SRI LANKAPPA & ORS. versus KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION & ORS. on 8 December 2021

1. Special leave granted. The appellants are aggrieved by ajudgment and order of the Karnataka High Court[1] which allowed theregular first appeal filed by the first respondent (Karnataka IndustrialCorporation, hereafter called “KIC”).

2. The appellants had filed a suit[2] seeking declaration of title andinjunction in respect of suit properties as stipulated in the schedule[3](hereafter called “Suit Schedule Property”) which were 11 acres and 16guntas of agricultural land. Muninarayana Gowda, Putta s/o Ramanna,Sampath s/o Hanumantharayappa, Raja s/o Mangamma and KIC wereimpleaded as respondents. The appellant’s case was that Chowdappa,their grandfather, was granted the Suit Schedule Property by order dated22.10.1929 passed by the Amaldar, Bangalore South Taluk, and thatafter his death, his heirs and the appellants were owners in possessionof the Suit Schedule Property. It was alleged by KIC (the fifthrespondent), a partnership firm, that by order dated 25.03.1968, theKarnataka Government had granted the Suit Schedule Property to it, fornon-agricultural use, and the appellants sought to interfere with KIC’spossession. KIC resisted the suit alleging, inter alia, that it was theabsolute owner in possession of “Khatha No. 290 formerly Sy. No. 30measuring 11 acres 16 guntas in extent situated at Thalaghattapuravillage, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk and it is the suitschedule property”.

3. During pendency of the appellant’s suit [hereafter called the“1995 Suit”] KIC filed O.S. No.21/1996 (hereafter called “KIC Suit-I”)

1 Dated 22.01.2020 by the principal Bench at Bengaluru in RFA No. 14/2019.

2 O.S. No.388/1995, before the Court of II Munsiff, Bangalore Rural District.3 Sy.No. 30, measuring 11 acres 16 guntas situated in Talaghattapura Village, UttarahalliHobli, Kanakapura Main Road, Bangalore South Taluk.

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Aclaiming injunction to restrain the appellant from disturbing its possessionof the Suit Schedule Property. In its suit, it was alleged inter alia, that:

“3. The plaintiff is the owner in possession of Sy. No. 30measuring 11 acres 16 guntas in extent, situate atTalaghattapura village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore SouthBTaluk.

4. It has been converted for non-agricultural use for thepurpose of establishing a Table Moulded Brick Factory.DOCUMENT NO. 2 (two) and DOCUMENT NO. 3 (Three) isthe certified copy of the Index of Lands. The plaintiff is inCexclusive possession of the property mentioned above,hereinafter called ‘Suit Schedule Property’. After conversion,the Katha number of the schedule property is 290 and it hasbeen assessed to payment of tax to Talaghattapura OramaPanchayat, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk. Up-to-date taxes have been paid in respect of the suit scheduleDproperty.

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In view of the aforesaid orders in the other suits, thedefendants are trying to dispossess the plaintiff-firm from theEpossession of the land in question and are trying to trespasson the suit schedule property. Defendants have no right, titleand interest in the suit schedule property and they are not theowners of the suit schedule property and they are not andwere not in possession of the suit schedule property at anypoint of time.

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10. The aforesaid documents completely establish that theplaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit scheduleproperty. As the land in question is converted for non-agricultural use and katha number is given by thePanchayath, RTC is not being written in respect of the suitGproperty….”

4. Both suits, i.e., the 1995 Suit and KIC Suit-I were tried togetherand disposed of by common judgment[4]. It was held by the trial court thatthe appellants herein could establish “their continued, unhindered and H4 Dated 31.01.1998, Ld. First Add. Civil Judge (Junior) at Bangalore.

unhampered possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the suitschedule property since 1929” till date of judgment; and that they hadperfected title against the Karnataka Government in 1963. It was alsoheld that “Hence, the Govt. had no rights and title over the suitschedule property on the date of grant i.e., on 25.3.1968”. It wasfurther held that:

“When the Govt. itself has lost the title and right over the suitschedule property it has no right to grant the suit scheduleproperty to the 5th defendant. The defendants never inpossession of the suit schedule property.”

