LACHHMI NARAIN SINGH (D) THROUGH LRS & ORS. versus SARJUG SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. on 17 August 2021

212

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 8 S.C.R.

ALACHHMI NARAIN SINGH (D) THROUGH LRS & ORS.

v.

SARJUG SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 5823 of 2011)

BAUGUST 17, 2021

[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]

Deeds and Documents: Wills and Codicils – Revocation ofWill – Probate – On facts, testator executed a Will in favour ofapplicant – Probate proceedings by applicant – Objector’s caseCthat Will favouring the applicant was revoked and cancelled by aregistered deed – Trial court held that the applicant not entitled toget the Will probated as the same was revoked – In appeal, the HighCourt granted probate holding that the Will favouring the applicantwas not cancelled – High Court disbelieved the registered deed ofDcancellation whereby, the Will was revoked by the testator – Onappeal, held: High Court erred by ignoring the material evidencein disbelieving the Cancellation Deed and holding that the applicantwas entitled to grant of probate of the Will – Probate applicantnever raised any objection regarding the mode of proof before thetrial court, thus, there is merit in the case of the objectors –EFurthermore, the trial court was right in holding that the testatorwas medically fit and had cancelled the Will himself – Alsogenuineness of the Cancellation deed cannot be doubted only dueto the fact that same was not signed and the testator as a literateperson, affixed his thumb impression which was proved to be genuineFby the expert – Thus, the order of High Court set aside.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 In allowing the appeal of the probate applicant,the High Court referred to the health condition of the testator-Rwho suffered from paralysis before his death and had opined thatGit would not be possible for the testator to visit the Sub-Registrar’sOffice, to cancel the Will. Inference was accordingly drawn onhis impersonation, at the Sub-Registrar’s Office. Such conclusionwas reached even though, neither any suggestion nor any cross-examination was put to the objector’s witnesses, regardingHimpersonation of the testator at the Sub-Registrar’s Office. It is also important to record that Report of Handwriting Expert andDeed of Cancellation were both marked without objection, whenthe documents were tendered in the trial Court. The High Courtfailed to give due weightage to the evidence of OW-3, OW-4 andOW-5 who led evidence on genuineness of the cancellation deed.Instead, erroneous presumption was drawn on impersonation andincapability of the testator, to visit the office of the Sub-Registrarto register the Cancellation Deed. That apart, the probateapplicant never opposed the acceptance and marking of theconcerned cancellation deed, in the trial Court. Therefore, in theface of the Expert’s Report, when the Deed of Cancellation weremarked without any objection before the trial court, those cannotbe treated as inadmissible and should have been accepted asgenuine, particularly in view of the testimony of OW-3-5, whostood firm on execution of the registered revocation deed by thetestator. [Para 14-16][219-F-H; 220-A-D]

1.2 On the issue of testator’s thumb impression on thecancellation deed, it is telling that all the four deeds executed bythe testator in his lifetime, contained his thumb impression andnot his signature. Therefore, adverse presumption ongenuineness of the cancellation deed cannot be drawn merelybecause the testator chose to append his thumb impression. Thatapart, the Report of the handwriting expert (OW-3) clearlyindicates that the thumb impression on all the documents placedbefore the Expert’s opinion are of the same person-R. Since theExpert’s Report was marked in Court, without objection fromthe applicant, the genuineness of the same cannot be allowed tobe questioned before the appellate Court. A contrary inferencewas erroneously drawn by the High court by referring to the healthcondition of the testator, when the revocation deed wasregistered. The key characteristic of thumb impression is thatevery person has a unique thumb impression. Forgery of thumbimpressions is nearly impossible. Therefore, adverse conclusionshould not be drawn for affixing thumb impression instead ofsigning documents of property transaction. Therefore,genuineness of the Cancellation deed cannot be doubted onlydue to the fact that same was not signed and R as a literate person,affixed his thumb impression. This is more so in this case sincethe testator’s thumb impression was proved to be genuine bythe expert. [Para 17, 18][220-D-H]

