THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU versus DR. VASANTHI VEERASEKARAN on 1 July 2019

[2019] 8 S.C.R. 883

THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU

v.

DR. VASANTHI VEERASEKARAN

(Civil Appeal No. 8626 of 2009)

JULY 01, 2019

[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Allotment of alternate housingsite to the displaced persons – Property owned and possessed bythe private respondents were acquired for the purpose ofimplementing ‘Mass Rapid Transport System’ (MRTS) Railwayproject, under the provision of the Act, 1894 – Writ petitions – HighCourt while rejecting the challenge to acquisition proceedingsobserved that the appropriate authority of the State Government toconsider the representation made by private respondents forallotment of a housing site by way of rehabilitation – Pursuantthereto, representation was made before the State Government,however, relief claimed was declined – Writ petition against the saidorder of the State Government – High Court held that petitionerswere entitled to alternate site under special category of displacedpersons due to the acquisition of their lands for Railways – Onappeal, held: The acquisition in the present case was not for thepurpose of development of urban area or for providing a housingscheme to the residents of the urban area in which the acquiredlands were situated – The acquisition was for a project of MRTS(Railways) on behalf of the Ministry of Railway, Government ofIndia and not for the State Government or State Authority –Admittedly, no scheme was formulated in relation to the stated railwayproject implemented by the Central Government for providingalternative housing sites to Project affected persons – In the absenceof such a scheme, the direction of High Court to provide alternativehousing sites cannot be countenanced in law – Further, privaterespondents were duly compensated in conformity with the mandateof Act, 1894 – Thus, impugned judgment and order of the HighCourt set aside.

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884SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2019] 8 S.C.R.

AAllowing the appeals, the Court

HELD : 1. The acquisition in the present case is certainlynot for the purpose of development of urban area or for providinga housing scheme to the residents of the urban area in which theacquired lands are situated. The acquisition, is for a project ofBMRTS (Railways) on behalf of the Ministry of Railway,Government of India and not for the State Government or StateAuthority. Furthermore, admittedly, no scheme has beenformulated in relation to the stated railway project implementedby the Central Government for providing alternative housing sitesto project affected persons. In the absence of such a scheme, itCis unfathomable that the High Court could still issue a directionto the State Government and Tamil Nadu Housing Board, inexercise of writ jurisdiction, to provide alternative land to theprivate respondent(s) as a special category of displaced persons.Such a direction cannot be countenanced in law. This is reinforcedDfrom the principle underlying the dictum in the case of NewReviera Coop. Housing Society and Anr. Vs. Special LandAcquisition Officer and Ors. In the said decision, the Court notedthat it would be a different matter if the State had come forwardwith a proposal to provide an alternative site but that principlecannot be extended as a condition in all cases of acquisition ofEthe land that the owner must be given an alternative site or flat.The Court unambiguously rejected the contention of the affectedpersons that acquisition of their land without providing them analternative site would impinge upon their right to life under Article21 of the Constitution of India. [Para 9] [895-F-H; 896-A-C]F

2. Again, in the case of State of Kerala and Ors. Vs. M.Bhaskaran Pillai and Anr., the Court negatived the claim of theland owners that the unused acquired land for construction ofnational highway should be returned to them. Instead, the Courtheld that since the acquisition had been completed and the landGhad vested in the State Government, the unutilised acquired landcould be disposed of only through public auction so that the publicwould benefit by getting a higher value. In another case, TamilNadu Housing Board Vs. L. Chandrasekaran (dead) by Lrs. AndOrs., the Court restated the doctrine of public trust disabling theState from giving back the property for a consideration less thanHthe market value, if it could not be used for any other public purpose by the State in cases where the acquisition process hadbeen completed under the 1894 Act. [Para 10] [896-D-F]

3. The private respondents, however, would urge that theState Government had initiated the acquisition proceedings andwas intently concerned with the stated project within the Stateand, for which reason, it could not be extricated from its obligationflowing from the existing State policy at the relevant time enablingthe State Government to exercise discretionary quota. The privaterespondent(s) have relied on instances where such allotmentshave been made, as is evident from the communications annexedat R4, R5 and R6 to the additional affidavit filed on 15[th] April,2019, as per the liberty granted by this Court. [Para 11] [897-C]

