KEISHAM MEGHACHANDRA SINGH versus THE HON’BLE SPEAKER MANIPUR LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY & ORS. on 21 January 2020

[2020] 2 S.C.R.

A

KEISHAM MEGHACHANDRA SINGH

v.

THE HON’BLE SPEAKER MANIPUR LEGISLATIVEASSEMBLY & ORS.

B

(Civil Appeal No. 547 of 2020)

JANUARY 21, 2020

[R. F. NARIMAN, ANIRUDDHA BOSE AND

V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]

C

Constitution of India – Tenth Schedule – Disqualification ofa candidate nominated in Legislative Assembly elections on groundof defection – The election for the 11th Manipur Legislative Assemblywas conducted in March, 2017 – None of the political parties wereDable to secure a majority i.e. 31 seats in a Legislative Assembly of60 seats in order to form the Government – The Congress Partyemerged as the single largest party with 28 seats and BJP with 21seats – The respondent no. 3 contested as a candidate nominatedand set up by the Congress party and was duly elected – OnE12.03.2017, respondent no. 3 along with various BJP members metthe Governor of the State and staked a claim for forming a BJP-ledGovernment – Thereafter, the respondent no. 3 was sworn in as aMinister in BJP-led government – Applications were filed beforethe Speaker of the legislative Assembly between April and July, 2017Fseeking disqualification of the respondent no. 3 under paragraph2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule – No action was taken by the Speaker– Held: It is clear from a reading of the judgment in Rajendra SinghRana and S.A. Sampath Kumar that a failure to exercise jurisdictionvested in a Speaker cannot be covered by the shield contained inGparagraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule, and that when a Speaker refrainsfrom deciding a petition within a reasonable time, there was clearlyan error which attracted jurisdiction of the High court in exerciseof the power of judicial review – Further, Kihoto Hollohan do notin any manner, interdict judicial review in aid of the Speaker arrivingH

at a prompt decision as to disqualification under the provisions ofthe Tenth Schedule – The Speaker, in acting as a Tribunal underthe Tenth Schedule is bound to decide disqualification petitionswithin a reasonable period – What is reasonable will depend on thefacts of each case, but absent exceptional circumstances for whichthere is good reason, a period of three months from the date onwhich the petition is filed is the outer limit within which thedisqualification petition filed before the Speaker must be decided ifthe Constitutional objective of disqualifying persons who haveinfracted the Tenth Schedule is to be adhered to – The only reliefthat can be given in these instant appeals is that the Speaker of theLegislative Assembly be directed to decide the disqualificationpetitions pending before him within a period of four weeks from thedate on which this judgment is intimated to him.

Words and Phrases – "Quia timet" – Discussed.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

Held: 1. It is clear from a reading of the judgment inRajendra Singh Rana and, in particular, the underlined portionsof paragraphs 40 and 41 that the very question referred by theTwo Judge Bench in S.A. Sampath Kumar has clearly beenanswered stating that a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested ina Speaker cannot be covered by the shield contained in paragraph6 of the Tenth Schedule, and that when a Speaker refrains fromdeciding a petition within a reasonable time, there was clearly anerror which attracted jurisdiction of the High Court in exerciseof the power of judicial review. [Para 22][154E-F]

Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya (2007)4 SCC 270 : 2007 (2) SCR 591; S.A. Sampath Kumar

v. Kale Yadaiah and Ors. SLP(C) No. 33677/2015 –

relied on

2. Indeed, the same result would ensue on a proper readingof Kihoto Hollohan. Paragraphs 110 and 111 of the said judgment A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Awhen read together would make it clear that what the finalityclause in paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule protects is theexclusive jurisdiction that vests in the Speaker to decidedisqualification petitions so that nothing should come in the wayof deciding such petitions. The exception that is made is also ofBimportance in that interlocutory interference with decisions ofthe Speaker can only be qua interlocutory disqualifications orsuspensions, which may have grave, immediate, and irreversiblerepercussions. Indeed, the Court made it clear that judicialreview is not available at a stage prior to the making of a decisionCby the Speaker either by a way of quia timet action or by otherinterlocutory orders. [Para 23][154G-H, 155A-B]

Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors. (1992) Supp. (2)SCC 651; [1992] 1 SCR 686 – relied on DFletcher v. Bealey (1884) 28 Ch. D. 688; LondonBorough of Islington v. Margaret Elliott [2012] EWCACiv. 56 (See paragraph 30) and Vastint Leeds BV v.Persons Unknown [2018] EWHC 2456 (Ch.) –referred to.E3. On perusal of the various decisions, it shows that whatwas meant to be outside the pale of judicial review in paragraph110 of Kihoto Hollohan are quia timet actions in the sense ofinjunctions to prevent the Speaker from making a decision onFthe ground of imminent apprehended danger which will beirreparable in the sense that if the Speaker proceeds to decidethat the person be disqualified, he would incur the penalty offorfeiting his membership of the House for a long period.Paragraphs 110 and 111 of Kihoto Hollohan do not, therefore, inGany manner, interdict judicial review in aid ofthe Speaker arrivingat a prompt decision as to disqualification under the provisionsof the Tenth Schedule. Indeed, the Speaker, in acting as a Tribunalunder the Tenth Schedule is bound to decide disqualificationpetitions within a reasonable period. What is reasonable willH

depend on the facts of each case, but absent exceptionalcircumstances for which there is good reason, a period of threemonths from the date on which the petition is filed is the outerlimit within which disqualification petitions filed before theSpeaker must be decided if the constitutional objective ofdisqualifying persons who have infracted the Tenth Schedule isto be adhered to. This period has been fixed keeping in mind thefact that ordinarily the life of the Lok Sabha and the LegislativeAssembly of the States is 5 years and the fact that persons whohave incurred such disqualification do not deserve to be MPs/MLAs even for a single day, as found in Rajendra Singh Rana, ifthey have infracted the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. [Para28][157A-F]

