SHRI RAM SHRIDHAR CHIMURKAR versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR. on 17 January 2023

SHRI RAM SHRIDHAR CHIMURKAR

v.

UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

(Civil Appeal No. 386 of 2023)

JANUARY 17, 2023

[K. M. JOSEPH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 – r. 54(14)(b) –Pension Rules – Adoption after the death of Government servant –Right of adopted son to claim pension – The ‘S’, a retiredSuperintendent, died issueless in 1994 – His wife adopted theappellant in 1996 – Appellant claimed family pension payable tothe family of the deceased government employee – The claim ofthe appellant was rejected on the ground that children adopted bywidow of a government servant, after the death of the governmentservant, would not be entitled to receive family pension – CAT directedthe respondents to consider the appellant’s claim – High Courtreversed the judgment passed by the CAT – High Court held thatthe appellant herein could have been entitled to receive familypension had he been legally adopted by the deceased governmentservant, which was not the case in the instant matter – On appeal,held: The heirs listed u/r. 54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules arethe immediate dependents of the deceased government servant –Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, requires that the familymember must have a close nexus with the deceased governmentservant, and must have been dependent on him during his lifetime –The definition of the term ‘family’ cannot be extended to includethose persons who were not even dependents of the governmentservant, at the time of his death – The context requires thatassociation or connection of such persons with the deceasedgovernment servant must be direct and not remote – Therefore, ason or daughter adopted by the widow of adeceased governmentservant, after the death of the government servant, could not beincluded within the definition of ‘family’ under said Rule.

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956: ss. 8 & 12 –Effect of Adoption – On Family Pension – On adoption by a widow,the adopted son or daughter is deemed to be a member of the familyof the deceased husband of the widow - There exists a vital difference

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Abetween the rights of an adopted son under Hindu Law and hisrights to draw family pension, which creates a burden on the publicexchequer – The word “adoption” in Rule 54(14)(b)(ii) of the CCS(Pension) Rules, in the context of grant of family pension, must berestricted to an adoption made by a government servant duringhis/her lifetime and must not be extended to a case of adoptionBmade by a surviving spouse of the government servant after his/her death.

Maxim - Nocitur a Sociis - Explained and Discussed Dismissing the appeal, the CourtCHELD : 1. The provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956determine the rights of a son adopted by a Hindu widow only vis-aÌ-vis his adoptive family. Rights and entitlements of an adoptedson of a Hindu widow, as available in Hindu Law, as against hisadoptive family, cannot axiomatically be held to be available tosuch adopted son, as against the government, in a caseDspecifically governed by extant pension rules. The provisions ofthe HAMA Act, 1956, relate generally to the capacity of the femaleHindu to take a son or daughter in adoption and the effects thatfollow such an adoption. The said provisions do not lend muchassistance in the instant case which does not pertain to the rightsof the adoptee such as the Appellant herein under Hindu Law,Ebut to his rights and entitlements under the CCS (Pension) Rules.There exists a vital difference between the rights of an adoptedson under Hindu Law and his rights to draw family pension, whichcreates a burden on the public exchequer. It is thereforenecessary to determine the rights and entitlements of theFAppellant having regard to Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension)Rules. [Para 10][943-D-G]

2. The use of the phrase “in relation to” in statutes is witha view to bring one person or thing into association or connectionwith another person or thing. The direct or indirect nature ofGsuch association or connection depends on the context. In Rule54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, the phrase “in relation toa government servant” would indicate that the categories ofpersons listed thereunder, such as wife, husband, judiciallyseparated wife or husband, son or unmarried daughter who hasnot attained the age of twenty-five years, adopted son or daughter,Hetc. are sought to be brought into association with the deceased government servant. The context requires that association orconnection of such persons with the deceased government servantmust be direct and not remote. The said Rule requires that thefamily member must have a close nexus with the deceasedgovernment servant, and must have been dependent on him duringhis lifetime. Therefore, a son or daughter adopted by the widowof a deceased government servant, after the death of thegovernment servant, could not be included within the definitionof ‘family’ under Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules.Family pension was devised as a means to help the dependentsof the deceased government servant tide over the crisis and toextend to them some succour. Therefore, the definition of theterm ‘family’ cannot be extended to include those persons whowere not even dependents of the government servant, at thetime of his death. [Para 11.1 & 12][944-H; 945-A-D; 946-B]

