K. H. NAZAR versus MATHEW K. JACOB & ORS. on 30 September 2019

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[2019] 14 S.C.R. 928

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2019] 14 S.C.R.

K. H. NAZAR

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v.

MATHEW K. JACOB & ORS.

(Civil Appeal Nos.7699-7700 of 2019)

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SEPTEMBER 30, 2019

[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.]

Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 – ss.2(5) and 81(1)(q) – Widthand amplitude of the expression ‘commercial site’ – Appellantrequested environmental clearance to carry out quarryingCoperations on land – Permission was granted – Writ petition wasfiled by Respondent Nos.1 & 2 – Respondents objected that theland in question cannot be used for a purpose other than plantation,especially for quarrying operations – Single Judge of the HighCourt doubted the correctness of the judgment passed by theDDivision Bench of the High Court in State of Kerala v. MohammedaliHaji, which held that quarry falls within the ambit of ‘commercialsite’ and it was exempted from the applicability of the Act – SingleJudge referred the matter to the larger Bench – In the larger Bench,the majority opinion was in favour of the Respondent Nos.1 & .2and held that land which is used for quarrying is not covered byEthe expression ‘commercial site’, therefore, there can be no exemptionof such land from the Act – On appeal, held: There is a definitedistinction between the expression ‘lands’ and ‘sites’ in the contextin which they have been used in the Act – Commercial sites readalong with the other clauses dealing with sites clearly indicate thatFland occupied by structure is described as ‘site’ – The expression‘commercial site’ cannot take into its fold vacant lands, includinglands used for the purpose of quarrying – It has a restrictive meaningin comparison to the other categories of ‘land’ in s.81 – Therefore,quarry cannot fit into the terms ‘commercial site’ – There is no errorin the majority opinion of the Full Bench of the High Court – AppealsGdismissed.

Interpretation of Statutes – Beneficial legislation – Held:Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be construed with apurpose-oriented approach – The Act should receive a liberal H

construction to promote its objects – Also, literal construction ofthe provisions of a beneficial legislation has to be avoided – It isthe Court’s duty to discern the intention of the legislature in makingthe law – Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute shouldreceive a purposeful or functional interpretation – Exceptions tobeneficial legislation should be narrowly interpreted.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. While interpreting a statute, the problem ormischief that the statute was designed to remedy should first beidentified and then a construction that suppresses the problemand advances the remedy should be adopted. It is settled lawthat exemption clauses in beneficial or social welfare legislationsshould be given strict construction. [Para 13] [939-F]

2. There is no dispute that the Kerala Land Reforms Act,1963 is a beneficial legislation. The extent of land that can beheld is fixed and any land in excess has to be surrendered to theGovernment, which is distributed in favour of the landless in theState. The interpretation of the provisions of the Act should bein a manner which promote the said object. [Para 14] [940-B]

3. Section 81 exempts among others, lands comprised ofmills, factories or workshops, lands occupied by educationalinstitutions, and lands owned by Universities, religious andcharitable institutions. House sites, sites of temples, churchesand mosques, sites of buildings including warehouses andcommercial sites are also exempted. There is a definitedistinction between the expressions ‘lands’ and ‘sites’ in thecontext in which they have been used. Commercial sites readalong with the other clauses dealing with sites clearly indicatethat land occupied by structures is described as ‘site’. As statedabove, the other clauses in Section 81 dealing with sites are housesites, temples, churches and mosques and buildings. As such,the expression ‘commercial site’ cannot take into its fold vacantlands, including lands used for the purpose of quarrying. It has arestrictive meaning in comparison to the other categories of ‘land’in Section 81. Therefore, quarry cannot fit into the terms‘commercial site’. The Appellant contended that digging the land A

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Afor extracting stones is for a commercial purpose of making profitand hence quarry is acommercial site. This Court does not agree.A commercial site is a land on which there is a structure beingutilized for an industrial or commercial purpose. Extension ofthe words ‘commercial site’ to quarries would result in defeatingthe purpose of the Act. [Para 15] [940-C-F]B

