NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA versus SRI P. NAGARAJU @ CHELUVAIAH & ANR on 11 July 2022

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 8 S.C.R.

A

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA

v.

SRI P. NAGARAJU @ CHELUVAIAH & ANR.

(Civil Appeal No. 4671 of 2022)

B

JULY 11, 2022

[INDIRA BANERJEE AND A. S. BOPANNA, JJ.]

National Highways Act – ss.3J, 3G (7) – Arbitration andConciliation Act, 1996 – ss.28(2), 31(3), 34, 37 – Right to FairCCompensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitationand Resettlement Act, 2013 – ss.26, 28 – Lands of claimants/respondents were notified for acquisition under the preliminarynotification dtd.01.02.16 and 02.02.16 issued under NH Act –Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) determined thecompensation at Rs.2026/- and Rs.17200/- per sq. mtr respectivelyD– Challenged by respondents, Arbitrator having taken intoconsideration the method adopted by the SLAO while determiningthe compensation, though adopted the same mode of determinationby reckoning the guideline value provided by the Department ofStamps and Registration for the purpose of registration of saleEtransactions, however took into consideration the subsequentnotifications dtd. 28.03.16 and 05.12.18 to reckon the guidelinevalue – Market value was determined at Rs.15,400/- per sq. mtrand Rs.25,800/- per sq. mtr respectively and compensation wasawarded – Appellant aggrieved by the method adopted by theArbitrator in determining the market value and compensation filedFarbitration suit u/s. 34 of the Act, 1996, dismissed by District Judge– Appeals also dismissed by High Court– Held: On facts, the relianceplaced on the guideline value notification dtd. 28.03.16 forreckoning the market value of the property acquired under thepreliminary notification dtd. 01.02.16, by itself cannot be acceptedGto be a patent illegality committed by the Arbitrator – However, themanner in which the notification dtd. 28.03.16 was relied upon andthe value fixed under the said notification in respect of two distinctlayouts was automatically made applicable to the lands in questiondespite noting the guideline value notified for the same surveynumber would indicate that the said exercise was undertaken withoutHsufficient opportunity to NHAI – Further, appropriate reasons were

also not indicated by the Arbitrator to arrive at the conclusion touniformly adopt the value of Rs.15,400/- per sq.mtr fixed in respectof lands in a layout which was separately indicated in the notification– If there is evidence brought on record in the manner known to lawwith opportunity to the opposite side, it certainly would be open forthe Arbitrator to adopt the said value – However, the pleadings inthe claim petition and the award indicate that the appellant did nothave sufficient opportunity before the Arbitrator to controvert thematerial sought to be relied upon by the Arbitrator nor has theArbitrator indicated sufficient reasons which to that extent wouldindicate patent illegality in the award passed by the Arbitrator beingcontrary to ss.28(2) and 31(3) of Act, 1996 – That being the factsituation and also the position of law being clear that it would notbe open for the court in the proceedings u/s.34 or in the appeal u/s.37 to modify the award, the appropriate course to be adopted insuch event is to set aside the award and remit the matter to theArbitrator in terms of s.34(4) to keep in view these aspects of thematter and even if the notification dtd. 28.03.16 relied upon isjustified as the same could be relied upon, the further aspects withregard to the appropriate market value fixed under the saidnotification for the lands which is the subject matter of theacquisition or comparable lands is to be made based on appropriateevidence available before it and on assigning reasons for theconclusion to be reached by the Arbitrator – In C.A. No. 4681/2022,arbitrator committed patent illegality in applying two differentnotifications in determining the market value – Only course open isto set aside the award and allow the Arbitrator to reconsider thematter on that aspect – Impugned order set aside – Consequently,the awards, connected awards which are the subject matter in theseappeals are also set aside – Arbitration proceedings remanded –Stamp Act, 1899.

National Highways Act – ss.3J, 3G(7) – Right to FairCompensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitationand Resettlement Act, 2013 – ss.26, 28 – Jurisdiction of arbitratordetermining the compensation under NH Act vis-à-vis RFCTLARRAct, 2013 – Scope of – Discussed.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 –s.34 – Interferencewith an award, limited scope available u/s.34 – Discussed.

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National Highways Act – Arbitration proceedings relating toNH Act – Just and fair compensation – Process for determinationof – Discussed – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency inLand Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – ss.26,28 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.28(2), 31(3), 34.

A

BPartly allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 While arriving at the conclusion that notificationbearing SO No.2368(E)dated 28.8.2015 whereunder theprovisions of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 are made applicable, it isnoted that NH Act is also one of the enactments specified in theCFourth Schedule. The observations contained also in para 29, 30and 31 in Tarsem Singh will make it more than evident that thisCourt was concerned about discrimination in determination ofcompensation under different enactments though in that case theissue was limited to solatium and interest.In that view of thematter, though Section 3G(7)(a) of the NH Act provides theDparameters to be taken into consideration, it only provides thebasic parameters to be taken note of, for determining the amountpayable as compensation. While applying the said parameters fordetermination of compensation, since RFCTLARR Act, 2013 isalso applicable as NH Act is contained in Fourth Schedule, theEfactors as provided under Section 26 and 28 RFCTLARR Act,2013 including the seventh factor will also be applicable inappropriate cases for the determination of the market value asfair compensation for the acquired land. When land is acquiredfrom a citizen, Articles 300A and 31A of the Constitution willhave to be borne in mind since the deprivation of property shouldFbe with authority of law, after being duly compensated. Such lawshould provide for adequately compensating the land loserkeeping in view the market value. Though each enactment mayhave a different procedure prescribed for the process ofacquisition depending on the urgency, the method of determiningGthe compensation cannot be different as the market value of theland and the hardship faced due to deprivation of the propertywould be the same irrespective of the Act under which it isacquired or the purpose for which it is acquired. In that light, ifSection 28 of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 is held not applicable inview of Section 3J of NH Act, the same will be violative of ArticleH

14 of the Constitution. In that circumstance, the observation inTarsem Singh (supra) that Section 3J of NH Act is unconstitutionalto that extent though declared so while on the aspect of solatiumand interest, it is held so on all aspects relating to determinationof compensation. In any event, the extracted portion of thenotification dated 28.08.2015 is explicit that the benefits availableto the land owners under RFCTLARR Act is to be also availableto similarly placed land owners whose lands are acquired underthe 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule, among whichNH Act is one. Hence all aspects contained in Section 26 to 28 ofRFCTLARR Act for determination of compensation will beapplicable notwithstanding Section 3J and 3G(7)(a) of NH Act.[Paras 16-18][1094-C; 1095-C; 1096-E-H; 1097-A-C]

Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304 :[2019] 13 SCR 49 – referred to.

1.2 In NHAI vs. Sayedabad Tea Company Ltd. (2020) 15SCC 16, this Court while examining the question as to whetherthe land loser can seek the appointment of an Arbitrator in termsof Section 11 of Act, 1996, it was noted that such power would notbe available in view of the provisions contained in Section 3G(5)of NH Act since Arbitrator is to be appointed by the CentralGovernment to discharge its functions as per the provisions ofthe Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Having taken note of thesaid decision, though it is seen that it was held so whileconsidering the maintainability of petition under Section 11 ofthe Act, 1996 to exclude the right of the land loser to seek theappointment of an Arbitrator keeping in view the statutoryprovision in the NH Act, the larger perspective of such limitedright to the land loser in the process of arbitration is also to bekept in view. Unlike the arbitration in a contractual matter wherethe parties from the very inception at the stage of entering into acontract would mutually agree to refer any future dispute to anarbitrator, at that very stage are aware that in the event of anydispute arising between the parties the contours of the right,remedy, and scope from the commencement of the arbitration upto the conclusion through the judicial process. The terms ofarbitration and the rights and obligations will also be a part of theagreement and a reference to the same in the award will constitute AB

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Asufficient reasons for sustaining the award in terms of Section31(3) of Act, 1996. Whereas, in the arbitration proceedings relatingto NH Act, the parties are not governed by an agreement toregulate the process of arbitration. However, in the process ofdetermination of just and fair compensation, the provisions inSection 26 to 28 of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 will be the guidingBfactor. The requirement therein being adverted to, should bedemonstrated in the award to satisfy that Section 28(2) and 31(3)of Act, 1996 is complied. Therefore, what is also to be kept inperspective while noticing the validity or otherwise of an awardregarding which the non-furnishing of reasons is contended asCpatent illegality is the reason assigned for determining justcompensation in terms thereof. The situation which may arise incases when a lesser compensation is determined in the arbitrationproceedings and the land loser is complaining of the award isalso to be kept in perspective since the requirement of reasonsto be given by the learned Arbitrator in cases for determinationDof market value and compensation should indicate reasons sincethe same will have to be arrived at on a comparative analysis forwhich the reasons should be recorded and Section 26 to 28 ofRFCTLARR Act will be relevant. Neither the land loser nor theexchequer should suffer in the matter of just and fairEcompensation. Hence the reasons under Section 31(3) is to beexpected in that manner, the absence of which will call forinterference under Section 34 of Act, 1996. [Para 23][1104-B-H;1105-A-B]

NHAI vs. Sayedabad Tea Company Ltd. (2020) 15 SCCF16 – referred to.

1.3 Leaving aside the facts in the instant case for a while, ifin a matter as against the determination of the market value bythe SLAO, the land loser had referred to the exemplar sale deedsand seeks higher compensation than prescribed in the guidanceGvalue, and in that circumstance, if no reasons are assigned by thelearned Arbitrator for such determination and either approvesthe SLAO award or awards a lesser amount than the actualentitlement, in such circumstance the arbitration process whichis thrust on the land loser should not be an impediment and limitedinterference should not be a reason to deny the just and fairH

compensation. In such cases while examining the award in thelimited scope under Section 34 of Act, 1996, the Court is requiredto take note as to whether the evidence available on record hasbeen adverted to and has been taken note by the Arbitrator indetermining the just compensation failing which it will fall foul ofSection 31(3) and amount to patent illegality. Therefore, whileexamining the award within the parameters permissible underSection 34 of Act, 1996 and while examining the determination ofcompensation as provided under Sections 26 and 28 of theRFCTLARR Act, 2013, the concept of just compensation for theacquired land should be kept in view while taking note of theaward considering the sufficiency of the reasons given in the awardfor the ultimate conclusion. In such event an error if found, thoughit would not be possible for the Court entertaining the petitionunder Section 34 or for the appellate court under Section 37 ofAct 1996 to modify the award and alter the compensation as itwas open to the court in the reference proceedings under Section18 of the old Land Acquisition Act or an appeal under Section 54of that act, it should certainly be open to the court exercisingpower under Section 34 of Act, 1996 to set aside the award byindicating reasons and remitting the matter to the Arbitrator toreconsider the same in accordance with law. The said exercisecan be undertaken to the limited extent without entering intomerits where it is seen that the Arbitrator has on the face of theaward not appropriately considered the material on record or hasnot recorded reasons for placing reliance on materials availableon record in the background of requirement under RFCTLARRAct, 2013. [Para 24][1105-B-H]

1.4 Under the scheme of the Act 1996 it would not bepermissible to modify the award passed by the learned Arbitratorto enhance or reduce the compensation based on the materialavailable on record in proceeding emanating from Section 34 ofAct, 1996. The option would be to set aside the award and remandthe matter. [Para 26][1107-F-G]

NHAI vs. M. Hakeem & Anr., (2021) 9 SCC 1 : 2021(8) SCALE 391 – referred to.

