STATE OF WEST BENGAL versus ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS. on 11 October 2022

[2022] 13 S.C.R. 946

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 13 S.C.R.

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STATE OF WEST BENGAL

v.

ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 6706 of 2022)

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OCTOBER 11, 2022

[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD ANDHIMA KOHLI, JJ.]

Universities – Vice-Chancellor – Re-appointment of –CChallenge to – Calcutta University Act, 1979 – ss. 8 and 60 – HighCourt allowed petition u/Art.226 seeking a writ of quo warrantoagainst the Vice-Chancellor (VC) of Calcutta University – The HighCourt held that the State government had no authority to appointor re-appoint the VC under s.8 of the Act, or by taking recourse tothe residuary provisions of s.60 of the Act – As a consequence, theDorder issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of WestBengal re-appointing the incumbent VC of Calcutta University wasset aside – The High Court held that the scheme of s.8 empowersonly the Chancellor to appoint, re-appoint, temporarily appoint orremove the VC; and s.60 to which recourse was taken by the StateEgovernment provides only for the removal of difficulties arising ingiving effect to the provisions of the statute – Apart from the reasoningbased on the provisions of the Act, the High Court also held thatthe UGC Regulations envisage that the appointment of a VC can bemade only by a Visitor / Chancellor, and this came in the way of theState government making the appointment – On appeal, held: ThereFis neither an express provision nor a necessary intendment by whichit could be inferred that the power which is entrusted to theChancellor to appoint a VC is taken away in the case of re-appointment – A re-appointment is the appointment of an existingincumbent who fulfils the conditions of eligibility – The power ofGappointment including of reappointment is entrusted to theChancellor and not the State Government – The amended provisionsof s.8(2)(a) of the Act cannot be construed to mean that the powerof reappointment has been taken away from the Chancellor andentrusted to the State government – Where there is a specificprovision, as in the present case s.8(2)(a), it was not open to theHState government to conjure up a lacunae or omission and purportedly exercise the power to remove difficulties – The Stategovernment chose the incorrect path under s.60 by misusing the“removal of difficulty clause” to usurp the power of the Chancellorto make the appointment – The government cannot misuse the“removal of difficulty clause” to remove all obstacles in its pathwhich arise due to statutory restrictions – Allowing such actionswould be antithetical to the rule of law – In the guise of removingthe difficulties, the State cannot change the scheme and essentialprovisions of the Act – Even if the provisions of the Act allowed theappointment of the Vice Chancellor by the State government, it wouldbe in violation of the UGC Regulations – The Regulations becomepart of the statute framed by Parliament and will prevail – Thejudgment of the High Court is correct in law and on fact and doesnot warrant interference in appeal – The State government couldnot have issued the order re-appointing the VC – The UniversityGrants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for appointment ofTeachers and Other Academic Staff in Universities and Collegesand Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in HigherEducation) Regulations 2018 – Regulation 7.3 – Constitution ofIndia – Art. 226.

Writs – Writ of Quo Warranto – Held: The writ of quo warrantocan be issued where an appointment has not been made inaccordance with the law – Constitution of India – Article 226 –Service Law – Appointment.

Interpretation of Statutes – Where there is a specific provision,it is not open to the State government to conjure up a lacunae oromission and purportedly exercise the power to remove difficulties– Misusing the limited power granted to make minor adaptationsand peripheral adjustments in a statute for making its implementationeffective, to side-step the provisions of the statute altogether woulddefeat the purpose of the legislation.

Interpretation of Statutes – A statute must be read to avoid aconstruction which would make certain provisions or termsmeaningless or redundant – An effort must be made to read theprovisions of the statute in a holistic manner so as to imbue it withmeaning and content.

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ADismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD:1. Through a line of cases, this Court has laid outthe terms on which the writ of quo warranto may be exercised.The Court has settled the position that the writ of quo warrantocan be issued where an appointment has not been made inBaccordance with the law. [Paras 23 and 28][963-A; 965-F]

University of Mysore v C.D. Govindra Rao, (1964) 4SCR 575 – followed.

High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan MazdoorPanchayat, (2003) 4 SCC 712; B. Srinivasa Reddy v.CKarnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage BoardEmployees’ Assn. (2006) 11 SCC 731; CentralElectricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo(2014) 1 SCC 161 and Bharati Reddy v. State ofKarnataka (2018) 6 SCC 162 – relied on.

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2.1. The procedure for appointing a VC is prescribed inclauses (b) and (c) of Section 8(1) of the Calcutta University Act1979. Clause (b) postulates that (i) a search committee has to beconstituted by the state government; (ii) the search committeehas to prepare a panel of three names in order of preference; (iii)Ein preparing the panel, the search committee has to give properweightage to academic excellence, exposure to the highereducation system in the country and abroad, adequate experiencein academic and administrative governance; (iv) the searchcommittee has to reflect its consideration of the above in writingwhile submitting the panel to the Chancellor; and (v) the searchFcommittee has to consist of three persons as stipulated in Section8(1)(c). [Para 33][966-H; 967-A-B]

2.2. In the case of a reappointment, the unamendedprovisions of Section 8(2)(a) provided earlier that a VC would beeligible for reappointment for a period not exceeding four years,G“subject to the provisions of this section”. The provisions ofSection 8(2)(a) were substituted by the Amending Act of 2019.Section 8(2)(a) as amended stipulates that a VC shall be eligiblefor reappointment for another term of four years “subject to thesatisfaction of the State government and on the basis of his past H

academic excellence and administrative success establishedduring his term of office in the capacity of VC”. [Para 34][967-C]

2.3. Section 8(2)(a) is sought to be interpreted by theappellants as indicating that the power of reappointment is takenaway from the Chancellor and is entrusted to the Stategovernment. This would be an incorrect reading of the statutoryprovision. Section 8(2)(a) provides for (i) the term of office of aVC; (ii) eligibility for reappointment; (iii) the term of office uponreappointment; (iv) the conditions subject to which a person shallbe eligible for reappointment; and (v) the outer age limit of 70years. The expression “subject to the satisfaction of the Stategovernment” cannot by a process of inferential reasoning beconstrued to vest the power of reappointment in the Stategovernment. The provisions of Section 8 envisage diversesituations. While the eligibility for appointment is indeeddetermined by the State government’s satisfaction, the power ofmaking the appointment continues to vest in the Chancellor.[Paras 36 and 37][967-F-H; 968-A]

