U.P. AVAS EVAM VIKAS PARISHAD THROUGH HOUSING COMMISSIONER & ANR. versus NOOR MOHAMMAD & ORS. on 16 December 2021

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 9 S.C.R.

AU.P. AVAS EVAM VIKAS PARISHAD THROUGHHOUSING COMMISSIONER & ANR.

v.

NOOR MOHAMMAD & ORS.

B(Civil Appeal No. 8083 of 2011)

DECEMBER 16, 2021

[HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.48(1), 4, 6 – United ProvincesCTown Improvement Act, 1919 – ss.36, 42 – Notification issued u/s.48(1), 1894 Act for release of the land of the respondents-landowners from acquisition – However, by another notification theaforesaid notification was cancelled – Latter notification challengedby land owners, set aside by High Court – On appeal, held: FirstNotification was secured by the respondents by false representationsDand by playing fraud – When the respondents wanted to ward offthe acquisition, they claimed that there were cemeteries of theirforefathers – However, after the first notification was issued theystarted selling the land to third parties, who do not share the samereligious sentiments with the respondents – An order secured byEfraud and misrepresentation will not confer any vested right – Thus,the land owners cannot pitch their claim either on the basis of vestingor on the basis of Art.300A – They cannot be allowed to contendthat the land can be acquired only through a fresh process ofacquisition – Impugned orders of the High Court set aside – Writpetitions filed by the respondents dismissed – Constitution of IndiaF– Art.300A.

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.48(1) – Notification under, ifa quasi-judicial order – Held: No – Thus, the argument that theGovernment cannot fall back upon s.21, General Clauses Act torescind an order u/s.48(1) is rejected – General Clauses Act – s.21

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Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.4(1), 48(1) – Notification u/s.4(1) vis-à-vis u/s.48(1) – Discussed.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The power to issue Notification would includeHa power to rescind the Notification. This position was not contested by the respondents, when their attempts to have theland released from acquisition, proved unsuccessful on earlieroccasions. As a matter of fact, on the application presented bythe respondents on 28.02.1983, the Government issued a letterdated 30.01.1985 requesting the appellant-Parishad to initiatenecessary action for exemption of the land, subject to the conditionthat the land owners will not sell the land. This condition wasstipulated in view of the fact that the request of the respondentwas based on religious sentiments due to the alleged existenceof cemeteries of about 20 of their forefathers on the acquiredland. But the proposal mooted by the State Government on30.01.1985 was opposed by the Parishad on the ground that therewas no mention about any cemeteries, when the land owners filedobjections to the acquisition. In the light of such objections, theGovernment issued proceedings dated 27.06.1985 withdrawingthe earlier proposal dated 30.01.1985. In a fresh representationmade on 29.05.1999 it was reiterated that there are cemeteriesand Mazaars of the forefathers of the land owners and that regularreligious programmes were being conducted in the acquired land.It is on the basis of the said representation that the Notificationdated 7.04.2003 was issued under Section 48(1). [Paras 11,14][1068-E-G; 1069-C-D]

1.2 The land owners were actually playing hide and seekby pleading religious sentiments, leading to the issue of theNotification dated 7.04.2003 under Section 48(1). The Notificationunder Section 48(1) was invited by the land owners by makingfalse representations. The land owners have actually played fraudupon the Government and secured the Notification dated7.04.2003. Hence, they cannot be allowed to contend that theland can be acquired only through a fresh process of acquisition.The first Notification was secured by the respondents by falserepresentations and by playing fraud. When the respondentswanted to ward off the acquisition, they claimed that there werecemeteries of their forefathers, but after the first notification wasissued, they started selling the land to third parties, who cannotand do not share the same religious sentiments with therespondents. The second Notification dated 15.09.2005 whichcontains the list of sales made by the land owners. The enquiryconducted by the Housing Commissioner has revealed that the A

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Aland mafia has taken over the land. An order secured by fraudand misrepresentation will not confer any vested right and that,therefore, the land owners cannot pitch their claim either onthe basis of vesting or on the basis of Article 300A. [Paras 15,24][1069-D-F; 1072-C-E]

