nariman and Shri Dushyant Dave, learned SeniorCounsels, who have argued the case for Shri Alok Kumar Verma, Director,BCBI and Common Cause have contended that the history of theinstitutional framework surrounding the CBI leading to the statutoryenactments in question and the views expressed in the judgment of thisCourt inVineet Narain (supra), including the operative directions underArticle 142 of the Constitution, can leave no doubt that the judicialendeavour should/must always be to preserve, maintain and further theCintegrity, independence and majesty of the institution i.e. CBI. This isthe core intent behind the statutory enactments and the amendmentsthereto, details of which have been noticed. The Director of the CBI isthe centre of power in an abundantly powerful organization havingjurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute key offences and offendersDhaving great ramifications and consequences on public life. There canbe no manner of doubt that the Director who has been given a minimumassured tenure of “not less than two years” must be insulated from allexternal interference if the CBI has to live up to the role and expectationsof the legislature and enjoy public confidence to the fullest measure.This is how the provisions of the cognate legislations i.e. the CVC Act,E2003 and DPSE Act, 1946 (as amended), must be interpreted, accordingto the learned counsels. It is specifically urged that the embargo underSection 4B(2) of the DSPE Act which mentions that the Director shallnot be transferred except with the previous consent of the Committeemust be construed in the broadest perspective to include any attempt to Fdivest the Director, CBI of his powers, functions, duties, etc. in anymanner whatsoever and not necessarily relatable to the transfer of theincumbent as is understood in ordinary parlance. According to thelearned counsels, unless such a meaning is attributed to the provisions ofSection 4B(2) of the DSPE Act, the legislative intent would be rendered futile and so would be the entire judicial exercise culminating in theGoperative directions of this Court inVineet Narain (supra).

25. So construed, according to the learned counsels, the exerciseof power in the present case is blatantly and patently flawed. There canbe no legal recognition of the action taken on the strength of the impugnedorders which have been notified without seeking the previous consent ofH

the Committee for appointment of Director, CBI constituted under Section4A(1), of the DSPE Act, 1946.

26. The alternative argument made is that if the provisions ofSection 4B(2) of the DSPE Act are to be “narrowly” construed byunderstanding the word “transfer” as is normally understood in servicejurisprudence, the ultimate validity of the impugned exercise will have tobe tested by the adequacy and sufficiency of reasons to justify apremature curtailment of the tenure of the Director, CBI. No suchjustification, according to the learned counsels, exists. In this regard, ithas been pointed out that the allegations against the Director, CBI madeby Special Director, CBI Shri Rakesh Asthana and the purported inquiryinto such allegations by the CVC and the disinvestment of powers duringthe interregnum i.e. pendency of the inquiry are wholly unjustified actionsprompted by collateral reasons. Interference, in the larger public interest,by this Court in the exercise of powers of judicial review under Article32 of the Constitution of India would therefore be called for.

27. The aforesaid argument has been countered by Shri K.K.Venugopal, learned Attorney General appearing for the Union of Indiawho contends that the role of the Committee under Section 4A(1) of theDSPE Act is limited to making recommendations on the basis of whichthe Central Government is to make the appointment. According to thelearned Attorney, once the recommendation is made by the Committeeand the appointment is made, the Committee becomes functus officio.Reliance has been placed in this regard onShankarsan Dash vs.Union of India2 and Jai Singh Dalal and others vs. State of Haryana &another3 to contend that when the law does not recognize in anyincumbent, who may have been recommended, a right to be appointed itcannot be contended that after the appointment is made the Committeeconstituted to make recommendations for appointment has to be consultedin all cases of disinvestment of power, even beyond what is specificallyprovided for by Section 4B(2) of the DSPE Act. Section 4B(2), it ispointed out provides/mandates the requirement of previous consent onlyin cases of transfer of the Director which is also what had been directedby this Court in paragraph 58(8) of the report inVineet Narain (supra).The Learned Attorney has further submitted that the present is not acase of transfer so as to require the previous consent of the Committee 2 (1991) 3 SCC 47

3 1993 Supp. (2) SCC 600

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Aunder Section 4B(2) of the DSPE Act. Reliance has also been placedon the provisions of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 topersuade the Court to recognise in the Central Government a power todivest the Director, CBI of his powers, functions, duties, etc. Accordingto the learned Attorney the power to divest must be acknowledged to bethe logical corollary of the power of appointment of the Director, CBIBwhich is vested in the Central Government.

