STATE OF M.P. & ORS. versus RAKESH SETHI & ANR. on 26 August 2020

734

[2020] 7 S.C.R. 734

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2020] 7 S.C.R.

ASTATE OF M.P. & ORS.

v.

RAKESH SETHI & ANR.

(Civil Appeal No. 7074 of 2008)

BAUGUST 26, 2020

[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]

Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994:

r. 55 A – Validity of – High Court held that Rule 55-A is ultraCvires the State’s power under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and CentralMotor Vehicles Rules, 1989 – Held: In view of ss. 65(1) and 211 ofMotor Vehicles Act, State Government has the authority to prescribea fee for reserving certain numbers or distinguishing marks to beassigned as registration numbers – Therefore, Rule 55A is not inexcess of the powers conferred upon the State by the Act or theDCentral Rules – The State was competent to make the legislationthrough the provisions of the Act – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 –ss. 65(1) and 211 – Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

EHeld: 1. The High Court, in its impugned judgement, lostsight of the true import of Section 211 of Motor Vehicles Act,1988. The existence of specific provisions empowering the State[such as Sections 41(13), 47(7), 49(4) and 50(5)] of the Act, meansthat the power of the State to claim or charge amounts, isspecifically recognized by express provisions. Further, there areFcertain services and functions for which the State is empoweredto levy fees. It is precisely to cover these contingencies, i.e. wherethe service is rendered or some function performed, that the Stateis empowered by a residual provision (much like the CentralGovernment with which it shares the power concurrently) to levyGfees. Section 211 is cast in wide terms and that any rule whichthe Central Government or the State Government is empoweredto make under the Act may, notwithstanding the absence of anyexpress provision to that effect, provide for the levy of such fees inrespect of applications, amendment of documents, issue ofcertificates, licences, permits, tests, endorsements, badges, plates, H

countersignatures, authorisation, supply of statistics or copies ofdocuments or orders and for any other purpose or matter involvingthe rendering of any service. Clearly, therefore, the Parliamentintended that contingencies not covered by a specific power tolevy fees or amounts, which entailed some activity on the part ofthe State, including rendering of any service could be legitimatelycharged or subjected to the levy of fee or amounts. [Para 29][754-D-G]

2. The assignment of numbers by the registering authoritythrough an official/agency or department notified by the StateGovernment, cannot be seen as a mere step – albeit at the fag-end of the registration allotment process. In fact, though it is theculmination of the allotment process, it is nevertheless animportant step. The state is entitled to indicate its choice ormanner of assigning by prescribing a particular set of proceduresfor the assignment of numbers. Thus, for instance, the assignmentof the concerned “code” - to the individual registering authoritiesfollowed by the assignment of numerics may follow apredetermined pattern which may be district wise, StateGovernment department wise (in the case of publicly ownedvehicles), different sequences for buses and heavy vehicles andso on. If such a predetermined choice can be made by prescribingthe mode of assignment, it is both regulatory and at the sametime indicative of State policy. Per se, the Court cannot brushaside the element of service which may be involved – especiallyif the general public or a sub-section of it, wishes to chooseparticular numbers for various considerations. Such “fancy”numbers or “auspicious” numbers may well therefore have to beset apart having regard to the peculiar socio-cultural needs ofthe people of the state. It is in such an event that the availabilityof such numbers and their reservation as a choice and the powerof their assignment assumes importance. In the impugned Rule55A in the present instance, introduced in 2001 throughamendment by the State of M.P., prescribes four different fees –` 15000/- for the registration marks 1 to 9 in any series prevalentwithin the jurisdiction of the registering authority; and` 12000/- for reservation of marks from 10 to 100 in any serieswithin the jurisdiction of the registering authority. For reservationof large series of numbers indicated in Rule 55A(c), ` 10000/- AB

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Aand ` 2000/- for reservation of any other number or numbers within1000 from the last number assigned in the serial order. In additionto charging such fees, the registering authority is enjoined byRule 55A(2) to follow the principle of first-come-first-serve inreserving particular numbers; and to allot the registration markreserved upon production of the vehicle along with the applicationBin Form-20 (of the Central Rules), provided the vehicle iscompliant with the provisions of the Act and Rules. By Rule 55A(d),the reservation of the mark would be cancelled if the vehicle isnot produced for allotment within three months from the date ofallotment. Obviously, this is meant to avoid abuse of theCreservation process by trafficking in numbers, by providing finitetime within which such numbers can be used. [Paras 30, 31][754-H; 755-A-D; 756-A; 757-A-D]

3. The generality of the power under Section 65(1) of theMotor Vehicles Act to frame rules is sufficient along with SectionD211, to conclude that the State Government has the authority toprescribe a fee for reserving certain numbers or distinguishingmarks to be assigned as registration numbers. It has not beenshown how the setting apart of or reservation of some numbers –here, a fraction of the large potential batch of numbers which theregistering authority can otherwise assign to vehicles, is per seEarbitrary or unreasonable. Neither were any such arguments urgedbefore this Court. [Para 33][758-D-F]

4. Whenever a State confers rule making power orempowers delegated legislation, i.e. where or wherever the statutefirst lays out a general provision authorizing subordinateFlegislation or the framing of separate legislation to carry out thepurposes of that Act, and uses the expression “in particular andwithout generality of the foregoing powers”, followed by anotherdelegation which enumerates specific powers preceded byexpressions such as “in particular and without the generality ofGthe foregoing powers,” the particularization is only illustrative anddoes not subsume the general power. [Para 34][758-F-H]

5. Therefore, the assignment of “distinctive marks” i.e.registration numbers to motor vehicles (which includes the powerto reserve and allocate them, for a specific fee) is a distinct service H

for which states or their authorities (such as the registeringauthorities, in this case) are entitled to charge a prescribed fee.Rule 55A of the MP Rules is not therefore, in excess of the powersconferred upon the state, by the Act or the Central Rules. [Para39][761-E-F]

6. It is not correct to say that the State was not competentto make the legislation. The State of M.P. derived its powers toframe the concerned rules, through the provisions of the MotorVehicles Act itself. The question, therefore, of repugnance asproperly understood, did not arise; rather it was a case whetherthe state government, as one of the delegated authorities, wasempowered through Parliamentary law to frame the rule that itdid. [Para 40][761-G-H; 762-A]

Offshore Holdings (P.) Ltd. v. Bangalore DevelopmentAuthority (2011) 3 SCC 139 : [2011] 1 SCR 453;Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P (1981)4 SCC 471; Academy of Nutrition Improvement v. Unionof India (2011) 8 SCC 274 : [2011] 8 SCR 680; D.K.Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat (1986) Suppl. SCC20 : [1986] 1 SCR 479; Afzal Ullah v. State of U.P.[1964] 4 SCR 991 – relied on.