4. It is time that Parliament have a rethink on whetherdisqualification petitions ought to be entrusted to a Speaker as aquasi-judicial authority when such Speaker continues to belongto a particular political party either de jure or de facto. Parliamentmay seriously consider amending the Constitution to substitutethe Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies asarbiter of disputes concerning disqualification which arise underthe Tenth Schedule with a permanent Tribunal headed by a retiredSupreme Court Judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court,or some other outside independent mechanism to ensure thatsuch disputes are decided both swiftly and impartially, thus givingreal teeth to the provisions contained in the Tenth Schedule, whichare so vital in the proper functioning of our democracy. [Para30][159A-C]

5. It is not possible to accede to appellant’s submissionthat this Court issue a writ of quo warranto quashing theappointment of the Respondent No.3 as a minister of a cabinetled by a BJP government. The respondent is right in stating thata disqualification under the Tenth Schedule from being an MLAand consequently minister must first be decided by the exclusiveauthority in this behalf, namely, the Speaker of the Manipur AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

ALegislative Assembly. It is also not possible to accede to theargument of the appellant that the disqualification petition bedecided by this Court in these appeals given the inaction of theSpeaker. It cannot be said that the facts in the present case aresimilar to the facts in Rajinder Singh Rana. In the present case,Bthe life of the legislative assembly comes to an end only in March,2022 unlike in Rajinder Singh Rana where, but for this Courtdeciding the disqualification petition in effect, no relief could havebeen given to the petitioner in that case as the life of the legislativeassembly was about to come to an end. The only relief that canCbe given in these appeals is that the Speaker of the ManipurLegislative Assembly be directed to decide the disqualificationpetitions pending before him within a period of four weeks fromthe date on which this judgment is intimated to him. In case nodecision is forthcoming even after a period of four weeks, it willDbe open to any party to the proceedings to apply to this Court forfurther directions/reliefs in the matter. [Para 31][159C-H]

Case Law Reference

[2007] 2 SCR 591relied onPara 22E[1992] 1 SCR 686relied onPara 23

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 547 of2020.FFrom the Judgment and Order dated 23.07.2019 of the High Courtof Manipur at Imphal in W.P. (C) No. 70 of 2018.

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 548, 549, 550 of 2020.

G

Ms. Madhavi Divan, ASG, Kapil Sibal, S. G. Hasnain, H. S.Paonam, Sr. Advs., Yasir Rauf, Syed Mohd. Fazal, Vijay Kumar, SyedJaved Hashmi, Ms. Vithika Garg, Ms. Vidushi Garg, M Z. Chaudhry,Syed Imtiyaz Ali, Ali Safeer Farooqi, Arvind Kumar Kanva, Aftab Ali H

Khan, David A., Ms. Vaishali Verma, Ms. Rajkumari Banju, L. K.Paonam, S. Gunabanta Meitei, Niraj Bobby Paonam, Ms. TomthinnganbiKoijam, S. K. Bhattacharya, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R. F. NARIMAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The Appeals in the present case raise important questionsrelating to the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India (hereinafterreferred to as “Tenth Schedule”). The election for the 11[th] ManipurLegislative Assembly was conducted in March, 2017. The said Assemblyelection produced an inconclusive result as none of the political partieswere able to secure a majority i.e. 31 seats in a Legislative Assembly of60 seats in order to form the Government. The Indian National Congress(hereinafter referred to as “Congress Party”) emerged as the singlelargest party with 28 seats, the Bharatiya Janata Party (hereinafterreferred to as “BJP”) coming second with 21 seats. The RespondentNo.3, in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 18659 of 2019,contested as a candidate nominated and set up by the Congress Partyand was duly elected as such. On 12.03.2017, immediately after thedeclaration of the results, Respondent No.3 along with various BJPmembers met the Governor of the State of Manipur in order to stake aclaim for forming a BJP-led Government. On 15.03.2017, the Governorinvited the group lead by the BJP to form the Government in the State.On the same day, the Chief Minister-Designate sent a letter to theGovernor for administering oath as Ministers to eight elected MLAsincluding Respondent No.3. On the same day, Respondent No.3 wassworn in as a Minister in the BJP-led government and continues as suchtill date.

3. As many as thirteen applications for the disqualification ofRespondent No.3 were filed before the Speaker of the ManipurLegislative Assembly between April and July, 2017 stating thatRespondent No.3 was disqualified under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth A

B

C

DE

F

G

H

ASchedule. The present petition that was filed by the Appellant, in theCivil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 18659 of 2019, was dated31.07.2017.

4. Since no action was taken on any of these petitions by theBSpeaker, one T.N. Haokip filed a writ petition being Writ Petition (C)No.353 of 2017 before the High Court of Manipur at Imphal, in whichthe Petitioner prayed that the High Court direct the Speaker to decidehis disqualification petition within a reasonable time. On 08.09.2017, theHigh Court stated that as the issue of whether a High Court can direct aCSpeaker to decide a disqualification petition within a certain timeframeis pending before a Bench of 5 Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Courtthe High Court cannot pass any order in the matter, and the matter wasordered to be listed so as to await the outcome of the cases pendingbefore the Supreme Court.D5. After waiting till January, 2018, on 29.01.2018, the Appellant, inthe Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 18659 of 2019, filed WritPetition (C) No.17 of 2018 before the same High Court asking for thefollowing reliefs:E“i. Issue Rule Nisi;

ii. To issue an appropriate Writ, Order or Direction as to thisHon’ble Court may deem fit and proper;

iii. To declare that Respondent No. 3 has incurred disqualificationFfor being a member of the Manipur Legislative Assembly under para2(1) (a) of the Xth Schedule to the Constitution of India in terms of lawlaid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court inRajendra Singh Rana and Ors. -Vrs- Swami Prasad Maurya and Ors.reported in (2007) 4 SCC 270.G

iv. If the Hon’ble High Court is pleased to consider that the prayermade in para no. (ii) and (iii) above deserve merit for a favourable order,a writ in the nature of Quo Warranto be issued ousting Respondent No.3 from the post/office of Minister.”

