THE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND AND BUILDING AND ORS. versus ANJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND ANR. on 24 November 2022

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition(C) No. 203 of 2015 by which the High Court has allowed the said writpetition preferred by the respondent No.1 herein and has declared thatthe acquisition with respect to the land in question comprised in KhasraGNo. 156 admeasuring 2 bighas, 4 biswas in village Lado Sarai, NewDelhi, is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to FairCompensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation andResettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”), theDepartment of Land and Building and the Land Acquisition Collectorhave preferred the present appeal.H

2. We have heard Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, learned counselappearing on behalf of the appellants and Shri Rishab Nagar, learnedcounsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1(i) to 1(iv).

3. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case,the acquisition proceedings commenced in the year 1986. The awardunder the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was declared on 14.09.1986.According to the appellants, the possession of the land in question wastaken on 22.09.1986.

3.1 From the impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt, it appears that relying upon its earlier decision in the case ofJagjeet Singh & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition(C) No. 960 of 2015, which was also with respect to Khasra No. 156admeasuring 2 bighas, 4 biswas in village Lado Sarai, New Delhi, bywhich the High Court allowed the said writ petition preferred by thelandowners and declared that the acquisition with respect to the saidland is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, theHigh Court has allowed the present Writ Petition (C) No. 203 of 2015and has disposed of the same in terms of the order passed in Writ Petition(C) No. 960 of 2015.

3.2 However, from the judgment and order passed by the HighCourt in Writ Petition (C) No. 960 of 2015 in the case of JagjeetSingh & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., it appears that the HighCourt has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in the case ofPune Municipal Corporation and Anr. Vs. Harakchand MisirimalSolanki and Ors. reported in (2014) 3 SCC 183. The High Court inthe said case, i.e., Jagjeet Singh & Ors. (supra), without going intothe controversy of physical possession had declared that the acquisitionwith respect to the said land is deemed to have lapsed as thecompensation with respect to the land in question has not been tenderedto the recorded owner. However, it cannot be disputed that the decisionof this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr.(supra) has been subsequently specifically overruled by the ConstitutionBench of this Court in the case of Indore Development AuthorityVs. Manoharlal and Ors. reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129.

3.3 However, it is the case on behalf of the respondent Nos.1(i)to 1(iv) that the Civil Appeal against the decision of the Delhi High Courtin the case of Jagjeet Singh & Ors. (supra) has been dismissed bythis Court by common judgment and order dated 04.05.2017 and even A

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Athe review application has been dismissed and therefore, the impugnedjudgment and order passed by the High Court may not be interferedwith by this Court. However, it is required to be noted that when CivilAppeal No. 6250 of 2017 in the case of Jagjeet Singh & Ors. (supra)came to be dismissed, the law was not settled, which has ultimatelybeen settled by the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in theBcase of Indore Development Authority (supra) and therefore, thedecision of this Court in the case of Jagjeet Singh & Ors. (supra)shall not be of any assistance to the respondents in view of the law laiddown by this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority(supra). It is required to be noted that the review application has beenCdismissed on the ground of delay and not on merits.

3.4 Now on merits, it was the specific case on behalf of the authoritythat the possession of the land in question was already taken over on22.09.1986. However, thereafter without entering into the question ofpossession, the High Court has declared that the acquisition with respectDto land in question is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of theAct, 2013 as the compensation with respect to the land in question wasnot paid. As observed and held by this Court in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority (supra) for the purpose of deemed lapse ofland acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, boththe conditions namely the possession of land has not been taken overEand the compensation not paid are required to be satisfied. As observedand held by this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority(supra), if one of the conditions are not satisfied, there cannot be anylapse of acquisition under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. In paragraphs365 and 366, the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of IndoreFDevelopment Authority (supra) has observed and held as under:- “365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune MunicipalCorpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki,(2014) 3 SCC 183] is hereby overruled and all other decisions inwhich Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v.GHarakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183] has beenfollowed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji NagarResidential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. Stateof T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353] cannot be said to be laying downgood law, is overruled and other decisions following the same arealso overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra H

[(2018) 3 SCC 412], the aspect with respect to the proviso toSection 24(2) and whether “or” has to be read as “nor” or as“and” was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decisiontoo cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the presentjudgment.

366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer thequestions as under:

366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case theaward is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement ofthe 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation hasto be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

366.2. In case the award has been passed within thewindow period of five years excluding the period covered by aninterim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue asprovided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894Act as if it has not been repealed.

366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) betweenpossession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”.The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction ofauthorities for five years or more prior to commencement of thesaid Act, the possession of land has not been taken norcompensation has been paid. In other words, in case possessionhas been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is nolapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession hasnot been taken then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensationin court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the provisoto Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect tomajority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as onthe date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with theprovisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interestunder Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit ofcompensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land A

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acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect tothe majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation underthe 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date ofnotification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensationas provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open tohim to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) dueto non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. Theobligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensationor who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claimthat the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2)of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is tobe treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Actand as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquestreport/memorandum. Once award has been passed on takingpossession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests inState there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapseunder Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for adeemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authoritieshave failed due to their inaction to take possession and paycompensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act cameinto force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with theauthority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence ofinterim orders passed by court has to be excluded in thecomputation of five years.

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise tonew cause of action to question the legality of concludedproceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceedingpending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014.It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopenconcluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question thelegality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of courtto invalidate acquisition.”

3.5 Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that in the presentcase, the compensation was not paid to the landowners in view of thefact that there was ownership dispute between the co-owners withrespect to compensation. In paragraph 6 (vi), the respondents haveadmitted the same, which reads as under:- “…………………….Admittedly, as per the available record, i.e.,Naksha Muntazmin, the compensation inclusive of solatium andinterest up to 16th Sept 1986 was ordered not to be paid on accountof dispute amongst the claimants. And nor was the corpusdeposited in the Reference Court as per the provisions of theAct.”

3.6 Therefore, if the compensation has not been paid due to interse dispute between the co-owners, thereafter, it will not be open for therespondents – landowners to make a grievance that once thecompensation was not paid, the acquisition is deemed to have lapsed. Inany case, in view of the decision of this Court in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority (supra), the impugned judgment and orderpassed by the High Court is unsustainable.

4. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, presentappeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt in Writ Petition (C) No. 203 of 2015 declaring that the acquisitionwith respect to the land in question is deemed to have lapsed underSection 24(2) of the Act, 2013 is hereby quashed and set aside.

Present appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.

Ankit Gyan

Appeal allowed.

(Assisted by : Aarsh Choudhary, LCRA)

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