28. On the other hand, Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor Generalappearing for the CVC has argued that merely on the appointment of aMember of the Indian Police Service as the Director, CBI, the incumbentdoes not cease to be a public servant/government servant. He continuesCto be, according to the learned Solicitor General, a civil servant; a memberof the Indian Police Service amenable to all service conditions asapplicable and also to the disciplinary control of the Competent Authority.The only exception in this regard, according to the learned AdditionalSolicitor General, is provided by Section 4B(1) of the DSPE Act whichDprovides for a fixed tenure of the Director. It is only the Rules/conditionsof service so far as the retirement is concerned that stands diluted/affectedby the provisions of Section 4B(1) of the DSPE Act and none other.

29. In brief, these are the broad submissions of the contestingparties. It has been further supplemented by the learned counsels forEthe petitioner that on a meaningful interpretation of the provisions of therelevant statutes the Court should take the view that what is providedtherein is a complete insulation of the incumbent holding the post ofDirector of the CBI and no action affecting his continuance and functioningcan be taken except with the previous consent of the Committee underSection 4A of the DSPE Act. It is only after the incumbent ceases toFhold the post of Director, upon transfer or otherwise, made with theprevious consent of the Committee, that the disciplinary control oversuch incumbent as a civil servant can be exercised by the CentralGovernment.

30. The contentions advanced by the rival parties would requireGthe Court to consider two issues to determine the validity of the impugnedorders. The first is the competence of the CVC and the Government ofIndia to divest the Director, CBI of all his powers, functions, duties,supervisory role, etc. without obtaining the prior consent of the Committeeconstituted under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act to make H

recommendations for appointment of the Director, CBI. Learned counselsfor the petitioners are emphatic in their contentions that obtaining suchprior consent is the in-built mandate under the Statute which flows fromthe operative directions issued by this Court in paragraph 58 of VineetNarain (supra). Therefore, according to the learned counsels for thepetitioners, the impugned orders passed without obtaining prior consentof the Committee are non-est in law and no other issue really need begone into in the present case.

31. The above contention raises a pure question of law answerableon application of known and established principles of law includinginterpretation of the provisions of the CVC Act, 2003 and the DSPEAct, 1946 and further in the light of such legislative intent that can beculled out in making the enactments in question. Not only do we preferto deal with the said question in the first instance for the above statedreason but such an exercise becomes obligatory in view of thejurisdictional questions that are inbuilt therein. On the aforesaid basisthe second question raised can be relegated to a later stage ofconsideration, which question, we may indicate is one relating to thesufficiency/adequacy or even the relevance of the reasons that hadprompted the CVC and the Government of India to take the impugneddecisions, a question that may legitimately call for an answer only in theevent of our disagreeing with the contentions advanced on behalf of thepetitioner on the first issue namely that the divestment of power andauthority of the Director, CBI can only be with the prior consent of theCommittee.

32. There is no manner of doubt that the enactment of the CVCAct, 2003 and the amendments made by the said enactment, inter alia,in the DSPE Act (by Section 26 of the CVC Act, 2003) are a sequel tothe operative directions of this Court in paragraph 58 ofVineet Narain(supra). The legislature in its wisdom had not considered the necessityof tempering down the directions of this Court inVineet Narain (supra)in any manner whatsoever. The mode and manner of appointment ofCentral Vigilance Commissioner and Vigilance Commissioners as wellas that of the Director, CBI as spelt out by this Court in Vineet Narain(supra) has been scrupulously followed by Parliament. In fact, at thisstage, we may even take note of the fact that Parliament on its own inamending Section 4A of the DSPE Act by the Lokpal and LokayuktasAct, 2013 (Act No.1 of 2014) has gone a step further to give effect to AB

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Athe directions of this Court made inVineet Narain (supra) inasmuch asthe object for change of the Committee for making recommendationsfor appointment of the Director, CBI has been stated to be the necessity“to provide a High Power Selection Committee for selection ofDirector of the Delhi Special Police Establishment”.