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A1.5 The mere provision as contemplated under Section3G(5) of NH Act providing for either of the parties to assail thedetermination made by the SLAO by itself does not provide abetter status to the award passed by the SLAO. Even the awardpassed by the SLAO under the provisions of NH Act would stillcontinue to remain as an offer of compensation by the AcquiringBAuthority to the land loser and the materials relied on by theSLAO even if discussed in detail does not provide the status of ajudicially considered order so as to interfere with the same onlyif error is pointed out. It is not necessary to critically examinethe award made by SLAO before considering enhancement.CNotwithstanding the documents relied upon by the SLAO it wouldstill be open for the learned Arbitrator to rely upon any additionalmaterial that may be brought before the learned Arbitrator notnecessarily to point out an error in the consideration made bySLAO but such material could be considered despite theconsideration made by the SLAO if such material aids in decidingDjust and fair compensation. Though, as contended by the learnedAdditional Solicitor General it is seen that in Tarsem Singh it isheld that there is a regime change and the stage to offer an amountby way of compensation is removed, it only means that the processof award notice etc. from Section 9 to 15A, before possessionEunder Section 16 of L.A. Act is removed, which only alters theprocedure and enables immediate vesting of the land with theacquiring authority but does not take away the character of theSLAO award from being an offer of compensation. Hence, in thepresent case, though the SLAO has taken note of the guidelinedated 07.11.2014 it would be open for the learned Arbitrator toFtake note of any other evidence that would be more relevantthan the said guideline to re-determine the compensation in termsof the parameters under Sections 26 and 28 of RFCTLARR Act,2013. [Para 30][1109-E-H; 1110-A-C]

1.6 The further contention of the learned Additional SolicitorGGeneral is that the award passed by the learned Arbitrator is ex-facie erroneous amounting to patent illegality since the learnedArbitrator while redetermining the compensation has taken intoconsideration the guideline value as provided under thenotification dated 28.03.2016. In that regard, it is contended thatH

the notification under Section3A of NH Act was issued on01.02.2016. The provision in Section 3G (7) of NH Act providesthat the competent authority or the Arbitrator while determiningthe amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (5) shall takeinto consideration the market value of the land as on the date ofpublication of the notification under Section 3A. It is contended,despite the said provision to consider the market value as on thedate of the acquisition notification, the entire basis on which thelearned Arbitrator has re-determined the compensation is basedon a notification dated 28.03.2016 issued by the Department ofStamps and Registration which is notably the market value fixedon a date subsequent to the acquisition notification dated01.02.2016. It is therefore, contended that the award passed bythe learned Arbitrator would not be sustainable. That apart, areference is made to para 49 and 50 in the case of M. Hakeem(supra) to contend that in fact this Court has indicated that thereliance placed on the guideline determining the market valuefor registration would not be justified. On that aspect it isnecessary for us to clarify at this stage itself that such observationas contained in M. Hakeem (supra) is not made with referenceto any provision of the Act. In contrast, a reference to Section26(1)(a) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 indicates that the statutoryprovision itself provides for the market value specified in theIndian Stamp Act, 1899 for the registration of sale deeds oragreement to sell, in the area where the land is situated to beadopted by the Collector for assessing and determining themarket value of the acquired land. In view of the said provision,it is open for the SLAO as well as the learned Arbitrator to relyupon the guideline and if the value provided therein is higherthan the value of the property indicated from the other documents,it would be open to place reliance on the guideline issued for thepurpose of the registration under the Stamp Act to determinethe market value to be tendered as compensation for acquisition.[Para 31][1110-C-H; 1111-A-B]

1.7 In that view, the question that would arise forconsideration in the case on hand is as to whether the awardpassed by the learned Arbitrator would stand vitiated merelybecause the guideline dated 28.03.2016 which is marginally ABC

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Asubsequent in point of time is reckoned, when the acquisitionnotification under Section 3A of NH Act was prior to the samei.e. on 01.02.2016. As already noted, Section 3G(7)(a) of NH Actprovides for determination of the market value on the date ofpublication of the acquisition notification under Section 3A. In anormal circumstance, for the determination of the market value,Bthe rate prevailing prior to the date of the notification shall bethe basis more particularly when the determination is made basedon sale exemplars, as otherwise there is a likelihood ofmanipulation with escalated price being dishonestly indicated inthe subsequent transactions. While taking note of the documentsCrelied on for the purpose of determination of the market value,the existence of appropriate documents in the facts of each casewould also become relevant. In circumstances where a documentwhich is proximal to the date of acquisition is not available, itwould be open to rely on a document which is much prior in pointof time and if the time gap is more, determination could be madeDby providing for reasonable escalation depending on the areawherein the acquired property is situate and nature of property.Similarly, in a circumstance where no document which is prior tothe date of the acquisition notification is available and theexemplars are subsequent to the date of acquisition notification,Ethe value therein could be noted and reasonable de-escalationbe considered to determine the appropriate value. Needless tomention that no strait-jacket formula can be applicable to all caseswith arithmetical precision in the matter of determination ofcompensation. In that backdrop, in the instant case it is no doubttrue that the notification issued by the Department of Stamps andFRegistration on 07.11.2014 is prior to the acquisition notificationdated 01.02.2016. It is also to be noted that there was a time gapof more than one year between the two. In a normal circumstance,even if the notification dated 07.11.2014 was taken intoconsideration it would be open for the learned Arbitrator toGconsider certain amount of escalation to determine the marketvalue. The said process could have been adopted if there was noother document. At this juncture, it is necessary to note that theSLAO in fact had relied on the said notification dated 07.11.2014and determined the market value but had ignored the fact thatthe lands regarding which the market value was to be determinedH

had been converted for purposes other than agriculture. TheSLAO had therefore taken into consideration the registrationvalue which had been fixed in respect of the agricultural property.In that light, firstly it would have been open for the learnedArbitrator to take note of the value fixed for the commercial/industrial lands under that notification itself and provide certain amount of escalation. [Paras 32, 33][1111-C-H; 1112-A-C]

1.8 Notwithstanding such option of providing escalation tothe already existing guideline value being available to the learnedArbitrator, what cannot be lost sight in the instant case is that, asevident from the notification dated 28.03.2016 the process forredetermining the guideline value had commenced through thenotification bearing No.CBC-25/2014-15 dated 14.09.2015 andproceedings of the committee were also held during 2015-2016which ultimately led to the notification dated 28.03.2016. Further,though the preliminary notification for acquisition was issued on01.02.2016, the final notification under Section 3D of NH Act wasissued on 23.09.2016. During the intervening period the guidelinevalue notification dated 28.03.2016, the process for which hadcommenced through the notification dated 14.09.2015, wasalready published. Furthermore, when all these proceedings werein close proximity to the date of the preliminary notification foracquisition and the revision of the market value by the Departmentof Stamps and Registration itself was within a period of one yearand 4 months from the earlier guideline value published on07.11.2014, it would indicate that the escalation which wasotherwise open for being worked out and applied by the learnedArbitrator on taking note of the notification dated 07.11.2014 wasundertaken by the Department of Stamps and Registration andthe benefit of considering such escalation was available to thelearned Arbitrator by taking note of the guideline dated28.03.2016, though technically published on a date subsequentto the preliminary notification dated 01.02.2016. In that view ofthe matter, in the present facts and circumstances, the relianceplaced on the guideline value notification dated 28.03.2016 forreckoning the market value of the property acquired under thepreliminary notification dated 01.02.2016, by itself cannot beaccepted to be a patent illegality committed by the learned AB

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AArbitrator. It is also to be noted that though the notification isdated 01.02.2016 the award notice is dated 03.07.2017 by whichtime the guideline value notification dated 28.03.2016 was alreadyin vogue. The learned Arbitrator had not committed any illegalitymuch less patent illegality in reckoning the guideline valuenotification dated 28.03.2016 [Paras 34-36][1112-C-H; 1113-A-BB]

1.9 To consider this aspect of the matter what is necessaryto be taken note is that the SLAO had determined thecompensation by taking note of the market value assigned toagricultural property under the notification dated 07.11.2014. TheCclaimants were before the learned Arbitrator in terms of Section3G(5) of the NH Act, a copy of which is available at Annexure-P6to the appeal papers. The grievance essentially put forth in theclaim petition is that the preliminary notification is dated01.02.2016 and the notice of award for fixing the amount ofDcompensation for the acquired land has been issued on 03.07.2017.In that light, it was contended that the market value of the non-agricultural lands adjoining the Bengaluru Mysuru NationalHighway such as the one owned by the claimant has increasedconsiderably after the acquisition of the schedule land andaccordingly the Registration Department has revised the guidelineEvalue. However, there is no reference to any specific notificationrelating to the guideline value much less the notification dated28.03.2016. Further, there is no other indication to the mannerin which the notification dated 28.03.2016 was brought on recordthough the said notification is published in the gazette.FComparison with lands in ‘Zunadu’ and ‘City Greens’ is also notpleaded. Further, as pointed out by the learned Additional SolicitorGeneral the land situate in Madhapura and Mayaganahalli havebeen notified at serial Nos. 519, 524 and 525 respectively withreference the same survey number as that of the acquired land.

The land value for ‘Zunadu’ and ‘City Greens’ are notifiedGseparately at Serial Nos.250 and 529. In that circumstance notjust to place reliance on the notification dated 28.03.2016 butalso to apply the value notified for ‘Zunadu’ and ‘City Greens’ tothe acquired lands, necessary pleading in claim petition andevidence with opportunity to NHAI to rebut the same shouldHhave been placed before the learned Arbitrator. Based on the same a consideration in that regard was required to be made bythe learned Arbitrator to arrive at a conclusion with regard to theapplicability of the guideline value fixed under notification dated28.03.2016 for the lands that had been converted to purposesother than agriculture. Further while applying the guideline valuefixed for ‘Zunadu’ and ‘City Greens’ to the acquired lands bydiscarding guideline value for the same survey number, necessaryevidence to derive comparison between the lands so as to applythe value fixed in respect of another item of land in the samenotification was necessary to be brought on record and was to beconsidered by the learned Arbitrator by assigning reasons. [Para37][1113-E-H; 1114-A-D]

1.10 The extracted portion of the award would demonstrate,prior to said finding being recorded, the learned Arbitrator hasnot referred to the manner in which the notification dated28.03.2016 was brought on record and relied upon in theproceedings. The award, except for recording that the notificationindicates the value fixed at Rs.8,000/- per sq.mtr in respect ofconverted land situate in the survey numbers of Mayaganahallivillage and stating that the price of the converted lands of theGreen City in the same village has been fixed at Rs.15,400/- persq.mtr has not referred to any evidence relating to thecomparability with that land despite noting the guideline value ofRs.8000/- fixed for claimant’s land. The very fact that the layoutis named as ‘City Greens’ and ‘Zunadu’ appears to be that thelands therein are situate in a self-contained and developed layout with all civic amenities due to which it is separately indicatedin the notification for specifically fixing the guideline value. Evenif the lands belonging to the claimants is converted for residentialpurposes, value for the same was fixed in the notification byspecifying the survey number. If the value as fixed under theguideline for ‘City Greens’ and ‘Zunadu’ was to be adopted ascomparable land to the acquired land, necessary reasons oughtto have been indicated in the award with reference to theevidence brought on record, with opportunity to NHAI to havetheir say on that aspect and reasons justifying such comparisonshould have been recorded. Further the manner in which thenotification dated 28.03.2016 has been relied upon and the value AB

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Afixed under the said notification in respect of two distinct layoutshas been automatically made applicable to the lands in questiondespite noting the guideline value notified for the same surveynumber would indicate that the said exercise has been undertakenwithout sufficient opportunity to NHAI. Further, appropriatereasons have not been indicated by the learned Arbitrator toBarrive at the conclusion to uniformly adopt the value of Rs.15,400/- per sq.mtr fixed in respect of lands in a layout which wasseparately indicated in the notification. As stated above, if thereis evidence brought on record in the manner known to law withopportunity to the opposite side, it certainly would be open forCthe learned Arbitrator to adopt the said value. However, fromthe pleading in the claim petition and from the portion extractedfrom the award which is the only basis for the ultimate order madeby the learned Arbitrator, it would indicate that the NHAI did nothave sufficient opportunity before the learned Arbitrator tocontrovert the material sought to be relied upon by the learnedDArbitrator nor has the learned Arbitrator indicated sufficientreasons which to that extent would indicate patent illegality inthe award passed by the learned Arbitrator being contrary toSection28(2) and 31(3) of Act, 1996. [Para 39][1115-E-H; 1116-A-E]E1.11 That being the fact situation and also the position oflaw being clear that it would not be open for the court in theproceedings under Section 34 or in the appeal under Section 37to modify the award, the appropriate course to be adopted in suchevent is to set aside the award and remit the matter to the learned FArbitrator in terms of Section 34(4) to keep in view these aspectsof the matter and even if the notification dated 28.03.2016 reliedupon is justified since we have indicated that the same could berelied upon, the further aspects with regard to the appropriatemarket value fixed under the said notification for the lands which is the subject matter of the acquisition or comparable lands is toGbe made based on appropriate evidence available before it andon assigning reasons for the conclusion to be reached by thelearned Arbitrator. In that regard, all contentions of the partiesare left open to be put forth before the learned Arbitrator. [Para40][1116-F-H]H