H

6. The writ petition was taken up and heard by the High Courtand disposed of by the impugned judgment dated 23.07.2019. Thequestions that the High Court posed before itself, which requiredconsideration at its hands, were stated as follows:

“(a) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case,the respondent No. 1 can be said to have failed to discharge itsduties as enjoined in the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution ofIndia to decide the petitions?

(b) If the above issue (a) is answered in the affirmative, whetherthe respondent No. 3 has prima facie incurred disqualification?

(c) If the respondent No. 3 is found to have incurred a primafacie disqualification, whether this Court can issue an orderdisqualifying the respondent No. 3 from being a member of theManipur Legislative Assembly or alternatively, whether this Courthas the power and jurisdiction to issue a writ of quo warrantodeclaring the holding of the post of a Minister by the respondentNo. 3 as illegal, as it being without any authority of law?”

7. In answer to a preliminary objection taken by the Speaker thatjudicial review is shut out in cases like the present, the High Court heldthat the Speaker is a quasi-judicial authority who is required to take adecision within a reasonable time, such reasonable time obviously beinga time which is much less than five years since the life of the House wasfive years. The High Court held that the remedy provided in the TenthSchedule is in essence an alternative remedy to be exhausted beforeapproaching the High Court, and this being the case, if such alternativeremedy is found to be ineffective due to deliberate inaction or indecisionon the part of the Speaker, the Court cannot be denied jurisdiction toissue an appropriate writ to the Speaker. Consequently, the preliminaryobjection was dismissed and the Court went on to hear the writ petitionon merits. On the facts as stated above, following Ravi S. Naik v.State of Maharashtra 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 641, the Court found thatthe voluntary giving up of the membership of a political party may be A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Aexpress or implied by conduct, and that the unequivocal conduct of theRespondent No.3 becoming a Minister in a BJP-led Government afterfighting the election by being a member of the Congress Party wouldmake it clear that the disqualification contained in paragraph 2(1)(a) ofthe Tenth Schedule is clearly attracted. The High Court then cited severalBjudgments on the writ of quo warranto but ultimately came to a findingthat since the very same issue was pending before a Constitution Benchof the Supreme Court, it would not be appropriate for the High Court topass any order for the time being, which would include orders relating tothe inaction or indecision on the part of the Speaker, as well as theCissuing of a writ of quo warranto. The High Court thus ultimatelydeclined to grant any relief in the writ petition, as a result of which theAppellant is before us.

8. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalfDof the Appellant, in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 18659 of2017, has argued that the Speaker in the present case has deliberatelyrefused to decide the disqualification petitions before him. This is evidentfrom the fact that no decision is forthcoming till date on petitions thatwere filed way back in April, 2017. Further, it is clear that notice in theEpresent disqualification petition was issued by the Speaker only on12.09.2018, long after the petition had been filed, and as correctly statedby the High Court, it cannot be expected that the Speaker will decidethese petitions at all till the life of the Assembly of 5 years expires. Inthese circumstances, he has exhorted us to issue a writ of quo warrantoFagainst Respondent No.3 stating that he has usurped a constitutionaloffice, and to declare that he cannot do so. For this purpose, he has citedseveral judgments of this Court. He has also argued that though it iscorrect to state that whether a writ petition can at all be filed againstinaction by a Speaker is pending before a Bench of 5 Judges of thisGCourt, yet, it is clear from a reading of paragraph 110 of Kihoto Hollohanv. Zachillhu & Ors. (1992) Supp. (2) SCC 651, that all that wasinterdicted by that judgment was the grant of interlocutory stays whichwould prevent a Speaker from making a decision and not the other way H

H

around. For this purpose, he read to us Black’s Law Dictionary on themeaning of a quia timet action, and argued that the judgment read as awhole would make it clear that if the constitutional objective of checkingdefections is to be achieved, judicial review in aid of such goal canobviously not be said to be interdicted. He also strongly relied upon theobservations of this Court in Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami PrasadMaurya (2007) 4 SCC 270 and exhorted us to uphold the reasoningcontained in the impugned judgment and then issue a writ of quo warrantoagainst Respondent No.3.

9. Mrs. Madhavi Divan, learned Addl. Solicitor General appearingfor the Hon’ble Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly, has arguedthat the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition filed by the Appellant, in theCivil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 18659 of 2017, are diametricallyopposed to the relief asked for in Writ Petition (C) No.353 of 2017, as aresult of which, there being mutually destructive pleas and prayers madein the two writ petitions, no relief ought to be granted in the presentcase. In any case, the prayers asked for in the present case are directlyinterdicted by the judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court inKihoto Hollohan (supra) inasmuch as a writ of quo warranto cannotpossibly be granted without first deciding whether Respondent No.3stands disqualified, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of theSpeaker. She argued that the High Court was wholly incorrect in holdingthat the Speaker’s decision under the Tenth Schedule would be in thenature of an alternative remedy and held that this would be directlycontrary to several judgments of this Court, in particular, Nabam Rebiaand Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal PradeshLegislative Assembly (2016) 8 SCC 1, which states that the Speakerhas exclusive jurisdiction to decide disqualification questions that arereferred to him. In any case, she argued that a Three Judge Benchcannot decide the present case and has to await the judgment of a FiveJudge Bench which has been made on a specific reference made by aTwo Judge Bench of this Court. She also distinguished the sheet anchorof Shri Sibal’s case i.e. the judgment in Rajendra Singh Rana (supra)

AB

CD

E

F

G

H

142SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aby stating that the facts there were completely different and thatultimately judicial review took place only because there was a finaldecision of the Speaker in that case. Further, because of the fact thatthe life of the Assembly was about to end, this Court using its powersunder Article 142 of the Constitution of India in an extra-ordinary situationBdecided the petition for disqualification itself. Both these features areabsent in the present case. Thus, according to her, while the ultimateconclusion in the High Court judgment is correct, all the findings in favorof the Appellant fly in the face of judgments of this Court.

