PRAHLAD RAUT versus ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES on 27 August 2019

[2019] 11 S.C.R. 809

PRAHLAD RAUT

v.

ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES

(Civil Appeal No. 6640 of 2019)

AUGUST 27, 2019

[R. BANUMATHI AND INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985: s. 21 – Limitation –Suspension of appellant-Steward on charges of embezzlement andmisappropriation – Registration of FIR – Thereafter, appellantcommitted theft in public place and registration of second FIR andconviction u/s. 379 IPC – Issuance of Memorandum removingappellant from service from the date of his conviction and directionto refund the subsistence allowance received by him – After a decadeon account of compromise between the appellant and respondent,first FIR quashed by the High Court – Representation moved byappellant demanding retiral benefits – After 13 years from the dateof Memorandum, application filed by appellant challenging theMemorandum – Tribunal set aside the memorandum and grantedall benefits to the appellant – Writ petition by the respondent –Allowed by the High Court – On appeal, held: Sub-Section (3) ofSection 21 is attracted when there is sufficient cause for the delayin filing an appeal beyond the period of limitation – Finding of thetribunal that the application had been filed within limitation, ispatently erroneous and was rightly not accepted by the High Court – Successive representations do not save limitation and does notjustify delay of about thirteen years in approaching the tribunal –Memorandum had to be challenged before the tribunal within theperiod of limitation as prescribed in s. 21(1)(b), which would startrunning from the date of expiry of six months from the date of filingof appeal or alternatively the appellant would have to showsufficient cause for the delay in filing the application beyond theperiod prescribed by limitation – It cannot be said that the quashingof the first FIR gave rise to afresh cause of action – Forfeiture ofpensionary benefits by reason of a punitive order of termination isnot a continuing cause of action – First FIR was not quashed onthe ground that the same did not disclose any offence or was

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Aotherwise frivolous, vexatious or harassive – Also it cannot be saidthat absolute penury led the appellant to commit the offence u/s.379 – Any sympathy for the appellant would be completely misplaced– Thus, the order of the High Court is upheld – Central Civil Services(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 – r. 19(1).

BLimitation: Object of – Held: Law of limitation is founded onpublic policy – Object of limitation is to put a quietus on stale anddead disputes – Person ought not to be allowed to agitate his claimafter a long delay – When retiral benefits are withheld without cause,there would be a continuing cause of action – However, whenretirement benefits are withheld by way of disciplinary action, theCorder would necessarily have to be challenged within the period oflimitation or alternatively there would have to be sufficient causefor the delay.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

DHELD: 1.1 Sub–Section (3) of Section 21 of theAdministrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is attracted when there issufficient cause for the delay in filing an appeal beyond the periodof limitation. The finding of the tribunal that the OriginalApplication had been filed within limitation, is patently erroneousand has rightly not been accepted by the High Court. It is wellEsettled that successive representations do not save limitationand certainly does not justify delay of about thirteen years inapproaching the tribunal. [Para 27, 28][821-A, C]

1.2 Removal under Rule 19(i) of the Central Civil Services(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 entails theFconsequence of forfeiture of retiral benefits such as pension. Theorder of 6.01.2000 necessarily had to be challenged before theTribunal within the period of limitation or alternatively theappellant would have to show sufficient cause for the delay infiling the Original Application beyond the period prescribed byGlimitation. The question of entitlement, if at all, of the appellantto gratuity and provident fund, notwithstanding his removal bythe Memorandum dated 6.01.2000 was neither raised before norconsidered by the Tribunal. Nor was the question considered bythe High Court. The question cannot be raised at the stage ofthis appeal. [Para 32][823-E, F]H

1.3 The High Court has very rightly taken note of the factthat the first FIR had been quashed pursuant to a settlementbetween the parties in terms whereof the appellant paid an amountof Rs.2 lakhs and another amount of Rs.2,46,130/– by way ofbankers’ cheque, by way of compensation for the loss caused tothe Cooperative Society. [Para 34, 35][824-C]