3. The cannon of construction described in the principle,Nocitur a Sociis, may be applied to the present case. The saidprinciple posits that the meaning of a phrase must be construedhaving regard to the words immediately surrounding it. In thepresent case, the heirs listed under Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS(Pension) Rules are the immediate dependents of the deceasedgovernment servant. Therefore, persons who were not dependanton the government servant prior to his death cannot be held tobe included in the definition of ‘family’ under Rule 54(14)(b) ofthe CCS (Pension) Rules. [Para 12.1][946-C-E]

Vijayalakshmamma vs. B.T. Shankar, (2001) 4 SCC 558:[2001] 2 SCR 769 - held inapplicable.

Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1988) 2SCC 299 : [1988] 2 SCR 962; Poonamal vs. Union ofIndia,(1985) 3 SCC 345 : [1985] 3 SCR 1042 - reliedon.

Sawan Ram vs. Kalawanti, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1761 : [1967]SCR 687; Sitabai vs. Ramchandra, A.I.R. 1970 SC 343: [1970] 2 SCR 1 - referred to.

Case Law Reference

[2001] 2 SCR 769[1988] 2 SCR 962[1985] 3 SCR 1042

held inapplicablePara 15relied onPara 11relied onPara 12

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A[1967] SCR 687referred toPara 9.1[1970] 2 SCR 1referred toPara 9.2

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.386 of2023.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.11.2015 of the High CourtBof Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Nagpur in W.P. No.2110 of 2003.

Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, R. Vijay Nandan Reddy, V. KrishnaSwaroop, Advs. for the Appellant.

Mrs. Madhvi Divan, ASG, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Mrs. VaishaliVerma, Mrs. Vimla Sinha, Mrs. Vishakha, Advs. for the Respondents.

CThe Judgment of the Court was delivered byNAGARATHNA J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal assails the judgment of the Nagpur Bench of HighCourt of Judicature at Bombay, dated 30[th]November, 2015 whereinDWrit Petition No. 2110 of 2003 filed by the Respondents herein wasallowed. Consequently, the judgment and order passed by the CentralAdministrative Tribunal, Mumbai dated 19[th]July, 2002, whereby theOriginal Application filed by the Appellant herein was allowed, has beenset aside.E3. Succinctly stated, the facts giving rise to the instant appeal areas under:

3.1. That Shridar Chimurkar was serving as a Superintendentin the office of Respondent No. 2, Deputy Director andHO National Sample Survey Organization, Field ZonalFOffice, Nagpur, and retired on attaining superannuation inthe year 1993. He died issueless in the year 1994, leavingbehind his wife, namely, Maya Motghare who thereafteradopted Sri Ram Shridhar Chimurkar, the Appellant hereinas her son on 6[th]April, 1996, i.e., nearly two years after thedeath of Shridar Chimurkar.G

3.2. After the death of Shridar Chimurkar, his wife, MayaMotghare and the Appellant were living in a portion of ahouse owned by Prakash Motghare, the natural father ofthe Appellant. Subsequently, in April, 1998, Maya Motgharemarried Chandra Prakash, a widower, and began residingHwith him at Janakpuri, New Delhi.

3.3. In the aforesaid background, the Appellant claimed familypension payable to the family of the deceased governmentemployee, Shridar Chimurkar, from the Respondents, byaddressing a letter in this regard, dated 18[th]January, 2000.The claim of the Appellant was rejected by the Respondentson the ground that children adopted by a widow of agovernment servant, after the death of the governmentservant, would not be entitled to receive family pension asper Rule 54 (14) (b) of the Central Civil Services (Pension)Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “CCS (Pension)Rules” for the sake of brevity). The Respondents’ decisionwas communicated to the Appellant by way of letter dated23[rd]February, 2000.

3.4. Aggrieved by the Respondents’ rejection of his claim forfamily pension, the Appellant filed an Original Application,being O.A. No. 2166 of 2001, before the CentralAdministrative Tribunal, Mumbai, praying that the order ofthe Respondents dated 23[rd]February, 2000 be quashed andset aside, as being illegal and unconstitutional. Further, adeclaration that the Appellant is the adopted son of thedeceased government employee and is therefore entitledto receive family pension, was also sought.

