ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. versus M/S TEJPARAS ASSOCIATES EXPORTS PVT. LTD. on 3 October 2019

228

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2019] 13 S.C.R.

A

ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.

v.

M/S TEJPARAS ASSOCIATES EXPORTS PVT. LTD. (Civil Appeal No. 6524 of 2009)BOCTOBER 03, 2019

[R. BANUMATHI AND A. S. BOPANNA, JJ.]

Limitation Act, 1963: ss.3, 5 and 14 – Arbitration Award –Appellant in order to assail award filed petition u/s.34 before JaipurDistrict Court – Objection by respondent that cause of action aroseCat Jodhpur – Jaipur District Court held the petition as notmaintainable before it but exercised power under Or.7 r.10 and 10Aand returned the petition to appellant with direction to appear beforeDistrict Court Jodhpur on 2.4.2008 for presentation of petition andproceed with the matter – However, appellant presented the petitionDonly on 10.4.2008 instead of specified date of 2.4.2008 –Respondent filed application under s.3 of Limitation Act beforeDistrict Court, Jodhpur seeking rejection of petition on the groundof limitation – Appellant filed application under s.14 of LimitationAct seeking exclusion of time spent in the proceedings before DistrictJudge, Jaipur – District Court Jodhpur dismissed the petition underEs.34 of the Act, 1996 on limitation point – Appeal also dismissed byHigh Court – Hence instant appeal – Held: The petition filed unders.34 at Jaipur was within the period of limitation – Delay was forthe period of 8 days in re-presenting the petition beyond the datefixed after it was returned under Or.7 r.10 CPC – In thatFcircumstance, even if the term “sufficient cause” as contained unders.5 of the Limitation Act is taken note, in the facts the same was notwith reference to petition under s.34 of Act, 1996 for condonationof delay beyond the period prescribed under s.34(3) of Act, 1996 –District Court, Jaipur had ordered return of the petition forappropriate presentation and the date was fixed – The correctnessGof the said order was not assailed by the respondent seekingabsolute rejection of the petition by raising grounds on the natureof findings rendered therein since that Court had not held the petitionto be malafide – In such circumstance, the issue of delay arose onlyin the context of delay of 8 days in re-presentation as permitted by H

Jaipur Court – Therefore, re-examination of the matter to considerthe entire period spent before the Court at Jaipur as malafide so asto non-suit the appellant and deny consideration of proceedingsunder s.34 of Act, 1996 which was initiated within the period oflimitation at the first instance, on its merits was not justified – Inthat view, order on the application filed under s.14 and s.3 of theLimitation Act by the District Judge, Jodhpur was not sustainable –Consequently, the proceedings in Arbitration Application restoredto the file of the District Judge, Jodhpur – Parties to appear beforethe said Court on 15.10.2019 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 –Or.7 r.10 and 10A – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

Conclusion

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 10A indicate that there-presentation of the petition in the Court which is indicated inthe order for return cannot be considered as a fresh filing in allcircumstances when, it is returned to the plaintiff for such re-presentation. In the instant case, though the appellant had notfiled the application indicating the Court to which the petitionwould be re-presented and did not seek for fixing the date ofhearing, the Court at Jaipur while ordering return of the petitionafter consideration of the application of the respondent underOrder 7 Rule 11 CPC had indicated the Court to which it was tobe presented and the date for appearance on 02.04.2008 for thatpurpose. Hence, it is not as if the proceeding came to an abruptend when the petition was returned so as to consider the nextfiling as a fresh petition. In that circumstance when the time hadbeen granted and date was fixed by the District Judge at Jaipurand if for any reason the re-presentation was not possible on thatdate, the course open to the appellant was to file an applicationunder Section 148 of CPC before the Court at Jaipur whichordered for return and fixed the time for presentation in the Courtat Jodhpur, seeking extension of time granted earlier. However,since the same was not resorted to by the appellant and thepetition was re-presented before the District Court at Jodhpurwith a delay of about 8 days from the date fixed for presentationand as no extension was also sought, condonation of such delayought to have been sought. Since the petition was filed with delayand no other application had accompanied the petition, therespondent filed the application under Section 3 of Limitation AB

