REDDY VEERANA versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS on 5 May 2022

[2022] 3 S.C.R. 663

REDDY VEERANA

v.

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS

(Civil Appeal No. 3636 of 2022)

MAY 05, 2022

[VINEET SARAN AND J. K. MAHESHWARI, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: ss. 4, 11, 17 – Compensation –Grant of – Large piece of land allotted to DLF, including thescheduled piece of land of the appellant for which, the decree ofpermanent injunction was in operation – Scheduled piece of landsubsequently acquired – High Court determined compensation atthe rate of Rs. 1,10,000/- per square meter as per circle rate andalso ordered deduction of development charges to the extent of 50%– On appeal, held: Determination of the compensation has to bemade by taking into consideration the circle rate which wasdetermined as per the market value – High Court rightly determinedcompensation at the rate of Rs. 1,10,000/- per square meter as percircle rate – As regards deduction of development charges to theextent of 50% made by High Court, the High Court did not takeinto consideration all the factors encircling the issue and routinelyproceeded with the maximum deduction of 50% development charge– Scheduled piece of land is a costly land, being situated at thecentre of development of authority, has commercial use, and even amall has been constructed on it – Without acquisition, the piece ofland belonging to appellant was transferred to DLF and theacquisition was made subsequently – Possession of scheduled pieceof land, though taken long back in year 2004-2005, but till date,the appellant has not been paid the compensation and is litigatingbefore courts even up to subsequent rounds – In view thereof,deduction of development charges to the extent of 50% by HighCourt cannot be sustained – Also, the civil right of appellant isviolated in breach of Art. 300-A – In view thereof, respondentsdirected to compute the amount of compensation by taking the circlerate of Sector -18, i.e., Rs. 1,10,000/-per square meter – Judgmentof the High Court directing 50% deduction towards developmentcharge set aside, however, the amount of solatium of 30% is payable– Statutory interest on the amount of compensation to be payable

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A@ 9% from the date of taking over of possession, for a period ofone year, thereafter, @ 15% p.a. to be paid, and in addition thereto,3% penal interest to be paid – Constitution of India – Art. 300A.

Compensation – Determination of – Held: Compensation canbe determined by taking into consideration the circle rate whichBhas been determined as per the market value – Market value of aproperty is the price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willingseller for it, taking into account its current condition, all existingadvantages, and potential possibilities, while excluding any benefitresulting from the implementation of the scheme for which theproperty is compulsorily acquired – Thus, the market value is to beCdetermined in the light of price paid by the purchaser of similarland in the neighbourhood of the land in question and in cases,where no records for such transaction/purchase is available, theminimum statutory value in accordance with Stamp Act must be takenas market value for circle rate – In no event, the compensation canDbe paid at a rate lesser than that of market value as determined forthe purpose of payment of stamp duty under Stamp Act.

Conclusion

Compensation – Determination of – Deduction of developmentcharges – Quantum of – Held: There is no straight jacket formulato arrive at the quantum of deduction of development charge – ItEmust be assessed based on the facts of the individual case after dueconsideration of all the factors, the nature of land to be acquired,the extent of area to be acquired, the extent of development in theadjoining land as well as land proposed to be acquired, thecommercial potentiality and so on.FInterest: Nature of – Held: Is a consideration paid either forthe use of money or forbearance from demanding it after it hasfallen due – Interest, whether it is statutory or otherwise, representsthe profit, the creditor may have made if he had used the money orfrom the loss, he may have suffered because he could not use theamount.G

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The determination of the compensation has tobe made by taking into consideration the circle rate which hasbeen determined as per the market value. The market value of aproperty is the price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willingH

seller for it, taking into account its current condition, all existingadvantages, and potential possibilities when led out in the mostadvantageous manner, while excluding any benefit resulting fromthe implementation of the scheme for which the property iscompulsorily acquired. Therefore, the market value is to bedetermined in the light of price paid by the purchaser of similarland in the neighbourhood of the land in question and in cases,where no records for such transaction/purchase is available, theminimum statutory value in accordance with Stamp Act must betaken as market value for circle rate. [Para 21][686-B-D]

Bhopendra Singh and Others v. Awas Evam VikasParishad and Others 2005 (2) Uttaranchal Decision, 295 – approved.

1.2 The order passed by District Magistrate, notifying thecircle rate to be Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. mt. as applicable oncommercial properties, residential properties etc., situated inNoida is on record. Further, the nature of acquired land is alsonot in dispute for the reason that, NOIDA while contesting theSuit filed by appellant seeking permanent injunction, itselfadmitted that the land has been determined for use of commercialpurposes and hence, it is a valuable land. This fact is also fortifiedby the Revenue Inspector’s report, submitted in compliance ofinterim order passed by High Court in Writ Petition No. 75152of 2005. By the said report, it is apparent that, on spot the landof Khasra No. 422 and 427 was converted into a part of Sector18, for which demarcation is not possible because of absence ofany fixed identification points for demarcation since the land isfully developed. Thus, NOIDA cannot turn around to say in thiscase that the land is either agricultural or at best residential.[Para 22][686-E-H]

1.3 With regard to determination of the compensation inthe instant case, the judgment of Bhopendra Singh’s case, whereinthe circle rate showing market value assessed by the Collectorfor the purpose of registration of instrument of sale was madevalid. The said judgment was not interfered with by this Courtthereafter. In the case of the land owner itself, the High Court byorder dated 10.12.2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 75152 of 2005, A

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Adirected the Special Land Acquisition Officer to determine thecompensation according to the law as laid down in judgmentrendered in Bhopendra Singh’s case, which is sustained by thisCourt. Therefore, the issue of basis of determination ofcompensation has been settled inter--party and also un-interferedby this Court. Now, on the said issue, relying upon the judgmentBof Anil Kumar Srivastava’s case cannot be interfered with in thiscase. In no event, the compensation can be paid at a rate lesserthan that of market value as determined for the purpose ofpayment of stamp duty under Stamp Act. [Para 25][689-G-H; 690-A-B]

C1.4 The land in dispute was not only designated forcommercial use, rather it was also declared to be part of industrialdevelopment plan area. After development, even a mall has beenconstructed on it. The High Court in the impugned order hasrightly determined payment of compensation at the rate ofDRs. 1,10,000/- per square meter as per circle rate. The findingsof High Court for grant of compensation with rate Rs. 1,10,000/-per sq. Mt is upheld. [Para 26][690-B-D]

1.5 With regard to deduction of development charges tothe extent of 50% made by High Court, there is no straight jacketEformula to arrive at the quantum of deduction of developmentcharge and same must be assessed based on the facts of theindividual case after due consideration of all the factors whichmight affect such quantum. The High Court did not take intoconsideration all the factors encircling the issue and routinelyproceeded with the maximum deduction of 50% developmentFcharge. On perusal of the impugned judgment, it is clear that theHigh Court has inter-alia highlighted the glaring mischiefs playedby NOIDA in the whole acquisition proceedings but at the sametime, it has failed to accord a substantial reason for maximumdeduction of development charges. It is not for the first time thatGNOIDA is in cross-roads before this Court for playing hand-in-glove with large developers. [Para 27][690-D-G]

1.6 It is uncontroverted from the material available onrecord that, the scheduled piece of land was allotted by NOIDA

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to respondent no. 7 in absence of formal acquisition, whereafter,the said scheduled land was developed in the line of commercialhub and even a mall was constructed on it. Hence, the quantumof deduction of development charges should have been evaluatedby High Court from the contextual perspective of all the relevantfactors, which clearly has not been done in the instant case. [Para28][690-G-H; 691-A]

1.7 The general factors that are to be taken intoconsideration for deciding the quantum of deduction ofdevelopment charges, majorly include the nature of land to beacquired, the extent of area to be acquired, the extent ofdevelopment in the adjoining land as well as land proposed to beacquired, the commercial potentiality and so on. Therefore,deduction of development charge in the instant case should havebeen made while considering the said factors. However, it is madeclear that this observation is being made in peculiar facts of theinstant case and not in general. [Para 29][693-F-G]