C10. Having heard learned counsel for both the parties, it is importantto first set out the reference order of this Court dated 08.11.2016 in S.A.Sampath Kumar v. Kale Yadaiah and Ors. SLP(C) No. 33677/2015.A Division Bench of this Court after referring to Speaker, HaryanaVidhan Sabha v. Kuldeep Bishnoi & Ors. (2015) 12 SCC 381, andDSpeaker, Orissa Legislative Assembly v. Utkal Keshari Parida(2013) 11 SCC 794, then held:

“We have considered the aforesaid submissions of both the learnedAttorney General and the learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe petitioner. We feel that a substantial question as to theEinterpretation of the Constitution arises on the facts of the presentcase. It is true that this Court in Kihoto Hollohan’s case laid downthat a quiatimet action would not be permissible and Shri JayantBhushan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of some ofFthe respondents has pointed out to us that in P. Ramanatha Aiyar’sAdvanced Law Lexicon a quiatimet action is the right to beprotected against anticipated future injury that cannot be preventedby the present action. Nevertheless, we are of the view that itneeds to be authoritatively decided by a Bench of five learnedGJudges of this Court, as to whether the High Court, exercisingpower under Article 226 of the Constitution, can direct a Speakerof a legislative assembly (acting in quasi judicial capacity underthe Tenth Schedule) to decide a disqualification petition within acertain time, and whether such a direction would not fall foul of H

the quiatimet action doctrine mentioned in paragraph 110 of KihotoHollohan’s case. We cannot be mindful of the fact that just as adecision of a Speaker can be corrected by judicial review by theHigh Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, so prima facieshould indecision by a Speaker be correctable by judicial reviewso as not to frustrate the laudable object and purpose of the TenthSchedule, which has been referred to in both the majority andminority judgments in Kihoto Hollohan’s case. The facts of thepresent case demonstrate that disqualification petitions had beenreferred to the Hon’ble Speaker of the Telangana State LegislativeAssembly on 23rd August, 2014, and despite the hopes andaspirations expressed by the impugned judgment, the Speaker haschosen not to render any decision on the said petitions till date.We, therefore, place the papers before the Hon’ble Chief Justiceof India to constitute an appropriate Bench to decide this questionas early as possible.”

11. We would have acceded to Mrs. Madhavi Divan’s plea that inview of this order of a Division Bench of this Court, the hearing of thiscase ought to be deferred until the pronouncement by a Five Judge Benchof this Court on the issues raised in the present petition. However, wefind that this very issue was addressed by a Five Judge Bench judgmentin Rajendra Singh Rana (supra) and has already been answered.Unfortunately, the decision contained in the aforesaid judgment was notbrought to the notice of the Division Bench which referred the matter toFive Hon’ble Judges of this Court, though Rajendra Singh Rana (supra)was sought to be distinguished in Kuldeep Bishnoi (supra), which wasbrought to the notice of the Division Bench of this Court.

12. Backtracking a little, it is important to first set out what wasdecided in the majority decision in Kihoto Hollohan(supra). A Benchof 3 learned Judges of this Court set out, in paragraph 24 of the judgment,several questions that required decision in that case. We are directlyconcerned with questions (E) and (F), which are so set out and whichread as follows:

ABC

D

E

F

G

H

A“24. On the contentions raised and urged at the hearing thequestions that fall for consideration are the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(E) That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2) of the TenthSchedule attracts the immunity under Articles 122 and 212. TheBSpeaker and the Chairman in relation to the exercise of the powersunder the Tenth Schedule shall not be subjected to the jurisdictionof any Court.

The Tenth Schedule seeks to and does create a new and non-justiciable area of rights, obligations and remedies to be resolvedCin the exclusive manner envisaged by the Constitution and is notamenable to, but constitutionally immune from, curial adjudicativeprocesses.

(F) That even if Paragraph 7 erecting a bar on the jurisdiction ofCourts is held inoperative, the Courts’ jurisdiction is, in any event,Dbarred as Paragraph 6(1) which imparts a constitutional ‘finality’to the decision of the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case maybe, and that such concept of ‘finality’ bars examination of thematter by the Courts.”

13. The majority judgment noticed that before the ConstitutionE(Fifty Second Amendment) Act, 1985 inserting the Tenth Schedule intothe Constitution of India, two abortive attempts were made in view ofthe recommendations of the Committee on Defections to enact an anti-defection law. The first was the Constitution (Thirty Second Amendment)Bill, 1973, which lapsed on account of dissolution of the House; and theFsecond was the Constitution (Forty Eighth Amendment) Bill, 1979 whichalso so lapsed. The Court in paragraphs 9 and 13 referred to the objectof the Constitution (Fifty Second Amendment) Act, 1985 as follows:

“9. This brings to the fore the object underlying the provisions inGthe Tenth Schedule. The object is to curb the evil of politicaldefections motivated by lure of office or other similar considerationswhich endanger the foundations of our democracy. The remedyproposed is to disqualify the Member of either House of Parliamentor of the State Legislature who is found to have defected from H

continuing as a Member of the House. The grounds ofdisqualification are specified in Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule.

xxx xxx xxx

13. These provisions in the Tenth Schedule give recognition tothe role of political parties in the political process. A political partygoes before the electorate with a particular programme and itsets up candidates at the election on the basis of such programme.A person who gets elected as a candidate set up by a politicalparty is so elected on the basis of the programme of that politicalparty. The provisions of Paragraph 2(1)(a) proceed on the premisethat political propriety and morality demand that if such a person,after the election, changes his affiliation and leaves the politicalparty which had set him up as a candidate at the election, then heshould give up his membership of the legislature and go back beforethe electorate. The same yardstick is applied to a person who iselected as an Independent candidate and wishes to join a politicalparty after the election.”

14. The Court dealt with contentions (E) and (F) together asfollows:

“95. In the present case, the power to decide disputeddisqualification under Paragraph 6(1) is pre-eminently of a judicialcomplexion.

96. The fiction in Paragraph 6(2), indeed, places it in the firstclause of Article 122 or 212, as the case may be. The words“proceedings in Parliament” or “proceedings in the legislature ofa State” in Paragraph 6(2) have their corresponding expression inArticles 122(1) and 212(1) respectively. This attracts an immunityfrom mere irregularities of procedures.

