SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL versus SANJAY AND OTHERS on 1 September 2021

640

[2021] 11 S.C.R. 640

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 11 S.C.R.

ASANJAY RAMDAS PATIL

v.

SANJAY AND OTHERS

(Civil Appeal No. 5060 of 2021)

BSEPTEMBER 01, 2021

[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]

Municipal Corporations:

Maharashtra Municipal Corporations (Reservation of OfficesCof Mayors) Rules, 2006 – r. 3(2) – Constitution of India – Art. 243T– Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 – s. 19A –Reservation of offices for the election of Mayor – Issuance ofNotification whereby Office of Mayor in Dhule MunicipalCorporation for the term commencing from June, 2021 reservedDfor Backward Class category – Writ petition by respondent no.1challenging the said Notification and sought direction to reservethe post of Mayor of the said Corporation for the next term forScheduled Caste category – Notification set aside by the High Courtholding that since already on two earlier occasions, the Office ofMayor of the said Corporation was reserved for Backward Class,Ecoupled with the fact that there has been no reservation for theScheduled Caste category, amounted to violation of rotation policy– On appeal, held: Rules of 2006 are mechanism for giving effectto the constitutional mandate u/Art. 243T of providing reservationfor Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the enablingFprovision for providing reservation for Backward Class of Citizensin proportion to their population – Combined reading of the saidRules along with the Art. 243T and s. 19(1A) would not permit theinterpretation as placed by the High Court – Taking intoconsideration the fact that the number of seats reserved forScheduled Castes are 3 whereas for Backward Class are 7 i.e. moreGthan twice, it is quite probable that the post of Mayor could bereserved for two earlier terms for Backward Class and whereas noreservation is provided for Scheduled Castes – Dominant purposeand the legislative intent of r. 3 is to provide reservation in proportionof the population of such categories in the Municipal areas andHalso to ensure that while all the eligible Corporations get reservation at some point of time for the different categories, at the same timethere would be no repetition of reservation until the rotation iscomplete – Legislative intent is to exclude the Corporations whichwere earlier reserved for a particular category until all thecategories are provided reservation – However, while doing so, theCourt will have to interpret r. 3 in such a manner that this scheme ismade workable and not frustrated.

Interpretation of statutes: Cardinal principle of constructionof a statute – Held: Duty of the Court is to construe the Statute as awhole – One provision of the Act is to be construed with referenceto other provisions so as to make a consistent enactment of thewhole Statute – Provisions which appear to be in conflict with eachother are to be constructed so as to harmonise them – Whileinterpreting a particular statutory provision, it should not resultinto making the other provision a “dead letter” – Furthermore, thecourt needs to ascertain the intention of the law-making authorityin the backdrop of dominant purpose and the intendment of theStatute – Court will have to prefer an interpretation which makesthe Statute workable and gives effect to the intention of thelegislature than the one which defeats the purpose of the enactment.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Section 19 of the Maharashtra MunicipalCorporations Act, 1949 provides for election of Mayor andDeputy Mayor from amongst the Councillors in the Corporation.Sub-section (1A) of Section 19 of the Act provides that thereshall be reservation for the office of the Mayor in the Corporation,by rotation, for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes,Women and the Backward Class of Citizens, in the prescribedmanner. [Paras 13, 14][652-E, G-H]

Conclusion

1.2 Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Maharashtra MunicipalCorporations (Reservation of Offices of Mayors) Rules, 2006provides that the Government shall, by notification in the OfficialGazette, specify the number of offices of Mayors in the MunicipalCorporations in the State to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes,Scheduled Tribes, Backward Class of Citizens and Women(including the women belonging to the category of Backward Classof Citizens). [Para 16][654-F-G]

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A1.3 Clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 thereof providesthat by notification in the Official Gazette, the State Governmentshall allot by draw of lots, the offices of the Mayors to be reservedfor the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, the BackwardClass of Citizens and Women, on the principles specified in sub-rule(1). Clause (b) thereof provides that the State GovernmentBshall ensure that, at any given point of time, the number of officesof Mayors, reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the ScheduledTribes, the Backward Class of Citizens and Women shall not beless than the number determined in accordance with theprovisions of sub-rule (1). Clause (c) provides that the lots inCrespect of women belonging to a particular category shall bedrawn only among the offices of Mayors reserved for suchcategory. Clause (d) provides that while drawing lots, the officeof Mayors reserved for such category in the earlier years shallbe excluded from the draw of lots for those categories. Clause(e) provides that the offices of Mayors to be reserved shall beDrotated in the subsequent terms of office of Mayor to suchCorporation in which no reservation has been made in theprevious terms until such reservations are given by rotation toeach category. It is thus clear that the scheme of Rules which isin tune with Section 19(1A) of the said Act and in turn with theEconstitutional provision under Article 243T of the Constitution,is to provide reservation to the Scheduled Castes and ScheduledTribes in proportion to the total population of the ScheduledCastes and Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal Corporation areas.Insofar as the Backward Class is concerned, the reservationprovided is fixed at 27% of the total number of offices of Mayors.F1/3rd of the total number of posts shall be reserved for womencategory including the one belonging to Scheduled Castes,Scheduled Tribes and Backward Class of Citizens. Clause (a) ofsub-rule(2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules mandates the StateGovernment to allot by draw of lots, the offices of Mayors for theGScheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Class of Citizensand Women, on the principles specified in sub–rule (1). Clause(b) of sub–rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules mandates the StateGovernment to ensure that, at any given point of time, the number H

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of offices of Mayors, reserved for the said categories, shall notbe less than the number determined in accordance with theprovisions of sub-rule(1). Clause (c) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 ofthe said Rules provides that the lots in respect of womenbelonging to a particular category shall be drawn only among theoffices of Mayors reserved for such category. Clause (d) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that while drawinglots, the offices of Mayors reserved for such category in theearlier years shall be excluded from the draw of lots for thosecategories. Clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rulesrequires that the offices of Mayors to be reserved, shall be rotatedin the subsequent terms of office of Mayor to such Corporation,in which no reservation has been made in the previous termsuntil such reservations are given by rotation to each category.[Paras 18, 19][655-E-H; 656-A-G]

1.4 The High Court, while interpreting clause (e) of sub-rule(2) of Rule 3 held that until the reservations are given by rotationto each category, the reservation cannot be provided to a categoryfor which reservation was already provided. [Para 20][656-G-H]

M. Abdul Azeez v. State of Karnataka and Others WritPetition No. 38256 of 2013 decided on 06.01.2014 –referred to.

1.5 There is no hesitation in observing that sub-rule (2) ofRule 3 of the said Rules has not been happily worded. On a plainreading, various clauses in the sub–rule are capable of beinginterpreted in a manner that there are inconsistencies and at times,conflict amongst them. It is the duty of the Court to construe theStatute as a whole and that one provision of the Act has to beconstrued with reference to other provisions so as to make aconsistent enactment of the whole Statute. It is the duty of theCourt to avoid a head-on clash between two sections and construethe provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other insuch a manner so as to harmonise them. It is further equallysettled that while interpreting a particular statutory provision, itshould not result into making the other provision a “uselesslumber” or a “dead letter”. While construing the provisions, the AB

