STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH PRINCIPAL SECRETARY & ANR. versus MAHENDRA GUPTA & ORS. on 8 February 2018

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH PRINCIPALSECRETARY & ANR.

v.

MAHENDRA GUPTA & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 1562 of 2018)

FEBRUARY 08, 2018

[A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]

Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 – rr.63, 65 –Legality of the order by State Transport Authority – On facts, StateTransport Authority allowed the application for modification of timeschedule for movement of the vehicle, by order dated 15.12.2014 –Matter was heard by the Authority on 16.10.2014, where chairpersonand two members were present, however, the order was deliveredon 15.12.2014 with the signatures of Chairperson and only onemember, since one member was transferred in the meanwhile –Legality of the order dated 15.12.2014 – Held: Concept of takingdecision by majority of votes of the members is very much presentin the scheme of the Rules – Although, where a decision is to betaken by the circulation by votes a special majority is provided inr.65(4) but instant case not being a case of decision by circulation,simple majority by members present was sufficient for making abinding decision by the State Transport Authority – Hearing tookplace on 16.10.2014 where the Chairperson and two members werepresent the quorum being three as per r.68(1) was complete – Further,there being neither any pleading nor any material to hold that thethird member has agreed with the opinion, the present case isexamined as if, the third member did not agree with the orderproposed – Thus, the order issued by the State Transport Authority,signed by the Chairperson and one member is a valid order havingbeen issued with the majority opinion of two out of three, who heardthe application on 16.10.2014, and was fully in accordance withthe statutory scheme of the 1994 Rules – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988– s.68(1) and (3).

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 In the instant case, there is no dispute that when

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Athe meeting was held on 16.10.2014 quorum was complete sinceChairperson and two members were present which fact is clearlynoticed in the order dated 15.12.2014. The three members whowere present in the meeting heard the applicant and objectors.But the order could be issued only on 15.12.2014, by which oneof the members had been transferred and was not available toBsign the order. One more important fact which is to be noticed isthat the Single Judge had categorically noted that the above issuewas raised only during the hearing before the Single Judge andthere was no pleading in the writ petition. [Para 12][452-F-H;453-A]

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1.2 The multi-member body transacts its business afterdebate, consultation and discussion. The view of multi-memberbody is expressed unanimously or by votes. For various kind ofdecisions by multi-member body special majorities are alsoprovided for acceptance of the decision. Normally, all decisionsDof a multi-member body are expressed by opinion of majority ofthe members present except where the special majorities areprovided in the statute itself. [Para 13][453-C-D]

1.3 Although Rules, 1994 do not expressly provide thatdecision of the State Transport Authority shall be taken inEaccordance with the opinions of the majority but there being nospecial majority provided for decision to be taken in the meetingof the State Transport Authority, normal, rule that decision bymajority of the members present has to be followed. In the instantcase, when three members were present and quorum wascomplete, the decision taken by majority, i.e., opinion of twoFmembers shall form the valid decision of the State TransportAuthority. [Para 15][454-B-C]

1.4 The concept of taking decision by majority of votes ofthe members is very much present in the scheme of the Rules.Although, where a decision is to be taken by the circulation byGvotes a special majority is provided in Rule 65(4) but presentbeing not a case of decision by circulation, simple majority bymembers present was sufficient for making a binding decision bythe State Transport Authority. [Para 17][454-E]

1.5 It is clear that observation of the Division Bench of theHHigh Court that there is nothing on record to indicate that the quorum of State Transport Authority was complete, is factuallywrong. The order of the State Transport Authority dated15.12.2014 has been brought on record and the relevant portionof the order has been extracted which clearly mentions that thehearing took place on 16.10.2014 where the Chairperson andtwo members were present the quorum being three as per Rule68(1) was complete. Thus, observation of the Division Bench ofthe High Court that quorum was not complete and matter wasnot heard by three members is not correct. [Para 19][454-H; 455-A-C]