1.8 As per the stand taken by NOIDA, the scheduled pieceof land is a costly land, being situated at the centre of developmentof authority and has commercial use. On spot, the demarcationwas not possible because the land was fully developed. In thebackdrop, without acquisition, the piece of land belonging toappellant was transferred to respondent no. 7. The acquisitionwas made subsequently in view of the observations made by theDistrict Court confirming the decree of permanent injunction forthe said piece of land. At the time of taking over of possession,the amount of compensation was not made and now, the appellantis running from pillar to post to receive the adequatecompensation. Even after settling the dispute for payment ofcompensation at the circle rate of Rs. 1,10,000/- inter--party inthe previous round of litigation, the NOIDA in its own volitionneither determined the compensation nor paid to the appellant.The possession of scheduled piece of land, though taken longback in year 2004--2005, but till date, the appellant has not beenable to reap the fruits of compensation and kept litigating before A

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Acourts even up to subsequent rounds. Thus, deduction made toextent of 50% in by High Court cannot be sustained. [Para30][694-A-D]

1.9 The compensation at the circle rate of Rs. 1,10,000/-per sq. meter be payable to the appellant. On perusal, it is clearBthat if amount of compensation is not paid or deposited on orbefore taking possession of the land, interest @ 9% p.a. leviablefrom the time of taking of possession until it shall have been sopaid or deposited. It further provides that if the amount ofcompensation has not been paid or deposited within one year,the interest would be payable @ 15% p.a. on expiry of the periodCof one year. On facts, the land was given initially in the year 2003to respondent No.7 and the acquisition was made subsequently.The additional award was passed on 31.1.2011 after a delay offive years from the date of taking over of possession. The amountwas deposited in the year 2017 by a delay of approximately 14Dyears. In the peculiar facts of this case, the civil right of appellantis violated in breach of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.Such action of the NOIDA clearly amounts to constitutional tort.[Para 31][694-D-H; 695-A-C]

1.10 In addition to the statutorily paid interest, the additionalEamount of penal interest must be paid in place of shifting the datefor determination of the amount of compensation or to determinethe compensation as per 2013 Act. The nature of interest isessentially a consideration paid either for the use of money orforbearance from demanding it after it has fallen due. Interest,whether it is statutory or otherwise, represents the profit, theFcreditor may have made if he had used the money or from theloss, he may have suffered because he could not use the amount.Therefore, the amount of compensation be payable along withstatutory interest, as directed by the High Court and 3% penalinterest, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. [ParaG32][696-C-F]

1.11 The respondents are directed to compute the amountof compensation by taking the circle rate of Sector -18, i.e., Rs.1,10,000/- per square meter; that the judgment of the High Courtdirecting 50% deduction towards development charge is set aside;Hthat the respondents are directed not to make any deduction A

towards the development charge while computing/calculating theamount of compensation as per circle rate; that as directed bythe High Court, the amount of solatium of 30% in terms of Section23(2) of 1894 Act is also payable; that the statutory interest onthe amount of compensation to be payable @ 9% from the dateof taking over of possession, i.e., February, 2005 for a period ofone year, thereafter, @ 15% p.a. be paid as per the proviso ofSection 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; and that in additionto the said statutory interest, 3% penal interest is further directedto be paid in the peculiar facts of this case. [Para 33][696-G-H;697-A-C]

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Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal & Ors.(2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1; Anil KumarSrivastava v. State of U.P. (2004) 8 SCC 671 : [2004] 3Suppl. SCR 675; R. Unnikrishnan and Another v. V. K.Mahanudevan and Others (2014) 4 SCC 434 : [2014]1 SCR 350; Bhagwathula Samanna v. Special Tahsildarand Land Acquisition Officer (1991) 4 SCC 506 : [1991]1 Suppl. SCR 172; Trishala Jain v. State of Uttaranchal(2011) 6 SCC 47 : [2011] 8 SCR 520; Kasturi and Ors.v. State of Haryana (2003) 1 SCC 354 : [2002] 4 Suppl.SCR 117; Kalyani (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. v.Sulthan Bathery Municipality & Ors. Civil Appeal No.3189 of 2022 – referred to.

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Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3636of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2021 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2272 of 2019.

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Civil Appeal No. 3637 of 2022

Balbir Singh, ASG, Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Adv., P.B. Suresh, Vipin Nair,Agnish Aditya, Arindam Ghosh, Kshitij Mittal, Sumeer Jain, AngadSandhu, Naman Tandon, Samarvir Singh, Love Kumar Gupta, DeepeshBRaj, Soayib Qureshi, Advs. for the Appellant.

Balbir Singh, ASG, Ravindra Kumar Raizada, AAG, Sumeer Jain,Angad Sandhu, Naman Tandon, Samarvir Singh, Love Kumar Gupta,Deepesh Raj, Soayib Qureshi, Avnish Pandey, Ms. Alka Sinha, AnuvratSharma, Praveen Bahadur, Ms. Ruby Ahuja, Vishal G., Ms. Peepti Sarin,CVasu Singh, Tappan Preet Hora, M/S. Karanjawala & Co., Advs. forthe Respondents.

The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:

JUDGMENT

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1. Leave granted.

2. The present Civil Appeals arise out of the judgment dated28.10.2021, passed by High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CivilMiscellaneous Writ Petition No. 2272 of 2019 filed by appellant ReddyVeerana (co-petitioner), by which, the High Court intervened in the awardEof compensation dated 31.01.2011, passed by Additional DistrictMagistrate (Land Acquisition) for acquired land of appellant, admeasuring2.18.00 bighas of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427, situated in village ChhaleraBangar and disposed-off the petition.

3. Assailing the said order, both the parties are before this Court.FBriefly stated, facts are that vide sale deed dated 24.04.1997, appellantalong-with two others purchased the scheduled property land in KhasraNo. 422 admeasuring 3 bighas 9 biswas and in Khasra No. 427admeasuring 2 bighas 4 biswas and 10 biswansi (i.e., total of 13757.8 sq.meters) in village Chhalera Bangar, Gautam Buddh Nagar district for atotal sale consideration of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (One crore only). However,Gthrough the prior land acquisition proceedings in year 1979-1980, a portionof the purchased land to the extent of 1 bigha 5 biswas 15 biswansi inKhasra No. 427 and 1 bigha in Khasra No. 422 was acquired by State.Thus, the property which remained unacquired with the appellant was 2bigha 18 biswa 10 biswansi (i.e. total of 7400 sq. meters) in both theHaforesaid khasra numbers (in short be called as scheduled piece of land).

4. As is borne out of the record, pursuant to purchase of land byappellant, since early 2000s, employees of NOIDA were interfering withthe peaceful possession of the appellant (land-owner), which resultantlyled into Civil Suit No. 416/1998 being filed by appellant for permanentinjunction against NOIDA, with a prayer to not interfere with thepossession. For the purpose to demonstrate the utility and value of land,the averments made in the written statement filed by NOIDA inter-aliacategorically contended, were as thus:

“…..the land in dispute is situated in the centre of developmentof authority and the use of land has been prescribed to beused for commercial. Therefore, this land is very costly.Since………the land of village Chhalera Bangar under theprovisions of Section 2 of Act No. 6 of 1976 is declared asindustrial area and construction on this land without thepermission of defendant is illegal.”

5. The Trial Court, after due deliberation on the contentions raisedby both the parties, vide order dated 16.02.2000, partly decreed the suitin favour of appellant (Reddy Veerana) herein and restrained NOIDAfrom taking possession of land which was not the subject matter of theprior acquisition in year 1979-1980. Further, the Court also declared theappellant as the owner of the remaining portion of land of Khasra No.422 and 427 which was purchased vide sale deed as mentioned earlier.