B33. The Court, in its bid to understand the true legislative intentionbehind the statutory enactments in question, cannot be oblivious of theviews expressed by this Court in Vineet Narain (supra) leading to theoperative directions in para 58 that formed the basis of the legislativeexercise in question. The said views must be understood to have beenconsidered fully by Parliament before engrafting the consequentialCdirections contained in paragraph 58 of Vineet Narain (supra) in theform of statutory enactments, details of which have been noticed earlier.In this regard, paragraphs 3 and 48 of the report of this Court in VineetNarain (supra) must hold a special field so as to deserve a recall of thecontents thereof which are in the following terms:

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“3. This experience revealed to us the need for the insulation ofthese agencies from any extraneous influence to ensure thecontinuance of the good work they have commenced. It is thisneed which has impelled us to examine the structure of theseagencies and to consider the necessary steps which would provideEpermanent insulation to the agencies against extraneous influencesto enable them to discharge their duties in the manner requiredfor proper implementation of the rule of law. Permanent measuresare necessary to avoid the need of every matter being brought tothe court for taking ad hoc measures to achieve the desired results.This is the occasion for us to deal with the structure, constitutionFand the permanent measures necessary for having a fair andimpartial agency. The faith and commitment to the rule of lawexhibited by all concerned in these proceedings is the surestguarantee of the survival of democracy of which rule of law isthe bedrock. The basic postulate of the concept of equality: “BeGyou ever so high, the law is above you,” has governed all stepstaken by us in these proceedings.

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48. In view of the common perception shared by everyone includingthe Government of India and the Independent Review Committee H

(IRC) of the need for insulation of the CBI from extraneousinfluence of any kind, it is imperative that some action is urgentlytaken to prevent the continuance of this situation with a view toensure proper implementation of the rule of law. This is the needof equality guaranteed in the Constitution. The right to equality ina situation like this is that of the Indian polity and not merely of afew individuals. The powers conferred on this Court by theConstitution are ample to remedy this defect and to ensureenforcement of the concept of equality.”

34. These are the basic facts that cannot be overlooked whilegathering the intention of the legislature in making the provisions containedin Section 4A and Section 4B of the DSPE Act. An indepth considerationof the matter leaves us with no doubt that the clear legislative intent inbringing the aforesaid provisions to the statute book are for the purposeof ensuring complete insulation of the office of the Director, CBI fromall kinds of extraneous influences, as may be, as well as for upholdingthe integrity and independence of the institution of the CBI as a whole.

35. There are certain other relevant facts that cannot be ignored.The provisions of various State enactments (Police Act), as for exampleUttrakhand Police Act 2007, following the decision of this Court inPrakash Singh And Othersvs. Union of India And Others4 (2006)8 SCC 1,while providing for a tenure of two years to the Director Generalof Police of the State expressly contemplates removal of the incumbentbefore expiry of the of the tenure on certain specified grounds [Section20 (4) & (5)]. Similarly, Section 6 of the CVC Act, which has beenextracted above, specifically contemplates certain interim measuresagainst the Central Vigilance Commissioner or a Vigilance Commissionerpending consideration by the Supreme Court of the reference made bythe President to the Court for removal of any such incumbent. Removalof any of the aforesaid incumbents holding any of the aforesaid posts isalso contemplated on certain contingencies occurring as spelt out bysub-section (3) of Section 6 of the CVC Act. No such provision hasbeen engrafted so far as the office of the Director, CBI is concernedexcept what is contained in Section 4B(2) of the DSPE Act, namely,that “the Director shall not be transferred except with the previousconsent of the Committee referred to in sub-section (1) of section 4 (2006) 8 SCC 1

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A4A”. As already noticed, Section 4B including sub-section (2) thereofof the DSPE Act, as it exists on date, were brought in by the samelegislation i.e. CVC Act (Act No.45 of 2003).

36. If the legislative intent would have been to confer in anyauthority of the State a power to take interim measures against theBDirector, CBI thereby affecting his functioning, surely, the legislationwould have contained enabling provisions to that effect and consequentlywould have been differently worded and drafted. It is against thisbackdrop that the words “transferred except with the previousconsent of the Committee” mentioned in Section 4B(2) of the DSPEAct has to be understood. If the word “transferred” has to be understoodCin its ordinary parlance and limited to a change from one post to another,as the word would normally convey and on that basis the requirement of“previous consent of the Committee” is understood to be only insuch cases, i.e. purely of transfer, such an interpretation would be self-defeating and would clearly negate the legislative intent. In such anDevent it will be free for the State Authority to effectively disengage theDirector, CBI from functioning by adopting various modes, known andunknown, which may not amount to transfer but would still have thesame effect as a transfer from one post to another, namely, cessation ofexercise of powers and functions of the earlier post. This is clearly notwhat the legislature could have intended. The long history of evolutionEhas shown that the institution of the CBI has been perceived to benecessarily kept away from all kinds of extraneous influences so that itcan perform its role as the premier investigating and prosecuting agencywithout any fear and favour and in the best public interest. The head ofthe institution, namely, the Director, naturally, therefore, has to be theFrole model of independence and integrity which can only be ensured byfreedom from all kinds of control and interference except to the extentthat Parliament may have intended. Such intendment, in our consideredview, would require all Authorities to keep away from intermingling orinterfering in the functioning of the Director. In a situation where such interference may at all be called for, public interest must be writ largeGagainst the backdrop of the necessity. The relevance and adequacy ofthe reasons giving rise to such a compelling necessity can only be testedby the opinion of the Committee constituted under Section 4A(1) of theDSPE Act in whom the power to make recommendations for appointmentof the Director has been vested by Parliament. This alone can provideH