1.6 For the decisions of this Court, Article 145 sub-clause(5) of the Constitution of India provides that judge of this Courtcan deliver a judgment with the concurrence of a majority of theJudges present at the hearing of the case. [Para 21][455-G-H]

1.7 The present is a case where decision by a multi-memberbody is to be taken in the meeting of the Committee as per thestatutory Rules. There being no such majority provided for takinga decision, the decision by majority has to be accepted as theopinion of the State Transport Authority. [Para 21][456-C]

1.8 There is no pleading in the writ petition as to whetherthe third member, who was transferred had agreed with theproposed order or did not agree with the decision, which was tobe delivered by the State Transport Authority. Had third memberagreed, there cannot be any debate in this matter. But there beingneither any pleading nor any material to come to the conclusionthat the third member has agreed with the opinion, the presentcase is examined as if, the third member did not agree with theorder proposed. The order issued by the State TransportAuthority, signed by the Chairperson and one member is a validorder having been issued with the majority opinion of two out ofthree, who heard the application on 16.10.2014. Thus, in any viewof the matter, no illegality can be attached with the order dated15.12.2014, which was signed by the Chairperson and onemember. [Para 25][458-E-H]

1.9 The decision dated 15.12.2014 issued with thesignatures of Chairperson and one member was a valid decisionin spite of the fact that one of the members who was present inthe hearing when the meeting took place on 16.10.2014 and had

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Abeen transferred in the meanwhile did not sign the order. Thedecision of the State Transport Authority dated 15.12.2014 wasfully in accordance with the statutory scheme of the Rules, 1994and both the Single Judge and Division Bench erred in holdingthe decision as invalid. Thus, the judgments of the High Courtare set aside. [Paras 26, 27][459-A-C]B

Ramaswamy Nadar v. The State of Madras AIR 1958SC 56 : [1958] SCR 739; Gokal Chand Jagan Nath v.Nand Ram Das Atma Ram AIR (1938) P.C. 292; A.Shanta Rao v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal,Hyderabad & Ors. AIR 1985 A.P. 256 – referred to.

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“Law and Practice of Meetings” by ShackletonEleventh Edn – referred to.

Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1562of 2018.

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From the Judgment and Order dated 22.03.2017 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in W.A. No. 177 of 2015.

Mishra Saurabh, Arjun Garg, Ankit Kr. Lal, Advs. for theAppellants.

FThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. 1. The State of Madhya Pradesh is inappeal against the judgment of Division Bench of the High Court ofMadhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior dated 22.03.2017 by which judgmentwrit appeal filed by the State questioning the judgment of the learnedGSingle Judge dated 17.03.2015 has been dismissed.

2. The parties shall be described as referred to in the writ petition.The facts giving rise to this appeal are:

The writ petitioners have permanent permit for two routes, oneGwalior to Bhander and second Gwalior to Datia. Respondent No.3 has H

also the permanent permit for the route Gwalior to Jhansi. RespondentNo.3 preferred an application for modification of time schedule formovement of his vehicle. The application of Respondent No.3 came forhearing before the State Transport Authority on 16.10.2014. On the dateof hearing both counsel for the applicant as well as counsel for theobjectors were heard. The State Transport Authority allowed themodification and decided to change the time schedule as prayed by theapplicant in the public interest. The order was issued by the StateTransport Authority on 15.12.2014. Aggrieved by the order dated15.12.2014, Writ Petition No.883 of 2015 was filed by the two petitionerswho were objectors before the State Transport Authority. In the writpetition various grounds were taken questioning the application filed bythe applicant-Pawan Arora. One of the grounds taken before the learnedSingle Judge was that although the State Transport Authority heard thematter on 16.10.2014 consisted of Chairperson and two members,however, the order was delivered with the signatures of Chairpersonand only one member, since one member, Shri Sanjay Choudhary wastransferred in the meanwhile, hence, the order dated 15.12.2014 is illegal.The learned Single Judge accepted the contention of the writ petitionersand allowed the writ petition by setting aside the order dated 15.12.2014.

