SANJAY DUBEY versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER on 11 May 2023

[2023] 4 S.C.R. 939

SANJAY DUBEY

v.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER

(Criminal Appeal No. 1466 of 2023)

MAY 11, 2023

[KRISHNA MURARI ANDAHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, JJ.]

Constitution of India – Articles 226, 227 – Power of HighCourt to issue additional directions/orders in bail pleas – FIR wasfiled against accused u/ss.376, 506, IPC; POCSO Act, SCST Actand IT Act –FSL Report was forwarded to the appellant-Inspectorwith a note that DNA examination as per guidelines beundertaken however, the DNA examination was not carried out –In the meantime, the accused filed his bail plea – High Courtcalledfor the case-diary, but the FSL Report was not included therewith –Appellant was found guilty of dereliction of dutyand directionwasissued for holding departmental proceedings against him – Onappeal, held: High Court is a Constitutional Courtpossessing widerepertoire of powers – It has original, appellate and suo motu powersu/Articles 226 and 227 which are meant for taking care of situationswhere the High Court feels that some direction(s)/order(s) arerequired in the interest of justice – However, in the present case,since the Superintendent of Police, the officer superior to theappellant had himself stated that he would take action against theappellant and was initiating enquiry for imposition of major penalty,therefore, there was no occasion for the High Court to further issuedirection for action against the appellant –However,since the caseis sensitive and prima facie there was callousness on the part of thepolice officer(s) concerned, including the appellant, in conductinga proper investigation,on facts, the impugned judgment not interferedwith–Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.439 – Penal Code, 1860–ss.376, 506 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,2012– Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention ofAtrocities) Act, 1989 – Information Technology Act, 2000.

Administration of Justice–Administration of CriminalJustice–Significance of investigation – Discussed.

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APractice and Procedure – Judgments – Interpretation of –Held: Judgments are not to be read as Euclid’s theorems –They arenot to be construed as statutes andspecific cases are authoritiesonly for what they actually decide.

Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta v State of GujaratB(2019) 14 SCC 522; State Represented by Inspector ofPolice v M Murugesan (2020) 15 SCC 251 : [2020] 2SCR 553 – distinguished.

B S Hari Commandant v Union of India 2023 SCCOnLine SC 413; Sidhartha Vashist v State (NCT ofCDelhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1 : [2010] 4 SCR 103; Manoj vState of Madhya Pradesh (2023) 2 SCC 353; State ofGujarat v Kishanbhai (2014) 5 SCC 108 : [2014] 1SCR 197– relied on.

Sreenivasa General Traders v State of Andhra Pradesh,D(1983) 4 SCC 353 : [1983] 3 SCR 843; M/s Amar NathOm Prakash v State of Punjab (1985) 1 SCC 345 :[1985] 2 SCR 72; BGS SGS Soma JV v NHPC Limited(2020) 4 SCC 234 : [2019] 17 SCR 742; Chintels IndiaLimited v Bhayana Builders Private Limited (2021) 4SCC 602– referred to.E

Case Law Reference

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.09.2022 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh, Principal Seat at Jabalpur in MCRC No. 43998 of2022.

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SANJAY DUBEY v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ANDANOTHER

Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Adv., Awanish Kumar, Siddharth KumarSharma, S. K. Pandey, Chandrashekhar A. Chakalabbi, Anshul Rai, M/s. Dharmaprabhas Law Associates, Advs. for the Appellant.

Mukul Singh, A.A.G., Mrinal Gopal Elker, Rajan Chourasia, Advs.for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.

Heard learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties.

2. Leave granted.

3. The present appeal is directed against the Judgment and Orderdated 21.09.2022 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”)rendered by a learned Single Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradeshat Jabalpur (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) in MCRC No.43998 of 2022, in which a finding, albeit prima facie, of being guilty ofdereliction of duty against the appellant has been recorded. Further, itwas observed in the Impugned Judgment that the appellant is not fit tobe assigned any important responsibility in the Police Department and isunfit to hold any responsible post. It has further been noted that theSuperintendent of Police, Katni had already line-attached the appellantand was initiating enquiry for imposition of major penalty, for which hewould get conducted a preliminary enquiry by the AdditionalSuperintendent of Police and forward the report to the DisciplinaryAuthority for imposition of a major penalty.

4. The Impugned Judgment also records a ‘direction’ issued totake appropriate action against the appellant for dereliction of duty,insubordination and causing undue disruption in the proceedings of theHigh Court.