3.5. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai, by an orderdated 19[th]July, 2002, allowed O.A. No. 2166 of 2001 filedby the Appellant and directed the Respondents to considerthe Appellant’s claim for family pension by treating him asthe adopted son of the deceased government employee,Shridar Chimurkar. The salient findings of the Tribunal maybe culled out as under:

i.That Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules,initially excluded sons or daughters born or adoptedby the government servant after retirement, from thebenefit of family pension. However, by way ofamendments to the said Rule in the year 1990 and1993, the bar against children born or adopted afterretirement, seeking family pension, was removed.

That the order of the Respondents dated 23[rd]February, 2000 would not survive in view of theaforesaid amendments.

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936SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aii.That as per Sections 8 and 12 of the Hindu Adoptionsand Maintenance Act, 1956, (‘HAMA Act’, for short)the widow of a Hindu male is competent to adopt ason or a daughter without there being a direction/expression of desire to that effect, by her deceasedhusband. That the effect of adoption by a widowBwould be that the child so adopted would be deemedto be the child of her deceased husband also, videVijayalakshmamma vs. B.T. Shankar, (2001) 4SCC 558 (“Vijayalakshmamma”).

iii.That the adoption of the Appellant by Maya Motgharewould be deemed to be adoption of the Appellant byher deceased husband Shridar Chimurkar also.

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3.6. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Tribunal, theRespondents herein challenged the same by filing WritPetition No. 2110 of 2013 before the Nagpur Bench of HighDCourt of Judicature at Bombay.

3.7. By the impugned judgment and order dated 30[th]November,2015, the High Court allowed the said Writ Petition andreversed reversed judgment and order passed by the CentralAdministrative Tribunal, Mumbai dated 19[th]July, 2002.EHence this appeal by the original applicant.

Before proceeding further, it would be useful to encapsulatethe reasoning of the High Court for allowing the Writ Petitionfiled by the appellant herein, as under:

i.That the Appellant herein could have been entitled toFreceive family pension had he been legally adoptedby the deceased government servant, which was notthe case in the instant matter.

ii.That the Tribunal had erred in relying on Section 8and 12 of the HAMA Act, 1956, which generallydeals with, inter alia, adoption by a Hindu widow.

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iii.That Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rulesdoes not deal with adoption by a widow of agovernment servant after the death of the governmentservant.

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SHRI RAM SHRIDHAR CHIMURKAR v. UNION OF INDIA &ANR. [B. V. NAGARATHNA J.]

4. We have heard learned Counsel, Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, appearingon behalf of the Appellant, and learned Additional Solicitor General ofIndia, Mrs. Madhvi Goradia Divan, appearing on behalf of the Union ofIndia, and perused the material on record.

Submissions:

5. Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf ofthe Appellant, at the outset, contended that the High Court erred ininterfering with the findings of the Tribunal, without appreciating the lawon the capacity of a Hindu widow to adopt.

5.1. It was further contended that adoption made by a Hinduwidow would be deemed to be an adoption by her deceasedhusband also, as per the provisions of HAMA Act, 1956,and in view of the said position of law, the High Court oughtnot to have interfered with the findings of the Tribunal. Thatsuch a view has stood affirmed by this Court inVijayalakshmamma wherein a declaration was made tothe effect that adoption by a Hindu widow would be deemedto be adoption by her husband also.

5.2. Reliance was also placed on the text of Rule 54 (14) (b) ofthe CCS (Pension) Rules, as it initially stood, as contrastedwith the text of the said provision after amendments to thesame in the years 1990 and 1993, to contend that the baragainst children born or adopted after retirement, seekingfamily pension, was removed by way of the subsequentamendments. Therefore, children adopted at any time afterretirement of the government servant, including childrenadopted by the widow of the government servant after hisdeath ought to be included under the definition of ‘family’for the purpose of granting family pension.

5.3. That unlike the position under classical Hindu Law, a Hindufemale under the provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956 isrendered eligible to adopt, not only acting at the behest ofher husband or on seeking his approval, but also in her ownright. Further, Section 12 thereof provides that a child adoptedshall cease to have any ties with the family of her/his birthand shall only have ties with his adoptive family. On a conjointreading of the aforesaid propositions, what emerges is that A

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an adoption by a Hindu widow would necessarily create atie between the child so adopted and her deceased husband.

