SADHNA CHAUDHARY versus STATE OF U.P. & ANR. on 6 March 2020

[2020] 4 S.C.R. 887

SADHNA CHAUDHARY

v.

STATE OF U.P. & ANR.

(Civil Appeal No. 2077 of 2020)

MARCH 06, 2020

[S. A. BOBDE, CJI, B. R. GAVAI AND SURYA KANT, JJ.]

Service Law: Judicial service – Allegation against appellantjudicial officer that while posted as ADJ, she had decided the landacquisition reference illegally and against all judicial norms andpropriety awarding to the claimants the amount of compensationat an unduly high rate which led to inference that she was actuatedby extraneous considerations and thereby failed to maintainabsolute integrity and complete devotion of duty and committedmisconduct under U.P. Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1956– Enquiry Committee held that the charges were proved for, theerrors were apparent in both cases which were such shockingblunders that they could not be attributed to mere misjudgment andconsequently were proved to be deliberate – Accordingly, order ofdismissal from service passed – Appellant unsuccessfullychallenged the order of dismissal before High Court – On appeal,held: It is the decision making process of delinquent officer andnot the end result of the judicial process which could be subjectedto disciplinary action – It is a matter of record that at the timewhen the High Court was seized of this matter, writ petitions againstboth of the appellant’s land acquisition judgments were dismissedby its coordinate benches – High Court nevertheless, rightlyobserved that dismissal of writ petitions against the appellant’sorders did not serve as vindication or confirmation of her orders– Indeed, as correctly noted by the High Court, the scope ofjudicial review under Art.226 is limited – The standards to be metprior to interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction are very high,and there needs to be gross substantive injustice through theconclusion, glaring irregularities in procedure or the need toresolve important questions of law for a writ court to overturn theReference Court’s order – Hence, dismissal of writ petition merelysignifies the failure to demonstrate any of these high standards,in a particular case, and not the endorsement of the orders passed

887

A

B

C

DEF

G

H

Aby a subordinate authority – However, the facts of the instant caseare distinct – This Court, in fact, entered into the merits of one ofthe allegedly erroneous orders – Not only was the judgmentaffirmed, but rather the compensation was further enhanced – It,therefore, can no longer be stated that the appellant’s order waswrong in conclusion – This fact is significant as it establishes thatBthe increase in compensation by the appellant was not abhorrent– There is no explicit mention of any extraneous considerationbeing actually received or of unbecoming conduct on the part ofthe appellant – Instead, the very basis of the finding of‘misbehaviour’ is the end result itself, which as per the High CourtCwas so shocking that it gave rise to a natural suspicion as to theintegrity and honesty of the appellant – Although this might be rightin a vacuum, however, given how the end result itself has beenuntouched by superior courts and instead in one of the two cases,the compensation only increased, no such inference can be made– Thus, case against the appellant not made out – Order ofDdismissal set aside – Constitution of India – Art.226 – Judicialservice.Judicial Officers: Judicial officers must aspire and adhereto a higher standard of honesty, integrity and probity – Also meresuspicion cannot constitute ‘misconduct’ – Any ‘probability’ ofEmisconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentarymaterial, even though the standard of proof would obviously notbe at par with that in a criminal trial.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

Conclusion

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. It is a principle since the nineteenth century thatFjudges cannot be held responsible for the end result or the effectof their decisions. This is necessary to both uphold the rule oflaw, and insulate judicial reasoning from extraneous factors. Itis courts, which uphold the law and ensure its enforcement. Theyinstil trust of the constitutional order in people, and ensure theGmajesty of law and adherence to its principles. Courts henceprevent people from resorting to their animalistic instincts, andinstead provide them with a gentler and more-civilisedalternative of resolving disputes. In getting people to obey theirdicta, Courts do not make use of guns or other (dis)incentives,but instead rely on the strength of their reasoning and a certainHtrust and respect in the minds of the general populace. Hence, it is necessary that any corruption or deviation from judicialpropriety by the guardians of law themselves, be dealt withsternly and swiftly. [Paras 18, 19] [897-B-E]

2. The judicial officers must aspire and adhere to a higherstandard of honesty, integrity and probity. Also mere suspicioncannot constitute ‘misconduct’. Any ‘probability’ of misconductneeds to be supported with oral or documentary material, eventhough the standard of proof would obviously not be at par withthat in a criminal trial. While applying these yardsticks, the HighCourt is expected to consider the existence of differing standardsand approaches amongst different judges. [Paras 20, 21] [897-F; 899-G-H; 900-A]

Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra(2019) 9 SCC 144 – referred to.