2.4. The effect of the words “subject to the provisions ofthis section” in Section 8(2)(a) in its unamended form was thatthe reappointment would have to be in a manner provided inSection 8, which obviously included Section 8(1). Deletion of thosewords in Section 8(2)(a), as amended, would mean that theprocedure which has been prescribed for making the appointmentof a VC, namely the appointment of a search committee and thepreparation of a panel, would not be attracted in the case of areappointment. In the case of a reappointment, a VC who hascompleted a term of four years would be eligible subject to thesatisfaction of the State government and on the basis of theirpast academic excellence and administrative record during theterm of office held as a VC. [Para 40][968-F-H; 969-A]

3. It is a settled principle of law that a statute must be readto avoid a construction which would make certain provisions orterms meaningless or redundant. An effort must be made to readthe provisions of the statute in a holistic manner so as to imbue itwith meaning and content. [Para 41][969-B-D]

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950SUPREME COURT REPORTS

AUnion of India v Hansoli Devi (2002) 7 SCC 273 :[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 324 and Aswini Kumar Ghose v.Arabinda Bose 1953 SCR 1 – referred to.

Quebec Railway, Light Heat & Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry,AIR 1920 PC 181 – referred to.

B

4.1. There is neither an express provision nor a necessaryintendment by which it could be inferred that the power which isentrusted to the Chancellor to appoint a VC is taken away in thecase of a reappointment. A reappointment is the appointment ofan existing incumbent who fulfils the conditions of eligibility. TheCfulfilment of the conditions makes a person eligible forreappointment. The power of appointment including ofreappointment is entrusted to the Chancellor and not to the Stategovernment. The amended provisions of Section 8(2)(a) cannottherefore be construed to mean that the power of reappointmenthas been taken away from the Chancellor and entrusted to theDState government. Reading the provisions in such a manner, wouldmake the provisions entrusting the power of appointment of theVC with the Chancellor redundant. [Para 42][969-D-F]

4.2. Moreover, in the present case, the State governmentitself made a reference to the Chancellor when the issue asEregards the reappointment of the VC came up. Evidently as theState government stated before the High Court, the Chancellorwas in disagreement with the State government. Therefore, it isclear that the State government was in agreement with theinterpretation of the Act as laid out above. [Para 43][969-G; 970- FA]

5. Section 8(6) stipulates the manner in which a vacancy inthe office of the VC which occurs by reason of death, resignation,expiration of the term of office, removal or otherwise shall befilled up. The provision indicates that such vacancy shall be filledGup in accordance with the provisions of sub-Section (1) of Section8. Section 8(6) has to be read in conjunction with Section 8(1)since the former expressly refers to the latter. The reference tothe provisions of sub-Section (1) for filling up a vacancy on theexpiration of the term of office will not obviously apply to a caseof reappointment because the procedure contemplated by SectionH

8(1)(b) of a search committee would not attach to a reappointment.On this aspect, the High Court has correctly disagreed with thepetitioner before it and noted that amended Section 8(2)(a) whichprovides for the re-appointment of a VC for another term doesnot require that the procedure prescribed in Section 8(1) has tobe followed for re-appointment. [Para 46][970-F-H]

6. Faced with the view of the Chancellor, the Stategovernment attempted to get around the situation by purportingto exercise its powers under Section 60 which contemplates asituation where inter alia any difficulty arises in giving effect tothe provisions of the Act “on account of any lacunae or omission”in its provisions or for any other reason whatsoever. In such cases,the State government is empowered, as the occasion may require,to do anything which appears to it to be necessary for removingthe difficulty notwithstanding anything to the contrary containedelsewhere in the Act or any other law. Where there is a specificprovision, as in the present case Section 8(2)(a), it was not opento the State government to conjure up a lacunae or omission andpurportedly exercise the power to remove difficulties. The Stategovernment chose the incorrect path under Section 60 bymisusing the “removal of difficulty clause” to usurp the power ofthe Chancellor to make the appointment. A government cannotmisuse the “removal of difficulty clause” to remove all obstaclesin its path which arise due to statutory restrictions. Allowing suchactions would be antithetical to the rule of law. Misusing thelimited power granted to make minor adaptations and peripheraladjustments in a statute for making its implementation effective;to side-step the provisions of the statute altogether would defeatthe purpose of the legislation. Accordingly, the High Court wasjustified in coming to the conclusion that “in the guise of removingthe difficulties, the State cannot change the scheme and essentialprovisions of the Act”. [Paras 47, 48, 49 and 50][971-A, C-E;972-C-F]

Madeva Upendra Sinai v Union of India (1975) 3 SCC765 : [1975] 2 SCR 640 – relied on.

7. In Gambhirdan K Gadhvi case, despite the appointmentbeing in terms of the statutory provisions of the Sardar Patel A

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AUniversity Act 1955, the Court issued a writ of quo warrantosetting aside the appointment of the Vice Chancellor by relyingupon the UGC Regulations 2018. In view of the decision inGambhirdan K Gadhvi, even if the provisions of the Act allowedthe appointment of the Vice Chancellor by the State government,it would be in violation of the UGC Regulations. The RegulationsBbecome part of the statute framed by Parliament and will prevail.The judgment of the High Court is correct in law and on fact anddoes not warrant interference in appeal. The State governmentcould not have issued the order re-appointing the VC. [Paras 55,56 and 57][973-E; 974-D-E]

C

Gambhirdan K Gadhvi v State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC179 - relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6706of 2022.G

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.09.2022 of the High Courtof Calcutta in WPA (P) No.55 of 2022.

With

Civil Appeal No. 6707 of 2022.H

Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Advs., Ms. AsthaSharma, Nipun Saxena, Amit Bhandari, Ravinder Singh, Ms. RaveeshaGupta, Ms. Mantika Haryani, Shreyas Awasthi, Kunal Chatterji, Ms.Maitrayee Banerjee, Rohit Bansal, Advs. for the Appellant.

Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Adv., Kabir Shankar Bose, Mukul Singh, AmitMishra, Venkata Raghuvamsy D., Kshitij Mittal, Abhijeet, SurjenduShankar Das, Sunil Fernandes, Nupur Kumar, Ms. Diksha Dadu,Divyansh Tiwari, Ms. Muskan Surana, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.

1. By its judgment dated 13 September 2022, a Division Bench ofthe High Court at Calcutta allowed a petition under Article 226 of theConstitution seeking a writ of quo warranto against the Vice-Chancellor[1] of Calcutta University. The High Court held that the Stategovernment had no authority to appoint or re-appoint the VC underSection 8 of the Calcutta University Act 1979[2] or by taking recourse tothe residuary provisions of Section 60 of the Act. As a consequence, theorder issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of West Bengalon 27 August 2021 re-appointing the incumbent VC of Calcutta Universitywas set aside. The High Court has held that the VC had no authority tohold that office on the basis of the order of appointment. Both the Stateof West Bengal and Dr Sonali Chakravarti Banerjee, the VC whoseappointment has been set aside, are in appeal.

2. By a notification dated 28 August 2017, the Chancellor ofCalcutta University appointed Professor Dr Sonali Chakravarti Banerjeeas the VC of Calcutta University. The notification was in exercise of thepowers conferred by Section 8(1)(a) read with Section 8(2)(a) of theAct. The term of appointment was for a period of four years with effectfrom the date on which she joined office or until she attained the age ofsixty-five or until further orders, whichever is the earliest.

3. The term of office of the VC was to end on 27 August 2021.The State government in the Higher Education Department submittedproposals for the re-appointment of the VC for a period of four years tothe Chancellor on 4 June 2021 and 17 June 2021 which were not acceptedas the Chancellor sought certain clarifications.

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A4. On 17 August 2021, the Chancellor suo moto accorded anextension to the tenure of the VC for a period of three months underSection 8(2)(b) of the Act.

5. The State government issued a notification on 27 August 2021stating that:

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(i) While extending the tenure of the VC, the Chancellor hadinvoked Section 8(2)(b) without consultation with theMinister, which was mandatory;

(ii) The step taken by the Chancellor of the University wasvoid ab initio, particularly in light of provisions of Rule 9Cof the West Bengal State Universities (Terms and Conditionsof Service of the Vice Chancellors and the Manner andProcedure of Official Communication) Rules 2019;

(iii) The Chancellor of the University had not agreed with theproposal of the State government and initiated a step withoutDfulfilling the requisite legal pre-condition of consultation withthe Minister;

(iv) The provisions of the Act are “silent to deal with thesituation”;

(v) The State government “has no other option but to invokeEthe provisions of Section 60”; and

(vi) The incumbent VC was being re-appointed with effect from28 August 2021 for a period of four years or until she attainsthe age of seventy, whichever is earlier, in terms of theprovisions of Section 60 read with Section 8(2)(b) of theAct as amended in 2019.F

6. The order of the State government re-appointing the VC wasquestioned in a public interest petition instituted by an alumnus of CalcuttaUniversity who is also a practicing advocate. The submissions beforethe High Court in support of the petition under Article 226 were that:

G(i)The State government had no power to re-appoint the VCsince both the power to appoint and re-appoint is vestedwith the Chancellor;

(ii) In terms of Section 8(6), the procedure which is prescribedin Section 8(1) for initial appointment has to be followed forthe purpose of re-appointment as well;H

(iii) The amended provisions of Section 8(2) do not constitute acomplete code and the entire section has to be interpreted;

(iv) The provisions of the Act could not have been by-passedby invoking Section 60;

(v) The re-appointment of the VC without following theprocedure prescribed in Section 8(1) eliminates competitionand was in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution;

(vi) The appointment of the VC by the State was contrary tothe UGC (Minimum qualifications for appointment ofteachers and other academic staff in University and Collegesand measures for the maintenance of standards in HigherEducation) Regulations 2018.[3]

7. The petition was opposed on behalf of the State government bysubmitting that:

(i) In terms of the unamended provisions of Section 8, theprocedure prescribed in sub-Section (1) has to be followedfor re-appointment;

(ii) This position was altered by the 2019 amendment to theAct;

(iii) The appointment and re-appointment of a VC stand on adifferent footing and the power of reappointment is vestedwith the State government and not the Chancellor;

(iv) Even if the Chancellor is the re-appointing authority, he hasno discretion once a recommendation is made by the Stategovernment upon its satisfaction; and

(v) Since the Chancellor has not taken any action in terms ofSection 8 (2)(a), the State government had no option but tore-appoint the incumbent VC by taking recourse to theprovisions of Section 60.

8. The incumbent VC who had been re-appointed by the Stategovernment was impleaded as a party to the proceeding and urged that:

(i) There is a distinction in law between appointment and re-appointment because in the case of the latter, the zone of 3 UGC Regulations

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956SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 13 S.C.R.

Aconsideration is restricted to persons already holding thepost and in such cases the suitability of the incumbent whichwas assessed at the time of initial appointment need not bereassessed;

(ii) In the case of a re-appointment, Section 8(2)(a) prescribesBthat academic excellence and administrative success arethe only factors which are to be taken into considerationfor re-appointment and the procedure which is prescribedby Section 8(1) is not attracted; and

(iii) No writ of quo warranto can be issued where the suitabilityCof the VC for re-appointment is sought to be questioned.

9. The Division Bench of the High Court relied upon the judgmentsof this court in Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. DhobeiSahoo[4] and Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka[5 ]andnoted that awrit of quo warranto can be issued when:

D(i)A person holding public office lacks eligibility criteriaprescribed for such appointment; and

(ii) The appointment is made contrary to the statutory provisionsor rules.