3. The State of Madhya Pradesh filed writ appeal challenging thejudgment of the learned Singe Judge. The State contended before theDivision Bench of the High Court that there was no illegality in the orderissued by the Chairperson and one member, although, it was heard bythree members when the meeting took place on 16.10.2014. The DivisionBench dismissed the appeal upholding the view of the learned SingleJudge.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of the appealcontends that under the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994quorum of the meeting of the State Transport Authority is three - Chairmanplus two members and quorum was complete when the meeting washeld on 16.10.2014, the decision delivered by the majority of the membersis in no manner illegal. It is submitted that after hearing, one memberwas transferred and was not available to be part of the order issued on15.12.2014. It is submitted that even it is assumed that one member wasnot agreeing with the decision of two other members, although, there isno such pleading or material on the record, the decision taken by themajority of the members was fully valid and there was no infirmity in the AB

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Aorder dated 15.12.2014. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge aswell as Division Bench committed error in taking the view that the orderdated 15.12.2014 was an illegal order.

5. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the order ofthe High Court and contends that when one member who heard theBmatter on 16.10.2014 was not available, no decision could have beentaken by the State Transport Authority. He submits that the matter washeard by three members, hence decision could have been issued only bythree members and the views taken by the learned Single Judge andDivision Bench are in accordance with law.

C6. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel forthe parties and perused the records.

7. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for constitution of aState Transport Authority to exercise and discharge the powers andfunctions as specified in sub-section (3) of Section 68. Section 68(1) andD68(3) are quoted below:

“68.Transport Authorities.-(1) The State Government shall,by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute for the Statea State Transport Authority to exercise and discharge thepowers and functions specified in sub-section (3), and shallin like manner constitute Regional Transport Authorities toexercise and discharge throughout such areas (in this Chapterreferred to as regions) as may be specified in the notification,in respect of each Regional Transport Authority; the powersand functions conferred by or under this Chapter on suchAuthorities:

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Provided that in the Union territories, the Administrator mayabstain from constituting any Regional Transport Authority.(2)....................................

(3) The State Transport Authority and every RegionalTransport Authority shall give effect to any directions issuedunder section 67 and the State Transport Authority shall,subject to such directions and save as otherwise provided byor under this Act, exercise and discharge throughout the Statethe following powers and functions, namely :- G

(a) to co-ordinate and regulate the activities and policies ofthe Regional Transport Authorities, if any, of the State ; (b) to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authoritywhere there is no such Authority and, if it thinks fit or if sorequired by a Regional Transport Authority, to perform thoseduties in respect of any route common to two or more regions;

(c) to settle all disputes and decide all matters on whichdifferences of opinion arise between Regional TransportAuthorities; [(ca) Government to formulate routes for playing stagecarriages;] and (d) to discharge such other functions as may be prescribed.”

8. The Rules have been framed by the State of Madhya Pradesh,namely, the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994. Chapter V ofthe Rules contains heading “Control of Transport Vehicles”. Rule 63provides for State Transport Authority. Rule 63(4) to (7) are quoted asbelow:

-“63. State Transport Authority.

(4) The State Transport Authority shall meet at such timeand at such place as the Chairman may appoint.

(5) Not less than three days’ notice shall be given to a memberof the meeting of the State Transport Authority.

(6) The quorum to constitute a meeting of the State TransportAuthority shall be the Chairman or the nominated Chairmanunder the sub-rule (7) and two other members (whether officialor non-official). If within hall an hour from the time appointedfor the meeting a quorum is not completed, the meeting shallbe adjourned to such day and at such time and place as theChairman or the acting Chairman nominated under sub-rule(7) may appoint and no quorum is necessary for holding theadjourned meeting.

(7) The Chairman, if unable to attend the meeting, shallnominate a member to act as Chairman at the meeting.”