THE FACTUAL PRISM:

5. The Appellant was an Inspector of Sleemanabad Police Station,Katni where FIR No. 424 of 2021 dated 18.07.2021 was registeredagainst the accused therein, one Shiv Kumar Kushwah (hereinafterreferred to as the “accused”) under Sections 376 & 506 of the IndianPenal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”), Sections 3 and4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012(hereinafter referred to as the “POCSO Act”), Sections 3(1)(W)(ii) and A

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A3(2)(V) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Preventionof Atrocities) Act, 1989 and Sections 67 and 67A of the InformationTechnology Act, 2000. The Forensic Science Laboratory Report(hereinafter referred to as the “FSL Report”) was forwarded to theoffice of the Superintendent of Police, Katni on 25.10.2021. The FSLReport was forwarded to the appellant with a note that DNA examinationBas per guidelines be undertaken. However, the DNA examination wasnot carried out. In the meantime, the accused filed MCRC No.43998 of2022 seeking bail before the High Court.

6. During the proceedings, the High Court called for the case-diary, but the FSL Report was not included therewith. This led the HighCCourt to seek the personal appearance of the Superintendent of Police,Katni and the In-charge of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory,Jabalpur. On 21.09.2022, the duo mentioned supra appeared before theHigh Court, and informed that the FSL Report was sent to the office ofSuperintendent of Police, Katni on 25.10.2021. The Superintendent ofDPolice, Katni stated that the FSL report was forwarded to the appellantalong with communication dated 27.10.2021, with a note that DNAexamination as per guidelines be carried out. However, the same wasnot done, as the appellant took the stand that the concerned WomanSub-Inspector had not brought the FSL Report to his knowledge.

E7. The learned Government Advocate for the State stated beforethe High Court that the case-diary had been received in the Office ofthe learned Advocate General on 13.09.2022, but the FSL Report wasnot included therewith. This prompted the High Court to pass theImpugned Judgment, as discussed above.FSUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:

8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that theaccused had filed MCRC No.43998 of 2022 under Section 439 of theCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the“Code”), which only relates to grant of bail to an accused in custody.GThus, the direction to take action and hold a departmental enquiry asalso the recording of finding against the appellant cannot be sustained.In support of his contention, learned counsel referred to and relied uponthe decisions of this Court in Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta v Stateof Gujarat, (2019) 14 SCC 522 and State Represented by Inspectorof Police v M Murugesan, (2020) 15 SCC 251. It was contendedH

that no matter how laudable the object, while deciding an application forbail, the Court cannot enter into any other realm.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE:

9. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submitted that theappellant had, clearly, exhibited insubordination, incompetence and,dereliction of duty in an important matter and thus, in any way, wasliable to be proceeded against. It was submitted that the DepartmentalCommittee concerned had also conducted an enquiry where the appellantand some other officials were found negligent in performing their dutiesin providing the FSL Report along with the case-diary besides suppressingmaterial documents. Learned counsel added that due to an interim stayapropos the departmental proceedings against the appellant, granted videOrder dated 23.11.2022, the matter could not be taken to its logical end.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

10. Having given the matter our anxious and thoughtfulconsideration, though the appellant may have a point that, stricto sensu,in a petition under Section 439 of the Code, the concerned Court oughtnot to travel beyond considering the specific issue viz. whether to grantbail or reject bail to an accused in custody, it cannot be lost sight of thatthe Court concerned herein was not a ‘Court of Session’ but the HighCourt for the State of Madhya Pradesh, established under Article 214 ofthe Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”).

11. This singular fact, for reasons elaborated hereinafter, leads usto decline interfering with the Impugned Judgment, but for differentreasons. We have no hesitation in stating that had the Impugned Judgmentbeen rendered by a Court of Session, the factors that would have weighedwith us would be starkly different.

12. A little digression is necessitated. The High Court is aConstitutional Court, possessing a wide repertoire of powers. The HighCourt has original, appellate and suo motu powers under Articles 226and 227 of the Constitution. The powers under Articles 226 and 227 ofthe Constitution are meant for taking care of situations where the HighCourt feels that some direction(s)/order(s) are required in the interest ofjustice. Recently, in B S Hari Commandant v Union of India, 2023SCC OnLine SC 413, the present coram had the occasion to hold asunder:

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A“50. Article 226 of the Constitution is a succour to remedyinjustice, and any limit on exercise of such power, is only--selfimposed. Gainful refer ence can be made to, amongstothers, A VVenkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani,(1962) 1 SCR 573 and U P State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v.Kamal Swaroop Tandon, (2008) 2 SCC 41. The High Courts,Bunder the Constitutional scheme, are endowed with the abilityto issue prerogative writs to safeguard rights of citizens. Forex- actly this reason, this Court has never laid down any strait-jacket principles that can be said to have “cribbed, cabinedand confined” [to borrow the term employed by the Hon.CBhagwati, J. (as he then was) in E P Royappa v. State ofTamil Nadu,(1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555] theextraordinary powers vested under Arti- cles 226 or 227 ofthe Constitution.Adjudged on the anvil of Nawab ShaqafathAli Khan (supra), this was a fit case for the High Court tohave examined the matter threadbare, more so, when it didDnot involve navigating a factual minefield.”