B2. A proceeding under Section 48(1) of the Land AcquisitionAct is administrative in nature as can be seen from the languageemployed. What is provided in Section 48(1) is the power/libertyto withdraw from acquisition. It is an administrative act. While aNotification for acquisition issued under Section 4(1) of the LandAcquisition Act seeks to take away an individual’s right toCproperty, a Notification under Section 48(1) is actually the reverseor opposite. It confers benefit upon an individual and hence it isnot supposed to be preceded by any enquiry. The essence of anorder which is quasi-judicial in nature is that it is preceded by anopportunity of hearing to the party affected thereby. A notificationDunder Section 48(1) does not warrant any notice or opportunityof hearing, to the original land owners. If at all any person will beaggrieved by the Notification under Section 48(1), it will be thebeneficiary of the acquisition, which in this case is the Parishad,and not the land owners. Therefore, it can be understood if theParishad makes out a grievance that their rights were taken awayEby the notification under Section 48(1) especially after the landvested in them. Therefore, the argument that a Notification underSection 48(1) is a quasi-judicial order is rejected. As aconsequence, the argument that the Government cannot fall backupon Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to rescind an orderFunder Section 48(1) is rejected. [Paras 20, 22][1070-F; 1071-C,F-H; 1072-A-B]

Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation(Gwalior) M.P. Ltd. vs. CIT (2018) 4 SCC 494 :[2018] 10 SCR 481; H.C. Suman vs. RehabilitationMinistry Employees CoOperative House Building SocietyGLtd. New Delhi and Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 485: [1991] 3 SCR839 – held inapplicable.

3. The impugned orders of the High Court are set asideand the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed.Since the acquisition has been complete in all respects theH

appellant may proceed to implement the public purpose for whichthe land was acquired. [Para 27][1073-B-C]

Mutha Associates and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtraand Ors. (2013) 14 SCC 304: [2013] 10 SCR 1051 –referred to.

Case Law Reference[2018] 10 SCR 481held inapplicablePara 17[1991] 3 SCR 839held inapplicablePara 18[2013] 10 SCR 1051referred toPara 25

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.8083of 2011.

From the Judgment and Order dated 31.08.2010 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No.64727 of 2005.

With

Civil Appeal No.8072 of 2011.

Vishwajit Singh, Pankaj Singh, Ms. Veena Kaul Singh, Advs. forthe Appellants.

Krishnam Mishra, Param Kumar Mishra, Ms. Sharmila Upadhyay,Anand Varma, Ms. Chitranka Naik, Ms. Apoorva Pandey, Advs. for theRespondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.

1. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, which is a statutory authorityof the State of Uttar Pradesh for housing and development, has come upwith the present appeals, challenging the orders of the High Court ofJudicature at Allahabad, setting aside a Notification cancelling a previousNotification issued under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 for the release of the land of the respondents herein from acquisition.

2. We have heard Shri Vishwajit Singh, learned counsel appearingfor the appellants and Mr. Krishnam Mishra and Mr. Anand Varma,learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

3. A Notification dated 25.07.1964 was issued by the StateGovernment under Section 36 of the United Provinces TownImprovement Act, 1919 (hereinafter referred to as “the U.P. Act”) forthe acquisition of land of a total extent of acre 1.85 in Village Mirzapur, A

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ATehsil-Sadar, District Gorakhpur for the public purpose of providinghousing/residential accommodation. This notification is akin to Section4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

4. The above notification was followed by another notificationdated 17.06.1967 under Section 42 of the U.P. Act, which is equivalentBto Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It appears that theemergency clause was invoked and the enquiry dispensed with, beforethe declaration was made. The possession of the entire land except onepiece bearing plot No.292/2 measuring an extent to 0.028 acres, wastaken over by the State Government on 24.07.1970 and an award wasalso passed on 30.03.1971.

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5. From the year 1983, the land owners made attempts to get thelands released from acquisition, but fortune fluctuated in a see-saw battle.