10. The reasons adduced by the High Court in support of itsEjudgment were:

(i) Under Section 7(1), the Governor of the State of WestBengal is the Chancellor of the University;

(ii) Section 8(1)(b) confers the powers of appointment on theChancellor;F

(iii) Under Section 8(2)(b), the Chancellor has the power tocontinue the VC after the expiration of the term of his officeup to a period of two years or until the attainment of theage of 70 years whichever is earlier;

(iv) In terms of Section 8(5), a temporary appointment of theGVC may be made by the Chancellor; and

(v) Section 8(7) empowers the Chancellor to remove the VCon satisfaction of prescribed conditions.

4 (2014) 1 SCC 161H5 (2018) 6 SCC 162

On the above premises, the Division Bench held that the schemeof Section 8 empowers only the Chancellor to appoint, re-appoint,temporarily appoint or remove the VC. In other words, the Stategovernment has no power to appoint or re-appoint the VC. The HighCourt held that Section 60 to which recourse was taken by the Stategovernment provides only for the removal of difficulties arising in givingeffect to the provisions of the statute.

11. Apart from the reasoning based on the provisions of the Act,the Division Bench held that the UGC Regulations envisage that theappointment of a VC can be made only by a Visitor / Chancellor. This inthe view of the High Court came in the way of the State governmentmaking the appointment and, in this context, it relied upon a judgment ofthis Court in Ghambirdan K Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat.[6]

12. On behalf of the petitioners before the High Court, it wasurged during the course of those proceedings that the same procedurewhich was provided for appointment of a VC under Section 8(1) wasrequired to be followed at the time of re-appointment. On the otherhand, the State government relied on the amended provisions of Section8(2)(a). On this point, the High Court disagreed with the petitioner andnoted that amended Section 8(2)(a) which provides for the re-appointmentof a VC for another term does not require that the procedure prescribedin Section 8(1) should be followed for re-appointment. In the amendmentof 2019, the expression “following the provisions of sub-Section (1)”were deleted from Section 8(2)(a). The High Court did not thereforesubscribe to the submission of the petitioner before it that the sameprocedure was required to be followed for the re-appointment of a VCas prescribed for the purpose of appointment in Section 8(1).

13. However, ultimately, on the basis of its analysis, the High Courtheld that the State government had no authority to re-appoint the VCeither under Section 8 or by taking recourse to the provisions of Section60 and consequently held that the notification of 27 August 2021 wascontrary to law. It is on that basis, that the re-appointment of the VC hasbeen set aside.

14. Before we summarize the rival submissions and proceed toanalyse them, it is necessary to advert to the salient provisions of theAct bearing upon the controversy.

6 (2022) 5 SCC 179

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A15. Section 7(1) stipulates that the Governor shall by virtue of hisoffice be the Chancellor of the University and shall be the head of theUniversity and the President of the Senate.

16. Section 8 provides for the VC. Section 8(1)(a) stipulates theconditions of eligibility for appointment as a VC in the following terms:

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“8(1)(a) The Vice-chancellor shall be a distinguished academicwith proven competence and integrity, and having a minimumof ten years of experience in a University system of which atleast five years shall be as a professor or ten years of experiencein a reputed research or academic administrative organizationCof which at least five years shall be in an equivalent position ofprofessor.”

Section 8(1)(b) provides for the procedure for the appointment ofa VC:

“8(1)(b). The Vice Chancellor shall be appointed by theDChancellor out of the panel of three names recommended inorder of preference by the Search Committee constituted bythe State Government. While preparing the panel, the SearchCommittee must give proper weightage to academic excellence,exposure to the higher education system in the country andEabroad and adequate experience in academic and administrativegovernance and reflect the same in writing while submittingthe panel to the Chancellor.”

Clause (c) of Section 8(1) provides for the constitution of a searchcommittee. In 2019, the State legislature enacted the West BengalFUniversity Laws (Amendment) Act 2019. The amended Act wasassented to by the Governor of West Bengal and was published in theofficial Gazette on 27 August 2019. As a result of the amending enactment,amendments were made to the seven state enactments governing stateuniversities. Section 8(2)(a) as it stood prior to the amendment whichwas brought about in 2019, was in the following terms:

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“(2)(a) The Vice-chancellor shall hold office for a term of fouryears or till he attains the age of sixty-five years, whichever isearlier, and shall be eligible for re-appointment for another termof four years or till he attains the age of sixty-five years,whichever is earlier, following the provisions of sub-section(1).”

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Sub-Section (2) of Section 8 as amended reads as follows:

“(2)(a) The Vice-Chancellor shall hold office for a period offour years appointed as such in terms of the provisions of sub-section (1), and shall be eligible for reappointment for anotherterm of four years subject to the satisfaction of the StateGovernment and on the basis of his past academic excellenceand administrative success established during his term of officein the capacity of Vice-Chancellor, or till he attains the age ofseventy years, whichever is earlier.”

Section 8(2)(b) as amended is in the following terms:

“8(2)(b) The Chancellor may, notwithstanding the expirationof the term of the office of the Vice-Chancellor, allow him tocontinue in office for a period not more than two years at atime in consultation with the Minister, which shall under nocircumstances be extended beyond the age of seventy years,subject to the satisfaction of the State Government and on thebasis of his past academic excellence and administrativesuccess established during his term of office in the capacity ofVice-Chancellor.”

Sub-Sections (5) and (6) of the Section 8 as amended read thus:

“8(2)(5) If –

(a) the Vice-Chancellor is, by reasons of leave, illness or othercause, temporarily unable to exercise the powers and performthe duties of his office, or (b) a vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice-Chancellor by reasonof death, resignation, removal, expiry of term of his office orotherwise, then, during the period of such temporary inability or pendingthe appointment of a Vice-Chancellor, as the case may be,the Chancellor in consultation with the Minister may appoint aperson to exercise the powers and perform the duties of theVice-Chancellor.

(6) The vacancy in the office of the Vice-Chancellor occurringby reason of death, resignation or expiry of the term of hisoffice, removal or otherwise shall be filled up by appointment A

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Aof a Vice-Chancellor in accordance with the provisions ofsub-section (1) within a period of six months from the date ofoccurrence of the vacancy, and such period shall be held toinclude any period for which a Vice-Chancellor is allowed tocontinue in consultation with the Minister to exercise the powersand perform the duties of the Vice-Chancellor under sub-Bsection (5).”