Distt. Council of United Khasi and Jaintia Hills v.Sitimon Sawian (1971) 3 SCC 708 : [1972] 1 SCR 398;Indian Medical Assn. v. Union of India (2011) 7 SCC179 : [2011] 6 SCR 599; Jantia Hill Truck Owners Assn.v. Shailang Area Coal Dealer & Truck Owner Assn.(2009) 8 SCC 492 : [2009] 10 SCR 536; T. Cajee v. U.Jormanik Siem [1961] 1 SCR 750; Surinder Singh v.Central Government (1986) 4 SCC 667 : [1986] 3 SCR946; Rohtak & Hissar District Electric Supply Co. Ltd.v. State of UP AIR 1966 SC 1471 : [1966] 2 SCR 863;Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd v. Telecom RegulatoryAuthority of India and Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 222 : [2013]12 SCR 999; K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu(1985) 2 SCC 116 : [1985] 2 SCR 1028 – referred to.

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ACaseLaw Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7074of 2008.

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From the Judgment and Order dated 15.05.2008 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in W.P. No. 2344 of 2004.

Vikramjeet Banerjee, ASG, Saurabh Mishra, AAG, Arjun Garg,Aakash Nandolia, Ankit Swarup, Neelmani Pant, Jawad Tariq,Ms. Vidisha Swarup, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Ms. Rukmini Bobde,FNachiketa Joshi, Advs. for the appearing parties.

Manoj Swarup, Sr. Adv. (A.C.).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

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1. This appeal challenges a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh HighCourt which quashed Rule 55A of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994(hereafter “the State Rules”) framed by the Madhya Pradesh State(hereafter “the state”) and published by it. The respondent (hereafter“the vehicle owner”) had approached the High Court, contending that Hthe said rule was ultra vires the state’s power under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereafter “the Act”), and the Central Motor Vehicle Rules,1989 (hereafter “the Central Rules”). The High Court accepted hiscontentions.

2. The vehicle owner purchased the motorcycle in May, 2004 andapplied for its registration on 25-05-2004 before the concerned registeringauthority, through the prescribed application in Form No. 20. By an order(of 27-05-2004), the registering authority rejected the application, statingthat the vehicle owner’s claim for allotment of registration number ‘MP-KL-4646’ could not be accepted, as the petitioner had not paid the requiredfee prescribed for allotment of that number. The motorcycle was allottedanother number (MP20-KL-5100) which the petitioner did not want. Hetherefore, approached the High Court in writ proceedings, contendingthat allotment of a particular number on payment of a fee (provided inRule 55A) was contrary to and inconsistent with the provisions of Section41 and the powers conferred on the State Government to frame rulesunder Section 65 of the Act of 1988. He challenged the amendmentincorporated in the State Rules of 1994 by a notification dated 15.02.2001.He also sought a direction to the registration authority that he should beassigned the number 4646 for his motorcycle. Under Rule 55A, thisnumber was reserved by the State to be assigned by a separateprocedure. The Rules, particularly Rule 55A prescribed not only theprocedure but also a special fee for assigning such reserved numbers(which included 4646, which the vehicle owner insisted should be allottedto him). He contended that Rule 55A, was ultra vires the provisions ofthe Act.

3. Mr. Saurabh Mishra, learned counsel for the State relied uponthe scheme of the Act, and highlighted that while Section 41(2)undoubtedly conferred the power to prescribe rules and also a fee toallot registration numbers, yet Section 41(6) was specific in that evenwhile the Central Government was authorized to allot certain numbersto the State, the further or onward registration or assignment of thosenumbers as registration numbers was left to the State.

4. Learned counsel argued that the State Rules were framed byvirtue of the powers conferred under section 65 of the Act, whichempowers the State to inter alia, make rules with regard to issue orrenewal of certificate of registration, as well as amounts to be chargedfor such registration. It was also argued that under Section 211 of theAct, the State is entitled to levy a fee with respect to applications submitted A

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Afor issuing certificates, licenses or registrations and as the State fixedthe procedure for allotment of registration mark by reservation exercisingpowers under Section 211, such procedure is in accordance with thelaw. It was argued by Mr. Mishra, that by virtue of Section 41 (6), theregistering authority can assign to any vehicle for display on it, adistinguishing mark known as the registration mark. It is submitted thatBin this instance, since Rule 55A merely empowers the registering authorityto assign a specific registration mark, on demand to the concerned person,the power exercised is relatable to Section 41(6), and the High Court’sconclusions are erroneous.

5. It was pointed out by Mr. Mishra that the responsibility ofCassigning registration mark to motor vehicles is that of the StateGovernment. He emphasized that Section 64 (d) of the Act empowersthe Central Government to “prescribe the manner and the form inwhich the registration mark of the vehicles is to be displayed”. TheCentral Government has in fact, specified the form and the manner ofDdisplay of registration marks on motor vehicles, under Rules 50 and 51of the Central Rules. The issue raised by the petitioner relates to allocationof a particular registration series, which is within the exclusive domainof the concerned registering authority of the State. The CentralGovernment is not concerned with the allocation of distinguishedregistration marks.E

6. Learned counsel argued that the powers of the centralgovernment and the states were clearly delineated; no doubt, the CentralGovernment had exclusive domain over the allocation of particularnumbers or series of numbers to the states, and could prescribe the feeto be paid when applications are made for registration. However, underFSection 41(6), once a series of numbers (or alpha numeric series) isallotted to a state, the procedure to be followed and the fee to beprescribed for assigning the concerned numbers as registration ofindividual vehicles is that of the state. The registering authority is noneother than a state designated official or agency.G

7. Reliance was placed on Offshore Holdings (P.) Ltd. v.Bangalore Development Authority[1] by Mr. Mishra, who drew theattention of this court to observations that when two laws, one by theCentre and the other by the state, are alleged to be in conflict (or repugnantto each other) the court should not readily infer repugnancy, but should:H1 (2011) 3 SCC 139.

“ignore an encroachment which is merely incidental in orderto reconcile the provisions and harmoniously implement them.If ultimately, the provisions of both the Acts can coexist withoutconflict, then it is not expected of the courts to invalidate thelaw in question.”

8. This court had also observed that the doctrine of supremacy offederal laws under Article 254 should:

“normally be resorted to only when the conflict is so patentand irreconcilable that coexistence of the two laws is notfeasible. Such conflict must be an actual one and not a mereseeming conflict between the entries in the two lists. Whileentries have to be construed liberally, their irreconcilabilityand impossibility of coexistence should be patent.”