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A9. Rule 64 provides for Regional Transport Authority and Rule 65is for Conduct of Business of Transport Authorities. Rule 65(2) to 65(4)are as follows:

65. Conduct of Business of Transport Authorities. -

(2) The State or Regional Transport Authority, as the casemay be, may decide any matter of urgent nature withoutholding a meeting by the majority of votes of members byrecorded in writing and send to the Secretary (hereinafterreferred to as the procedure by circulation).

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(3) In the event of procedure by circulation being followed,the Secretary shall send to each member of the TransportAuthority such particulars of the matter as may be reasonablynecessary in order to enable the member to arrive at a decisionand shall specify the date by which the votes of members areto be received in the office of the Transport Authority. Uponreceipt of the votes of members as aforesaid, the Secretaryshall lay the papers before the Chairman, who shall recordthe decision by endorsement on the form of application orother document, as the case may be, according to the votesreceived and the vote or votes cast by the Chairman. Therecord of the votes cast shall not be available for inspectionby any person save by a member of the Transport Authorityat a regularly constituted meeting of the Transport Authority.No decision shall be made upon procedure by circulation, ifbefore the date by which the voles of members are required toreach the office of the Transport Authority, not less than one-third of the members of the Transport Authority have givennotice in writing to the Secretary demanding that the matterbe referred to a meeting of the Transport Authority.

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(4) The number of votes, excluding the Chairman’s second orcasting vote, necessary for a decision to be taken uponprocedure by circulation shall not be less than the membersnecessary to constitute a quorum.

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10. The facts of the case, as noted above, reveal that StateTransport Authority convened the meeting of the Authority by issuingthe Agenda for 16.10.2014. In addition to Chairperson, two members -H

Shri Sanjay Chaudhary, Transport Commissioner and Shri Rajiv Sharma,AChief Engineer, Public Works Department were present in the meeting.The applicant as well as the counsel for the objectors were heard on16.10.2014. The decision of the Committee was issued on 15.12.2014which was signed by the Chairperson and only one member, Shri RajivSharma, since, after the date of the hearing and before the issuance ofBthe order one member, Shri Sanjay Chaudhary was transferred. Thecopy of the order dated 15.12.2014 has been brought on record asAnnexure P-1 which clearly mentions the date of hearing, i.e., 16.10.2014.It is useful to extract only the relevant parts of the order for the presentcase:

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“THE STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,MADHYA PRADESH MOTIMAHAL, GWALIORAgenda Serial No.71Case No.2159/2014

Hearing on 16.10.2014

Before:

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Listing the aforesaid application submitted by the applicantfor hearing in the meeting of the State Transport Authoritydated 16.10.2014 the same was included in the agenda andGpublished on the Departmental Website and the notice boardof the Office and all regional/ additional regional / DistrictTransport Office. The objections of the aforesaid Drivers wereobtained until the aforesaid fixed date.

The case was presented in the meeting dated 16.10.2014 ofthe State Transport Authority. On the day of hearing, on behalfof the parties their appointed counsels appeared, who wereheard.

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Note: Since one member Shri Sanjay Chaudhary of theAuthority was transferred after hearing, the aforesaid orderis being passed by the Chairperson and one member ChiefEngineer of the Authority.

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State Transport Authority State Transport Authority Madhya Pradesh”

11. The only issue which needs to be considered in this appeal isas to whether, when in the meeting dated 16.10.2014 the Chairpersonand two members had heard the application for the change of the timeschedule, the order could have been passed allowing the application bythe two members (Chairperson and one member) alone, since the orderwas signed only by the Chairperson and one member, on 15.12.2014.