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A1.3 As regards the implication of the conduct of theobjectors, who did not produce the original deed of cancellation,they also failed to take any steps to produce the original (reportedto be in possession of YK). On this, the probate applicant neitherobjected to production of certified copy nor insisted on productionof the original Cancellation Deed. As can be seen, the probateBobjectors never objected to presentation of the certified copy ofCancellation Deed. Before the trial Court, probate applicantprimarily argued that R was keeping ill-health and it was notpossible for him to have gone alone to the Sub-Registrar’s officefor getting the Cancellation Deed registered. When this was theCsubmission and the concerned deed was introduced and markedwithout protest, the High court in the face of overwhelmingevidence in support of the genuineness of the cancellation deed,should not have drawn an adverse inference against the objectorsby referring to the health condition of the testator. In suchscenario, where no protest was registered by the probate applicantDagainst production of certified copy of the Cancellation Deed, hecannot later be allowed to take up the plea of non-production oforiginal cancellation deed in course of the appellate proceeding.The main contention of probate applicants was that the mode ofproof of Cancellation deed was inadequate, however, such wasEnot the stand of the probate applicants before the trial court. Theobjection as to the admissibility of a registered document mustbe raised at the earliest stage before the trial court and theobjection could not have been taken in appeal, for the first time.[Para 19, 20][221-A-F]F1.4 It is clear that plea regarding mode of proof cannot bepermitted to be taken at the appellate stage for the first time, ifnot raised before the trial Court at the appropriate stage. This isto avoid prejudice to the party who produced the certified copyof an original document without protest by the other side. If suchobjection was raised before trial court, then the concerned partyGcould have cured the mode of proof by summoning the originalcopy of document. But such opportunity may not be available orpossible at a later stage. Therefore, allowing such objection tobe raised during the appellate stage would put the party (whoplaced certified copy on record instead of original copy) in aH

LACHHMI NARAIN SINGH (D) THROUGH LRS. v. SARJUGSINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

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jeopardy & would seriously prejudice interests of that party. Itwould also be inconsistent with the rule of fair play. [Para 24][223-D-G]

1.5 The High Court had erred by ignoring the materialevidence in disbelieving the Cancellation Deed and on that scoredeclaring that the applicant is entitled to grant of probate of theWill. Given the fact that Probate applicant never raised anyobjection regarding the mode of proof before the trial court, therewas no occasion for the High Court to say that it was the duty ofdefendant to produce original deed of cancellation. [Para 25][223-G-H; 224-A]

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1.6 On the basis of the examination, the trial court was rightin holding that the testator was medically fit and had cancelledthe Will himself. The evidences of the relevant OWs havewithstood the scrutiny of the trial court and those have remainedunshaken and should be trusted. Considering the omission ofthe probate applicants to raise objection regarding mode of proofbefore the trial court, there is merit in the case of the objectors.The order of High Court is set aside and the judgment of theFirst Additional District Judge. [Para 26, 27][224-C-E]

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Padman v. Hanwanta AIR 1915 PC 111; Gopal Das v.Sri Thakurji AIR 1943 PC 83; R.V.E VenkatachalaGounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P Temple(2003) 8 SCC 752 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 450;Dayamathi Bai v. KM Shaffi (2004) 7 SCC 107 : [2004]3 Suppl. SCR 336; Babu Anand Behari v. Dinshow &Co. AIR 1946 PC 24 – referred to.

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Case Law Reference

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ACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5823of 2011.

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.04.2009 of the High Courtof Patna in Appeal from Original Decree No. 127 of 1974.

Ms. Sreoshi Chatterjee, Shiv Kumar Pandey, Chandrashekhar A.BChakalabbi, Awanish Kumar, Anshul Rai for M/S. Dharmaprabhas LawAssociates, Advs. for the Appellants.

Abhay Kumar, Adv. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHRISHIKESH ROY, J.

1. This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated15.04.2009 of the Patna High Court whereby the appeal filed by theprobate applicant was allowed in his favour by concluding that the Willfavouring Sarjug Singh was not cancelled. Thus, the appellate CourtDreversed the Trial Court’s decision which held that the applicant isdisentitled to get the Will probated as the same was revoked. The HighCourt to give the impugned verdict against the objectors, disbelieved theregistered deed of cancellation dated 02.02.1963 (Exbt C) whereby, theExbt 2 Will, was revoked by the testator.