4. This Court upheld the view of the majority of the fullBench of the High Court that exemption of quarries by theGovernment under Section 81 (3) would not arise if quarries arecovered by Section 81 (1) (q) of the Act. In other words, if quarriesare commercial sites, the need for their exemption in publicCinterest does not arise. Section 81(3) of the Act empowers theGovernment to exempt lands for commercial purposes in publicinterest. The overriding power conferred on the Government toexempt lands from the applicability of the Act cannot be utilizedfor the purpose of interpretation of Section 81 (1) (q) which Dexempts commercial sites from the purview of the Act. Section81 (1) (k) exempts unused lands of industrial or commercialundertakings at the time of commencement of the Act. Theprovision presupposes that an industrial or commercialundertaking was existing on the date of the commencement of the Act and there was some land set apart for the use of theEundertaking in future. The said land is exempted only if the landis used for the industrial or commercial purposes of theundertaking within the time to be fixed by the authority. If theland is not used for the purpose for which it was set apart, theexemption ceases to operate. It is clear from the above thatFSection 81(1) (k) deals with a completely different type of landbelonging to an industrial or commercial undertaking set apartfor use of the said undertaking. Therefore, this Court is not inagreement with the support sought by the dissenting Judge fromSection 81 (1) (k) to interpret the expression ‘commercial site’in Section 81 (1) (q). [Para 17] [941-A-D]G

Regional Executive, Kerala Fishermen’ Welfare FundBoard v. Fancy Food(1995) 4 SCC 34 ;Bombay AnandBhavan Restaurant v. ESI Corporation(2009) 9 SCC61;Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijay Kumar(2008)9 SCC 527 : [2008] 7 SCR 673 ; Workmen v. American H

Express International Banking Corpn. (1985) 4 SCC71 ;Bharat Singh v. Management of New DelhiTuberculosis Centre(1986) 2 SCC 614 : [1986] 2 SCR169 ; Rajasthan SEB v. Associated Stone Industries(2006) 6 SCC 141 – relied on.

State of Kerala v. K. A. Gangadharan(1977) 1 SCC208 : [1977] 1 SCR 960 ;Indian Performing RightsSociety v. Sanjay Dalia(2015) 10 SCC 161 : [ 2015] 8SCR 210 ; Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai ShantramKowshik(1984) 1 SCC 588 ;Minister Administeringthe Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council[2008] HCA 48 – referred to.

K. Krishnankutty v. State of Kerala and Others.CRP No.1245/1975 ;State of Kerala v. MohammedaliHaji (1996) 1 KLT 584(DB) ;One Earth One Life &Ors. v. State of KeralaWP (C) No. 28496 of 2016 –referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7699-7700 of 2019

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.11.2018 of the High Courtof Kerala at Ernakulam in Writ Petition No. (C) 17384/2017 andWrit Petition No. (C) 18246/2017

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A K.V. Vishwanathan, Bechu Kurian Thomas, Sr. Advs., P. VinayKumar, Mukunda Rao, Martin Chacko and Enoch David, Advs. for theAppellant.

Pallav Shishodia, Sr. Adv, Romy Chacko, Prashant Kumar, ShaktiChand Jaidwal, G. Prakash, Jishnu M.L., Mrs. Priyanka Prakash,BMrs. Beena Prakash, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

Leave granted.C

1. The width and amplitude of the expression ‘commercial site’ inSection 2 (5) and Section 81 (1) (q) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act,1963 (for short, “the Act”), falls for our consideration in these Appeals.Commercial sites are exempted from the purview of the Act. The questionwhether a rocky land which is used for quarrying purposes can be treatedDas a ‘commercial site’ and thereby excluded from the applicability of theAct was answered by a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Courtby holding that mere blasting of rocks and conversion into metals doesnot render the area a ‘commercial site’.[1] Twenty years after the saidjudgment, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court took a differentview. Quarrying was held to be a commercial operation involving theEprocess of manufacture. Hence, it was held that a quarry falls within theambit of ‘commercial site’ and is exempted from the applicability of theAct.[2]