13. Returning to the present case, though usually the proper courseof action of the High Court ought to have been to confine itself to theEacceptance/rejection of the prayer for bail made by the accused underSection 439 of the Code; however the High Court, being satisfied thatthere were, in its opinion, grave lapses on the part of the police/investigative machinery, which may have fatal consequences on the justicedelivery system, could not have simply shut its eyes.

F14. We are of the view that the learned Single Bench could havedirected institution of separate proceedings taking recourse to Article226 of the Constitution, after formulating reasons and points forconsideration. Thereafter, the matter should have been referred to thelearned Chief Justice of the High Court for placing it before an appropriateBench, which would proceed in accordance with law, of course, afterGaffording adequate opportunity to the person(s) proceeded against.

15. With regard to the High Court’s justified concern to preventmiscarriage of justice, separate/fresh proceedings could have beeninstituted as indicated above. We hasten to add that our observations arenot to be construed to imply that the High Courts should delve into theH

efficacy of investigation at the stage of bail, and the present judgment isnot to be misread to haul up the investigative agencies/officers in allcases.

16. This Court could have interfered with the ‘direction’ fordepartmental proceedings against the appellant, as learned counsel forthe appellant advanced, had been so done in Sangitaben ShaileshbhaiDatanta (supra) and M Murugesan (supra). However, it would beproper to take note that in the aforesaid two cases, the factual positionswere quite different. In Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta (supra),the Court took note of the fact that in the case involving rape of a minor,the High Court ordering the accused and the appellant therein, who wasthe grandmother of the victim along with parents of the victim to undergoscientific tests viz. lie detection, brain-mapping and narco-analysis wasnot only in contravention of the first principles of criminal law jurisprudencebut also a violation of statutory requirements and thus, the bail granted tothe accused was cancelled. The facts of the instant case are quitedifferent, and ergo, Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta (supra) doesnot aid the appellant.

17. In M Murugesan (supra), it was noted that the jurisdictionof High Court is limited to grant or refuse to grant bail pending trial andsuch jurisdiction ends when the bail application is finally decided. In thisbackground, the High Court, after taking a decision on the bail application,having retained the file and directing the State to constitute a Committeeand seek its recommendation on reformation, rehabilitation and re-integration of convicts/accused persons and best practices for improvingthe quality of investigation and also to obtain District-wise data fromState and upon submission of final data, after reviewing the same, makingsuch data a part of the order after decision on bail application, was heldto be beyond jurisdiction. In the present case, on the date of passing ofthe Impugned Judgment, the bail application was still at large, and hadnot yet been decided one way or the other.

18. There is no quibble with the propositions lucidly enunciated inSangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta (supra) and M Murugesan (supra).Yet, as our discussions in the preceding paragraphs display, the sameare inapplicable to the extant factual matrix. It is too well-settled thatjudgments are not to be read as Euclid’s theorems; they are not to beconstrued as statutes, and; specific cases are authorities only for whatthey actually decide. We do not want to be verbose in reproducing the AB

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Arelevant paragraphs but deem it proper to indicate some authorities onthis point – Sreenivasa General Traders v State of Andhra Pradesh,(1983) 4 SCC 353 and M/s Amar Nath Om Prakash v State of Punjab,(1985) 1 SCC 345 – which have been reiterated, inter alia, in BGSSGS Soma JV v NHPC Limited, (2020) 4 SCC 234, and Chin- telsIndia Limited v Bhayana Builders Private Limited, (2021) 4 SCCB602.

19. In the present case, the judgment impugned was passed beforethe final disposal of the bail application by the High Court. On a closerscrutiny of the judgment impugned, it is clear that the Superintendent ofPolice, Katni, while appearing in person on 21.09.2022 had submittedCthat he had already line-attached the appellant vide an order dated20.09.2022 and was initiating enquiry for imposition of major penalty.The High Court was informed that the Superintendent of Police, Katniwould “get conducted preliminary enquiry in the hands of theAdditional S.P. and forward the report to the disciplinary authorityDof the T.I.to initiate inquiry for major penalty.”20. The aforenoted was only reiterated by the High Court in thelatter portion of the judgment impugned, in the following terms:

“Let DNA report be now produced within a period of threeweeks by the concerned Officer for which Superintendent ofEPo- lice, Katni shall personally monitor that sample is sent intime to the concerned DNA Testing Laboratory and report isob- tained besides taking appropriate action against theconcerned T.I. Shri Sanjay Dubey for dereliction of duty,insubordi- nation and causing undue disruption intheFproceedings of the High Court.” (sic)