an adequate safeguard to ensure the independence of the office keepingin view the legislative intent, as found and held by us. In this regard wefeel fortified in saying that the status of the Committe having undergonean upward movement by the amendment brought in by the Lokpal andLokayuktas Act, 2013 (Act No.1 of 2014) it cannot but be said that thelegislative intent in shielding and insulating the office of the Directorfrom any kind of extraneous influence has been foremost in the mind ofParliament which intent found manifestation in the changes in law broughtabout in the circumstances noted above.

37. There is yet another issue of significance that arises from theweighty arguments advanced in the course of the long debate that hastaken place. This is with regard to the application of Sections 14, 15 and16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 so as to confer a power in theCentral Government to pass the impugned orders including the order ofappointment of an acting Director of the CBI. The preceding discussionsand our views on the true and correct meaning of the provisions containedin Sections 4A & 4B of the DSPE Act leaves us convinced that theaforesaid provisions of the General Clauses Act will have no applicationto the present case in view of the clear and apparent intention to thecontrary that unequivocally flows from the aforesaid provisions of theDSPE Act.

38. So far as the correctness of the impugned decisions on meritis concerned, not much argument have been made either on the relevanceor the sufficiency of the grounds shown and disclosed for the impugneddecisions. This is, perhaps, on the understanding of the learned counselsthat our attempts to keep the report of the enquiry by the CVC orderedon 26[th] October and 12[th] November, 2018 in sealed cover was sufficientlyindicative of the mind of the Court that this aspect of the case shouldrequire to be unfolded only if inevitable and that too in the event of anegative decision on the jurisdictional question. The inherent limitationin such an exercise of, if at all is to be undertaken, is another inhibitingfactor. Be that as it may such an exercise has now become whollyunnecessary in view of the decision on the jurisdictional issue.

39. Consequently, in the light of our views as expressed above weset aside the following orders dated 23[rd] October, 2018:

(i) of the CVC divesting the powers, functions, duties, supervisoryrole, etc. of Shri Alok Kumar Verma as Director, CBI

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A(ii) of the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, PublicGrievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel & Trainingdivesting Shri Alok Kumar Verma, Director, CBI of hisfunctions, powers, duties and supervisory role with immediateeffect and until further orders.

B(iii) of the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, PublicGrievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel & Trainingby which one Shri M. Nageshwar Rao, IPS, Joint Director,CBI has been asked to look after the duties and functions ofDirector, CBI with immediate effect.

C40. Our interference, as above, will now require the matter to beconsidered by the Committee under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act,1946 which may be so done at the earliest and, in any case, within aweek from the date of this order. A meeting of the Committee may beaccordingly convened by the competent authority.

D41. As the issue of divestment of power and authority of theDirector, CBI is still open for consideration by the Committee and ourinterference with the impugned orders has been on the ground indicatedabove, we deem it proper to direct that the petitioner Shri Alok KumarVerma, Director, CBI, upon reinstatement, will cease and desist fromtaking any major policy decisions till the decision of the CommitteeEpermitting such actions and decisions becomes available within the timeframe indicated. We further make it explicit that the role of the PetitionerShri Alok Kumar Verma as the Director, CBI during the interregnumand in terms of this order will be confined only to the exercise of theongoing routine functions without any fresh initiative, having no majorFpolicy or institutional implications.

42. Coming to the several IAs filed, we are of the view that theorders of transfer etc. impugned/mentioned in the said IAs are a sequelof the three orders dated 23[rd] October, 2018 which were specificallyimpugned in the writ petitions. As we have answered the writ petitionsGin the manner indicated above, we do not consider it necessary to examinethe correctness of the further/consequential orders of transfer etc. andthat too on the basis of interlocutory applications filed in pending writpetitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, which stand disposed of bythe present order. However, we leave the parties with the remedy of ALOK KUMAR VERMA v. UNION OF INDIA[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI]

challenging the said consequential orders in an appropriate manner andbefore the appropriate forum, if so required and so advised.

43. Both writ petitions and all the IAs are accordingly disposedof.

Devika Gujral

Matters disposed of.

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