DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY versus SUNIL KHATRI & ORS. on 19 May 2022

SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 4 S.C.R. 68

[2022] 4 S.C.R.

ADELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

v.

SUNIL KHATRI & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 3862 of 2022)

BMAY 19, 2022

[HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in LandAcquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s. 24(2) –Land acquisition proceedings, when deemed to have lapsed – LandCof the respondents notified u/s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894as required for the planned development of Delhi vide notificationdated 25.11.1980 – Declaration u/s. 6 published and the awardpassed – Initiation of acquisition process vide notifications dated5.11.1980 and 25.11.1980 – Challenge to, in various writ petitionsD– High Court granted interim order of stay of dispossession –Numerous litigation continued – Meanwhile, 2013 Act came intoforce – Application filed in the pending writ petition – Allowed bythe High Court holding that the acquisition proceedings stood lapsedby virtue of s.24(2) – On appeal, held : Since the entire notificationwas quashed by the High Court in Gurdip Singh and Balbir Singh,Ethus, the State could not take possession on the basis of quashednotification – However, before the judgments of this Court werepronounced in the year 1999 or 2000, the land owner had obtainedstay of dispossession – Thus, it is not a stay of dispossession pendingnotification u/s. 6 or award u/s. 11-A but the acquisition of the entireFland which came to be settled by this Court – Thus, the State couldnot take possession on the basis of a notification u/s. 6 leading tothe award in 1987 – There was no stay but the acquisition itselfstood quashed – When the 2013 Act came into force on 01.01.2014,the five years period had not lapsed which was stay free or freefrom setting aside of the acquisition – Appellant was prevented byGthe interim orders in a number of writ petitions filed to take possession– Thus, prior to the commencement of 2013 Act, there was no stayfree period of 5 years which could lead to a declaration that theproceedings stand lapsed – Notifications u/s. 6 quashed on15.5.1989 and 17.12.1996 were set aside in Gurdip Singh Uban-IHand II’s case but before that, there was an order of stay of

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SUNIL KHATRI &

dispossession granted in favour of the land owner on 27.9.1999 –Thus, on account of setting aside of notification u/s. 6, the Statecould not take possession in view of the orders passed by the HighCourt – Thus, order passed by High Court is set aside.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 In the writ petition filed by the land owners,there was an interim order of stay granted on 9.7.1999, evenbefore Gurdip Singh Uban-I was decided on 20.8.1999. Thenotifications under Section 6 of the Act which were quashedbecame effective only after the order of this Court in Gurdip SinghUban-I and II. The land owner strangely made no mention of thejudgment delivered on 22.4.1997 in Abhey Ram. The order ofstay of dispossession in the writ petition filed by the land ownercontinued when the 2013 Act came into force. The land whichwas the subject matter of challenge in Gurdip Singh Uban wasalso at Village Chattarpur, even before the Award was announced.There was an interim order of stay of dispossession on 28.4.1986in respect of land situated in the village Chattarpur whichcontinued till such time the notification under Section 6 of theAct was quashed relying upon Balbir Singh decided on 15.05.1989and Sudan Singh. This order was set aside by this Court on20.8.1999 in Gurdip Singh Uban I. The land owner had got stay intheir writ petition on 9.7.1999. Thus, there was no stay free periodof 5 years before coming into force of the 2013 Act. [Para 21][83-B-E]

1.2. It is to be noted that since the entire notification wasquashed by the High Court in Gurdip Singh and Balbir Singh,therefore, the State could not take possession on the basis ofquashed notification. But before the judgments of this Court werepronounced in the year 1999 or 2000, the land owner had obtainedstay of dispossession. Therefore, it is not a stay of dispossessionpending notification under Section 6 or award under Section 11-A but the acquisition of the entire land which came to be settledby this Court. Thus, the State could not take possession on thebasis of a notification under Section 6 leading to the award on05.06.1987. The argument that there was no stay from the dateof the award till the stay was granted in favour of the land owneris hence partly correct as there was no stay but the acquisition A

BC

D

E

F

G

H

70SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aitself stood quashed. Therefore, when the 2013 Act came intoforce on 01.01.2014, the five years had not lapsed which was stayfree or free from setting aside of the acquisition. [Para 22][83-F-H]

1.3. Pertinent to note, though the High Court in Balak Ram-BII had not quashed the notification under Section 6 of the Act,but in some of the subsequent judgments such as in Balbir Singh,the High Court held that the notification stands quashed and theland stood reverted back to the land owners. Therefore, an optionwas given to the land owners to refund the compensation. Suchjudgment of Balbir Singh was affirmed by this Court in DelhiCDevelopment Authority v. Sudan Singh. Delhi High Court in GurdipSingh Uban etc. relied upon Sudan Singh to hold that thenotification under Section 6 of the Act stands quashed. However,Sudan Singh was specifically found to be laying down not goodlaw in Abhey Ram, Gurdip Singh Uban-I and Gurdip Singh Uban- DII. There was a stay in the writ petition filed by the land ownersthemselves which continued to operate till the 2013 Act cameinto force. Therefore, it was the order of the High Court itselfwhich prevented the appellant to take possession. However, suchposition got clarified only after the judgment in Gurdip SinghUban-I, later clarified in Gurdip Singh Uban-II, but in theEmeantime, there was an interim order granted in favour of theland owners.[Para 26][87-A-D]