ERELEVANT FACTS

2. Rajendra Singh (since deceased) had executed a Will on14.09.1960 (Exbt 2) in favour of the applicant Sarjug Singh. The executantdied issueless on 21.08.1963 leaving behind his sister Duler Kuer, wifeof late Thakur Prasad Singh and nephew Yugal Kishore Singh and alsoFthe probate applicant Sarjug Singh. The case of the applicant is that thetestator’s wife died long ago and therefore Rajendra Singh who wasissueless bequeathed his property in village Pojhi Bujurg and Pojhi Kapoor,District-Saran, Bihar by executing the Will (Ext.2) favouring therespondent Sarjug Singh (since deceased).

G3. In the probate proceeding initiated by Sarjug Singh i.e. ProbateCase No. 19/1967, objection was filed by Shyam Sunder Kuer alias RajBansi Kuer (claiming to be the second wife and widow of the testator).Khedaran Kuer also opposed the applicant and she claimed to be thewidow of Jamadar Singh who was the son of late Jag Jitan Singh (brotherof the testator Rajendra Singh). According to the objectors, the WillH

favoring Sarjug Singh was revoked and cancelled by a registered deeddated 02.02.1963 (Exbt. C). It was also the objector’s contention thatRaj Bansi Kuer was in possession of all assets belonging to late RajendraSingh and she along with Khedaran Kuer, sold several plots of land tothe appellants. Eight of the vendees who took possession after suchpurchase, appeared in the probate proceedings and supported the caseof the objectors.

4. It is relevant to state that the validity of the Will in favour of theapplicant Sarjug Singh was never seriously challenged but the objectorspleaded that the concerned Will was cancelled by a registered deed on02.02.1963 (Exbt. C) by the testator himself. The applicant howeverclaims that the testator was in very poor health, paralytic and was not ina position to attend the Sub-Registrar’s office on 02.02.1963 to executethe registered cancellation deed (Ext. ‘C’). The applicant also challengedthe genuineness of the testator’s thumb impression on the cancellationdeed of the Will.

5. In the Probate case filed by Sarjug Singh, the learned FirstAdditional District Judge, Chapra firstly concluded that the Will (Ext. 2)is a genuine document. However, by referring to the evidence laid bythe objectors, the learned Judge then held that the Will (Ext. 2) wascancelled on 02.02.1963 under a registered deed (Ext. C), a few monthsbefore Rajendra Singh died on 21.08.1963, at Patna hospital. The Courtalso referred the death certificate (Ext. F) to conclude that the samedoes not indicate that the testator was suffering from paralysis. Thisobservation was made by the trial Court to reject the contention of theapplicant to the effect that Rajendra Singh was paralytic and wasincapable of cancelling the Will a few months before he died. The learnedJudge then considered the sale deeds produced by the objector ShyamSunder Kuer and observed that she was dealing with Rajendra Singh’sproperty as his legal heir and this according to the Court was also indicativeof the fact that the Will for which probate was sought, was revoked bythe testator himself.

6. The learned trial Court while examining the genuineness of thecancellation deed dated 02.02.1963 (Ext. ‘C’) referred to the evidenceof the handwriting expert, Hassan Raza (OW-3), the attesting witnessof cancellation deed, Jagarnath Prasad (OW-4) and the scribe of thecancellation deed Shashinath Mishra (OW-5). The OW-3 as an expert,compared the admitted thumb mark of Rajendra Singh on the deed of A

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Agift dated 23.7.1947 in favour of Jugal Kishore Singh (Ext. 1) and on theWill dated 14.09.1960 in favour of Sarjug Singh (Ext. 2) with the thumbimpression registered at Chapra Registration Office and recorded thefollowing :- “8. …..xxx…The expert who examined these thumb marks isBof the opinion that all these thumb impressions tally. O.W.3S.E.T. Hassan Raza is the Expert and Ext. B is his report.There is nothing in his cross-examination to discard hisevidence and report …..xxx….”