97. That apart, even after 1986 when the Tenth Schedule wasintroduced, the Constitution did not evince any intention to invokeArticle 122 or 212 in the conduct of resolution of disputes as tothe disqualification of members under Articles 191(1) and 102(1).

ABC

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

The very deeming provision implies that the proceedings ofdisqualification are, in fact, not before the House; but only beforethe Speaker as a specially designated authority. The decision underParagraph 6(1) is not the decision of the House, nor is it subject tothe approval by the House. The decision operates independentlyof the House. A deeming provision cannot by its creation transcendits own power. There is, therefore, no immunity under Articles122 and 212 from judicial scrutiny of the decision of the Speakeror Chairman exercising power under Paragraph 6(1) of the TenthSchedule.

xxx xxx xxx

100. By these well known and accepted tests of what constitutea Tribunal, the Speaker or the Chairman, acting under Paragraph6(1) of the Tenth Schedule is a Tribunal.

xxx xxx xxx

109. In the light of the decisions referred to above and the natureof function that is exercised by the Speaker/Chairman underParagraph 6, the scope of judicial review under Articles 136, and226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed bythe Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6 would be confined tojurisdictional errors only viz., infirmities based on violation ofconstitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules ofnatural justice and perversity.

110. In view of the limited scope of judicial review that is availableon account of the finality clause in Paragraph 6 and also havingregard to the constitutional intendment and the status of therepository of the adjudicatory power i.e. Speaker/Chairman, judicialreview cannot be available at a stage prior to the making of adecision by the Speaker/Chairman and a quia timet action wouldnot be permissible. Nor would interference be permissible at aninterlocutory stage of the proceedings. Exception will, however,have to be made in respect of cases where disqualification or suspension is imposed during the pendency of the proceedingsand such disqualification or suspension is likely to have grave,immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequence.

111. In the result, we hold on contentions (E) and (F):

That the Tenth Schedule does not, in providing for an additionalgrant (sic ground) for disqualification and for adjudication ofdisputed disqualifications, seek to create a non-justiciableconstitutional area. The power to resolve such disputes vested inthe Speaker or Chairman is a judicial power.

That Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule, to the extent it seeksto impart finality to the decision of the speakers/Chairmen is valid.But the concept of statutory finality embodied in Paragraph 6(1)does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under Articles136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution insofar as infirmities basedon violations of constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-compliancewith Rules of Natural Justice and perversity, are concerned.

That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2) of the TenthSchedule attracts an immunity analogous to that in Articles 122(1)and 212(1) of the Constitution as understood and explained inKeshav Singh case [(1965) 1 SCR 413 : AIR 1965 SC 745] toprotect the validity of proceedings from mere irregularities ofprocedure. The deeming provision, having regard to the words‘be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament’ or ‘proceedings inthe legislature of a State’ confines the scope of the fictionaccordingly.

The Speakers/Chairmen while exercising powers and dischargingfunctions under the Tenth Schedule act as Tribunal adjudicatingrights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisionsin that capacity are amenable to judicial review.

However, having regard to the Constitutional Schedule in the TenthSchedule, judicial review should not cover any stage prior to themaking of a decision by the Speakers/Chairmen. Having regard A

B

C

DE

F

G

H

Ato the constitutional intendment and the status of the repository ofthe adjudicatory power, no quia timet actions are permissible, theonly exception for any interlocutory interference being cases ofinterlocutory disqualifications or suspensions which may havegrave, immediate and irreversible repercussions andBconsequence.”

15. In Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), this Court dealt with anorder made by the Speaker of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assemblydated 06.09.2003. On the facts in that case, the 14[th] Legislative AssemblyCElection for the State of U.P. was held in February, 2002 and since noneof the political parties secured the requisite majority, a coalitiongovernment was formed headed by Ms. Mayawati, leader of the BahujanSamaj Party (hereinafter referred to as “BSP”). On 25.08.2003, theCabinet took a unanimous decision for recommending dissolution of theDAssembly, after which, on 27.08.2003, 13 members of the LegislativeAssembly elected to the Assembly on tickets of the BSP met the Governorand requested him to invite the leader of the Samajwadi Party, namely,Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav, to form the Government. On 29.08.2003,the Governor invited the leader of the Samajwadi Party to form theEGovernment and gave him a time of two weeks to prove his majority inthe Assembly. On 04.09.2003, Mr. S.P. Maurya, leader of the BSP fileda petition before the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule praying that the13 BSP MLAs who had proclaimed support to Shri Mulayam SinghYadav before the Governor on 27.08.2003 had incurred the disqualificationFmentioned in paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule. Meanwhile, agroup of 37 MLAs, said to be on behalf of 40 MLAs elected on BSPtickets, requested the Speaker to recognize the split in the BSP on thebasis that one-third of the members of BSP consisting of 109 legislatorshad separated from the BSP. On 06.09.2003, therefore, the Speaker didGthree things – first, he accepted that 37 out of 109 comprises one-thirdof the members of the BSP, which amounted to a split, this group beingknown as the Loktantrik Bahujan Dal. This Dal had merged with theSamajwadi Party which merger was then accepted by the very sameHorder dated 06.09.2003. Third, the Speaker did not decide the application seeking disqualification of the 13 MLAs who were part of the 37 MLAswho appeared before the Speaker, and adjourned the disqualificationpetition. Meanwhile, since a writ petition was filed in the High Court ofJudicature at Allahabad before the Lucknow Bench against this order,the Speaker passed another order on 14.11.2003, stating that the orderadjourning the petition for disqualification would continue until after theHigh Court decided the writ petition. However, on 07.09.2005, evenbefore the writ petition was disposed of by a Full Bench of the HighCourt, the Speaker passed an order rejecting the petition filed fordisqualifying of 13 MLAs of the BSP.