6. Eventually by a Notification dated 7.04.2003 issued in exerciseof the powers conferred by Section 49(1) of the U.P. Avas Evam VikasDParishad Adhiniyam, 1965 read with Section 48(1) and 49(1) of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894, the land was exempt from acquisition. But withina couple of years, the Government issued another notification dated15.09.2005 cancelling the notification dated 07.04.2003 on the groundthat the land owners had played fraud by making false representations,while seeking the release of the land.E

7. Challenging the said Notification dated 15.09.2005, the originalland owners filed a writ petition in W.P (C) No.64727 of 2005 and thepurchaser of one part of the land from the original owners filed anotherwrit petition in W.P No.50151 of 2008. Both these writ petitions wereallowed by Division Bench of the High Court by an Order datedF31.08.2010, holding that once the acquired land is released fromacquisition, by way of Notification, the Government can reclaim the landonly by initiating a fresh process of acquisition. Aggrieved by the saidorder, the Housing and Development Authority has come up with theabove appeals.G8. Before we address the rival contentions for consideration, it

8. Before we address the rival contentions for consideration, itmay be necessary to bring on record the background in which the originalNotification dated 07.04.2003 under Section 48(1) of the Land AcquisitionAct was passed and the reasons for the issue of the latter notificationdated 15.09.2005 cancelling the previous one. This background as well H

as the reasons are stated very pithily in the second Notification dated15.09.2005 and, hence, it is reproduced as follows:

“Land in Village Mirzapur/Betiahtata, Gorakhpur wasacquired under the provisions of U.P. Town Improvement Act,1919 for the Betiahata South Scheme , Gorakhpur of the U.P.Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and later on 8.6.1965, it wastransferred to the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad for planneddevelopment of the area. The State Government issuedNotification u/s 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 vide no.93Ka/37-19(1)(16)-66 dated 13.1.1970.

An application dated 28.2.83 along with a letter addressedto the Chief Secretary dated nil in connection with Khasrano. 257 (rakba 0.51 Acre), Khasra no. 254 (rakba 0.30 Acre), Khasra no. 255/1 (rakba 0.18 Acre), Khasra no. 255/2(rakba 0.18 Acre), Khasra no. 291/1 (rakba 0.31 Acre),Khasra no. 291/2 (rakba 0.31 Acre), Khasra no. 292/1 (rakba0.03 Acre), Khasra no. 292/2 (rakba 0.03 Acre) total rakba1.85 acre land, sent by applicants Smt. Shakuran w/o LateRojan, Shri Noor Mohd., Shri Shafi Mohd., Shri RamjanMohd. all sons of sons of Late Salarbux Mohalla TetiahataSouth (New Avas Vikas Colony), Post Office Sadar, Dist.Gorakhpur was received by the Government on 23.1.84 bywhich the applicants brought to the notice of the governmentthat the aforesaid plots belonged to them which have beenacquired by the Parishad. There exist 17 or 18 cemeteries oftheir forefathers and they earn their livelihood by way ofvegetation/horticulture on the said land. There are 20 membersin their family and none of them have their own house andthat they would live there by making houses on the land. Afterdue consideration on the applications received fromapplicants, the government issued G.O. no. 472/37-2-85-3HB(108)/83 dated 30.01.85 thereby exempting the aforesaidkhasras from acquisition with the condition that thelandowners will not sell out the land. Following the aforesaidG.O., the Housing Commissioner, U.P. Avas Evam VikasParishad wrote a letter to the government requesting forcancellation of the aforesaid G.O. dated 30.01.85 andaccordingly, Amendment Order dated 27.6.85 was issued by AB

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the Government whereby cancelling the earlier G.O. dated30.1.85 in which it was specifically mentioned that the layoutmap of the Yojana may be modified, while excluding theMazaars, if any exists on the disputed land.

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Subsequent to the aforesaid order, the applicants filed writpetition no. 19757 /1985 in the Hon’ble High Court. Incompliance of the orders of the Hon’ble High Court, aftergiving serious thoughts to the joint representation of theapplicants, the same was rejected on 21.12.91. The applicantsagain filed writ petition no. 5002/1992 before the Hon’bleHigh Court in which the Hon’ble High Court passed“dismissed as withdrawn” order on 19.5.99.