C

D

EF

G

H

AAct which prompted a knee jerk reaction by the appellant in filingthe application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Theaverments in the application was in the nature of an applicationseeking condonation of delay in re-presentation of the petitionas against the date fixed by the Court for presentation in Jodhpur.[Paras 8-9][236-B-C, F-H; 237-A-C]

B

2. The condonation of delay sought was not for filing thepetition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 for the first time. Thepetition filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 at Jaipur waswithin the period of limitation and the delay regarding whichexplanation is put forth is for the period of 8 days in re-presentingCthe petition beyond the date fixed after it was returned underOrder 7 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, in thatcircumstance even if the term “sufficient cause” as containedunder Section 5 of the Limitation Act is taken note, in the presentfacts the same is not with reference to petition under Section 34of Act, 1996 for condonation of delay beyond the period prescribedDunder Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996. Though that be the positionwhat is necessary to be taken note is that the application filed forexcluding the time is under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.[Para 11][238-B-D]

3. Keeping in view the fact situation the petition is to beEreturned for presentation in appropriate court, the very natureof consideration made by the Court at Jaipur would indicate thatthe matter required a detail consideration before exercising thepower under Order 7 Rule 10 and 10A of the Civil ProcedureCode and the Court during the said proceedings has not arrivedat a conclusion that the proceedings had been initiated malafideFbefore that Court. However, keeping in view the overall factsand circumstance of this case the Court had ordered return ofthe petition for appropriate presentation and the date had beenfixed. The correctness of the said order had not been assailedby the respondent seeking absolute rejection of the petition byGraising grounds on the nature of findings rendered therein sincethat Court had not held the petition to be malafide. In suchcircumstance, in the fact situation wherein the issue of delay hadarisen only in the context of the delay of 8 days in re-presentationas permitted by the Court at Jaipur, re-examination of the matterto consider the entire period spent before the Court at Jaipur asHmalafide so as to non-suit the appellant and deny consideration of proceedings under Section 34 of Act, 1996 which was initiatedwithin the period of limitation at the first instance, on its meritswill not be justified. In that view, the order passed on theapplication filed under Section 14 and Section 3 of the LimitationAct passed by the District Judge, Jodhpur and the order passedby the High Court are not sustainable. They are accordingly, setaside. Consequently, the proceedings in Arbitration Applicationis restored to the file of the District Judge, Jodhpur. The partiesshall appear before the said Court on 15.10.2019 as the first datefor appearance without issue of notice/summons from that Court.[Paras 12-15][239-B-H]

Shri Amar Chand Inami v. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC115 : [1973] 2 SCR 684 - relied on Joginder Tuli v. S.L. Bhatia and another (1997) 1 SCC502 : [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 221; S. Ganesharaju (dead)through LRs. and Anr. v. Narsamma (dead) through LRs.and Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 341; Union of India v. PopularConstruction Company (2001) 8 SCC 470 : [2001] 3Suppl. SCR 619; Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Unionof India (2019) 2 SCC 455 : [2008] 5 SCR 1108;M/s Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. ThePrincipal Secretary, Irrigation Department & Ors.(2008) 7 SCC 169 - referred to CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 6524of 2009.

From the Judgment and Order 06.02.2009 of the High Court ofJudicature for Rajasthan at Jodphur in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1103of 2008.

AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

A Dr. Meera Agarwal, Ramesh Chandra Mishra, Advs. for theAppellant.

Puneet Jain, Ms. Christi Jain, Harsh Jain, Harshit Khanduja,Abhinav Deshwal, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Advs. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered byB