1.4 The order of dismissal dated 6.1.2000 under Rule 19(i)ofCCS(CCA) Rules, 1985 was challenged on 2013 after almost 13years. Even assuming that the appeal was never decided, thecause of action for filing an application before the tribunal wouldhave arisen on expiry of six months from the date of filing theappeal, in view of Section 20(2)(b) of the Act. The application tothe tribunal would have to be filed within the period of limitationas prescribed in Section 21(1)(b) of the Act, which would startrunning from the date of expiry of six months from the date offiling of appeal. The contention of the appellant that the quashingof the first FIR gave rise to afresh cause of action is completelymisconceived. The High Court rightly declined to accept thefinding of the tribunal that the O.A. was within the period oflimitation. [Para 37, 39][824-E-F; 825-B,F]

1.5 The High Court rightly held that the law of limitation isfounded on public policy. The object of limitation is to put aquietus on stale and dead disputes. A person ought not to beallowed to agitate his claim after a long delay. There can be nodoubt that when retiral benefits are withheld without cause, therewould be a continuing cause of action. However, when retirementbenefits are withheld by way of disciplinary action, the order wouldnecessarily have to be challenged within the period of limitationor alternatively there would have to be sufficient cause for thedelay. Once there is cessation of employer–employee relationshipby an order of termination, the cause of action would necessarilyarise when the order of termination is passed. The forfeiture ofpensionary benefits by reason of a punitive order of terminationis not a continuing cause of action. [Para 44][827-E-G]

1.6 It cannot be said that this Court take a sympatheticview of the plight of the appellant considering that the first FIR

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Awas quashed and after the conviction pursuant to the second FIRthe appellant was released on probation of good conduct afterwhich there was no further complaint against him. The first FIRwas quashed pursuant to a settlement between the appellant andthe respondent in terms whereof the appellant compensated theBpecuniary loss caused by him to the Cooperative Society. TheFIR was not quashed on the ground that the same did not discloseany offence or was otherwise frivolous, vexatious or harassive.While under suspension in contemplation of disciplinaryproceedings for misconduct related to the first FIR, the appellantcommitted theft of a bag containing money at a public place forCwhich he was convicted under Section 379 IPC. It cannot be saidthat absolute penury led him to commit the offence since theappellant was receiving subsistence allowance while undersuspension. Any sympathy for the appellant would be completelymisplaced. Thus, the judgment and order of the High Court doesDnot call for any interference. [Para 45, 46, 47][827-H; 828-A-D]Sardar Singh v. Union of India (1991) SCC OnlineP&H 1943; Union of India and Others v. Tarsem Singh(2008) 8 SCC 648 : [2008] 12 SCR 104; Union Bankof India and Others v. C.G. Ajay Babu and AnotherE(2018) 9 SCC 529 : [2018] 9 SCR 995; S.S. Rathore v.State of Madhya Pradesh (1989) 4 SCC 582 : [1989] 1Suppl. SCR 43; State of Madhya Pradesh v. SyedQamarali (1967) 1 SLR 228; State of Punjab and Othersvs. Gurdev Singh (1991) 4 SCC 1 : [1991] 3 SCR 663– referred to.F

Case Law Reference

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6640Of 2019.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.07.2017 of the HighCourt of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5977 of 2016

Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., Puneet Singh Bindra, Ms. SimranJeet, Advs. for the Appellant.

Dushyant Parashar, Adv. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by INDIRA BANERJEE, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appeal is against a judgment and order dated 24.07.2017of the Delhi High Court, allowing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5977 of 2016filed by the respondent, and setting aside the order dated 29.02.2016passed by the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal atNew Delhi, whereby the learned Tribunal had allowed Original Application(O.A.) No.3381 of 2013 filed by the appellant challenging an order dated6.1.2000 removing the appellant from the service of the respondent.

3. The appellant was appointed by the respondent as Bearer on09.02.1972 and was promoted to the post of Steward on 15.10.1987. Hewas elected as an executive member of the Cooperative Society knownas AIIMS Cooperative, Thrift and Credit Society, hereinafter referredto as “Cooperative Society”, run by the respondent, and became itstreasurer.