5. For the same reason, KIC’s suit was dismissed. It was heldthat the grant in its favour was ineffective, as the Karnataka Governmenthad no power to issue it, and further that KIC was never in possession.KIC and the other aggrieved parties (including the other respondents inthe 1995 Suit) appealed this, by preferring R.A. No.31/1998. This commonappeal was disposed of by judgment and decree dated 03.03.1999. Theappellate court noticed that the findings of the trial court in KIC Suit-Iwere unchallenged. KIC had relied on a document to say that the landswere converted. The appellate court while dismissing the appeal, heldas follows:

“The appellant Corporation contended that the suit land wasgot converted by the conversion sanctioned certificate saidto have been issued by Tahasildar dated 18.12.78 and copyof the said document is marked as Ex. D4. In my consideredview no reliance can be placed upon Ex. D4 which is muchdisputed by the respondents because it is only a Xerox copyand the appellant has failed to produce the original of thesame before the Court. On the other hand Ex. Pl is anendorsement issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Bangaloredated: 27.5.89 which reveals that the proceedings regardingconversion of land are not available in the office. Hence, Ifind some force in the arguments of the respondent that Ex.D4 is a got up document. If the suit land was really gotconverted, the appellant could have produced the certifiedcopies of relevant documents from the Revenue Office. Itappears that Ex. D4 is a fictitious document and there is noorder for conversion of land as contended by the appellant.Hence the entries made in the relevant R.T.C. records that the A

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Aland was converted are incorrect and false. The R.T.C: extractsfor the year 1983-84, 84-85 reveal that 4 acres of land isunder cultivation but the name of cultivator is not mentionedin cultivator’s column. It is not the case of appellant-that itcultivated the lands during relevant period. Since the findinggiven in O.S. 21/96 remained unchallenged, I am of theBconsidered view that, it is the respondents who are in physicalpossession of suit land and trial court is justified in grantingthe prohibitory injunction as against the appellant.”

6. The declaration granted in the 1995 Suit by judgment dated31.01.1998 (that the appellants herein were absolute owners) was setCaside; however, it was held that KIC’s grant had been cancelled. Thedecree of permanent injunction was however, confirmed. KIC had alsopreferred a second appeal[5] in which the judgment of the first appellatecourt in R.A. No.31/1998 was impugned. KIC’s second appeal wasdismissed by judgment dated 16.06.2005, by the Karnataka High Court.DThe High Court categorically held that a deemed cancellation of thegrant of land in favour of KIC had occurred, as due procedure had notbeen followed while making the alleged grant. The High Court held:

“In view of the detailed discussion made above, whileanswering the substantial question of law raised in favour ofEthe respondents, it is held that both the courts below haverightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs/respondentsare in possession of the suit property and thereby rightlyinjuncted the appellants frominterfering with the peacefulpossession and enjoyment of the suit property and that thereis deemed cancellation of the grant of land granted in favourFof the appellants and that due procedure has not beenfollowed while making alleged grant in favour of the”appellants.

7. A special leave petition[6] was preferred before this Court againstthe above judgment of the Karnataka High Court, in which KIC was theGfifth petitioner. Leave was granted, and the petition was converted intoCivil Appeal No.10086/2010. The civil appeal was dismissed by orderdated 22.11.2017. Therefore, the matter had attained finality.

5 RSA No. 236/1999 before Karnataka High Court.H6 SLP 15070/2006.

8. KIC filed another suit O.S. No. 1168/2018 (hereafter called“KIC Suit-II”). In that suit, the following reliefs were claimed:

“(a) declaring that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of thesuit schedule property; (b) directing the defendants Nos. 5 to 27 to deliver possessionof the suit schedule property to the plaintiff;

(c) to grant permanent injunction restraining the defendantNo. 1 to 4 from deleting the name of plaintiff from revenuerecords without due process of law,”

The trial court considered the plaint in KIC Suit-II and rejectedthe plaint, after considering all the previous facts and the history of thelitigation. The trial court observed that:

“In the case on hand, the issue regarding deemed cancellationof grant was decided by all the courts up to the Hon’ble ApexCourt. It is also significant to note that the finding of theHon’ble High Court of Karnataka in RSA 236/99, as to thetitle of the plaintiff, based on the alleged grant was directlyand substantially in issue and sad issue was answered in theAffirmative by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka. Itappears that challenging the findings of the Hon’ble HighCourt of Karnataka, the plaintiff herein filed review petition,which was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka.Indeed, the plaintiff also approached the Hon’ble Apex Court,on couple of occasions. The contention of the plaintiff is thathe is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule propertyby virtue of the grant and the plaintiff is the owner of the suitschedule property. The claim of the plaintiff that the propertywas granted by the Government of Mysore, has beenconsistently negatived by the Hon’ble Courts. Therefore, thiscourt cannot entertain the above suit, for the relief ofdeclaration, once again on the basis of the alleged grant.Hence, I proceed to pass the following:ORDER

The suit of the plaintiff is hereby rejected as not maintainable.”