After referring to the testimony of the attesting witness and theCscribe of the cancellation deed, the trial Court concluded as below:- “10. …..xxx…There is no evidence on the side of the applicantnor there is any suggestion to the attesting witness O.W. 4and Shashinath Mishra the scribe O.W. 5 to the effect thatsome body also had impersonated Rajendra Singh before theDSub-Registrar….xxx….”

7. On the above analysis, the learned trial Court, under its judgmentdated 14.12.1973 concluded that the Will has been revoked and theapplicant Sarjug Singh is disentitled to get the Will probated.

8. Aggrieved by the rejection of the Probate case by the TrialECourt, the applicant Sarjug Singh filed the First Appeal No. 127 of 1974before the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, on 21.03.2002,Sarjug Singh died but no application was filed for substitution of thedeceased appellant.

9. The High Court addressed the core issue on whether theFtestator had cancelled the Will. Then the Court noted the precarioushealth condition of the testator and the failure of the objectors to producethe original of the cancellation deed and non-presentation of the materialwitness. On such consideration, the appellate Court held that the deedcancelling the Will should not be taken into evidence. The learned Judgealso noted that the validity of the Will was never seriously questionedGand the objectors had stated that the Will was cancelled by the testatorhimself. The High Court accordingly granted the probate and reversedthe finding of the trial Court. The subsequent purchasers of the assetswho supported the objector’s case in the probate proceedings, have thenfiled the present appeal.H

10. In course of the proceedings before this Court, suggestionwas earlier made to the parties for amicable settlement of the rival claimsand accordingly time was granted to the counsel to obtain instructions.But when the case was taken up for final hearing, the Court is informedby the respondents’ counsel that they failed to reach any acceptablesettlement and the appeal should therefore be heard.

11. Insofar as the non-substitution of the deceased Sarjug Singhbefore the High Court and non-substitution of legal heirs of othercontesting parties, the same need not detain us at this point, in view ofthe proceeding on 13.04.2021 in this Court where, the parties have agreedthat although the appeal before the High Court was decided against adead person and the legal heirs of the present appellants were belatedlybrought on record, since all legal heirs of the contesting parties arerepresented, the case should be decided on its legal merit. In view ofsuch consensus, taking note of the amended memo of parties whichwere filed, we have proceeded to adjudicate the appeal.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

12. We have heard Ms. Sreoshi Chatterjee, the learned counselappearing for the appellants/objectors. The legal heirs of Sarjug Singh(probate applicant) are represented by the learned counsel Mr. AbhayKumar.

13. The merit of the claim of either party in the present matterwill hinge around the core issue as to whether Rajendra Singh had actuallyrevoked the Will in favour of Sarjug Singh and his physical and mentalcapacity to execute the Cancellation Deed (Ext. C) and also whetherthumb impression of Rajendra Singh on the registered document dated02.02.1963 is genuine or not.

14. In allowing the appeal of the probate applicant, the High Courtreferred to the health condition of Rajendra Singh who suffered fromparalysis before his death and had opined that it would not be possiblefor the testator to visit the Sub-Registrar’s Office, to cancel the Will.Inference was accordingly drawn on his impersonation, at the Sub-Registrar’s Office. Such conclusion was reached even though, neitherany suggestion nor any cross-examination was put to the objector’switnesses, regarding impersonation of the testator Rajendra Singh at theSub-Registrar’s Office. It is also important to record that Ext. B (Reportof Handwriting Expert) and Ext. C (Deed of Cancellation) were both A

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Amarked without objection, when the documents were tendered in thetrial Court.

15. The High Court in our assessment, failed to give due weightageto the evidence of OW-3, OW-4 and OW-5 who led evidence ongenuineness of the cancellation deed. Instead, erroneous presumptionBwas drawn on impersonation and incapability of the testator, to visit theoffice of the Sub-Registrar to register the Cancellation Deed.