9. Mr. Mishra also relied on other decisions of this court, highlightingthat conflict of laws or repugnancy between state and central laws shouldnot be readily inferred, under the Constitution, but rather, the courts shouldfirst attempt at harmonizing the two sets of apparently conflicting norms.[2]Counsel also relied on Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh v. State ofM.P[3] and urged that the course adopted by the state to assign specificregistration numbers through a separate procedure, was in fact a resultof popular demand, since many people wanted such specific registrationnumbers for numerological, astrological and religious reasons. Hesubmitted that the state could have even resorted to its executive powerswithout framing a rule, since the task of assigning numbers fell within itsdomain, under the scheme of the Act.

10. It was argued that a reading of Section 211 along with Section65(2)(d) and (k) clearly indicates that the State Government can makerules with regard to the subjects on which it is specifically empoweredto do so. As far as the registration of motor vehicles and prescribingfees for registration are concerned, the power is of the State Governmentto prescribe rules for providing the procedure for assigning or renewingregistration numbers, through the registering authority. Stressing thatSection 211 was erroneously interpreted by the High Court, learned 2 Fatehchand Himmatlal v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 2 SCC 670]; Union of India v.Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers’ College [(2002) 8 SCC 228] and Girnar Tradersv State of Maharasthra [(2011) 3 SCC 1].3 (1981) 4 SCC 471.

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Acounsel submitted that it clearly empowered the state to prescribe a feenot otherwise provided, in respect of a service provided by it. Counselargued that the state provided a separate service, i.e. allocating specificdesired numbers to vehicle owners, for which it could well claim a fee,over and above the registration fee prescribed by the Central Government,under Section 41(2).B

11. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the generality of theprovisions of Section 65(1) and the deployment of the expression “withoutprejudice to the generality of provisions of sub-section (1)” in Section65 (2), together with Section 65(2)(p) were meant to clothe the stategovernment with the power to impose a fee for the kind of servicesCinvolved in the present dispute. He relied on the judgment in Academyof Nutrition Improvement v. Union of India[4] where this court hadinterpreted a pari materia expression (“in particular and without thegenerality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all orany of the following matters”[5]). This court had observed, in thatDjudgment, as follows:

“Statutes delegating the power to make rules follow a standardpattern. The relevant section would first contain a provisiongranting the power to make rules to the delegate in generalterms, by using the words `to carry out the provisions of thisEAct’ or `to carry out the purposes of this Act’. This is usuallyfollowed by another sub-section enumerating the matters/areasin regard to which specific power is delegated by using thewords `in particular and without prejudice to the generalityof the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or anyof the following matters.” Interpreting such provisions, thisFCourt in a number of decisions has held that where power isconferred to make subordinate legislation in general terms,the subsequent particularization of the matters/topics has tobe construed as merely illustrative and not limiting the scopeof the general power. Consequently, even if the specificGenumerated topics in section 23 (1A) may not empower theCentral Government to make the impugned rule (Rule 44-I),making of the Rule can be justified with reference to thegeneral power conferred on the central government under 4 (2011) 8 SCC 274.H5 Section 2 (1), The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

section 23 (1), provided the rule does not travel beyond thescope of the Act.”

12. Service of notice of the present proceedings was complete,upon the respondent vehicle owner. He has however chosen to remainabsent. Having regard to the public importance of issues involved in thepresent case, Mr. Manoj Swaroop, learned senior counsel, was asked toassist this court as amicus curiae which he did, with much industry andardor. The amicus urged this court not to disturb or interfere with thejudgment under appeal. He outlined the scheme of the Act, and underlinedSections 41(1), (2), (3), (6) and (the now deleted[6] s. 41(13)), and contendedthat there was a clear demarcation of powers of the state and centralgovernments. Highlighting the delineation of rule making powers underSection 64 (by the central government) and under Section 65 (by thestate government) it was submitted that the subject of prescription offee for allotment of registration was exhausted; the central governmenthad exclusive authority to prescribe the particulars required, the form tobe used for applying[7] and the form of registration certificates for variouskinds of vehicles[8]. Thus, the state had no power to prescribe fees, muchless prescribe by-rules for a procedure for assigning specific numbers tovarious applicants. It was argued that even the power of allocation of asequence of numbers to individual states was reserved to the centralgovernment alone. These ruled out prescription of any further fee, orcreation of a separate procedure for assigning specific numbers, andcharging higher amounts from desirous applicants/ vehicle owners.

13. Mr. Swaroop argued that Section 211 states that if by anyrule, the Central or the State Government is empowered to make underthe Motor Vehicles Act, then the Central Government or the StateGovernments, notwithstanding the absence of any express provision,are empowered to provide for levy of such fees in respect of variousitems like applications, applications for amendment to the issue ofcertificates and other matters provided therein. It was argued that tolevy a fee under Section 211, a provision should exist empowering theCentral Government or the State Government to make such a rule. Suchpower cannot be exercised in regard to matters for which the Act doesnot give power to the State Government to make Rules. Since the powerto prescribe a fee for registration of a motor vehicle is vested in the 6 By virtue of amendment through Act 32 of 2019, by Parliament.

7 Form 20, attached to the Central Rules.

8 Form 23 and 23A, attached to the Central Rules.

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ACentral Government under Section 41(2), the power to levy a fee undersection 211 can be exercised by the State Government only if it isempowered under the Act to prescribe fees for the purpose of registrationof a motor vehicle. The Act does not empower the State Government tolevy fees for registration of a vehicle; therefore, no fees can be prescribedfor allotment of a registration mark for a motor vehicle, exercising powersBunder Section 211. It was submitted that the so called right of assigningthe registration number is only the last step in the process of allotment,for which the Central Government levies a fee under Section 41(2).

14. Mr. Swaroop argued that the state is conferred with poweronly to make rules providing the procedure for issue or renewal ofCcertificate or recovery of amount or amounts under sub-section (13) ofSection 14 i.e., to prescribe the amount to be paid for delay on the partof the owner to file an application for registration of motor vehicle undersub-section (1) of Section 41 or under sub-section (8) of Section 41 forrenewal of motor vehicles registration. These provisions do not empower Dthe state to make a rule fixing the fee to be charged for registration of amotor vehicle. It is, therefore, clear that under the Act, the power toprescribe a fee for registration of motor vehicles is only conferred onthe Central Government, and in exercise of the such power, the CentralGovernment has already fixed the fee under Rule 81 of the CentralMotor Vehicle Rules, 1989.

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15. Next, reliance was also placed on Sections 47(7), 49(4) and50(5) of the Act. The amicus contended that these provisions specificallyconferred powers upon the state to prescribe amounts as fee for transferof registration of vehicles on their removal from one state to another; forobtaining no objection certificate from the registering authority, and uponFtransfer of ownership. He therefore, urged that the splitting up of anindivisible process, by drawing a distinction between “allotment” ofnumbers by the Centre and their onward assignment by the stateregistering authority and the charging of a separate fee for the latter,was impermissible. The absence of specific provisions enabling the stateGto prescribe amounts as fees, for particular enumerated services, showedParliamentary intent to exclude the state from levying a fee for “assigning”a registered number, for an act for which the Central government hadprescribed a fee under Section 41(2). Counsel also urged that theprovision of Section 41(2) had the effect of excluding the power ofprescribing any fee in relation to registration of vehicles, including theHstate’s powers under Section 65 and 211.