1.12 C.A. No.4681/2022 @ SLP(C)No.2503/2022

The learned Arbitrator has committed patent illegality inapplying two different notifications in determining the marketvalue, keeping in view the scope available under Section 34 ofAct, 1996 it would not be open for this Court to substitute itsview to that of the learned Arbitrator and modify the award. Inthe circumstance where we have opined that the award passedby the learned Arbitrator suffers from patent illegality andappropriate consideration is necessary, the only course open isto set aside the award and allow the learned Arbitrator toreconsider the matter on that aspect. [Para 48][1119-B-D]

1.13 From the conclusion reached, in both the set of casesit is evident that awards passed by the learned Arbitrator is to beset aside and the matters be remanded in terms of Section 34(4)of Act, 1996 so as to enable the learned Arbitrators to assignreasons to arrive at their conclusion. In this regard, it is madeclear that we have approved the guideline value notification dated28.03.2016 being reckoned for determining the market value.Hence, the claimants in any event would be entitled todetermination of market value at the guideline value indicatedvide notification dated 28.03.2016 for the respective propertiesin Madhapura, Mayaganahalli etc. as against what is awarded bySLAO if there is no other evidence indicating higher marketvalue. The consideration to be made by the learned Arbitratorhowever is as to the material and evidence if any available totreat the acquired land as comparable to the lands situate in ‘CityGreens’ and ‘Zunadu’ layout and award the compensation basedon the guidance value indicated for the lands in the said layout iffound comparable. The reason for not applying the guideline valueindicated for the lands in the very survey number of the acquiredlands is to be disclosed on such consideration. Needless tomention that any other sale transaction if higher than the guidelinevalue can also be considered to arrive at just and faircompensation. Since in any event the claimants would be entitledto higher amount than what was awarded by SLAO, the part ofthe amount awarded by the learned Arbitrator which was depositedbefore this Court and disbursed to the claimants will be subject A

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Ato adjustment based on the quantum of compensation that wouldultimately be decided by the learned Arbitrator. In the matterarising out of SLP No.2503/2022 the applicability of theappropriate special instruction, if any, is to be considered. [Para49][1119-E-H; 1120-A-B]B1.14 For all the aforesaid reasons, (i) the judgment dated26.07.2021 in MFA. No.2040/2021(AA) and connected mattersapproving the Order dated 26.02.2021 in suits under Section 34of Act, 1996 and in MFA No.2041/2021 (AA) approving orderdated 27.01.2021 are set aside. Consequently, the awards dated13.08.2019 and connected awards, and the award datedC06.01.2020 which are the subject matter in these appeals are setaside. The arbitration proceedings are remanded. [Para 50][1120-C]

State of Chhattisgarh vs. Sale Udyog Private Ltd. (2022)2 SCC 275; Ssangyong Engineering & ConstructionDCo. Ltd., vs. NHAI (2019) 15 SCC 131 : [2019] 7 SCR522; Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd. vs. GirdharSondhi (2018) 9 SCC 49: [2018] 10 SCR 937; MMTCLtd. vs. Vedanta Ltd. (2019) 4 SCC 163 : [2019] 3 SCR1023; Associate Builders vs. Delhi DevelopmentEAuthority (2015) 3 SCC 49 : [2014] 13 SCR 895; DelhiAirport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. vs. Delhi Metro RailCorporation Ltd. (2022) 1 SCC 131 : 2021 (10) SCALE428; Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. vs. Crompton GreavesLtd. (2019) 20 SCC 1; Abdul Karim Alarakha vs. State(1982) 3 SCC 227 – referred to.F

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4671of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.07.2021 of the High Courtof Karnataka at Bengaluru in M.F.A. No. 2040 of 2021.

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 4676, 4677, 4678, 4679, 4680 and 4681 of 2022.

Ms. Madhavi Divan, ASG, Abhishek Thakur, Sahil Monga, PradeepKumar Mathur, Ms. Vidushi Jain, Chiranjeev Johri, Kuldeep Singh,Kartikeya Jha, Daksh Arora, Santosh Kumar-I, Shashwat Singh, Advs.for the Appellant.

S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., K. Parameshwar, Nishanth Patil, NareshKaushik, Anand Singh, Manoj Joshi, Yogesh Yadav, B. PurushottamaReddy, Prafulla Saini, Nishant Gautam, Ms. Lalitha Kaushik, Ms. AlaishaAshar, Dhruv Joshi, B. P. Ravi, Akshata Singh, Vardhman Kaushik, Advs.for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A. S. BOPANNA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant – National Highways Authority of India (‘NHAI’for short) is before this Court in these appeals assailing the judgmentdated 26.07.2021 by the Division Bench, High Court of Karnataka,Bengaluru in MFA No.2037/2021 (AA) and connected matters. Theappeals filed by the appellant herein before the High Court were dismissed,whereby the judgment dated 26.02.2021 passed by the Principal DistrictSessions Judge, Ramanagara in Arbitration Suit No.22/2019 andanalogous suits as also the judgment dated 27.01.2021 by the Principaland District and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengalurufiled under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Act1996’ for short) were upheld. The said arbitration suits under Section 34of Act, 1996 were filed by NHAI assailing the award dated 13.08.2019and 06.01.2020 passed by the Deputy Commissioner and Arbitrator,National Highway – 275 (land acquisition), Ramanagara District,Ramanagara in Case No.LAQ(A)/NH-275/CR/137/2017-18 and DeputyCommissioner-1 and Arbitrator Bengaluru Urban District, Bengaluru in A

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ACase No.LAQ/ARB/BNG/NH-275/CR/02/2018-19. By the said awardsthe respective learned Arbitrators had enhanced the compensation fromRs.2026/- per sq. mtr and Rs.17,200/- determined by the Special LandAcquisition Officer (‘SLAO’ for short) to Rs.15,400/- per sq. mtrandRs.25,800/- respectively. Since the learned District Judge and the HighCourt have upheld the determination of the compensation based on theBmarket value determined at Rs.15,400/- and Rs.25,800 per sq. mtr, theappellant – NHAI, claiming to be aggrieved is before this Court.

3. Considering that the description of the parties was different inthe hierarchy of the proceedings, for the sake of convenience and claritythe appellant herein would be described as ‘NHAI’ and the privateCrespondents herein (land losers) would be referred to as the ‘claimants’hereinafter, wherever the context so requires. The claimants –(privaterespondents in these appeals) are the owners of the different extent ofland in the various survey numbers which were all part of the sameacquisition which was initiated under the preliminary notifications dated D01.02.2016 and 02.02.2016 issued under the National Highways Act(‘NH Act’ for short).The facts arising in the appeal relating to SLP(C)No.19775/2021 is referred as the lead case. The facts in the other casesare more or less similar, while the legal issues raised are the same.

4. The lands situated in Survey Nos. 92/1, 90/2A, 42/1 ofEMayaganahalli, survey no.35/3 and 37/1 of Madapura, survey no.24 ofKallugopahalli and survey no.40/8 of Kumbalagodu, among others werenotified for acquisition under the preliminary notification dated 01.02.2016and 02.02.2016. The said acquisition was a part of the process forformation of the Bengaluru-Mysore (NH-275) Highway. The finalnotification was issued on 23.09.2016 and 04.10.2016. The SLAO onFinitiating the process for passing the award, on consideration of thematerial available before him, had passed the award dated 10.03.2017and 04.01.2017 determining the compensation at Rs.2026/-and Rs.17200/- per sq. mtr respectively. The SLAO keeping in view the provisionscontained under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency inGLand Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013(‘RFCTLARR Act, 2013’ for short), took note of the sale exemplarswhich were available before him but ultimately took note of the valueprovided under the notification dated 07.11.2014 issued by the Departmentof Stamps and Registration for the purpose of registration of the saletransactions, to award compensation.H

5. The claimants being dissatisfied with the determination of thecompensation awarded by SLAO, filed their respective petitions beforethe learned Arbitrator in terms of the provisions contained under Section3G(7) of NH Act. The learned Arbitrator having taken into considerationthe method adopted by the SLAO while determining the compensation,though has adopted the same mode of determination by reckoning theguideline value provided by the Department of Stamps and Registrationfor the purpose of registration of sale transactions, has however takeninto consideration the subsequent notifications dated 28.03.2016 and05.12.2018 to reckon the guideline value. In addition, the learned Arbitratorwhile applying the guideline dated 28.03.2016 and 05.12.2018 has takennote that the lands which were the subject matter of acquisition wereconverted for residential use and industrial purpose, from agriculturalpurpose. While adopting the guideline value of residential and industrialproperty, the learned Arbitrator has instead of applying the same valuewhich was provided under the guideline to the specific survey number inthe village wherein the property under acquisition is situate, has adoptedthe guideline value which was separately indicated in the said notificationin respect of a specified residential layout which is situated in the vicinity.Accordingly, the market value was determined at Rs.15,400/- per sq.mtr. On the said basis, learned Arbitrator had taken note that the landbearing Survey No.40/8 in Kumbalagodu was converted for industrialpurpose and since the guideline dated 05.12.2018 provided that anadditional amount of 50% is to be added as against what had beenindicated for residential property under the guideline, an amount ofRs.25,800/- per sq. mtr was determined. Having arrived at suchdetermination of the market value, the total extent of the land acquiredwas considered and the compensation was awarded.

6. The NHAI claiming to be aggrieved by the method adopted bythe learned Arbitrator in determining the market value and compensation,filed the arbitration suit under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 raising variouscontentions. It was contended that the award passed is against theprovisions of law and public policy, apart from being in violation ofPrinciples of Natural Justice. It was contended that the notification foracquisition was issued on 01.02.2016, which is the relevant date fordetermining the market value. The grievance put forth was that thelearned Arbitrator in the first set of cases had taken into considerationthe guideline value which was fixed under a subsequent notification dated28.03.2016. The further grievance is that even under the said notification A

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Adated 28.03.2016 the guideline value in respect of the lands which aresituated in the village which was the subject matter of acquisition isfixed at about Rs.8000/- per sq. mtr but the learned Arbitrator has withoutbasis adopted the guideline value of Rs.15,400/- per sq. mtr. which wasthe guideline value for a different specified land. In that view, it wascontended that the SLAO on the other hand had taken into considerationBthe sale value for which the transactions had taken place. In the saidprocess, since the guideline value fixed under the notification dated07.11.2014, prior to the date of preliminary notification for acquisitiondated 01.02.2016 was fixed and considering the fact that Section 26 ofRFCTLARR Act, 2013 provides for awarding the higher of the value,Cthe SLAO had adopted the guideline value of Rs.2026/- per sq. mtr inrespect of lands in survey nos.92/1, 90/2A of Mayaganahalli and surveyno.35/3 and 37/1 of Madapura while the properties in survey no.42/1 ofMayaganahalli was awarded Rs.7833/- and the property in survey no.24of Kallugopahalli was awarded Rs.8102/- and the property in surveyno.40/8 of Kumbalagodu was awarded Rs.17,200/-.D

7. The learned Principal District and Sessions Judge while takingnote of the contentions as put forth has kept in view the narrow scopeavailable in a suit/petition under Section 34 of Act, 1996 and also keepingin view the provisions contained in Section 26 and 28of RFCTLARRAct, 2013 has arrived at the conclusion that as against the considerationEmade by the SLAO by reckoning the land under acquisition as agriculturalland, the learned Arbitrator has taken note that the lands were convertedfor residential purpose and in that light had taken into consideration theguideline value fixed in respect of the residential extension known as‘city green’ and ‘Zunadu’ for which the guideline value for registrationFpurpose was fixed at Rs.15,400/- per sq. mtr. In that view, the learnedDistrict Judge on taking note of the decisions laying down that limitedscope is available for interference under Section 34 of Act, 1996, hasdismissed the suit.