4. On perusal of the said communications. It is evident that,in these cases, the acquisition was made for construction ofhouses under LIG/MIG scheme in respect of which a policyexisted for grant of alternative housing site to the affectedpersons. Those schemes were implemented by the State HousingBoard. These instances will be of no avail to the privaterespondents whose lands have been acquired for implementationof MRTS Project implemented by the Government of India(Railways). The private respondent(s) have been dulycompensated in conformity with the mandate of the Act of 1894.Therefore, they cannot expect any further relief much less fromthe State Government or, for that matter, the Tamil Nadu HousingBoard. [Para 12] [897-D-F]

New Reviera Coop. Housing Society and Anr. v. SpecialLand Acquisition Officer and Ors. (1996) 1 SCC 731 :[1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 169 ; State of Kerala and Ors. v.M. Bhaskaran Pillai and Anr. (1997) 5 SCC 432 : [1997]1 Suppl. SCR 87 ; Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. L.Chandrasekaran (dead) by Lrs. And Ors. (2010) 2 SCC786 ; V. Chandrasekaran and Anr. v. AdministrativeOfficer and Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 133 : [2012] 10SCR 603 – relied on.

Bharat Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors.(1988) 4 SCC 534 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 1050 – heldinapplicable.

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AHansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra and ors. (1993)3 SCC 634 : [1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 216 ; State of U.P. v.Smt. Pista Devi and Ors. (1986) 4 SCC 251 : [1986] 3SCR 743 ; S.B. Kishore v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC90 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

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From the Judgment and Order dated 28.04.2006 of the High Courtof Madras in W. P. No. 11907 of 2006.E

With

C. A. NO. 8625/2009, C.A. No. 8627/2009 and C.A.No. 8630/2009

V. Giri, Sr. Adv, C. Paramasivam, Ms. Purbitaa Mitra, Mrs. SvadhaFand K. V. Vijayakumar, Advs. for the Appellant.

A.Mariarputham, Sr. Adv., Ms. Aruna Mathur, Avneesh Arputham,Ms. Anuradha Arputham, Ms. Getanjali, R. Ayyam Perumal, C.Paramasivam, M. Yogesh Khanna, M/s. Arputham Aruna and Co. andV. Ramasubramanian, Advs. for the Respondents.G

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.

1. These appeals emanate from the common judgment and orderof the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 28[th] April, 2006 disposingHof the concerned writ petitions instituted by the private respondent(s) in

the respective appeals. Although four separate writ petitions were filed,one common factum noticed from the factual narration in the impugnedjudgment is that the property owned and possessed by the privaterespondents in the concerned appeals came to be acquired for the purposeof implementing the “Mass Rapid Transport System” (for short “MRTS”)Railway Project, under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894(for short “1894 Act”). After following due process, the acquisitionproceedings culminated with the passing of the award and taking overof possession of the concerned property. After possession was taken,the subject property was made over to the appropriate authority forimplementation of the Railway Project.

2. The private respondent(s) in the respective appeals had,however, unsuccessfully challenged the acquisition proceedings by filingwrit petitions in the High Court. While rejecting the challenge, the HighCourt vide order dated 12[th] December, 2003 observed that the appropriateauthority of the State Government ought to consider the representationmade by the private respondents in the concerned appeals for allotmentof a housing site by way of rehabilitation as a special category ofdisplaced persons, in view of the dictum presumably in Hansraj H.Jain Vs. State of Maharashtra and ors.[1](incorrectly mentioned asLakhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab-1993 AIR SCW 2938which is a decisionin a criminal matter). The operative part of the said order reads thus:

“5. The learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon thepronouncement of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1986 SC2025, AIR 1988 SC 2181, AIR 1991 SC 90 and AIR SCW 1993@ 2923, persuasively contended that there could be direction tothe State Government to allot lands from any one of the Housingschemes in the city. There is forece and substance in thiscontention.