6. Being aggrieved by aforesaid order, NOIDA preferred CivilAppeal No. 61 of 2020 before District Judge, which also came to bedismissed vide order dated 30.03.2001 with certain observations madein the following manner –

“The lower court has not committed any error in decreeingthe suit of permanent injunction of plaintiff produced in regardto the land admeasuring 02-09-00 bigha of Khasra no. 422and land admeasuring 00-09-10 bigha of Khasra No. 427 ofvillage Chhalera Bangar, Tehsil Dadri, District – GautamBuddh Nagar against appellant. The defendant/appellant evennow is free to acquire the remaining land of the aforesaidKhasra Nos. but until and unless the land is not acquired, tillthen the decree of permanent injunction issued by the lower”court shall remain applicable.

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AThe judgment and decree granting permanent injunction passedby District Judge, confirming the order of Trial Court has not been assailedand therefore, it has become final. Moreover, despite the decree ofpermanent injunction being operative, NOIDA in the year 2003 floated atender for development of large piece of land including the remainingpiece of land of Khasra No. 422 and Khasra No. 427 which is the subjectBmatter of this case. The said tender was widely advertised by NOIDAin various newspapers and subsequently, nine reputed developers includingMGF, Unitech, Sun City, Sahara India and Omex purchased the biddocuments. It was a known fact that out of the large piece of the land,the scheduled piece of land was in dispute and hence, all the reputedCdevelopers abstained from bidding for the tender. Be that as it may, onthe closing date of tender i.e. 9.03.2004, only one tender on behalf ofrespondent No. 7 herein, i.e., M/s DLF Universal Ltd. (hereinafterreferred to as DLF) was received and evaluated by Technical Committee,whereafter, respondent No. 7 quoted the rate and qualified in the saidtender. Consequently, the large piece of land as mentioned above wasDallotted to DLF vide order dated 12.04.2004, including the scheduledpiece of land for which, the decree of permanent injunction was inoperation.

7. After the allotment of land to respondent No. 7, a preliminarynotification dated 02.09.2005 was issued by NOIDA under Section 4(1)Eread with Section 17(1) of the ‘Land Acquisition Act, 1894’ (hereinafterreferred to as 1894 Act), followed by a notification dated 22.11.2005under Section 6 of the 1894 Act, to acquire the scheduled piece of landmeasuring 0.7400 hectare in Khasra No. 422 and 427 at village ChhaleraBangar, Dadri, NOIDA. The possession of the scheduled piece of landFwas taken on 20.01.2006 as per order passed by Additional DistrictCollector (Land Acquisition) Noida.

8. The aforesaid notifications were challenged by the appellantbefore High Court of Allahabad in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.75152 of 2005 and Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 70088 of 2006.GAs per interim orders of the High Court in the aforesaid petitions, RevenueInspector visited the scheduled piece of land on 05.08.2008 and in hisreport noted as under –

“In accordance to the spot, the land of Khasra No. 422 and427 which in present has been converted in Sector 18 inHregards to demarcation, has no identification spot because the NOIDA authority has been fully developedand in absenceof any fixed identification, demarcation of land is not”possible.

The High Court vide order dated 10.12.2009 disposed-off thematter and held as under –

“Perusal of record shows that the notification under Section4 of the Act was issued on 2.9.2005 and in this notificationunder Section 4 of the Act a direction was also issued underSection17(4) of the Act to the effect that the provision ofSection 5-A of the Act shall not apply. A notification underSection 6 of the Act as contained in Annexure No. 2 to theinstant writ petition was issued on 22.11.2005 and the urgencyclause was invoked under Section 17(1) of the Act.

Mr. S.D. Kautilya, learned counsel for the petitioners made astatement at bar that the petitioners do not press the reliefclaimed in the instant writ petitions and only pray that theircompensation be determined and be paid to them inaccordance with law and also keeping in mind the Judgementof High Court of Uttaranchal rendered in Bhopendra Singhand others Vs. Awas Vikas Parishad and others, reported in2005(2) Uttaranchal Decision, 295. According to him thisstatement is being made keeping in mind the Commissioner’sreport that the land cannot be demarcated and the petitionerscannot get back the land.

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, but withoutprejudice to the merits of the case, the writ petition is disposedof with the direction to the SLAO to determine thecompensation according to law as laid down in the judgementrendered in Bhopendra Singh and others (Supra). Thepayment of the compensation shall be made preferably withina period of one month. However, it is further provided that ifas per policy of NOIDA any land is to be given to thepetitioners, same shall be expedited for rehabilitation of thepetitioner. Writ petition is disposed of.”

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AIt may not be out of context to state that, the appellant (land-owner) gave the concession before the Court in view of the observationmade by Revenue Inspector in the report that the land was fully developedby NOIDA and demarcation was not possible. Therefore, the directionfor determination of compensation as per the judgment rendered in thecase of ‘Bhopendra Singh and Others Vs. Awas Evam VikasBParishad and Others, 2005 (2) Uttaranchal Decision, 295; MANU/UC/0270/2005’ was only prayed.

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9. Being aggrieved, NOIDA challenged the aforesaid judgment inSpecial Leave to Appeal (C) No. 20196-20197 of 2010 (later admittedand converted into Civil Appeal No. 731-732 of 2013). During the pendencyCof the aforesaid appeal, this Court vide order dated 10.01.2011, issuednotice while observing that ‘in the meanwhile, there shall be stay ofoperation of the impugned judgment and order dated 10.12.2009 passedby High Court’. It is the specific case of the appellant (land-owner) thatNOIDA did not even inform the Court about passing of award underDSection 11 of the 1894 Act during the pendency of the said appeal.

10. Be that as it may, after almost delay of 5 years, an awarddated 31.01.2011 was passed by Additional District Magistrate (LandAcquisition), NOIDA, Gautam Buddh Nagar, under Section 11 of 1894Act. In the said award, the compensation was determined by the authorityEin the following manner –

“…… a decision was reached in the meeting on the basis ofgeneral acquisition process to pay them compensation at therate of Rs. 181.87 per square yard on the basis of sell letterdated 04.02.2005 for the land sold in village Sadarpar ofFthis circle, whose borders touch the borders of villageChhalera Bangar against the land sold in village Chhalerathree years before the advertisement of this Act on 02.09.2005under Section 4(1), 17 and were not found suitable for gettingcompensation, the approval of which was given byCommissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut through his officialGletter No. 452/891/2004-06 dated 18.01.2006.”

Regarding the pending litigation before this Court, the award dealtwith the same as under –

“With reference to the disposal of Civil Misc. Writ PetitionNo. 75152/2005 – Vishnu Pradhan Vs. NOIDA & Ors., Hon.H

High Court of Allahabad on 10.12.2009 ordered to disposethe compensation on the basis of minimum determined circlerate by the District Collectors as per the order passed by theHon. High Court, Uttaranchal, against the petition filed forcompensation, determination and payment by BhopendraSingh and Others Vs. Resident Development Council andOthers, but against the orders of Hon. High Court, a SpecialPetition No. CC 20196-20197/2010 was filed in the Hon.Supreme Court of India by Naveen Okhla Udyog VikasPradhikaran, Noida versus Vishnu Pradhan and others, inwhich the enforcement of the orders of Hon. High Court dated10.12.2009 was stopped on 10.01.2001. Due to thepostponement order issued by Hon. Supreme Court of India,the determined rate of Rs. 181.87 per square yard remainseffective for the uncontracted lands as per the decision takenin the said meeting convened under the chairmanship ofDistrict Collector, Gautam Buddh Nagar and the decision ofacquired land will be taken on this basis only.”