16. Mr. Swaroop sought to contrast the provisions of the nowrepealed Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, with the Act. He contended thatSection 41(2) manifested Parliamentary intent to exclude state power inrespect of a subject matter, where such power had previously existed.He highlighted that under the old law, individual states were free toprescribe fees according to varying standards. The Act however, wasan improvement, because a single power of one fee, could be prescribedunder Section 41(2).

17. The amicus lastly relied on a notification issued by the CentralGovernment[9] which had assigned specified groups of letters “for useas registration mark for each State and Union Territory to befollowed by the code number of the Registering Authority to beallotted by the State Government or, as the case may be theAdministrator, not exceeding four figures, to be used as registrationmark.” It was urged that the notification, after setting out in tabularform, the letters assigned to various states and union territories, furtherdirected that whenever the four figures referred to earlier “reached9999, the next series shall begin with the alphabet ‘A’ followed bynot more than four figures and thereafter with alphabet ‘B’ followedby not more than four figures and so on…”

18. Counsel asserted that this exercise exhaustively resulted inallotment of letters and numbers to the concerned states, which thenmerely had to follow a procedure of assigning them, on the basis of apre-determined sequence. Under no circumstances could the state orthe registering authority pick out a few or some numbers for specialassignment, and charge a separate, higher fee.

19. Learned counsel relied on Distt. Council of United Khasiand Jaintia Hills v. Sitimon Sawian[10] where, this court construed theterm “allot” and held that “The word “allot” according to standard dictionaries means,distribute by lot, or in such a way that the recipients have nochoice; to assign as a lot or apportion to; and the word“allotment” means, apportioning; the action of allotting; shareallotted to one; small portion of land let out for cultivation.”

9 S.O. 444(E) dated 12 June, 1989.

10 (1971) 3 SCC 708 at p. 712.

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A20. It was submitted that allotment of a registration, and prescribinga fee, for that purpose, under Section 41(2) similarly enfolds within theterm, the entire process, including the kind of application, payment offee, the form to be used, etc. All these are within the domain of theCentral Government; the state cannot segregate the last limb and seekto recover a fee for “assigning” the actual number to individuals. LearnedBcounsel also relied on the judgment in Indian Medical Assn. v. Unionof India[11], where it was held that “66. The word “allot”, in its verb form, is defined by ConciseOxford Dictionary [ 8th Edn., Oxford University Press (1990)]to include the meaning of the act to give or apportion to,Cdistribute officially to. Allotment is what results from such anact i.e. an apportionment. The word “reserve” is defined toalso include the meaning of “order to be specifically retainedor allocated for a particular person”, and the word“reservation” is the act or an instance of reserving or beingDreserved. The word “allocate” is defined to include themeanings of an act to assign or devote something for a purposeor to a person.”

Mr. Swaroop lastly relied on the decision of this court in JantiaHill Truck Owners Assn. v. Shailang Area Coal Dealer & TruckEOwner Assn.[12]

21. The learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. VikramjitBanerjee, appearing for the Union, supported the state’s position. Heurged that under Section 39 of the Act, every motor vehicle plying onroads should be registered. Section 40 of the Act, prescribes that suchFregistration is made by the concerned registering authority of the StateGovernment under whose jurisdiction the owner of the vehicle residesor has a place of business. It is the duty of the concerned registeringauthority of the State Government to assign a registration mark to thevehicle as per Section 41(6) of the Act. Every application for registrationof motor vehicles should be accompanied with the fees as specified byGthe Central Government. The Central Government has already specifiedfees for registration of vehicles under Rule 81 of the Central Rules.

22. The ASG urged that Section 64(d) of the Act empowers theCentral Government to prescribe the manner and the form in which the 11 (2011) 7 SCC 179 at p. 217.H12 (2009) 8 SCC 492 at p. 500. (2009) 8 SCC 492 at p. 500.

12 (2009) 8 SCC 492 at p. 500. (2009) 8 SCC 492 at p. 500.

registration mark of the vehicles is to be displayed. Accordingly, theCentral Government has specified the form and the manner of displayof registration marks on the motor vehicles under Rules 50 and 51 of theCentral Rules. The issue in this case, i.e. relating to the allocation of aparticular registration number concerns the registering authority of theState Government, and not the Union. It was argued that under Section65 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the State Governments are vestedwith the power to frame rules on issues pertaining to registration ofmotor vehicles, which are not covered under Section 64 of the Act.Under 65(2)(b) of the Act, the appointment, functions and jurisdiction ofregistering and other prescribed authorities fall under the purview of theState Government. Moreover, under Section 65(2)(b) of the Act, theStates are vested with power to make rules on any other matter relatingto registration of motor vehicles, which need to be specified. Allocationof a registration mark is the responsibility of the concerned StateGovernment. The States are competent to make rules for this purpose.

Provisions of the Act

23. The relevant provisions of the Act are reproduced below:

“39. Necessity for registration.—No person shall drive anymotor vehicle and no owner of a motor vehicle shall causeor permit the vehicle to be driven in any public place or inany other place unless the vehicle is registered inaccordance with this Chapter and the certificate ofregistration of the vehicle has not been suspended orcancelled and the vehicle carries a registration markdisplayed in the prescribed manner:

Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a motorvehicle in possession of a dealer subject to such conditionsas may be prescribed by the Central Government.

40. Registration, where to be made. — Subject to theprovisions of section 42, section 43 and section 60, everyowner of a motor vehicle shall cause the vehicle to beregistered by a registering authority in whose jurisdictionhe has the residence or place of business where the vehicleis normally kept.

41. Registration, how to be made. — (1) An application byor on behalf of the owner of a motor vehicle for registration AB

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shall be in such form and shall be accompanied by suchdocuments, particulars and information and shall be madewithin such period as may be prescribed by the CentralGovernment: Provided that where a motor vehicle is jointlyowned by more persons than one, the application shall bemade by one of them on behalf of all the owners and suchapplicant shall be deemed to be the owner of the motorvehicle for the purposes of this Act.

(2) An application referred to in sub-section (1) shall beaccompanied by such fee as may be prescribed by theCentral Government.

(3) The registering authority shall issue to the owner of amotor vehicle registered by it a certificate of registrationin such form and containing such particulars andinformation and in such manner as may be prescribed bythe Central Government.