8. The High Court, in an appeal under Section 37 of Act, 1996Gwhile adverting to the very contentions put forth by NHAI in attackingthe award passed by the learned Arbitrator has taken into considerationthat NHAI had sufficient opportunity to put forth their contentions in theproceedings before the learned Arbitrator. The reliance placed on theguideline value notification dated 28.03.2016 was adverted to by theHigh Court and it was noted that the said guideline value had been notifiedH

in the official gazette which was to the knowledge of all concerned. Inthat light, keeping in view the fact that the SLAO though had taken noteof the guideline value for the earlier period, the market value was fixedunscientifically since the lands which were converted to commercial,industrial and residential purposes had not been taken into consideration.The contention of the claimants that the acquired land was situated nearto the lands in ‘Zunadu’ Extension and ‘city greens’ was held justified.In this regard, the High Court had taken into consideration that inKallugopahalli, even under the earlier notification dated 07.11.2014 underStamp Act, the guideline value fixed for registration was Rs.8,073/- persq. mtr for converted land and for sites in ‘Zunadu’, it was Rs.13,993/-per sq. mtr. In comparison, under the guideline value notification dated28.03.2016 the market value for ‘Zunadu’ is Rs.15,400/- per sq. mtr. Inthat light, taking note of the fact that the notification dated 28.03.2016contained reference to a notification dated 14.09.2015 proposing theregistration value which was earlier to the acquisition notification was ofthe opinion that reckoning of the value specified in the notification dated28.03.2016 by the learned Arbitrator, which was upheld in the suit underSection 34 of the Act, 1996 is justified. Similar consideration is made inrespect of the extent of land situate in the remaining survey numberswhich have reference to the acquisition process. The issue relating toindustrial land is referred separately here below. The market valuedetermined at Rs.15,400/- per sq. mtr in respect of all the lands hasaccordingly been upheld by the High Court. In that view, the High Courtwas of the opinion that in the limited scope available in an appeal underSection 37 of Act, 1996 an examination beyond the scope provided underSection 34 of Act, 1996 is not to be undertaken and has indicated that ifa plausible view is taken by the learned Arbitrator, it should not besubstituted by another view of the Court under Sections 34 and 37 ofAct, 1996. Accordingly, the appeals filed by NHAI have been dismissed.

9. It is in that view the NHAI claiming to be aggrieved is beforethis Court in these appeals.

10. We have heard Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned Additional SolicitorGeneral for NHAI, Mr. S. Nagamuthu learned senior counsel, Mr.Naresh Kaushik and Mr. K. Parameshwar being assisted by theadvocates on record for the respective claimants. We have also perusedthe appeal papers in great detail.

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A11. From the narration of the sequence made above it would beclear that the factual aspects involved in the instant case are to beconsidered in the background of the legal contentions urged. While doingso, what is also to be borne in mind is that these appeals arise out of theproceedings whereunder an award had been passed by the learnedArbitrator in arbitration proceedings. In that light, the limited scopeBavailable under Act, 1996 to assail an award as provided under Section34 of the said Act is also to be kept in view even in these appeals. Whiledoing so, what cannot also be lost sight of is the fact that the arbitrationwas not initiated based on an agreement entered into between thecontracting parties under a contract but is under a statutory provisionCwhich provides for such arbitration in lieu of ‘reference’ under the regimefor acquisition of land for public purpose. One of the parties to sucharbitration proceedings would also be a land loser and the adjudication inthe arbitration proceedings is not based on any definite terms of thecontract providing for mutual obligations determinable under the contractbut for determination of ‘just compensation’ in respect of land which isDcompulsorily acquired for a public purpose. Notwithstanding the same,the broad perspective relating to the limited grounds to challenge anaward under Section 34 of Act, 1996 also is to be kept in perspectivesince the arbitration is governed by Act, 1996.

12. In order to consider whether an award is in accordance withElaw, at the outset the scope of jurisdiction of an arbitrator whiledetermining the compensation under NH Act vis-à-vis RFCTLARR Act,2013 to which detailed reference is made by the learned AdditionalSolicitor General is to be noted. It is contended that the factors todetermine the compensation payable to the land loser as provided inFSection 3G(7)(a) of the NH Act can only be the basis. In that view, it iscontended that the parameters contained in Section 28 of RFCTLARRAct, 2013 cannot be taken into consideration. The contention in thatregard is that while determining the market value, the definite parametersas contained in Section 3G(7)(a) of NH Act alone would be applicable and in view of the provisions contained in Section 3J of NH Act theGprovisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall not be made applicable. It istherefore contended that by invoking Section 28 of RFCTLARR Act,2013the seventh factor stated therein, namely, the ground relating to thefixation of the market value based on equity, justice and benefit to theaffected families cannot be a criteria to determine the market value. ToHpress home the point, the learned Additional Solicitor General has referred

to a comparative statement between the two provisions under the saidtwo enactments which is taken note as hereunder:

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A13. It is contended that the applicability of the provisions of theRFCTLARR Act, 2013 is limited to the provision contained in Section26 thereof for determination of the market value by the Collector whichprovides the basic factors to be taken into consideration in view ofnotification dated 28.08.2015 and the Act cannot be made applicablebeyond the same.B

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14. The contention on behalf of the claimants is that thedetermination of the compensation requires all factors to be taken intoconsideration for fixing the ‘fair and just compensation’ and as such theparameters contained in Section 28 RFCTLARR Act, 2013are alsoapplicable since the NH Act finds a place in the Fourth Schedule toCRFCTLARR Act, 2013.

15. On this aspect, it would be appropriate to take note of thedecision rendered by this Court in Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh,(2019) 9 SCC 304 relied on by both sides, wherein it has been held ashereunder:D

“51. We were also referred to an order in Sunita Mehra v. Unionof India, in which this Court held:

“5. The only point agitated before us by the learned SolicitorGeneral is that in para 23 of the impugned judgment of theHigh Court, it has been held that landowners would “henceforth”be entitled to solatium and interest as envisaged by theprovisions of Sections 23 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894. In the ultimate paragraph of the impugned judgment ithas, however, been mentioned that in respect of all acquisitionsmade under the National Highways Act, 1956, solatium andinterest in terms similar to those contained in Sections 23(2)and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 will have to be paid.

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6. The learned Solicitor General has pointed out that there is anapparent inconsistency in the judgment, which needs to be clarified.It has also been submitted by the learned Solicitor General thatthe order of the High Court should be clarified to mean that theissue of grant of interest and solatium should not be allowed to bereopened without any restriction or reference to time. The learnedSolicitor General has particularly submitted that to understand theorder of the High Court in any other manner would not only seriouslyburden the public exchequer but would also amount to overlooking G

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the delay that may have occurred on the part of the landowner(s)in approaching the Court and may open floodgates for en masselitigation on the issue.

7. We have considered the submissions advanced. In GurpreetSingh v. Union of India , this Court, though in a different context,had restricted the operation of the judgment of thisCourtin Sunder v. Union of India and had granted the benefitof interest on solatium only in respect of pending proceedings.We are of the view that a similar course should be adopted in thepresent case also. Accordingly, it is directed that the award ofsolatium and interest on solatium should be made effective only toproceedings pending on the date of the High Court order in GoldenIron and Steel Forging v. Union of India i.e. 28-3-2008.Concluded cases should not be opened. As for futureproceedings, the position would be covered by theprovisions of the Right to Fair Compensation andTransparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation andResettlement Act, 2013 (came into force on 1-1-2014),which Act has been made applicable to acquisitions underthe National Highways Act, 1956 by virtue of notification/order issued under the provisions of the 2013 Act.”

52. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in theaforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases.This assumes importance in view of the plea of Shri Divan thatthe impugned judgments should be set aside on the ground thatwhen the arbitral awards did not provide for solatium or interest,no Section 34 petition having been filed by the landowners on thisscore, the Division Bench judgments that are impugned before usought not to have allowed solatium and/or interest. Ordinarily, wewould have acceded to this plea, but given the fact that theGovernment itself is of the view that solatium and interest shouldbe granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, in theinterest of justice we decline to interfere with such orders, givenour discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitutionof India. We therefore declare that the provisions of theLand Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interestcontained in Sections 23(1-A) and (2) and interest payablein terms of Section 28 proviso will apply to acquisitions A

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made under the National Highways Act. Consequently, theprovision of Section 3-J is, to this extent, violative of Article14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared tobe unconstitutional. Accordingly, appeal arising out of SLP (C)No. 9599 of 2019 is dismissed.”

(emphasis supplied)

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16. While arriving at the conclusion that notification bearing SONo.2368(E)dated 28.8.2015 whereunder the provisions of RFCTLARRAct, 2013 are made applicable, it is noted that NH Act is also one of theenactments specified in the Fourth Schedule. The relevant portion of theCnotification dated 28.08.2015 reads as hereunder:

“And whereas, the Central Government considers it necessary toextend the benefits available to the land owners under theRFCTLARR Act to similarly placed land owners whose landsare acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the FourthDSchedule; and accordingly the Central Government keeping inview the aforesaid difficulties has decided to extend the beneficialadvantage to the land owners and uniformly apply the beneficialprovisions of the RFCTLARR Act, relating to the determinationof compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement as were madeapplicable to cases of land acquisition under the said enactmentsEin the interest of the land owners; D

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 113 of the Right to Fair Compensation andTransparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and ResettlementAct, 2013 (30 of 2013), the Central Government hereby makesFthe following Order to remove the aforesaid difficulties, namely;-

1. (1) This Order may be called the Right to Fair Compensationand Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation andResettlement (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2015.

(2) It shall come into force with effect from the 1st day ofSeptember, 2015.

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2. The provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation andTransparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and ResettlementAct, 2013, relating to the determination of compensation inaccordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement H

in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructureamenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply to allcases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in theFourth Schedule to the said Act.

[F.No. 13011/01/2014-LRD]

K. P. KRISHNAN, Addl. Secy.”

17. The observations contained also in para 29, 30 and 31 in TarsemSingh (supra) will make it more than evident that this Court was concernedabout discrimination in determination of compensation under differentenactments though in that case the issue was limited to solatium andinterest. The said paras read as hereunder:-

“29. Both, P. Vajravelu Mudaliar and Nagpur Improvement Trustclinch the issue in favour of the Respondents, as has been correctlyheld by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Golden Iron andSteel Forging. First and foremost, it is important to note that, ashas been seen hereinabove, the object of the 1997 Amendmentwas to speed up the process of acquiring lands for NationalHighways. This object has been achieved in the manner set outhereinabove. It will be noticed that the awarding of solatium andinterest has nothing to do with achieving this object, as it is nobody’scase that land acquisition for the purpose of national highwaysslows down as a result of award of solatium and interest. Thus, aclassification made between different sets of landowners whoselands happen to be acquired for the purpose of National Highwaysand landowners whose lands are acquired for other public purposeshas no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved bythe Amendment Act, i.e. speedy acquisition of lands for the purposeof National Highways. On this ground alone, the AmendmentActfalls foul of Article 14.

30. Even otherwise, in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar, despite the fact thatthe object of the Amendment Act was to acquire lands for housingschemes at a low price, yet the Amendment Act was struck downwhen it provided for solatium at the rate of 5% instead of 15%,that was provided in the Land Acquisition Act, the Court holdingthat whether adjacent lands of the same quality and value areacquired for a housing scheme or some other public purpose suchas a hospital is a differentiation between two sets of landowners A

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Ahaving no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved.More pertinently, another example is given – out of two adjacentplots belonging to the same individual one may be acquired underthe principal Act for a particular public purpose and one acquiredunder the Amending Actfor a housing scheme, which, whenlooked at from the point of view of the landowner, would beBdiscriminatory, having no rational relation to the object sought tobe achieved, which is compulsory acquisition of property for publicpurposes.