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ACourt will have to ascertain the intention of the law-makingauthority in the backdrop of dominant purpose and the underlyingintendment of the Statute. [Paras 24, 31][660-F-G; 664-F-H]

Philips India Limited v. Labour Court, Madras andOthers (1985) 3 SCC 103 : [1985] 3 SCR 491;BBalasinor Nagrik Cooperative Bank Limited v. BabubhaiShankerlal Pandya and Others (1987) 1 SCC 606 :1987 (1) JT 462; Mohan Kumar Singhania and Othersv. Union of India and Others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 594;Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain (1997) 1 SCC 373: [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 707; Jagdish Singh v. Lt.CGovernor, Delhi and Others (1997) 4 SCC 435 : [1997]2 SCR 953; Commissioner of Income Tax v. HindustanBulk Carriers (2003) 3 SCC 57 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR387 – referred to.

1.6 The 2006 Rules are mechanism for giving effect to theDconstitutional mandate under Article 243T of the Constitution ofproviding reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribesand the enabling provision for providing reservation for BackwardClass of Citizens in proportion to their population. The said Ruleshave been prescribed so as to provide a procedure for theEreservation of the office of Mayor in the Corporation by rotationfor the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, Women and theBackward Class of Citizens as mandated under Section 19 (1A)of the said Act. It could thus be seen that the intent and thedominant purpose of Rule 3 of the said Rules is to providereservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, BackwardFClass of Citizens and Women and further to ensure that there isno repetition of reservation of a particular category in a particularCorporation. It could thus be seen that the dominant purposeand the legislative intent of the said Rules is to provide reservationin proportion of the population of such categories in the MunicipalGareas and also to ensure that while all the eligible Corporationsget reservation at some point of time for the different categories,at the same time there would be no repetition of reservation untilthe rotation is complete. However, while doing so, the number ofseats reserved for a particular category also cannot be ignored.

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The total number of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes are 3whereas for Backward Class of citizens, they are 7. Sub-rule (2)of Rule 3 prescribes the manner in which the seats are to beallotted to be reserved for various categories including women.[Para 32][665-A-F]

1.7 No doubt, that at the first blush, an isolated reading ofclause (e) is capable of being interpreted in a manner that untilreservation is provided for each category by rotation, the saidoffice cannot be reserved for a category for which it was alreadyreserved. However, if the Rules along with Article 243T of theConstitution and Section 19(1A) of the said Act are read as awhole, then the dominant purpose behind the said Rules appearsto be that the reservation as mandated in the Constitution, shouldbe provided for offices of Mayors in the Corporations. While doingso, the reservation has to be provided by a draw of lots. It has tobe ensured that at any given point of time, the number of officesof Mayors reserved for such categories should not be less thanthe number determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the said Rules. Clause (d) of sub-rule (2) ofRule 3 of the said Rules also provides that while drawing lots,the offices of Mayors reserved for such category in the earlieryears, shall be excluded from the draw of lots for those categories.The purpose appears to ensure that the reservation is not thrustupon a particular Corporation again and again and all theCorporations, at some point of time, will have the office of Mayorreserved for particular category in accordance with the said Rules.The office of Mayor can be reserved for Scheduled Tribes in only9 Corporations whereas all the Corporations are eligible forreservation for Scheduled Castes and Backward Class of Citizens.However, taking into consideration the fact that the number ofseats reserved for Scheduled Castes are 3 whereas for BackwardClass of Citizens, they are 7 i.e. more than twice, it is quiteprobable that the post of Mayor could be reserved for two earlierterms for Backward Class of Citizens and whereas no reservationis provided for Scheduled Castes. A harmonious construction ofthe said Rules would not lead to a conclusion that the procedureas followed by the State Government in allotting the reservation A

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Aby draw of lots, would be said to be inconsistent with the schemeof the said Rules. As has been explained in the affidavit by theRegional Deputy Director, after excluding 12 Corporations whichare already reserved for Scheduled Castes in the earlier yearsand the one which was reserved for Scheduled Tribes in the firstdraw of lots, there were 14 Corporations available including theBDhule Municipal Corporation. The said Corporation was alsoincluded in the draw of lots for Scheduled Castes. However, inthe draw of lots, it could not be reserved for Scheduled Castes.However, insofar as Backward Class is concerned, out of 27Corporations, 26 Corporations excluding newly created PanvelCCorporation were already reserved for Backward Class in theearlier years. As such, the State excluded the 7 Corporationswhich were immediately reserved for the Backward Class andalso excluded the 4 Corporations which were reserved forScheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the present draw oflots. Coincidentally, in the draw of lots, Dhule MunicipalDCorporation was one of the 7 Corporations which got to bereserved for the Backward Class. [Para 33][665-G-H; 666-A-H;667-A]

1.8 Such a situation is bound to occur in view of the differencein number of seats, reserved for Scheduled Castes and BackwardEClass of Citizens. If the interpretation as placed is to be acceptedthen unless the post of Mayor is reserved for Scheduled Tribesin all the Corporations to complete the rotation, it will not bepossible to provide reservation for the categories which werealready reserved earlier. However, it could be seen that as perFthe Rules, only 9 Corporations could be reserved for ScheduledTribes. Therefore, the combined reading of the said Rules alongwith the constitutional mandate under Article 243T of theConstitution and Section 19(1A) of the Act would not permit theinterpretation as placed by the High Court. [Para 34][667-B-D]G1.9 The Court will have to prefer an interpretation whichmakes the Statute workable. The interpretation which gives effectto the intention of the legislature, will have to be preferred. Theinterpretation which brings about the effect of result, will have tobe preferred than the one which defeats the purpose of theenactment. The dominant intent of the said Rules is to give effectH

to the reservation policy while ensuring that reservations arenot repeated in particular Corporations and at the same time inall the Corporations, there shall be reservation, at some point oftime, for all the eligible categories by rotation. The legislativeintent is to exclude the Corporations which were earlier reservedfor a particular category until all the categories are providedreservation. However, while doing so, the Court will have tointerpret Rule 3 of the said Rules in such a manner that thisscheme is made workable and not frustrated. Taking intoconsideration the difference in number of seats for ScheduledCastes and Backward Class of Citizens, the interpretation asplaced by the High Court, would not make the said Rules workableand give effect to the legislative intent. It would have been adifferent matter that even after completion of the cycle, requisitereservation as per the Rules is not provided to the ScheduledCastes and excessive reservation is provided for Backward Classof Citizens. Such is not the case. Unfortunately, for the writpetitioner, even for the present term, Dhule MunicipalCorporation was also in the pool of eligible Corporations for drawof lots for Scheduled Castes category. However, in the draw, itcould not be reserved for Scheduled Castes. Only thereafter,Dhule Municipal Corporation was considered in the pool of drawof lots for Backward Class of Citizens. This was so because inthe immediate preceding elections, the office of Mayor was notreserved for Backward Class of Citizens. Thus, the impugnedjudgment and order passed by the High Court is quashed and setaside. [Para 38, 42][669-C-H; 671-B]

