SATYE SINGH & ANOTHER versus STATE OF UTTARAKHAND on 15 February 2022

1. The present appeal filed by the appellants-accused emanatesfrom the Judgment dated 29[th] August, 2013 passed by the High Court ofUttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Jail Appeal No. 64/2010, wherebythe High Court has dismissed the said appeal and upheld the convictionand sentence awarded by the District & Sessions Judge, Tehri Garhwalin Sessions Trial No. 22/2009. Both the appellants-accused wereconvicted by the Sessions Court for the offence under Section 302 readwith Section 34 and Section 201 of the IPC and were sentenced toundergo life imprisonment and pay fine of Rs. 20,000/- for the offenceunder Section 302 read with Section 34 and to undergo rigorous G

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Aimprisonment for a period of six years and pay fine of Rs.10,000/- forthe offence under Section 201 of the IPC.

2. The case in nutshell of the prosecution before the Trial Courtwas that Smt. Shashi Devi had married the accused- Satye Singh fouryears prior to the date of incident which had taken place any time betweenBthe evening of 27.06.2009 to the morning of 28.06.2009. The accused-Indra Devi happened to be the mother of the accused-Satye Singh. On28.06.2009 at about 8.40 a.m., Rai Singh (PW-8), Pradhan of the village-Ger of the accused informed Virendra Raj (PW-11), Naib Tehsildar,Revenue Police telephonically that one lady had died due to burns. TheNaib Tehsildar -Virendra Raj (PW-11) therefore reached at the spot i.e.CChhan (hut) of the accused, after making an entry of the said informationin the G.D. vide Rapat No. 28/42, and saw that the dead body of thedeceased was lyingin the room of Chhan in the burnt condition. It wasthe further case of the prosecution that Sharad Singh, father of thedeceased, on receiving the phone call from the accused-Satye SinghDhad also arrived on the spot. The said Sharad Singh gave a writtencomplaint to the Naib Tehsildar against the accused-Satye Singh(husband), Indra Devi (mother-in-law), and Sangeeta Devi (sister-in-law) of the deceased, which was registered as the Case Crime No. 16/2009 on 28.06.2009 at about 4.50 p.m., at the Revenue Police StationBayargaon, District Tehri Garhwal. After the inquest proceedings wereEconducted, the dead body was sealed and taken to the Baushari Hospitalfor the post-mortem. The said Naib Tehsildar after drawing thepanchnama and other proceedings, arrested the accused- Satye Singh.He also recorded the statement of other witnesses. Thereafter, he havingbeen transferred, the further investigation was handed over to the NaibFTehsildar, Gunanand Bahuguna (PW-10). The said Investigating Officerafter completing the investigation filed charge-sheet against the accused-Satye Singh and Indra Devi showing the accused Sangeeta Devi asabsconding, for the offences under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC inthe Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tehri Garhwal.G3. The said case being triable by the Court of Sessions wascommitted to the Sessions Court, Tehri Garhwal for trial. Both theaccused having denied the charges levelled against them, the prosecutionto prove the charges, led oral evidence by examining 11 witnesses andalso adduced documentary evidence. After the completion of the evidenceof prosecution, the accused-Satye Singh in his further statement beforeH

the Trial Court recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. stated inter aliathat there was no custom of dowry in their society and that he did notknow how his wife Shashi died. He further stated that he along withother people of the village had kept on searching Shashi for the wholenight but she was not found. According to him, Shashi had possiblycommitted suicide. The accused- Indra Devi had stated that since shewas the mother of Satye Singh, she was falsely implicated in the case.The Trial Court after appreciating the evidence on record convicted andsentenced both the accused as stated hereinabove, vide order dated11.10.2010, which came to be upheld by the High Court vide the impugnedorder.

4. The learned Advocate Mr. Shikhil Suri appearing on behalf ofthe appellants-accused through Supreme Court Legal Services Committeevehemently submitted that both the Courts i.e., the Trial Court and theHigh Court had committed gross error in convicting the appellants thoughthere was no cogent evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove thecharges levelled against the appellants. According to him, neither themanner in which the alleged incident had taken place was proved northe place at which the deceased was allegedly killed and burnt wasproved by the prosecution. He further submitted that since the appellantshappened to be the husband and mother-in-law of the deceased, theywere arrested and convicted, merely on the basis of suspicion, conjecturesand surmises. Taking the court to the evidence of witnesses recordedduring the course of trial, he submitted that the case was based on thecircumstantial evidence as there was no eye witness to the alleged incidentand the prosecution had failed to prove the entire chain of circumstancesleading to the guilt of the accused.