16. On these facts, the Court noted in paragraph 17 of the judgmentthat the order dated 06.09.2003 is the subject matter of challenge in thewrit petition filed before the High Court. In paragraph 30 of the judgment,this Court made it clear that the order of the Speaker dated 07.09.2005would have no independent legs to stand on, stating as follows:

“30. ...This last order is clearly inconsistent with the Speaker’searlier order dated 14-11-2003 and still leaves open the questionwhether the petition seeking disqualification should not have beendecided first or at least simultaneously with the application claimingrecognition of a split. If the order recognising the split goes,obviously this last order also cannot survive. It has perforce togo.” [Emphasis Supplied]

17. After referring to this Court’s decision in Kihoto Hollohan(supra) and Ravi S. Naik (supra) in para 22 of the judgment, the Courtheld:

“22.…Suffice it to say that the decision of the Speaker renderedon 6-9-2003 was not immune from challenge before the HighCourt under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.”

18. The Court then went on to hold:

“25. …On the scheme of Articles 102 and 191 and the TenthSchedule, the determination of the question of split or mergercannot be divorced from the motion before the Speaker seeking a A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

disqualification of a member or members concerned. It is thereforenot possible to accede to the argument that under the TenthSchedule to the Constitution, the Speaker has an independent powerto decide that there has been a split or merger of a political partyas contemplated by paras 3 and 4 of the Tenth Schedule to theConstitution. The power to recognise a separate group inParliament or Assembly may rest with the Speaker on the basisof the Rules of Business of the House. But that is different fromsaying that the power is available to him under the Tenth Scheduleto the Constitution independent of a claim being determined byhim that a member or a number of members had incurreddisqualification by defection. To that extent, the decision of theSpeaker in the case on hand cannot be considered to be an orderin terms of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. The Speakerhas failed to decide the question, he was called upon to decide, bypostponing a decision thereon. There is therefore some merit inthe contention of the learned counsel for BSP that the order ofthe Speaker may not enjoy the full immunity in terms of para 6(1)of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution and that even if it did,the power of judicial review recognised by the Court in KihotoHollohan [1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 : AIR 1993 SC 412 : (1992) 1SCR 686] is sufficient to warrant interference with the order inquestion.”

19. The Court also hastened to add:

“29. In the case on hand, the Speaker had a petition moved beforehim for disqualification of 13 members of BSP. When thatapplication was pending before him, certain members of BSP hadmade a claim before him that there has been a split in BSP. TheSpeaker, in the scheme of the Tenth Schedule and the rules framedin that behalf, had to decide the application for disqualificationmade and while deciding the same, had to decide whether in viewof para 3 of the Tenth Schedule, the claim of disqualification had

to be rejected. We have no doubt that the Speaker had totallymisdirected himself in purporting to answer the claim of the 37MLAs that there has been a split in the party even while leavingopen the question of disqualification raised before him by way ofan application that was already pending before him. This failureon the part of the Speaker to decide the application seeking adisqualification cannot be said to be merely in the realm ofprocedure. It goes against the very constitutional scheme ofadjudication contemplated by the Tenth Schedule read in thecontext of Articles 102 and 191 of the Constitution. It also goesagainst the rules framed in that behalf and the procedure that hewas expected to follow. It is therefore not possible to accept theargument on behalf of the 37 MLAs that the failure of the Speakerto decide the petition for disqualification at least simultaneouslywith the petition for recognition of a split filed by them, is a mereprocedural irregularity. We have no hesitation in finding that thesame is a jurisdictional illegality, an illegality that goes to the rootof the so-called decision by the Speaker on the question of splitput forward before him. Even within the parameters of judicialreview laid down in Kihoto Hollohan [1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 :AIR 1993 SC 412 : (1992) 1 SCR 686] and in Jagjit Singh v.State of Haryana [(2006) 11 SCC 1 : (2006) 13 Scale 335] it hasto be found that the decision of the Speaker impugned is liable tobe set aside in exercise of the power of judicial review.”

20. The Court then adverted to the scope of judicial review beinglimited as decided in Kihoto Hollohan (supra) as follows:

“39. On the side of the 37 MLAs, the scope of judicial reviewbeing limited was repeatedly stressed to contend that the majorityof the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction. Dealing with theambit of judicial review of an order of the Speaker under theTenth Schedule, it was held in Kihoto Hollohan [1992 Supp (2)SCC 651 : AIR 1993 SC 412 : (1992) 1 SCR 686] : (SCC p. 706,paras 95-97)

ABC

DE

F

GH

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

“95. In the present case, the power to decide disputeddisqualification under para 6(1) is pre-eminently of a judicialcomplexion.

96. The fiction in para 6(2), indeed, places it in the first clauseof Article 122 or 212, as the case may be. The words‘proceedings in Parliament’ or ‘proceedings in the legislatureof a State’ in para 6(2) have their corresponding expression inArticles 122(1) and 212(1) respectively. This attracts animmunity from mere irregularities of procedures.

97. That apart, even after 1986 when the Tenth Schedule wasintroduced, the Constitution did not evince any intention toinvoke Article 122 or 212 in the conduct of resolution of disputesas to the disqualification of Members under Articles 191(1)and 102(1). The very deeming provision implies that theproceedings of disqualification are, in fact, not before the House;but only before the Speaker as a specially designated authority.The decision under para 6(1) is not the decision of the House,nor is it subject to the approval by the House. The decisionoperates independently of the House. A deeming provisioncannot by its creation transcend its own power. There is,therefore, no immunity under Articles 122 and 212 from judicialscrutiny of the decision of the Speaker or Chairman exercisingpower under para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule.”

After referring to the relevant aspects, it was held: (SCC p. 707,para 100)

“100. By these well known and accepted tests of whatconstitute a Tribunal, the Speaker or the Chairman, acting underpara 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule is a Tribunal.”

It was concluded: (SCC p. 710, para 109)

“109. In the light of the decisions referred to above and thenature of function that is exercised by the Speaker/Chairmanunder para 6, the scope of judicial review under Articles 136

and 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an orderpassed by the Speaker/Chairman under para 6 would beconfined to jurisdictional errors only viz. infirmities based onviolation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliancewith rules of natural justice and perversity.”

The position was reiterated by the Constitution Bench in RajaRam Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha [(2007) 3 SCC 184 :JT (2007) 2 SC 1]. We are of the view that contours of interferencehave been well drawn by Kihoto Hollohan [1992 Supp (2) SCC651 : AIR 1993 SC 412 : (1992) 1 SCR 686] and what is involvedhere is only its application.