3. It is a matter of record that at the time when the HighCourt was seized of this matter, writ petitions against both ofthe appellant’s land acquisition judgments had been dismissedby its coordinate benches. The High Court nevertheless, rightlyobserved that dismissal of writ petitions against the appellant’sorders did not serve as vindication or confirmation of her orders.Indeed, as correctly noted by the High Court, the scope ofjudicial review under Article 226 is limited. The standards to bemet prior to interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction are veryhigh, and there needs to be gross substantive injustice throughthe conclusion, glaring irregularities in procedure or the needto resolve important questions of law for a writ court to overturnthe Reference Court’s order. Hence, dismissal of writ petitionmerely signifies the failure to demonstrate any of these highstandards, in a particular case, and not the endorsement of theorders passed by a subordinate authority. However, the facts ofthe present case are distinct. This Court, in fact, entered intothe merits of one of the allegedly erroneous orders. Not onlywas the judgment affirmed, but rather the compensation wasfurther enhanced. It hence can no longer be stated that theappellant’s order was wrong in conclusion. This fact is significantas it establishes that the increase in compensation by theappellant was not abhorrent. Had the charge been specific thatthe decision-making process was effectuated by extraneousconsiderations, then the correctness of the appellant’s A

B

C

DE

F

G

H

Aconclusions probably would not have mattered as much.However, a perusal of the charges would make it evident thatthe exclusive cause of enquiry, inference of dishonesty as wellas imposition of penalty was only on the basis of the conclusionof enhancement of compensation. Given how the challenge toone of those two orders had been turned down at the High CourtBstage, and the order was both affirmed and furthered in principleby this Court, the very foundation of the charges no longersurvives. [Paras 24-26] [900-E-H; 901-A-C]

4. There is no fault in the proposition that the end resultof adjudication does not matter, and only whether the delinquentCofficer had taken illegal gratification (monetary or otherwise) orhad been swayed by extraneous considerations while conductingthe process is of relevance. There is no explicit mention of anyextraneous consideration being actually received or ofunbecoming conduct on the part of the appellant. Instead, the very basis of the finding of ‘misbehaviour’ is the end result itself,Dwhich as per the High Court was so shocking that it gave riseto a natural suspicion as to the integrity and honesty of theappellant. Although this might be right in a vacuum, however,given how the end result itself has been untouched by superiorcourts and instead in one of the two cases, the compensationEonly increased, no such inference can be made. Thus, the entirecase against the appellant collapses like a house of cards. Theorder of dismissal is set aside. [Paras 27-29] [901-D-F-H; 902- A-B]

Lile Singh v. State Land Acquisition Reference No. 193Fof 2006 delivered on 10.02.2003 ; Umesh Chandrav. State Land Acquisition Reference No. 91 of 2001delivered on 07.11.2003 ; PC Joshi v. State of UP(2001) 6 SCC 491 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 369 ; Unionof India v. J Ahmed AIR 1979 SC 1022 : [1979] 3SCR 504 ; Agra Development Authority v. State of UPG2004 All LJ 1853 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

[2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 369referred toPara 11[1979] 3 SCR 504referred toPara 14H(2019) 9 SCC 144referred toPara 20

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2077of 2020.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.2018 of the HighCourt of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Writ Petition No.170 (S/B) of 2006.

Dhusyant Dave, Sr. Adv., Ms. Shirin Khajuria, Ms. RoopaliLakhotia, Ms. Radhika Maharwal, Ms. Asavari Jain and Ms. GeetanjaliVishwanathan, Advs. for the Appellant.

Ashok K. Srivastava, Sr. Adv., Sunny Choudhary, Lalit Sankhla,Adarsh Upadhyay and Amol Chitravanshi, Advs. for the Respondents.