Finally, the award was passed in following terms subject to thedecision of this court and compensation was computed as under –

“Therefore, for the 0.828 ha, land acquired by New OkhlaIndustrial Development Authority for planned industrialdevelopment in village Chhalera Bangar, Pargana Dadri,Tehsil Dadri, District – Gautam Buddh Nagar, thecompensation is Rs. 18,00,481.00 and 30% solatium payableon it amounts to Rs. 5,40,144.00 and 12% payable on thecompensatory amount is Rs. 53,866.00 which amounts to a--total of Rs. 23,94,491.00 (Rupees TwentyThree Lacs Ninety-Four Thousand Four Hundred NinetyOne only) and thedecision upon it is being declared today on 31.01.2011. Thisdecision will be as per the obedience of the order issued bythe Hon. Supreme Court of India against Special Petition No.CC 20197-20197/2010 – NOIDA versus Vishnu Pradhan andothers.”

Thereafter, on 04.11.2015, the appeal of NOIDA before this Courtwas dismissed for being devoid of merits.

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A11. It is also relevant to note that, vide order dated 04.11.2015,this Court also dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 1107 of 2009, which assailedthe judgment of High Court of Uttaranchal in Bhopendra Singh (supra).In view of the aforesaid order, Deputy Chief Executive of NOIDAaddressed a letter dated 11.05.2016 to Additional District Magistrate(Land Acquisition) to comply with the order of High Court of JudicatureBat Allahabad and Supreme Court of India. In the meanwhile, the appellantherein preferred representations before the concerned authority andthereby sought compensation in terms of the aforesaid orders passed bythis Court, however, in vain. The District Magistrate, Gautam BuddhNagar on 08.01.2018, dismissed the representation of the appellant (land-Cowner) and observed as under –

“In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that when the matter waspending adjudication before the Hon. Supreme Court, thenin such circumstances, the award/decision dated 31.01.2011was not be announced/passed by then Additional DistrictDMagistrate (Land Acquisition), Noida, Gautam Buddh Nagarand the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition),Noida, Gautam Buddh Nagar, in the matter has to wait forthe final orders of Hon. Supreme Court. The award/decisiondated 31.01.2011 of Additional District Magistrate (LandAcquisition) is not the compliance of order dated 10.12.2009Epassed by Hon. High Court and stay order dated 10.01.2011passed by Hon. Supreme Court, but because this award/decision has already been passed/declared by then AdditionalDistrict Magistrate (Land Acquisition) Noida, Gautam BuddhNagar, therefore, legally it is not appropriate to dispose-offFthis point at the level of District Magistrate.”

Being aggrieved by the order passed by District Magistrate, theappellant preferred Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 1841-1842 of 2018 inCivil Appeal Nos. 731-732 of 2013. This Court vide order dated22.10.2018, dismissed the aforesaid contempt as withdrawn and grantedGliberty to the petitioner to avail appropriate remedy before the High Court.

12. In view of the order passed in Contempt Petition by this Court,the appellant (land-owner) again approached the High Court in WritPetition No. 2272 of 2019, wherein the High Court vide impugnedjudgment and order dated 28.10.2021, with regard to question of title ofHappellant on the scheduled land, the High Court held as under –

“31. We would first be dealing with the issue as to whetherAthe writ petition filed by the sole petitioner to claimcompensation of land measuring 2.18.00 bighas ofKhasra Nos. 422 and 427 is maintainable. Therespondents have produced a copy of the order dated12.09.2002 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division),BGautam Buddha Nagar to deny acceptance ofcompromise and accordingly, allegations have beenmade about suppression of aforesaid fact. It is also thatno compromise deed or decree has been issued by thecompetent Court and for that reason, one co-owner ofthe land, namely, Vishnu Pradhan contested the caseCseparately to challenge the acquisition of the land. We,however, find that petitioner has produced a copy ofthe Khatauni of Fasli Year 1407- 1412 when the landwas recorded solely in the name of the petitioner. It waspursuant to the order dated 01.09.2010 in Suit No. 2441Dof 2010 under Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act, 1996and the judgment of Civil Judge (Senior Division) dated17.06.2010 to record entire land of Khasra Nos. 422and 427 in the name of the present petitioner. A copy ofthe Khatauni was submitted alongwith thesupplementary affidavit, thereby the objection onEmaintainability of the writ petition in the hands of thepetitioner is not tenable rather the petitioner becamesole owner of the property in dispute after an orderunder Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act and thejudgment of the Civil Court dated 17.06.2010. His nameFwas accordingly entered in the khatauni. Therespondents have ignored the subsequent orders bywhich land was entered in the name of the petitioneralone.”

Further, on the aspect of whether the schedule property was anagriculture land or commercial land, the High Court referred to thepleadings of respondents themselves in Suit No. 416 of 1998 and provisionsof Uttar Pradesh Industrial Development Act, 1976, to conclude that theschedule land was a commercial property and the compensation shall bedetermined accordingly.

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ARegarding the deduction towards development charges, the HighCourt held as follows –

“63. The respondents were expected to take into account thecircle rate of the land in question and thereupon to makereasonable deductions towards the development whichBmay be between 20% and 50% as per the judgment ofthe Apex Court in the case of Viluben JhalejarContractor (supra).

64. If the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Courtin the judgment cited above is applied, thenCdetermination of compensation should have been madeafter taking the circle rate of Rs.1,10,000/- per squaremeter of the land in question and thereupon to makededuction towards the development. The developmentcharges can be maximum to the extent of 50% of it andaccordingly respondents should have takenDRs.55,000/- per square meter to be the market value ofthe land.

65. The official respondents while doing it could havenoticed that the land was allotted to respondent no.7one and half years back prior to the notification underESection 4 of the Act of 1894. It was by the allotmentletter dated 12.04.2004. The circle rate was determinedthereupon on 16.04.2004. The allotment of land to therespondent no.7 was 8 times bigger than the land of thepetitioner and it was one and half years back. WhileFapplying the judgment of the Apex Court, the marketvalue should have been taken @ Rs.55,000/- per squaremeter. However, due to the interim order of the ApexCourt dated 11.01.2011 against the judgment dated10.12.2009, the respondents did not determine thecompensation as per the direction given by this Court.”GAnd lastly, the High Court disposed-off the petition with thefollowing directions –

“69. Accordingly, we find reasons to cause interference intheaward dated 31.01.2011 and direct the respondentsto determine the compensation as under –H

1. The respondents are directed to take into considerationthe circle rate of Sector – 18 since 16.04.2004 given inAnnexure – 7 of supplementary counter affidavit filedby the respondent no. 5. It was Rs. 1,10,000/- per squaremeter for Sector – 18.

2. After making 50% deduction towards the developmentcharges, it would come to Rs. 55,000/- per square meterand accordingly the compensation would be determinedon the aforesaid rate for the land admeasuring 2.18bighas.

3. The addition of solatium of 30% would be madethereupon. The amount arrived as per the direction inparas (1) and (2) would be payable with interest @ 9%per annum for one year from the date of possession i.e.February, 2005 and thereupon 15% per annum as perthe Proviso to Section 34 of the Act of 1894.

4. The amount deposited in the year 2017 would earninterest @ 15% only till it was deposited. The amountso deposited would be paid to the petitioner with theinterest earned on it.

5. The amount of compensation would be paid thereuponto the petitioner.”

13. The High Court on the issue of applicability of Section 24 of‘Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013’ (hereinafter referred to as2013 Act), held that, the argument of lapsing of acquisition for an awardpassed beyond a period prescribed under Section 11(a) cannot be acceptedin view of the ratio of judgment of this Court in ‘Indore DevelopmentAuthority Vs. Manohar Lal & Ors., 2020 (8) SCC 129’. After goingthrough the said judgment, it is clear that Section 24(1)(a) of 2013 Act,starts with non-obstante clause and states that in case where theproceedings have been initiated under 1894 Act, but, the award has notbeen made under Section 11, the provisions of the 2013 Act relating tothe determination of compensation would apply. In the case at hand, theaward was made on 31.01.2011 after grant of stay on 10.01.2011 inCivil Appeal No. 731-732 of 2013, though it was by a delay of 5 years.By the final order passed on 04.11.2015, the said appeals were dismissed.