State of Tamil Nadu v. M.K. Kandaswami and Others(1975) 4 SCC 745 : [1976] 1 SCR 38; Commissionerof Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003) 3 SCC57 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387; Balram Kumawat v.Union of India and Others (2003) 7 SCC 628 : [2003]3 Suppl. SCR 24; The Regional Manager and Anotherv. Pawan Kumar Dubey (1976) 3 SCC 334 : [1976] 3SCR 540 – referred to.

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CCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.5060 of2021.

From the Judgment and Order dated 07.05.2021 of the High Courtof Judicature at Bombay Bench at Aurangabad in Writ Petition No.14440of 2019D

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 5061, 5062 and 5063 of 2021

Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., Braj Kishore Mishra, Vinod Kumar,Abhishek Yadav, Amit Bhagat, Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, N.L. Choudhari,EMahesh P. Shinde, Ms. Rucha A. Pande, Nishant RamakantraoKatneshwarkar, Prashant Katneshwarkar, Yogesh B. Bolkar, Sachin Patil,Rahul Chitnis, Aaditya A. Pande, Geo Joseph, Makarand D. Adkar, VijayKumar, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Suhas Kadam, M/s Black & White Solicitors,Adv. for the appearing parties.FThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B. R. GAVAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. All these appeals take exception to the judgment and orderGpassed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,Bench at Aurangabad dated 7[th] May 2021, thereby allowing the writpetition being Writ Petition No.14440 of 2019, filed by respondent No.1-Sanjay Sudhakar Jadhav and setting aside the Notification dated 27[th]November 2019 in respect of Dhule Municipal Corporation, vide whichthe Office of Mayor in Dhule Municipal Corporation for the termH

commencing from June, 2021 was reserved for Backward Class category.The High Court further directed the State of Maharashtra to reconsiderthe reservation process for the office of Mayor in Dhule MunicipalCorporation in accordance with the observations made by it in thejudgment.

3. Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 7556 of 2021, 7557 of2021 and 7558 of 2021 are filed by the Municipal Councillors who belongto the Backward Class category whereas the appeal arising out ofSLP(C) No. 8870 of 2021 is filed by the State of Maharashtra.

4. Facts in brief giving rise to filing of these appeals are as under:- We will refer to the facts in appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.7556of 2021. The respondent No.1 though belongs to the Scheduled Castecategory, was elected as a Councillor to the Dhule Municipal Corporation(hereinafter referred to as the “said Corporation”) from the Generalcategory. By the Notification dated 27[th] November 2019, the Office ofMayor in the said Corporation was earmarked for Backward Class ofCitizens for the next term of two and half years commencing from June,2021. Contending that from the year 2003 onwards, the Office of Mayorin the said Corporation was reserved for Backward Class category onvarious occasions, but was not reserved for Scheduled Caste category,a petition came to be filed by the respondent No.1, challenging the saidreservation with a prayer for direction to reserve the post of Mayor ofthe said Corporation for the next term of two and a half years forScheduled Caste category. The said petition came to be allowed asaforesaid. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals.

5. The Division Bench of the High Court while construing sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations (Reservationof Offices of Mayors) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the “saidRules”) and relying on the judgment of the Single Judge of the KarnatakaHigh Court held that since already on two earlier occasions, the Officeof Mayor of the said Corporation was reserved for Backward Class,reserving the same again for Backward Class coupled with the fact thatthere has been no reservation for the Scheduled Caste category, amountedto violation of rotation policy. As such, it remanded the matter torespondent No.2-State for consideration afresh in accordance with theseobservations.

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A6. We have heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counseland Mr. Braj Kishore Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe private appellants and Mr. Sachin Patil, learned counsel appearingon behalf of the State of Maharashtra. We have heard Mr. NishantRamakantrao Katneshwarkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe respondent-original writ petitioner.B

7. It is the contention of the appellants that the judgment of theHigh Court is rendered without considering the import of Clauses (d)and (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules. It is submitted that outof the 27 total seats of Mayors available in the State, 1 is reserved forCScheduled Tribes, 3 are reserved for Scheduled Castes and 7 are reservedfor Backward Class of Citizens. Learned counsel for the appellant furthersubmitted that out of 27 seats, only 9 seats are eligible for reservation ofScheduled Tribes category. It is stated that taking into consideration thefact that the seats reserved for Backward Class of Citizens are 7 asagainst 3 for Scheduled Castes, which is more than twice, it is quiteDpossible that while applying the said Rules, the reservation may beprovided for Backward Class category on more than one occasion andno reservation be provided for Scheduled Castes even on a singleoccasion.

8. It is stated on behalf of the State that while earmarking theEseats of Mayor, the State of Maharashtra had followed an appropriateprocedure so as to give effect to the said Rules. It is submitted that,however, the same has not been taken into consideration by the HighCourt.

9. As against this, Mr. Katneshwarkar, learned counsel appearingFon behalf of the original writ petitioner would submit that the High Courthas correctly applied the principle of rotation and held that unless all thecategories got representation in a particular Municipal Corporation, thereservation for a particular category cannot be repeated.G10. It is not in dispute that from 2003 to 2017, the Office of Mayorof the said Corporation was reserved for Backward Class category fortwo terms, out of the total 7 terms. It is also not in dispute that there wasno reservation provided for the Scheduled Castes category even once.We will have to consider the rival submissions in the backdrop of thisfactual scenario.H

11. It will be relevant to refer to Article 243T of the Constitutionof India which reads thus:- “243T. Reservation of seats

(1) Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and theScheduled Tribes in every Municipality and the number of seatsso reserved shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportionto the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in thatMunicipality as the population of the Scheduled Castes in theMunicipal area or of the Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal areabears to the total population of that area and such seats may beallotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality.

(2) Not less than one third of the total number of seats reservedunder clause (1) shall be reserved for women belonging to theScheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes.

(3) Not less than one third (including the number of seats reservedfor women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the ScheduledTribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct electionin every Municipality shall be reserved for women and such seatsmay be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in aMunicipality.

(4) The offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities shall bereserved for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes andwomen in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law,provide.

(5) The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2) and thereservation of offices of Chairpersons (other than the reservationfor women) under clause (4) shall cease to have effect on theexpiration of the period specified in Article 334.