In that context it was submitted that the Appellant hereinwould have ties not only with Maya Motghare, his adoptivemother, but also with her deceased husband, ShridarChimurkar, more so because, as on the date of adoption,she had not re-married. That, as on the date of adoption ofthe Appellant, Maya Motghare was the widow of ShridarChimurkar and therefore, the Appellant would be the adoptedson of Shridar Chimurkar also and all enumeratedconsequences of such adoption would necessarily follow.

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With the aforesaid averments, it was prayed that thepresent appeal be allowed by setting aside the impugnedjudgment of the High Court and restoring the judgment ofthe Tribunal.

D6. Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General Mrs. MadhviGoradia Divan, appearing on behalf of the Union of India submitted thatthe impugned judgment is based on a faultless appreciation of the lawand does not call for interference by this Court.

6.1. It was submitted that Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension)ERules, does not cover adoption by a widow of a governmentservant, after the death of such a government servant.Therefore, the said rule could not be invoked for grant offamily pension to the Appellant herein. That the definitionof ‘family’ in relation to a government servant, as providedunder Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, is notFexpansive enough to take within its sweep a child adoptedby the widow of a government servant after his death.

6.2. It was contended that reliance placed by the learnedCounsel for the Appellant on Section 8 and 12 of HAMAAct, 1956, was misplaced. That the said provisions merelyGrecognize that a female Hindu, including a widow, couldadopt a child under the provisions of the said Act. However,the said provisions are irrelevant to the present case, whichpertains not merely to a question as to the capacity of aHindu widow to adopt, but involves issues of entitlement ofa child so adopted by a Hindu widow, to family pension on H

the death of the government servant.

6.3. It was next contended that the adoption of the Appellant byMaya Motghare, who was the widow of deceasedgovernment servant Shridar Chimurkar, would not relateback to the date of his retirement from service. Therefore,the appellant could not claim family pension, in his capacityas the adopted son of Shridar Chimurkar.

With the aforesaid averments it was prayed on behalfof the Respondents that the present appeal be dismissed asbeing devoid of merit, and the impugned judgment of theHigh Court be affirmed.

Points for Consideration:

7. Having regard to the submissions of the learned Senior Counseland learned Counsel for the respective parties, the following points wouldarise for our consideration:

i.Whether a child adopted by a widow of a governmentservant, subsequent to the death of the government servantwould be included within the scope of the definition of‘family’ under Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules,and would therefore be entitled to receive family pensionpayable under the said Rules?

ii.What order?

Legal Scheme:

8. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to therelevant provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956 and the CCS (Pension)Rules.

8.1. HAMA Act, 1956 seeks to codify the law relating toadoptions and maintenance among Hindus. Chapter II ofthe Act pertains to adoption and prescribes inter-alia, themanner in which an adoption is to be made, the legalobligations created by way of adoption and theconsequences that are to follow an adoption.

8.2. Section 5 of the said Act provides that no adoption shall bemade by a Hindu, except in accordance with the provisionsof the Act; and any adoption made in contravention of theprovisions of the Act shall be void and shall neither createany rights in the adoptive family, in favour of the person so A

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adopted, nor destroy the rights of any person in the familyof his or her birth. Further, Section 6 lists the requisites of avalid adoption under the said Act. Section 7 pertains to thecapacity of a male Hindu to take in adoption, while Section8 deals with the capacity of a female Hindu to adopt. Section8 is relevant to the present case and is usefully extractedas under:

“8. Capacity of a female Hindu to take in adoption.¯Anyfemale Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minorhas the capacity to take a son or daughter in adoption:Provided that, if she has a husband living, she shall notadopt a son or daughter except with the consent of herhusband unless the husband has completely and finallyrenounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or hasbeen declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to beof unsound mind.”