6. In the circumstances, the present applications taken out by thepetitioners do deserve further consideration and the petitionersrequest for housing site deserves to be considered by the State byway of rehabilitation.

7. Hence, it is made clear that in the event of the petitionersapplying to the State Government and Tamil Nadu Housing Boardfor allotment of house sites in any one of the housing projects 1 (1993) 3 SCC 634

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Apromoted by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, their request shallbe considered for allotment of lands, as a special category ofdisplaced persons by the acquisition of lands for the railways ashas been held by the Supreme Court in Lakhjit Singh Vs. State ofPunjab reported in 1993 AIR SCW 2938.

B8. With the above observations, the above miscellaneous petitionsare ordered accordingly.”

3. In furtherance of the direction given by the High Court, theprivate respondent(s) pursued representation before the StateGovernment. Eventually, the State Government declined to grant anyCrelief to the private respondent(s) and communicated its decision to themvide letter dated 26[th] May, 2005. It may be apposite to reproduce onesuch communication, issued to the private respondent in Civil AppealNo.8625 of 2009 and Civil Appeal No.8630 of 2009. The same readsthus:

“GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU

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Housing and UrbanDevelopment DepartmentSecretariat, Chennai-9

FromThiru Lal Rawana Sailo,EI.A.S.,Secretary to Government Letter No.41629/UD3(2)/2003-13Dated: 26.05.2005

ToFThiru P. Arivudainambi,MIG No.3, Santhome HighRoad,Foreshre Estate,TNH Board,GChennai-600028.

Tmt. S. Sulochana,19, Leith Castle Street,Sea View Apartments,Santhome, HChennai-600028

Sir/Madam,

Sub : Land Acquisition-Mass Rapid Transit System-Landsacquired for Mass Rapid Transmit Syste, S.No.300/12measuring 5445 sq.ft. belonging to Tmt. S. SulochnaS.No.300/13 measuring 5554 sq.ft. belonging to Thiru P.Arivudainambi- Request for allotment of plots-requested.

Ref: 1.High Court order dated 01.12.2003 in WPMP No.230772003 and W.P. No.3372/2003 etc.

2. High Court of Madras order dated 12.12.2003 inW.P.M.P. No.28883/2003 in W.P. No.3372/2003 etc.

3. Your lawyer Notice dated 10.11.2004.

4. Your petition dated 01.08.2004, 21.02.2005 and21.04.2005.

5. High Court order dated 04.03.2005 and 18.03.2005 inW.P. No.7469/2005.

In the High Court order first cited, the Hon’ble Court has dismissedyour W.P.M.P.23078/2003 and 11290/2003.

2. In the High Court order second cited it has been observed bythe Hon’ble Court that in the event of petitioners applying to theState Government and Tamil Nadu Housing Board for allotmentof House sites in any one of the Housing projects formulated bythe Tamil Nadu Housing Board, their request shall be considered.Therefore in pursuance of the orders of the Hon’ble Court yourrepresentation has been examined by the Government inconsultation with the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

3. I am, accordingly, directed to inform you that during the landacquisition process you were informed of the procedural formalitiesby the Land Acquisition Officer and as per statutory requirementsaward No.1/2003 was also passed on 08.01.2003 on land acquisitionproceedings. As ordered in W.P.No.16929/99 the land in questionfor a public purpose. The Hon’ble Court had also on 10.10.2002on your submission directed in W.P.No.141183/2000 andW.P.No.15974/2000 alongwith W.P.No.36980/2002 to deposit thecompensation amount in the High Court which was also compliedwith. Therefore, the land in question was already taken over by A

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the Land Acquisition Officer and handed over to the MetropolitanTransport Project (Railways) for Mass Rapid Transit Systemscheme after observing all statutory provisions and Hon’ble Courtorders.