1.4. The period of 5 years had not lapsed on 1.1.2014 whichcould lead to lapsing of the acquisition proceedings. The appellantwas prevented by the interim orders in a number of writ petitionsFfiled to take possession. Therefore, prior to the commencementof 2013 Act, there was no stay free period of 5 years which couldlead to a declaration that the proceedings stand lapsed. Stillfurther, the notifications under Section 6 of the Act quashed on15.5.1989 and 17.12.1996 were set aside in Gurdip Singh Uban-GI and II but before that, there was an order of stay of dispossessiongranted in favour of the land owner on 27.9.1999. Therefore, onaccount of setting aside of notification under Section 6 of the Act,the State could not take possession in view of the orders passedby the High Court. The order passed by the High Court is setaside. [Para 28, 29][88-G-H; 89-A-B]H

Munni Lal v. Lt. Governor of Delhi 1983 SCC OnLineDel 321; Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India 1987SCC OnLine Del 227 : AIR 1987 Del 239; Shri B. R.Gupta v. Union of India & Ors. 1988 SCC OnLine Del367 : (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB); Abhey Ram v. Unionof India C.W.P. No. 2657/85; Abhey Ram & Ors. v.Union of India & Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421 : [1997] 3SCR 931; Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh& Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 430; Balbir Singh v. Union ofIndia & Ors. 1989 SCC OnLine Del 211 : (1989) 39DLT 233 (DB); Brig. Gurdip Singh Uban v. Union ofIndia 1996 SCC OnLine Del 879; Delhi Administrationv. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 44 : [1999]1 Suppl. SCR 650; Delhi Administration v. Gurdip SinghUban & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 296 : [2000] 2 Suppl. SCR496; Chatro Devi v. Union of India 2005 SCC OnlineDelhi 279; Union of India v. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC564 : [2014] 8 SCR 751; Indore Development Authorityv. Manoharlal and Others (2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020]3 SCR 1; Om Prakash v. Union of India and Others(2010) 4 SCC 17 : [2010] 2 SCR 447; Manohar LalAtree v. Union of India & Ors. Civil Writ Petition No.2364 of 1990; Smt. Sheila Khatri & Ors. v. Union ofIndia & Ors. Civil Writ Petition No. 1786 of 1998;Delhi Development Authority v. Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd.& Ors. Civil Appeal No. 3073 of 2022; Mrs. VerinderKaur v. Government of NCT of Delhi WP (C) No. 589of 2018; Delhi Development Authority v. Rajan SoodCivil Appeal No. 1927 of 2022; Delhi DevelopmentAuthority v. Bhim Sain Goel & Ors. Civil Appeal No.3151 of 2022 - referred to.

Case Law Reference

A

B

E

F

G

H

[2022] 4 S.C.R.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3862Bof 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.12.2014 of the High Courtof Delhi at New Delhi in WP (C) No. 1786 of 1999.

Sanjay Poddar, Sr. Adv., Ashwani Kumar, Anshay Dhatwalia,Govind Kumar, Pratish Goel, Advs. for the Appellant.

C

Sumit Bansal, Udaibir Singh Kochar, Ms. Tanya Aggarwal, GaganGupta, Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by HEMANT GUPTA, J.

D

1. The challenge in the present appeal is to an order dated22.12.2014 passed by the High Court of Delhi whereby an applicationfiled in the pending writ petition was allowed, holding that the acquisitionproceedings stand lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of the Right to FairCompensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation andResettlement Act, 2013[1].

E

2. The land of the respondents[2] measuring 14 Bigha 8 Biswacomprising in Khasra No. 1883 (4-16), 1884 (4-16) and 1885 (4-16) atvillage Chattarpur was notified under Section 4 of the Land AcquisitionAct, 1894[3], as required for the planned development of Delhi videFnotification dated 25.11.1980. The notification was in respect of landssituated at Village Chattarpur, Satbari Maidangarhi, Sayoorpur and RajpurKhurd. The declarations under Section 6 of the Act were published on27.5.1985, 6.6.1985, 7.6.1985 and 26.2.1986, and the award was announcedon 05.06.1987.

3. The process of acquisition initiated vide notifications dated5.11.1980 and 25.11.1980 was challenged in a number of writ petitionsbefore the High Court and an interim order of stay of dispossession was G

1 For short, the ‘2013 Act’

2 For short, the ‘land owners’

H3 For short, the ‘Act’

granted. In the first bunch of writ petitions, the challenge was to thenotification under Section 4 of the Act inter alia on the ground that thenotification was not for a public purpose. Such challenge was remainedunsuccessful on 15.11.1983 by a judgment reported as Munni Lal v. Lt.Governor of Delhi[4].

4. Various writ petitions were thereafter filed to challenge thenotification under Section 6 of the Act on the ground that such notificationhas been published after the time limit provided by Central Act No. 68 of1984. The Full Bench of the High Court in a judgment dated 27.5.1987reported as Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India[5]held that the stayof dispossession in one or the other writ petition is required to be takeninto consideration for determining the period of three years in publicationof the notification. The High Court held as under:

“39. We have, for the reasons stated above, come to the conclusionthat the period during which stay orders were in force should beexcluded in computing the validity of the declaration under S. 6.So far as the notification dated 25- 11-80 is concerned, we findthat the latest of the S. 6 declarations was on 26-2-86. The stayorder (in C.M.P. 668/81) was in operation from 18-3-81 to15-11-83 i.e. for a period of 2 years, 7 months and 27 days. Theyare therefore in time having been issued within three years plus 2years 3 months, i.e., 5 years 3 months of the S. 4 notification. Sofar as the notification dated 5-11-1980 is concerned, we find thatthe latest of the S. 6 declaration was issued on 7-6- 1985, i.e., 4years 7 months after the S. 4 notification. They stay order (inCMP 4226/81) was operative from 30-9-1981 to 15-11-1983, i.e.,for 2 years and 11/2 months. If this period is excluded thedeclaration is within time. We answer the principal issue debatedbefore us accordingly.”