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31. Nagpur Improvement Trust has clearly held that ordinarily aclassification based on public purpose is not permissibleCunder Article 14for the purpose of determining compensation.Also, in para 30, the Seven-Judge Bench unequivocally statesthat it is immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Actoranother Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired, as, ifthe existence of these two Acts would enable the State to giveDone owner different treatment from another who is similarlysituated, Article 14would be infracted. In the facts of these cases,it is clear that from the point of view of the landowner it isimmaterial that his land is acquired under the National HighwaysAct and not the Land Acquisition Act, as solatium cannot be deniedon account of this fact alone.”E

18. In that view of the matter, though Section 3G(7)(a) of the NHAct provides the parameters to be taken into consideration, it onlyprovides the basic parameters to be taken note of, for determining theamount payable as compensation. While applying the said parametersfor determination of compensation, since RFCTLARR Act, 2013 is alsoFapplicable as NH Act is contained in Fourth Schedule, the factors asprovided under Section 26 and 28 RFCTLARR Act, 2013 including theseventh factor will also be applicable in appropriate cases for thedetermination of the market value as fair compensation for the acquiredland. When land is acquired from a citizen, Articles 300A and 31A of theGConstitution will have to be borne in mind since the deprivation of propertyshould be with authority of law, after being duly compensated. Such lawshould provide for adequately compensating the land loser keeping inview the market value. Though each enactment may have a differentprocedure prescribed for the process of acquisition depending on theurgency, the method of determining the compensation cannot be differentH

as the market value of the land and the hardship faced due to deprivationof the property would be the same irrespective of the Act under which itis acquired or the purpose for which it is acquired. In that light, if Section28 of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 is held not applicable in view of Section 3Jof NH Act, the same will be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Inthat circumstance, the observation in Tarsem Singh (supra) that Section3J of NH Act is unconstitutional to that extent though declared so whileon the aspect of solatium and interest, it is held so on all aspects relatingto determination of compensation. In any event, the extracted portion ofthe notification dated 28.08.2015 is explicit that the benefits available tothe land owners under RFCTLARR Act is to be also available to similarlyplaced land owners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactmentsspecified in the Fourth Schedule, among which NH Act is one. Henceall aspects contained in Section 26 to 28 of RFCTLARR Act fordetermination of compensation will be applicable notwithstanding Section3J and 3G(7)(a) of NH Act.

19. In that background, the award passed by the Arbitrator is tobe examined keeping in view the limited scope available under Section34 of Act, 1996 to interfere with an award. The learned Additional SolicitorGeneral while attacking the award has sought to contend that the awardsuffers from patent illegality which is a ground to interfere with an awardas provided under Section 34(2A) of Act, 1996, yet the District Judgeand High Court has failed to interfere. To contend with regard to thefacets which could be considered as patent illegality, reliance is placedon the decision in the State of Chhattisgarh vs. Sale Udyog PrivateLtd. (2022) 2 SCC 275 with specific reference to paragraphs 14,15, 16and 24 therein. The same is as hereunder:

“14. The law on interference in matters of awards under the 1996Act has been circumscribed with the object of minimisinginterference by courts in arbitration matters. One of the groundson which an award may be set aside is “patent illegality”. Whatwould constitute “patent illegality” has been elaborated in AssociateBuilders v. DDA [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49:(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204], where “patent illegality” that broadlyfalls under the head of “Public Policy”, has been divided into threesub-heads in the following words:

“42. In the 1996 Act, this principle is substituted by the “patentillegality” principle which, in turn, contains three sub-heads:

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42.1 (a) A contravention of the substantive law of India wouldresult in the death knell of an arbitral award. This must beunderstood in the sense that such illegality must go to the root ofthe matter and cannot be of a trivial nature. This again is really acontravention of Section 28(1)(a) of the Act, which reads as under:

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42.2. (b) A contravention of the Arbitration Act itself would beregarded as a patent illegality – for example if an arbitrator givesno reasons for an award in contravention of Section 31(3) of theAct, such award will be liable to be set aside.

42.3 (c) Equally, the third sub-head of patent illegality is really acontravention of Section 28(3) of the Arbitration Act, which readsas under:

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‘28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute- (1)-(2) * * *(3) In all cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide in accordancewith the terms of the contract and shall take into account theEusages of the trade applicable to the transaction.’

This last contravention must be understood with a caveat. AnArbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of thecontract, but if an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in areasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be setFaside on this ground. Construction of the terms of a contract isprimarily for an arbitrator to decide unless the arbitrator construesthe contract in such a way that it could be said to be somethingthat no fair-minded or reasonable person could do.”

15. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI(Ssanguyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15SCC 131 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 213], speaking for the Bench, R.F.Nariman, J. has spelt out the contours of the limited scope ofjudicial interference in reviewing the arbitral awards under the1996 Act and observed thus :

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37. Insofar as domestic awards made in India are concerned, anadditional ground is now available under sub-section (2-A), addedby the Amendment Act, 2015, to Section 34. Here, there must bepatent illegality appearing on the face of the award, which refersto such illegality as goes to the root of the matter but which doesnot amount to mere erroneous application of the law. In short,what is not subsumed within “the fundamental policy of Indianlaw”, namely, the contravention of a statute not linked to publicpolicy or public interest, cannot be brought in by the backdoorwhen it comes to setting aside an award on the ground of patentillegality.

38. Secondly, it is also made clear that reappreciation of evidence,which is what an appellate court is permitted to do, cannot bepermitted under the ground of patent illegality appearing on theface of the award.

39. To elucidate, para 42.1 of Associate Builders [AssociateBuilders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ)204],namely, a mere contravention of the substantive law of India,by itself, is no longer a ground available to set aside an arbitralaward. Para 42.2 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v.DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204], however,would remain, for if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an awardand contravenes Section 31 (3) of the 1996 Act, that would certainlyamount to a patent illegality on the face of the award.

40. The change made in Section 28 (3) by the Amendment Actreally follows what is stated in paras 42.3 to 45 in AssociateBuilders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2SCC (Civ) 204], namely, that the construction of the terms of acontract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitratorconstrues the contract in a manner that no fair-minded orreasonable person would; in short, that the arbitrator’s view is noteven a possible view to take. Also, if the arbitrator wanders outsidethe contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commitsan error of jurisdiction. This ground of challenge will now fallwithin the new ground added under Section 34 (2-A).

41. What is important to note is that a decision which is perverse,as understood in paras 31 and 32 of Associate Builders {AssociateBuilders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204], AB

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while no longer being a ground for challenge under “public policyof India”, would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearingon the face of the award. Thus, a finding based on no evidence atall or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at itsdecision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the groundof patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on documents takenbehind the back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualifyas a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision isnot based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore, wouldalso have to be characterised as perverse.”

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16. In Delhi airport Metro Express (P) Ltd. [Delhi Airport MetroExpress (P) Ltd. v. DMRC, (2022) 1 SCC 131] referring to thefacets of patent illegality, this Court has held as under :

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29. Patent Illegality should be illegality which goes to the root ofthe matter. In other words, every error of law committed by theArbitral Tribunal would not fall within the expression “patentDillegality”. Likewise, erroneous application of law cannot becategorised as patent illegality. In addition, contravention of lawnot linked to public policy or public interest is beyond the scopeof the expression “patent illegality”. What is prohibited is forcourts to reappreciate evidence to conclude that the awardsuffers from patent illegality appearing on the face of the award,Eas Courts do not sit in appeal against the arbitral award. Thepermissible grounds for interference with a domestic award underSection 34 (2-A) on the ground of patent illegality is when thearbitrator takes a view which is not even a possible one, orinterprets a clause in the contract in such a manner which noFfair-minded or reasonable person would, or if the arbitratorcommits an error of jurisdiction by wandering outside the contractand dealing with matters not allotted to them. An arbitral awardstating no reasons for its findings would make itself susceptibleto challenge on this account. The conclusions of the arbitratorwhich are based on no evidence or have been arrived at byGignoring vital evidence are perverse and can be set aside on theground of patent illegality. Also, consideration of documents whichare not supplied to the other party is a facet of perversity fallingwithin the expression “patent illegality”.

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24. The patent illegality committed by the arbitrator was to applythe 2016 Guidelines which came into force after the issuance of H

the Section 3A notification, contrary to the mandate of Section3G(7)(a) of the NH Act read with the proviso to Section 26(1)and Section 11 of the LA Act, 2013. In the seventh SLP bearingSLP(C) No.2503/2022, the 2018 Guidelines have been appliedshowing complete arbitrariness and whimsicality on the part ofthe arbitrators, resulting in wide inconsistency and uncertainty inthe process relating to a common acquisition.”

20. The learned Additional Solicitor General in order to contendwith regard to the patent illegality has also relied on the decision in thecase of NHAI vs. M. Hakeem & Anr. (2021) 9 SCC 1and in SsangyongEngineering & Construction Co. Ltd., V/s. NHAI (2019) 15 SCC 131holding that the patent illegality appearing on the face of the award goesto the root of the matter. It is contended that if an Arbitrator gives noreasons for an award and contravenes Section 31(3) of Act 1996, thesame would amount to patent illegality on the face of the award. In thatlight, it is contended that in the instant case there is no reason whatsoevergiven by the Arbitrator to rely upon the guideline value fixed in respectof another property for which value is indicated in a different serialnumber, instead of relying on the value for the same survey number.Without indicating reasons to draw a comparison with the land underacquisition, the same is applied though value of the very same landscontaining same survey number was provided for in the same notification.Further, no opportunity was given to rebut the same.

21. On the aspect relating to the scope of examination of an awardwithin the limited power to interfere provided under Section 34 of Act1996, the learned senior counsel and other counsel for the claimants inorder to contend that the award passed by the Arbitrator is sustainablein the instant case where the Arbitrator is none other than the DeputyCommissioner who has taken note of the market value in the vicinity,has relied on the decision of this Court in NHAI vs. M. Hakeem &Anr., (2021) 9 SCC 1. The decision in Emkay Global FinancialServices Ltd. vs. Girdhar Sondhi (2018) 9 SCC 49 is relied to contendthat the proceedings under Section 34 of Act, 1996 is summary in nature.Proceedings does not require framing of issues and leading evidence.The expression ‘furnishes proof’ in Section 34 is only to examine therecord. However, what is to be noted by us is the manner in which theproceedings was conducted by the learned Arbitrator and whether thataspect has been properly appreciated in the proceedings under Section34 and 37 of Act, 1996.

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AReliance is placed on MMTC Ltd. vs. Vedanta Ltd. (2019) 4SCC 163, wherein it is held that the jurisdiction under Section 34 is notas an appeal. Supreme Court should be slow to interfere with concurrentfinding and the interference on merits is on limited grounds underSection34(2)(b)(ii). Patent illegality would mean contravention of 1996Act and of terms of contract and illegality appearing on the face of theBaward but not by re-appreciation of evidence. In Associate Buildersvs. Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49 it is held that noneof the grounds under Section 34 (2)(a) deal with merits of the decisionrendered by an arbitral award. Interference is permissible only whenfindings of an arbitrator is arbitrary, capricious or perverse or whenCconscience of Court is shocked or when illegality is not trivial but goes tothe root of the matter.

22. The case in Ssangyong Engineering and ConstructionCompany Ltd. (supra) relied on by the learned Additional SolicitorGeneral is also relied by the learned counsel for claimants to contendDregarding limited scope. This Court, in that context has referred to therequirement to be complied in the proceedings before the arbitrator, whichif not complied will be ground of challenge under Section 34(2)(a)(iii).We deem it appropriate to note the relevant observation which read ashereunder:-

E“51. Sections 18, 24(3) and 26 are important pointers to what iscontained in the ground of challenge mentioned in Section34(2)(a)(iii). Under Section 18, each party is to be givena full opportunity to present its case. Under Section 24(3), allstatements, documents, or other information supplied by one partyto the Arbitral Tribunal shall be communicated to the other party,Fand any expert report or document on which the Arbitral Tribunalrelies in making its decision shall be communicated to the parties.Section 26 is an important pointer to the fact that when an expert’sreport is relied upon by an Arbitral Tribunal, the said report, andall documents, goods, or other property in the possession of theGexpert, with which he was provided in order to prepare his report,must first be made available to any party who requests for thesethings. Secondly, once the report is arrived at, if requested, partieshave to be given an opportunity to put questions to him and topresent their own expert witnesses in order to testify on the pointsat issue.H

52. Under the rubric of a party being otherwise unable to presentits case, the standard textbooks on the subject have stated thatwhere materials are taken behind the back of the parties by theTribunal, on which the parties have had no opportunity to comment,the ground under Section 34(2)(a)(iii) would be made out.”

