DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY versus BHAGWAT SINGH & ORS. on 2 November 2022

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in WritPetition(C) No. 10359 of 2015 by which the High Court has allowed thesaid writ petition preferred by the private respondent herein – originalCwrit petitioner, and has held and declared that the acquisition with respectto the land in question has lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to FairCompensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation andResettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”), theDelhi Development Authority has preferred the present appeal.

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2. Having gone through the Impugned judgment and order passedby the High Court, it is seen that the High Court has ordered lapsing ofthe land in question under Section 24 of the Act, 2013 relying upon thedecision of this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation andAnr. Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors. (2014) 3 SCCE183 and on the ground that the compensation has not been paid to thelandowners. However, it is required to be noted that before the HighCourt, it was the specific case on behalf of the Delhi DevelopmentAuthority that the possession of the land in question has already beentaken. As observed hereinabove on the ground that the compensationhas not been paid to the landowner relying upon the decision of thisFCourt in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. (supra),the High Court has allowed the said writ petition and has declared thatthe acquisition with respect to the land in question has lapsed.

3. The decision of this Court in the case of Pune MunicipalCorporationand Anr. (supra) relied upon by the High Court has beenGoverruled by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case ofIndore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors. (2020)8 SCC 129 and in paragraph 366, it is ultimately concluded as under:- “366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer thequestions as under:

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366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case theaward is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement ofthe 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation hasto be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

366.2. In case the award has been passed within the windowperiod of five years excluding the period covered by an interimorder of the court, then proceedings shall continue as providedunder Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if ithas not been repealed.

366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) betweenpossession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”.The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction ofauthorities for five years or more prior to commencement of thesaid Act, the possession of land has not been taken norcompensation has been paid. In other words, in case possessionhas been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is nolapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession hasnot been taken then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2)of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation incourt. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the provisoto Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect tomajority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as onthe date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with theprovisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interestunder Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit ofcompensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of landacquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect tothe majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation underthe 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date ofnotification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensationas provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open tohim to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) dueto non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The A

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obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensationor who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claimthat the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2)of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to betreated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

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366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act andas contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquestreport/memorandum. Once award has been passed on takingpossession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests inState there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapseunder Section 24(2).

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366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemedlapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have faileddue to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation forfive years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in aproceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concernedas on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passedby court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.

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366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to newcause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedingsof land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending onthe date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does notrevive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concludedproceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of modeof taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit ofcompensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidateacquisition.”

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4. In view of the decision of this Court in the case of IndoreGDevelopment Authority (supra), specifically overruling the decisionof this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr.(supra) relied upon by the High Court while passing the impugnedjudgment and order, the impugned judgment and order passed by theHigh Court is unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed andset aside.H

5. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, presentappeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the original writpetition preferred by the original writ petitioner stands dismissed.

Nidhi Jain

Appeal allowed.

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