The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:

JUDGMENT

1. Leave Granted.

2. This appeal has been preferred by Sadhana Chaudhary, beingaggrieved, against an order dated 12.12.2018 passed by the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad by which her writ petition, seeking judicialreview of her dismissal from the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Servicesby Respondent No. 1, had been rejected.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The appellant was recruited into the Uttar Pradesh JudicialServices on 05.06.1975 and was posted as Additional Munsif, Dehradun.She was subsequently promoted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate Cadrein 1981, and again to the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Services on21.03.1987.

4. A Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,while seized of the first appeal against a Land Acquisition Reference,made certain observations on 05.03.2004 with regard to the manner inwhich some other land acquisition cases of similar nature were beingadjudicated by subordinate judicial officers in the state of UttarPradesh.[1] A copy of the judgment was placed by the Registrar beforethe Administrative Committee of High Court for appropriate action. TheAdministrative Committee constituted a committee comprising of twoJudges to probe into complaints of collusion in land acquisition matters.

1 Agra Development Authority v. State of UP, 2004 All LJ 1853.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

AThis enquiry committee after visiting numerous districts of westernUttar Pradesh (UP) and examination of many judgments, submitted areport on 19.09.2004 recommending initiation of disciplinary actionagainst certain judicial officers, including the appellant.

5. Accordingly, a Charge Sheet was served upon the appellantBwith regard to two judicial orders delivered by her during her stint asAdditional District Judge at Ghaziabad. Following were the chargesattributed to the appellant:

“Charge No.1 - That you on 10.02.2003 while posted as IIndAdditional District Judge Ghaziabad decided Land AcquisitionCReference No.193/1996 Lile Singh Vs. State of U.P. and 35others illegally and against all judicial norms and proprietyawarding to the claimants solatium, additional amount and interestover and above the rate at which two other claimants had enteredinto compromise which was inclusive of such other benefits atDan enhanced rate of Rs. 265/- per sq. yard as against Rs. 74.40determined by the S.L.A.O. for land area 276 Bighas 12 Biswasand 15 Biswansi, unduly awarded an additional amount ofRs. 47,73,39,903.86 which leads to an inference that you wereactuated by extraneous considerations and you thereby failed tomaintain absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty and youEthus committed misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of UPGovt. Servants Conduct rules 1956.

Charge No.2 - That you on 7.11.2003 posted as AdditionalDistrict Judge, Court No.1, Ghaziabad, while deciding LandFAcquisition Reference No.91 of 2001 Umesh Chandra Vs. Stateof UP and 66 other cases enhanced the rate of compensationfrom Rs.100/- per square yard determined by the S.L.A.O toRs.160/- per square yard, illegally disregarding the exemplars filedby the defendants including your own award in Land AcquisitionReference No.1 of 1992, Surendra Vs State of UP decided onG24.03.1993, for land acquired in the same year, in the same areaand under the same scheme in order to award an additionalamount of Rs. 28,53,24,896.80 to the claimants for land area483 Bighas, 14 Biswas and 8 Biswansis leading to inference thatyou were actuated by extraneous considerations and you therebyHfailed to maintain absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty, and you thus committed misconduct within the meaning of Rule3 of UP Government Servants Conduct Rules 1956.”

(Emphasis applied)

6. The appellant submitted detailed reply to the chargesheet, aswell as additional written arguments. Subsequently, an enquiry wasconducted and the Enquiry Committee through its report dated09.09.2005 held that both the charges had been proved for these wereerrors apparent in both cases which were such ‘shocking blunders’ thatthey could not be attributed to mere misjudgment, and consequently wereproved to be ‘deliberate’. The said report was placed before theAdministrative Committee which accepted the same vide resolutiondated 29.11.2005, and referred the matter to the Full Court fordetermination of quantum of punishment. The Full Court resolved todismiss the appellant from service and consequently forwarded itsrecommendation to the State (Respondent No. 1), which through anoffice memorandum issued by its Appointments Department on17.01.2006, dismissed the appellant from service with immediate effect.The appellant challenged the order of dismissal before the High Courton judicial side invoking the writ jurisdiction.