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12. The statutory provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 aswell as the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 indicate thatthe State Transport Authority is a multi-member body constituted by theState Government under Section 68(1). The State Transport Authorityis a multi-member body which transacts business in meeting except inFcase of emergency. Meeting is to be convened at such time and at suchplace as the Chairman may appoint. Three days’ notice is required to begiven to the members and quorum of the meeting is the Chairman or thenominated Chairman and two other members, i.e., quorum is three. Inthe present case, there is no dispute that when the meeting was held on16.10.2014 quorum was complete since Chairperson and two membersGwere present which fact is clearly noticed in the order dated 15.12.2014as extracted above. The three members who were present in the meetingheard the applicant and objectors. But the order could be issued only on15.12.2014, by which one of the members had been transferred andwas not available to sign the order. One more important fact which is toHbe noticed is that learned Single Judge had categorically noted that the above issue was raised only during the hearing before the learned SingleJudge and there was no pleading in the writ petition. In paragraph 16 ofthe judgment, learned Single Judge himself has noticed the following:

“16.The last question raised by the parties is about thecompetency of the STA in passing the impugned order.Although there is no pleading in this regard in this petition.However, learned senior counsel, Shri K.N. Gupta has notdisputed the fact that the matter was heard by three membersand order is passed by two members.....”

13. The multi-member body transacts its business after debate,consultation and discussion. The view of multi-member body is expressedunanimously or by votes. For various kind of decisions by multi-memberbody special majorities are also provided for acceptance of the decision.Normally, all decisions of a multi-member body are expressed by opinionof majority of the members present except where the special majoritiesare provided in the statute itself.

14. Shackleton on the “Law and Practice of Meetings”, EleventhEdition while discussing the majority has stated following in paragraph7-30. Relevant parts of paragraphs 7-30 and 7-31 are quoted below:

“4 MAJORITY

Definition

7-30 Majority is a term signifying the greater number. Inlegislative and deliberative assemblies, it is usual to decidequestions by a majority of those present and voting. This issometimes expressed as a “simple” majority, which means thata motion is carried by the mere fact that more votes are castfor than against , as distinct from a “special” majority wherethe size of the majority is critical.

The principle has long been established that the will of acorporation or body can only be expressed by the whole or amajority of its members, and the act of a majority is regardedas the act of the whole.

A majority vote binds the minority

7-31 Unless there is some provision to the contrary in theinstrument by which a corporation is formed, the resolution

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Aof the majority, upon any question, is binding on the majorityand the corporation, but the rules must be followed.”

15. Although Rules, 1994 do not expressly provide that decisionof the State Transport Authority shall be taken in accordance with theopinions of the majority but there being no special majority provided forBdecision to be taken in the meeting of the State Transport Authority,normal, rule that decision by majority of the members present has to befollowed. In the present case when three members were present andquorum was complete, the decision taken by majority, i.e., opinion oftwo members shall form the valid decision of the State TransportAuthority.C16. Rule 65 sub-section (2) of the Rules dealing with the conductof business of Transport Authorities provides:

“65(2) The State or Regional Transport Authority, as the casemay be, may decide any matter of urgent nature withoutDholding a meeting by the majority of votes of members byrecorded in writing and send to the Secretary (hereinafterreferred to as the procedure by circulation).”

17. Thus, the concept of taking decision by majority of votes ofthe members is very much present in the scheme of the Rules. Although,Ewhere a decision is to be taken by the circulation by votes a specialmajority is provided in Rule 65(4) but present being not a case of decisionby circulation, simple majority by members present was sufficient formaking a binding decision by the State Transport Authority.

18. In paragraph 18.1 of the judgment, the Division Bench observed that:F

“18.1. In the instant case there is nothing on record to indicatethat the STA with complete quorum heard the matter and before oneof the members Shri Sanjay Chaudhry was transferred outGany draft order was got approved from the said transferredmember.”