5. After deciding the question of law, the matter was ordered tobe placed before the appropriate Division Bench. The writ petitions weredecided by the Division Bench on 14.10.1988, when the operative orderwas passed stating ‘reasons to follow’. The High Court upon recordingthe reasons in a judgment reported as Shri B.R. Gupta v. Union ofIndia & Ors.[6]on 18.11.1988, set aside the notification issued under 4 1983 SCC OnLine Del 321

5 For short, the ‘Balak Ram-I’, 1987 SCC OnLine Del 227 : AIR 1987 Del 239

6 For short, the ‘Balak Ram-II’, 1988 SCC OnLine Del 367 : (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)

A

BC

DEF

G

H

ASection 6 of the Act as the writ petitioner was neither given an opportunityof personal hearing, nor was he actually heard in the objections filed bythe land owners under Section 5A of the Act and since there was norecord maintained for consideration of large number of objections filedby the writ petitioners/land owners, it was held that the writ petitionerwhose land is being taken by the Government without his consent has aBright to know the reasons as to why his claim for exemption was beingdeclined. It was held as under:

“16. We may note that there are number of other contentionsraised by the petitioner in the writ petition apart from the onesthat are mentioned and considered above. We need not go into allCof them and given any finding, since we have already come to theconclusion that reports under Section 5A and orders under Section6 cannot be sustained in law on the basis of the contentions alreadynoted by us.”

6. In C.W.P. No. 2657/85 (Abhey Ram v. Union of India), anDorder of status quo was passed by the High Court on 29.10.1985. Thewrit petition was dismissed later on 2.9.1987 in view of the judgment inBalak Ram-I. The land owners filed an appeal before this Court wherebythe order of status quo as to dispossession was passed on 25.3.1988. Inthe final order, reported as Abhey Ram & Ors. v. Union of India &EOrs.[7], the judgment in Balak Ram-I was maintained. This Court referredto Balak Ram-II wherein it was found that the writ petitions wereallowed on 14.10.1998 by an operative order that ‘reasons to follow’.This Court noticed that unfortunately, in Delhi Development Authorityv. Sudan Singh & Ors.[8], the operative part of the judgment was notbeen brought to the notice of this Court. Therefore, the ratio therein hasFno application to the facts in this case. A three judge Bench of this Courtheld as under:

“12. It is true that a Bench of this Court has considered the effectof such a quashing in Delhi Development Authority v. SudanSingh [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : (1991) 45 DLT 602] . But, unfortunately,Gin that case the operative part of the judgment referred to earlierhas not been brought to the notice of this Court. Therefore, theratio therein has no application to the facts in this case............’’

7 (1997) 5 SCC 421H8 (1997) 5 SCC 430

7. The judgment in Sudan Singh was directed against an order ofthe Delhi High Court in a judgment reported as Balbir Singh v. Unionof India & Ors.[9]. The High Court restrained the respondents on 6.1.1989in Civil Writ Petition No. 51 of 1989 from dispossessing the petitionerfrom the land in dispute or demolition of the building. The writ petitionwas allowed on 21.4.1989 and the notification under Section 6 wasquashed as a whole. There was also a direction to handover physicalpossession of the land to the land owners on their depositing thecompensation amount disbursed to them along with interest.

8. In Brig. Gurdip Singh Uban v. Union of India[10], the DelhiHigh Court was examining the acquisition of land in Village Chattarpurvide notification dated 25.11.1980 under Section 4 of the Act. The HighCourt quashed the notification under Section 6 of the Act. It was held asunder:

“27. The petitioners have urged before us that the judgement inBalak Ram Gupta’s case has received the seal of approval of theSupreme Court in 45 (1991) DLT (11) 602 (SC) (DelhiDevelopment Authority v. Sudan Singh) in para 4, wherein theSupreme Court has also said that the notifications with respectnot to 11 villages, but 12 villages have been quashed.

28. In the light of the specific seal of approval by the SupremeCourt in the aforesaid judgment, it is difficult to see how the FullBench judgement of the High Court in Balak Ram Gupta’s caseand Division Bench judgement in Balak Ram Gupta’s case isnot applicable to the instant case, particularly in view of the factthat “notification”, are specifically treated as “law”, ascontemplated by Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution of India. Ithas been so held in (1985) 1 SCC 641. (Indian ExpressNewspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. v. Union of India). Thenotifications being law, law having been quashed, and madenugatory it enures for the benefit of all persons who are likely tobe affected by such law/notification.”