40. Coming to the case on hand, it is clear that the Speaker, in theoriginal order, left the question of disqualification undecided.Thereby he has failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred onhim by para 6 of the Tenth Schedule. Such a failure to exercisejurisdiction cannot be held to be covered by the shield of para 6 ofthe Schedule. He has also proceeded to accept the case of a splitbased merely on a claim in that behalf. He has entered no findingwhether a split in the original political party was prima facie provedor not. This action of his, is apparently based on his understandingof the ratio of the decision in Ravi S. Naik case [1994 Supp (2)SCC 641 : (1994) 1 SCR 754]. He has misunderstood the ratiotherein. Now that we have approved the reasoning and theapproach in Jagjit Singh case [(2006) 11 SCC 1 : (2006) 13Scale 335] and the ratio therein is clear, it has to be held that theSpeaker has committed an error that goes to the root of the matteror an error that is so fundamental, that even under a limited judicialreview the order of the Speaker has to be interfered with. Wehave, therefore, no hesitation in agreeing with the majority of theHigh Court in quashing the decisions of the Speaker.

41. In view of our conclusions as above, nothing turns on thearguments urged on what were described as significant facts andon the alleged belatedness of the amendment to the writ petition.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

154SUPREME COURT REPORTS

AIt is indisputable that in the order that was originally subjected tochallenge in the writ petition, the Speaker specifically refrainedfrom deciding the petition seeking disqualification of the 13 MLAs.On our reasoning as above, clearly, there was an error whichattracted the jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of its powerB”of judicial review.

21. Finding that the life of the Assembly was about to end andthat if the 13 members were found to be disqualified their continuance inCthe Assembly even for a day would be illegal and unconstitutional, andthat their holding of office as Ministers would also be illegal, the Courtstated that it was bound to protect the Constitution and its values, andthe principles of democracy, which is a basic feature of the Constitution,and then went on to declare that the writ petition will stand allowed withDa declaration that the 13 members who met the Governor on 27.08.2003stand disqualified from the U.P Legislative Assembly w.e.f. 27.08.2003on the ground contained in paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule.

22. It is clear from a reading of the judgment in Rajendra SinghERana (supra) and, in particular, the underlined portions of paragraphs 40and 41 that the very question referred by the Two Judge Bench in S.A.Sampath Kumar (supra) has clearly been answered stating that a failureto exercise jurisdiction vested in a Speaker cannot be covered by theshield contained in paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule, and that when aFSpeaker refrains from deciding a petition within a reasonable time, therewas clearly an error which attracted jurisdiction of the High Court inexercise of the power of judicial review.

23. Indeed, the same result would ensue on a proper reading ofGKihoto Hollohan (supra). Paragraphs 110 and 111 of the said judgmentwhen read together would make it clear that what the finality clause inparagraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule protects is the exclusive jurisdictionthat vests in the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions so that nothingshould come in the way of deciding such petitions. The exception that isHmade is also of importance in that interlocutory interference with decisions of the Speaker can only be qua interlocutory disqualifications orsuspensions, which may have grave, immediate, and irreversiblerepercussions. Indeed, the Court made it clear that judicial review is notavailable at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speakereither by a way of quia timet action or by other interlocutory orders.

24. A quia timet action has been described in Black’s LawDictionary as follows:

“Quia Timet. Because he fears or apprehends. In equity practice,the technical name of a bill filed by a party who seeks the aid of acourt of equity, because he fears some future probable injury tohis rights or interests, and relief granted must depend oncircumstances.”

25. The leading judgment referred to insofar as quiatimetactionsare concerned is the judgment in Fletcher v. Bealey (1884) 28 Ch. D.688. In this case, a quia timet action was asked for to interdict the tortof nuisance in order to prevent noxious liquid from flowing into a river.Pearson, J. after referring to earlier judgments on quia timet action thenheld at page 698:

“I do not think, therefore, that I shall be very far wrong if I lay itdown that there are at least two necessary ingredients for a quiatimet action. There must, if no actual damage is proved, be proofof imminent danger, and there must also be proof that theapprehended damage will, if it comes, be very substantial. I shouldalmost say it must be proved that it will be irreparable, because, ifthe danger is not proved to be so imminent that no one can doubtthat, if the remedy is delayed, the damage will be suffered, I thinkit must be shewn that, if the damage does occur at any time, it willcome in such a way and under such circumstances that it will beimpossible for the Plaintiff to protect himself against it if relief isdenied to him in a quia timet action.”

26. This statement of the law has subsequently been followed byrecent English decisions reported as London Borough of Islington v.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

AMargaret Elliott [2012] EWCA Civ. 56 (See paragraph 30) and VastintLeeds BV v. Persons Unknown [2018] EWHC 2456 (Ch.) in whicha quia timet injunction was described in the following terms:

“26. Gee describes a quiatimet injunction in the following terms[Gee, Commercial Injunctions, 6th ed (2016) at [2-035]]:

B

“A quia timet (since he fears) injunction is an injunction grantedwhere no actionable wrong has been committed, to prevent theoccurrence of an actionable wrong, or to prevent repetition of anactionable wrong.””

CThe decision in Fletcher (supra) was referred to in approval inparagraph 30 of the aforesaid judgment.

27. The decision in Fletcher (supra) was also referred to by thisCourt in Kuldip Singh v. Subhash Chander Jain (2000) 4 SCC 50 asDfollows:

“6. A quia timet action is a bill in equity. It is an action preventivein nature and a specie of precautionary justice intended to preventapprehended wrong or anticipated mischief and not to undo awrong or mischief when it has already been done. In such anaction the court, if convinced, may interfere by appointment ofreceiver or by directing security to be furnished or by issuing aninjunction or any other remedial process. In Fletcher v. Bealey[(1885) 28 Ch D 688 : 54 LJ Ch 424 : 52 LT 541] , Mr JusticePearson explained the law as to actions quia timet as follows:

E

F

“There are at least two necessary ingredients for a quia timetaction. There must, if no actual damage is proved, be proof ofimminent danger, and there must also be proof that the apprehendeddamage will, if it comes, be very substantial. I should almost say itmust be proved that it will be irreparable, because, if the danger isnot proved to be so imminent that no one can doubt that, if theremedy is delayed the damage will be suffered, I think it must beshown that, if the damage does occur at any time, it will come insuch a way and under such circumstances that it will be impossible G

for the plaintiff to protect himself against it if relief is denied tohim in a quia timet action”.”