4. You have again submitted a lawyer notice in the reference 3[rd]cited and sent petitions in the reference 4[th] cited to the Governmentfor reconsideration of your request. Therefore, your request wasonce again examined by the Government in the light of the HighCourt orders in the reference 5[th] cited. The Hon’ble High Court,in the said order dated 04.03.2005 and modified on 18.03.2005,has ordered that, instead of the Housing Board, the Governmentwould pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. Hencethe whole issue was again re-examined by the Government afresh.

5. As already submitted by the Government before the HighCourt on more than one occasion, I am directed to informyou that your request for allotment of land in any one of theTamil Nadu Housing Board/Chennai MetropolitanDevelopment Authority scheme will not arise as the landswere not acquired for the purpose of Tamil Nadu HousingBoard of Chennai Metropolitan Development Authorityschemes but they were acquired for Mass Rapid TransitSystem and handed over to the Metropolitan TransportProject (Railways) which come under Government of Indiafor their railway scheme. Hence acquisition of your land inS.No.300/12 measuring 5445 and 5554 sq.ft. respectively wasnot arbitrary or illegal in any way as all procedural formalitieswere gone thro’ by the Land Acquisition Officer as per the LandAcquisition Act. The lands were already vested with theMetropolitan Transport Project (Railways) for Mass RapidTransit System and, therefore, there is no justification forallotment of land to you in any scheme area when the landswere not acquired either by Tamil Nadu Housing Board orChennai Metropolitan Development Authority.

6. I am, therefore, directed to inform you that in view of theforegoing valid reasons your request is not feasible of compliance.

Your faithfullySd/-

For Secretary to Government.

Copy to:

The Member-Secretary, Chennai Metropolitan DevelopmentAuthority, Chennai-8.

The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai-35.

The Collector of Chennai, Singaravelar Maaligai, Rajaji Salai,Chennai-I.

The Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) MRTS, TiurmailaiRailway Station, Mylapore, Chennai-4.

The Special Tahsildar, (Land Acquisition), Chennai MetropolitanDevelopment Authority, Chennai-8 (for guidance andinformation).”

(emphasis supplied)

The representation made by the private respondents in the otherappeals, however, were not replied to, as a result of which they filedfresh writ petition(s) which were heard analogously with the writpetition(s) filed by the private respondent(s) in the aforementioned twoappeals questioning the communication dated 26[th] May, 2005, rejectingtheir representation.

4. All connected writ petitions were accordingly heard and decidedtogether by the impugned judgment. The reason which weighed with theHigh Court to allow the writ petitions filed by the concerned privaterespondent(s) can be discerned from the discussion in paragraph Nos.6and 7 of the impugned judgment. We deem it apposite to reproduce thesame along with the operative order contained in paragraph Nos.8 and 9of the impugned judgment. The same read thus:

“6. We have already referred to the fact that this order has becomefinal. Though it is stated that the petitioners/land owners deposited,the fact remains, even without resorting to acquisition proceeding,possession of the lands was forcibly taken from the petitioners. Itis also not in dispute that, in order to implement the project, namely,M.R.T.S. Scheme, possession of the lands was taken forciblyand the construction work was started without awaiting for thecompletion of the acquisition proceedings. That was that reasonfor the learned Judge to pass the directions in the order dated A

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12.12.2003. In fact, the learned Judge heavily relied on the SupremeCourt decision reported in 1993 AIR SCW 2923 (cited supra)while passing the positive direction to the Government. As rightlyobserved by the learned Judge in the order dated12.12.2003, the petitioners are entitled to alternate siteunder the Special Category of displaced persons due to theacquisition of their lands for the Railways. Unfortunately, inW.P. No.39279 of 2005, the second respondent, in spite of thereasoned positive direction dated 12.12.2003 of the learned Judgeof this Court, rejected the request of the petitioner. Likewise, inthe other two cases, though the order was passed even as earlyas on 12.12.2003 and representations were made on 18.4.2005,no order has been passed by the Government till this date.