Permissibility of interference is on specific grounds of (i) arbitratornot adopting judicial approach (ii) breach of principles of natural justice(iii) contravention of statute not linked to public policy or public interest,as being patent illegality under Section 34(2A) and (iv) most basic notionsof justice.

The decision in Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. vs. DelhiMetro Rail Corporation Ltd. (2022) 1 SCC 131 is relied upon to indicatethat there should be minimal interference in arbitral awards, save, itsuffers from patent illegality. What is patent illegality is delineated inpara 29 which is as hereunder: - “29. Patent illegality should be illegality which goes to the root ofthe matter. In other words, every error of law committed by theArbitral Tribunal would not fall within the expression “patentillegality”. Likewise, erroneous application of law cannot becategorized as patent illegality. In addition, contravention of lawnot linked to public policy or public interest is beyond the scope ofthe expression “patent illegality”. What is prohibited is for Courtsto reappreciate evidence to conclude that the award suffers frompatent illegality appearing on the face of the award, as Courts donot sit in appeal against the arbitral award. The permissible groundsfor interference with a domestic award under Section34(2-A) onthe ground of patent illegality is when the arbitrator takes a viewwhich is not even a possible one, or interprets a clause in thecontract in such a manner which no fair-minded or reasonableperson would, or if the arbitrator commits an error of jurisdictionby wandering outside the contract and dealing with matters notallotted to them. An arbitral award stating no reasons for its findingswould make itself susceptible to challenge on this account. Theconclusions of the arbitrator which are based on no evidence orhave been arrived at by ignoring vital evidence are perverse andcan be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Also, considerationof documents which are not supplied to the other party is a facetof perversity falling within the expression “patent illegality”.

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A23. Having taken note of the rival contentions and while examiningthe scope available under Section 34 of Act 1996 in the backdrop of theprecedents, what is also to be kept in perspective is the decision referredto in the case of NHAI vs. Sayedabad Tea Company Ltd. (2020) 15SCC 16. In the said case, this Court while examining the question as towhether the land loser can seek the appointment of an Arbitrator inBterms of Section 11 of Act, 1996, it was noted that such power would notbe available in view of the provisions contained in Section 3G(5) of NHAct since Arbitrator is to be appointed by the Central Government todischarge its functions as per the provisions of the Arbitration andConciliation Act. Having taken note of the said decision, though it isCseen that it was held so while considering the maintainability of petitionunder Section 11 of the Act, 1996 to exclude the right of the land loser toseek the appointment of an Arbitrator keeping in view the statutoryprovision in the NH Act, the larger perspective of such limited right tothe land loser in the process of arbitration is also to be kept in view.Unlike the arbitration in a contractual matter where the parties from theDvery inception at the stage of entering into a contract would mutuallyagree to refer any future dispute to an arbitrator, at that very stage areaware that in the event of any dispute arising between the parties thecontours of the right, remedy, and scope from the commencement of thearbitration up to the conclusion through the judicial process. The termsEof arbitration and the rights and obligations will also be a part of theagreement and a reference to the same in the award will constitutesufficient reasons for sustaining the award in terms of Section 31(3) ofAct, 1996. Whereas, in the arbitration proceedings relating to NH Act,the parties are not governed by an agreement to regulate the process ofarbitration. However, in the process of determination of just and fairFcompensation, the provisions in Section 26 to 28 of RFCTLARR Act,2013 will be the guiding factor. The requirement therein being advertedto, should be demonstrated in the award to satisfy that Section 28(2) and31(3) of Act, 1996 is complied. Therefore, what is also to be kept inperspective while noticing the validity or otherwise of an award regardingwhich the non-furnishing of reasons is contended as patent illegality isGthe reason assigned for determining just compensation in terms thereof.The situation which may arise in cases when a lesser compensation isdetermined in the arbitration proceedings and the land loser is complainingof the award is also to be kept in perspective since the requirement ofreasons to be given by the learned Arbitrator in cases for determinationHof market value and compensation should indicate reasons since the same will have to be arrived at on a comparative analysis for which thereasons should be recorded and Section 26 to 28 of RFCTLARR Actwill be relevant. Neither the land loser nor the exchequer should sufferin the matter of just and fair compensation. Hence the reasons underSection 31(3) is to be expected in that manner, the absence of which willcall for interference under Section 34 of Act, 1996.

24. Leaving aside the facts in the instant case for a while, if in amatter as against the determination of the market value by the SLAO,the land loser had referred to the exemplar sale deeds and seeks highercompensation than prescribed in the guidance value, and in thatcircumstance, if no reasons are assigned by the learned Arbitrator forsuch determination and either approves the SLAO award or awards alesser amount than the actual entitlement, in such circumstance thearbitration process which is thrust on the land loser should not be animpediment and limited interference should not be a reason to deny thejust and fair compensation. In such cases while examining the award inthe limited scope under Section 34 of Act, 1996, the Court is required totake note as to whether the evidence available on record has beenadverted to and has been taken note by the Arbitrator in determining thejust compensation failing which it will fall foul of Section31(3) and amountto patent illegality. Therefore, while examining the award within theparameters permissible under Section 34 of Act, 1996 and whileexamining the determination of compensation as provided under Sections26 and 28 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, the concept of just compensationfor the acquired land should be kept in view while taking note of theaward considering the sufficiency of the reasons given in the award forthe ultimate conclusion. In such event an error if found, though it wouldnot be possible for the Court entertaining the petition under Section 34 orfor the appellate court under Section 37 of Act 1996 to modify the awardand alter the compensation as it was open to the court in the referenceproceedings under Section 18 of the old Land Acquisition Act or anappeal under Section 54 of that act, it should certainly be open to thecourt exercising power under Section 34 of Act, 1996 to set aside theaward by indicating reasons and remitting the matter to the Arbitrator toreconsider the same in accordance with law. The said exercise can beundertaken to the limited extent without entering into merits where it isseen that the Arbitrator has on the face of the award not appropriatelyconsidered the material on record or has not recorded reasons for placingreliance on materials available on record in the background of requirementunder RFCTLARR Act, 2013.

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25. In that context it will be apposite to note the decision relied onby the learned Additional Solicitor General in Dyna Technologies (P)Ltd. vs. Crompton Greaves Ltd. (2019) 20 SCC 1 wherein inter alia itis held as under:

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“34. The mandate under Section 31(3) of the Arbitration Act isto have reasoning which is intelligible and adequate and, whichcan in appropriate cases be even implied by the courts from a fairreading of the award and documents referred to thereunder, if theneed be. The aforesaid provision does not require an elaboratejudgment to be passed by the arbitrators having regard to thespeedy resolution of dispute.

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35. When we consider the requirement of a reasoned order, threecharacteristics of a reasoned order can be fathomed. They are:proper, intelligible and adequate. If the reasonings in the order areimproper, they reveal a flaw in the decision-making process. Ifthe challenge to an award is based on impropriety or perversity inDthe reasoning, then it can be challenged strictly on the groundsprovided under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. If the challengeto an award is based on the ground that the same is unintelligible,the same would be equivalent of providing no reasons at all. Comingto the last aspect concerning the challenge on adequacy of reasons,the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 has toEadjudicate the validity of such an award based on the degree ofparticularity of reasoning required having regard to the nature ofissues falling for consideration. The degree of particularity cannotbe stated in a precise manner as the same would depend on thecomplexity of the issue. Even if the Court comes to a conclusionFthat there were gaps in the reasoning for the conclusions reachedby the Tribunal, the Court needs to have regard to the documentssubmitted by the parties and the contentions raised before theTribunal so that awards with inadequate reasons are not set asidein casual and cavalier manner. On the other hand, ordinarilyunintelligible awards are to be set aside, subject to party autonomyGto do away with the reasoned award. Therefore, the courts arerequired to be careful while distinguishing between inadequacy ofreasons in an award and unintelligible awards.

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36. At this juncture it must be noted that the legislative intentionof providing Section 34(4) in the Arbitration Act was to make theHaward enforceable, after giving an opportunity to the Tribunal to undo the curable defects. This provision cannot be brushed asideand the High Court could not have proceeded further to determinethe issue on merits.

37. In case of absence of reasoning the utility has been providedunder Section 34(4) of the Arbitration Act to cure such defects.When there is complete perversity in the reasoning then only itcan be challenged under the provisions of Section 34 of theArbitration Act. The power vested under Section 34(4) of theArbitration Act to cure defects can be utilised in cases where thearbitral award does not provide any reasoning or if the award hassome gap in the reasoning or otherwise and that can be cured soas to avoid a challenge based on the aforesaid curable defectsunder Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. However, in this casesuch remand to the Tribunal would not be beneficial as this casehas taken more than 25 years for its adjudication. It is in this stateof affairs that we lament that the purpose of arbitration as aneffective and expeditious forum itself stands effaced.

42. From the facts, we can only state that from a perusal of theaward, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it has beenrendered without reasons. However, the muddled and confusedform of the award has invited the High Court to state that thearbitrator has merely restated the contentions of both parties. Froma perusal of the award, the inadequate reasoning and basing theaward on the approval of the respondent herein cannot be statedto be appropriate considering the complexity of the issue involvedherein, and accordingly the award is unintelligible and cannot besustained.”

26. Under the scheme of the Act 1996 it would not be permissibleto modify the award passed by the learned Arbitrator to enhance orreduce the compensation based on the material available on record inproceeding emanating from Section 34 of Act, 1996. The option wouldbe to set aside the award and remand the matter. In this regard it wouldbe apposite to take note of the observation in M. Hakeem (supra), ashereunder:- “42. It can therefore be said that this question has now beensettled finally by at least 3 decisions of this Court. Even otherwise,to state that the judicial trend appears to favour an interpretationthat would read into Section 34 a power to modify, revise or vary A

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Athe award would be to ignore the previous law contained in the1940 Act; as also to ignore the fact that the 1996 Act was enactedbased on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International CommercialArbitration, 1985 which, as has been pointed out in Redfern andHunter on International Arbitration, makes it clear that, giventhe limited judicial interference on extremely limited grounds notBdealing with the merits of an award, the “limited remedy” underSection 34 is coterminous with the “limited right”, namely, eitherto set aside an award or remand the matter under thecircumstances mentioned in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act,1996.”

C27. In the above backdrop, the contention relating to ‘patentillegality’ in an award in terms of Section 34(2A) of Act 1996 as putforth by the learned Additional Solicitor General needs consideration.On such consideration, only if the award passed in the instant case fallsfoul of any such requirement so as to bring it within the power of reviewDunder Section 34 of Act 1996, the interference would be warranted. Asnoted, strong reliance is placed by the learned Additional Solicitor Generalto the decision in the case of State of Chhattisgarh (supra) to contendwith regard to the different facets of patent illegality in an award includingviolation of requirement under Section 28(2) and 31(3) of Act 1996.

E28. In order to demonstrate that the award passed in the instantcase suffers from such patent illegality, the learned Additional SolicitorGeneral has contended that the compensation determined by the SLAOis not just an offer as was the case under the Land Acquisition Act inview of the provision contained in Section 3G(5) of NH Act. In thatregard, it is contended that Section 3G(5) is explicit that either of theFparties if dissatisfied with the amount determined by the competentauthority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 3G of NHAct are entitled to file an application to the Arbitrator appointed by theCentral Government for determination. Hence, it is contended that unlikeSection 18 of the Land Acquisition Act wherein the land loser alonecould seek reference for enhancement of the compensation, under NHGAct the acquiring authority is also granted the liberty of filing an applicationbefore the learned Arbitrator if the compensation determined by theSLAO is excessive. In that view, it is contended that when there isdetermination made by the SLAO based on the material available beforehim with opportunity to both the parties, such determination cannot beHdisturbed by the learned Arbitrator in a mechanical manner unless the

award passed by SLAO is pointed out to be erroneous in law. In thatregard, it is contended that in the instant case, the SLAO has taken intoconsideration the various sale deeds as exemplars to note the sale valueof the property in different transactions relating to certain other propertiessituate in the area. Having thus assessed the average value, the SLAOhas taken into consideration the guideline value of 2014 which was priorto the date of the acquisition notification and on finding that the guidelinevalue of the property fixed for registration is more than the value forwhich sale transactions have been made, has adopted the guideline valueas provided under Section 26(1)(a) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.