8.3. Section 12 of HAMA Act, 1956, which is relevant to thepresent case, lists the effects or consequences of adoptionby providing that an adopted child shall be deemed to bethe child of his or her adoptive father or mother for allpurposes with effect from the date of the adoption and fromsuch date, all the ties of the child in the family of his or herbirth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by thosecreated by the adoption in the adoptive family. The saidprovision is extracted as under:

“12. Effects of adoption. —An adopted child shall bedeemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father ormother for all purposes with effect from the date of theadoption and from such date all the ties of the child inthe family of his or her birth shall be deemed to besevered and replaced by those created by the adoptionin the adoptive family:

Provided that— (a) the child cannot marry any personwhom he or she could not have married if he or she hadcontinued in the family of his or her birth; (b) any property which vested in the adopted child beforethe adoption shall continue to vest in such person subjectto the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of 941ANR. [B. V. NAGARATHNA J.]such property, including the obligation to maintainArelatives in the family of his or her birth;

(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of anyestate which vested in him or her before the adoption.”

8.4. However, the present case pertains not merely to a questionas to the capacity of a Hindu widow to adopt, but involvesissues of entitlement of a child adopted by a Hindu widow, B

to family pension payable to certain categories of legal heirsof a deceased government servant. It is necessary to referto the relevant Rules of the Central Civil Services (Pension)Rules, 1972, as amended from time to time.

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Rule 3(1)(f) of the CCS (Pension) Rules defines theterm ‘family pension’ in the following manner:

“Family pension means `Family Pension, 1964',admissible under Rule 54 but does not include dearnessrelief.”

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Rule 54 deals, inter alia, with the amount of familypension payable, and the procedure to be followed forpayment thereof. Rule 54(14)(b) which is relevant to thepresent case, defines ‘family’ for the purpose of Rule 54, inthe following terms:

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“(b) “family” in relation to a government servant means–

i.Wife in the case of a male Governmentservant, or husband in the case of a femaleGovernment servant; F

ia.A judicially separated wife or husband,such separation not being granted onthe ground of adultery and the personsurviving was not held guilty ofcommitting adultery; G

ii.Unmarried son who has not attained the ageof twenty-five years and unmarried orwidowed or divorced daughter, including suchson and daughter adopted legally”;

iii.Dependent parents;

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iv.Dependent disabled siblings (i.e., brother orsister) of a government servant.”

With that primer, we shall proceed to consider thequestion as to the entitlement of a child adopted by a Hinduwidow, to family pension payable under Rule 54 of the CCS(Pension) Rules.

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Analysis:

9. Section 8 of HAMA Act, 1956 pertains to the capacity of afemale Hindu to take a son or a daughter in adoption. The said provisionpermits a female Hindu who is not a minor or of unsound mind, to take aCson or daughter in adoption to herself, in her own right. The provisionrequires that a female Hindu who has a husband, shall not adopt exceptwith the express consent of her husband. However, no such pre-conditionis applicable in relation to a Hindu widow; a divorced female Hindu; or afemale Hindu whose husband has, after marriage, finally renounced theDworld or has been declared by a Court of competent jurisdiction to be ofunsound mind.

9.1. Therefore, there exists an unequivocal statutory declarationas to the capacity of a female Hindu, including a widow, totake a son or daughter in adoption, in her own right. TheEquestion would therefore arise as to what would be theadoptive family of a child who is adopted by a widow, or bya married woman whose husband has completely and finallyrenounced the world, or has been declared to be of unsoundmind. The text of Section 12 of the Act lends limitedperspective in this regard. However, this Court has clarifiedFthis aspect by declaring that, on adoption by a widow, theadopted son or daughter is deemed to be a member of thefamily of the deceased husband of the widow, vide SawanRam vs. Kalawanti, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1761.

9.2. Further, in Sitabai vs. Ramchandra, A.I.R. 1970 SC 343,Gthis Court took note of the consequences of adoption aslisted under Section 12 of the Act, and observed as followsas to the as to the effects of adoption by a Hindu widow:

“5. […] It is clear on a reading of the main part of Section12 and Sub-section (vi) of Section 11 that the effect ofadoption under the Act is that it brings about severance H

of all ties of the child given in adoption in the family ofhis or her birth. The child altogether ceases to have anyties with the family of his birth. Correspondingly, thesevery ties are automatically replaced by those created bythe adoption in the adoptive family. The legal effect ofgiving the child in adoption must therefore be to transferthe child from the family of its birth to the family of itsadoption.

The scheme of Sections 11 and 12, therefore, is that inthe case of adoption by a widow the adopted childbecomes absorbed in the adoptive family to which thewidow belonged. In other words the child adopted istied with the relationship of sonship with the deceasedhusband of the widow.”