5. However, the learned Advocate Mr. Krishnam Mishraappearing for the respondent-State of Uttarakhand submitted that therebeing concurrent findings of the facts recorded by the two courts, thisCourt exercising limited jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitutionof India may not re-appreciate the evidence and come to a differentconclusion. Mr. Mishra further submitted that the prosecution hadexamined the witnesses to prove that there was a harassment to thedeceased by the accused and on the previous day of the incident also aquarrel had taken place between the deceased and the accused, whichhad resulted into the deceased Shashi leaving the house. According tohim, the accused had tried to mislead the Investigating Officer by AB

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Apropounding the story that Shashi had committed suicide, however, fromthe evidence of the doctor viz. Sanjay Kavdwal (PW-9) and the injuriesmentioned in the post-mortem report, it was duly proved that the injuriesfound on the dead body of Shashi were ante-mortem, and her death wascaused due to Haemorrhage and shock on account of ante-morteminjuries. He, pressing into service Section 106 of the Evidence Act,Bsubmitted that there was no explanation given by the accused in theirfurther statement as to why did Shashi leave their home the previousday and what they did they do for the whole night, when Shashi was notfound.

C6. Now it may be stated at the outset that undeniably the entirecase of the prosecution hinged on circumstantial evidence as therewas no eye witness to the alleged incident. Though the accused hadtried to propound the story of the deceased having committed suicide,both the courts had rightly not accepted the said story, in view of theclinching evidence of the Dr. Sanjay Kavdwal, who had carried outDthe post-mortem of the deceased and recorded the injuries found onthe dead body of the deceased, which were ante-mortem in nature.The ante mortem injuries recorded in the post-mortem report were asunder:

(i) Fracture occipital bone 3CMx3CME

(ii) Fracture left humoorus (compound) lower

(iii) Abdomen was burst and intestine was protruding out,10CM x 4CM

F(iv)Entire body had blackened, charred, peeling, scaringlike parchment and the muscles were visible. Hairs ofthe head had burnt.

The said doctor had opined that the cause of death wasHaemorrhage and shock due to ante mortem injuries. The said doctorGwas cross-examined at length to prove that the injuries were not antemortem and were due to burning only, however, the doctor hadcategorically denied the same and had further explained as to how andwhen the blisters would develop on the body on account of burning.From the said evidence of the doctor, there remains no shadow of doubtthat the deceased Shashi had died a homicidal death.H

7. This takes the Court to the next issue as to how and who causedthe death of Shashi. The prosecution in order to prove the charges levelledagainst the accused had examined 11 witnesses. However, none ofwitnesses had any knowledge about the alleged incident. PW-1 viz.Jontara Devi, aunt of the deceased had deposed, inter alia, thaton 27[th]at about 11.00 o’clock Satye Singh had made a phone call to her toenquire whether the Shashi had come to her house, and that on the nextday she had come to know that Shashi was burnt to death. In the cross-examination, she had admitted that the accused Satye Singh or all hisfamily members had never made any demand of dowry in her presence,nor any assault was made by them in her presence.

8. The father of the deceased – Sharad Singh (PW-2) of coursehad stated in his evidence that the accused i.e., husband of the deceasedand his family members used to harass his daughter- Shashi for dowryand, therefore, many a times Shashi used to come his house running. Hehad also stated that one month prior to the incident in question, Shashihad come to his house and told him that she was being assaulted andabused by the accused for the dowry. As regards the incident in question,he had stated that Satye Singh had called him in the morning at about 10-11 o’clock to inform him that Shashi had committed suicide by settingherself ablaze. He therefore along with villagers had gone to the Chhanof the accused and saw that dead body of Shashi was lying there inburnt condition. He had given the written complaint to the police withregard to the incident in question. In the cross examination he had admittedthat he had never seen any injuries on her body nor he had lodged anycomplaint about the alleged harassment by the accused. He had furtherstated that the Chhan i.e. cowshed of the accused was situated at thedistance of half an hour of the house of the accused at village Ger andthat there was a forest of Baanj, Buransh in between the village and theChhan. He had also stated that the father of the Satye Singh was deafand dumb. He also admitted that on the previous evening when JontaraDevi informed him about the phone call from Satye Singh enquiring aboutShashi, he did not go to the village of the accused, thinking that theykeep on quarrelling like that. He also admitted that Satye Singh and allhis family members were present when he reached at the spot i.e., theChhan. He had admitted that he did not know as to how his daughterwas burnt, however, had denied the suggestion that Shashi had caughtfire from the Chulla (hearth). He also denied that there was no harassmentby the accused to his daughter.