2. The Appellant requested environmental clearance for his quarrywhich was recommended in his favour by the District Expert AppraisalFCommittee (DEAC) on 25.04.2017. Respondents No.1 and 2 filed aWrit Petition aggrieved by the said recommendation to permit quarry onland which was a plantation site. It is relevant to note that the Appellant’sland was exempted from the realm of the Act as it was a plantation.The objection of Respondent No.1 and 2 was that the Appellant cannotbe permitted to use the land for a purpose other than plantation, especiallyGfor quarrying operations. After examining the judgments of the HighCourt in K. Krishnankutty v. State of Kerala and Others (supra) andState of Kerala v. Mohammedali Haji (supra), a learned Single Judge 1K. Krishnankutty v. State of Kerala and Others. CRP No.1245/1975H2State of Kerala v. Mohammedali Haji. (1996) 1 KLT 584 (DB)

of the High Court of Kerala doubted the correctness of the latter judgmentin State of Kerala v. Mohammedali Haji (supra) and referred thematter to a larger Bench.

3. The Writ Petition filed by Respondent No.1 and 2 was heardby a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court comprising three Judges.The majority opinion was in favour of Respondent No.1 and 2. It washeld by the majority that the land which is used for quarrying is notcovered by the expression ‘commercial site’. Therefore, there can beno exemption of such land from the applicability of the Act. The Appellantis aggrieved by the said judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court.

4. Mr. K. V. Vishwanathan, learned Senior Counsel for theAppellant took us through the provisions of the Act including Sections2(5), 81 and 83 to argue that a quarry is a commercial site, which isexempted under Section 81 (1) (q) of the Act. He alluded to the statementof objects and reasons to submit that the legislation was made to protectthe interests of all stake-holders. He referred to the meaning of thewords ‘commercial activities’ and ‘business’ to submit that the activityof quarrying is done for profit. Hence, quarrying is a commercial activity.According to him, there can be no distinction between activities doneabove and below the surface of land for the purpose of deciding whetherland is a commercial site or not. He criticized the plurality opinion forerroneously invoking the mischief rule. He commended the judgmentof the dissenting Judge for our acceptance. He emphasized thatenvironmental issues are not germane for interpretation of Sections 2(5) and 81 (1) (q) of the Act.

5. Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned Senior Counsel appearing forthe State of Kerala resisted the submissions made on behalf of theAppellant by submitting that the expression ‘commercial site’ is a termof art and has to be interpreted on the basis of the context in which it isused.

6. Mr. Romy Chacko, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1and 2 asserted that the Act is a beneficial legislation. When there is adoubt about the meaning of expressions used in such a statute, literalinterpretation should be avoided and Courts should adopt the principlesof purposive construction. He submitted that the exemption provisionshould be narrowly construed.

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A7. Before we consider the submissions made by the learnedcounsel, it is necessary to examine the provisions of the Act. Section 83of the Act provides that no person shall be entitled to own or hold orpossess under a mortgage, lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceilingarea with effect from the date notified by the Government of Kerala inthe Gazette. The ceiling area of land is specified in Section 82 of theBAct. Lands exempted under Section 81 shall be excluded fromcomputation of the ceiling area as per Section 82 (6) of the Act. Section81 of the Act is as follows:

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81. Exemptions: - (1) the provisions of this Chapter shall notapply to- C

a) Lands owned or held by the Government of Kerala or theGovernment of any other State in India or the Government ofIndia or a local authority [or the Cochin Port Trust] or anyother authority which the Government may, in public interest,exempt, by notification in the Gazette, from the provisions ofDthis Chapter.

[Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not applyto lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held byany person under lease whether current or time expired orotherwise.]