9. Furthermore, this Court in Delhi Administration v. GurdipSingh Uban & Ors.[11]allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of theHigh Court and it was held as under:

9 1989 SCC OnLine Del 211 : (1989) 39 DLT 233 (DB)

10 1996 SCC OnLine Del 879

11 For short, the ‘Gurdip Singh Uban-I’ (1999) 7 SCC 44

A

B

C

D

EF

G

H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A“7. We may state that it is true that in Sudan Singh’s case a twoJudge Bench of this Court confirmed another judgment of the DelhiHigh Court wherein the High Court had allowed the writ petitionon the basis that the judgment of the Division Bench dated18.11.1988 had quashed the Section 6 declaration wholly. It isalso true that in Sudan Singh’s case too no objections were filedBby the owners under section 5A. But, we are governed by thejudgment of the three Judge Bench in Abhey Ram’s case wherethe said Bench not only referred to the effect of the DivisionBench judgment of the High Court dated 18.11.1988 but alsoreferred to the judgment of the two Judge Bench of this Court inCSudan Singh’s case. The three Judge Bench in Abhey Ram isbinding on us in preference to the judgment of two Judges inSudan Singh”.

10. The land owners filed review petition against the order passedin Gurdip Singh Uban-I inter-alia on the ground that on account of Dconflict between Abhey Ram and Sudan Singh, matter should be placedbefore larger Bench. Such review was dismissed on 24-11- 1999 in thejudgment reported as Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban &Ors.[16]. This Court held as under:

“45. It will be noticed that when Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC 421]Ewas decided in the High Court, the Full Bench decision alone wasthere and not the subsequent Division Bench judgment in BalakRam Gupta case. But by the time Abhey Ram case [(1997) 5SCC 421] came up before the three learned Judges in this Courton 20-8-1999, the latter order of the Division Bench dated 18-11-1988 in Balak Ram Gupta [B.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1989)F38 DLT 243 (DB) (order dated 18-11-1988)] was also availableand naturally the appellant raised a plea based on the latter orderof the Division Bench judgment dated 18-11-1988 which said thatthe entire Section 5-A inquiry and the entire land acquisitionproceedings stood quashed. The appellant in Abhey Ram [(1997)G5 SCC 421], in our view, was certainly entitled to do so. Hiscontention was however repelled in Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC421] holding that notwithstanding the broad language used in thelatter reasoned order dated 18- 11-1988, its area of operationwas to be confined to what was stated by the same Division H16 For short, the ‘Gurdip Singh Uban-II’, (2000) 7 SCC 296

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SUNIL KHATRI &ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

Bench earlier on 14-10-1988 when a brief operative order waspassed in the 73 cases allowing the writ petitions. We have alreadyheld that the writ absolute dated 14-10-1988 in each case wasbased on non-consideration of objections and not on the basis ofthere being no public purpose and that the decision in each casemust, therefore, be confined to the land covered therein. The three-Judge Bench in Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC 421] held that thereasoned order dated 18-11-1988 of the Division Bench could nottravel beyond the earlier operative order dated 14-10-1988 andcould not have covered land other than the land involved in thesaid batch of writ petitions. In our view, the question of thecorrectness or interpretation of the orders dated 14-10-1988 and18-11- 1988 in Balak Ram Gupta was put in issue directly inAbhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC 421] in this Court and the said decisionin Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC 421] can neither be characterisedas uncalled for nor as being obiter nor as a decision per incuriam.Sudan Singh [(1997) 5 SCC 430] had not gone into this questionat all and would not help the applicant.”

11. In another bunch of writ petitions in Chatro Devi v. Union ofIndia[12], the Hon’ble Judges of the Division Bench differed on the questionas to whether the objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act are requiredto be decided only by the person who has provided the opportunity ofhearing. The matter was referred to a 3[rd] Judge who held that whereobjections have been filed and heard by one Collector and the report hadbeen submitted by another Collector, the proceedings stand vitiated forbeing in violation of the principles of natural justice. Some of the landowners in this matter were owners of land in Village Chattarpur whereinthere was interim order of stay of dispossession. Though the Hon’bleJudges differed on the ground of hearing of objections filed by the landowners, but in respect of all other issues, the Court held as under:

“33. The Division Bench judgment in the case of Balak RamGupta (supra) no longer can be stated to be a good law in viewof the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abhey Ram’s case,Gurdip Singh’s case as well as a recent Division Bench judgmentof this Court in the case of Sunil Nagpal v. Union of India, CW838/86 decided on 17.12.2004 wherein similar writ petitions weredismissed. The judgment of Sudan Singh (supra) was not ABC

D

E

F

G

H

Aapproved by a Larger Bench of Supreme Court in Abhey Ram’scase (supra). Thus, none of these two judgments can tilt eitherthe equity or the law in favour of the petitioners.

xxx xxx xxx

39. It is evident from the above discussion that larger number of,Bwrit petitions have been dismissed by the Courts and particularlyafter pronouncement of the judgment of the Supreme Court in thecases of Gurdip Singh and Abhey Ram (supra) even recently inthe Sunil Nagpal’s case (supra) number of writ petitions weredismissed by another Division Bench of this Court. Wherever theCpetitioners have been granted relief by different Division Benchof this Court, it has been primarily by following the judgment ofthe Division Bench in Balak Ram Gupta’s case (supra) and priorto the pronouncement of the judgment of the Supreme Court inthe above referred cases. Even if one was to accept the contentionsraised on behalf of the petitioners, in my opinion, the petitionersDare not entitled to any relief in the facts and circumstances of thepresent case.”