7. In view of the peculiar factual position, viz, that the land of thepetitioners were taken possession forcibly even before initiationof the acquisition proceedings; and of the stand taken by thepetitioners that they lost their respective housing plots; and alsotaking note of the positive direction of this Court, dated12.12.2003, to provide equivalent alternate site under thespecial category of displaced persons; we are of the viewthat the rejection order dated 26.5.2005 passed by the Governmentin respect of the petitioner in W.P. No.39279 of 2005 is liable tobe quashed. As far as the petitioners in W.P. Nos.11907 and 11908of 2006 are concerned, they are also entitled to similar allotmentas directed in the order dated 12.12.2003.

8. In these circumstances, we issue the following directions:-

(i) The Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban LandDevelopment Department, Fort St. George, Chennai-9 isdirected to allot alternate land to the petitioners, approximatein extent to the acquired land, within the Corporation/City limits,within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copyof this order.

(ii) the petitioners are liable to pay the cost of the land as fixedby the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

9. Writ petitions are allowed with the above directions. No costs.Connected Miscellaneous Petitions stand closed.”

(emphasis supplied)

5. By these appeals, the State Government has assailed theaforementioned judgment. According to the appellant, the lands inquestion were acquired in accordance with law and, after following dueprocess, possession thereof was taken over and thereafter made over tothe appropriate authority of the MRTS Project (Railways). In other words,the land was not acquired for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board as such. Itis urged that the direction issued by the High Court vide the impugnedjudgment is on an erroneous assumption that the State Government wasobliged to provide an alternative housing site to the private respondent(s)in the concerned appeals, in terms of the direction given by the HighCourt vide order dated 12[th] December, 2003. It is then contended thatthe direction given by the High Court in the impugned judgment is in thenature of granting an extra-legal concession by way of allotment of analternative site in lieu of acquired lands sans any such legal obligation onthe State under the 1894 Act or any policy in force pertaining to theproject of MRTS (Railways) to be implemented by the Ministry ofRailway, Government of India. The appellant has relied on the decisionsof this Court to buttress the proposition that the private respondent(s)had no legal right to get an alternative housing site in such a situation.The appellant has also distinguished the reported judgments referred toby the High Court in the impugned judgment as being inapplicable to thefacts of the present case.

6. The private respondent(s), on the other hand, have supportedthe view expressed by the High Court in the impugned judgment andwould submit that the direction was in furtherance of the obligation ofthe State flowing from the order dated 12[th] December, 2003. Further, inlight of the reported decisions adverted to by the High Court in theimpugned judgment, it is not open to the appellant-State to deny therelief of allotment of an alternative housing site to them as a specialcategory of displaced persons due to the stated project. In addition, theprivate respondent(s), during the pendency of these appeals, had filedan affidavit to place on record that in the past, the State Governmentexercised discretionary power to allot alternative housing site to theaffected persons due to the acquisition of their land for public purposes.The private respondent(s) would submit that no interference in the factsituation of the present case is warranted and the appeals be dismissed.

7. We have heard Mr. V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel, for theappellant and Mr. A. Mariarputham, learned Senior Counsel, for theprivate respondent(s).

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A8. The foremost reason which weighed with the High Court is,the direction issued by the High Court vide order dated 12[th] December,2003 had attained finality. Indubitably, that order has not been challengedby the State or any other State Authority. Nevertheless, the purport ofthe order is nothing more than a direction to the State Government andthe Tamil Nadu Housing Board “to consider” the representation(s) madeBby the private respondent(s) for allotment of an alternative housing sitein any one of the housing projects promoted by the Tamil Nadu HousingBoard, as a special category of displaced persons. Thus, the direction isnot in the nature of a peremptory direction to allot an alternative housingsite despite absence of any policy with reference to the project underCconsideration or obligation flowing from the provisions of 1894 Act. Thisis the first fallacy committed by the High Court in the impugned judgment.