7. The Division Bench of the HC took note of the two landacquisition references which had been decided by the appellant. Withregards to the first case of Lile Singh v. State[2] it held that the appellanthad wrongly relied upon a compromise deed of two other claimants toenhance compensation from Rs. 74.40/sq yd (as determined by theSpecial Land Acquisition Officer) to Rs. 264/sq yd. Additionally, shehad awarded solatium and interest over and above the said determinedrate, which led to a steep escalation to Rs. 720/sq yd. Holding suchreliance on compromise deeds as being incomprehensible owing to thestatutory bar of Section 11(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, theescalation was deemed disproportionate and against judicial propriety.

8. With regard to the second reference in Umesh Chandra v.State[3], the Court observed that the appellant as a judge illegallydisregarded exemplars filed by the State-respondents, particularly, anaward of Rs. 108/sq yd passed only a few months ago by her in a similarcase. Notwithstanding such evidence, the appellant was said to have 2 Land Acquisition Reference No. 193 of 2006, delivered on 10.02.2003.

3 Land Acquisition Reference No. 91 of 2001, delivered on 07.11.2003.

AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

Aincreased the compensation from Rs. 100/sq yd to Rs. 160/sq yd, incontravention of all judicial norms.

9. The Bench opined that it was settled law that although thefinal decision made by a judicial officer was of no relevance for purposesof disciplinary enquiry, however, the legality and correctness of theBdecision-making process as well as the conduct of the officers indischarge of their duties ought to be considered. The High Courtaccordingly endorsed the Respondent’s plea that the decision-makingprocess of the appellant while deciding the aforementioned two landacquisition references was bereft of judicial propriety, settled judicialnorms and was actuated by extraneous considerations. Additionally, theCHigh Court placed emphasis on the windfall gain made available to theclaimants as being evidence of the deliberate lapses made by theappellant in response to extraneous considerations, and not merely errorsof judgment. This, the High Court noted, amounted to misconduct asopined by the Enquiry Committee.D

10. Furthermore, the Court noted that, even otherwise, strict rulesof evidence were inapplicable to departmental enquiries, and the scopeof judicial review in such matters also being very limited, findings ofthe disciplinary enquiry could be interfered with only in the completeabsence of material, which was not the case at hand.E

CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES

11. Counsel for the appellant made a spirited argument thatalthough the High Court undoubtedly expounded the correct law,however it failed to appropriately apply it to the facts of the presentFcase. He argued that the chargesheet made no allegation of the‘decision-making process’ being illegal, and the same could not be madea ground for the appellant’s dismissal later. Taking the Court throughthe charge sheet on record, it was highlighted that no allegation of receiptof any illegal gratification or being swayed by any specific extraneousfactor was even levelled against her, let alone being proved. NoGwitnesses or material to cast doubts upon the decision-making processwere adduced, except for merely the two land acquisition referenceorders. This, as per PC Joshi v. State of UP[4], was clearlyimpermissible. Even otherwise, determining appropriateness of the H4 (2001) 6 SCC 491.

substance of the judicial orders was said to be the domain of appellatecourts and not the enquiry committees.

12. Even on merits, it was contended that the High Court erredin holding that the appellant had illegally relied upon compromise deedswhile authoring the order in Liley Singh, for the supposed bar underSection 11(3) of the LA Act was applicable only to awards byCollectors. Reference Courts were guided by distinct legal provisionsunder Sections 23 and 24, per which compromise deeds were notexcluded. The escalations were also shown as not being arbitrary, butrather founded upon the Compromise Policy of the New Okhla IndustrialDevelopment Authority, which was tweaked to grant statutory dues ofsolatium and interest instead of the additional 10% developed land beinggranted by the State authorities. Hence, it was pleaded, that if anything,the net compensation of Rs. 720/sq yd was effectively lower in cost tothe State than the Rs. 1120/sq yd being borne under their own policy.