(4) In addition to the other particulars required to beincluded in the certificate of registration, it shall alsospecify the type of the motor vehicle, being a type as theCentral Government may, having regard to the design,construction and use of the motor vehicle, by notificationin the Official Gazette, specify.

(5) The registering authority shall enter the particulars ofthe certificate referred to in sub-section (3) in a register tobe maintained in such form and manner as may beprescribed by the Central Government.

(6) The registering authority shall assign to the vehicle,for display thereon, a distinguishing mark (in this Actreferred to as the registration mark) consisting of one ofthe groups of such of those letters and followed by suchletters and figures as are allotted to the State by the CentralGovernment from time to time by notification in the OfficialGazette, and displayed and shown on the motor vehicle insuch form and in such manner as may be prescribed by theCentral Government.

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64. Power of Central Government to make rules. — TheCentral Government may make rules to provide for all or anyof the following matters, namely:

(a) the period within which and the form in which anapplication shall be made and the documents, particulars andinformation it shall accompany under sub-section (1) ofsection 41; (b) the form in which the certificate of registration shall bemade and the particulars and information it shall containand the manner in which it shall be issued under sub-section(3) of section 41;

(c) the form and manner in which the particulars of thecertificate of registration shall be entered in the records ofthe registering authority under sub-section (5) of section 41; (d) the manner in which and the form in which the registrationmark, the letters and figures and other particulars referredto in sub-section (6) of section 41 shall be displayed andshown; 1. Ins. by Act 54 of 1994, s. 19 (w.e.f. 14-11-1994).

(e) the period within which and the form in which theapplication shall be made and the particulars and informationit shall contain under sub-section (8) of section 41; (f) the form in which the application referred to in sub-section(14) of section 41 shall be made, the particulars andinformation it shall contain and the fee to be charged; (g) the form in which the period within which the applicationreferred to in sub-section (1) of section 47 shall be made andthe particulars it shall contain; (h) the form in which and the manner in which the applicationfor “No Objection Certificate” shall be made under sub-section (1) of section 48 and the form of receipt to be issuedunder sub-section (2) of section 48;

(i) the matters that are to be complied with by an applicantbefore no objection certificate may be issued under section48; AB

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A(j) the form in which the intimation of change of address shallbe made under sub-section (1) of section 49 and thedocuments to be submitted along with the application;

(k) the form in which and the manner in which the intimationof transfer of ownership shall be made under sub-section (1)Bof section 50 or under sub-section (2) of section 50 and thedocument to be submitted along with the application;

(l) the form in which the application under sub-section (2) orsub-section (3) of section 51 shall be made; (m) the form in which the certificate of fitness shall be issuedCunder sub-section (1) of section 56 and the particulars andinformation it shall contain; (n) the period for which the certificate of fitness granted orrenewed under section 56 shall be effective; D(o) the fees to be charged for the issue or renewal or alterationof certificates of registration, for making an entry regardingtransfer of ownership on a certificate of registration, formaking or cancelling an endorsement in respect of agreementof hire-purchase or lease or hypothecation on a certificateof registration, for certificates of fitness for registration marks,Eand for the examination or inspection of motor vehicles, andthe refund of such fees.

(p) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed bythe Central Government.

65. Power of State Government to make rules. — (1) A StateFGovernment may make rules for the purpose of carrying intoeffect the provisions of this Chapter other than the mattersspecified in section 64.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power,such rules may provide for—

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(a) the conduct and hearing of appeals that may bepreferred under this Chapter (the fees to be paid in respectof such appeals and the refund of such fees); (b) the appointment, functions and jurisdiction ofHregistering and other prescribed authorities;

(c) the exemption of road-rollers, graders and othervehicles designed and used solely for the construction,repair and cleaning of roads from all or any of theprovisions of this Chapter and the rules made thereunderand the conditions governing such exemption; (d) the issue or renewal of certificates of registration andfitness and duplicates of such certificates to replace thecertificates lost, destroyed or mutilated; (e) the production of certificates of registration before theregistering authority for the revision of entries therein ofparticulars relating to the gross vehicle weight; (f) the temporary registration of motor vehicles, and theissue of temporary certificate of registration and marks; (g) the manner in which the particulars referred to in sub-section (2) of section 58 and other prescribed particularsshall be exhibited; (h) the exemption of prescribed persons or prescribedclasses of persons from payment of all or any portion ofthe fees payable under this Chapter;

(i) the forms, other than those prescribed by the CentralGovernment, to be used for the purpose of this Chapter; (j) the communication between registering authorities ofparticulars of certificates of registration and by ownersof vehicles registered outside the State of particulars ofsuch vehicles and of their registration; (k) the amount or amounts under sub-section (13) of section41 or sub-section (7) of section 47 or sub-section (4) ofsection 49 or sub-section (5) of section 50;

(l) the extension of the validity of certificates of fitnesspending consideration of applications for their renewal; (m) the exemption from the provisions of this Chapter, andthe conditions and fees for exemption, of motor vehiclesin the possession of dealers; (n) the form in which and the period within which the returnunder section 62 shall be sent; A

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(o) the manner in which the State Register of Motor Vehiclesshall be maintained under section 63; (p) any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed.”

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211. Power to levy fee. — Any rule which the CentralGovernment or the State Government is empowered to makeunder this Act may, notwithstanding the absence of anyexpress provision to that effect, provide for the levy of suchCfees in respect of applications, amendment of documents, issueof certificates, licences, permits, tests, endorsements, badges,plates, countersignatures, authorisation, supply of statisticsor copies of documents or orders and for any other purposeor matter involving the rendering of any service by the officersor authorities under this Act or any rule made thereunder asDmay be considered necessary:

Provided that the Government may, if it considersnecessary so to do, in the public interest, by general or specialorder, exempt any class of persons from the payment of anysuch fee either in part or in full.”

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Analysis and Conclusions

24. As is evident from the relevant extracts of the Act, Section 39obliges every vehicle owner to secure a registration; every owner has toregister his vehicle by approaching the registering authority (designatedby the State by virtue of Section 65(2)(b)[13 ]of the Act).

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25. Section 41(1), the next in sequence, enables the CentralGovernment to prescribe the form for application for such registration.There are two provisos to this; the second proviso added in 2019 statesthat in case of a new motor vehicle, the application for registration inthat State shall be made by the dealer of such motor vehicle, if the new G

13 Section 65(2)(b) of the Act reads as follows:(2) without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may providefor:

xxxx xxxx xxxx

(b) the appointment, functions and jurisdiction of registering and other prescribedHauthorities.

motor vehicle is registered in the same State. By Section 41(2), theapplication for registration has to be accompanied by “such fee as maybe prescribed by the Central Government.” By Section 41(3), theregistering authority has to issue the certificate of registration in thename of the owner in such form containing the relevant particulars asprescribed by the Central Government.