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AThereafter, the representation was made by the appellant askingcompensation at the rate of Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. mtrs. as directed byHigh Court inter-party relying upon judgment of Bhopendra Singh(supra) was rejected vide order dated 08.01.2018. Thereafter, thecontempt petitions were filed alleging non-compliance of the order ofthe High Court which were dismissed as withdrawn while granting theBliberty to appellant to avail appropriate remedy. Thus, on the date ofcommencement of the 2013 Act, the possession was taken and the awardwas passed, though as alleged it was non-est. In our opinion, by theimpugned order, the determination of compensation as per circle rate ofRs. 1,10,000/- per sq. mtrs for commercial land was the question res-Cintegra in the light of Bhopendra Singh (supra) judgment and the award,whether rightly or wrongly passed, was in existence on the date ofcommencement of 2013 Act. Therefore, in our considered opinion, theHigh Court has rightly refused to interfere on the issue of applicability of2013 Act for determination of compensation and rightly relied upon thejudgment on Indore Development Authority (supra).D

14. Being aggrieved by the impugned order, the appellant (land-owner) and NOIDA have filed separate appeals, which are heardanalogously.

Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. P.B.ESuresh for appellant, in addition to the point of applicability of Section 24of 2013 Act as discussed above, contended as under –

a.That, the award dated 31.01.2011 passed by DistrictMagistrate was in violation of order of this Court as well asthe High Court of Judicature at Allahabad;Fb.

b.The award itself acknowledged that it was contingent innature; c.There was no personal hearing granted to the appellant, eventhough NOIDA knew about the interest of the appellant inthe scheduled property;G

d.The impugned award was a void exercise since the publicnotice of the same was given two days after the designateddate of hearing under Section 9 of the 1894 Act; e.The award itself was passed after a delay of 5 years sincethe date of hearing, which violates the mandate under SectionH

REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH ANDOTHERS

11A of the 1894 Act. Therefore, the date of award ofcompensation should be shifted or in alternate, since thecompensation was deposited in the year 2017, therefore, theamount of compensation be determined as per the provisionsof 2013 Act.

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f.Deduction with respect to development charges could not beBlevied as the plot was already developed even before theacquisition; g.NOIDA illegally sold the schedule property even before theacquisition which is a clear-cut violation of right to propertyunder Article 300A of the Constitution. Such ConstitutionalCtort should not be allowed to be left unpunished and therespondent authorities should not take benefit of their ownwrongful acts.

15. Per contra, Mr. Balbir Singh, learned Additional SolicitorGeneral appearing on behalf of NOIDA, contended as under –

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a.Appellant cannot be entitled for a compensation more thanRs. 31,850/- which was the price tendered by respondent no.7 (DLF); b.The said price of Rs. 31,850/- has been adjudicated by thisCourt in ‘Anil Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of U.P., (2004)E8 SCC 671’ to be reasonable;

c.It has been conceded that allotment to respondent no. 7 (DLF)was prior to the date of acquisition of the scheduled land; d.Appellant (land-owner) acquired the property in year 1997for a sale consideration of Rs. 1 crore. One of the earlierland owners namely Vishnu Vardhan had entered into anagreement to sale dated 07.06.2006, for a sale considerationof Rs. 3 crores only. These transactions indicate that theaforesaid land was an agricultural plot, however, the scheduledland has to be characterized as agriculture land or at bestresidential; F

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e.Jurisdiction of reference court constituted under Section 18of 1894 Act has been by-passed by the High Court whiledetermining the compensation; H

Af.Development charge amounting to 75% has to be deductedinstead of 50%;

g.Compensation granted by the High Court would amount tounjust enrichment for the appellant which cannot be sustainedunder the law.

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16. Mr. Rayzada, Additional Advocate General appearing for theState has submitted that, the subject land was bought as benami propertyand hence, appellant is only entitled for 1/3[rd] of the amount.

17. Learned counsel for respondent no. 7 has submitted that, thedispute is inter-se NOIDA and appellant herein and respondent no. 7Chas nothing to add other than to state that the allotment of land wassubject matter of litigation before this Court in Anil Kumar Srivastava(supra), which has upheld the allocation through the process of auction.However, the compensation, if any, enhanced, may be directed onlyagainst NOIDA.D

18. Before adverting to the merits of the rival contentions raisedby both parties, at the outset it is relevant to mention that, the legalityand validity of judgment dated 10.12.2009 passed by High Court in CivilMiscellaneous Writ Petition No. 75152/2005 has sustained the scrutinyof this Court and has been upheld vide order dated 04.11.2015 in CivilEAppeal No. 731-732 of 2013. The judgment has attained finality inter-sethe parties. It is not the case of respondents that the previous judgmentas well as the impugned order has been rendered by an incompetentauthority. In other words, the said judgment has effectively put thecontroversy inter-se the parties to rest. Thus, incidentally, what remainsin the matter is mere observance of those directions given by the HighFCourt in the light of prevailing law. Therefore, the contention disputingthe payment of compensation altogether for the acquired land is untenableand cannot be entertained at this stage. The conclusion arrived at byHigh Court has been given seal of affirmation by this Court and hence,the right of the appellant herein to get compensation in terms ofGdetermination as directed has been crystallized and cannot be interferedwith. It would be unjust and improper to allow re-agitation of issues andvexing the appellant twice when the matter has already been put to restby impugned judgment inter-se the parties.

19. At this juncture, we consider it appropriate to refer ‘R.Unnikrishnan and Another Vs. V.K. Mahanudevan and Others,H

(2014) 4 SCC 434’, wherein para 19, the Court while dealing withfinality to binding judicial decisions observed as follows –

“19. It is trite that law favours finality to binding judicialdecisions pronounced by courts that are competent to-deal with the subjectmatter. Public interest is againstindividuals being vexed twice over with the same kindof litigation. The binding character of the judgmentspronounced by the courts of competent jurisdiction hasalways been treated as an essential part of the rule oflaw which is the basis of the administration of justice inthis country. We may gainfully refer to the decision ofthe Constitution Bench of this Court in ‘Daryao v. Stateof U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 1457]’ where the Court succinctlysummed up the law in the following words:

9. …It is in the interest of the public at large that afinality should attach to the binding decisionspronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction, andit is also in the public interest that individuals shouldnot be vexed twice over with the same kind oflitigation.

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11. …The binding character of judgments pronouncedby courts of competent jurisdiction is itself anessential part of the rule of law, and the rule of lawobviously is the basis of the administration of justiceon which the Constitution lays so much emphasis.”

20. Therefore, in view of settled legal position with respect tobinding nature of the judgment that has attained finality, there is no iotaof doubt that NOIDA is under mandatory obligation to determine thecompensation as per law laid down in Bhopendra Singh (supra). Therelevant extracts from Bhopendra Singh (supra) are being reproducedherein below for ready reference –

“4.Learned reference court has assessed the market valueof similar land @ of Rs. 6/- per square feet on theground that other land of the same area which wasacquired with land in question was also valued at the A