28. A reading of the aforesaid decisions, therefore, shows thatwhat was meant to be outside the pale of judicial review in paragraph110 of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) are quia timet actions in the sense ofinjunctions to prevent the Speaker from making a decision on the groundof imminent apprehended danger which will be irreparable in the sensethat if the Speaker proceeds to decide that the person be disqualified, hewould incur the penalty of forfeiting his membership of the House for along period. Paragraphs 110 and 111 of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) donot, therefore, in any manner, interdict judicial review in aid ofthe Speakerarriving at a prompt decision as to disqualification under the provisionsof the Tenth Schedule. Indeed, the Speaker, in acting as a Tribunal underthe Tenth Schedule is bound to decide disqualification petitions within areasonable period. What is reasonable will depend on the facts of eachcase, but absent exceptional circumstances for which there is good reason,a period of three months from the date on which the petition is filed isthe outer limit within which disqualification petitions filed before theSpeaker must be decided if the constitutional objective of disqualifyingpersons who have infracted the Tenth Schedule is to be adhered to. Thisperiod has been fixed keeping in mind the fact that ordinarily the life ofthe Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assembly of the States is 5 years andthe fact that persons who have incurred such disqualification do notdeserve to be MPs/MLAs even for a single day, as found in RajendraSingh Rana (supra), if they have infracted the provisions of the TenthSchedule.

29. In the years that have followed the enactment of the TenthSchedule in 1985, this Court’s experience of decisions made by Speakersgenerally leads us to believe that the fears of the minority judgment inKihoto Hollohan (supra) have actually come home to roost. Verma, J.had held :

“181. The Speaker being an authority within the House and histenure being dependent on the will of the majority therein, likelihood A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

of suspicion of bias could not be ruled out. The question as todisqualification of a Member has adjudicatory disposition and,therefore, requires the decision to be rendered in consonance withthe scheme for adjudication of disputes. Rule of law has in itfirmly entrenched, natural justice, of which, rule against bias is anecessary concomitant; and basic postulates of rule against biasare: nemo judex in causa sua — ‘A Judge is disqualified fromdetermining any case in which he may be, or may fairly besuspected to be, biased’; and ‘it is of fundamental importancethat justice should not only be done, but should manifestly andundoubtedly be seen to be done.’ This appears to be the underlyingprinciple adopted by the framers of the Constitution in notdesignating the Speaker as the authority to decide election disputesand questions as to disqualification of members under Articles103, 192 and 329 and opting for an independent authority outsidethe House. The framers of the Constitution had in this mannerkept the office of the Speaker away from this controversy. Thereis nothing unusual in this scheme if we bear in mind that the finalauthority for removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court and HighCourt is outside the judiciary in the Parliament under Article 124(4).On the same principle the authority to decide the question ofdisqualification of a Member of Legislature is outside the Houseas envisaged by Articles 103 and 192.

B

C

D

E

182. In the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker is made not only the soleFbut the final arbiter of such dispute with no provision for any appealor revision against the Speaker’s decision to any independentoutside authority. This departure in the Tenth Schedule is a reversetrend and violates a basic feature of the Constitution since theSpeaker cannot be treated as an authority contemplated for beingGentrusted with this function by the basic postulates of theConstitution, notwithstanding the great dignity attaching to thatoffice with the attribute of impartiality.”

H

30. It is time that Parliament have a rethink on whetherdisqualification petitions ought to be entrusted to a Speaker as a quasi-judicial authority when such Speaker continues to belong to a particularpolitical party either de jure or de facto. Parliament may seriously consideramending the Constitution to substitute the Speaker of the Lok Sabhaand Legislative Assemblies as arbiter of disputes concerningdisqualification which arise under the Tenth Schedule with a permanentTribunal headed by a retired Supreme Court Judge or a retired ChiefJustice of a High Court, or some other outside independent mechanismto ensure that such disputes are decided both swiftly and impartially,thus giving real teeth to the provisions contained in the Tenth Schedule,which are so vital in the proper functioning of our democracy.

31. It is not possible to accede to Shri Sibal’s submission that thisCourt issue a writ of quo warranto quashing the appointment of theRespondent No.3 as a minister of a cabinet led by a BJP government.Mrs. Madhavi Divan is right in stating that a disqualification under theTenth Schedule from being an MLA and consequently minister mustfirst be decided by the exclusive authority in this behalf, namely, theSpeaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly. It is also not possible toaccede to the argument of Shri Sibal that the disqualification petition bedecided by this Court in these appeals given the inaction of the Speaker.It cannot be said that the facts in the present case are similar to the factsin Rajinder Singh Rana (supra). In the present case, the life of thelegislative assembly comes to an end only in March, 2022 unlike inRajinder Singh Rana (supra) where, but for this Court deciding thedisqualification petition in effect, no relief could have been given to thepetitioner in that case as the life of the legislative assembly was about tocome to an end. The only relief that can be given in these appeals is thatthe Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly be directed to decidethe disqualification petitions pending before him within a period of fourweeks from the date on which this judgment is intimated to him. In caseno decision is forthcoming even after a period of four weeks, it will beopen to any party to the proceedings to apply to this Court for furtherdirections/reliefs in the matter.

AB

C

DE

F

G

H

A32. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 23.07.2019is set aside. The Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) No. 18659 of 2019and SLP(C) No. 18763 of 2019 are partly allowed and the Civil Appealsarising out of SLP(C) No. 23703 of 2019 and SLP(C) No. 24146 of2019 are dismissed in terms of this judgment. No order as to costs.

B

Ankit Gyan

Appeals disposed of.

C

D

E

F

G

H