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Explanation I. – “Lands owned by the Government of Kerala”shall, for the purposes of this clause, have the same meaningas “Government lands” under sub-section (1) of Section 2 ofthe Kerala Government land Assignment Act, 1960 [but landsescheated to the Government and held by tenants entitled tofixity of tenure under Section 13 shall not be deemed to belands owned by the Government of Kerala;]

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Explanation II – Lands, the right, title and interest in respectof which have vested in the Government under sub-section(9) of Section 66 or Section 72, shall not be deemed to be“lands owned by the Government of Kerala” for the purposesof this clause;]

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Explanation III - For the purposes of this clause, “otherauthority” shall include a corporation owned or controlled H

K. H. NAZAR v. MATHEW K. JACOB & ORS.[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

by the Government of Kerala or the Government of any otherState in India or the Government of India;]

b) Lands taken under the management of the Court of Wards; Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease toapply at the end of three years from the commencement ofthis Act;

c) Lands comprised of mills, factories or workshops and whichare necessary for the use of such mills, factories or workshops; d)Private forests; e)Plantations; f)x x x x g)x x x x

h) lands mortgaged to the Government, or to a co-operativesociety (including a co-operative land mortgage bank)registered or deemed to be registered under the Co-operativeSocieties Act for the time being in force, or to the KeralaFinancial Corporation, or to the Kerala IndustrialDevelopment Corporation, or to the State Small IndustriesCorporation, as security for any loan advanced by theGovernment or by such society or Corporation, so long asthe mortgage subsists:

provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease toapply at the end of three years from the commencement ofthis Act;

i) lands purchased by the Kerala Co-operative Central LandMortgage Bank or a Primary Mortgage Bank under Section18 of the Kerala Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks Act,1960 [or by the Kerala State Co-operative Bank Ltd., or by aprimary agricultural credit co-operative society or by ascheduled bank as defined in the Reserve Bank of India Act,1934] so long as such lands continue in the possession of thebank;

j) Lands purchased by the Kerala Financial Corporation orlands the management of which has been taken over by that A

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Corporation, under Section 32 of the State FinancialCorporations Act, 1951, so long as such lands remain in theownership, or continue under the management, as the casemay be, of the said Corporation:

[provided that the exemption under this clause shall not applyin the case of lands the management of which has been takenover by the Corporation on or after the 1[st] day of April, 1964;]

k) lands belonging to or held by an industrial or commercialundertaking at the commencement of this Act, and set apartfor use for the industrial or commercial purpose of theundertaking:

Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease toapply if such land is not actually used for the purpose forwhich it has been set apart, within such time as the DistrictCollector may, by notice to the undertaking, specify, in thatbehalf;

l) x x x x

m) house sites, that is to say, sites occupied by dwelling housesand lands, wells, tanks and other structures necessary forthe convenient employment of the dwelling houses.

Explanation.- For the avoidance of doubt, it is herebydeclared that a compound wall shall not be deemed to be astructure necessary for the convenient enjoyment of a dwellinghouse, if the land on which the dwelling house is situatedand enclosed by the compound wall is more than the landnecessary for the convenient enjoyment of the dwelling house.

n) x x x x

o) sites of temples, churches, mosques and cemeteries andburial and burning grounds:

p) sites of buildings and including warehouses;

q) commercial sites;

r) land occupied by educational institutions including landnecessary for the convenient use of the institutions andplaygrounds attached to such institutions;

K. H. NAZAR v. MATHEW K. JACOB & ORS.[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

s) lands vested in the Bhoodan Yagna Committee; t)lands owned or held by-

i.a University establishment by law; or

ii a religious, charitable or educational institutions of a publicnature; or

iii. a public trust which expression shall include a wakf;Provided that-

(i) the entire income of such lands is appropriated for theUniversity, institution or trust concerned, and

(ii) where the University, institution or trust come to hold thesaid lands after the commencement of this Act, the Governmenthave certified previously that such lands are bona fiderequired for the purposes of the University, institution or trust,as the case may be; and

u) lands granted to defence personnel for gallantry.

(2) [xxx]

(3) The Government may if they are satisfied that it is necessaryto do so in the public interest- (a) on account of any special use to which any land is put; or (b) on account of any land being bona fide required for thepurpose of conversion into plantation or for the extension orpreservation of an existing plantation or for any commercial,industrial, educational or charitable purpose, by notificationin the Gazette, exempt such land from the provisions of thisChapter, subject to such restrictions and conditions as theymay deem fit to impose:

Provided that the land referred to in clause (b) shall be usedfor the purpose for which it is intended within such time asthe Government may specify in that behalf; and, where theland is not so used within the time specified, the exemptionshall cease to be in force.]