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said rate by the Special Land Acquisition Officer.However, learned Counsel for the Appellants arguedthat the land in question is adjoining to the main roadunlike the land which was taken into consideration bythe reference court. It is further argued that the land inquestion should not have been valued less thanRs. 50/- Square feet. On perusal of the oral evidenceadduced by the parties we found that P.W.-1 Smt. RajDulari has stated that in the year 1976 value of land inquestion was Rs. 50/- per square feet. P.W.-2 ArvindSingh, P.W.-3 Ranvir Singh and P.W.-4 Harpal Singhhave also made the similar statements.But in the mattersof Land Acquisition, best way to assess the market valueis to examine the value in the light of price paid by thepurchaser of similar land in the neighbourhood of theland in question. Such transaction if nearer the date ofnotification of acquisition, facilitates the court to assessthe more accurate market value of the land. However,in the present case none of the above witnesses haveadduced any evidence as to the exemplar sale deedpertaining to the nearby similar land. In absence of suchsale, deeds we are compelled to see the valuation of thesurrounding land made by the Collector Nainital underRule 340-A of the U.P. Stamp (first amendment) Rules,-1976. Paper No. 44C/1 is copy of the Circle rateshowing market value assessed by the Collector for thepurposes of registration of instrument of sale. The saiddocuments shows that the circle rate of the land inquestion for imposing the stamp duty over the documentsis Rs. 95/- to Rs. 135/- per sq. meter as market value ofthe land adjoining to road and Rs. 67/- to Rs. 80/- persq. meter for the land away from the road. From theevidence on record, it is clear that the land in questionwas near the main road. As such the market value asper the circle rate was treated for the purpose ofrealizing stamp duty not less than Rs. 95/- per sq. meter.It would be injustice to the owner of land if for realizingthe stamp duty we apply the circle rate and deny at-least the said rate in making payment of compensation on acquisition of his land. The total area of the land inquestion is 2900 sq. yard. The learned reference courthas erred in law by multiplying the rate mentioned persq, feet with area in terms of sq. yard. That is why dueto miscalculation the amount has been stuck at meagerRs. 17,400/-. Area measuring 0.6 acre is equal to 2900Sq, yard which is equal to 2397 sq. meter. If we assessthe market value relying on the circle rate it would beRs. 95/- per sq. meter, the market value of the land inthe year 1976 comes out to be Rs. 95/- A – 2397.80 sq.meters = 2,27,791/-.

12. The market value determined for the circle, is theminimum statutory market value, in accordance with thestatutory rules framed under the Stamp Act, as amendedby the U.P. Act, on the basis of which, stamp duty ispaid as per schedule appended to Section 3 and saledeed is to be entertained only after the payment of thestamp duty paid on the said minimum market value andif in the opinion of the Registering Authority the valueof the property is more than the minimum valuedetermined as per the rules, he may refer the matter tothe Authority who may further proceed to require thevendee to pay more stamp duty. And if not paid theymay impound the sale deed. Thus, the basis of exerciseof power, is the minimum market value determinedaccording to rule. If for the augmentation of therevenue, government fixes the market value of theproperty in a circle why that not be taken as minimummarket value of the property for the purpose of LandAcquisition Act. The procedure of determination ofmarket value provided under Section 23 of Land-Acquisition Act is parimateria to the rules framed underthe Stamp Act. Therefore, we hold that while avoidingcompensation for land acquired under the LandAcquisition Act, the compensation cannot be paid at alesser rate than that of market value determined for AB

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Athe purpose of payment of stamp duty under the Stamp”Act.

21. Bare perusal of the aforesaid makes it clear that, thedetermination of the compensation has to be made by taking intoBconsideration the circle rate which has been determined as per the marketvalue. The market value of a property is the price that a willing purchaserwould pay to a willing seller for it, taking into account its current condition,all existing advantages, and potential possibilities when led out in themost advantageous manner, while excluding any benefit resulting fromCthe implementation of the scheme for which the property is compulsorilyacquired. Therefore, the market value is to be determined in the light ofprice paid by the purchaser of similar land in the neighbourhood of theland in question and in cases, where no records for such transaction/purchase is available, the minimum statutory value in accordance withStamp Act must be taken as market value for circle rate.D

22. In the instant case, since the title of the appellant on thescheduled piece of land has not been contested by the respondents andthe adjudication is confined only to the quantum of compensation, wedeem it appropriate not to interfere with the findings of the High Courtwith respect to the ownership. Be that as it may, moving further, theEorder dated 27.03.2004 passed by District Magistrate, Gautam BuddhNagar notifying the circle rate to be Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. mt. asapplicable on commercial properties, residential properties etc., situatedin Noida is also on record. Further, the nature of acquired land is also notin dispute for the reason that, NOIDA while contesting the Civil Suit No.F416/1998 filed by appellant herein seeking permanent injunction, itselfadmitted that the land has been determined for use of commercialpurposes and hence, it is a valuable land. This fact is also fortified by theRevenue Inspector’s report dated 05.08.2008, submitted in complianceof interim order passed by High Court in Writ Petition No. 75152 of2005. By the said report, it is apparent that, on spot the land of KhasraGNo. 422 and 427 was converted into a part of Sector 18, for whichdemarcation is not possible because of absence of any fixed identificationpoints for demarcation since the land is fully developed. Thus, NOIDAcannot turn around to say in this case that the land is either agriculturalor at best residential. Thus, the arguments as advanced is contrary toHrecord, far from truth and cannot be countenanced.

23. Now, the argument advanced by learned Additional SolicitorGeneral for State and counsel for respondent no. 7 relying upon thejudgment of Anil Kumar Srivastava (supra), which was a PIL filedbefore the Allahabad High Court and later transferred to this Court, isalso required to be analyzed. This Court in the aforesaid case dealt withthe challenge made to tender floated by NOIDA in 2003 and dismissedthe said PIL while observing as thus –

“7.In reply, respondent no. 2 has pointed out that theimpugned Scheme was given wide publicity; that thedevelopment of the plot admeasuring 54,320.18 sq. m.became necessary to decongest Sector 18 where carparking has become an acute problem; that decongestioncould be achieved by constructing shopping malls with matching parking facility; that although the area of theplot in question is 54,320.18 sq. m., FAR is restricted to150 and ground cover is restricted to 30% unlike theinstances of plots submitted by the petitioner where fora smaller plot of 6000-7000 sq. m., FAR is 150 and forstill smaller plots of 600 sq. m., FAR is 250 (see AnnexureP-1). That by offering the said plot admeasuring54,320.18 sq. m., the Authority is saving on internaldevelopment for amenities, parking, etc……..

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9. Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned Senior Counselappearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that thereserve price fixed by respondent no. 2 at the rate of Rs27,500 per sq. m. is contrary to clause 2(e) of the Boardresolution dated 10-7-2003; that under the said clause,the reserve rate of commercial plots admeasuring 5001sq. m. or more was one-and-a-half times the sector rate;that the sector rate was Rs 90,000 per sq. m.; that thereserve price of Rs 27,500 per sq. m. for the plotadmeasuring 54,320.18 sq. m., without sub-division, wasabysmally low and understated……….It was submittedthat transfer of the said plot admeasuring 54,320.18sq. m. at such a low reserve price of Rs 27,500 per sq.m. would result in causing huge loss of Rs 340 crores tothe State exchequer.

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A14.Applying the above tests to the facts of this case, wefind that there is no material on record to show that thetender price of Rs 31,850 per sq. m. is a low price. Theentire edifice of the petition is based on the challengeto the reserve price of Rs 27,500 per sq. m. As statedabove, fixation of the reserve price is to facilitate theBconduct of the sale. It was open to the petitioner tochallenge the tender price of Rs 31,850 per sq. m. asunderstated, notwithstanding the fixation of the reserveprice. No comparative sales instances, with similarparameters of ground cover of 30% and 150 FAR, haveCbeen placed before us. No figures of cost of 2800 ECShave been placed before us as such costs would increasethe reserve price. On the other hand, we find that thereserve price has been fixed by taking into accountseveral factors. Firstly, in the past tenders invited forrelatively smaller plots with higher reserve price hadDfailed. It is important to bear in mind that the tenderprocess is an expensive exercise. To resort repeatedly tothis exercise is a costly affair. Secondly, in the presentcase, the reserve price was fixed by taking into accountthe comparative offers/sales in the adjoiningEsectors……..