10. Having acknowledged the consequences of adoption underHindu Law, it is necessary to highlight at this juncture that the saidprovisions of the HAMA Act, 1956 determine the rights of a son adoptedby a Hindu widow only vis-à-vis his adoptive family. Rights andentitlements of an adopted son of a Hindu widow, as available in HinduLaw, as against his adoptive family, cannot axiomatically be held to beavailable to such adopted son, as against the government, in a casespecifically governed by extant pension rules. The provisions of theHAMA Act, 1956, as discussed above, relate generally to the capacityof the female Hindu to take a son or daughter in adoption and the effectsthat follow such an adoption. The said provisions do not lend muchassistance in the instant case which does not pertain to the rights of theadoptee such as the Appellant herein under Hindu Law, but to his rightsand entitlements under the CCS (Pension) Rules. There exists a vitaldifference between the rights of an adopted son under Hindu Law andhis rights to draw family pension, which creates a burden on the publicexchequer. It is therefore necessary to determine the rights andentitlements of the Appellant having regard to Rule 54 (14) (b) of theCCS (Pension) Rules.

10.1Rule 54 deals, inter alia, with the amount of family pensionpayable, and the procedure to be followed for paymentthereof. Rule 54(14)(b) which is relevant to the presentcase, defines ‘family’ for the purpose of Rule 54. It is thecase of the Appellant that a “son or daughter adopted legally”

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by a government servant is eligible to claim family pensionafter the death of the government servant, and therefore,such benefit ought to be extended in his favour also. That,although he was adopted by the widow of a governmentservant, he must be deemed to be the adopted son of thedeceased government servant and therefore allowed thebenefit of family person.

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11. This matter calls for an interpretation of the phrase “in relationto a government servant” as appearing in Rule 54 (14)(b) of the CCS(Pension) Rules.

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In order to engage with this prong of the matter, i.e., effect of thephrase “in relation to a government servant” as appearing in Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, in determining the Appellant’sentitlement to family pension, it may be useful to refer to the decision ofthis Court in Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1988) 2DSCC 299 on the interpretation of the phrase “in relation to”:

In the said case, this Court held as follows, while interpreting thephrase “in relation to” in the context of the Swadeshi Cotton MillsCompany Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1986:

E“50. The expression “in relation to” (so also “pertaining to”), isvery broad expression which pre-supposes another subject matter.These are words of comprehensiveness which might have both adirect significance as well as an indirect significance dependingon the context…In this connection reference may be made to 76Corpus Juris Secundum at pages 620 and 621 where it is statedFthat the term “relate” is also defined as meaning to bring intoassociation or connection with. It has been clearly mentioned that“relating to” has been held to be equivalent to or synonymouswith as to “concerning with” and “pertaining to”. The expression“pertaining to” is an expression of expansion and not ofGcontraction.”

[Emphasis by me]

11.1. The use of the phrase “in relation to” in statutes is with aview to bring one person or thing into association orconnection with another person or thing. The direct or H

indirect nature of such association or connection dependson the context. In Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension)Rules, the phrase “in relation to a government servant”would indicate that the categories of persons listedthereunder, such as wife, husband, judicially separated wifeor husband, son or unmarried daughter who has not attainedthe age of twenty-five years, adopted son or daughter, etc.are sought to be brought into association with the deceasedgovernment servant. The context requires that associationor connection of such persons with the deceased governmentservant must be direct and not remote. The said Rulerequires that the family member must have a close nexuswith the deceased government servant, and must have beendependent on him during his lifetime. Therefore, a son ordaughter adopted by the widow of a deceased governmentservant, after the death of the government servant, couldnot be included within the definition of ‘family’ under Rule54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules.

12. It may also be appropriate to refer to the decision of thisCourt in Poonamal vs. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 345, whereinthe purpose for which ‘family pension’ is granted, was highlighted bythis Court in the following words:

“Family pension came to be conceptualised in the year 1950. Whena Government servant die in harness or soon after retirement, inthe traditional Indian family on the death of the only earningmember, the widow or the minor children were not only renderedorphans but faced more often destitution and starvation.Traditionally speaking the widow was hardly in a position to obtaingainful employment. She suffered the most in as much as shewas deprived of the companionship of the husband and alsobecame economically orphaned. As a measure of socioeconomicjustice family pension scheme was devise to help the widows tieover the crisis and till the minor children attain majority to extendthem some succour. This appeared to be the underlying motivationin devising the family pension scheme. It was liberalised fromtime to time. The liberalisation was however subject to thecondition that the Government Servant had in his life time agreed A

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Athat he shall make a contribution of an amount equal to two months’emoluments or Rs. 5,000 whichever is less out of the death-cum-retirement gratuity. Those Government servants who did not acceptthis condition were denied the benefit of family pension scheme.”