8. In the present case, the Appellant is claiming exemption on theground that a quarry would fall within the sweep of ‘commercial site’ as A

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Astated in Section 81 (1) (q). Commercial site is defined in Section 2 (5)as follows:

‘‘2(5) “commercial site” means any land (not being akudiyiruppu or a kudikidappu or karaima) which is usedprincipally for the purposes of any trade, commerce, industry,Bmanufacture or business;’’

9. The Appellant contended that the definition of ‘commercialsite’ is very wide and any land which is principally used for the purposeof trade, commerce, industry, manufacture or business is a commercialsite. According to the Appellant, breaking of rock is a manufacturingCactivity. Quarrying operations involve digging land and breaking of rocksinto metal pieces. It was submitted that digging of land and breaking ofrock is for a commercial activity and the sale of stones is for the purposeof trade and business. We are afraid that we cannot agree.

10. The dominant legislative intent of the Act is the imposition ofDceiling on land holdings and distribution of excess land among landlesspeople.[3] Large number of people have no place of abode in the State ofKerala, which is known as God’s own country. To provide land to suchlandless people by taking it from those who possess in excess is themajor objective of the Act.[4]

E11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be construed witha purpose-oriented approach.[5] The Act should receive a liberalconstruction to promote its objects.[6] Also, literal construction of theprovisions of a beneficial legislation has to be avoided. It is the Court’sduty to discern the intention of the legislature in making the law. Oncesuch an intention is ascertained, the statute should receive a purposefulFor functional interpretation[7].

12. In the words of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.[8], the principles ofstatutory construction of beneficial legislation are as follows:

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3 State of Kerala v. K. A. Gangadharan (1977) 1 SCC 208

4 One Earth One Life & Ors. v. State of Kerala, WP (C) No.28496 of 2016

5 Regional Executive, Kerala Fishermen’ Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food, (1995)4 SCC 34

6 Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. ESI Corporation, (2009) 9 SCC 61 and Unionof India v. Prabhakaran Vijay Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527

7 Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, (1986) 2 SCC 614.

8 Workmen v. American Express International Banking Corpn. (1985) 4 SCC 71

4. The principles of statutory construction are well settled.Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as socialwelfare legislation and human rights’ legislation are not tobe put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputian dimensions.In construing these legislations the imposture of literalconstruction must be avoided and the prodigality of itsmisapplication must be recognised and reduced. Judges oughtto be more concerned with the “colour”, the “content” andthe “context” of such statutes (we have borrowed the wordsfrom Lord Wilberforce’s opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds [(1971)3 All ER 237] ). In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointedout that law is not to be left behind in some island of literalinterpretation but is to enquire beyond the language,unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; thelaw is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguisticconsiderations. In one of the cases cited before us, that is,Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government IndustrialTribunal-cum-Labour Court [(1980) 4 SCC 443], we hadoccasion to say, “Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of‘bread and butter’ statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity,receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designedto give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court isnot to make inroads by making etymological excursions.”

13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that thestatute was designed to remedy should first be identified and then aconstruction that suppresses the problem and advances the remedy shouldbe adopted.[9] It is settled law that exemption clauses in beneficial orsocial welfare legislations should be given strict construction[10]. It wasobserved in Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik(supra) that the exclusionary provisions in a beneficial legislation shouldbe construed strictly so as to give a wide amplitude to the principal objectof the legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds.Similarly, in Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSWAboriginal Land Council[11], Kirby, J. held that the principle of providing 9 Indian Performing Rights Society v. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 161

10 Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik, (1984) 1 SCC 588

11 [2008] HCA 48

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Apurposive construction to beneficial legislations mandates that exceptionsin such legislations should be construed narrowly.

14. There is no dispute that the Act is a beneficial legislation. Theextent of land that can be held is fixed and any land in excess has to besurrendered to the Government, which is distributed in favour of theBlandless people in the State. The interpretation of the provisions of theAct should be in a manner which promote the said object.