15. Reading of the said clause indicates that the figure ofRs 90,000 is not mentioned. It is a figure alleged by thepetitioner. As stated above, there is a difference betweenthe circle rate and the sector rate. The petitioner hasFconfused the two. The circle rate is notified by theGovernment for the guidance of the Sub-Registrar. Theyare notified for revenue purposes. There is nothing toshow that Rs 90,000 per sq. m. was the sector rate. Inthe present case, we are concerned with a larger plot of54,320.18 sq. m. with different variables of 30% groundGcover and 150 FAR. Keeping in mind all these factors,the Authority has fixed the reserve price. In the presentcase, undue importance has been given to the fixationof the reserve price. As stated above, notwithstandingthe reserve price, the petitioner could have broughtHbefore the Court material, if any, to show undervaluation. In the present case, the tender price isRs 31,850 per sq. m. It is higher than the reserve price.There is no material to show whether the tender price isunderstated. In the circumstances, there is no merit inthe contention of the petitioner that the land is sold atan abysmally low price.”

24. From reading of the aforesaid judgment, it is clear that in thePIL, petitioner had only challenged the reserve rate as being abysmallylow and did not challenge the tender price of Rs. 31,850 per sq. mtrs.Further, the PIL petitioner inter-alia had not led any evidence to showexemplar deeds as to the actual market value of the plot or the circlerate determined under the Stamp Act. On the pleadings and evidence asexisted before it, this Court concluded that the reserve price of land wasreasonable and accordingly dismissed the PIL. It was fairly admitted bythe learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for NOIDA that, atthe time of arguments before this Court, NOIDA had not revealed thisfact that they were intending to auction third party lands without therebeing formal acquisition as such. It is not out of place to mention that,emphasis in the PIL was on the act of handing over of the land byNOIDA to respondent no. 7 being arbitrary. While in the present case,the emphasis is on grant of compensation for the land of third party,whose land has been malafidely and forcefully handed over to respondentno. 7 in contravention of the decree of permanent injunction, withoutany formal acquisition, though made subsequently. In the said PIL, whatmay be the just and reasonable amount of compensation was not thequestion for determination. Therefore, the emphasis made by learnedAdditional Solicitor General relying on the judgment of Anil KumarSrivastava (supra) in this regard is bereft of any merit.

25. As discussed above, with regard to determination of thecompensation in the present case, the judgment of Bhopendra Singh(supra), wherein the circle rate showing market value assessed by theCollector for the purpose of registration of instrument of sale was madevalid. The said judgment was not interfered with by this Court thereafter.In the case of the land owner itself, the High Court by order dated10.12.2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 75152 of 2005, directed the SpecialLand Acquisition Officer to determine the compensation according tothe law as laid down in judgment rendered in Bhopendra Singh (supra), AB

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Awhich is sustained by this Court. Therefore, the issue of basis ofdetermination of compensation has been settled inter-party and also un-interfered by this Court. Now, on the said issue, relying upon the judgmentof Anil Kumar Srivastava (supra) cannot be interfered with in thiscase. In no event, the compensation can be paid at a rate lesser thanthat of market value as determined for the purpose of payment of stampBduty under Stamp Act.

26. As previously stated, the land in dispute was not only designatedfor commercial use, rather it was also declared to be part of industrialdevelopment plan area. After development, even a mall has beenconstructed on it. In our view, the High Court in the impugned order hasCrightly determined payment of compensation at the rate ofRs. 1,10,000/- per square meter as per circle rate. We, therefore, confirmthe findings of High Court for grant of compensation with rateRs. 1,10,000/- per sq. mt.

27. In the light of the preceding discussion, the only question thatDremains now for our consideration is with regard to deduction ofdevelopment charges to the extent of 50% made by High Court inimpugned order. On the said issue, there is no straight jacket formula toarrive at the quantum of deduction of development charge and samemust be assessed based on the facts of the individual case after dueEconsideration of all the factors which might affect such quantum. Asevident, the High Court did not take into consideration all the factorsencircling the issue and routinely proceeded with the maximum deductionof 50% development charge. We say so because, on perusal of theimpugned judgment, it is clear that the High Court has inter-alia highlightedthe glaring mischiefs played by NOIDA in the whole acquisitionFproceedings but at the same time, it has failed to accord a substantialreason for maximum deduction of development charges. It is furtherobserved that, it is not for the first time that NOIDA is in cross-roadsbefore this Court for playing hand-in-glove with large developers.

28. Be as it may, it is uncontroverted from the material availableGon record that, the scheduled piece of land was allotted by NOIDA torespondent no. 7 in absence of formal acquisition, whereafter, the saidscheduled land was developed in the line of commercial hub and even amall was constructed on it. Hence, in our considered opinion, the quantumof deduction of development charges should have been evaluated byHHigh Court from the contextual perspective of all the relevant factors, which clearly has not been done in the instant case. Nevertheless, tocure the anomaly, it is trite at this juncture to refer to the doctrineenunciated by this Court in case of ‘Bhagwathula Samanna Vs. SpecialTahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, (1991) 4 SCC 506’, whereinwhile dealing with the question of principle of deduction in the land value,this Court held as follows –

“11. The principle of deduction in the land value covered bythe comparable sale is thus adopted in order to arriveat the market value of the acquired land. In applyingthe principle, it is necessary to consider all relevant facts.It is not the extent of the area covered under theacquisition which is the only relevant factor. Even inthe vast area there may be land which is fully developedhaving all amenities and situated in an advantageousposition. If smaller area within the large tract is alreadydeveloped and suitable for building purposes and havein its vicinity roads, drainage, electricity,communications etc. then the principle of deductionsimply for the reason that it is part of the large tractacquired, may not be justified.

12. ….. The land involved in these cases is of even leveland fit for construction without the necessity of levellingor reclamation. The High Court has itself concluded onthe evidence that the lands covered by the acquisitionare located by the side of the National Highway and theSouthern Railway Staff Quarters with the town planningtrust road on the north. The neighbouring areas arealready developed ones and houses have beenconstructed, and the land has potential value for beingused as building sites. Having found that the land is tobe valued only as building sites and having stated theadvantageous position in which the land in question liesthough forming part of the larger area, the High Courtshould not have applied the principles of deduction. Itis not in every case that such deduction is to be allowed.Where the acquired land is in the midst of alreadydeveloped land with amenities of roads, electricity etc.,the deduction in the value of the comparable land is notwarranted.

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A13.The proposition that large area of land cannot possiblyfetch a price at the same rate at which small plots aresold is not absolute proposition and in givencircumstances it would be permissible to take intoaccount the price fetched by the small plots of land. Ifthe larger tract of land because of advantageousBposition is capable of being used for the purpose forwhich the smaller plots are used and is also situated ina developed area with little or no requirement of furtherdevelopment, the principle of deduction of the valuefor purpose of comparison is not warranted. With regardCto the nature of the plots involved in these two cases, ithas been satisfactorily shown on the evidence on recordthat the land has facilities of road and other amenitiesand is adjacent to a developed colony and in suchcircumstances, it is possible to utilize the entire area inquestion as house sites. In respect of the land acquiredDfor the road, the same advantages are available, and itdid not require any further development. We, are,therefore, of the view that the High Court has erred inapplying the principle of deduction and reducing thefair market value of land from Rs 10 per sq. yard to RsE6.50 per sq. yard. In our opinion, no such deduction isjustified in the facts and circumstances of these cases.”The appellants, therefore, succeed.

29. Further, this Court in ‘Trishala Jain Vs. State of Uttaranchal,(2011) 6 SCC 47’, while dealing with determination of compensationFand deduction of development charges held as under –

“44.It is thus evident from the above enunciated principlethat the acquired land has to be more or less developedland as its developed surrounding areas, with allamenities and facilities and is fit to be used for thepurpose for which it is acquired without any furtherexpenditure, before such land could be considered forno deduction. Similarly, the sale instances even ofsmaller plots could be considered for determining themarket value of a larger chunk of land with somededuction unless, there was comparability in potential, G

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utilization, amenities and infrastructure with hardly anydistinction. On such principles each case would haveto be considered on its own merits.

