ANIL BHARDWAJ versus THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. on 13 October 2020

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[2020] 9 S.C.R. 442

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2020] 9 S.C.R.

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ANIL BHARDWAJ

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THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OFMADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 3419 of 2020)

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OCTOBER 13, 2020

[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]

Service Law – Judicial Service – The appellant was selectedfor the post of District Judge (Entry Level) – In his onlineCapplication, the appellant had mentioned that one FIR u/ss. 498/406/34 was pending against him – On 14.09.2018, an order wasissued which declared the appellant ineligible and his name wasdeleted from the select list for the said post – A writ petition wasfiled by the appellant challenging the order dated 14.09.2018 – ItDwas disclosed under the Right to Information Act that the joint meetingof Administrative Committee (Higher Judicial Service) andExamination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee dated18.07.2018 had considered appellant not suitable for beingappointed – Meanwhile, the appellant was acquitted of the chargeframed against him vide judgment dated 18.09.2019 – The appellantEwithdrew his earlier writ petition and filed a fresh writ petitionincorporating subsequent events, facts and acquittal order – Thesaid writ petition was dismissed by the High Court – Before theSupreme Court, the appellant contended that his subsequent acquittalshould have been reconsidered by the High Court and the HighFCourt committed an error in not considering the appellant forappointment – It was further contended that as per paragraph 6(viii)of the guidelines issued by the State on the subject ‘regarding issuingof new guidelines for character verification’, the candidate will beeligible for Government Service as appellant has been acquitted –Held: There is no dispute that on the date when the CommitteeGdeclared the appellant unsuitable, criminal case against him u/s.498A and 406 IPC was pending which was registered on a complaintfiled by the appellant’s wife – The mere inclusion in the select listdoes not give an indefeasible right to a candidate – The employerhas right to refuse appointment to the candidate included in theH

select list or any valid ground – The persons who occupy judicialservice of the State are persons who are expected to have impeccablecharacter and conduct – The decision of the Committee was wellwithin the jurisdiction and power of the Committee and cannot besaid to be unsustainable – There was no infirmity in the decisiontaken by the Committee – The High Court did not commit any errorin dismissing the writ petition – The fact that subsequently theappellant was acquitted in the criminal case did not furnish sufficientground for reconsidering the appellant for appointment on the post– As far as the paragraph 6(viii) of the guidelines is concerned, thesame cannot came to the rescue of the appellant since at the time ofcharacter verification the appellant had not been acquitted and hewas acquitted after more than a year from rejection of his candidature– Thus, the appellant was not entitled for any relief in the writpetition.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. In the present case, the decision of Examination-cum-Section and Appointment Committee for holding theappellant unsuitable was based on the relevant consideration,i.e., a criminal case against the appellant under Section 498A/406/34 IPC was pending consideration which was registered ona complaint filed by the wife of the appellant. Such decision of theCommittee was well within the jurisdiction and power of theCommittee and cannot be said to be unsustainable. The merefact that subsequently after more than a year when the personwhose candidature has been cancelled has been acquitted cannotbe a ground to turn the clock backward. [Para 23][452-G-H; 453-A]

2. There being no infirmity in the decision dated 18.07.2018of the Committee declaring the appellant unsuitable for the postand consequential decision taken by the State to delete the nameof the appellant, the High Court did not commit any error indismissing the writ petition. The fact that subsequently theappellant was acquitted in the criminal case did not furnishsufficient ground for reconsidering the appellant for appointmenton the post. [Para 24][453-B-C]

3. The guidelines dated 05.06.2003 has been issued byGovernment of Madhya Pradesh on the subject “regarding issuing AB

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Aof new guidelines for character verification.” Clause (viii) ofparagraph 6 on which the reliance is placed contemplates thatthe candidate who has been acquitted on merit by the Court willbe eligible for the Government service. The aforesaidcontemplation relates to at the time of character verification. Thus,at the time of character verification, if a candidate is found to beBacquitted on merits by the Court, the candidate shall be treatedto be eligible for Government Service. The Clause (viii) cannotcome to the rescue of the appellant who at the time of characterverification or at the time of consideration of the case of theappellant by the committee on 18.07.2018 had not been acquitted.CHad the appellant in column 12 had mentioned about the acquittalor at the time of character verification it was found that thecandidate has been acquitted on merit by the Court, Clause 6(viii)would have been attracted but in the present case the said clauseis not attracted since at the time of character verification theappellant had not been acquitted and he was acquitted after moreDthan a year from rejection of his candidature. [Paras 26 and27][453-E-F; 454-B-D]

Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another v.Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685 : [2013] 13 SCR 432;Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others (2016) 8 SCCE471 : [2016] 7 SCR 445; Union Territory, ChandigarhAdministration and Others v. Pradeep Kumar andAnother (2018) 1 SCC 797 : [2018] 1 SCR 112 – reliedon.

Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh andFOthers (2015) 2 SCC 377 : [2014] 11 SCR 155 –distinguished.

Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra and OthersAIR 2018 SC 4895; Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) andAnother v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service CommissionGand Others (2008) 17 SCC 703 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

AIR 2018 SC 4895referred toPara 8(2008) 17 SCC 703referred toPara 12

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3419of 2020.

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.01.2020 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in WP-27779 of 2019.

R. Venkataramani, Sr. Adv., Danish Zubair Khan, Adv. for theCappearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

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2. This appeal has been filed questioning the Division Benchjudgment dated 06.01.2020 of the High Court of Madhya Pradeshdismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. The appellant in thewrit petition has prayed for quashing the orders dated 14.09.2018,18.07.2018 and 21.09.2019 by which appellant has been held not suitablefor being appointed to the post of District Judge (Entry Level).

3. The brief facts of the case are:

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh issued an advertisement dated09.03.2017 inviting applications for recruitment in the post of DistrictJudge (Entry Level) in the cadre of Higher Judicial Service by DirectRecruitment from amongst the eligible Advocates. In pursuance to theadvertisement, the appellant submitted online application form. Theappellant after being declared successful in the Main Examination wascalled for interview. The provisional select and waiting list was publishedin which the name of the appellant was included at Serial No.13 in thecategory of unreserved. The appellant received a communication on06.04.2018 from the Law and Legislative Department informing that hehas been selected for the post of District Judge (Entry Level). He wasasked to appear before the Medical Board for the health tests. On02.07.2018 the appellant was informed that in his attestation form FIRNo.852/2014 under Section 498/406/34 IPC is shown and the copy of F

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Athe same was asked for. On 14.09.2018 order was issued by the PrincipalSecretary, Madhya Pradesh, Law and Legislative Department declaringthe appellant ineligible and directing for deletion the name of the appellantfrom the select list. The Government also issued a Gazette notificationdeleting the name of the appellant from the Merit No.13 of the mainselect list.B

4. The appellant filed a Writ Petition No.27434 of 2018 before theHigh Court challenging the order dated 14.09.2018 and the Gazettenotification dated 21.09.2018. On application submitted under the Rightto Information Act, the appellant was provided extract of the Minutes ofthe Joint Meeting of Administrative Committee (Higher Judicial Service)Cand Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee dated18.07.2018 by which proceedings the appellant was not considered suitablefor being appointed to the post of District Judge (Entry Level). On thebasis of a complaint by the wife of the appellant, a criminal case wasregistered and vide judgment dated 18.09.2019 the appellant was acquittedDof the charge framed against him.

5. The appellant filed an application for amendment of the writpetition to bring on record the order of the acquittal and other eventsoccurred during the pendency of the writ petition. The appellant waspermitted to withdraw his earlier writ petition with liberty to file a freshEwrit petition. Writ Petition No.27779 of 2019 was filed by the appellantincorporating subsequent events, facts and acquittal order which writpetition has been dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 06.01.2020by the High Court. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the appellanthas come up in this appeal.

F6. We have heard Shri R. Venkataramani, learned senior counselfor the appellant.

7. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that theappellant in his online application form has disclosed about the lodging ofFIR No.852/2014 under Section 498A/406/34 IPC. He submits thatGappellant having disclosed the lodging of FIR against him has notconcealed any fact before the High Court and he having been selectedon merit was entitled to be appointed. Shri Venkataramani submits thaton the subsequent acquittal of the appellant on 18.09.2019 his case forappointment was to be reconsidered by the High Court and the HighCourt committed an error in not considering the appellant for appointment.H

The candidature of the appellant could not have been cancelled merelyon the ground of pendency of criminal case. The appellant could nothave been deprived of the employment after acquittal. There was noother material on record to indicate that antecedent or conduct of theappellant was not upto the mark. The High Court ought to have sent thematter back before the Higher Judicial Service and Examination-cum-Selection Committee for reconsideration.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the judgmentsof this Court which have been relied by the High Court in the impugnedjudgment. Learned counsel for appellant has also placed reliance on thejudgment of this Court in Mohammed Imran vs. State of Maharashtraand others (C.A.No.10571 of 2018) decided on 12.10.2018. Hesubmits that the judgment of Mohammed Imran was also a case of ajudicial officer who was directed by this Court to be given appointment.

9. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel forthe parties and perused the records.