19. The above observation was made by the Division Bench ofthe High Court while distinguishing the judgment of this Court inRamaswamy Nadar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1958 SC 56. Before H

we refer to the decision of this Court in Ramaswamy Nadar, it is clearthat observation of the Division Bench of the High Court that there isnothing on record to indicate that the quorum of State Transport Authoritywas complete, is factually wrong. The order of the State TransportAuthority dated 15.12.2014 has been brought on record as Annexure P-1 and the relevant portion of the order has been extracted above by uswhich clearly mentions that the hearing took place on 16.10.2014 wherethe Chairperson and two members were present the quorum being threeas per Rule 68(1) was complete. The hearing took place by threemembers which is noted in the order itself, as extracted above. Thus,observation of the Division Bench of the High Court that quorum wasnot complete and matter was not heard by three members is not correct.

20. Now, we come to the judgment of this Court in RamaswamyNadar(supra). In the above case the matter was heard by a Bench ofthree Judges of this Court who after hearing had announced the decisionof acquittal. Draft judgment was also approved by one of the Judgeswho had, however, died before judgment could be delivered. Noteappended in the judgment was to the following effect:

“NOTE

SINHA, J.

When hearing of this appeal was finished last week by a Benchconsisting of three of us, B.P. Sinha, P. Govinda Menon andJ.L. Kapur, JJ., we announced that we had come to theconclusion that the appellant should be acquitted. We alsoindicated that the judgment will be delivered the weekfollowing. The draft of the judgment was sent to late Mr. JusticeMenon last week and he had approved of it. What we arenow delivering are the reasons of the Judges who constitutedthe Bench; but it will be signed by two only of us on accountof the unexpected death of Mr. Justice. Menon.

K.S.B.

Appeal allowed.”

21. In the above case judgment was pronounced with theconcurrence of the three judges. When the hearing took place opinion ofall the three Judges was expressed but judgment could be signed by twoJudges since one of the Judges died. Although, the facts of the abovecase was little different i.e. there was material to indicate that the third A

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AJudge who could not sign had also concurred with the opinion, but in thepresent case there is no pleading of third member whether agreeing ornot agreeing with the decision. For the present case, we proceed on thepremise that the third member did not agree with the decision. For thedecisions of this Court, Article 145 sub-clause (5) of the Constitution ofIndia provides that judge of this Court can deliver a judgment with theBconcurrence of a majority of the Judges present at the hearing of thecase.

22. The present is a case where decision by a multi-member bodyis to be taken in the meeting of the Committee as per the statutoryRules. There being no such majority provided for taking a decision, theCdecision by majority has to be accepted as the opinion of the State Transport Authority.

23. Two more cases, which were relied by the appellant andnoticed by the High Court need to be noted. The Privy Council judgmentin Gokal Chand- Jagan Nath Vs. Nand Ram Das- Atma Ram, AIRD(1938) P.C. 292, is relevant for the present case. In the appeal beforethe Privy Council, judgment of the High Court was assailed on the groundthat the two Hon’ble Judges of the High Court heard the matter, although,both judges concurred with the judgment, but one Judge went on leavebefore signing the judgment, which was signed by only one Judge. TheEPrivy Council repelled the contention and held that signing by one of theJudges at best was only irregularity, not affecting the merits of the case.Following was laid down in Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8:- “6. A further point was raised by the appellants. They urgedthat the judgment of the High Court appealed from was not aFvalid judgment because it failed to comply with Order XLI,Rule 31, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The relevant factson this issue are that the hearing in the High Court was beforetwo Judges, Harrison and Agha Haider JJ., and was actuallydelivered by the former Judge, the latter agreeing. Thejudgment was delivered on February 22, 1933. But HarrisonGJ. went on leave before signing the judgment, which wassigned by Agha Haider J., the Deputy Registrar appending anote that Harrison J. had gone on leave before signing thejudgment he delivered.

7. Order XLI, Rule 31 requires that the judgment of theappellate Court shall be in writing and shall state variousmatters, and “shall at the time that it is pronounced be signedand dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.”