12. This Court in a judgment reported as Union of India v. ShivRaj[13 ]dismissed the appeals arising out of Chatro Devi inter-alia on theground that the majority view of the High Court that objections areErequired to be decided by the same Collector who heard the objections iscorrect. The said judgment however, relating to interpretation of Section24(2) of the 2013 Act, was held to be not laying down good law in theConstitution Bench judgment of this Court reported as IndoreDevelopment Authority v. Manoharlal and Others.[14]F

13. In another set of appeals, this Court in a judgment reported asOm Prakash v. Union of India and Others[15]dismissed the appealsof the land owners who had not filed objections under Section 5-A ofthe Act. This Court relied upon Abhey Ram and Gurdip SinghUban-I held as under:

G“54. It is emphasised by him that in the light of judgment of thisCourt in Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban [(2000) 7 SCC296] known as Gurdip Singh Uban-II [(2000) 7 SCC 296], all 13 (2014) 6 SCC 56414 (2020) 8 SCC 129H15 (2010) 4 SCC 17

points having already been considered, no fresh look is requiredby this Court. More so, when each and every point argued,hammered and contended by the appellants has already beendecided against them. It was also submitted by him that in thename of unfair treatment, matters which stood closed either byseveral judgments of this Court or of the Delhi High Court andalso keeping in mind that the land acquisition proceedings wereinitiated in the year 1980, nothing more is required to be done andthe appeals deserve to be dismissed.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

91. In the light of the foregoing discussion, more so, keeping inmind the ratio of which stood concluded by a judgment of Benchof three learned Judges of this Court in Abhey Ram [(1997) 5SCC 421], we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where weare called upon to come to a different conclusion that subsequentdeclaration issued under Section 6 was beyond the period oflimitation. Fact situation does not warrant us to do so.”

14. In Manohar Lal Atree v. Union of India & Ors.[16], thechallenge was to the acquisition of land situated in Village Satbari. On27.7.1990, the Division Bench passed an interim order that anydevelopment activity undertaken on the land in question will be at the riskand cost of the respondents. However, the writ petition was allowed on6.12.1990 relying upon Balbir Singh that the notification under Section6 of the Act stands quashed. There was also a direction for restorationof possession and on payment by the land owners of the compensationdisbursed.

15. The respondents-land owners in Smt. Sheila Khatri & Ors.v. Union of India & Ors.[17], in the writ petition filed in the year 1999,alleged that the notification under Section 6 of the Act stands quashedand therefore, the award in respect of land of the land owners wasillegal. The land owners challenged the Section 6 notification and that nofurther proceedings could be taken under Section 11-A of the Act on thebasis of the existing Section 4 notification. The land owners made referenceto Writ Petition No. 2478 of 1985 (Moohul Transport Company Pvt.Ltd. v. Union of India) wherein it was held that the entire land covered 16 Civil Writ Petition No. 2364 of 1990 decided on 6.12.1990

17 Civil Writ Petition No. 1786 of 1998

AB

CD

E

F

G

H

Aby that notification stands de-acquired. The land owners also madereference to Balbir Singh wherein a direction was issued to handoverthe vacant possession of land to all those persons who have receivedcompensation and the land owners were directed to return/refund thecompensation received by them along with interest. The land ownershave averred to the following effect:B

“16. That it is submitted that all the above mentioned judgementspassed by this Court in CWP No. 1639 of 1985 dated 18.11.1989(Balak Ram II) dated 16.5.1989 in CWP No. 51 of 1989 (BalbirSingh) and judgement dated 6th December, 1990 in Civil WritPetition No. 2364 of 1990 (Manohar Lal Atree) applies squarelyCto the case of the petitioners in the present writ petition. In viewof the above mentioned legal position, the land in question ownedand possessed by the petitioners are free from acquisitionproceedings and the petitioners are the lawful owners in actualphysical possession of the said land.”D(Names Mentioned for easy identification of the cases)

16. The land owners contended that the objections dated 2.12.1980were found in the old records left by late Shri K.C. Khatri, therefore,they have reason to believe that objections were filed by the deceasedK.C. Khatri. We may state that there is no categorical assertion of filingEof such objections, therefore, the reason to believe that objections werefiled is not conclusive. Still further, even if such objections were filed,neither Shri K.C. Khatri nor his legal heirs have disputed the acquisitionproceedings on the ground of non-consideration of such objections beforeannouncing of the award bearing No. 15/87-88 on 5.6.1987. The landFowners have also referred to an order passed by the Division Bench ofthe High Court on 17.12.1996 in the case of Brig. Gurdeep Singh Ubanholding that once the acquisition proceedings were quashed in a writpetition, the entire proceedings fall through.

17. According to the appellant, there was a stay of dispossessionGoperating in one or the other writ petition, even after decision of BalakRam-II on 14.10.1988/ 18.11.1988. Thereafter, the Delhi High Court inBalbir Singh, Gurdeep Singh Uban and in various other judgmentshad taken a view that the entire acquisition proceedings shall standquashed. However, the issue was clarified by this Court in Abhey Ramon 22.4.1997 and Gurdip Singh Uban-I and II on 20.8.1999 andH

18.8.2000 respectively. Therefore, there was an era of uncertainty aboutthe status of acquisition proceedings in view of either stay operatingagainst the appellant or on account of setting aside of the notification underSection 6 of the Act. It was only the issue of the validity of notificationunder Section 6 of the Act which attained finality when Gurdip SinghUban-II was decided. Thus, the period of five years had not expiredbefore the commencement of the 2013 Act with effect from 1.1.2014.