(6) Nothing in this Part shall prevent the Legislature of a Statefrom making any provision for reservation of seats in anyMunicipality or offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities infavour of backward class of citizens.”

12. Perusal of Clause (1) of Article 243T would reveal that itmandates the State to reserve seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled A

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ATribes in every Municipality. It further mandates that the number ofseats so reserved shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion tothe total number of seats to be filled by direct election in the Municipalityas the population of the Scheduled Castes in the Municipal area or of theScheduled Tribes in the Municipal area bears to the total population ofthat area. It further mandates that such seats may be allotted by rotationBto different constituencies in a Municipality. Clause (2) thereof providesthat not less than 1/3[rd] of the total number of seats reserved under Clause(1) shall be reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or,as the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes. Clause (3) provides that notless than 1/3[rd] (including the number of seats reserved for womenCbelonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes) of the totalnumber of seats to be filled by direct election shall be reserved for womenand such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies ina Municipality. Clause (4) thereof provides that the offices of theChairpersons in the Municipalities shall be reserved for the ScheduledCastes, the Scheduled Tribes and women in such manner as theDLegislature of a State may, by law, provide. Clause (6) thereof enablesthe Legislature of the State to make provision for reservation of seats inany Municipality or offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities in favourof Backward Class of Citizens.

13. Section 19 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act,E1949 (hereinafter referred to as the “said Act”) provides for election ofMayor and Deputy Mayor from amongst the Councillors in theCorporation. It will be relevant to refer to Section 19 (1A) of the saidAct:-“19. Mayor and Deputy MayorF

(1) …

(1A) There shall be reservation for the office of the Mayor in theCorporation, by rotation, for the Scheduled Castes, the ScheduledTribes, women and the Backward Class of citizens, in theGprescribed manner.”

14. It could thus be seen that sub-section (1A) of Section 19 ofthe said Act provides that there shall be reservation for the office of theMayor in the Corporation, by rotation, for the Scheduled Castes, theScheduled Tribes, Women and the Backward Class of Citizens, in theHprescribed manner.

15. The manner of reservation has been provided under Rule 3 ofthe said Rules which reads thus:- “3. Reservation of offices for the election of Mayor- (1) TheState Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette,specify the number of offices of Mayors in the MunicipalCorporations in the State to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes,Scheduled Tribes, the category of Backward Class of Citizensand Women (including the women belonging to the category ofBackward Class of Citizens) on the following principles:- (a) The number of offices of Mayors to be so reserved for theScheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall bear, as nearly asmay be, the same proportion to the number of such offices in theCorporations in the State as the population of the Scheduled Castesand the Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal Corporation areas bearsto the total population of all Municipal Corporation areas:

Provided that, such office of Mayor may not be so reserved, ifthe number of Councillors to be elected at ward elections fromthe category of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes is lessthan three:

Provided further that, while specifying such reservation one-third of the total number of seats so reserved shall be reservedfor the women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or, as the casemay be, the Scheduled Tribes:

Provided also that, in a Municipal Corporation, where only oneoffice of the Councillor is reserved for the Scheduled Caste or, asthe case may be, the Scheduled Tribes, then it shall not be necessaryto reserve the office for women belonging to the Scheduled Castesor, as the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes; (b) As nearly as may be, twenty-seven per cent of the totalnumber of offices of Mayors in the State shall be reserved for thecategory of Backward Class of Citizens:

Provided that, one-third of the offices so reserved shall bereserved for Women belonging to the category of Backward Classof Citizens; AB

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(c) One-third of the total number of offices of Mayors in theState (including the number of offices reserved for the ScheduledCastes, the Scheduled Tribes and the category of Backward Classof Citizens) shall be reserved for women.

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(2) The State Government shall,-B

(a) By notification in the Official Gazette, allot by draw oflots, the offices of the Mayors to be reserved for the ScheduledCastes, the Scheduled Tribes, the category of Backward Class ofCitizens and Women, on the principles specified in sub-rule (1).

(b) Ensure that, at any given point of time, the number of officesof Mayors, reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the ScheduledTribes, the category of Backward Class of Citizens and Womenshall not be less than the number determined in accordance withthe provisions of sub-rule (1).

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(c) The lots in respect of women belonging to a particularcategory shall be drawn only among the offices of Mayors reservedfor such category.

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(d) While drawing lots, the office of Mayor reserved for suchcategory in the earlier years shall be excluded from the draw oflots for those categories; E

(e) The offices of Mayors to be reserved shall be rotated inthe subsequent terms of office of Mayor to such Corporation, inwhich no reservation has been made in the previous terms untilsuch reservations are given by rotation to each category.”

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16. It is clear that sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the said Rules providesthat the Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specifythe number of offices of Mayors in the Municipal Corporations in theState to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes,Backward Class of Citizens and Women (including the women belongingGto the category of Backward Class of Citizens). Clause (a) of sub-rule(1) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that the number of offices ofMayors to be so reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribesshall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the number ofsuch offices in the Corporations in the State as the population of theScheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal CorporationH

areas bears to the total population of all Municipal Corporation areas.Obviously, the said provision is in tune with Clause (1) of Article 243T ofthe Constitution of India. The first proviso thereof provides that suchoffice of Mayor may not be so reserved, if the number of Councillors tobe elected at ward elections from the category of the Scheduled Castesor Scheduled Tribes is less than 3. The second proviso provides thatwhile specifying such reservation, 1/3[rd] of the total number of seats soreserved shall be reserved for the women belonging to the ScheduledCastes or, as the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes. It further providesthat in a Municipal Corporation, where only one office of the Councilloris reserved for the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, theScheduled Tribes, then it shall not be necessary to reserve the office forwomen belonging to the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, theScheduled Tribes.

17. Clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the said Rules providesthat as nearly as may be, 27% of the total number of offices of Mayorsin the State shall be reserved for the category of Backward Class ofCitizens. The proviso thereof provides that 1/3[rd] of the offices so reservedshall be reserved for Women belonging to the category of BackwardClass of Citizens. Clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the said Rulesprovides that 1/3[rd] of the total number of offices of Mayors in the State(including the number of offices reserved for the Scheduled Castes, theScheduled Tribes and the category of Backward Class of Citizens) shallbe reserved for women.

18. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules would be the mostrelevant one inasmuch as it is that provision which falls for considerationin the present matter. Clause (a) thereof provides that by notification inthe Official Gazette, the State Government shall allot by draw of lots,the offices of the Mayors to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes, theScheduled Tribes, the Backward Class of Citizens and Women, on theprinciples specified in sub-rule(1). Clause (b) thereof provides that theState Government shall ensure that, at any given point of time, the numberof offices of Mayors, reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the ScheduledTribes, the Backward Class of Citizens and Women shall not be lessthan the number determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (1). Clause (c) provides that the lots in respect of women belongingto a particular category shall be drawn only among the offices of Mayorsreserved for such category. Clause (d) provides that while drawing lots, A

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Athe office of Mayors reserved for such category in the earlier yearsshall be excluded from the draw of lots for those categories. Clause (e)provides that the offices of Mayors to be reserved shall be rotated in thesubsequent terms of office of Mayor to such Corporation in which noreservation has been made in the previous terms until such reservationsare given by rotation to each category.B

19. It is thus clear that the scheme of Rules which is in tune withSection 19(1A) of the said Act and in turn with the constitutional provisionunder Article 243T, is to provide reservation to the Scheduled Castesand Scheduled Tribes in proportion to the total population of the ScheduledCCastes and Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal Corporation areas. Insofaras the Backward Class is concerned, the reservation provided is fixed at27% of the total number of offices of Mayors. 1/3[rd] of the total numberof posts shall be reserved for women category including the one belongingto Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Class of Citizens.Clause (a) of sub-rule(2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules mandates the StateDGovernment to allot by draw of lots, the offices of Mayors for theScheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Class of Citizens andWomen, on the principles specified in sub-rule (1). Clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules mandates the State Government toensure that, at any given point of time, the number of offices of Mayors,Ereserved for the said categories, shall not be less than the numberdetermined in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule(1). Clause (c)of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that the lots in respectof women belonging to a particular category shall be drawn only amongthe offices of Mayors reserved for such category. Clause (d) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that while drawing lots, theFoffices of Mayors reserved for such category in the earlier years shallbe excluded from the draw of lots for those categories. Clause (e) ofsub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules requires that the offices ofMayors to be reserved, shall be rotated in the subsequent terms of officeof Mayor to such Corporation, in which no reservation has been made inthe previous terms until such reservations are given by rotation to eachGcategory.

20. The High Court, while interpreting clause (e) of sub-rule (2)of Rule 3 of the said Rules, has held that until the reservations are givenby rotation to each category, the reservation cannot be provided to aHcategory for which reservation was already provided. While doing so, the High Court has relied on the judgment of the Karnataka High Courtin M. Abdul Azeez v. State of Karnataka and Others[1]. We will have toexamine the correctness of the said view.

21. The procedure adopted for draw of lots followed by the Statewas explained by filing an affidavit before the High Court by Smt. AliceSufi Pore, Regional Deputy Director, Municipal Administration,Aurangabad. It will be relevant to refer to paragraphs (5) to (8) of thesaid affidavit:- “5. The principles and manner for the reservation is mentioned inthe Rule 3 (1) and procedure to be followed by the StateGovernment is mentioned in Rule 3 (2) of Maharashtra MunicipalCorporations (Reservation of Offices of Mayor) Rules 2006. Asper the provisions broadly the office of the Mayor of Corporationsare reserved in the proportion mentioned as follows:- (a) The number of offices of the Mayor to be so reserved forthe Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall bear, as nearlyas maybe the same proportion to the total number of such officesin the Corporations in the State as the population of the ScheduledCastes and Scheduled tribes in the Municipal Corporation areasbears to the total population of all the Municipal Corporation Areas.

(b) As nearly as may be, 27% of the total number of offices ofthe Mayors in the State shall be reserved for the Backward classof Citizen.

(c) One third of the total number of offices of Mayors (includingthe number of offices reserved for women belonging to thecategory of backward Class of Citizen) in the Corporations in theState shall be reserved for women.

6. While drawing the lots for the reservation of the office of theMayors of all 27 Corporations in the state on 13.11.2019 the aboveproportion mentioned in the concern Rules is followed in totalityand the offices of Mayors reserved for different classes is asfollows:- 1 Writ Petition No. 38256 of 2013 decided on 06.01.2014

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7. As per Rule 3 (2) (d) while allotting the offices of the Mayorfor persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribesand the Backward Class of Citizens (including women belongingDto the said categories) the offices of the Mayor reserved for anyof the said categories in the earlier years shall be excluded Rule 3(2) (e) indicates the policy of rotation has to be followed whileallotting the offices of Mayor.

E8. It is humbly submitted that the provisions and the essence ofthe rules of reservation is followed totally considering the totalnumber of Corporations and the reservations in earlier years in 27Corporations in the State. The approved procedure to follow theabove rules is adopted in the draw of lots dated 13.11.2019. Theapproved minutes of the draw of lots dated 13.11.2019 is annexedFherewith and marked as Exhibit ‘A’. A copy of the factual positionof earlier Reservation in Annexed here with and marked as Exhibit‘B’. As per the factual position of earlier reservation and thenumber of posts mandatorily needs to be reserved for variousclass the following approved principle is followed:- E

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a) For Schedule Tribes 1 posts of Mayor needs to be mandatorilyreserved and out of 27 Corporations there are 9 Corporationswhere the number of Concillors to be elected at ward electionfrom the said category is not less than 3. Out of those 9 corporation4 Corporations were reserved for schedule tribes in earlier years.HAnd those 4 corporations are excluded as their are 5 corporations available for draw of lots, which were not previously reserved forscheduled tribes. And in the draw of lots dated 163.11.2019 byfollowing the laid procedure out of those 5 Corporations 1corporation is reserved for schedule Tribe [sic].

b) For Schedule Castes 3 posts of Mayor needs to bemandatorily reserved and out of 27 Corporation 12 corporationswere reserved for schedule Castes in earlier years. Those 12Corporations and 1 corporation (vasi-Virar Corporation) whichwas reserved for schedule tribes in the first draw of this draw oflots dated 13.11.2019 are excluded, So there are 14 Corporationsavailable, which were not previously reserved for schedule caste.In para no.4 of this minutes the details of draw of lots for scheduledcaste is mentioned. And it is clear that Dhule Corporation wasalso considered among those 14 corporations in the draw forschedule caste. Though it is a draw of lots out of those 14corporations 3 corporations (Mira- Bhayender, Ahmednagar andParbhani Corporation) got reserved for Schedule caste [sic].

c) For backward Class of Citizens 7 posts of Mayor needs tobe mandatorily reserved and it is clearly mentioned that out of 27Corporations 26 Corporations excluding newly created PanvelCorporation were reserved for Backward Class of Citizens inearlier years. As 26 Corporations were reserved for backwardClass of Citizens in earlier years, for the draw of lots dated13.11.2019 even the minimum required 7 Corporations were notavailable. Which were not previously reserved for backward Classof Citizens. And considering this fact and the provisions in the Actand Rules the 7 Corporations which were reserved for backwardClass of Citizens in the earlier years, i.e. immediately precedingterm were excluded in the draw of lots dated 13.11.2019.