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17. In the present case, the notification issued by the Stategovernment reappointing the VC specifically notes that the proposalsubmitted by it for reappointment of the VC was not accepted by theChancellor:C

“Whereas, the State Government in the Higher EducationDepartment, considering the above, had submitted the proposalof reappointment of Prof. (Dr) Chakravarti Banerjee before theHon’ble Chancellor of the University for a period of four years,on two occasions firstly on 04.06.2021 and secondly on 17.06.2021.DHowever, Hon’ble Chancellor of the University did not acceptthe proposal given by the Higher Education Department and soughtcertain clarifications on some issues not related directly with thesubject matter…”

18. In its counter affidavit filed before the High Court, the StateEgovernment submitted that in accordance with the amended provisionsof the Act, the State government considering “the past academicexcellence and the administrative success” of the incumbent VCrecommended her re-appointment for a further term of four years oruntil she attains the age of 70 years, whichever is earlier. The StateFgovernment submitted that since the VC had already been appointed foran earlier term there was no requirement of a fresh search committeefor the purpose of a reappointment. However, according to the Stategovernment, the Chancellor was not in agreement with the interpretationof the amended provisions since the State government opined that whena reappointment was proposed under amended Section 8(2)(a) thereGwas no necessity of undergoing a further selection process. The Stategovernment urged that Section 8(2)(a) only postulates satisfaction ofthe State government and does not require the concurrence of theChancellor. In other words, according to the State government, it hasunfettered rights in the matter of reappointment to the post of VC. ThisHsubmission has been rejected by the High Court.

19. Dr Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearingon behalf of the State of West Bengal urged that:

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(i) The power conferred by Section 8(5) on the Chancellor toappoint a person to exercise the powers and perform theduties of the VC during the period of the temporary inabilityof an incumbent VC or pending the appointment of a VCBapplies only when the power of reappointment has not beenexercised under Section 8(2)(a);

(ii) Likewise, Section 8(6) applies only when the power toreappoint under Section 8(2)(a) has not been exercised; C

(iii) Section 8(2)(a) clearly specifies that a VC shall be eligiblefor reappointment for another term of four years subject tothe satisfaction of the State government and on the basis oftheir past academic excellence and administrative successduring the term of office as a VC; D

(iv) Unamended Section 8(2)(a) stipulated that a VC would beeligible for reappointment for a period not exceeding fouryears “following the provisions of sub-section (1)”; and

(v) In the amended provisions of Section 8(2)(a), the expression“”following the provisions of sub-section (1)” wasconspicuously deleted as a result of which the procedureprescribed in Section 8(1) for the appointment of a VC doesnot apply to a reappointment.

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20. On the other hand, the petitioner before the High Court,submitted that:

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(i) Section 8(2)(a) does not take away the power of theChancellor to appoint a VC under Section 8(1)(b);

(ii) In effecting the reappointment of a VC, the procedure whichis prescribed by sub-Section (1) of Section 8 of constitutinga Search Committee needs to be followed; G

(iii) The UGC Regulations clearly stipulate that the appointmentof a VC has to be made by the Chancellor;

(iv) In terms of Section 7, the Chancellor is the head of theUniversity; H

A(v)Section 8(2)(a) provides for the satisfaction of the Stategovernment coupled with the eligibility of a VC forreappointment. But this does not take away the power ofthe Chancellor to make the appointment; and

(vi) As a matter of fact, it was on the premise that the power toBreappoint vests with the Chancellor that the file pertainingto the reappointment of the VC was forwarded to theChancellor by the State government.

21. Mr Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalfof the VC submitted that:

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(i) Section 8(6) does not stand with Section 8(2) because interms of Section 8(6) the appointment of a VC is to bemade in accordance with the provisions of sub-Section (1)in terms of which the three-member search committee hasto be constituted; D(ii)The judgment of the High Court in the present casespecifically holds that the procedure which is prescribed bySection 8(1)(b) of constituting the search committee doesnot apply to a reappointment; and

(iii) Section 8 envisages distinct situations namely:E

a.Appointment of a VC by the Chancellor out of apanel of three names recommended by the SearchCommittee constituted by the State government; b.Reappointment in respect of which the power isvested in the State government under Section 8(2)(a);F

c.Extension of the term of a VC beyond the expirationof the term of office under Section 8(2)(b) by theChancellor in consultation with the Minister; d.A temporary appointment of the VC which is madeGby the Chancellor in consultation with the Ministerunder Section 8(5).

22. These rival submissions would need to be analyzed. However,before we enter into a substantive analysis of the submissions, it wouldbe appropriate to deal with the procedural objection regarding the limitsHof the writ of quo warranto.

23. Through a line of cases, this Court has laid out the terms onwhich the writ of quo warranto may be exercised. In University ofMysore v C.D. Govindra Rao, a Constitution Bench of this Court,speaking through Justice Gajendragadkar (as he then was), held that:[7]

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Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicialenquiry in which any person holding an independent substantivepublic office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show bywhat right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if theinquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has novalid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts himfrom that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warrantoconfers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to controlexecutive action in the matter of making appointments to publicoffices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects acitizen from being deprived of public office to which he may havea right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adoptedsubject to the conditions recognized in that behalf, they tend toprotect the public from usurpers of public office; in some cases,persons, not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupythem and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance ofthe executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if thejurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properlyinvoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to thepost allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizencan claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the court,inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and isheld by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarilyleads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of thesaid alleged usurper has been made in accordance with lawor not.

24. In High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan MazdoorPanchayat,[8] in his concurring opinion in a three judge Bench, Justice SBSinha, held that:

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A22. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matterof this nature is required to determine at the outset as to whethera case has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or awrit of quo warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue awrit of quo warranto is a limited one. While issuing such a writ,the Court merely makes a public declaration but will not considerBthe respective impact on the candidates or other factors whichmay be relevant for issuance of a writ of certiorari. (See R.K.Jain v. Union of India, SCC para 74.)

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23. A writ of quo warranto can only be issued when theappointment is contrary to the statutory rules. (See Mor ModernCCoop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Financial Commr. & Secy. toGovt. of Haryana.)