15. Section 81 exempts among others, lands comprised of mills,factories or workshops, lands occupied by educational institutions, andlands owned by Universities, religious and charitable institutions. HouseCsites, sites of temples, churches and mosques, sites of buildings includingwarehouses and commercial sites are also exempted. There is a definitedistinction between the expressions ‘lands’ and ‘sites’ in the context inwhich they have been used. Commercial sites read along with the otherclauses dealing with sites clearly indicate that land occupied by structuresis described as ‘site’. As stated above, the other clauses in Section 81Ddealing with sites are house sites, temples, churches and mosques andbuildings. As such, the expression ‘commercial site’ cannot take into itsfold vacant lands, including lands used for the purpose of quarrying. Ithas a restrictive meaning in comparison to the other categories of ‘land’in Section 81. Therefore, quarry cannot fit into the terms ‘commercialEsite’. Mr. Bechu Kurian, leaned Senior Counsel argued on behalf of theAppellant that digging the land for extracting stones is for a commercialpurpose of making profit and hence quarry is a commercial site. We donot agree. A commercial site is a land on which there is a structurebeing utilized for an industrial or commercial purpose. Extension of thewords ‘commercial site’ to quarries would result in defeating the purposeFof the Act.

16. We disagree with the opinion of the dissenting Judge that theexpression ‘commercial site’ should be attributed its natural and originalmeaning. On the basis of the statement made by the learned AdditionalAdvocate General, the dissenting Judge held that if lands used forGquarrying operations prior to the Act coming into force stood exemptedunder Section 81 (1) (k), a quarry should be considered as commercialsite. Further, it was observed that if a quarry can be exempted underSection 81 (3) by the Government in public interest, then quarrying is acommercial activity falling within the sweep of Section 81 (1) (q) of theAct.H

17. We uphold the view of the majority that exemption of quarriesby the Government under Section 81 (3) would not arise if quarries arecovered by Section 81 (1) (q) of the Act. In other words, if quarries arecommercial sites, the need for their exemption in public interest does notarise. Section 81(3) of the Act empowers the Government to exemptlands for commercial purposes in public interest. The overriding powerconferred on the Government to exempt lands from the applicability ofthe Act cannot be utilized for the purpose of interpretation of Section 81(1) (q) which exempts commercial sites from the purview of the Act.Section 81 (1) (k) exempts unused lands of industrial or commercialundertakings at the time of commencement of the Act. The provisionpresupposes that an industrial or commercial undertaking was existingon the date of the commencement of the Act and there was some landset apart for the use of the undertaking in future. The said land is exemptedonly if the land is used for the industrial or commercial purposes of theundertaking within the time to be fixed by the authority. If the land is notused for the purpose for which it was set apart, the exemption ceases tooperate. It is clear from the above that Section 81(1) (k) deals with acompletely different type of land belonging to an industrial or commercialundertaking set apart for use of the said undertaking. Therefore, we arenot in agreement with the support sought by the dissenting Judge fromSection 81 (1) (k) to interpret the expression ‘commercial site’ in Section81 (1) (q).

18. Another submission of the Appellant that quarrying includes amanufacturing activity does not appeal to us. Breaking of rock intosmall pieces of stone, according to us, is not a manufacturing activity.For this view, we seek support from a judgment of this Court in RajasthanSEB v. Associated Stone Industries[12]. It was held in the said judgmentthat cutting and polishing stones into slabs is not a process of manufacturefor the obvious and simple reason that no new and distinct commercialproduct came into existence as the end product still remained stone andthus its original identity continued.

19. The findings recorded in the majority opinion on the issuepertaining to the environment is not relevant for the decision of the dispute.The concern of the Court should have been restricted to the gamut ofthe expression ‘commercial site’. The interpretation of Section 81 whichexempts certain lands and sites should be interpreted in a manner, whichpromotes the object of the Act and restricts concentration of large12(2006) 6 SCC 141

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Aswathes of land in favour of a few individuals. Wider construction ofthe words ‘commercial site’ would defeat the laudable object of the Act.

20. The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no error inthe majority opinion of the Full Bench in the impugned judgment whichrequires to be upheld.

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21. The Appeals are dismissed, accordingly.

Ankit Gyan

Appeals dismissed.

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