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A9. PW -3 Bhagdeyi Devi, mother of the deceased, PW-5 (BharatSingh) uncle of the deceased and other villagers PW-4 (Bhagat Singh),PW-6 (Balbir Singh) and PW-7 (Gabbar Singh) were examined by theprosecution, however, none had any knowledge as to how, when andwhere the deceased was killed and burnt.B10. It is also very pertinent to note that the entire investigation

B10. It is also very pertinent to note that the entire investigationcarried out by the Investigating Officers Gunanand Bahuguna (PW -10)and Virendra Raj (PW-11) was in a very cursory and shoddy manner.On receiving the information from Shri Rai Singh, Pradhan of the village,the Naib Tehsildar (Virendra Raj) had reached to the spot i.e the Chhanand registered the complaint against the accused Satye Singh, IndraCDevi and Sangeeta Devi, at the instance of the complainant Sharad Singh,however, had not bothered to investigate as to how the incident hadtaken place. There was no investigation carried out by either of theInvestigating Officers as to at which place the deceased was killed andburnt, and how and by whom her burnt body brought in the Chhan.DThough, according to the Investigating Officer, it was suspected that thecrime was committed by Atar Singh, father of Satye Singh, he was neverimplicated in the case. There was no recovery and discovery of anyincriminating articles made from the accused during the course ofinvestigation and no attempt was made to collect any evidence muchless cogent evidence to connect the accused with the alleged crime.E

11. On the totality of circumstances and evidence on record, atthe most it could be said from the evidence of the parents of the deceasedthat there was harassment by the accused to the deceased, though nocharge under section 498A of IPC was framed by the trial court againstthe accused. It could be further inferred from the evidence on recordFthat the deceased Shashi had left the house on the previous evening ofthe alleged incident and that she was not found during the whole night,nonetheless such circumstance itself could not be said to be sufficientproof to come to a conclusion that accused had murdered and burntShashi as alleged. It is settled position of law that circumstancesGhowsoever strong cannot take place of proof and that the guilt of theaccused have to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.At this juncture, let us regurgitate, the golden principles laid down by thisCourt in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Mahashtra reportedin 1984 (4) SCC 116. This court while drawing the distinction between“must be” and “may be” observed as under in para 153:H

“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that thefollowing conditions must be fulfilled before a case againstan accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt isto be drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that thecircumstances concerned “must or should” and not “maybe” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legaldistinction between “may be proved” and “must be orshould be proved” as was held by this Court in ShivajiSahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where theobservations were made.

Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must beand not merely may be guilty before a court can convictand the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ islong and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only withthe hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,they should not be explainable on any other hypothesisexcept that the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature andtendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis exceptthe one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not toleave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistentwith the innocence of the accused and must show that inall human probability the act must have been done by theaccused.”

12. It was further observed in Para-158 to 160 as under:

“158. It may be necessary here to notice a very forceful argumentsubmitted by the Additional Solicitor General relying on a decisionof this Court in Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar [AIR 1955

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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ASC 801 : (1955) 2 SCR 570, 582 : 1955 Cri LJ 1647] tosupplement his argument that if the defence case is false it wouldconstitute an additional link so as to fortify the prosecution case.With due respect to the learned Additional Solicitor-General weare unable to agree with the interpretation given by him of theaforesaid case, the relevant portion of which may be extractedBthus:

“But in a case like this where the various links as stated abovehave been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances pointto the appellant as the probable assailant, with reasonabledefiniteness and in proximity to the deceased as regards timeCand situation,. . . such absence of explanation or falseexplanation would itself be an additional link which completesthe chain.”