25. In B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply& Drainage Board Employees’ Assn.,[9 ]the limitations of the writ ofquo warranto were elaborated upon by a two judge Bench of this Court.DThe court observed:

“49. […] The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writof quo warranto is a limited one which can only be issuedwhen the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules.

E[…]

51. It is settled law by a catena of decisions that the courtcannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the Governmentin the choice of the person to be appointed so long as theperson chosen possesses the prescribed qualification andFis otherwise eligible for appointment. This Court in R.K. Jainv. Union of India [(1993) 4 SCC 119] was pleased to hold that theevaluation of the comparative merits of the candidates would notbe gone into a public interest litigation and only in a proceedinginitiated by an aggrieved person, may it be open to be considered.GIt was also held that in service jurisprudence it is settled law thatit is for the aggrieved person, that is, the non-appointee to assailthe legality or correctness of the action and that a third party hasno locus standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action.Further, it was declared that public law declaration would only be H9 (2006) 11 SCC 731

made at the behest of a public-spirited person coming before thecourt as a petitioner…”

(emphasis supplied)

26. In Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. DhobeiSahoo[10], another two judge Bench of this Court reiterated that:

21. […] the jurisdiction of the High Court while issuing awrit of quo warranto is a limited one and can only be issuedwhen the person holding the public office lacks the eligibilitycriteria or when the appointment is contrary to the statutoryrules. That apart, the concept of locus standi which is strictlyapplicable to service jurisprudence for the purpose of canvassingthe legality or correctness of the action should not be allowed tohave any entry, for such allowance is likely to exceed the limits ofquo warranto which is impermissible. The basic purpose of awrit of quo warranto is to confer jurisdiction on theconstitutional courts to see that a public office is not heldby usurper without any legal authority.

27. More recently, in Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka[11], athree judge Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Justice DYChandrachud) was a part, noted the line of precedent clarifying the remitof the writ of quo warranto.

28. Through these decisions, the Court has settled the positionthat the writ of quo warranto can be issued where an appointment hasnot been made in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the rivalcontentions must be analyzed by dealing with the scheme of the statutoryprovisions governing the appointment and reappointment of the VC.

29. Section 8 of the Act envisages several situations:

(i) Appointment of a VC (Section 8(1)(b));

(ii) Reappointment of a VC (Section 8(2)(a));

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A(iv)Appointment of a person to exercise the powers and performthe duties of the VC, occasioned by a.The temporary inability of the VC to exercise thepowers and perform the duties of the office byreasons of leave, illness or other causes; and B

b.A vacancy occurring in the office of VC upon thedeath, resignation, removal, expiry of term of officeor otherwise. (Section 8(5)).

30. Section 8 makes provisions for firstly, the conditions of eligibilityfor holding the office of a VC; secondly, the term for which the officeCwould be held; thirdly, the procedure for appointment; and fourthly, whohas the power to make the appointment.

31. The conditions of eligibility for holding the post of VC arestipulated in Section 8(1)(a) namely (i) a distinguished academic withproven competency and integrity; (ii) (a) minimum of ten years ofDexperience in a University system of which at least five years shall beas a professor; or (b) ten years of experience in a reputed research oracademic administrative organization of which at least five years shallbe in a position equivalent to a professor.

32. The term of office of a VC, including in the case of aEreappointment, is four years or until the attainment of the age of 70years, whichever is earlier. Where the term of office of a VC has expired,Section 8(2)(b) postulates that, notwithstanding the expiration of the term,the VC may be allowed to continue in office for a period not exceedingtwo years at a time but such an extension shall not be granted beyondFthe age of 70. In case of a temporary inability of an incumbent VC dueto leave, illness or other cause, Section 8(5)(a) contemplates theappointment of a person to exercise the powers and perform the dutiesof that office during the period of such temporary inability. Where avacancy occurs by reason of death, resignation, removal, expiry of theterm of office or otherwise, a person may likewise be appointed toGexercise the powers and perform the duties of a VC pending theappointment.

33. The procedure for appointing a VC is prescribed in clauses(b) and (c) of Section 8(1). Clause (b) postulates that (i) a searchcommittee has to be constituted by the state government; (ii) the searchHcommittee has to prepare a panel of three names in order of preference;

(iii) in preparing the panel, the search committee has to give properweightage to academic excellence, exposure to the higher educationsystem in the country and abroad, adequate experience in academic andadministrative governance; (iv) the search committee has to reflect itsconsideration of the above in writing while submitting the panel to theChancellor; and (v) the search committee has to consist of three personsas stipulated in Section 8(1)(c).

34. In the case of a reappointment, the unamended provisions ofSection 8(2)(a) provided earlier that a VC would be eligible forreappointment for a period not exceeding four years, “subject to theprovisions of this section”. The provisions of Section 8(2)(a) weresubstituted by the Amending Act of 2019. Section 8(2)(a) as amendedstipulates that a VC shall be eligible for reappointment for another termof four years “subject to the satisfaction of the State government and onthe basis of his past academic excellence and administrative successestablished during his term of office in the capacity of VC”.

35. In other words, Section 8(2)(a) establishes, firstly, the eligibilityof a VC for reappointment for another term of four years; the expression“another term” signifying that the new term will be in addition to theearlier term of four years; and, secondly, the requirement that theeligibility for reappointment would be subject to the satisfaction of theState government on the basis of academic excellence and administrativesuccess during the period when the individual held office of VC.Significantly, Section 8(2)(a) is a provision which prescribes the term,namely, the initial term of four years and if an incumbent is reappointed,a further period of four years. Moreover, Section 8(2)(a) stipulates theconditions subject to which the VC would be eligible for reappointmentfor another term of four years.

36. Section 8(2)(a) is sought to be interpreted by the appellants asindicating that the power of reappointment is taken away from theChancellor and is entrusted to the State government. This would be anincorrect reading of the statutory provision. Section 8(2)(a) provides for(i) the term of office of a VC; (ii) eligibility for reappointment; (iii) theterm of office upon reappointment; (iv) the conditions subject to which aperson shall be eligible for reappointment; and (v) the outer age limit of70 years. The expression “subject to the satisfaction of the Stategovernment” cannot by a process of inferential reasoning be construedto vest the power of reappointment in the State government.