16. That apart, the probate applicant never opposed the acceptanceand marking of the concerned cancellation deed, in the trial Court.Therefore, in the face of the Expert’s Report (Ext. B), when the DeedCof Cancellation (Ext. C) were marked without any objection before thetrial Court, those cannot be treated as inadmissible and should have beenaccepted as genuine, particularly in view of the testimony of OW-3,OW-4 and OW-5, who stood firm on execution of the registeredrevocation deed by the testator, Rajendra Singh.D17. On the issue of testator’s thumb impression on the cancellationdeed, it is telling that all the four deeds executed by Rajendra Singh in hislifetime, contained his thumb impression and not his signature. Therefore,adverse presumption on genuineness of the cancellation deed cannot bedrawn merely because the testator chose to append his thumb impression.That apart, the Ext. B Report of the handwriting expert (OW-3) clearlyEindicates that the thumb impression on all the documents placed beforethe Expert’s opinion are of the same person i.e. of Rajendra Singh. Sincethe said Ext. B was marked in Court, without objection from the applicant,the genuineness of the same cannot be allowed to be questioned beforethe appellate Court. A contrary inference according to our opinion, wasFerroneously drawn by the High court by referring to the health conditionof the testator, when the revocation deed was registered.

18. The key characteristic of thumb impression is that every personhas a unique thumb impression. Forgery of thumb impressions is nearlyimpossible. Therefore, adverse conclusion should not be drawn forGaffixing thumb impression instead of signing documents of propertytransaction. Therefore, genuineness of the Cancellation deed cannot bedoubted only due to the fact that same was not signed and Rajendra asa literate person, affixed his thumb impression. This is more so in thiscase since the testator’s thumb impression was proved to be genuine bythe expert.H

19. Next, we need to consider the implication of the conduct ofthe objectors, who did not produce the original deed of cancellation.They also failed to take any steps to produce the original (reported to bein possession of Yugal Kishore Singh). On this, the probate applicantneither objected to production of certified copy nor insisted on productionof the original Cancellation Deed. Mr. Abhay Kumar, learned counselhowever contended that even the Trial Court had not pressed forproduction of the original Cancellation Deed. As can be seen, the probateobjectors never objected to presentation of the certified copy ofCancellation Deed. Before the trial Court, probate applicant primarilyargued that Rajendra was keeping ill -health and it was not possible forhim to have gone alone to the Sub- Registrar’s office for getting theCancellation Deed registered. When this was the contention of theapplicant and the concerned deed was introduced and marked withoutprotest, the High court in the face of overwhelming evidence in supportof the genuineness of the cancellation deed, should not have drawn anadverse inference against the objectors by referring to the healthcondition of the testator.

20. In such scenario, where no protest was registered by theprobate applicant against production of certified copy of the CancellationDeed, he cannot later be allowed to take up the plea of non-productionof original cancellation deed in course of the appellate proceeding. Asalready noted, the main contention of probate applicants was that themode of proof of Cancellation deed was inadequate. However, suchwas not the stand of the probate applicants before the Trial Court. Theobjection as to the admissibility of a registered document must be raisedat the earliest stage before the trial court and the objection could nothave been taken in appeal, for the first time. On this we may drawsupport from observations made by Justice Ameer Ali in Padman v.Hanwanta[1] where the following was set out by the Privy Council “The defendants have now appealed to His Majesty-in-Council, and the case has been argued on their behalf ingreat detail. It was urged in the course of the argument that aregistered copy of the Will of 1898 was admitted in evidencewithout sufficient foundation being laid for its admission. Noobjection, however, appears to have been taken in the firstcourt against the copy obtained from the Registrar’s office 1 AIR 1915 PC 111

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Abeing put in evidence. Had such objection been made at thetime, the District Judge, who tried the case in the first instance,would probably have seen that the deficiency was supplied.Their Lordships think that there is no substance in the presentcontention.” (emphasis in original)

B21. A similar view was taken by George Rankin, J. in the decisionof Privy Council in Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji[2] where it was held thatObjection as to the mode of proof must be taken when the document istendered and before it is marked as an exhibit. It cannot be taken inappeal. Objection as to mode of proof should be taken before a documentis admitted and marked as exhibit. In present case probate applicantCnever raised any objection in regards to mode of proof of cancellationdeed before the Trial Court, as is evident from perusal of records andthis must be held against him.