A. S. BOPANNA, J.

1. The appellant insurance company had issued fire insurancepolicy in respect of the plant and machinery of the respondent company.The sum for which it was insured was a sum of Rs.70,00,000/- (RupeesCSeventy Lakhs only). In respect of the policy issued on 01.12.1999, theclaim arose on 23.04.2000 when fire accident took place in the premisesof the respondent. In respect of the claim, the appellant insurancecompany offered a sum of Rs.7,98,019/- (Rupees Seven Lakhs Ninety-Eight Thousand Nineteen only) to the respondent on 06.12.2000. Therespondent having refused to accept the same, a meeting was thereafterDconvened on 20.09.2001 wherein Vijaya Bank at whose instance thepolicy was issued was also present. In the said meeting, the appellantinsurance company revised the offer to pay the respondent a sum ofRs.33,80,925/- (Rupees Thirty-Three Lakhs Eighty Thousand NineHundred Twenty-Five only). The said sum was also not acceptable toEthe respondent but a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhsonly) was paid to the respondent through Vijaya Bank. The respondenttherefore being aggrieved that the claim for insurance reimbursementwas not satisfied, had approached the National Consumer DisputesRedressal Commission, New Delhi (“NCDRC” for short) by filing OPNo. 146 of 2002. The said complaint came to be dismissed on the groundFthat the claim involves complicated questions of law and the Civil Courtwould have jurisdiction to decide the matter.

2. The matter was, however, ultimately referred to arbitration byan Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three learned Arbitrators. In the arbitralproceedings, an award dated 28.06.2004 was passed, whereunder twoGout of three arbitrators awarded the sum of Rs.44,90,000/- (Rupees Forty-Four Lakh Ninety Thousand only) with interest at 18% per annum alsothe costs as indicated therein. Since, a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- had alreadybeen paid by the appellant on 20.09.2001, the award constituted theentire sum of Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Lakhs only) for which itwas insured. The third learned arbitrator, however, dissented from theH

majority award and held that the sum of Rs. 33,80,925/- offered by theappellant insurance company was fair and proper. Subsequent theretothe appellant herein filed an application under Section 33 of the Arbitrationand Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act, 1996” for short) seeking for clarificationrelating to the award dated 28.06.2004 and also with regard to the venueof arbitration as indicated in the award. The said application filed underSection 33 of the Act was dismissed through the order dated 17.12.2004.Pursuant thereto the appellant insurance company, in order to assail theaward dated 28.06.2004 and the order dated 17.12.2004 filed the petitionunder Section 34 of the Act, 1996 on 24.02.2005. Since, the award indicatedthat the same was passed at Jaipur and the third learned arbitrator in hisorder had declared the venue of the arbitral tribunal to be at Jaipur, theappellant insurance company filed the petition on 24.02.2005 before thelearned District Judge, Jaipur.

3. The respondent on appearing in the said proceedings hadobjected to the proceedings being held at Jaipur, since according to therespondent the entire cause of action had arisen at Jodhpur. The learnedDistrict Judge at Jaipur on considering the rival contentions had throughthe order dated 12.03.2008 held the petition as not maintainable beforethat Court but exercised the power under Order 7 Rule 10 and 10 A ofthe Civil Procedure Code and returned the petition to the appellantinsurance company and directed that the parties shall be present beforethe learned District Judge, Jodhpur, on 02.04.2008 for presentation ofthe petition therein and proceed with the matter. The appellant insurancecompany however presented the petition before the learned DistrictJudge, Jodhpur, only on 10.04.2008, instead of the specified date of02.04.2008. In that circumstance, the respondent herein filed anapplication under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, before the learnedDistrict Judge, Jodhpur, in the re-presented petition under Section 34 ofthe Act, 1996 which was numbered as arbitration application number18-A of 2008. Through the said application the respondent had soughtrejection of the petition on the ground of the limitation.

4. At this stage, the appellant insurance company filed anapplication dated 03.05.2008 under Section 14 of the Limitation Act,seeking that the time spent in the proceedings before the learned DistrictJudge, Jaipur, be excluded and the petition be entertained on its merits.The respondent herein opposed the said application. The learned DistrictJudge, Jodhpur, through the order dated 15.07.2008 had considered the A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Aapplications under Section 14 and 3 of the Limitation Act and dismissedthe application filed by the appellant insurance company under Section14 of the Limitation Act and allowed the application filed by the respondentherein under Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the petitionfiled under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 was dismissed. The appellantinsurance company therefore claiming to be aggrieved filed the appealBunder Section 37 of the Act, 1996 before the High Court of judicaturefor Rajasthan at Jodhpur. The High Court after taking note of the orderpassed by the learned District Judge, Jodhpur, while disposing of theapplication under Section 3 & 14 of the Limitation Act has dismissed theappeal through the order dated 06.02.2009. The appellant insuranceCcompany therefore claiming to be aggrieved by the said order dated06.02.2009 passed by the High Court in SP (C) Misc. Appeal No. 1103/2008 is before this Court in this appeal.