10. The present is not a case where the name of the appellantwas deleted in the select list on the ground of any concealment of criminalcase against him. The appellant has brought on the record the proceedingsof Examination-cum-Selection Committee dated 18.07.2018. At ItemNo.2 of the Agenda the Committee recorded the following decision:

“ITEM NO.02.Consideration on the matter relates to CharacterVerification Reports of selected 13 candidates of MPHJS (DistrictJudge-Entry Level) (Direct from Bar) Exam-2016 & 2017,received from Law Department, Bhopal for determination of theireligibility for the said post.

1. Shri Anil Bhardwaj:-

Attestation Form submitted Shri Anil Bhardwaj and policeverification report submitted by Deputy Commissioner of Police,Special Branch, New Delhi, goes to show that FIR 852/2014 underSection 498A/406/34 of IPC has been registered against Shri AnilBhardwaj on the basis of complaint filed by Smt. Pooja wife ofShri Anil Bhardwaj.

After due consideration resolved that a case against ShriAnil Bhardwaj under Section 498A, 406-34 IPC is still pendingbefore Rohini Court, New Delhi. Therefore, he is not considered AB

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Asuitable for being appointed to the post of District Judge (EntryLevel).”

10. The FIR against the appellant was lodged by his wife underSection 498A and 406 IPC in the year 2014 on the basis of which acharge-sheet was submitted in the Court on 15.07.2017 under SectionB498A and 406 IPC. The appellant has disclosed lodging of the FIR againsthim in his online application form. The name of the appellant was includedin the select list which was forwarded to the State. The State aftercharacter verification submitted a report which report was consideredon 18.07.2018 by the Administrative Committee (Higher Judicial Service)and Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee and aCresolution was taken that due to pendency of the case under Section498A, 406-34 IPC on the basis of complaint filed by the wife, Smt.Pooja, the appellant is not considered suitable for being appointed to thepost of District Judge.

11. Before the High Court, the decision of the Committee datedD18.07.2018 as well as the order of the State dated 14.09.2018 for deletingthe name of the appellant was challenged in the writ petition. The mainissue to be considered was as to whether resolution dated 18.07.2018suffered from error which requires judicial review by the High Court inexercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. The submission which hasEbeen pressed by the counsel for the appellant is that appellant’s casewas required to be reconsidered in view of his subsequent acquittal on18.09.2019.

12. The recruitment to the Judicial Service is governed by theprovisions of Madhya Pradesh Uchchatar Nyayik Seva (Bharti TathaFSeva Sharten) Niyam, 1994. This Court issued direction to all States tofill up the vacancies in subordinate Courts in a time schedule. The directionwas issued by this Court in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) and another vs.Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission and others, 2008(17)SCC 703. The selection process for filling up the post of District Judgehas to be completed by all the High Courts as per the time scheduleGfixed by this Court. After declaration of the merit list the candidateshave to be given appointments in time bound manner so that they mayjoin the respective posts. There is no dispute that on the date when theCommittee declared the appellant unsuitable, criminal case against himunder Section 498A and 406 IPC was pending which was registered onHa complaint filed by the appellant’s wife, Smt. Pooja. The mere inclusion in the select list does not give an indefeasible right to a candidate. Theemployer has right to refuse appointment to the candidate included inthe select list on any valid ground. The persons who occupy JudicialService of the State are persons who are expected to have impeccablecharacter and conduct. It is not disputed that the criminal case underSection 498A and 406 IPC was pending at the time when the appellantapplied for the recruitment, when he appeared for the interview andwhen the result was declared. The character verification report wasreceived from the State where pendency of the criminal case wasmentioned which was the reason for the Committee to declare theappellant unsuitable. The submission which needs to be considered isthat whether in view of the subsequent acquittal of the appellant, hiscase was required to be reconsidered and he was entitled to be appointed.

13. This Court in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi andanother vs. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685, while considering acase of antecedents verification for appointment into Delhi Police Servicemade the following observation in paragraph 35:

“35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shouldersthe great responsibility of maintaining law and order and publicorder in the society. People repose great faith and confidence init. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing tojoin the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. Hemust have impeccable character and integrity. A person havingcriminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he isacquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal ordischarge order will have to be examined to see whether he hasbeen completely exonerated in the case because even a possibilityof his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline ofthe police force.…………”

14. The observation was made by this Court in the above casethat a candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person havingimpeccable character and integrity. The above observations apply withgreater force to the Judicial Service. This Court further observed thateven in the case of acquittal, it has to be examined as to whether theperson was completely exonerated in the case or not. In the presentcase the acquittal having taken place after the close of recruitmentprocess, there was no question of examining the acquittal order by theHigh Court at the time of finalizing the selection process.