By following the laid procedure the 4 Corporations which arereserved in the 1[st] and 2[nd] draws for Scheduled Tribes (1Corporation) and scheduled castes (3 Corporations) in the currentdraw of lots and 7 corporations which were reserved for backwardClass of Citizens in the immediately preceding term are excludedand the remaining corporations including Dhule Corporation areconsidered for this draw and in the draw the 7 Corporations arereserved for backward class of Citizens.”

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A22. It could thus be seen from paragraph (8) of the said affidavitthat insofar as Scheduled Castes are concerned, 3 posts of Mayor needto be mandatorily reserved. It could further be seen that out of 27Corporations, 12 Corporations were reserved for Scheduled Castes inearlier years. It further states that those 12 Corporations and 1Corporation (Vasai-Virar Corporation) which was reserved for ScheduledBTribes in the first draw of lots dated 13[th] November 2019 were excluded.As such, there are 14 Corporations available, which were not previouslyreserved for Scheduled Castes. It is further clear that when draw of lotswas done for the Scheduled Castes category, amongst the other eligibleCorporations, Dhule Municipal Corporation was also considered.CHowever, in the said draw of lots, 3 Corporations i.e. Mira-Bhayandar,Ahmednagar and Parbhani Municipal Corporation got reserved forScheduled Castes.

23. Insofar as Backward Class is concerned, it is stated that 7posts of Mayor need to be mandatorily reserved. Out of 27 Corporations,D26 Corporations excluding the newly created Panvel Corporation werereserved for Backward Class of Citizens in the earlier years. It is statedthat since 26 Corporations were reserved for Backward Class of Citizens,even the minimum required 7 Corporations were not available in thedraw in question. As such, 7 Corporations which were reserved forBackward Class of Citizens in the earlier years i.e. immediately precedingEterm, were excluded in the draw of lots. So also, 4 Corporations whichgot reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the first andsecond draw, were excluded. As such, the draw of lots was done fromthe pool of 16 Corporations after excluding the 7 Corporations whichwere reserved for Backward Class of Citizens in the immediatelyFpreceding term and the 4 Corporations which were reserved forScheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

24. We have no hesitation in observing that sub-rule (2) of Rule 3of the said Rules has not been happily worded. On a plain reading, variousclauses in the sub-rule are capable of being interpreted in a manner thatthere are inconsistencies and at times, conflict amongst them. We willGhave to therefore examine the legal position with the aid of principles ofinterpretation as laid down by this Court in such situations.

25. In Philips India Limited v. Labour Court, Madras andOthers[2], this Court observed thus:-H2 (1985) 3 SCC 103

“15. No canon of statutory construction is more firmly establishedthan that the statute must be read as a whole. This is a generalrule of construction applicable to all statutes alike which is spokenof as construction ex visceribus actus. This rule of statutoryconstruction is so firmly established that it is variously styled as“elementary rule” (see Attorney General v. Bastow [(1957) 1 AllER 497] ) and as a “settled rule” (see Poppatlal Shah v. Stateof Madras [AIR 1953 SC 274 : 1953 SCR 667] ). The onlyrecognised exception to this well-laid principle is that it cannot becalled in aid to alter the meaning of what is of itself clear andexplicit. Lord Coke laid down that: “it is the most natural andgenuine exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statuteby another part of the same statute, for that best expressethmeaning of the makers” (Quoted with approval in PunjabBeverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand [(1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978SCC (L&S) 165 : (1978) 3 SCR 370]).”

26. In Balasinor Nagrik Cooperative Bank Limited v. BabubhaiShankerlal Pandya and Others[3], this Court observed thus:-

“4. …..It is an elementary rule that construction of a section is tobe made of all parts together. It is not permissible to omit any partof it. For, the principle that the statute must be read as a whole isequally applicable to different parts of the same section……”

27. Again in the case of Mohan Kumar Singhania and Othersv. Union of India and Others[4], this Court observed thus:- “67. We think, it is not necessary to proliferate this judgment byciting all the judgments and extracting the textual passages fromthe various textbooks on the principles of Interpretation of Statutes.However, it will suffice to say that while interpreting a statute theconsideration of inconvenience and hardships should be avoidedand that when the language is clear and explicit and the wordsused are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe themin their ordinary sense with reference to other clauses of the Actor Rules as the case may be, so far as possible, to make a consistentenactment of the whole statute or series of statutes/rules/regulations relating to the subject matter, Added to this, in construing 3 (1987) 1 SCC 606

4 1992 Supp (1) SCC 594

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662SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aa statute, the Court has to ascertain the intention of the law makingauthority in the backdrop of the dominant purpose and theunderlying intendment of the said statute and that every statute isto be interpreted without any violence to its language and appliedas far as its explicit language admits consistent with the establishedrule of interpretation.”B28. In Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain[5], this Court observedthus:- “15. On a conspectus of the case-law indicated above, thefollowing principles are clearly discernible:

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(1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clashbetween two sections of the Act and to construe theprovisions which appear to be in conflict with each otherin such a manner as to harmonise them.

(2) The provisions of one section of a statute cannot beDused to defeat the other provisions unless the court, inspite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effectreconciliation between them.

(3) It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the timethat when there are two conflicting provisions in an Act,Ewhich cannot be reconciled with each other, they shouldbe so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be givento both. This is the essence of the rule of “harmoniousconstruction”.

(4) The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretationFwhich reduces one of the provisions as a “dead letter”or “useless lumber” is not harmonious construction.

(5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provisionor to render it otiose.”

29. In Jagdish Singh v. Lt. Governor, Delhi and Others[6], thisGCourt observed thus:- “7. ….It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute or thestatutory rule that efforts should be made in construing the different 5 (1997) 1 SCC 373H6 (1997) 4 SCC 435

provisions, so that, each provision will have its play and in theevent of any conflict a harmonious construction should be given.Further a statute or a rule made thereunder should be read as awhole and one provision should be construed with reference tothe other provision so as to make the rule consistent and anyconstruction which would bring any inconsistency or repugnancybetween one provision and the other should be avoided. One rulecannot be used to defeat another rule in the same rules unless it isimpossible to effect harmonisation between them. The well-knownprinciple of harmonious construction is that effect should be givento all the provisions, and therefore, this Court has held in severalcases that a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a“dead letter” is not a harmonious construction as one part is beingdestroyed and consequently court should avoid such aconstruction…..”

30. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan BulkCarriers[7], this Court observed thus:- “16. The courts will have to reject that construction which willdefeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there maybe some inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v.Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC 627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446 (PC)]AC at p. 634, Curtis v. Stovin [(1889) 22 QBD 513 : 58 LJQB174 : 60 LT 772 (CA)] referred to in S. Teja Singh case [AIR1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] .)