9. As regards the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to bythe High Court, we must agree with the appellant that the same have noapplication to the fact situation of the present case. For, in State of U.P.DVs. Smt. Pista Devi and Ors.[2], the direction was issued to thedevelopment authority which had acquired the land for the public purposeof developing housing schemes with a view to provide housingaccommodation to the residents of Meerut City. Reliance has been placedupon paragraph Nos.9 and 10, which read thus:

E“9. It is, however, argued by the learned counsel for the respondentsthat many of the persons from whom lands have been acquiredare also persons without houses or shop sites and if they are to bethrown out of their land they would be exposed to serious prejudice.Since the land is being acquired for providing residentialaccommodation to the people of Meerut those who are beingFexpropriated on account of the acquisition proceedings would alsobe eligible for some relief at the hands of the Meerut DevelopmentAuthority. We may at this stage refer to the provision contained inSection 21(2) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 which readsas follows:

G“21. (2) The powers of the Authority or, as the case may be,the local authority concerned with respect to the disposal ofland under sub-section 1 shall be so exercised as to secure, sofar as practicable, that persons who are living or carrying on business or other activities on the land shall, if they desire toobtain accommodation on land belonging to the Authority orthe local authority concerned and are willing to comply withany requirements of the Authority or the local authorityconcerned as to its development and use, have an opportunityto obtain thereon accommodation suitable to their reasonablerequirements on terms settled with due regard to the price atwhich any such land has been acquired from them:

Provided that where the Authority or the local authorityconcerned proposes to dispose of by sale any land without anydevelopment having been undertaken or carried out thereon, itshall offer the land in the first instance to the persons fromwhom it was acquired, if they desire to purchase it subject tosuch requirements as to its development and use as theAuthority or the local authority concerned may think fit toimpose.”

10. Although the said section is not in terms applicable to thepresent acquisition proceedings, we are of the view that the aboveprovision in the Delhi Development Act contains a wholesomeprinciple which should be followed by all Development Authoritiesthroughout the country when they acquire large tracts of land forthe purposes of land development in urban areas. We hope andtrust that the Meerut Development Authority, for whose benefitthe land in question has been acquired, will as far as practicableprovide a house site or shop site of reasonable size on reasonableterms to each of the expropriated persons who have no houses orshop buildings in the urban area in question.”

The dictum in this judgment concerns the acquisition of large tractsof land, for the purposes of land development, in urban areas. Theacquisition in the present case is certainly not for the purpose ofdevelopment of urban area or for providing a housing scheme to theresidents of the urban area in which the acquired lands are situated. Theacquisition, as aforementioned, is for a project of MRTS (Railways) onbehalf of the Ministry of Railway, Government of India and not for theState Government or State Authority. Furthermore, admittedly, no schemehas been formulated in relation to the stated railway project implementedby the Central Government for providing alternative housing sites toproject affected persons. In the absence of such a scheme, it is AB

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Aunfathomable that the High Court could still issue a direction to the StateGovernment and Tamil Nadu Housing Board, in exercise of writjurisdiction, to provide alternative land to the private respondent(s) as aspecial category of displaced persons. Such a direction cannot becountenanced in law. This is reinforced from the principle underlying thedictum in the case of New Reviera Coop. Housing Society and Anr.BVs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors.[3] In paragraph 9 of thesaid decision, the Court noted that it would be a different matter if theState had come forward with a proposal to provide an alternative sitebut that principle cannot be extended as a condition in all cases ofacquisition of the land that the owner must be given an alternative site orCflat. The Court unambiguously rejected the contention of the affectedpersons that acquisition of their land without providing them an alternativesite would impinge upon their right to life under Article 21 of theConstitution of India.

10. Again, in the case of State of Kerala and Ors. Vs. M.DBhaskaran Pillai and Anr.[4], the Court negatived the claim of the landowners that the unused acquired land for construction of national highwayshould be returned to them. Instead, the Court held that since theacquisition had been completed and the land had vested in the StateGovernment, the unutilised acquired land could be disposed of only throughpublic auction so that the public would benefit by getting a higher value.EIn another case, Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. L. Chandrasekaran(dead) by Lrs. And Ors.[5], the Court restated the doctrine of public trustdisabling the State from giving back the property for a consideration lessthan the market value, if it could not be used for any other public purposeby the State in cases where the acquisition process had been completedFunder the 1894 Act. A similar view has been expressed in V.Chandrasekaran and Anr. Vs. Administrative Officer and Ors.[6]. Inparagraph 31, the Court observed thus:

“31. In view of the above, the law can be crystallised to mean,that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free fromGall encumbrances, it is not the concern of the landowner, whetherthe land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or 3 (1996) 1 SCC 7314 (1997) 5 SCC 4325 (2010) 2 SCC 786H6 (2012) 12 SCC 133

for any other purpose. He becomes persona non grata once theland vests in the State. He has a right to only receive compensationfor the same, unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged.The State neither has the requisite power to reconvey the land tothe person interested nor can such person claim any right ofrestitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutoryamendment to this effect.”