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Thereafter, the government reviewed the representationssubmitted by the applicants from time to time. In theirrepresentations, the applicants had primarily stated that theywere poor unemployed persons. None of their family membersDwas in government service. The aforesaid land was the onlysource of their livelihood and they earn their livelihood byway of vegetation/horticulture on the said land. There are 20members in their family and none of them have their ownhouse and that they would live there by making houses on theEland. Cemeteries of their forefathers exist on the land and asper the general policy of the Government, such land shouldnot be acquired. In view of the facts contained in therepresentation and after due consideration, Notificationno.1049/9-Aa-2-2003-3 HB (AB)/83 dated 7 April 1983 wasissued for exempting Khasra no. 257 (rakba 0.51 Acre),FKhasra no. 254 (rakba 0.30 Acre), Khasra no. 255/1 (rakba0.18 Acre), Khasra no. 255/2 (rakba 0.18 acre), Khasra no.291/1 (rakba 0.31 Acre), Khasra no.291/2 (rakba 0.31 Acre),Khasra no. 292/1 (rakba 0.03 Acre), Khasra no. 292/2 (rakba0.03 Acre) total rakba 1.85 acre land from acquisition.

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After passing of the Notification, it came to the notice of thegovernment from various sources that the aforesaid exemptedland was being used for commercial purposes and theland-mafias were buying and selling the land after raisingillegal constructions on it. In view of the complaints, inquirywas got conducted from the Housing Commissioner and the H

up-to-date status of the land was sought. The HousingCommissioner submitted his inquiry report thereby informedas under:- a)1.00 Acre {out of total 1.17 Acre land of Khasra no. 254(rakba 0.30 acre), khasra no. 255 (rakba 0.36 acre), khasrano. 257 (rakba 0.51 acre)} was sold out on 23.4.2003 throughAgreement Deed.

b) 5220 sq.ft. land from Khasra no. 255 was sold throughregistry on 29.4.2004 to Shri Shravan s/o Jaket, Dist. Deoria.

c) 2370 sq.ft. land from Khasra no. 254 was sold throughregistry on 16.9.2004 to Shri Bajrang Prasad Gupta s/o ShriMahavir Prasad.

d) 9000 sq.ft. land from Khasra no. 254 and 255 was sold throughregistry on 21.9.2004 to Smt. Lalita Chhabaria v1/o Shri HariPrasad Chhabaria.

e) Entire rakba 0.51 of Khasra no. 257 was sold throughregistry n 16.9.2004 to Smt. Vartika Singh w/o Shri KrishnaSingh and Shri Brijesh Kumar Singh s/o Shri Shiv PoojanSingh.

From the above, it is evident that the facts placed by theapplicants before the Government, on the basis of which theirland was released from acquisition vide Notification dated7.4.2003, were misleading and false. The applicants are inthe process of selling the land after dividing it in small plotsand they neither using the land for earning their livelihoodby way of doing vegetation nor for any other purpose.Therefore, after due consideration, the Governor of UttarPradesh has been pleased to approve cancellation of theaforesaid Notification no. 1049/9-Aa-2- 2003-3 HB (AB)/83dated 7 April, 1983 issued in respect of releasing the aforesaidland from acquisition.”

9. The main ground on which the High Court set aside the secondNotification dated 15.09.2005 was that once a Notification is issued underSection 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the land gets releasedfrom acquisition and that, therefore, the only way the State Governmentcould retrieve the land is to initiate the process of acquisition afresh.

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AThis reasoning is based upon two premises, namely, (i) that while thereis a provision under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for thewithdrawal of the land from acquisition, there is no provision in the Actfor cancellation of a Notification under Section 48(1); and (ii) that oncea Notification under Section 48 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act is issued,the land gets vested in the original owner and that therefore, divestingBcannot take place without following the process of acquisition asenunciated in the Statute.

10. But insofar as the first contention is concerned, Section 21 ofthe General Clauses Act, 1897 is a complete answer. It reads as follows:- C“21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, varyor rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws.- Where, byany Central Act or Regulations a power to issue notifications,orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includesa power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to thelike sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, varyDor rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye- laws soissued.”

11. Therefore, the power to issue Notification would include apower to rescind the Notification. This position was not contested by therespondents, when their attempts to have the land released fromEacquisition, proved unsuccessful on earlier occasions. As a matter offact, on the application presented by the respondents on 28.02.1983, theGovernment issued a letter dated 30.01.1985 requesting the Parishad toinitiate necessary action for exemption of the land, subject to the conditionthat the land owners will not sell the land. This condition was stipulatedFin view of the fact that the request of the respondent was based onreligious sentiments due to the alleged existence of cemeteries of about20 of their forefathers on the acquired land. But the proposal mooted bythe State Government on 30.01.1985 was opposed by the Parishad onthe ground that there was no mention about any cemeteries, when theland owners filed objections to the acquisition. In the light of suchGobjections, the Government issued proceedings dated 27.06.1985withdrawing the earlier proposal dated 30.01.1985.