18. Mr. Bansal, learned counsel for the land owners vehementlyargued that there is specific provision for exclusion of time if stay isoperating in another writ petition in terms of Explanation 2 in Section 6of the Act and the Explanation in Section 11-A of the Act, but there is nocorresponding exclusion clause in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.Therefore, it was contended that the period of stay can very well beexcluded for publication of a notification under Section 6 or for announcingthe award but not after the award, on the strength of the interim orderspassed in the writ petition of other land owners. Therefore, after theexpiry of five years before the status-quo order was passed in favour ofthe land owners, the proceedings had lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of2013 Act. It was contended that stay granted in the writ petitions filedby other land owners cannot be used by the State for excluding suchperiod in the case of the land owners herein.

19. Learned counsel for the land owners further argued that theaward was announced on 5.6.1987 and the interim order in favour of theland owners was passed on 9.7.1999. Thus, for a period of 12 yearsfrom the date of making of the award, there was no stay by the Court orby giving effect to any statutory provision of the Act granting such stayunder Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It was contended that the State hasbeen taking possession on different dates, therefore, it cannot be inferredthat the stay in one or the other case was deterrent for the appellant totake possession of the land which was subject matter of acquisition. Theland owners have made elaborate reference on the undisputed principlethat the judgment is an authority for what it actually decides and notwhat follows from it, i.e., what is meant by obiter dictum and ratiodecidendi. It was also argued that the Casus Omissus cannot be suppliedby including further words in the statute.

20. We have heard learned the Counsel for the parties and findthat the appeal deserves to be allowed. The aforementioned judgmentshave been thoroughly examined by this Court in Om Prakash. The AB

C

D

EF

G

H

Ajudgments in Balbir Singh and Gurdeep Singh Uban were againrecently examined by this Court in Delhi Development Authority v.Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd. & Ors.[18]decided on 6.5.2022, wherein it washeld as under:

“36. In Balak Ram-II, the acquisition proceedings were quashedBsince the objections filed by the land owners were not heard ordecided in accordance with law. Thus, Balak Ram-II is ajudgment in personam and not in rem, as the grievance of the writpetitioners was specific to them. The judgment of the High Courtin Balbir Singh is based upon the fact that in Balak Ram-II, theentire notification under Section 6 of the Act stands quashed. SuchCaspect has not found favor in Abhey Ram and Gurdip SinghUban-I and II. Otherwise also, non-hearing of objections filedwould be limited to those land owners who have filed objections.The predecessor-in-interest of the purchaser has not filed anyobjections under Section 5A of the Act, therefore, the judgment inDBalak Ram-II cannot come to the aid of land owners who havenever preferred any objections.

37. Therefore, the judgment in Balbir Singh does not confer anyright on the other land owners who have not disputed the acquisitionproceedings on the ground of lack of effective hearing ofEobjections under Section 5-A of the Act. Since the original landowner never filed any objections under Section 5-A of the Act,the purchaser cannot seek the relief which was not available evento the original land owner.

38. The purchaser has purchased the property knowing fully wellFthat the vendor has not disputed the acquisition proceedings. Buton the basis of an order passed in Balbir Singh, it was conveyedand accepted by the purchaser, that the acquisition stands quashedand original land owner was in possession of the land. Since SudanSingh, affirming the order in Balbir Singh has not been approvedby this Court in the three judgments referred hereinabove (AbheyGRam, Gurdip Singh Uban-I and Gurdip Singh Uban-II), noright would accrue to the original land owner or the purchaser.The High Court in the impugned order has not noticed any of thethree judgments of this Court in Abhey Ram, Gurdip Singh Uban- I and Gurdip Singh Uban-II nullifying the effect of Balbir Singhand instead ordered the purchaser to deposit twice of the amountpaid to the original land owner. The condition of payment ofcompensation in Balbir Singh by the land owners does not survivein view of the fact that such judgment has not been approved bythis Court.”

21. In the writ petition filed by the land owners, there was aninterim order of stay granted on 9.7.1999, even before Gurdip SinghUban-I was decided on 20.8.1999. The notifications under Section 6 ofthe Act which were quashed became effective only after the order ofthis Court in Gurdip Singh Uban-I and II. The land owner strangelymade no mention of the judgment delivered on 22.4.1997 in Abhey Ram.The order of stay of dispossession in the writ petition filed by the landowner continued when the 2013 Act came into force. The land whichwas the subject matter of challenge in Gurdip Singh Uban[19]was alsoat Village Chattarpur, even before the Award was announced. Therewas an interim order of stay of dispossession on 28.4.1986 in respect ofland situated in the village Chattarpur which continued till such time thenotification under Section 6 of the Act was quashed relying upon BalbirSingh decided on 15.05.1989 and Sudan Singh. This order was setaside by this Court on 20.8.1999 in Gurdip Singh Uban I. The landowner had got stay in their writ petition on 9.7.1999. Thus, there was nostay free period of 5 years before coming into force of the 2013 Act.