5. We have heard Dr. Meera Aggarwal, learned advocate for theappellant, Mr. Puneet Jain, learned advocate for the respondent andDperused the appeal papers.

6. As noted in the sequence of events that flowed from the pointthe policy was issued on 01.12.1999 and a claim relating to the samebeing made in view of the fire accident, the dispute essentially is withregard to the quantum of compensation which had led to the disputeEbetween the parties. The present proceeding has however arisen in thebackground of the petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 beingdismissed on the ground of limitation. In that circumstance, though theappellant had also filed the appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 andhad raised the contentions with regard to correctness or otherwise ofthe award dated 28.06.2004 and the order dated 17.12.2004 on theFapplication under Section 33 of the Act, 1996, the merits of the rivalcontentions relating to the claim would not arise for consideration at thisstage. This is for the reason that in the proceedings under Section 34 ofthe Act, which is the remedy available to assail the award, the contentionson merits of the claim relating to the insurance policy has not been goneGinto to consider the correctness or otherwise of the arbitral award andthe proceedings has been concluded on the ground of limitation.Consequently, in the appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 alsoit is on examination of that aspect the appeal has been dismissed. In thatview, the limited consideration to be made in this appeal is to determinewhether the dismissal of the petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996H

on the ground of limitation is justified. In that regard, if the conclusion tobe reached by us is to the effect that in the present circumstance thepetition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 was to be considered on merits,the matter would thereafter have to be gone into on merits before thelearned District Judge, Jodhpur, to advert to the merits limited to theconsideration permissible under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.

7. While taking note of these aspects the fact that the award wasinitially passed on 28.06.2004 and the third learned arbitrator disposed ofthe application under Section 33 of the Act, 1996 on 07.12.2004 is theposition which emerges from the record. In that view, the petition filedunder Section 34 of the Act, 1996 before the learned District Judge,Jaipur, on 24.02.2005 is within the time frame as stipulated under Section34 (3) of the Act, 1996. The position is also that the learned DistrictJudge, Jaipur, returned the original application through the order dated12.03.2008 permitting the appellant to present it before the learned DistrictJudge, Jodhpur, on 02.04.2008. If the petition was presented on the saiddate in terms of the order the need for consideration on delay would nothave arisen. However, as noticed the appellant insurance company re-presented the petition before the learned District Judge, Jodhpur only on10.04.2008. In view of the application filed by the respondent underSection 3 of the Limitation Act seeking dismissal in that context, theappellant herein filed the application under Section 14 of the LimitationAct. The issue that would therefore arise is as to whether the presentationof the petition before the learned Judge, Jodhpur, should be consideredas a fresh petition and the explanation for the entire period from theoriginal limitation period i.e., from the date of the award is to be consideredfor the purpose of condonation of delay for prosecuting in an alternatejurisdiction, while considering the application under Section 14 of theAct or in the present circumstance since the earlier Court had exercisedthe power under Order 7 Rule 10 and 10A of the Civil Procedure Code,the consideration should be for the delay condonation between the period02.04.2008 to 10.04.2008 merely being the delay in re-presentation.