12. Therefore, the land owners filed a writ petition in CivilMiscellaneous writ Petition No.19757 of 1985, seeking a direction to theGovernment and to the Parishad not to dispossess them. This Writ PetitionH

was disposed of by an Order dated 30.09.1988, permitting the land ownersto file a representation to the Government within one month and directingthe State Government to consider the said representation.

13. Pursuant to the said order, the land owners made arepresentation dated 10.10.1988. But the same was rejected by the StateGovernment by an Order dated 21.12.1991, pointing out that the landalready stood vested in the Parishad and that Parishad has already becomethe owner.

14. Challenging the Order of rejection dated 21.12.1991, the landowners filed a fresh writ petition in W.P. (C) No.5002 of 1992. But thesaid writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn, on 9.04.1999. Thereafter,a fresh representation was made on 29.05.1999. It was reiterated in thesaid representation that there are cemeteries and Mazaars of theforefathers of the land owners and that regular religious programmeswere being conducted in the acquired land. It is on the basis of the saidrepresentation that the Notification dated 7.04.2003 was issued underSection 48(1).

15. Therefore, it is clear that the land owners were actually playinghide and seek by pleading religious sentiments, leading to the issue of theNotification dated 7.04.2003 under Section 48(1). In other words theNotification under Section 48(1) was invited by the land owners by makingfalse representations. The land owners have actually played fraud uponthe Government and secured the Notification dated 7.04.2003. Hence,they cannot be allowed to contend that the land can be acquired onlythrough a fresh process of acquisition.

16. The learned counsel for the respondents-land ownerscontended that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, does not conferan overarching power on the Government to rescind a notificationconferring vested rights in immoveable property, especially when such apower is not contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The rightto property, though not a fundamental right, is held to be a Constitutionalright and a human right and that, therefore, according to the counsel forthe respondents, the same cannot be taken away by taking recourse toSection 21 of the General Clauses Act.

17. In support of the aforesaid contention, Mr. Anand Varmalearned counsel for the respondents relies upon the decision of this Court AB

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Ain Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (Gwalior) M.P.Ltd. vs. CIT[1], wherein it was held as follows:

“21. The general power, under Section 21 of the GeneralClauses Act, to rescind a notification or order has to beunderstood in the light of the subject-matter, context and theBeffect of the relevant provisions of the statute under whichthe notification or order is issued and the power is notavailable after an enforceable right has accrued under thenotification or order. Moreover, Section 21 has no applicationto vary or amend or review a quasi-judicial order…”

18. The learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon theCdecision in H.C. Suman vs. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees Co-Operative House Building Society Ltd. New Delhi and Ors.[2], whereinit was held that a substantial right created in favour of a party, which isenforceable in law cannot be taken away by a subsequent order undergeneral power of rescindment available under the General Clauses Act.

D19. But the decision in Industrial Infrastructure DevelopmentCorporation (supra) arose out of an order passed under Section 12-Aof the Income Tax Act, 1961, which was admittedly a quasi judicialorder. In paragraphs 19 and 20 of the said decision, this Court pointedout that “the functions exercisable by CIT under section 12-A areneither legislative nor executive but essentially quasi-judicial inEnature” and that “an order under section 12-A of the Income TaxAct does not fall in the category of orders mentioned in Section 21,which would be in the nature of Notification/Rules/bye-laws”.

20. But a proceeding under section 48(1) of the Land AcquisitionAct is administrative in nature as can be seen from the languageFemployed. Section 48 of the Act reads as follows:

48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but–compensation to be awarded when not completed.

(1) Except in the case provided for in section 36, theGovernment shall be at liberty to withdraw from theGacquisition of any land of which possession has not beentaken.

1(2018) 4 SCC 494

2 (1991) 4 SCC 485H

(2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any suchacquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount ofcompensation due for the damage suffered by the owner inconsequence of the notice or of any proceedings there under,and shall pay such amount to the person interested, togetherwith all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecutionof the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land.