8. The Rule does not say that if its requirements are notcomplied with the judgment shall be a nullity. So startling aresult would need clear and precise words. Indeed the Ruledoes not even state any definite time in which it is to be fulfilled.The time is left to be defined by what is reasonable. The Rulefrom its very nature is not intended to affect the rights ofparties to a judgment. It is intended to secure certainty in theascertainment of what the judgment was. It is a rule whichJudges are required to comply with for that object. No doubtin practice Judges do so comply, as it is their duty to do. Butaccidents may happen. A Judge may die after giving judgmentbut before he has had a reasonable opportunity to sign it.The Court must have inherent jurisdiction to supply such adefect. The case of a Judge who has gone on leave beforesigning the judgment may call for more comment, but even sothe convenience of the Court and the interest of litigants mustprevail. The defect is merely an irregularity. But in truth thedifficulty is disposed of by Sections 99 and 108 of the CivilProcedure Code. Section 99 provides that no decree shall bereversed or substantially varied nor shall any case beremanded, in appeal on account of any error, defect orirregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting themerits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. That Sectionconies in the part dealing with appeals from original decrees.But Section 108 applies the same provision to appeals fromappellate decrees and it is always in the discretion of theBoard to apply the principle on appeal to His Majesty inCouncil. In their Lordships’ judgment, the defect here was anirregularity not affecting the merits of the case or thejurisdiction of the Court, and is no ground for setting asidethe decree. “

24. Another judgment, which was cited by the appellant was A.Shanta Rao Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad &Ors., AIR 1985 A.P. 256. In the above case, State Transport AppellateTribunal consisting of Chairman and two members heard the matter.

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AHowever, the order was issued only with the signature of Chairman.The order was attacked on the ground that the other two members havingnot signed the order, the order is illegal. Repelling the contention followingwas stated in Paragraph 9:- “9. On the first question, I am of the view that once the minutesBof the State Transport Authority are found to be signed by allthe members including the Chairman, the mere fact that thefinal order is communicated under the signature of theChairman alone does not amount to any illegality. The Courthas to see the substance of the matter and not the mere form,and if it is clear that all the members of the Tribunal haveCapplied their mind to the facts of the case and arrived at aconclusion, it does not matter if the communication is madeunder the signature of the Chairman. “

25. Although, in above two cases, there was concurrence of allthe members of Court/Tribunal but all had not signed the order. TheDpresent is a case where Chairperson and two members heard theapplication in meeting dated 16.10.2014 but order was subsequentlypronounced on 15.12.2014 and signed by only Chairperson and onemember. The third member having been transferred in the meanwhile.As noticed above, there is no pleading in the writ petition as to whetherEthe third member, who was transferred had agreed with the proposedorder or did not agree with the decision, which was to be delivered bythe State Transport Authority. Had third member agreed, there cannotbe any debate in this matter, the issues being covered by judgment ofthis Court in Ramaswamy Nadar(supra) and judgment of the PrivyCouncil in Gokal Chand -Jagan Nath (supra). But there being neitherFany pleading nor any material to come to the conclusion that the thirdmember has agreed with the opinion, we have proceeded to examinethe present case as if, the third member did not agree with the orderproposed. We have already noticed the reason for coming to theconclusion that the order issued by the State Transport Authority, signedGby the Chairperson and one member is a valid order having been issuedwith the majority opinion of two out of three, who heard the applicationon 16.10.2014. Thus, in any view of the matter, no illegality can beattached with the order dated 15.12.2014, which was signed by theChairperson and one member.

26. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion thatdecision dated 15.12.2014 issued with the signatures of Chairperson andone member was a valid decision in spite of the fact that one of themembers who was present in the hearing when the meeting took placeon 16.10.2014 and had been transferred in the meanwhile did not signthe order. The decision of the State Transport Authority dated 15.12.2014was fully in accordance with the statutory scheme of the Rules, 1994and both the learned Single Judge and Division Bench erred in holdingthe decision as invalid. We, thus, are of the view that judgments of learnedSingle Judge and Division Bench do not express the correct view of thelaw.

27. In the result, the appeal is allowed and judgments of the HighCourt are set aside.

Nidhi Jain

Appeal allowed.

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