M/S BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. versus MAHENDRA PAL BHATIA AND ORS. on 1 April 2022

1. What was contemplated to be a summary proceeding for theeviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises under the PublicPremises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafterreferred to as the “Act”), having turned out to be a frustrating legalmarathon spread over a period of 38 years, eventually culminating in theHigh Court setting aside the orders of eviction passed under the Act, theGovernment Company which initiated the proceedings way back in 1984,has come up with the above appeal.

2. We have heard Mr. Anupam Lal Das, learned senior counselappearing for the appellant and Mr. Shambo Nandy, learned counselappearing for the respondents.

3. The Parliament enacted the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act,1973, (hereinafter referred to as the “Nationalisation Act”) providingfor the acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of the ownersin respect of coal mines specified in the Schedule. The Schedule to theNationalisation Act contained a list of about 711 coal mines located indifferent parts of the country. The Schedule also contained the namesand addresses of the owners of each of those mines and the amountpayable to those owners in terms of Section 8 of the Nationalisation Act.Serial No.92 of the Schedule contained the name of the coal mine “EastGodhur”. The owner of the coal mine was indicated to be “East Godhur A

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AColliery Company (Private) Limited, P.O. Dhandad” and the amount ofcompensation payable to the owner was also shown as Rs.4000/.

4. In the year 1984, the Estate Officer, Dhanbad initiatedproceedings in Case No.210 of 1984 under the provisions of the Act,against Bhatia brothers and others, on the ground that they are un-Bauthorised occupants of plot nos. 553, 554, 555, 556 and 559 to 564located in Village Matkuria, District Dhanbad. These proceedingsculminated in an order of eviction dated 18.09.1985.

5. But this order was set aside by the District Court, Dhanbad inan appeal under Section 9 of the Act, by an order dated 04.12.1986 andCthe matter was remanded back to the Estate Officer.

6. The Estate Officer passed a fresh order dated 08.03.1989dropping the eviction proceedings on the ground that the respondentswere authorized occupants. But the said order of the Estate Officerwas set aside by the District Court by an order dated 08.08.1990 in anDappeal filed by the appellant herein under Section 9 of the Act.

7. But the order of the District Court was set aside by the HighCourt by an order dated 17.07.1998 in a writ petition filed by therespondents and the matter got back to the District Court by way ofremand for a fresh disposal.

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E8. The District Court passed an order dated 28.09.2000 allowingthe appeal of the appellant herein and directing eviction. This order ofthe District Court was set aside by a learned Single Judge of the HighCourt by an order dated 20.06.2013 in a writ petition filed by therespondents. The said order of the learned Single Judge was confirmedFby the Division Bench in an intra-court appeal by judgment dated19.02.2015, which is what is impugned before us in the above appeal.

9. The only question which the Estate Officer, the District Courtand the High Court dabbled with, was as to whether the property in theoccupation of the respondents and their predecessor in interest wascovered by the definition of the expression “mine” in Section 2(h) of theGNationalisation Act. This question arose in the context of two limitedfacts namely,

(i) The property in question was purchased by an individual byname Jamini Mohan Majumdar, under a registered sale deed dated05.02.1945, long prior to 01.05.1973, the date of coming into force of theH

Nationalisation Act. In this sale deed dated 05.02.1945 Jamini MohanMajumdar’s occupation was described as “Manager”, East GodhurColliery;

(ii) The said Jamini Mohan Majumdar sold the property in questionunder four different sale deeds dated 17.01.1984. It was only thereafterthat proceedings under the Act, were initiated.

10. In view of the above two facts, the objection raised by therespondents to the proceedings under the Act was that the property wasa private property, not forming part of a “mine”. Reliance was alsoplaced upon the Report of the Court Commissioner, according to whichthere was no mark of any colliery in the disputed land and that there wasa two storey building on the disputed plot, with Godhur Colliery beinglocated 3 Kilometers away.

11. In other words the objection of the respondents was two-foldnamely, (i) that the property did not belong to the company which ownedthe East Godhur Coal Mine; and (ii) that the land in question was notused as a coal-mine.

12. But, unfortunately for the respondents, both the objectionscannot stand in the light of the statutory prescriptions. Section 3(1) ofthe Nationalisation Act, declares that on the appointed day, which was01.05.1973, the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to thecoal-mines specified in the Schedule shall stand transferred to and shallvest absolutely in the Central government free from all encumbrances.Section 3(1) of the Nationalisation Act, 1973 reads as follows:- “3. Acquisition of rights of owners in respect of coal mines.-(1) On the appointed day, the right, title and interest of the ownersin relation to the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall standtransferred to, and shall vest absolutely in, the Central Governmentfree from all incumbrances.”

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13. As could be seen from the vesting provision, what wastransferred to and vested in the Central Government, were not corporatehouses or business entities owning coal-mines. What was transferred toand vested in the Central Government were the coal-mines. In otherwords this Nationalisation Act, was little different from the statutoryenactments nationalizing institutions such as banks, insurance companies AB

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Aetc. Therefore, the ownership of the land was immaterial. If the land fellwithin the definition of the expression “mine” under the NationalisationAct, the same stood transferred to and vested in the Central Governmentunder Section 3(1).