8. The learned counsel for respondent in that regard has contendedthat when a plaint is returned under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC to be filedbefore the Court having jurisdiction and in that circumstance when theplaint is presented in the Court having jurisdiction the petition can bedeemed to be instituted in the proper Court as a fresh petition when theplaint is presented in such Court. To buttress such contention, the learned A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Acounsel has relied on the decision in the case of Shri Amar ChandInami vs. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC 115 with reference to para 9thereof. We have carefully perused the said decision in the backgroundof the said contention. Though such decision was rendered in the factsarising therein and the decision was rendered on 13.10.1972 in the contextof the provision contained in Order 7 Rule 10 CPC as it existed, it is toBbe noted that amendment was made on 01.02.1977 whereunder Rule10A was substituted under Order 7 Rule 10 of CPC. A perusal of thesame will indicate that after amendment the matter is not left in a limboafter the plaint is returned in terms of Rule 10(2) which existed earlier.Presently through Rule 10A to Order 7 of CPC on an application beingCmade a date is to be specified for its presentation so as to enable theappearance before the Court in which it would be re-presented.Therefore, the re-presentation of the petition in the Court which is indicatedin the order for return cannot be considered as a fresh filing in allcircumstances when, it is returned to the plaintiff for such re-representation. This Court in the case of Joginder Tuli vs. S.L. BhatiaDand another (1997) 1 SCC 502 has held that normally, when the plaintis directed to be returned for presentation to the proper court perhaps ithas to start from the beginning but in the cited case, since the evidencewas already adduced by the parties, the matter was tried accordingly.The High Court had in that case directed to proceed from the stage atEwhich the suit stood transferred and this Court did not find any illegalityin such order passed by High Court to treat the same as a continuationof the proceedings.

9. In the instant case though the appellant herein had not filed theapplication indicating the Court to which the petition would be re-Fpresented and did not seek for fixing the date of hearing, the Court atJaipur while ordering return of the petition after consideration of theapplication of the respondent under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC had indicatedthe Court to which it was to be presented and the date for appearanceon 02.04.2008 for that purpose. Hence, it is not as if the proceedingcame to an abrupt end when the petition was returned so as to considerGthe next filing as a fresh petition. In that circumstance when the timehad been granted and date was fixed by the learned District Judge atJaipur and if for any reason the re-presentation was not possible on thatdate, the course open to the appellant was to file an application underSection 148 of CPC before the Court at Jaipur which ordered for returnHand fixed the time for presentation in the Court at Jodhpur, seeking extension of time granted earlier. However, since the same was notresorted to by the appellant and the petition was re-presented before theDistrict Court at Jodhpur with a delay of about 8 days from the datefixed for presentation and as no extension was also sought as indicatedabove, condonation of such delay ought to have been sought. Since thepetition was filed with delay and no other application had accompaniedthe petition, the respondent filed the application under Section 3 ofLimitation Act which prompted a knee jerk reaction by the appellant infiling the application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Though thesaid application has invoked Section 14 of Limitation Act and thereaftersupported by an additional affidavit, the averments in the application is inthe nature of an application seeking condonation of delay in re-presentationof the petition as against the date fixed by the Court for presentation inJodhpur.

10. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the decisionin the case of S. Ganesharaju (dead) through LRs. and Anr. vs.Narsamma (dead) through LRs. and Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 341 tocontend that the expression “sufficient cause” as contemplated underSection 5 of the Limitation Act should be given liberal construction so asto advance substantial justice and the delay should be condoned unlessthe opposite party is able to show malafide in not approaching the Courtwithin time. It is further contended that it is held therein that the rules oflimitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of parties. Thelearned counsel for the respondent on the other hand would contend thatthe said decision rendered is in the context of consideration of “sufficientcause” as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act whichwould not be applicable to proceedings under Section 34 of the Act,1996. In that regard, the learned counsel for the respondent has reliedon the decision in the case of Union of India vs. Popular ConstructionCompany, (2001) 8 SCC 470 wherein it is held that Section 5 of theLimitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings under Section 34 ofthe Act, 1996 for setting aside the arbitral award. Further the decision inthe case of Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 2SCC 455 is also relied upon to contend that Section 5 of the LimitationAct has no application to a petition challenging the arbitral award underSection 34 of the Act, 1996. The said decision would however indicatethat Section 14 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an applicationsubmitted under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 seeking for exclusion ofcertain period if the application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 is at ABC

D

E

F

G

H

Athe first instance filed within the limitation period provided under Section34(3) of the Act, 1996. The position of law that Section 5 of the LimitationAct is not applicable to condone the statutory period under Section 34(3)of Act, 1996 is well established and needs no reiteration.