21. A combined reading of the afore-extracted snippets makes itcrystal clear that the Superintendent of Police, Katni, who was the officersuperior to the appellant, himself had stated that he would take actionGagainst the appellant and was initiating enquiry for imposition of majorpenalty, which statement was a suo motu act and not upon or flowingfrom any direction of the Court. Therefore, there was no occasion forthe High Court to further observe for action against the appellant to betaken, as already, the Superintendent of Police, Katni had taken a decisionto initiate enquiry against the appellant for imposition of major penalty.H

22. Be that as it may, the facts of the case prima facie disclosethat in such an important and sensitive case, there had been, at leastprima facie, callousness on the part of the police officer(s) concerned,including the appellant, in conducting a proper investigation to bring onrecord all relevant materials in support of the truth. Amidst such backdrop,the chances of undue benefit accruing to the accused, leading tomiscarriage of justice, cannot be ruled out, and may, in fact, haveincreased. The significance of the investigative component cannot beemphasised enough, and the views of this Court on such aspect havebeen brought to the fore in Sidhartha Vashist v State (NCT of Delhi),(2010) 6 SCC 1 and Manoj v State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 2SCC 353.

23. In this connection, on a slightly different but connected context,it would be apposite to refer to the judgment in State of Gujarat vKishanbhai, (2014) 5 SCC 108, wherein the Court opined and directedas under:

“22. Every acquittal should be understood as a failure of thejustice delivery system, in serving the cause of justice.Likewise, everyacquittal should ordinarily lead to theinference, that an innocent person was wrongfully prosecuted.It is therefore, essential that every State should put in place aprocedural mechanism which would ensure that the cause ofjustice is served, which would simultaneously ensure thesafeguard of interest of those who are innocent.In furtheranceof the above purpose, it is considered essential to direct theHome Department of every State, to examine all orders ofacquittal and to record reasons for the failure of eachprosecution case. A standing committee of senior officers ofthe police and prosecution departments, should be vested withthe aforesaid responsibility. The consideration at the handsof the above Committee, should be utilized for crystallisingmistakes committed during investigation, and/or prosecution,or both. The Home Department of every State Governmentwill incorporate in its existing training programmes for juniorinvestigation/prosecution officials course-content drawn fromthe above consideration. The same should also constitutecourse-content of refresher training programmes for seniorinvestigating/prosecuting officials. The above responsibility A

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Afor preparing training programmes for officials, should bevested in the same Committee of senior officers referred toabove. Judgments like the one in hand (depicting more than10 glaring lapses in the investigation/prosecution of the case),and similar other judgments, may also be added to the trainingprogrammes. The course content will be reviewed by the aboveBCommittee annually, on the basis of fresh inputs, includingemerging scientific tools of investigation, judgments of courts,and on the basis of experiences gained by the StandingCommittee while examining failures, in unsuccessfulprosecution of cases. We further direct, that the above trainingCprogramme be put in place within 6 months. This would ensurethat those persons who handle sensitive matters concerninginvestigation/prosecution are fully trained to handle the same.Thereupon, if any lapses are committed by them, they wouldnot beable to feign innocence, when they are made liable tosuffer departmental action, for their lapses.”

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24. While respectfully reiterating the above, drawing an analogytherefrom, as the lapses are grave, and additionally, but importantly, thefactum that the authority viz. the Superintendent of Police, Katni, itselfErealised lapses had crept into the investigation, and decided to initiateproceedings against the appellant (and others), the operative portion ofthe judgment impugned by the High Court, becomes, merely reiterative,perhaps in more direct terms, of what had been stated before it. Assuch, purely, in the extant facts and circumstances, the ImpugnedJudgment does not warrant any interference by this Court. We proposeFno order as to costs.

25. In sum, on an overall circumspection, and in view of thediscussion in the preceding paragraphs, the instant appeal deserves tobe, and is, dismissed, with the caveat that the High Court’s observationsare not to be treated as findings against the appellant.

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26. Interim order dated 23.11.2022, in the present case, is vacated.However, it is made clear that any observation(s) made by the HighCourt in relation to the appellant in the judgment impugned shall notcause any prejudice to him in the departmental proceedings, which shalltake its own course, in accordance with law, and after providing full andHeffective opportunity to the appellant.

SANJAY DUBEY v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ANDANOTHER [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]

27. The appellant would be entitled to raise all grounds andcontentions, as may be available to him, in facts and law, in thedepartmental proceedings. Our observations aforesaid, equally,will not prejudice the appellant, nor shall they be used against theaccused.

Divya Pandey

Appeal dismissed.

(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

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