17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower ofwhich would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation,we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislationto futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, basedon the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purposeof bringing about an effective result. (See Nokes v. DoncasterAmalgamated Collieries [(1940) 3 All ER 549 : 1940 AC 1014 :109 LJKB 865 : 163 LT 343 (HL)] referred to in Pye v. Ministerfor Lands for NSW [(1954) 3 All ER 514 : (1954) 1 WLR 1410(PC)] .) The principles indicated in the said cases were reiteratedby this Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union ofIndia [1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 455 : (1992) 19ATC 881 : AIR 1992 SC 1] .

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A18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of theAct should be construed with reference to other provisions in thesame Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the wholestatute.

19. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature byBdirecting its attention not merely to the clauses to be construedbut to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with otherparts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpretedoccurs. (See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [(1992) 1SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 286 : (1992) 19 ATC 507 : AIR 1992SC 81] .) Such a construction has the merit of avoiding anyCinconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or betweentwo different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is theduty of the court to avoid a head-on clash between two sectionsof the same Act. (See Sultana Begum v. Prem ChandJain [(1997) 1 SCC 373 : AIR 1997 SC 1006] .)D20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done to construethe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. Itshould not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with onehand what it took away with the other.

21. The provisions of one section of the statute cannot be used toEdefeat those of another unless it is impossible to effectreconciliation between them. Thus a construction that reducesone of the provisions to a “useless lumber” or “dead letter” is nota harmonised construction. To harmonise is not to destroy.”

31. It could thus be seen that it is more than well settled that it isFthe duty of the Court to construe the Statute as a whole and that oneprovision of the Act has to be construed with reference to other provisionsso as to make a consistent enactment of the whole Statute. It is the dutyof the Court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections and construethe provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such aGmanner so as to harmonise them. It is further equally settled that whileinterpreting a particular statutory provision, it should not result into makingthe other provision a “useless lumber” or a “dead letter”. While construingthe provisions, the Court will have to ascertain the intention of the law-making authority in the backdrop of dominant purpose and the underlyingintendment of the Statute.H

32. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to construethe provisions that fall for consideration. Undisputedly, the said Rulesare mechanism for giving effect to the constitutional mandate underArticle 243T of the Constitution of providing reservation for ScheduledCastes and Scheduled Tribes and the enabling provision for providingreservation for Backward Class of Citizens in proportion to theirpopulation. As already discussed hereinabove, the said Rules have beenprescribed so as to provide a procedure for the reservation of the officeof Mayor in the Corporation by rotation for the Scheduled Castes, theScheduled Tribes, Women and the Backward Class of Citizens asmandated under Section 19 (1A) of the said Act. It could thus be seenthat the intent and the dominant purpose of Rule 3 of the said Rules is toprovide reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, BackwardClass of Citizens and Women and further to ensure that there is norepetition of reservation of a particular category in a particularCorporation. It could thus be seen that the dominant purpose and thelegislative intent of the said Rules is to provide reservation in proportionof the population of such categories in the Municipal areas and also toensure that while all the eligible Corporations get reservation at somepoint of time for the different categories, at the same time there wouldbe no repetition of reservation until the rotation is complete. However,while doing so, the number of seats reserved for a particular categoryalso cannot be ignored. As already pointed out hereinabove, the totalnumber of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes are 3 whereas forBackward Class of citizens, they are 7. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of thesaid Rules prescribes the manner in which the seats are to be allotted tobe reserved for various categories including women. Clause (a) thereofprovides that it shall be done by notification in the Official Gazette byallotment of draw of lots. Clause (d) thereof provides that while drawinglots, the offices of Mayors reserved for such category in the earlieryears shall be excluded from the draw of lots for those categories. Clause(e) thereof provides that the offices of Mayors to be reserved shall berotated in the subsequent terms of office of Mayor to such Corporation,in which no reservation has been made in the previous terms until suchreservations are given by rotation to each category.

33. No doubt, that at the first blush, an isolated reading of clause(e) is capable of being interpreted in a manner that until reservation isprovided for each category by rotation, the said office cannot be reservedfor a category for which it was already reserved. However, if the Rules A

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Aalong with Article 243T of the Constitution and Section 19(1A) of thesaid Act are read as a whole, then the dominant purpose behind the saidRules appears to be that the reservation as mandated in the Constitution,should be provided for offices of Mayors in the Corporations. Whiledoing so, the reservation has to be provided by a draw of lots. It has tobe ensured that at any given point of time, the number of offices ofBMayors reserved for such categories should not be less than the numberdetermined in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3of the said Rules. Clause (d) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rulesalso provides that while drawing lots, the offices of Mayors reserved forsuch category in the earlier years, shall be excluded from the draw ofClots for those categories. The purpose appears to ensure that thereservation is not thrust upon a particular Corporation again and againand all the Corporations, at some point of time, will have the office ofMayor reserved for particular category in accordance with the said Rules.The office of Mayor can be reserved for Scheduled Tribes in only 9Corporations whereas all the Corporations are eligible for reservationDfor Scheduled Castes and Backward Class of Citizens. However, takinginto consideration the fact that the number of seats reserved forScheduled Castes are 3 whereas for Backward Class of Citizens, theyare 7 i.e. more than twice, it is quite probable that the post of Mayorcould be reserved for two earlier terms for Backward Class of CitizensEand whereas no reservation is provided for Scheduled Castes. We findthat a harmonious construction of the said Rules would not lead to aconclusion that the procedure as followed by the State Government inallotting the reservation by draw of lots, would be said to be inconsistentwith the scheme of the said Rules. As has been explained in the affidavitFfiled before the High Court by Smt. Alice Sufi Pore, after excluding 12Corporations which are already reserved for Scheduled Castes in theearlier years and the one which was reserved for Scheduled Tribes inthe first draw of lots, there were 14 Corporations available including theDhule Municipal Corporation. The said Corporation was also included inthe draw of lots for Scheduled Castes. However, in the draw of lots, itGcould not be reserved for Scheduled Castes. However, insofar asBackward Class is concerned, out of 27 Corporations, 26 Corporationsexcluding newly created Panvel Corporation were already reserved forBackward Class in the earlier years. As such, the State excluded the 7Corporations which were immediately reserved for the Backward ClassHand also excluded the 4 Corporations which were reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the present draw of lots. Coincidentally,in the draw of lots, Dhule Municipal Corporation was one of the 7Corporations which got to be reserved for the Backward Class.

34. We find that such a situation is bound to occur in view of thedifference in number of seats, reserved for Scheduled Castes andBackward Class of Citizens. If the interpretation as placed is to beaccepted then unless the post of Mayor is reserved for Scheduled Tribesin all the Corporations to complete the rotation, it will not be possible toprovide reservation for the categories which were already reservedearlier. However, it could be seen that as per the Rules, only 9Corporations could be reserved for Scheduled Tribes. We therefore findthat the combined reading of the said Rules along with the constitutionalmandate under Article 243T of the Constitution and Section 19(1A) ofthe said Act would not permit the interpretation as placed by the HighCourt.