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A37. The provisions of Section 8 envisage diverse situations. Whilethe eligibility for appointment is indeed determined by the Stategovernment’s satisfaction, the power of making the appointmentcontinues to vest in the Chancellor in terms of the provisions detailedbelow.B38. The Chancellor has been described in Section 7(1) as thehead of the University. The power of appointing a VC is vested bySection 8(1)(b) in the Chancellor. That provision stipulates that “the VCshall be appointed by the Chancellor”. Section 8(2)(b) empowers theChancellor to allow a VC to continue, notwithstanding the expiration ofits term, for a period of not more than two years at a time in consultationCwith the Minister. Here again, the continuation is “subject to thesatisfaction of the State government and on the basis of his past academicexcellence and administrative success” established during the term ofoffice in the capacity of VC. These words are in terms identical to thosecontained in Section 8(2)(a). Section 8(5) entrusts to the Chancellor theDpower to appoint the VC as a result of the temporary inability of the VCto perform the duties of the office or pending the appointment of the VCwhen a vacancy has arisen in the office.

39. The issue is whether the deletion of the expression “subject tothe provisions of this section” in the amended provisions of Section 8(2)(a)Ewould lead to the inference that the power of reappointment has beentaken away from the Chancellor and entrusted to the State government.The submission to that effect which has been urged on behalf of theappellants cannot be accepted.

40. The effect of the words “subject to the provisions of thisFsection” in Section 8(2)(a) in its unamended form was that thereappointment would have to be in a manner provided in Section 8, whichobviously included Section 8(1). Deletion of those words in Section8(2)(a), as amended, would mean that the procedure which has beenprescribed for making the appointment of a VC, namely the appointmentof a search committee and the preparation of a panel, would not beGattracted in the case of a reappointment. In the case of a reappointment,a VC who has completed a term of four years would be eligible subjectto the satisfaction of the State government and on the basis of their pastacademic excellence and administrative record during the term of officeheld as a VC. Significantly, Section 8(2)(a) speaks of the satisfaction ofHthe State government andpast academic excellence and administrative success during the term of office. Fulfilment of those conditions makesa person eligible for being reappointed as a VC.

41. It is a settled principle of law that a statute must be read toavoid a construction which would make certain provisions or termsmeaningless or redundant. In Union of India v Hansoli Devi,[12] aConstitution Bench of this Court reiterated the dictum in the decision ofthe Constitution Bench in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose,[13]that “it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in astatute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriateapplication in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation ofthe statute.” The Court in Hansoli Devi[14 ]reiterated the decision of thePrivy Council in Quebec Railway, Light Heat & Power Co.Ltd. v. Vandry[15 ]observing that the “legislature is deemed not to wasteits words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributesredundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compellingreasons.” An effort must be made to read the provisions of the statute ina holistic manner so as to imbue it with meaning and content.

42. There is neither an express provision nor a necessaryintendment by which it could be inferred that the power which is entrustedto the Chancellor to appoint a VC is taken away in the case of areappointment. There is no intrinsic reason or rationale to accept theinterpretation which has been urged on behalf of the State of West Bengal.A reappointment is the appointment of an existing incumbent who fulfilsthe conditions of eligibility. The fulfilment of the conditions makes a personeligible for reappointment. The power of appointment including ofreappointment is entrusted to the Chancellor and not to the Stategovernment. The amended provisions of Section 8(2)(a) cannot thereforebe construed to mean that the power of reappointment has been takenaway from the Chancellor and entrusted to the State government. Readingthe provisions in such a manner, would make the provisions entrustingthe power of appointment of the VC with the Chancellor redundant.

43. Moreover, in the present case, the State government itselfmade a reference to the Chancellor when the issue as regards the 12 (2002) 7 SCC 27313 1953 SCR 1

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Areappointment of the VC came up. Evidently as the State governmentstated before the High Court, the Chancellor was in disagreement withthe State government. Therefore, it is clear that the State governmentwas in agreement with the interpretation of the Act as laid out above.

44. The High Court has in the course of its judgment also extractedBthe communication of the Chancellor dated 17 August 2021 whichindicated that he was not agreeable to such an appointment. While turningdown the proposal to reappoint the VC, the Chancellor had observedthat:

“The proposal dated 4.6.2021 emanating from the StateCGovernment seeking reappointment of Prof. Sonali ChakravartiBanerjee, Vice Chancellor of Calcutta University for second termof four years, is not in consonance with the applicable statutoryprescriptions as is amply reflected in the note dated 2.8.2021. Ineed to indicate here that without being a participant in selection,and consequent selection, as incumbent Vice Chancellor cannotDget another term in view of section 8(2)(a) of the CalcuttaUniversity Act 1979.”

45. It would be appropriate to also analyse whether the re-appointment of the VC has to follow the same process as a freshappointment, by setting up a selection committee under Section 8(1) ofEthe Act, as indicated by the Chancellor.

46. Section 8(6) stipulates the manner in which a vacancy in theoffice of the VC which occurs by reason of death, resignation, expirationof the term of office, removal or otherwise shall be filled up. The provisionindicates that such vacancy shall be filled up in accordance with theFprovisions of sub-Section (1) of Section 8. Section 8(6) has to be read inconjunction with Section 8(1) since the former expressly refers to thelatter. The reference to the provisions of sub-Section (1) for filling up avacancy on the expiration of the term of office will not obviously applyto a case of reappointment because the procedure contemplated byGSection 8(1)(b) of a search committee would not attach to areappointment. On this aspect, the High Court has correctly disagreedwith the petitioner before it and noted that amended Section 8(2)(a)which provides for the re-appointment of a VC for another term doesnot require that the procedure prescribed in Section 8(1) has to befollowed for re-appointment.

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47. Faced with the view of the Chancellor, the State governmentattempted to get around the situation by purporting to exercise its powersunder Section 60. Section 60 provides as follows:

“If on account of any lacuna or omission in the provisions of thisAct, or for any other reason whatsoever, any difficulty arises asto the first constitution of any authority of the University underthis Act, or otherwise in giving effect to the provisions of this Act,the State Government, as occasion may require, may by order doanything which appears to it to be necessary for the purpose ofremoving the difficulty notwithstanding anything to the contrarycontained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law.”