29. The learned senior counsel for the claimants however, soughtto contend that even under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Actthe determination of market value if was excessive, it was open for theAcquiring Authority to seek reference to determine the just compensation,wherein it was open to the reference court to determine the justcompensation. In this regard, reliance is placed on the judgment of thisCourt in Abdul Karim Alarakha vs. State (1982) 3 SCC 227. In thatlight, a perusal of the said judgment would indicate that this Court whiletaking note of the facts therein under Section 18 of Rajasthan LandAcquisition Act held that the government also can seek reference as thescope was wider.

30. Be that as it may, in our opinion the mere provision ascontemplated under Section 3G(5) of NH Act providing for either of theparties to assail the determination made by the SLAO by itself does notprovide a better status to the award passed by the SLAO. Even theaward passed by the SLAO under the provisions of NH Act would stillcontinue to remain as an offer of compensation by the Acquiring Authorityto the land loser and the materials relied on by the SLAO even ifdiscussed in detail does not provide the status of a judicially consideredorder so as to interfere with the same only if error is pointed out. It is notnecessary to critically examine the award made by SLAO beforeconsidering enhancement. Notwithstanding the documents relied uponby the SLAO it would still be open for the learned Arbitrator to rely uponany additional material that may be brought before the learned Arbitratornot necessarily to point out an error in the consideration made by SLAObut such material could be considered despite the consideration made bythe SLAO if such material aids in deciding just and fair compensation.Though, as contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General it isseen that in Tarsem Singh (supra) it is held that there is a regime change AB

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Aand the stage to offer an amount by way of compensation is removed, itonly means that the process of award notice etc. from Section 9 to 15A,before possession under Section 16 of L.A. Act is removed, which onlyalters the procedure and enables immediate vesting of the land with theacquiring authority but does not take away the character of the SLAOaward from being an offer of compensation. Hence, in the present case,Bthough the SLAO has taken note of the guideline dated 07.11.2014 itwould be open for the learned Arbitrator to take note of any other evidencethat would be more relevant than the said guideline to re-determine thecompensation in terms of the parameters under Sections 26 and 28 ofRFCTLARR Act, 2013.C31. The further contention of the learned Additional SolicitorGeneral is that the award passed by the learned Arbitrator is ex-facieerroneous amounting to patent illegality since the learned Arbitrator whilere-determining the compensation has taken into consideration the guidelinevalue as provided under the notification dated 28.03.2016. In that regard,Dit is contended that the notification under Section3A of NH Act wasissued on 01.02.2016. The provision in Section3G(7) of NH Act providesthat the competent authority or the Arbitrator while determining the amountunder sub-section(1) or sub-section(5) shall take into consideration themarket value of the land as on the date of publication of the notificationunder Section 3A. It is contended, despite the said provision to considerEthe market value as on the date of the acquisition notification, the entirebasis on which the learned Arbitrator has re-determined the compensationis based on a notification dated 28.03.2016 issued by the Department ofStamps and Registration which is notably the market value fixed on adate subsequent to the acquisition notification dated 01.02.2016. It isFtherefore, contended that the award passed by the learned Arbitratorwould not be sustainable. That apart, a reference is made to para 49 and50 in the case of M. Hakeem(supra) to contend that in fact this Courthas indicated that the reliance placed on the guideline determining themarket value for registration would not be justified. On that aspect it isnecessary for us to clarify at this stage itself that such observation asGcontained in M. Hakeem (supra) is not made with reference to anyprovision of the Act. In contrast, a reference to Section 26(1)(a) of theRFCTLARR Act, 2013 indicates that the statutory provision itself providesfor the market value specified in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 for theregistration of sale deeds or agreement to sell, in the area where theHland is situated to be adopted by the Collector for assessing and

determining the market value of the acquired land. In view of the saidprovision, it is open for the SLAO as well as the learned Arbitrator torely upon the guideline and if the value provided therein is higher thanthe value of the property indicated from the other documents, it wouldbe open to place reliance on the guideline issued for the purpose of theregistration under the Stamp Act to determine the market value to betendered as compensation for acquisition.

32. In that view, the question that would arise for consideration inthe case on hand is as to whether the award passed by the learnedArbitrator would stand vitiated merely because the guideline dated28.03.2016which is marginally subsequent in point of time is reckoned,when the acquisition notification under Section 3A of NH Act was priorto the same i.e. on 01.02.2016. As already noted, Section3G(7)(a) ofNH Act provides for determination of the market value on the date ofpublication of the acquisition notification under Section 3A. In a normalcircumstance, for the determination of the market value, the rate prevailingprior to the date of the notification shall be the basis more particularlywhen the determination is made based on sale exemplars, as otherwisethere is a likelihood of manipulation with escalated price being dishonestlyindicated in the subsequent transactions. While taking note of thedocuments relied on for the purpose of determination of the market value,the existence of appropriate documents in the facts of each case wouldalso become relevant. In circumstances where a document which isproximal to the date of acquisition is not available, it would be open torely on a document which is much prior in point of time and if the timegap is more, determination could be made by providing for reasonableescalation depending on the area wherein the acquired property is situateand nature of property. Similarly, in a circumstance where no documentwhich is prior to the date of the acquisition notification is available andthe exemplars are subsequent to the date of acquisition notification, thevalue therein could be noted and reasonable de-escalation be consideredto determine the appropriate value. Needless to mention that no strait-jacket formula can be applicable to all cases with arithmetical precisionin the matter of determination of compensation.

33. In that backdrop, in the instant case it is no doubt true that thenotification issued by the Department of Stamps and Registration on07.11.2014 is prior to the acquisition notification dated 01.02.2016. It isalso to be noted that there was a time gap of more than one year betweenthe two. In a normal circumstance, even if the notification dated AB

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A07.11.2014 was taken into consideration it would be open for the learnedArbitrator to consider certain amount of escalation to determine themarket value. The said process could have been adopted if there was noother document. At this juncture, it is necessary to note that the SLAOin fact had relied on the said notification dated 07.11.2014 and determinedthe market value but had ignored the fact that the lands regarding whichBthe market value was to be determined had been converted for purposesother than agriculture. The SLAO had therefore taken into considerationthe registration value which had been fixed in respect of the agriculturalproperty. In that light, firstly it would have been open for the learnedArbitrator to take note of the value fixed for the commercial/industrialClands under that notification itself and provide certain amount of escalation.34. Notwithstanding such option of providing escalation to thealready existing guideline value being available to the learned Arbitrator,what cannot be lost sight in the instant case is that, as evident from thenotification dated 28.03.2016 the process for redetermining the guidelinevalue had commenced through the notification bearing No.CBC-25/2014-D15 dated 14.09.2015 and proceedings of the committee were also heldduring 2015-2016 which ultimately led to the notification dated 28.03.2016.Further, though the preliminary notification for acquisition was issued on01.02.2016,the final notification under Section 3D of NH Act was issuedon 23.09.2016.During the intervening period the guideline valueEnotification dated 28.03.2016, the process for which had commencedthrough the notification dated 14.09.2015, was already published.Furthermore, when all these proceedings were in close proximity to thedate of the preliminary notification for acquisition and the revision of themarket value by the Department of Stamps and Registration itself waswithin a period of one year and 4 months from the earlier guideline valueFpublished on 07.11.2014, it would indicate that the escalation which wasotherwise open for being worked out and applied by the learned Arbitratoron taking note of the notification dated 07.11.2014 was undertaken bythe Department of Stamps and Registration and the benefit of consideringsuch escalation was available to the learned Arbitrator by taking note ofGthe guideline dated 28.03.2016, though technically published on a datesubsequent to the preliminary notification dated 01.02.2016. In that viewof the matter, in the present facts and circumstances, the reliance placedon the guideline value notification dated 28.03.2016 for reckoning themarket value of the property acquired under the preliminary notificationdated 01.02.2016, by itself cannot be accepted to be a patent illegalityHcommitted by the learned Arbitrator.

35. It is also to be noted that though the notification is dated01.02.2016 the award notice is dated 03.07.2017 by which time theguideline value notification dated 28.03.2016 was already in vogue.

36. Having arrived at the conclusion that the learned Arbitratorhad not committed any illegality much less patent illegality in reckoningthe guideline value notification dated 28.03.2016, the issue that wouldstill remain for further consideration is as to whether an appropriateconsideration has been made by the learned Arbitrator in the matter ofapplying the market value notified as a guideline value under thenotification dated 28.03.2016 and as to whether the manner in which thesaid guideline was taken into consideration amounts to denial of opportunityto NHAI amounting to violation of principles of natural justice violatingSection 28(2). The further aspect which requires consideration is alsoas to whether the guideline value fixed in respect of ‘City Greens’ and‘Zunadu’ being applied automatically to the land in question was justifiedand as to whether the learned Arbitrator has indicated sufficient reasonsto place such reliance since the non-assignment of reasons or discussionwould also amount to patent illegality being contrary to Section 31(3) ofAct, 1996.

37. To consider this aspect of the matter what is necessary to betaken note is that the SLAO had determined the compensation by takingnote of the market value assigned to agricultural property under thenotification dated 07.11.2014. The claimants were before the learnedArbitrator in terms of Section 3G(5) of the NH Act, a copy of which isavailable at Annexure-P6 to the appeal papers. The grievance essentiallyput forth in the claim petition is that the preliminary notification is dated01.02.2016 and the notice of award for fixing the amount of compensationfor the acquired land has been issued on 03.07.2017. In that light, it wascontended that the market value of the non-agricultural lands adjoiningthe Bengaluru Mysuru National Highway such as the one owned by theclaimant has increased considerably after the acquisition of the scheduleland and accordingly the Registration Department has revised theguideline value. However, there is no reference to any specific notificationrelating to the guideline value much less the notification dated 28.03.2016.Further, there is no other indication to the manner in which the notificationdated 28.03.2016 was brought on record though the said notification ispublished in the gazette. Comparison with lands in ‘Zunadu’ and ‘CityGreens’ is also not pleaded. Further, as pointed out by the learnedAdditional Solicitor General the land situate in Madhapura and AB

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AMayaganahalli have been notified at serial Nos.519, 524 and 525respectively with reference the same survey number as that of theacquired land. The land value for ‘Zunadu’ and ‘City Greens’ are notifiedseparately at Serial Nos.250 and 529. In that circumstance not just toplace reliance on the notification dated 28.03.2016 but also to apply thevalue notified for ‘Zunadu’ and ‘City Greens’ to the acquired lands,Bnecessary pleading in claim petition and evidence with opportunity toNHAI to rebut the same should have been placed before the learnedArbitrator. Based on the same a consideration in that regard was requiredto be made by the learned Arbitrator to arrive at a conclusion with regardto the applicability of the guideline value fixed under notification datedC28.03.2016 for the lands that had been converted to purposes other thanagriculture. Further while applying the guideline value fixed for ‘Zunadu’and ‘City Greens’ to the acquired lands by discarding guideline value forthe same survey number, necessary evidence to derive comparisonbetween the lands so as to apply the value fixed in respect of anotheritem of land in the same notification was necessary to be brought onDrecord and was to be considered by the learned Arbitrator by assigningreasons.

38. In that background a perusal of the award passed by thelearned Arbitrator would indicate that the only discussion worth noting,after narration of the facts is contained in para 8 of the award whichEreads as hereunder:

“8. On perusal of the written statement and documents producedby the applicant as well as the written statement and documentsproduced by the respondents, it is seen that the land in dispute hasbeen acquired for the purpose of expansion of National Highway-F275 and while rendering the Award, the price of the land in questionhas been arrived at, by considering it as dry land. However, sincethe land in question, even prior to the issue of 3(A) Land AcquisitionNotification, has been converted for residential purpose as perOfficial Memorandum No.BDS/ALN/SR/89/91-92 dated20.06.1992 of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ramanagara Sub-GDivision, proper price has to be fixed by considering the lands inquestion as residential lands. This procedure has not been adopted.Further, by revising the market price, the Stamps and RegistrationDepartment has issued a Notification dated 28.03.2016 in respectof the lands belonging to City Greens situated in the Sy.Nos.Hcoming under the said Mayaganahalli village wherein, the price of

converted sites/sites of layouts approved by competent authority,has been fixed at Rs.15,400/- per Sq.Mtr. That their lands aremore developed than the lands of Green City and has hence prayedfor grant of compensation at a higher rate than the same. Onperusal of the said Notification of the Stamps and RegistrationDepartment, it is seen that the price of the applicant’s convertedlands situated in the survey numbers of Mayaganahalli village isfixed at Rs.8,000/- per Sq. Mtr. and the price of the convertedlands of Green City in the same village has been fixed at Rs.15,400/- per Sq. Mtr. Section 26 of the said Act clearly defines theprocedure for fixing the market price. Even then, it could be seenthat the applicant has not been given the fair price. Therefore, it isopined that instead of the present price fixed for the lands inquestion, its price has to be fixed on par with the rates fixed bythe Stamps and Registration Department on the basis of landconversion value in respect of the similarly situated lands of thesame village and that compensation be awarded accordingly.Further, since the Award has been passed by fixing the value ofthe assets and structures existing on the lands in question as perthe assessment of the concerned officers, the prayer of theapplicant to enhance compensation for the same has been rejectedand the following order is passed.”

