THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. versus BUNTY on 14 March 2019

JUDGMENT

1. Leave granted.

2. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others are in appeal asagainst the reversal of the judgment and order passed by the SingleJudge dismissing the writ application questioning the decision of theDScreening Committee holding the respondent/Bunty to be unfit forappointment as a constable in the police service of the State of MadhyaPradesh.

3. The respondent applied for the post of a Constable in the year2013. He appeared and cleared the Police Constable Recruitment TestE(II). Physical endurance test was held on 06.05.2013. He was medicallyexamined and selected on 09.05.2014. On 05.06.2014 he was called forverification of the marks sheet, caste certificate. He was called forpolice verification by the Screening Committee on 25.02.2015. On11.03.2015, the department, on the basis of the Report of the ScreeningFCommittee, decided to deny the appointment to the respondent/Buntyfor the reasons mentioned therein.

4. It is not in dispute that respondent/Bunty was involved in acase involving moral turpitude for the commission of an offence underSections 392 and 411 of the IPC. He was given benefit of doubt in theGsaid case and was acquitted vide judgment and order dated 7.1.2015and same has attained finality.

5. As against the denial of the appointment respondent/Bunty fileda writ petition before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench atIndore. Learned Single Judge of the High Court considered the matter H

in extensive detail and relied upon the decision of this Court inCommissioner of Police, New Delhi and Anotherv. Mehar Singh, (2013)7 SCC 685, and that the petitioner had appeared before the ScreeningCommittee and it was found in objectivity by the Screening Committeethat he was involved in a case of moral turpitude and the acquittal wasnot clean. He was found unfit for being appointed as Police Constablein a disciplined force. Reasons were communicated. Learned SingleJudge also relied upon the decision in State of M.P. and Othersv. DineshSingh Parihar and Others, rendered by the Division Bench of the HighCourt in Writ Appeal No.724/2014, dismissed the said writ application.However, the Division Bench, by the impugned judgment and order, hasallowed the writ appeal preferred by the respondent/Bunty on the groundthat the judgment of acquittal is based on material on record, he wasacquitted since the offence was not proved beyond reasonable doubt,appointment order has to be issued as a matter of course. Hence, theappeal by special leave is filed before this Court.

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has reliedupon the decisions of this Court in Mehar Singh (supra), State of MadhyaPradesh & Ors.v. Parvez Khan, (2015) 2 SCC 591, Union Territory,Chandigarh Administration and Othersv. Pradeep Kumar and Another,(2018) 1 SCC 797, to contend that when the Screening Committee hasformed an opinion with objectivity considered the allegations and overallmaterial the decision is not open to judicial review until and unless it hasacted arbitrarily or its decision is perverse. Learned counsel furthersubmitted that mere acquittal on the ground of benefit of the doubt couldnot have enured in favour of the appellant so as to be entitled toappointment, as a matter of course as observed by the Division Benchof the High Court.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of therespondent has relied on a decision of this Court in Avtar Singhv. Unionof India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471, and Joginder Singhv. UnionTerritory of Chandigarh and Others, (2015) 2 SCC 377. Learned counselappearing for the respondent has contended that it was a case of noevidence and with respect to PW.12 also in the representation filed beforethe Screening Committee with respect to the said witness the reasonswere assigned why he deposed against the respondent. Thus, in thefacts and circumstances of the case, no case for interference is madeout in the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench. The AB

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Arespondent could not have been termed to be unfit by the ScreeningCommittee, in view of the judgment of acquittal.

8. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of theopinion that the respondent had participated in the selection process inthe year 2013, at that time the said criminal case was pendingBconsideration and he has been acquitted subsequently, vide judgmentand order dated 7.1.2015 all throughout during selection process thecase was pending consideration and as certain witnesses have turnedhostile which is not unusual. The respondent knew very well about thependency of the case against him and it is not uncommon to see thatwitnesses turned hostile. In the aforesaid circumstance, it cannot beCsaid to be case of clear acquittal, in criminal case, he was given benefitof doubt not acquitted because the case against him was found to befalse. Thus, due to such acquittal appointment could not have followedas a matter of course as observed by the Division Bench of the HighCourt.

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9. Considering the nature of allegation in the case, it was a caseof impersonation as a police officer and thereby committing the offenceunder Sections 392 and 411 of the IPC. It was a case of the seriouskind, which involved moral turpitude and having not been granted theclean acquittal in the criminal case merely by the grant of benefit of theEdoubt, clouds cannot be said to be clear as to the antecedents of therespondent. Thus, the perception formed by the Screening Committeethat he was unfit to be inducted in the disciplined police force wasappropriate. In the aforesaid factual matrix, decision of ScrutinyCommittee could not be said to be such which warranted judicialinterference.F

10. Learned Single Judge of the High Court in the factual matrixprojected, has rightly relied upon the decision in Mehar Singh (supra),wherein this Court has observed as under:- “35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the greatresponsibility of maintaining law and order and public order insociety. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must beworthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the policeforce must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must haveimpeccable character and integrity. A person having criminalantecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or G

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discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge orderAwill have to be examined to see whether he has been completelyexonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking tothe life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the policeforce. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task oftaking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee.BThe decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as finalunless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the policeforce is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in awayward manner by misusing power are in the public domain andare a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force hastaken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute theCimportance and efficacy of a mechanism like the ScreeningCommittee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that personswho are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force.At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to theimportance of the trust reposed in it and mustDtreat all candidates with an even hand.”

11. That apart, when we consider the decision of the three-JudgeBench of this Court in Avtar Singh (supra) the Court observed:- “38.4.3 If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involvingmoral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technicalground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit ofreasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider allrelevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriatedecision as to the continuance of the employee.”

12. In Pradeep Kumar (supra) this Court has observed:- “15. From the above details, we find that the Screening Committeeexamined each and every case of the respondents and reasoningsfor their acquittal and taken the decision. While deciding whethera person involved in a criminal case has been acquitted ordischarged should be appointed to a post in a police force, natureof offence in which he is involved, whether it was an honourableacquittal or only an extension of benefit of doubt because ofwitnesses turned hostile and flaws in the prosecution are all theaspects to be considered by the Screening Committee for taking E

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510SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Athe decision whether the candidate is suitable for the post. Aspointed out earlier, the Screening Committee examined each andevery case and reasonings for their acquittal and took thedecision that the respondents are not suitable for thepost of Constable in Chandigarh Police. The procedure followedis as per Guideline 2(A)(b) an object ofBsuch screening is to ensure that only persons with impeccablecharacter enter police force. While so, the court cannot substituteits views for the decision of the Screening Committee.”

13. The law laid down in the aforesaid decisions makes it clearCthat in case acquittal in a criminal case is based on the benefit of doubtor any other technical reason, the employer can take into considerationall relevant facts to take an appropriate decision as to the fitness of anincumbent for appointment/continuance in service. The decision takenby the Screening Committee in the instant case could not have beenDfaulted by the Division Bench.

14. Coming to the decision relied upon by the learned counselappearing for the respondent in Joginder Singh (supra) we are of theopinion that it was not the case of the decision taken by the ScreeningCommittee on due consideration of the material on record of the case.EThus, the decision is distinguishable. In the peculiar facts andcircumstances of the case, we are inclined to hold that the decision ofthe Screening Committee was appropriate.

15. Thus, the judgment and order of the Division Bench cannot beallowed to be sustained, the same is hereby set aside and the judgmentFand order passed by the Single Judge are restored. The appeal is,accordingly, allowed. No orders as to costs. Pending application(s), ifany, shall stand disposed of.

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Kalpana K. Tripathy

Appeal allowed.

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