22. In support of our above conclusion, we may usefully refer tothe ratio in R.V.E Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu ViswesaraswamiD& V.P Temple[3] where Justice Ashok Bhan while dealing with the aspectof disallowing objection as to mode of proof at appellant stage as a ruleof fair play to avoid prejudice to the other side, said as follows:- “20. …….…. In the latter case, the objection should be takenwhen the evidence is tendered and once the document hasEbeen admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, theobjection that it should not have been admitted in evidenceor that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregularcannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent tothe marking of the document as an exhibit. The latterFproposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whetheran objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, wouldhave enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure thedefect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular.The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failurethe party entitled to object allows the party tendering theGevidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party isnot serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, aprompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering theevidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply 2 AIR 1943 PC 83H3 (2003) 8 SCC 752

LACHHMI NARAIN SINGH (D) THROUGH LRS. v. SARJUGSINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

its mind and pronounce its decision on the question ofadmissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event offinding of the court on the mode of proof sought to be adoptedgoing against the party tendering the evidence, theopportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for permittinga regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing theobjection raised by the opposite party, is available to the partyleading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair toboth the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referredto hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a promptand timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity forinsisting on formal proof of a document, the document itselfwhich is sought to be proved being admissible inevidence………” (emphasis in original)

23. This Court in the opinion written by Justice S. H. Kapadia inDayamathi Bai v. KM Shaffi[4] has similarly held that objection as to themode of proof falls within procedural law. Therefore, such objectionscould be waived. Moreover, objection is to be taken before the documentis marked as an exhibit and admitted in Court.

24. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that plea regardingmode of proof cannot be permitted to be taken at the appellate stage forthe first time, if not raised before the trial Court at the appropriate stage.This is to avoid prejudice to the party who produced the certified copy ofan original document without protest by the other side. If such objectionwas raised before trial court, then the concerned party could have curedthe mode of proof by summoning the original copy of document. Butsuch opportunity may not be available or possible at a later stage.Therefore, allowing such objection to be raised during the appellate stagewould put the party (who placed certified copy on record instead oforiginal copy) in a jeopardy & would seriously prejudice interests of thatparty. It will also be inconsistent with the rule of fair play as propoundedby Justice Ashok Bhan in the case of R.V.E. Venkatachala (Supra).

25. In consequence of above, we are of the considered opinionthat the High Court had erred by ignoring the material evidence indisbelieving the Cancellation Deed and on that score declaring that theapplicant is entitled to grant of probate of the Will (Ext. 2). Given thefact that Probate applicant never raised any objection regarding the mode4 (2004) 7 SCC 107

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Aof proof before the trial court, there was no occasion for the High Courtto say that it was the duty of defendant to produce original deed ofcancellation. The reliance therefore on the opinion of Lord Thankertonin Babu Anand Behari v. Dinshow & Co.[5] is found to be unjustified.This is because in that case, the authenticity of some extract of powerof attorney, was questioned but in the present case the certified copy ofBthe registered cancellation deed is produced and most importantly, thesame was not objected. Moreover, the plea of mode of proof was neverraised before the trial Court and therefore High Court’s reliance onaforementioned case to support the applicant is unacceptable.

26. On the basis of the above examination, it is our consideredCopinion that the Trial Court was right in holding that Rajendra wasmedically fit and had cancelled the Will himself. It is also seen that theevidences of the relevant OWs have withstood the scrutiny of the TrialCourt and those have remained unshaken and should be trusted.Considering the omission of the probate applicants to raise objection Dregarding mode of proof before the trial court, we find merit in the caseof the objectors.

27. For the above reasoning, we allow the present appeal setaside the impugned order of High Court and restore the judgment of theFirst Additional District Judge Chapra, with no order as to costs.

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Nidhi Jain

Appeal allowed.

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H5 AIR 1946 PC 24