(3) The provision of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far asmay be, to the determination of the compensation payableunder this section.”

What is provided in Section 48(1) is the power/liberty to withdrawfrom acquisition. It is an administrative act. Therefore, the reliance onthe decision in Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation(supra) is misplaced.

21. For the very same reason, the decision in H.C. Suman, isalso of no assistance to the respondents in as much as the first notificationof the Lt. Governor, which was sought to be withdrawn by the subsequentnotification, was issued pursuant to a quasi-judicial order passed by theLt. Governor on a statutory appeal. The quasi judicial order created avested right which was given effect through a notification. Therefore,this Court held in para 35 of the decision in H.C.Suman that the vestedright created by a quasi-judicial order cannot be taken away by takingrecourse to the general power of rescindment available under the GeneralClauses Act. Hence the reasoning contained in the said decision cannotbe applied to the case on hand.

22. While a Notification for acquisition issued under Section 4(1)of the Land Acquisition Act seeks to take away an individual’s right toproperty, a Notification under Section 48(1) is actually the reverse oropposite. It confers benefit upon an individual and hence it is not supposedto be preceded by any enquiry. The essence of an order which isquasi-judicial in nature is that it is preceded by an opportunity of hearingto the party affected thereby. A notification under Section 48(1) doesnot warrant any notice or opportunity of hearing, to the original landowners. If at all any person will be aggrieved by the Notification underSection 48(1), it will be the beneficiary of the acquisition, which in thiscase is the Parishad, and not the land owners. Therefore, we canunderstand if the Parishad makes out a grievance that their rights were AB

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Ataken away by the notification under Section 48(1) especially after theland vested in them.

23. Therefore, we reject the argument that a Notification underSection 48(1) is a quasi-judicial order. As a consequence, we reject theargument that the Government cannot fall back upon Section 21 of theBGeneral Clauses Act to rescind an order under Section 48(1).

24. Coming to the second limb of the argument that the Notificationunder Section 48(1) has created a vested right and that the same cannotbe taken away unilaterally by a subsequent Notification for cancellation,we have to state that the first Notification was secured by the respondentsCby false representations and by playing fraud. When the respondentswanted to ward off the acquisition, they claimed that there werecemeteries of their forefathers, but after the first notification was issued,they started selling the land to third parties, who cannot and do not sharethe same religious sentiments with the respondents. We have alreadyextracted the second Notification dated 15.09.2005 which contains theDlist of sales made by the land owners. The enquiry conducted by theHousing Commissioner has revealed that the land mafia has taken overthe land. It is trite to point out that an order secured by fraud andmisrepresentation will not confer any vested right and that, therefore,the land owners cannot pitch their claim either on the basis of vesting orEon the basis of Article 300A.

25. Interestingly, Sh. Anand Varma, learned counsel for therespondents relied upon the decision of this Court in Mutha Associatesand Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.[3], in support of his contentionthat even if the impugned notification is taken to be administrative inFnature, the same should be preceded by an opportunity of hearing to theland owners. But the decision in Mutha Associates (supra) is actually adouble-edged weapon insofar as the respondents are concerned. In thatcase, this Court held that even for the exercise of the power of withdrawalunder Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, an opportunity had tobe given necessarily to the beneficiary. In fact two principles could beGculled out from Mutha Associates. They are: (i) that the publication ofthe Notification under Section 48, is necessary just as the publication ofnotifications under Sections 4 and 6 are mandatory; and (ii) that thebeneficiary should be heard before the withdrawal of land fromacquisition.H3 (2013) 14 SCC 304

26. In this case, the Notification dated 7.04.2003 does not appearto have been preceded by an opportunity of hearing to the beneficiary,namely, U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. Therefore, the withdrawal ofsuch an illegal notification, which was secured by fraud, cannot be foundfault with.

27. Therefore, in fine, all the contentions of the respondents- landowners are liable to be rejected and the appeals liable to be allowed.Accordingly both the appeals are allowed, the impugned orders of theHigh Court are set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondentsare dismissed. Since the acquisition has been complete in all respectsthe appellant-Parishad may proceed to implement the public purpose forwhich the land was acquired. There will be no order as to costs.

Divya Pandey

Appeals allowed.

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