14. The definition of the expression “mine” under Section 2(h) ofBthe Nationalisation Act, is very wide. It reads as follows:-

2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwiserequires,—

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C(h) “ mine” means any excavation where any operation for thepurpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is beingcarried on, and includes—

(i) all borings and bore holes;

(ii) all shafts, whether in the course of being sunk or not; D

(iii) all levels and inclined planes in the course of being driven;

(iv) all open cast workings;

(v) all conveyors or aerial ropeways provided for bringing into orremoval from a mine of minerals or other articles or for theEremoval of refuse therefrom;

(vi) all lands, buildings, works, adits, levels, planes, machinery andequipments, instruments, stores, vehicles, railways, tramways andsidings in, or adjacent to, a mine and used for the purposes of themine; F

(vii) all workshops (including buildings, machinery, instruments,stores, equipment of such workshops and the lands on which suchworkshops stand) in, or adjacent to, a mine and used substantiallyfor the purposes of the mine or a number of mines under thesame management; G(viii) all coal belonging to the owner of the mine, whether in stockor in transit, and all coal under production in a mine;

(ix) all power stations in a mine or operated primarily for supplyingelectricity for the purpose of working the mine or a number ofmines under the same management; H

M/S BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. MAHENDRA PALBHATIA AND ORS. [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

(x) all lands, buildings and equipments belonging to the owner ofthe mine, and in, adjacent to or situated on the surface of, themine where the washing of coal obtained from the mine ormanufacture, therefrom, of coke is carried on;

(xi) all lands and buildings[ other than those referred to in sub-clause (x), wherever situated, if solely used for the location of themanagement, sale or liaison offices, or for the residence of officersand staff, of the mine;

(xii) all other fixed assets, movable and immovable, belonging tothe owner of a mine, wherever situated, and current assets,belonging to a mine, whether within its premises or outside.”

15. As could be seen from clause (xi) of Section 2(h), even thelands and buildings used solely for the location of the management, saleor liaison offices or for the residence of officers and staff were alsoincluded in the definition of the word “mine”. Therefore, the contentionthat the property was the private property of Jamini Mohan Majumdar,and that his occupation as Manager of a colliery was irrelevant, wouldfall to the ground. The focus of Section 2(h) read with Section 3(1) is onthe property and not on who the owner of the property is.

16. Similarly, the objection that the land in question was not usedas a colliery is also irrelevant in view of the fact that clause (xi) ofSection 2(h) uses the words “wherever situated”. In any case thecontention that the property was not part of a colliery, may be factuallyincorrect. The sale deed dated 05.02.1945 by which Jamini MohanMajumdar purchased the property in question contains a very specificrecital which reads as follows:

“…This deed witnesseth that in the schedule land in view of theongoing colliery workings the fertility of the schedule land hasbeen reduced for that reason and for monetary reason being inspecial need and having no alternative when I offered for absolutesale of the land in schedule as receipt of consideration price ofRs.575/- on this day by way of absolute sale this sale deed isbeing executed in your favour. You are at liberty to carry on allnature of colliery work both underground and surface andenjoy the name TO HAVE AND HOLD the same to and uptothe purchaser absolutely and forever in any manner whatsoeverwithout any hindrance or interruption from us together with all A

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Aright, benefit, easement, privileges, liberties which he hereto beginsenjoyed…’’

Therefore, the respondents cannot now rely upon the Report of aCourt Commissioner who carried out inspection probably after two/threedecades of nationalization.

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17. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance uponthe judgment of this Court in New Satgram Engineering Works &Another vs. Union of India & Ors.[1], in support of his contention thatthe question whether something is a “mine” or not is essentially a questionof fact and that when the facts are seriously controverted it wasCappropriate for the High Court to relegate the parties to the civil court.

18. Though paragraph 16 of the decision in New Satgram (supra)appears to support the contention of the respondents by highlighting thedifference between the language employed in clauses (vii) and clause(xi) of Section 2(h), a subsequent decision of this Court (also of a 3Dmember bench) in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. Madanlal Agrawal[2],steers clear any air of suspicion. In this case, this Court clarified that theextended meaning given to the word “mine” was to ensure that theactivity of mining coal could be carried on in an uninterrupted fashion.This Court also cautioned “that the Act should not be construed in away to frustrate the working of the coal mines altogether, therebyEstop or bring down production of coal by the nationalization ofcoal mines”.

19. Therefore, the impugned orders of the High Court run contraryto the statutory prescriptions and hence liable to be set aside. Accordingly,the appeal is allowed, the impugned orders of the High Court are setFaside and the writ petition filed by the respondents is dismissed. Theorder of eviction shall stand confirmed. There will be no order as tocosts.

Devika Gujral

G(Assisted by : Shubhanshu Das, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

1 (1980) 4 SCC 570H2 (1997) 1 SCC 177