159. It will be seen that this Court while taking into accountthe absence of explanation or a false explanation did holdthat it will amount to be an additional link to complete thechain but these observations must be read in the light of whatthis Court said earlier viz. before a false explanation can beused as additional link, the following essential conditions mustbe satisfied:

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(1) various links in the chain of evidence led by theprosecution have been satisfactorily proved,

(2) the said circumstance points to the guilt of the accusedwith reasonable definiteness, and

(3) the circumstance is in proximity to the time andsituation.

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160. If these conditions are fulfilled only then a court canuse a false explanation or a false defence as an additionallink to lend an assurance to the court and not otherwise. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, this does notappear to be such a case. This aspect of the matter wasexamined in Shankarlal case [(1981) 2 SCC 35, 39 : 1981SCC (Cri) 315, 318-19 : (1981) 2 SCR 384, 390 : 1981 CriLJ 325] where this Court observed thus : [SCC para 30, p. 43: SCC (Cri) p. 322]’’

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“Besides, falsity of defence cannot take the place of proof offacts which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed.A false plea can at best be considered as an additionalcircumstances, if other circumstances point unfailingly to theguilt of the accused.”

13. The said principles have been restated in catena of decisions.In State of U.P. vs. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) 2 SCC 86, it hasbeen observed in para 9 that:

’’9. This Court has, time out of number, observed that whileappreciating circumstantial evidence the Court must adopta very cautious approach and should record a convictiononly if all the links in the chain are complete pointing to theguilt of the accused and every hypothesis of innocence iscapable of being negatived on evidence. Great care must betaken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if theevidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences,the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. Thecircumstance relied upon must be found to have been fullyestablished and the cumulative effect of all the facts soestablished must be consistent only with the hypothesis ofguilt. But this is not to say that the prosecution must meetany and every hypothesis put forward by the accused howeverfar-fetched and fanciful it might be. Nor does it mean thatprosecution evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubtbecause the law permits rejection if the doubt is reasonableand not otherwise.’’

14. Again in Majendran Langeswaran vs. State (NCT ofDelhi) & Anr. (2013) 7 SCC 192, this court having found the materialrelied upon by the prosecution inconsistent and the infirmities in thecase of the prosecution, considered number of earlier decisions, andheld that the conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidencebut it should be tested on the touchstone of law relating to thecircumstantial evidence that all circumstances must lead to theconclusion that the accused is the only one who has committed thecrime and none else.

15. Applying the said principles to the facts of the present case,the Court is of the opinion that the prosecution had miserably failed toprove the entire chain of circumstances which would unerringly conclude A

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Athat alleged act was committed by the accused only and none else.Reliance placed by learned advocate Mr. Mishra for the State on Section106 of the Evidence Act is also misplaced, inasmuch as Section 106 isnot intended to relieve the prosecution from discharging its duty to provethe guilt of the accused. In Shambu Nath Mehra vs. State of Ajmer,AIR (1956) SC 404, this court had aptly explained the scope of SectionB106 of the Evidence Act in criminal trial. It was held in para 9:

“9. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal casethe burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 iscertainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On thecontrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases inCwhich it would be impossible, or at any ratedisproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establishfacts which are “especially” within the knowledge of theaccused and which he could prove without difficulty orinconvenience. The word “especially” stresses that. It meansDfacts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within hisknowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise,it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murdercase the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did notcommit the murder because who could know better than hewhether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot beEthe intention and the Privy Council has twice refused toconstrue this section, as reproduced in certain other Actsoutside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accusedperson to show that he did not commit the crime for whichhe is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. Emperor [AIR 1936FPC 169] and Seneviratne v. R. [(1936) 3 All ER 36, 49]”

16. In the case on hand, the prosecution having failed to provethe basic facts as alleged against the accused, the burden could not beshifted on the accused by pressing into service the provisions containedin section 106 of the Evidence Act. There being no cogent evidenceGadduced by the prosecution to prove the entire chain of circumstanceswhich may compel the court to arrive at the conclusion that the accusedonly had committed the alleged crime, the court has no hesitation inholding that the Trial Court and the High Court had committed grosserror of law in convicting the accused for the alleged crime, merely onthe basis of the suspicion, conjectures and surmises.H

17. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgments deserve tobe quashed and set aside and are hereby set aside accordingly. Theaccused are acquitted from the charges levelled against them and aredirected to be set free forthwith.

18. The appeal stands allowed accordingly.

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose

Appeal allowed.

(Assisted by : Preetam Bharti, LCRA)

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