9. KIC appealed, contending that the rejection of its plaint in KICSuit-II was erroneous. The High Court set aside the order rejecting the A

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Aplaint, and held that in the circumstances of the case, it was incumbentupon the trial court to issue summons, and its suo motu determination onthe maintainability of the suit before such issuance was erroneous. Theimpugned judgment also held that it was open to a court to reject theplaint at any stage.

BArguments Advanced

10. Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned senior counsel, urged thatthe High Court fell into error, in overlooking the fact that the subjectmatter of KIC Suit-II was barred by res judicata as the issues in itwere directly and substantially in issue in both the 1995 Suit and KICSuit-I. The decision in that suit had attained finality before this Court inCCivil Appeal No.10086/2010. Furthermore, the High Court erred inignoring that in terms of the mandate of Order II Rule 2 of the Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908 (hereafter called “CPC”), KIC, in KIC Suit-I wasbound to include the whole claim which it was entitled to make in respectof the cause of action and if it omitted tosue in respect of, or intentionallyDrelinquished, any portion of its claim, it could not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. It was argued that being partyto the 1995 Suit, KIC was aware of its claim ownership over the SuitSchedule Property. Therefore, the omission on KIC’s part in claimingrelief of declaration of ownership in its earlier suit (i.e., KIC Suit-I)which was tagged with the 1995 Suit, statutorily barred the subsequentEsuit (i.e., KIC Suit-II) for declaration of title under Order II Rule 2(2)CPC.

11. Learned senior counsel argued that the High Court overlookedthat since the grant issued by the Government of Karnataka was held tobe non-est by the common judgment of the trial court (dated 31.01.1998)Fin the 1995 Suit and KIC Suit I, and that such finding was modified bythe High Court in RSA No. 236/1999 – to the effect that the grant infavour of Muniswamappa is deemed to have been cancelled – KIClacked locus standi to file a suit for declaration on the basis of suchgrant. Learned senior counsel also drew attention of this Court to theHigh Court’s order in RP No. 493/ 2005 where it confirmed that theGgrant as claimed by KIC was deemed to have been cancelled, therebystripping it off of any right to title to the Suit Schedule Property.12. Learned senior counsel relied on the decision of this Court inT. Aravindandam and Others v T. V. Satyapal & Anr[7 ]where this Court H71977 (4) SCC 467.

upheld the jurisdiction of trial courts under Order VII Rule 11 CPC inrejecting frivolous and vexatious suits. Reliance was also placed onRamrameshwari Devi and Others v Nirmala Devi& Ors[8 ]where itwas held that the trial court ought not to have framed an issue on a pointwhich had been finally determined up to this Court, and further held thatunless the wrongdoers were denied profit or undue benefit from thefrivolous litigation, it would be difficult to control such litigations.

13. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned senior counsel for the respondentsherein, urged that KIC Suit-II was not in abuse of the process of anycourt of law. Subsequent to the filing of the suit, an application was filedbefore this Court. That application was declined. KIC Suit- I was a suitfor bare injunction and the title to the Suit Schedule Property was notconsidered. Therefore, the subsequentsuit (i.e., KIC Suit-II) seeking titleand possession was not barred.

14. Learned senior counsel contended that the civil court had tomandatorily issue summons tothe respondents; and that maintainabilityof the suit could only be considered after such issuance, when it wascontested by the respondents. However, in this case, before issuance ofthe summons to the respondents, the trial court suo moto passeddetermination on maintainability of the suit and rejected it as notmaintainable. That order was contrary to law. Consequently, the HighCourt was justified in setting it aside.

15. Ms. Suri relied on the judgment of this Court in AnathulaSudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy[9] to urge that KIC Suit-I was one forinjunction. There was no occasion for KIC to claim ownership or title tothe Suit Schedule Property. In these circumstances, KIC Suit-II claimingtitle and possession was maintainable. She also relied on Alka Gupta vNarendr Kumar Gupta[10] to say that the courts should not summarilyreject a plaint, on the ground that the judgment in an earlier suit, barredthe later one.

Analysis

16. It is apparent from the above facts that the two suits filedearlier – the 1995 Suit and KIC Suit-I – culminated in a decision favourableto the appellants herein, as KIC’s suit was dismissed. KIC and the other 8(2011) 8 SCC 249.9(2008) 4 SCC 594.10 2010 (10) SCC 141.