35. Apart from that, we find that another rule of interpretation willalso come into play. It will be relevant to refer to the observations of thisCourt in State of Tamil Nadu v. M.K. Kandaswami and Others[8]:- “26. ….If more than one construction is possible, that whichpreserves its workability, and efficacy is to be preferred to theone which would render it otiose or sterile…..”

36. This Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers(supra) has observed thus:- “15. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretationthereof by a court should be to secure that object unless crucialomission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.(See Whitney v. IRC [1926 AC 37 : 10 Tax Cas 88 : 95 LJKB165 : 134 LT 98 (HL)] , AC at p. 52 referred to in CIT v. S. TejaSingh [AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] and GursahaiSaigal v. CIT [AIR 1963 SC 1062 : (1963) 48 ITR 1] .)”

37. In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India and Others[9], thisCourt observed thus:- “25. A statute must be construed as a workable instrument. Utres magis valeat quam pereat is a well-known principle of law.

8 (1975) 4 SCC 7459 (2003) 7 SCC 628

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In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam [(1989)3 SCC 709 : AIR 1990 SC 123] this Court stated the law thus:(SCC p. 754, paras 118-120)

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“118. The courts strongly lean against any construction whichtends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of a statutemust be so construed as to make it effective and operative, onthe principle ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’. It is, no doubt,true that if a statute is absolutely vague and its language whollyintractable and absolutely meaningless, the statute could bedeclared void for vagueness. This is not in judicial review bytesting the law for arbitrariness or unreasonableness underArticle 14; but what a court of construction, dealing with thelanguage of a statute, does in order to ascertain from, andaccord to, the statute the meaning and purpose which thelegislature intended for it. In Manchester Ship CanalCo. v. Manchester Racecourse Co. [(1900) 2 Ch 352 : 69LJCh 850 : 83 LT 274 (CA)] Farwell, J. said: (pp. 360-61)

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‘Unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I coulddo nothing at all with them, I should be bound to find somemeaning and not to declare them void for uncertainty.’

119. In Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham CountyCouncil [(1960) 3 All ER 503 : (1960) 3 WLR 831 (HL)] LordDenning approving the dictum of Farwell, J. said: (All ER p. 516)

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‘But when a statute has some meaning, even though it isobscure, or several meanings, even though there is little tochoose between them, the courts have to say what meaningthe statute is to bear, rather than reject it as a nullity.’

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120. It is, therefore, the court’s duty to make what it can of thestatute, knowing that the statutes are meant to be operative andnot inept and that nothing short of impossibility should allow aGcourt to declare a statute unworkable. In Whitney v. IRC [1926AC 37 : 95 LJKB 165 : 134 LT 98 (HL)] Lord Dunedin said: (ACp. 52)

‘A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretationthereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucialomission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.’ “

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26. The courts will therefore reject that construction which willdefeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there maybe some inexactitude in the language used. [See Salmon v.Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC 627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446 (PC)](AC at p. 634).] Reducing the legislation futility shall be avoidedand in a case where the intention of the legislature cannot begiven effect to, the courts would accept the bolder constructionfor the purpose of bringing about an effective result…….”

38. It could thus be seen that the Court will have to prefer aninterpretation which makes the Statute workable. The interpretation whichgives effect to the intention of the legislature, will have to be preferred.The interpretation which brings about the effect of result, will have to bepreferred than the one which defeats the purpose of the enactment. Asalready discussed hereinabove, the dominant intent of the said Rules isto give effect to the reservation policy while ensuring that reservationsare not repeated in particular Corporations and at the same time in allthe Corporations, there shall be reservation, at some point of time, for allthe eligible categories by rotation. The legislative intent is to exclude theCorporations which were earlier reserved for a particular category untilall the categories are provided reservation. However, while doing so, theCourt will have to interpret Rule 3 of the said Rules in such a mannerthat this scheme is made workable and not frustrated. At the cost ofrepetition and particularly taking into consideration the difference innumber of seats for Scheduled Castes and Backward Class of Citizens,we find that the interpretation as placed by the High Court, would notmake the said Rules workable and give effect to the legislative intent. Itwould have been a different matter that even after completion of thecycle, requisite reservation as per the Rules is not provided to theScheduled Castes and excessive reservation is provided for BackwardClass of Citizens. Such is not the case. Unfortunately, for the writ petitioner,even for the present term, Dhule Municipal Corporation was also in thepool of eligible Corporations for draw of lots for Scheduled Castescategory. However, in the draw, it could not be reserved for ScheduledCastes. Only thereafter, Dhule Municipal Corporation was consideredin the pool of draw of lots for Backward Class of Citizens. This was sobecause in the immediate preceding elections, the office of Mayor wasnot reserved for Backward Class of Citizens.

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A39. The High Court has strongly relied on the following observationsof the Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in M. Abdul Azeez v.State of Karnataka and Others (supra):- “27.1. An elementary test to find out as to whether the principleof rotation is violated or not, is to examine as to whether anyBallotment to a reserved category is repeated in any Municipalitybefore commencement of a fresh cycle of rotation for thatcategory. If there is any allotment to any reserved category forthe second time in a Municipality before completion of a cycle ofrotation or before commencement of a fresh cycle of rotationfor that category, it would be a clear violation of the principle ofCrotation.”

40. However, it is to be noted that the Rules that fell forconsideration before the Karnataka High Court, provided that the officesof the President and Vice-President shall be rotated for the differentcategories from term-to-term. The Rules provided that the cycle of theDreservation will begin from the Municipal Council which had the highestpopulation of a particular category. The rotation will go to the otherMunicipal Councils in the descending manner on the basis of the populationof a particular category in the concerned Municipal Council area. Thescheme is that the Municipal Council which has the highest number ofEpopulation of a particular category, will be the first to be reserved forthat category and the Council with the least population of that category,would be the last one to be reserved for that category. Only aftercompletion of the said cycle, the reservation can come back for aparticular category which was reserved for it at the first instance. Itcould thus be seen that the Rules that fell for consideration before theFKarnataka High Court, were totally different than the ones which fellfor consideration before the Bombay High Court.

41. Though the Division Bench of the High Court was not boundby the judgment of the Single Judge and it had only a persuasive value,we may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in The RegionalGManager and Another v. Pawan Kumar Dubey[10]:- “7. …..Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would,we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctlyunderstood. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratiodecidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which mayappear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make aworld of difference between conclusions in two cases even whenthe same principles are applied in each case to similar facts…..”

42. We are therefore of the considered view that the view takenby the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court needs to be interfered.The appeals are therefore allowed and the judgment and order passedby the Bombay High Court dated 7[th] May 2021, is quashed and setaside.

Nidhi Jain

Appeals allowed.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H