13. Qua Umesh Chand, it was submitted that the deviation fromthe appellant’s very own judgment rendered five months ago, was aresult of the substantial development and increase in prices which tookplace in the interregnum. This was duly backed up by documentaryevidence produced by the vigilant claimants, and hence compensationwas enhanced by a factor of 60% to Rs. 160/sq yd. Glaringly, this verycompensation, which was found as being a shocking blunder by theenquiry committee, was further enhanced by the Apex Court in an SLPfiled by some other claimants to Rs. 297/sq yd., and appeals filed bythe Local Development Authority had been dismissed. Thus, the verybasis of the inference of misconduct was claimed as not havingsurvived.

14. Reiterating the position of law expounded by the High Court,the appellant argued that it was the conduct of a judicial officer indischarge of her duties, and not the legality/correctness of her decision,could be subjected to disciplinary action. Given the detailed reasons inboth references by the appellant, there was no ‘reckless discharge ofduties’ either. Even if there were to be such omission in duty, in theabsence of any charge of illegal gratification, it would amount to‘negligence’ and not ‘misconduct’ as per this Court’s order in Unionof India v. J Ahmed[5]. The charges were said to be based merely upon 5 AIR 1979 SC 1022.

AB

C

DE

F

G

H

Aunfounded suspicion, and any possible errors in the judicial orders werecontended not to be grounds for action, owing to long-settled principlesof judicial immunity tracing back to the Judicial Officers Protection Act,1850.

15. The enquiry itself was stated to be roving in nature, withoutBany rational basis for selecting those two cases only. The order of theHigh Court in Agra Development Authority (supra) was to beapplicable only to instances where complaints of judicial impropriety orallegations of collusion in land acquisition reference cases were madeagainst judicial officers, which was not the present case.CNotwithstanding guilt, the appellant urged that the quantum ofpunishment was unfair. Having rendered almost thirty years ofunblemished service, dismissing her on the strength of abovestatedcharges, was prayed as being disproportionate.

16. On the other hand, Learned Counsel for the High CourtD(Respondent No. 2) contended that judicial officers are not ordinarygovernment servants, and that they must adhere to a higher standardof probity and ought to be above suspicion. Persons occupying suchhigh posts should have high integrity, honesty, moral vigour, fairness andmust be impervious to corrupt or venial influences. The limited scopeof interference in matters of domestic enquiry where the allegationsEfounded upon specific facts have been proved, was also highlighted.

17. The scope of the present proceedings, thus was sought tobe restricted, by drawing attention to constitutional provisions whichbestowed exclusive control of the High Court over the subordinateFjudges, with the aim of preserving independence of judiciary. Given thefact that opportunities of being heard and placing on record writtensubmissions were duly accorded to the appellant, and her detailed replieshad been considered and rejected, it was not open for her to seekre-determination of her case through this Court. Both the enquirycommittee and the Full Court were contended to have applied their mindsGand passed reasoned orders wherein it was unequivocally found thatthe appellant had utterly failed to justify her conduct and had acted ina most reckless and arbitrary manner, which was bereft of all judicialpropriety. This was pleaded to undoubtedly amount to ‘gravestmisconduct’, justifying the dismissal of services for preserving publicHtrust in the judiciary.

ANALYSIS

18. Undoubtedly, the High Court is correct in its observation ofthe applicable law. Indeed, the end result of the judicial process doesnot matter, and what matters is only the decision-making processemployed by the delinquent officer. Clearly, it is a principle since thenineteenth century that judges cannot be held responsible for the endresult or the effect of their decisions.[6] This is necessary to both upholdthe rule of law, and insulate judicial reasoning from extraneous factors.

19. Even furthermore, there are no two ways with the propositionthat Judges, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion. Judicialofficers do discharge a very sensitive and important constitutional role.They not only keep in check excesses of the executive, safeguardcitizens’ rights and maintain law and order. Instead, they support thevery framework of civilised society. It is courts, which uphold the lawand ensure its enforcement. They instil trust of the constitutional orderin people, and ensure the majesty of law and adherence to its principles.Courts hence prevent people from resorting to their animalistic instincts,and instead provide them with a gentler and more-civilised alternativeof resolving disputes. In getting people to obey their dicta, Courts donot make use of guns or other (dis)incentives, but instead rely on thestrength of their reasoning and a certain trust and respect in the mindsof the general populace. Hence, it is necessary that any corruption ordeviation from judicial propriety by the guardians of law themselves,be dealt with sternly and swiftly.