48. Section 60 contemplates a situation where inter alia anydifficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of the Act “on accountof any lacunae or omission” in its provisions or for any other reasonwhatsoever. In such cases, the State government is empowered, as theoccasion may require, to do anything which appears to it to be necessaryfor removing the difficulty notwithstanding anything to the contrarycontained elsewhere in the Act or any other law. Where there is a specificprovision, as in the present case Section 8(2)(a), it was not open to theState government to conjure up a lacunae or omission and purportedlyexercise the power to remove difficulties. A “removal of difficulty clause”has been construed in Madeva Upendra Sinai v. Union of India[16],which reads as follows:

“39. To keep pace with the rapidly increasing responsibilities of awelfare democratic State, the Legislature has to turn out a plethoraof hurried legislation, the volume of which is often matched withits complexity. Under conditions of extreme pressure, with heavydemands on the time of the Legislature and the endurance andskill of the draftsman, it is well nigh impossible to foresee all thecircumstances to deal with which a statute is enacted or toanticipate all the difficulties that might arise in its working due topeculiar local conditions or even a local law. This is particularlytrue when Parliament undertakes legislation which gives a newdimension to socio-economic activities of the State or extends theexisting Indian laws to new territories or areas freshly merged inthe Union of India. In order to obviate the necessity of approaching A

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Athe Legislature for removal of every difficulty, howsoever trivial,encountered in the enforcement of a statute, by going throughthe time-consuming amendatory process, the Legislaturesometimes thinks it expedient to invest the Executive with a verylimited power to make minor adaptations and peripheraladjustments in the statute, for making its implementation effective,Bwithout touching its substance. That is why the “removal ofdifficulty clause”, once frowned upon and nick-named as “HenryVIII clause” in scornful commemoration of the absolutist ways inwhich that English King got the “difficulties” in enforcing hisautocratic will removed through the instrumentality of a servileCParliament, now finds acceptance as a practical necessity, inseveral Indian statutes of post-independence era.”

49. The State government chose the incorrect path under Section60 by misusing the “removal of difficulty clause” to usurp the power ofthe Chancellor to make the appointment. A government cannot misuseDthe “removal of difficulty clause” to remove all obstacles in its pathwhich arise due to statutory restrictions. Allowing such actions would beantithetical to the rule of law. Misusing the limited power granted tomake minor adaptations and peripheral adjustments in a statute formaking its implementation effective, to side-step the provisions of theEstatute altogether would defeat the purpose of the legislation.

50. Accordingly, the High Court in our view was justified in comingto the conclusion that “in the guise of removing the difficulties, the Statecannot change the scheme and essential provisions of the Act”.

51. In the view taken above on the construction of the provisionFof the Calcutta University Act 1979, while it is not necessary to advertto the provisions of the UGC Regulations which were also relied uponby the High Court in support of its conclusion, for the purposes ofcompleteness, they are dealt with as well.

52. The University Grants Commission (Minimum QualificationsGfor appointment of Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Universitiesand Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in HigherEducation) Regulations 2018 have been issued to prescribe, inter alia.the minimum qualifications for appointment and other service conditionsof University and College teachers.H

53. Regulation 1.2 of the UGC Regulations provides that they areapplicable to:

“every University established or incorporated by or under a CentralAct, Provincial Act or a State Act, every Institution including aConstituent or an affiliated College recognized by the Commission,in consultation with the University concerned under Clause (i) ofSection 2 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 andevery Institution deemed to be a University under Section 3 of thesaid Act.”

54. Regulation 7.3 provides for the minimum qualifications of aVC, selection procedure and the appointment procedure. Regarding theappointment of the VC, Regulation 7.3 states that:

7.3 Vice Chancellor:

[…]

(iii) The Visitor/Chancellor shall appoint the Vice Chancellor outof the Panel of names recommended by the Search-cum-SelectionCommittee.

55. In Gambhirdan K Gadhvi v State of Gujarat,[17] the SardarPatel University Act 1955, expressly vested the power of appointmentof the Vice Chancellor in the State government (instead of theChancellor). Despite the appointment being in terms of the statutoryprovisions of the Sardar Patel University Act 1955, the Court issued awrit of quo warranto setting aside the appointment of the Vice Chancellorby relying upon the UGC Regulations 2018. This Court, holding that theUGC Regulations were binding, held that:

49. Therefore, when the appointment of Respondent 4 is found tobe contrary to the UGC Regulations, 2018 and the UGCRegulations are having the statutory force, we are of the opinionthat this is a fit case to issue a writ of quo warranto and to quashand set aside the appointment of Respondent 4 as the Vice-Chancellor of the SP University.

50. It cannot be disputed that the UGC Regulations are enactedby the UGC in exercise of powers under Sections 26(1)(e) and26(1)(g) of the UGC Act, 1956. Even as per the UGC Act

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Aevery rule and regulation made under the said Act, shall belaid before each House of Parliament. Therefore, being asubordinate legislation, UGC Regulations becomes part ofthe Act. In case of any conflict between the State legislationand the Central legislation, Central legislation shall prevailby applying the rule/principle of repugnancy as enunciatedBin Article 254 of the Constitution as the subject “education”is in the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Scheduleto the Constitution. Therefore, any appointment as a Vice-Chancellor contrary to the provisions of the UGC Regulationscan be said to be in violation of the statutory provisions, warrantingCa writ of quo warranto.

56. In view of the decision in Gambhirdan K Gadhvi,[18] even ifthe provisions of the Act allowed the appointment of the Vice Chancellorby the State government, it would be in violation of the UGC Regulations.DThe Regulations become part of the statute framed by Parliament andwill prevail.

57. For the above reasons, we hold that the judgment of the HighCourt is correct in law and on fact and does not warrant interference inappeal. The State government could not have issued the order re-Eappointing the VC.

58. The appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.

59. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

FBibhuti Bhushan Bose(Assisted by : Preetam Bharti, LCRA)

Appeals dismissed.

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