11. The private respondents, however, would urge that the StateGovernment had initiated the acquisition proceedings and was intentlyconcerned with the stated project within the State and, for which reason,it could not be extricated from its obligation flowing from the existingState policy at the relevant time enabling the State Government to exercisediscretionary quota. The private respondent(s) have relied on instanceswhere such allotments have been made, as is evident from thecommunications annexed at R4, R5 and R6 to the additional affidavitfiled on 15[th] April, 2019, as per the liberty granted by this Court.

12. We have perused the said communications. It is evident that,in these cases, the acquisition was made for construction of houses underLIG/MIG scheme in respect of which a policy existed for grant ofalternative housing site to the affected persons. Those schemes wereimplemented by the State Housing Board. These instances will be of noavail to the private respondents whose lands have been acquired forimplementation of MRTS Project implemented by the Government ofIndia (Railways). The private respondent(s) have been duly compensatedin conformity with the mandate of the Act of 1894. Therefore, theycannot expect any further relief much less from the State Governmentor, for that matter, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

13. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to dilate onthe plea taken by the appellant that the policy regarding grant of alternativehousing site as a discretionary power of the State Government has beendiscontinued from the year 2011. For the completion of record, however,we must note the argument of the private respondent(s) that their claimmust be decided only on the basis of policy as it existed at the relevanttime and at least at the time of direction issued by the High Court videthe impugned judgment in the year 2006. As aforementioned, it is notnecessary for us to take this argument any further as we have held thatthe schemes applicable to the acquisition for development of houseshave no application to the project for which the lands owned by the AB

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Aprivate respondent(s) came to be acquired for implementation of a projectby the Government of India (Railways).

14. The other decision which commended to the High Court alsohas no application to the present case. For, in Bharat Singh and Ors.Vs. State of Haryana and Ors.[7], the land was acquired for developmentBand utilization for industrial purpose. The dictum in paragraph No.18 ofthe said decision, in no way, can be construed to mean that even if nopolicy for allotment of alternative housing site in connection with thestated project to be executed by the Railways is in force, yet the projectaffected land owners should be provided an alternative housing site thattoo by the State. On the other hand, the observation therein is merely toCdirect that the land owners who had become landless by the acquisitionof their land should make an application for allotment of alternative landand that they may be given priority in the matter of allotment providedthey fulfill the conditions for such allotment and if land is available. Inthe case of S.B. Kishore Vs. Union of India[8], the acquisition was forDthe purpose of development of the urban area and the relief given to theland owner was in the peculiar facts of that case. More importantly, therelief was with reference to the existing policy of allotting alternativehousing sites to the affected land owners. Even in the case of HansrajH. Jain (supra), the acquisition was for setting up a new township anda policy decision of the Government to offer alternative housing site toEthe affected land owner was applicable to such acquisition, as can bediscerned from paragraph 33 of the said judgment.

15. In view of the above, we have no hesitation in setting asidethe impugned judgment and, resultantly, dismissing the writ petitions filedby the private respondent(s).F

16. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed. The impugned commonjudgment and order of the High Court dated 28[th] April, 2006 in writpetition Nos.39279 of 2005, 11907 of 2006, 11908 of 2006 and 19029 of2006, respectively, is set aside. Resultantly, the aforementioned writpetitions are dismissed. All pending interim applications are disposed of.GNo order as to costs.

Ankit Gyan

Appeals allowed.

7 (1988) 4 SCC 534

H8 AIR 1991 SC 90