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Arespondents appealed against the decision in the present appellant’s suit;that appeal was also dismissed. The second appeal preferred by theparties i.e., RSA No. 236/1999 was dismissed on 16.06.2005. The HighCourt pertinently observed and held that the appellants herein were inpossession of the Suit Schedule Property and rightly injuncted therespondents from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoymentBof the same, holding further that there was deemed cancellation of thegrant of land granted in favour of the respondents herein as due procedurehad not been followed.

17. These findings were challenged in a suit filed by the appellants,which claimed that they had absolute title to the property. No doubt,CKIC’s suit claimed injunction; its dismissal, if that were the onlyproceeding, would not have precluded a subsequent suit, claiming title.However, the fact here is that KIC was a respondent in the suit filed bythe appellant (i.e., the 1995 Suit) which expressly sought the relief ofdeclaration that the appellant was the absolute owner. It was in such aDcontext that the question of ‘ownership’, which was directly in issue, ina proceeding, i.e., a suit, filed before a competent court, was decided.That decision ruled out KIC’s ownership, holding that there was “deemedcancellation of the grant of land” before the High Court. All thesefacts were disclosed by KIC in the suit filed after this Court dismissedits civil appeal, thus rendering the judgment in the second appeal final. InEthese circumstances, the issue which remains is whether the trial courtwrongly rejected KIC Suit-II, as found by the impugned judgment.

18. In Anathula Sudhakar, this Court outlined various situationsin which a person claiming possession or injunction can claim relief.They are set out below:F

“21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits forprohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is asunder:

(a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff’s title and heGdoes not have possession, a suit for declaration andpossession, with or without a consequential injunction, is theremedy. Where the plaintiff’s title is not in dispute or under acloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possessionwith a consequential injunction. Where there is merely aninterference with the plaintiff’s lawful possession or threat ofH

SRI LANKAPPA & ORS. v. KARNATAKA INDUSTRIALCORPORATION & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

dispossession, it is sufficient to sue forAan injunction simpliciter.

(b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only withpossession, normally the issue of title will not be directly andsubstantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will bedecided with reference to the finding on possession. But incases where de jure possession has to be established on thebasis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, theissue of title may directly and substantially arise forconsideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not bepossible to decide the issue of possession.

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(c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in asuit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings andappropriate issue regarding title (either specific, orimplied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar [AnnaimuthuThevar v. Alagammal, (2005) 6 SCC 202]). Where theaverments regarding title are absent in a plaint and wherethere is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigateor examine or render a finding on a question of title, ina suit for injunction. Even where there are necessarypleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicatedquestions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegatethe parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit fordeclaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit formere injunction.

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(d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, andappropriate issue relating to title on which parties leadevidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward,the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in asuit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to thenormal rule that question of title will not be decided in suitsfor injunction. But persons having clear title and possessionsuing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier andmore cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merelybecause some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes aclaim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court shoulduse its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquireinto title and cases where it will refer to the plaintiff to a more F

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Acomprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts ofthe case.”

19. In the present case, KIC no doubt sought only a permanentinjunction in its first suit. However, it is a fact of equal importance thatthe appellants-herein consistently agitated KIC’s title. KIC was a partyBto those proceedings. All the courts concurrently held that the grant, onwhich KIC based its possession, was deemed to be cancelled. Therefore,KIC could, by no procedure known to law, claim in another suit, that itwas the absolute owner by virtue of the self-same grant, which wasdeemed to have been cancelled. The trial court therefore cannot befaulted with for holding that the question of title was directly in issue inCthe previous proceedings, and merely because it resulted in findingsadverse to KIC, it could not escape being bound by those findings.

20. It is noticeable that the High Court, in the impugned judgment,has considered Vithalbhai (P) Ltd., v Union Bank of India[11]where ithas been held that a plaint can be rejected at any stage. Furthermore, itDhas also been ruled in M. Nagabhushana v State of Karnataka &Others[12] that the principle of res judicata is fundamental to the judicialsystem. Having regard to the above discussion, this Court is of the opinionthat the impugned judgment (in holding that despite the fact that in theprevious proceedings the issue of title stood concluded, the trail courtEhad to proceed with the suit) is clearly in error.

21. For the above reasons, the impugned judgment is hereby setaside; the appeal is allowed, without order on costs.

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Ankit Gyan

Appeal allowed.

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12(2011) 3 SCC 408.