Further, this Court in ‘Kasturi and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana,(2003) 1 SCC 354’, while dealing with various factual factors to betaken into consideration while applying the cut in payment of compensationtowards developmental charges held as under –

“7.........However, in cases of some land where there arecertain advantages by virtue of the developed areaaround, it may help in reducing the percentage of cut tobe applied, as the developmental charges required maybe less on that account. There may be various factualfactors which may have to be taken into consideration

while applying the cut in payment of compensationtowards developmental charges, maybe in some casesit is more than 1/3rdand in some cases less than 1/3rd. Itmust be remembered that there is difference between adeveloped area and an area having potential value,which is yet to be developed. The fact that an area isdeveloped or adjacent to a developed area will not ipsofacto make every land situated in the area alsodeveloped to be valued as a building site or plot,particularly when vast tracts are acquired, as in this case, for development purpose.”

The aforesaid judgments postulate general factors that are to betaken into consideration for deciding the quantum of deduction ofdevelopment charges. As iterated above, such factors majorly includethe nature of land to be acquired, the extent of area to be acquired, theextent of development in the adjoining land as well as land proposed tobe acquired, the commercial potentiality and so on. Therefore, deductionof development charge in the instant case should have been made whileconsidering the said factors. However, it is made clear that this observationis being made in peculiar facts of the present case and not in general.

30. Applying the ratio of said judgments in the facts of the case athand, as per the stand taken by NOIDA, the scheduled piece of land isa costly land, being situated at the centre of development of authorityand has commercial use. On spot, the demarcation was not possible AB

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Abecause the land was fully developed. In the backdrop, withoutacquisition, the piece of land belonging to appellant was transferred torespondent no. 7. The acquisition was made subsequently in view of theobservations made by the District Court confirming the decree ofpermanent injunction for the said piece of land. At the time of takingover of possession, the amount of compensation was not made and now,Bthe appellant is running from pillar to post to receive the adequatecompensation. Even after settling the dispute for payment of compensationat the circle rate of Rs. 1,10,000/- inter-party in the previous round oflitigation, the NOIDA in its own volition neither determined thecompensation nor paid to the appellant. The possession of scheduledCpiece of land, though taken long back in year 2004-2005, but till date, theappellant has not been able to reap the fruits of compensation and keptlitigating before courts even up to subsequent rounds. Considering allthis aspect, deduction made to extent of 50% in by High Court in thesaid cannot be sustained and is set aside without touching the findings onthe point of payment of solatium.D

31. As determined hereinabove, the compensation at the circlerate of Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. meter be payable to the appellant – ReddyVeerana. Now, the issue of interest is required to be looked into in thecontext of provisions of Section 34 of 1894 Act, which reads as thus:

E“34. Payment of interest - When the amount of suchcompensation is not paid or deposited on or before takingpossession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awardedwith interest thereon at the rate of [nine per centum] per annumfrom the time of so taking possession until it shall have been sopaid or deposited:F[Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is notpaid or deposited within a period of one year from the date onwhich possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centumper annum shall be payable from the date or expiry of the saidperiod of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereofGwhich has not been paid or deposited before the date of suchexpiry.]”

On perusal, it is clear that if amount of compensation is not paidor deposited on or before taking possession of the land, interest @ 9%p.a. leviable from the time of taking of possession until it shall have beenH

so paid or deposited. It further provides that if the amount of compensationhas not been paid or deposited within one year, the interest would bepayable @ 15% p.a. on expiry of the period of one year. On perusal ofthe aforesaid, it is clear that if the amount of compensation is not paid ordeposited, 9% interest would be leviable and payable. In case the saidamount is not deposited or paid within one year, then interest would bepayable @ 15% p.a. In the case at hand, as discussed above, the landwas given initially in the year 2003 to respondent No. 7 and the acquisitionwas made subsequently. The additional award was passed on 31.1.2011after a delay of five years from the date of taking over of possession.The amount was deposited in the year 2017 by a delay of approximately14 years. In the peculiar facts of this case, in our view, the civil right ofappellant Reddy Veerana is violated in breach of Article 300-A of theConstitution of India. Such action of the NOIDA clearly amounts toconstitutional tort. In the context of acquisition as made in this case inviolation of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, judgment of thisCourt in the case of ‘Kalyani (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. Vs. SulthanBathery Municipality & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3189 of 2022’ isrelevant, wherein it was observed as under –

“20. Article 300A clearly mandates that no person shall bedeprived of his property save by authority of law. Inthe present case, we do not find, under which authorityof law, the land of the appellants was taken and theywere deprived of the same. If the Panchayat and thePWD failed to produce any evidence that appellantshave surrendered their lands voluntarily, depriving theappellants of the property would be in violation ofArticle 300-A of the Constitution.

21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in this case of ‘K.T.Plantation Private Limited Vs. State of Karnataka, 2011(9) SCC 63’, apart from others, dealt with an issuerelating to payment of compensation where a person isdeprived of his property after deletion of Article 31(2).It laid down that there are two requirements to befulfilled while depriving a person of his property.Requirement of public purpose is a pre-condition andright to claim compensation is also inbuilt in Article 300-A. While answering the reference in paragraph 221 (e),it provided as follows –

AB

C

D

E

FG

H

A“221. We, therefore, answer the reference as follows:xxxxxx (e)Public purpose is a precondition for deprivationof a person from his property under Article 300-Aand the right to claim compensation is also inbuiltBin that Article and when a person is deprived of hisproperty, the State has to justify both the groundswhich may depend on scheme of the statute,legislative policy, object and purpose of thelegislature and other related factors.”

C32. Taking note of the aforesaid and in the peculiar facts of thiscase, we are of the view that in addition to the statutorily paid interest,the additional amount of penal interest must be paid in place of shiftingthe date for determination of the amount of compensation or to determinethe compensation as per 2013 Act, as demanded by the appellant ReddyDVeerana. It is not out of place to mention here that the nature of interestis essentially a consideration paid either for the use of money orforbearance from demanding it after it has fallen due. Interest, whetherit is statutory or otherwise, represents the profit, the creditor may havemade if he had used the money or from the loss, he may have sufferedbecause he could not use the amount. Therefore, in the present case, onEthe amount of compensation, in our view, the amount of compensationbe payable along with statutory interest, as directed by the High Courtand 3% penal interest, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of thecase, is directed.

33. In view of the foregoing, Civil Appeal No. 3637 of 2022,Fpreferred by NOIDA is dismissed, whereas the Civil Appeal No. 3636of 2022 filed by appellant Reddy Veerana is hereby allowed in part withthe following directions:

1. Respondents are directed to compute the amount ofcompensation by taking the circle rate of Sector-18, i.e.,GRs. 1,10,000/- per square meter;

2. The judgment of the High Court directing 50% deductiontowards development charge stands set-aside. In thepeculiar facts of the present case, the respondents aredirected not to make any deduction towards the development H

REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH ANDOTHERS

charge while computing/calculating the amount ofcompensation as per circle rate, specified in para 1 above; A

3. As directed by the High Court, the amount of solatium of30% in terms of Section 23(2) of 1894 Act is also payable;

4. The statutory interest on the amount of compensation shallbe payable @ 9% from the date of taking over ofpossession, i.e., February, 2005 for a period of one year.Thereafter, @ 15% p.a. be paid as per the proviso of Section34 of 1894 Act. In addition to the said statutory interest,3% penal interest is further directed to be paid in the peculiarfacts of this case.

B

C

5. It is made clear here that the amount so deposited in theyear 2017 would also earn the interest at the same rate, asdirected in para 4 above till the date of realization.

6. Since, the acquisition of the land in question was made byNOIDA which was purchased by respondent No. 7 in publicDauction, therefore, the liability to pay the amount ofcompensation would be of NOIDA. The entire amount shallbe paid within a period of six weeks from the date of thisjudgment.

E

Nidhi Jain(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

Appeals disposed of.

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G

H