11. Having noticed the said decisions, in the instant case as alreadyBindicated above the condonation of delay sought is not for filing the petitionunder Section 34 of the Act, 1996 for the first time. The petition filedunder Section 34 of the Act, 1996 at Jaipur was within the period oflimitation and the delay regarding which explanation is put forth is forthe period of 8 days in re-presenting the petition beyond the date fixedafter it was returned under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Civil ProcedureCCode. Therefore, in that circumstance even if the term “sufficient cause”as contained under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is taken note, in thepresent facts the same is not with reference to petition under Section 34of Act, 1996 for condonation of delay beyond the period prescribed underSection 34(3) of the Act, 1996. Though that be the position what isDnecessary to be taken note herein is that the application filed for excludingthe time is under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In addition to the verydecisions cited above indicating that Section 14 of the Limitation Actwould be applicable to the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act,1996 subject to the petition under Section 34 being filed within time, thelearned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the decision in theEcase of M/s Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. The PrincipalSecretary, Irrigation Department & Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 169 whereinthe same position is reiterated.

12. The learned counsel for the respondent would however, referto the very same decision and contend that even if Section 14 of theFLimitation Act is applicable, the exclusion of time can only be of theproceedings which is bonafide initiated in a Court without jurisdiction. Itis contended that in the instant case the entire cause of action hadoccurred at Jodhpur and despite the same the appellant had deliberatelyinitiated the proceedings at Jaipur which cannot be considered as aGbonafide mistake. Though such contention is put forth, what cannot belost sight in the instant facts is that the learned Judge of the AdditionalDistrict Court, Jaipur while considering the maintainability of theproceedings before that Court, through the order dated 12.03.2008 hastaken note of the very rival contentions with regard to the cause ofaction as contended and also the Court before which the proceedingsH

was required to be initiated. Though at this point of time the position oflaw has been enunciated through several decisions, and there is clarity,at that juncture the consideration with regard to the definition of Courtas contained in the Act was required to be interpreted and on taking noteof various decision of the Supreme Court had arrived at the conclusionthat keeping in view the fact situation the petition is to be returned forpresentation in the appropriate Court. The very nature of considerationmade by the Court at Jaipur would indicate that the matter required adetail consideration before exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 10and 10A of the Civil Procedure Code and the Court during the saidproceedings has not arrived at a conclusion that the proceedings hadbeen initiated malafide before that Court. However, keeping in view theoverall facts and circumstance of the present case the Court had orderedreturn of the petition for appropriate presentation and the date had beenfixed. The correctness of the said order had not been assailed by therespondent herein seeking absolute rejection of the petition by raisinggrounds on the nature of findings rendered therein since that Court hadnot held the petition to be malafide.

13. In such circumstance, in the fact situation wherein the issueof delay had arisen only in the context of the delay of 8 days in re-presentation as permitted by the Court at Jaipur, re-examination of thematter to consider the entire period spent before the Court at Jaipur asmalafide so as to nonsuit the appellant and deny consideration ofproceedings under Section 34 of Act, 1996 which was initiated withinthe period of limitation at the first instance, on its merits will not bejustified.

14. In that view, the order dated 15.07.2008 passed on theapplication filed under Section 14 and Section 3 of the Limitation Actpassed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge S.No.3, Jodhpurand the order dated 06.02.2009 passed by the High Court in S.B. (Civil)Misc. Appeal No.1103/2008 are not sustainable. They are accordingly,set aside. Consequently, the proceedings in Arbitration Application No.18-A of 2008 is restored to the file of the Additional District Judge S.No.3,Jodhpur.

15. The parties shall appear before the said Court on 15.10.2019as the first date for appearance without issue of notice/summons fromthat Court. The proceedings thereto shall be considered on merits in anexpeditious manner. All contentions in that regard are left open.

AB

C

D

E

FG

H

240SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2019] 13 S.C.R.

A16. The appeal is, accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.All pending applications shall stand disposed of.

Devika GujralB

Appeal allowed.

C

D

E

F

G

H