26. Section 41(6) the interplay of which, with Section 41(2), isdirectly in issue – enacts that the registering authority “shall assign tothe vehicle for display thereon a distinguishing mark consisting ofone of the groups of such of those letters and followed by suchletters and figures as are allotted to the State by the CentralGovernment from time to time”. Now, this provision is divided into twoparts. Although the duty of the registering authority to assign the“distinguishing mark” has been enacted as the first event, in reality, insequence, the allotment of groups of letters followed by such letters andfigures (which find mention in the latter part of the provision), that areallotted to the State by the Central Government would be an event thatoccurs prior to the assignment of such distinguishing mark and number.The notification of 12.06.1989 issued by the Central Government inexercise of this power to allocate numbers under Section 41(6) hasallocated distinguished groups of letters to each individual State and UT.According to the notification, this group of letters is to be followed bythe code number of the registering authority “to be allocated by theState Government or the Administrator of the UT”. The notification,after setting out the groups of letters, goes on to state that where fourfigures referred to earlier in it, (i.e. the notification) reaches 9999, thenext series shall begin with the alphabet A followed by not more thanfour figures and thereafter with alphabet B, and so on. This notificationfrom its facial reading clothes the state government or the UTadministration, with the distinct task of allotting the code number andthereafter assigning the numerics (the four numbers in question).

27. The reasoning of the High Court, in its impugned judgment isthat the field of prescribing the fee for an application for registration hasbeen exclusively conferred upon the Union Government, thus excludingfrom its sweep any State power to claim any manner of fee or amountas part of that task. The amicus characterized the impugned Rule 55Aas segregating and separating the last step in one indivisible process ofallotment of a registration mark.

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A28. The High Court, in addition, also concluded that Section 211was of no consequence and could not be pressed into service by theState Government inasmuch as the field of charging fees for allotmentof registration numbers was fully occupied by Section 41(2). It also heldthat by the same logic, the state had no power to make rules underSection 65(2) to charge any fee in this regard. The amicus had madeBreference to Section 65(2)(k) which explicitly talks of the power of theState to prescribe the amount or amounts payable under Section 41(13);Section 47(7), Section 49(4) or Section 50(5). Each of these provisionswas also relied upon to state that whenever Parliament intended toempower the State Government to charge fee or amounts, it did soCexpressly and that the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alteriusapplied in the circumstances.

29. This Court is of the opinion that the High Court, in its impugnedjudgement, lost sight of the true import of Section 211. The existence ofspecific provisions empowering the State (such as Sections 41(13), 47(7),D49(4) and 50(5)), means that the power of the State to claim or chargeamounts is specifically recognized by express provisions. Further, thereare certain services and functions for which the State is empowered tolevy fees. It is precisely to cover these contingencies, i.e. where theservice is rendered or some function performed, that the State isempowered by a residual provision (much like the Central GovernmentEwith which it shares the power concurrently) to levy fees. In this respect,it would be useful to note that Section 211 is cast in wide terms and thatany rule which the Central Government or the State Government isempowered to make under this Act may, notwithstanding the absenceof any express provision to that effect, provide for the levy of suchFfees in respect of applications, amendment of documents, issue ofcertificates, licences, permits, tests, endorsements, badges, plates,countersignatures, authorisation, supply of statistics or copies ofdocuments or orders and for any other purpose or matter involvingthe rendering of any service. Clearly, therefore, the Parliament intended that contingencies not covered by a specific power to levy fees or amounts,Gwhich entailed some activity on the part of the State, including renderingof any service could be legitimately charged or subjected to the levy offee or amounts.

30. The assignment of numbers by the registering authority, asseen earlier, through an official/agency or department notified by theH

State Government, cannot be seen as a mere step – albeit at the fag-endof the registration allotment process. In fact, though it is the culminationof the allotment process, it is nevertheless an important step. The state,in the opinion of this Court, is entitled to indicate its choice or manner ofassigning by prescribing a particular set of procedures for the assignmentof numbers. Thus, for instance, the assignment of the concerned “code”- to the individual registering authorities followed by the assignment ofnumerics may follow a predetermined pattern which may be districtwise, state government department wise (in the case of publicly ownedvehicles), different sequences for buses and heavy vehicles and so on.If such a predetermined choice can be made by prescribing the mode ofassignment, it is both regulatory and at the same time indicative of Statepolicy. Per se, the Court cannot brush aside the element of service whichmay be involved – especially if the general public or a sub-section of it,wishes to choose particular numbers for various considerations. Such“fancy” numbers or “auspicious” numbers may well therefore have tobe set apart having regard to the peculiar socio-cultural needs of thepeople of the state. It is in such an event that the availability of suchnumbers and their reservation as a choice and the power of theirassignment assumes importance. In the impugned Rule 55A[14 ]in the 14 55A. Allotment of registration mark. - (1) On receipt of an applicationmade in writing by any person to the registering authority for reservation ofregistration mark, the registering authority shall reserve the registrationmark in the following manner:-

(a) Registration marks from 1 to 9 in any series prevalent within thejurisdiction of Registering Authority, shall be reserved on payment of fee ofRs. 15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand) for each registration mark.(b) For reservation of registration mark from number 10 to 100 in any seriesprevalent within the jurisdiction of the Registering Authority, on payment offee of Rs. 12,000/- (Rupees Twelve Thousand) for each registration mark.(c) For reservation of registration mark number, 101, 111, 123, 200, 202,222, 234, 300, 303, 333, 345, 400, 404, 444, 456, 500, 505, 555, 567, 600,606, 678, 700, 707, 777, 786, 789, 800, 808, 888, 900, 909, 999, 1000, 1001,1010, 1111, 1112, 1212, 1213, 1221, 1234, 1313, 1314, 1331, 1414, 1415,1515, 1516, 1616, 1617, 1661, 1717, 1718, 1771, 1818, 1819, 1881, 1919,1929, 1991, 2000, 2002, 2020, 2021, 2112, 2121, 2122, 2222, 2223, 2323,2324, 2332, 2345, 2424, 2425, 2442, 2525, 2526, 2552, 2626, 2627, 2662,2727, 2728, 2772, 2828, 2829, 2882, 2929, 2930, 2992, 3000, 3003, 3030,3113, 3131, 3132, 3223, 3232, 3233, 3333, 3334, 3434, 3435, 3443, 3456,3535, 3536, 3553, 3636, 3637, 3663, 3737, 3738, 3773, 3838, 3839, 3883, AB