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A15. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the judgmentof this Court in Joginder Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarhand others, (2015) 2 SCC 377, which was a case whether the appellantwas acquitted by the trial court for a case under Section 148/149/323/325/307 IPC. In the above case acquittal took place even before theappellant was called for the interview/medical examination. This factBwas recorded in paragraph 24 of the judgment in the following words:

“24. However, in the present case, we have observed thatthe appellant was involved in a family feud and the FIR came tobe lodged against him on 14-4-1998, after he had applied for thepost of Constable. Further, he had been acquitted on 4-10-1999Ci.e. much before he was called for the interview/medicalexamination/written test………”

16. The above case is clearly distinguishable and does not helpthe appellant.

D17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Avtar Singh vs. Unionof India and others, (2016) 8 SCC 471, had occasion to examinedifferent aspects of verification form after selection including the questionof having criminal antecedents and pending of criminal case. This Courtlaid down that in the event criminal case is pending and incumbent hasnot been acquitted employer may well be justified in not appointing suchEan incumbent. In paragraph 32 following has been laid down:

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“32. No doubt about it that once verification form requirescertain information to be furnished, declarant is duty-bound tofurnish it correctly and any suppression of material facts orsubmitting false information, may by itself lead to termination ofFhis services or cancellation of candidature in an appropriate case.However, in a criminal case incumbent has not been acquittedand case is pending trial, employer may well be justified in notappointing such an incumbent or in terminating the services asconviction ultimately may render him unsuitable for job andGemployer is not supposed to wait till outcome of criminal case. Insuch a case non-disclosure or submitting false information wouldassume significance and that by itself may be ground for employerto cancel candidature or to terminate services.”

18. Even in a case where candidates have been acquitted in criminalcase, it was held that the decision of the Screening Committee being notH

actuated by mala fide regarding suitability of the candidate is to berespected. This Court in Union Territory, Chandigarh Administrationand others vs. Pradeep Kumar and another, (2018) 1 SCC 797,laid down following in paragraphs 13 and 17:

“13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal casedoes not automatically entitle him for appointment to the post. Stillit is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examinewhether he is suitable for appointment to the post. From theobservations of this Court in Mehar Singh, 2013 (7) SCC 685and Parvez Khan, 2015 (2) SCC 591 cases, it is clear that acandidate to be recruited to the police service must be ofimpeccable character and integrity. A person having criminalantecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted ordischarged, it cannot be presumed that he was honourablyacquitted/completely exonerated. The decision of the ScreeningCommittee must be taken as final unless it is shown to be malafide. The Screening Committee also must be alive to the importanceof the trust reposed in it and must examine the candidate withutmost character.

17. In a catena of judgments, the importance of integrityand high standard of conduct in police force has been emphasised.As held in Mehar Singh case[5], the decision of the ScreeningCommittee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In thecase in hand, there is nothing to suggest that the decision of theScreening Committee is mala fide. The decision of the ScreeningCommittee that the respondents are not suitable for being appointedto the post of Constable does not call for interference. The Tribunaland the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the decisionof the Screening Committee and the impugned judgment is liableto be set aside.”

19. Now, we may notice the judgment of Mohammed Imran(supra) which has been heavily relied by the learned counsel for theappellant. In the above case the appellant was selected for Judicial Servicewhose selection was cancelled on 04.06.2010 due to the characterverification report of the Police. Writ petition was dismissed by the HighCourt. It was contended before this court that the appellant was acquittedof the charge under Sections 363, 366, 34 IPC on 28.10.2004 that ismuch before he cleared the examination for appointment in the year A

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A2009. The appellant disclosed his prosecution and acquittal by the SessionsCourt. This Court noticed the aforesaid fact in paragraph 9 of thejudgment in the following words:

“9. It is an undisputed fact that one Shri Sudhir GulabraoBarde, who had been acquitted on 24.11.2009 in Case No.3022Bof 2007 under Sections 294, 504, 34 IPC, has been appointed……”

20. This Court held that report received reveals that except forthe criminal case, in which he had already been acquitted, the appellanthas a clean record and there is no adverse material against him to denyhim the fruits of his academic labour. This Court found decision rejectingCthe candidature of the appellant as untenable by making followingobservation in paragraph 11:

“11. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of thecase, we are of the considered opinion that the consideration ofthe candidature of the appellant and its rejection are afflicted by aDmyopic vision, blurred by the spectacle of what has been describedas moral turpitude, reflecting inadequate appreciation andapplication of facts also, as justice may demand.”