22. It is to be noted that since the entire notification was quashedby the High Court in Gurdip Singh and Balbir Singh, therefore, theState could not take possession on the basis of quashed notification. Butbefore the judgments of this Court were pronounced in the year 1999 or2000, the land owner had obtained stay of dispossession. Therefore, it isnot a stay of dispossession pending notification under Section 6 or awardunder Section 11-A but the acquisition of the entire land which came tobe settled by this Court. Thus, the State could not take possession on thebasis of a notification under Section 6 leading to the award on 05.06.1987.The argument that there was no stay from the date of the award till thestay was granted in favour of the land owner is hence partly correct asthere was no stay but the acquisition itself stood quashed. Therefore,when the 2013 Act came into force on 01.01.2014, the five years hadnot lapsed which was stay free or free from setting aside of the acquisition.

19 WP (C) No. 920 of 1986 decided on 17.12.1996

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A23. Learned counsel for the land owners has referred to a counteraffidavit dated 9.7.2018 filed by the State in Mrs. Verinder Kaur v.Government of NCT of Delhi[20]to the effect that the amount ofcompensation in respect of village Chattarpur was withdrawn for thepurpose of award in village Kakrola. However, the said writ petitionwas dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court inter alia onBthe ground that the petitioner did not challenge the acquisition proceedingsfor more than 3 decades. It was held as under:

“The fact of the matter is that as far as the Petitioner is concernedshe never came forward to challenge the land acquisitionproceedings at any stage. While certain others came to the CourtCand got interim orders in their favour, the Petitioner did not challengethe proceedings at any stage. The inability of the Respondents totake possession is explained by the fact that an interim order waspassed in one set of petitions which continued for a long time.

Interfering with the land acquisition proceedings at this stage whenDthe Petitioner has not shown any interest in challenging them formore than three decades would encourage an abuse of the processof law. Entertaining the petition would be contrary to the decisionby a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in IndoreDevelopment Authority v. Shailendra (2018) 3 SCC 412.”

E24. In another judgment of this Court reported as DelhiDevelopment Authority v. Rajan Sood[21], the land owner had the benefitof stay in his favour when the 2013 Act came into force. There was adirection issued in the writ petition filed by the land owner on 9.11.2011 toconsider the application under Section 48 of the Act. It was held thatFSection 48 of the Act would be applicable as the possession of land is nottaken over by the acquiring authority and thus the land owners would bedeemed to be in possession of the same. It was held as under:

“7.1 … It is the case on behalf of the original writ petitionersthat a purported letter dated 23.09.1986 allegedly taking symbolicGpossession was never disclosed by appellants in the proceedingsconducted before the High Court on two separate occasions andthe same has been filed for the first time in the present proceedings.The aforesaid is not correct. Even in the impugned order itself in 20 WP (C) No. 589 of 2018 decided on 13.8.2019H21 Civil Appeal No. 1927 of 2022 Decided on 29.3.2022

paragraph 2, the High Court has noted the submissions on behalfof the appellants to the effect that the possession was taken overon 23.09.1986. Therefore, it cannot be said such a plea is takenfor the first time before this Court. It is the case on behalf of theoriginal writ petitioners, relying upon the earlier order passed bythe High Court dated 09.11.2011 in writ petition No. 7714/2011that, the original writ petitioners continue to be in possession andthe actual possession has never been taken over. However, it isrequired to be noted that even in the order dated 09.11.2011, therewas no specific finding given by the High Court that the originalwrit petitioners are in possession of the land in question. On thecontrary, it is observed that the authority to consider the applicationunder section 48 of the Act, 1894 on merits on the assumption ofthe possession being with the original writ petitioners. Therefore,while passing the order dated 09.11.2011 also, the High Courtassumed the original writ petitioners are in possession hence assuch no specific finding was given to the effect that the originalwrit petitioners are in possession.

xx xx xx

7.3 Be that as it may. Assuming for the sake of argument that theoriginal writ petitioners are found to be in possession and thecompensation was not tendered, in that case also as can be seenfrom the order passed by the High Court on 09.11.2011 in writpetition No. 7714/2011, the authority was restrained from takingany coercive action in respect of the land in question. Therefore,in view of the subsequent decision of this Court in the case ofIndore Development Authority (supra - paragraph 366.8), theperiod, during which the interim order is/was operative, has to beexcluded in the computation of five years’ period. In the presentcase even, it is the contention on behalf of the original writ petitionersthat the order of no coercive action was directed to be continuedtill the application under section 48 of the Act, 1894 was decided.”

25. In another judgment in Delhi Development Authority v. BhimSain Goel & Ors.[22], notifications dated 21.3.2003 and 18.3.2004 underSections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively were the subject matter ofconsideration. The award was passed by the Land Acquisition Collectoron 22.8.2005. In a writ petition filed challenging the Section 6 notification, 22 Civil Appeal No. 3151 of 2022 passed by this Court on 25.4.2022

AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

Athe High Court directed to maintain status quo with regard to nature, titleand possession of the land in question. The writ petition was dismissedbut in appeal before this Court, there was an interim order of stay. Duringthe pendency of the appeal, the 2013 Act came to be enacted. The landowners filed a writ petition to declare the proceedings as lapsed. Suchwrit petition was allowed on 2.2.2016 which was then challenged beforeBthis Court. This Court held as under:

“12. On the application of the aforesaid principles to the facts ofthis case, there cannot be any doubt that the respondents cannottake shelter under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. This is for thesimple reason that it is by their conduct in approaching the CourtsCand obtaining interim orders that the appellant was prevented fromtaking possession of the lands. We are clear in our minds that thisis indeed one such case where the respondents have launchedlitigation, obtained orders and it has clearly prevented the appellantfrom taking possession and therefore, the impugned judgment ofDthe High Court would have to be set aside.

xx xx xx

xx xx xx

22. The principle which has appealed to the Constitution Bench ofthis Court is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. Thepublic authority which had set the law in motion under the earlierEregime cannot be put to a loss when at the end of the day or onthe day of reckoning it is found that they must succeed in law.Here we have found that the appellant is fully justified in contendingthat but for the orders passed by the High Court and this Court,the possession would have been taken, and the land would haveFvested under the law. We must proceed on the basis that but forthe interim orders passed which cannot survive the final disposalof the cases, the land would have stood vested with the Governmentunder the earlier regime…

xx xx xx

G

24. It is clear as daylight that it would be completely antitheticalto public interest were the Government be compelled to shell outpublic funds under the 2013 Act to acquire land which alreadybelongs to it. We cannot be oblivious to the said sublime principleas well.”

H

26. Pertinent to note, though the High Court in Balak Ram-II hadnot quashed the notification under Section 6 of the Act, but in some of thesubsequent judgments such as in Balbir Singh, the High Court held thatthe notification stands quashed and the land stood reverted back to theland owners. Therefore, an option was given to the land owners to refundthe compensation. Such judgment of Balbir Singh was affirmed by thisCourt in Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh[23]. Delhi HighCourt in Gurdip Singh Uban etc. relied upon Sudan Singh to hold thatthe notification under Section 6 of the Act stands quashed. However,Sudan Singh was specifically found to be laying down not good law inAbhey Ram, Gurdip Singh Uban-I and Gurdip Singh Uban-II. Therewas a stay in the writ petition filed by the land owners themselves whichcontinued to operate till the 2013 Act came into force. Therefore, it wasthe order of the High Court itself which prevented the appellant to takepossession. However, such position got clarified only after the judgmentin Gurdip Singh Uban-I, later clarified in Gurdip Singh Uban-II, butin the meantime, there was an interim order granted in favour of the landowners.

27. This Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlaland Others[24]held that the twin conditions of failure to take possessionor payment of compensation alone can lead to the lapse of notificationunder Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. This Court has held as under:

“306. When the authorities are disabled from performing dutiesdue to impossibility, would be a good excuse for them to savethem from rigour of provisions of Section 24(2). A litigant may beright or wrong. He cannot be permitted to take advantage of asituation created by him of interim order. The doctrine “commodumex injuria sua nemo habere debet” that is convenience cannotaccrue to a party from his own wrong. Provisions of Section 24do not discriminate litigants or non-litigants and treat themdifferently with respect to the same acquisition, otherwise,anomalous results may occur and provisions may becomediscriminatory in itself.

307. In Union of India v. Shiv Raj [Union of India v. Shiv Raj,(2014) 6 SCC 564 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 607] , this Court did not 23 (1997) 5 SCC 430

24 (2020) 8 SCC 129

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

Aconsider the question of exclusion of the time. In Karnail Kaur v.State of Punjab [Karnail Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2015) 3 SCC206 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 259] and in Sree Balaji Nagar ResidentialAssn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of T.N., (2015)3 SCC 353 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 298], various aspects includingthe interpretation of provisions of Section 24 were not taken intoBconsideration. Thus, the said rulings cannot be said to be layingdown good law.

A

xx xx xx

A

xx xx xx

314. The maxim “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” means that theClaw does not expect the performance of the impossible. Thoughpayment is possible but the logic of payment is relevant. There arecases in which compensation was tendered, but refused and thendeposited in the treasury. There was litigation in court, which waspending (or in some cases, decided); earlier references forenhancement of compensation were sought and compensation wasDenhanced. There was no challenge to acquisition proceedings ortaking possession, etc. In pending matters in this Court or in theHigh Court even in proceedings relating to compensation, Section24(2) was invoked to state that proceedings have lapsed due tonon-deposit of compensation in the court or to deposit in theEtreasury or otherwise due to interim order of the court needfulcould not be done, as such proceedings should lapse.

xx xx xx

316. Another Roman Law maxim “nemo tenetur ad impossibilia”,means no one is bound to do an impossibility. Though such acts ofFtaking possession and disbursement of compensation are notimpossible, yet they are not capable of law performance, duringsubsistence of a court’s order; the order has to be complied withand cannot be violated. Thus, on equitable principles also, such aperiod has to be excluded ........................“

G

G28. Therefore, the period of 5 years had not lapsed on 1.1.2014which could lead to lapsing of the acquisition proceedings. The appellantwas prevented by the interim orders in a number of writ petitions filed totake possession. Therefore, prior to the commencement of 2013 Act,there was no stay free period of 5 years which could lead to a declarationthat the proceedings stand lapsed. Still further, the notifications underH

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SUNIL KHATRI &ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

Section 6 of the Act quashed on 15.5.1989 and 17.12.1996 were setaside in Gurdip Singh Uban-I and II but before that, there was anorder of stay of dispossession granted in favour of the land owner on27.9.1999. Therefore, on account of setting aside of notification underSection 6 of the Act, the State could not take possession in view of theorders passed by the High Court.

29. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The order passedby the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the landowners is dismissed.

Nidhi Jain(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H