20. It has amply been reiterated by this Court that judicial officersmust aspire and adhere to a higher standard of honesty, integrity andprobity. Very recently in Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare v. State ofMaharashtra[7], a Division Bench of this Court very succinctly collatedthese principles and reiterated that:

“5. The first and foremost quality required in a Judge is integrity.The need of integrity in the judiciary is much higher thanin other institutions. The judiciary is an institution whosefoundations are based on honesty and integrity. It is,therefore, necessary that judicial officers should possess thesterling quality of integrity. This Court in Tarak Singh v. Jyoti 6 See Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850.

7 (2019) 9 SCC 144.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

Basu [Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu, (2005) 1 SCC 201] held asfollows: (SCC p. 203)

“Integrity is the hallmark of judicial discipline, apart fromothers. It is high time the judiciary took utmost care tosee that the temple of justice does not crack from inside,which will lead to a catastrophe in the justice-deliverysystem resulting in the failure of public confidence in thesystem. It must be remembered that woodpeckers insidepose a larger threat than the storm outside.”

B

6. The behaviour of a Judge has to be of an exactingstandard, both inside and outside the court. This Courtin Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad [DayaShankar v. High Court of Allahabad, (1987) 3 SCC 1:1987SCC (L&S) 132] held thus: (SCC p.1)

C

“Judicial officers cannot have two standards, one in thecourt and another outside the court. They must have onlyone standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. Theycannot act even remotely unworthy of the office theyoccupy.”

D

7. Judges are also public servants. A Judge should alwaysEremember that he is there to serve the public. A Judge is judgednot only by his quality of judgments but also by the quality andpurity of his character. Impeccable integrity should bereflected both in public and personal life of a Judge. Onewho stands in judgments over others should beincorruptible. That is the high standard which is expected ofFJudges.

E

8. Judges must remember that they are not merely employeesbut hold high public office. In R.C. Chandel v. High Court ofM.P. [R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P., (2012) 8 SCC 58: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 343 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 782 : (2012)G2 SCC (L&S) 469] , this Court held that the standard ofconduct expected of a Judge is much higher than that ofan ordinary person. The following observations of this Courtare relevant: (SCC p. 70, para 29)

“29. Judicial service is not an ordinary governmentservice and the Judges are not employees as such. Judges H

hold the public office; their function is one of the essentialfunctions of the State. In discharge of their functions andduties, the Judges represent the State. The office that aJudge holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must bea person of impeccable integrity and unimpeachableindependence. He must be honest to the core with highmoral values. When a litigant enters the courtroom, hemust feel secured that the Judge before whom his matterhas come, would deliver justice impartially anduninfluenced by any consideration. The standard ofconduct expected of a Judge is much higher than anordinary man. This is no excuse that since the standardsin the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn fromthe society cannot be expected to have high standards andethical firmness required of a Judge. A Judge, likeCaesar’s wife, must be above suspicion. The credibility ofthe judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who manit. For a democracy to thrive and the rule of law tosurvive, justice system and the judicial process have tobe strong and every Judge must discharge his judicialfunctions with integrity, impartiality and intellectualhonesty.”

9. There can be no manner of doubt that a Judge must decidethe case only on the basis of the facts on record and the lawapplicable to the case. If a Judge decides a case for anyextraneous reasons then he is not performing his duty inaccordance with law.

10. In our view the word “gratification” does not only meanmonetary gratification. Gratification can be of various types.It can be gratification of money, gratification of power,gratification of lust etc., etc. ...”