21. There can be no dispute that in event it is found that decisionby which the candidature of a candidate is rejected is arbitrary or actuatedEby malafide such decision can be interfered by the Constitutional Courts.We have already noticed the judgment of this Court in Union Territory,Chandigarh Administration and others vs. Pradeep Kumar andanother (supra) that the decision of the Screening Committee must befinal unless it is mala fide.

F22. There can be no dispute to the above proposition. But therecan be other valid reasons for not sustaining the decision of ScreeningCommittee/ Selection Committee apart from the ground of mala fide.Any arbitrary decision taken by the Selection Committee can very wellbe interfered by the Constitutional Courts in exercise of Judicial ReviewJurisdiction.G

23. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the decision ofExamination-cum-Section and Appointment Committee for holding theappellant unsuitable was based on the relevant consideration, i.e., acriminal case against the appellant under Section 498A/406/34 IPC waspending consideration which was registered on a complaint filed by theHwife of the appellant. Such decision of the Committee was well within the jurisdiction and power of the Committee and cannot be said to beunsustainable. The mere fact that subsequently after more than a yearwhen the person whose candidature has been cancelled has beenacquitted cannot be a ground to turn the clock backward.

24. There being no infirmity in the decision dated 18.07.2018 ofthe Committee declaring the appellant unsuitable for the post andconsequential decision taken by the State to delete the name of theappellant, the High Court did not commit any error in dismissing the writpetition. The fact that subsequently the appellant was acquitted in thecriminal case did not furnish sufficient ground for reconsidering theappellant for appointment on the post.

25. One more submission advanced by learned counsel for thepetitioner needs also to be considered. The petitioner’s contention is thatthe decision declaring the petitioner unsuitable on the ground of pendencyof criminal case under Section 498A, 406 IPC was contrary to theguidelines issued by the Government of Madhya Pradesh for characterverification dated 05.06.2003. He submits that as per paragraph 6(viii)of the guidelines on the acquittal on merit of the case by the Court, thecandidate will be eligible for Government service. He submits that theabove clause of the Government Order has been breached in declaringthe appellant unsuitable.

26. The guidelines dated 05.06.2003 has been issued byGovernment of Madhya Pradesh on the subject “regarding issuing ofnew guidelines for character verification.” Paragraph 6 which has beenrelied by the counsel for the appellant is regarding column 12 of theAttestation form. It is useful to extract paragraph 6 and clause (viii)which are as follows: - “6. The Column 12 of the attestation form filled for characterverification by selected candidates for government service, criminalbackground, judicial case and the information about acquittal orconviction in it, willfully or erroneously or ignorantly kept vacantsubject to qualification for appointment in government servicetaking into consideration the policy as per rules by the stategovernment with immediate effect decisions have been taken.

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454SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A(viii) On the acquittal on merit of the case by the Hon’ble Court,the candidate will be eligible for government service.”

27. Clause (viii) on which the reliance is placed contemplates thatthe candidate who has been acquitted on merit by the Court will beeligible for the Government service. The aforesaid contemplation relatesBto at the time of character verification. Thus, at the time of characterverification, if a candidate is found to be acquitted on merits by theCourt, the candidate shall be treated to be eligible for GovernmentService. The above clause (viii) as quoted above cannot come to therescue of the appellant who at the time of character verification or atthe time of consideration of the case of the appellant by the committeeCon 18.07.2018 had not been acquitted. Had the appellant in column 12had mentioned about the acquittal or at the time of character verificationit was found that the candidate has been acquitted on merit by the Court,Clause 6(viii) would have been attracted but in the present case the saidclause is not attracted since at the time of character verification theDappellant had not been acquitted and he was acquitted after more than a year from rejection of his candidature.

year from rejection of his candidature.

28. Learned counsel for the appellant lastly has contended thatdue to deletion of the name of appellant from select list a stigma isattached to him, for removal of which this Court may issue notice in thisESLP. As noted above, the appellant having already been acquitted by thejudgment dated 18.09.2019 stigma of criminal case has already washedout and the criminal case having resulted in acquittal no stigma is attachedto the appellant’s name on the above ground. The apprehension of thelearned counsel for the appellant that a stigma shall continue with thename of the appellant is misconceived, stigma, if any, is already over byFacquittal.

29. We, thus, are of the view that the High Court did not commitany error in dismissing the writ petition. The appellant was not entitledfor any relief in the writ petition. In the result, while dismissing this appealwe observe that stigma, if any, of the criminal case lodged againstGappellant under Section 498A/406/34 IPC is washed out due to theacquittal of the appellant vide judgment dated 18.09.2019.

Ankit Gyan

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