39. The above extracted portion of the award would demonstrate,prior to said finding being recorded, the learned Arbitrator has not referredto the manner in which the notification dated 28.03.2016 was brought onrecord and relied upon in the proceedings. The award, except forrecording that the notification indicates the value fixed at Rs.8,000/- persq.mtr in respect of converted land situate in the survey numbers ofMayaganahalli village and stating that the price of the converted landsof the Green City in the same village has been fixed at Rs.15,400/- persq.mtr has not referred to any evidence relating to the comparabilitywith that land despite noting the guideline value of Rs.8000/- fixed forclaimant’s land. The very fact that the layout is named as ‘City Greens’and ‘Zunadu’ appears to be that the lands therein are situate in a self-contained and developed lay out with all civic amenities due to which itis separately indicated in the notification for specifically fixing the guidelinevalue. Even if the lands belonging to the claimants is converted forresidential purposes, value for the same was fixed in the notification byspecifying the survey number. If the value as fixed under the guideline ABC

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Afor ‘City Greens’ and ‘Zunadu’ was to be adopted as comparable landto the acquired land, necessary reasons ought to have been indicated inthe award with reference to the evidence brought on record, withopportunity to NHAI to have their say on that aspect and reasonsjustifying such comparison should have been recorded. Further the mannerin which the notification dated 28.03.2016 has been relied upon and theBvalue fixed under the said notification in respect of two distinct layoutshas been automatically made applicable to the lands in question despitenoting the guideline value notified for the same survey number wouldindicate that the said exercise has been undertaken without sufficientopportunity to NHAI. Further, appropriate reasons have not been indicatedCby the learned Arbitrator to arrive at the conclusion to uniformly adoptthe value of Rs.15,400/- per sq.mtr fixed in respect of lands in a layoutwhich was separately indicated in the notification. As stated above, ifthere is evidence brought on record in the manner known to law withopportunity to the opposite side, it certainly would be open for the learnedArbitrator to adopt the said value. However, from the pleading in theDclaim petition and from the portion extracted from the award which isthe only basis for the ultimate order made by the learned Arbitrator, itwould indicate that the NHAI did not have sufficient opportunity beforethe learned Arbitrator to controvert the material sought to be relied uponby the learned Arbitrator nor has the learned Arbitrator indicated sufficientEreasons which to that extent would indicate patent illegality in the awardpassed by the learned Arbitrator being contrary to Section28(2) and 31(3)of Act, 1996.

40. That being the fact situation and also the position of law beingclear that it would not be open for the court in the proceedings underFSection 34 or in the appeal under Section 37 to modify the award, theappropriate course to be adopted in such event is to set aside the awardand remit the matter to the learned Arbitrator in terms of Section 34(4)to keep in view these aspects of the matter and even if the notificationdated 28.03.2016 relied upon is justified since we have indicated that thesame could be relied upon, the further aspects with regard to theGappropriate market value fixed under the said notification for the landswhich is the subject matter of the acquisition or comparable lands is tobe made based on appropriate evidence available before it and onassigning reasons for the conclusion to be reached by the learnedArbitrator. In that regard, all contentions of the parties are left open toHbe put forth before the learned Arbitrator.

C.A. No.4681/2022 @ SLP(C)No.2503/2022

Leave granted.

41. In the instant case the land acquired is in Survey No.40/8,Kumbalagodu Village, Bengaluru, South Taluk, Bengaluru District,measuring 121 sq. mtr. The purpose of acquisition is the same as in theearlier cases and the consideration relating to determination of marketvalue and award of compensation is also similar to those cases. However,in the instant case the acquisition is under a different preliminarynotification dated 02.02.2016 and the final notification is dated 04.10.2016.

42. Insofar as determination of the market value, both by the SLAOand the learned Arbitrator, it is based on the guideline value notificationdated 27.10.2014 published by the Department of Stamps and Registrationas per which it is fixed at Rs.17,200/- sq. mtr. The guideline valuenotification relied upon in this case is prior to the acquisition notificationand as such there is no grievance in that regard. Irrespective of thecontentions put forth on behalf of the NHAI at this juncture, the awardpassed by the learned Arbitrator would disclose that the NHAI whileopposing further enhancement by the learned Arbitrator had contendedto sustain the determination of market value at Rs.17,200/- per sq. ft.made by the SLAO by contending that the market value determined is inaccordance with law.

43. Hence, the issue that arises for consideration herein is only asto whether the course adopted by the learned Arbitrator to apply thesubsequent notification dated 05.12.2018 issued by the Department ofStamps and Registration to reckon the special instructions contained inthat notification so as to enhance the market value by 50% of the guidancevalue which is provided in the notification dated 27.10.2014 and thusarrive at the market value of Rs.25,800/- per sq. mtr. With the aid of twodifferent guideline value notifications is justified.

44. The learned Additional Solicitor General has highlighted thisaspect of the matter as patent illegality in passing the award in this case.It is contended that the learned Arbitrator has chosen to apply theNotification dated 05.12.2018 to consider enhancement by 50% forindustrial land since it was not specifically provided for in the guideline,by relying on the special instruction in guideline of 2018. In such event,the guideline value which was much lesser in the notification of 2018itself should have been taken into consideration. It is pointed out that theguideline value for residential land in the 2018 Notification works out to A

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ARs.11,900/- per sq. mtr. If 50% of the same is added to derive the valuefor industrial land, it will be Rs.16,680/- per sq. mtr. But the learnedArbitrator has chosen to sustain Rs.17,200/- awarded by SLAO basedon the guideline value of 2014 notification but relied on the 2018notification to apply the 50% value addition of the same to determinemarket value for industrial land, which is not sustainable. It is contendedBthat if Clause 6 of special instruction was applied the market value willwork out to Rs.12,900/- i.e. 75% of Rs.17,200/-.

45. The learned counsel for the claimant contended, the factremains that the industrial land belonging to the claimant has beenacquired. It is contended, in the notification dated 27.10.2014 althoughCKumbalagodu Industrial Area is mentioned, the categories of land forwhich value has been indicated does not include industrial plot. As suchthe value for industrial plot is to be determined by applying the provisionmade in special instructions. It is contended, though the learned Arbitratorhas noted the special instruction under 2018 Notification, even under theD2014 Notification, the special instruction provides for addition of 50% toarrive at the value of industrial plot. Hence the enhancement to the tuneof Rs.8600/- per sq. mtr. is justified.

46. Insofar as the learned Arbitrator having adopted the guidelineissued in 2014, the same is prior to the date of the notification forEacquisition and the aspects considered relating to date of notification inthe earlier set of cases does not arise. Hence, it is justified. The valueindicated at serial no.51 in the notification is for Kumbalagodu IndustrialArea, but the value stated therein is for residential sites, the approval forwhich was obtained from the different authorities. Though reference isto Kumbalagodu Industrial Area, the value of the industrial plot has notFbeen specified. It cannot also be assumed that the value indicated thereinitself is for industrial site, since in the same entry in Serial No.51, thevalue of residential buildings is also indicated. Hence, in the absence ofthe SLAO undertaking the exercise for determining the market value ofthe industrial land which was acquired, the learned Arbitrator was requiredto do so.G

47. The learned Arbitrator, however, while undertaking the saidexercise, as evident from the award has relied on the market value atRs.17,200/- sq. mtr. based on the guideline value Notification dated27.10.2014. But for determining the market value, the special instructionsin the notification dated 05.12.2018 is relied upon. Such procedureH

adopted is not justified and amounts to material irregularity on the faceof the award. The learned counsel for the claimant contended that thelearned Arbitrator though relied on 2018 notification, the SpecialInstruction No.3 in the 2014 notification also provides for adding 50% ofthe rates applicable if the acquired land is adjoining the National Highway.

48. Firstly, when we are of the opinion that the learned Arbitratorhas committed patent illegality in applying two different notifications indetermining the market value, keeping in view the scope available underSection 34 of Act, 1996 it would not be open for this Court to substituteour view to that of the learned Arbitrator and modify the award. Further,the learned Additional Solicitor General sought to refer to SpecialInstruction No.6 in the notification of 2014 to arrive at the market valueeven if it is accepted that the value of industrial land is not indicated inthe notification. These are aspects to which the learned Arbitrator isrequired to advert so as to arrive at the conclusion. In the circumstancewhere we have opined that the award passed by the learned Arbitratorsuffers from patent illegality and appropriate consideration is necessary,the only course open is to set aside the award and allow the learnedArbitrator to reconsider the matter on that aspect.

49. From the conclusion reached above, in both the set of cases itis evident that awards passed by the learned Arbitrator is to be set asideand the matters be remanded in terms of Section 34(4) of Act, 1996 soas to enable the learned Arbitrators to assign reasons to arrive at theirconclusion. In this regard, it is made clear that we have approved theguideline value notification dated 28.03.2016 being reckoned fordetermining the market value. Hence, the claimants in any event wouldbe entitled to determination of market value at the guideline value indicatedvide notification dated 28.03.2016 for the respective properties inMadhapura, Mayaganahalli etc. as against what is awarded by SLAO ifthere is no other evidence indicating higher market value. Theconsideration to be made by the learned Arbitrator however is as to thematerial and evidence if any available to treat the acquired land ascomparable to the lands situate in ‘City Greens’ and ‘Zunadu’ layoutand award the compensation based on the guidance value indicated forthe lands in the said layout if found comparable. The reason for notapplying the guideline value indicated for the lands in the very surveynumber of the acquired lands is to be disclosed on such consideration.Needless to mention that any other sale transaction if higher than theguideline value can also be considered to arrive at just and fair A

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Acompensation. Since in any event the claimants would be entitled tohigher amount than what was awarded by SLAO, the part of the amountawarded by the learned Arbitrator which was deposited before this Courtand disbursed to the claimants will be subject to adjustment based on thequantum of compensation that would ultimately be decided by the learnedArbitrator. In the matter arising out of SLP No.2503/2022 the applicabilityBof the appropriate special instruction, if any, is to be considered.

50. For all the aforesaid reasons, (i) the judgment dated 26.07.2021in MFA. No.2040/2021(AA) and connected matters approving the Orderdated 26.02.2021 in suits under Section 34 of Act, 1996 and in MFANo.2041/2021 (AA) approving order dated 27.01.2021 are set aside.CConsequently, the awards dated 13.08.2019 and connected awards, andthe award dated 06.01.2020 which are the subject matter in these appealsare set aside. (ii) The arbitration proceedings bearing Case Nos.:

LAQ(A)/NH-275/CR/137/2017-18,

LAQ(A)/NH-275/CR/134/2017-18,D

LAQ(A)/NH-275/CR/135/2017-18,

LAQ(A)/NH-275/CR/132/2017-18,

LAQ(A)/NH-275/CR/139/2017-18,

LAQ(A)/NH-275/CR/41/2019-20 are remanded to the DeputyECommissioner and Arbitrator, NH-275, Ramanagar District, Ramanagarand Case No.LAQ/ARB/BNG/NH-275/CR-02/2/2018-19 is remandedto Deputy Commissioner and Arbitrator, Bangalore Rural District.

51. The appeals accordingly are allowed in part with no order as to costs.F52. The pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Divya Pandey(Assisted by : Shubhanshu Das, LCRA)

Appeals partly allowed.

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