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Apresent instance, introduced in 2001 through amendment by the State ofM.P., prescribes four different fees – 15000/- for the registration marks 3939, 3940, 3994, 4000, 4004, 4040, 4041, 4114, 4141, 4142, 4224, 4242,4243, 4334, 4343, 4344, 4444, 4445, 4545, 4546, 4554, 4567, 4646, 4647,4664, 4747, 4748, 4774, 4848, 4849, 4884, 4949, 4950, 4994, 5000, 5005,5050, 5051, 5115, 5151, 5152, 5225, 5252, 5253, 5335, 5353, 5354, 5445,B5454, 5455, 5555, 5556, 5656, 5657, 5665, 5678, 5757, 5758, 5775, 5858,5859, 5885, 5959, 5960, 5995, 6000, 6006, 6060, 6061, 6116, 6161, 6162,6226, 6262, 6263, 6336, 6363, 6364, 6446, 6464, 6465, 6558, 6565, 6666,6667, 6767, 6768, 6776, 6789, 6869, 6886, 6969, 6970, 6996, 7000, 7007,7070, 7071, 7117, 7171, 7172, 7227, 7272, 7273, 7337, 7373, 7374, 7447,7474, 7475, 7557, 7575, 7576, 7667, 7676, 7677, 7777, 7778, 7878, 7887,C7979, 7980, 7997, 8000, 8008, 8080, 8081, 8181, 8182, 8228, 8282, 8283,8338, 8383, 8384, 8448, 8484, 8558, 8585, 8586, 8668, 8686, 8687, 8778,8787, 8788, 8888, 8889, 8989, 8998, 9(X)0, 9009, 9090, 9091, 9119, 9191,9192, 9229, 9292, 9293, 9339, 9393, 9394, 9449, 9494, 9495, 9559, 9595,9596, 9669, 9696, 9697, 9779, 9797, 9798, 9889, 9898, 9899, 9999, on payment of fee of Rupees 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) for each registrationDmark.

(d) For reservation of any other number not specified in subclauses (a), (b)and (c) of this rule within thousand numbers from the last number assigned inserial order on payment of a fee of Rs. 2000/- (Rupees Two Thousand) for eachregistration mark.

(2) The Registering Authority while reserving the registration mark on theEapplication of any person shall strictly adhere to the following guidelines :-(a) The Registering Authority shall reserve the registration mark on the basisof ‘first come first served’ principle.

(b) If there is more than one application on a day for particular registrationmark as specified above the reservation of registration mark shall be done inaccordance with the serial number on the cash receipt regarding payment ofFthe amount of fee.

(c) The registration mark reserved shall be allotted on production of thevehicle alongwith the application in Form-20 of the Central Motor VehiclesRules, 1989 and when the vehicle is found complying with the provisions ofthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the rules made thereunder for registrationof a motor, vehicle.G(d) The reservation of registration mark shall stand automatically cancelledif the vehicle is not produced for allotment of registration number withinthree months from the date of reservation of registration mark.(e) The amount of the fee paid for reservation of registration mark shall not berefundable.

(f) The registration mark cancelled under clause (d) can be re-reserved byHthe Registering Authority in accordance with the above procedure.

1 to 9 in any series prevalent within the jurisdiction of the registeringauthority; and 12000/- for reservation of marks from 10 to 100 in anyseries within the jurisdiction of the registering authority. For reservationof large series of numbers indicated in Rule 55A(c), 10000/- and 2000/- for reservation of any other number or numbers within 1000 from thelast number assigned in the serial order.

31. In addition to charging such fees, the registering authority isenjoined by Rule 55A(2) to follow the principle of first-come-first-servein reserving particular numbers; and to allot the registration mark reservedupon production of the vehicle along with the application in Form-20 (ofthe Central Rules), provided the vehicle is compliant with the provisionsof the Act and Rules. By Rule 55A(d), the reservation of the markwould be cancelled if the vehicle is not produced for allotment withinthree months from the date of allotment. Obviously, this is meant toavoid abuse of the reservation process by trafficking in numbers, byproviding finite time within which such numbers can be used.

32. Quite like in the case of fees for assignment of particularnumbers, certain other services too are contemplated under the Act.Section 56(1)[15] directs that no transport vehicle would be deemed to bevalidly registered unless it carries a certificate of fitness. Such fitnesscertificate is to be issued by authorized testing stations [by Section 56(2)].Section 43 enables the owner of a motor vehicle to apply to any registeringauthority or other authority which may be prescribed by the StateGovernment to have the vehicle temporarily registered. This provision 15 56. Re-assignment of registration number under certain condition. - (1)State Government may, by general or special order, direct all RegisteringAuthority of the State, to reassign the new number under the Act, in place ofnumber allotted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (No. 4 of 1939) in respectof all or any class of vehicles and also prescribe the manner and conditionthereof, and the provision of sub-section (6) of Section 41 of the Act shallapply in this respect.

(2) State Government while issuing order under sub-rule (1), shall provide areasonable time which shall not be less than six months within which theowner of such vehicle shall obtain new number.

(3) No fee shall be charged for the assignment of new number under sub-rule(1), if the owner applies within the prescribed time. Where the application isreceived after the expiry of prescribed period, a late fee of Rs. 100/- shall bepayable.

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Acontains a non-obstante clause. Various provisions of the Act deal withorders of higher authorities and appellate authorities. Implicit with this isthe power to issue copies of such decisions. Further, in cases whereindividuals or parties interested seek to duplicate or acquire extra copiesof such orders, a separate category of service is provided. Likewise,wherever duplicates of documents such as Registration Certificates etc.Bare issued, necessarily, a service is performed. Rule 62 of the M.P.Rules of 1994 provided for fees to be charged in respect of various suchservices (temporary registration or extension thereof in different classesof vehicles); copies of miscellaneous applications, duplicate certificateof fitness for different classes of vehicles and so on. An overall readingCof the M.P. Rules and the Act therefore clearly establishes that besidesthe express authorization to levy fees or collect amounts, both the CentralGovernment and the State Government are empowered – in fact dutybound to extend certain services in the performance of such duties.Both these bodies, i.e. the Central and State Governments wouldtherefore, be acting within their authority to charge or levy fees.D

33. If there are any further doubts on this issue, the generality ofthe power under Section 65(1) to frame rules, in the opinion of this Courtis sufficient along with Section 211, to conclude that the State Governmenthas the authority to prescribe a fee for reserving certain numbers orEdistinguishing marks to be assigned as registration numbers. It has notbeen shown how the setting apart of or reservation of some numbers –here, a fraction of the large potential batch of numbers which theregistering authority can otherwise assign to vehicles, is per se arbitraryor unreasonable. Neither were any such arguments urged before thisCourt.F