It is evident from the passage quoted above that family pensionBwas devised as a means to help the dependents of the deceasedgovernment servant tide over the crisis and to extend to them somesuccour. Therefore, the definition of the term ‘family’ cannot be extendedto include those persons who were not even dependents of thegovernment servant, at the time of his death.

C12.1. The cannon of construction described in the principle,Nocitur a Sociis, may be applied to the present case. Thesaid principle posits that the meaning of a phrase must beconstrued having regard to the words immediatelysurrounding it. In the present case, the heirs listed underDRule 54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules are theimmediate dependents of the deceased government servant.Therefore, persons who were not dependant on thegovernment servant prior to his death cannot be held to beincluded in the definition of ‘family’ under Rule 54(14)(b)of the CCS (Pension) Rules.E

13. Further, we are unable to find favour with the argument of thelearned Counsel for the Appellant that since the bar contained in Rule54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules against children born or adoptedafter retirement, seeking family pension, was removed by way of theFsubsequent amendments to the provision, children adopted at any timeafter retirement of the government servant, including children adoptedby the widow of the government servant after his death ought to beincluded under the definition of ‘family’ for the purpose of granting familypension. The provision could not be as expansive as suggested by thelearned Counsel for the Appellant. It is necessary that the scope of theGbenefit of family pension be restricted only to sons or daughters legallyadopted by the government servant, during his/her lifetime. The definitionof ‘family’ is narrowly worded under the CCS (Pension) Rules, in thespecific context of the entitlement to ‘family pension’ and in relation tothe government servant. Therefore, the word “adoption” in Rule H

54(14)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, in the context of grant of familypension, must be restricted to an adoption made by a government servantduring his/her lifetime and must not be extended to a case of adoptionmade by a surviving spouse of the government servant after his/herdeath. This is because the object of the provision is to lend succour to ason till he attains the age of twenty-five years and unmarried or widowedor divorced daughter; similarly to the adopted son or unmarried adopteddaughter when such an adoption had been made by the governmentservant during his/her lifetime.

14. Further, a case where a child is born to the deceasedgovernment servant after his death has to be contrasted with a casewhere a child is adopted by the widow of a government servant after hisdeath. The former category of heirs are covered under the definition offamily since such a child would be a posthumous child of the deceasedgovernment servant. The entitlement of such a posthumous child is whollydistinct from a child being adopted subsequent to the demise of thegovernment servant by the surviving spouse. The reason for the same isnot far to see. This is because the deceased government servant wouldhave had no relationship with the adopted child which would have beenadopted subsequent to his demise, as opposed to a posthumous child.Therefore, the definition of the word “family” in relation to a governmentservant means various categories of persons coming within thenomenclature of the word “family” and all persons who would have hada familial relationship with the government servant during his lifetime.Any other interpretation would lead to abuse of the provision in the matterof grant of family pension.

15. It is also observed that the decision of this Court inVijayalakshmamma would not aid the case of the Appellant. The saidcase is inapplicable to the facts of the present case for the reason thatthe said case pertains to the right of a widow to adopt and the right ofinheritance of a child so adopted. The present case is concerned onlywith the definition of ‘family’ under the CCS (Pension) Rules. The saiddefinition is a restrictive and specific one and cannot be expanded totake within its sweep, all heirs, as provided under Hindu law, or otherpersonal laws. It is trite that in construing a word in a statute, cautionhas to be exercised in adopting a meaning ascribed to that word or conceptin another statute.

AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

[2023] 1 S.C.R.

A16. In light of the reasons assigned hereinabove, the present appealis liable to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. The judgment ofthe High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated 30[th]November, 2015, ishereby affirmed.

Parties to bear their respective costs.

B

Ankit Gyan

(Assisted by : Rahul Rathi, LCRA)

Appeal dismissed.

C

D

E

F

G

H