(emphasis supplied)

21. We are also not oblivious to the fact that mere suspicioncannot constitute ‘misconduct’. Any ‘probability’ of misconduct needsto be supported with oral or documentary material, even though thestandard of proof would obviously not be at par with that in a criminaltrial. While applying these yardsticks, the High Court is expected toconsider the existence of differing standards and approaches amongst ABC

D

E

F

G

H

Adifferent judges. There are innumerable instances of judicial officerswho are liberal in granting bail, awarding compensation under MACTor for acquired land, backwages to workmen or mandatorycompensation in other cases of tortious liabilities. Such relief-orientedjudicial approaches cannot by themselves be grounds to cast aspersionson the honesty and integrity of an officer.B

22. Furthermore, one cannot overlook the reality of ours being acountry wherein countless complainants are readily available withouthesitation to tarnish the image of the judiciary, often for mere penniesor even cheap momentary popularity. Sometimes a few disgruntledCmembers of the Bar also join hands with them, and officers of thesubordinate judiciary are usually the easiest target. It is, therefore, theduty of High Courts to extend their protective umbrella and ensure thatupright and straightforward judicial officers are not subjected tounmerited onslaught.

D23. It is evident in the case in hand that the High Court itselfwas cognizant of this settled proposition of law. Learned senior counselfor the appellant also finds no fault with these principles, and insteadonly seeks for their application to the facts of the present case.

24. It is a matter of record that at the time when the High CourtEwas seized of this matter, writ petitions against both of the appellant’sland acquisition judgments had been dismissed by its coordinate benches.The High Court has, nevertheless, rightly observed that dismissal of writpetitions against the appellant’s orders did not serve as vindication orconfirmation of her orders. Indeed, as correctly noted by the HighFCourt, the scope of judicial review under Article 226 is limited. Thestandards to be met prior to interference in exercise of writ jurisdictionare very high, and there needs to be gross substantive injustice throughthe conclusion, glaring irregularities in procedure or the need to resolveimportant questions of law for a writ court to overturn the ReferenceGCourt’s order. Hence, dismissal of writ petition merely signifies thefailure to demonstrate any of these high standards, in a particular case,and not the endorsement of the orders passed by a subordinate authority.

25. However, the facts of the present case are distinct. ThisCourt, in fact, entered into the merits of one of the allegedly erroneousHorders. Not only was the judgment affirmed, but rather the compensation was further enhanced. It hence can no longer be stated that theappellant’s order was wrong in conclusion. This fact is significant as itestablishes that the increase in compensation by the appellant was notabhorrent.

26. Had the charge been specific that the decision-makingprocess was effectuated by extraneous considerations, then thecorrectness of the appellant’s conclusions probably would not havemattered as much. However, a perusal of the charges extracted abovemakes it evident that the exclusive cause of enquiry, inference ofdishonesty as well as imposition of penalty was only on the basis ofthe conclusion of enhancement of compensation. Given how thechallenge to one of those two orders had been turned down at the HighCourt stage, and the other was both affirmed and furthered in principleby this Court, the very foundation of the charges no longer survives.

27. We can find no fault in the proposition that the end result ofadjudication does not matter, and only whether the delinquent officerhad taken illegal gratification (monetary or otherwise) or had beenswayed by extraneous considerations while conducting the process isof relevance. Indeed, many-a-times it is possible that a judicial officercan indulge in conduct unbecoming of his office whilst at the same timegiving an order, the result of which is legally sound. Such unbecomingconduct can either be in the form of a judge taking a case out of turn,delaying hearings through adjournments, seeking bribes to give partiestheir legal dues etc. None of these necessarily need to affect theoutcome. However, importantly in the present case, a perusal of thechargesheet shows that no such allegation of the process having beenvitiated has been made against the appellant.

28. There is no explicit mention of any extraneous considerationbeing actually received or of unbecoming conduct on the part of theappellant. Instead, the very basis of the finding of ‘misbehaviour’ is theend result itself, which as per the High Court was so shocking that itgave rise to a natural suspicion as to the integrity and honesty of theappellant. Although this might be right in a vacuum, however, given howthe end result itself has been untouched by superior courts and insteadin one of the two cases, the compensation only increased, no suchinference can be made. Thus, the entire case against the appellantcollapses like a house of cards.

A

BC

DE

F

G

H

[2020] 4 S.C.R.

ACONCLUSION

In light of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed. Thejudgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed bythe appellant is allowed. The order of dismissal dated 17.01.2006 passedby Respondent No. 1 is set-aside, and the appellant’s prayers forBreinstatement with consequential benefits including retiral benefits, isaccepted. No order as to costs.

Devika Gujral

Appeal allowed.

C

D

E

F

G

H