34. This Court has in the past observed that whenever a Stateconfers rule making power or empowers delegated legislation, i.e. andwhere or wherever the statute first lays out a general provision authorizingsubordinate legislation or the framing of separate legislation to carry outthe purposes of that Act, and uses the expression “in particular andGwithout generality of the foregoing powers”, followed by anotherdelegation which enumerates specific powers preceded by expressionssuch as “in particular and without the generality of the foregoingpowers,” the particularization is only illustrative and does not subsumethe general power. The State had relied upon the decision in Academy H

of Nutrition (supra) which was to that effect. There are other decisionsas well on this issue.[16]

35. This court has, in the past, held that when a central enactmentclothes the state with the power, or tasks it to do a thing such as grant oflease of minor minerals, an implicit power to charge lease rent or royaltymust be read into the state’s power. In D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State ofGujarat, the court held:[17]

“40. the grant of a mining lease would thus provide for theconsideration for such grant in the shape of surface rent,dead rent and royalty. The power to make rules for regulatingthe grant of such leases would, therefore, include the powerto fix the consideration payable by the lessee to the lessor inthe shape of ordinary rent or surface rent, dead rent androyalty. If this were not so, it would lead to the absurd resultthat when the government grants a mining lease, it is grantedgratis to a person who wants to extract minerals and profitfrom them. Rules for regulating the grant of mining leasescannot be confined merely to rules providing for the form inwhich applications for such leases are to be made, the factorsto be taken into account in granting or refusing suchapplications and other cognate matters. Such rules mustnecessarily include provisions with respect to the considerationfor the grant. Under Section 15(1), therefore, the StateGovernments have the power to make rules providing forpayment of surface rent, dead rent and royalty by the lesseeto the government.”

16 See Afzal Ullah v. State of U.P. (1964) 4 SCR 991 which held that:

“It is now well settled that the specific provisions such as are contained in theseveral clauses of Section 298(2) are merely illustrative and they cannot be read asrestrictive of the generality of powers prescribed by Section 298(1) (vide KingEmperor v. Sibnath Banerji (AIR 1945 PC 156] ). If the powers specified by Section298(1) are very wide and they take in within their scope bye-laws like the ones withwhich we are concerned in the present appeal, it cannot be said that the powersenumerated under Section 298(2) control the general words used by Section 298(1).”Refer also: Rohtak & Hissar District Electric Supply Co Ltd v State of UP 1966 (2) SCR863; Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and (2014) 3SCC 222; K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1985) 2 SCC 116.17 (1986) Supp. SCC 20, at p. 54.

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36. In Jaintia Hill Truck Owners Assn[18], this court had pertinentlyobserved in the context of services rendered by weighment, throughthird party, agencies, where the state enabled charging of fee, that:

“28. Where the State or the State-controlled agencies renderservices for the purpose of effectuation of the provisions of aBCentral Act, it, in our opinion, is entitled to charge areasonable amount in respect thereof. We may, in this behalf,refer to a decision of this Court in T. Cajee v. U. JormanikSiem [AIR 1961 SC 276 : (1961) 1 SCR 750]. The questionwhich arose for consideration therein was as to whether inabsence of any law regulating the appointment and successionCof chiefs and headmen, a notice issued to the respondenttherein to show cause as to why he should not be removedfrom his office, was valid.”

37. The decision cited in Jaintia Hill (supra) – i.e., T. Cajee vU. Jormanik Siem[19] considered the validity of appointment of a villageDheadman by an autonomous district council, under provisions of the SixthSchedule to the Constitution of India. The High Court upheld the argumentthat a conferment of legislative power (conferred upon the DistrictCouncil) if not exercised, did not empower the council to issue appointmentin the absence of rules. This court disapproved the High Court’s reasoningEand held that:

“With respect, it seems to us that the High Court has read farmore into Para 3(1)(g) than is justified by its language. Para3(1) is in fact something like a legislative list and enumeratesthe subjects on which the District Council is competent toFmake laws. Under Para 3(1)(g) it has power to make lawswith respect to the appointment or succession of Chiefs orHeadmen and this would naturally include the power toremove them. But it does not follow from this that theappointment or removal of a Chief is a legislative act or thatno appointment or removal can be made without there beingGfirst a law to that effect. The High Court also seems to havethought that as there was no provision in the Sixth Schedulein terms of Articles 73 and 162 of the Constitution, theadministrative power of the District Council would not extend 18 Supra, fn. 12.H19 1961 (1) SCR 750.

to the subjects enumerated in Para 3(1). Now Para 2(4)provides that the administration of an autonomous districtshall vest in the District Council and this in our opinion iscomprehensive enough to include all such executive powersas are necessary to be exercised for the purposes of theadministration of the district…”

38. The other decision, cited in Jaintia Hill (supra), i.e., SurinderSingh v. Central Government[20]states the proposition in the followingterms:

“Where a statute confers powers on an authority to do certainacts or exercise power in respect of certain matters, subjectto rules, the exercise of power conferred by the statute doesnot depend on the existence of rules unless the statuteexpressly provides for the same. In other words framing ofthe rules is not a condition precedent to the exercise of thepower expressly and unconditionally conferred by the statute.The expression ‘subject to the rules’ only means, in accordancewith the rules, if any. If rules are framed, the powers soconferred on authority could be exercised in accordance withthese rules. But if no rules are framed there is no void and theauthority is not precluded from exercising the power conferredby the statute.”

39. This court therefore, holds that the assignment of “distinctivemarks” i.e. registration numbers to motor vehicles (which includes thepower to reserve and allocate them, for a specific fee) is a distinct servicefor which states or their authorities (such as the registering authorities,in this case) are entitled to charge a prescribed fee. Rule 55A of the MPRules is not therefore, in excess of the powers conferred upon the state,by the Act or the Central Rules.

40. This court notices that the impugned judgment proceeded onthe assumption that the state was not competent to make the legislation.The use of that expression, at best can be characterized as misconceived.In the present case, the state of M.P. derived its powers to frame theconcerned rules, through the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Actitself.The question, therefore, of repugnance as properly understood, did notarise; rather it was a case whether the state government, as one of thedelegated authorities, was empowered through Parliamentary law to20 (1986) 4 SCC 667.

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Aframe the rule that it did. At best, the issue that arose was whether theoffending rule (Rule 55A) was ultra vires the Act or the Central Rules.In the opinion of this court, the impugned rule was within the ambit ofthe powers delegated to the state, and directly related to performance ofits functions under Section 41(6), for which it could legitimately claim afee, as was done through Rule 55A.

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41. Before parting with this judgment, the court records its gratitudeto Mr. Manoj Swaroop, Senior Advocate for acting as amicus and ablymarshalling all arguments that could be mustered to assist this court.

42. The appeal has to succeed, in view of the above reasoning.CThe impugned judgment is therefore set aside. The appeal is accordinglyallowed, but without an order as to costs.

Kalpana K. Tripathy

Appeal allowed.

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