4. On or about 5.3.1991, a First Information Report being FIRNo.91 of 1991 under Sections 406/420/ 468/471/477A/120B of the IndianPenal Code (IPC), hereinafter referred to as the first FIR, was registeredagainst the appellant at the Defence Colony Police Station at New Delhi,allegedly for causing loss to the tune of Rs.5 Lakhs to the CooperativeSociety by forging the signatures of its members.

5. The appellant was arrested on 05.06.1991 and was in custodytill 12.06.1991. By reason of his detention for more than 48 hours, theappellant was, by an order dated 7.8.1991, placed under deemedsuspension in terms of Rule 10(2) of the Central Civil Services A

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A(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, hereinafter referred toas “CCS (CCA) Rules” and subsistence allowance was paid to him.

6. While the appellant was under suspension, another FIR No.868of 1991 under Sections 356/379/411 of the IPC, hereinafter referred toas the second FIR, was registered against the appellant at the ConnaughtBPlace Police Station at New Delhi, allegedly for snatching a bag containingcash of Rs.290/- and two lottery tickets from one Jai Ram son of ChimmaRam. Criminal proceedings commenced in pursuance of the second FIR.By a judgment and order dated 15.9.1993, the appellant was convictedby the Metropolitan Magistrate Delhi under Section 379 of the IndianCPenal Code.

7. Admittedly, the second FIR was registered against the appellantwhile he was under suspension. On behalf of the respondent, it has beencontended that the respondent had no knowledge of the second FIR orof the judgment and order dated 15.09.1993, of conviction of the appellantDunder Section 379 of the IPC, for about 7 years.

8. On 16.09.1993, the respondent had been released on probationof good conduct for a period of one year, on condition of furnishing apersonal bond and one surety of Rs.5,000/-. These orders were apparentlyconcealed from the respondent.

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9. It is the case of the respondent, that the respondent came toknow about the second FIR and the conviction of the appellant pursuantthereto, after about 7 years, after which the respondent was removedfrom service by a memorandum dated 6.1.2000 issued under Rule 19(i)of the CCS (CCA) Rules. The said Memorandum is extractedFhereinbelow:- “Whereas Shri Prahlad Raut, Steward (under suspension) from5.6.1991 on charge of embezzling and mis-appropriation inview of F.I.R. No.91 dated 3.3.1991 under Section 406/420/468/471/477-A and 120-B IPC

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And whereas Shri Prahlad Raut was later on charge for anoffence of theft of a bag in public place, he had beenconvicted by the Court of Shri D.K. Saini, MetropolitanMagistrate, New Delhi under section 356/379/411 IPC videjudgment dated 16.9.1993.

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As whereas it is considered that the conduct of the said ShriPrahlad Raut which had held to his conviction is such as torender his further retention in the service of the Instituteundesirable.

And whereas Shri Prahlad Raut was given an opportunityto offer his written explanation.

And whereas the said Shri Prahlad Raut has given a writtenexplanation which has been duly considered by theundersigned.

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by theRule 19 (1) of the C.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rule 1965 the undersignedremoves the said Shri Prahlad Raut from the service of theInstitute from the date of the conviction i.e. 16.9.1993.

Shri Prahlad Raut therefore is directed to deposit thesubsistence allowance as received by him from the A.I.I.M.S.beyond 16.9.1993.”

10. By the said memorandum dated 6.01.2000, issued under Rule19(i) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, the respondent removed the appellantfrom service with retrospective effect from 16.9.1993, being the date ofhis conviction, pursuant to the second FIR, and directed him to refundthe subsistence allowance received by him from 16.9.1993 onwards.

11. Rule 19 of the CCS(CCA) Rules is set out hereinbelow forconvenience:

“19. Special procedure in certain cases

Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 14 to Rule 18-(i) where any penalty is imposed on a Government servanton the ground of conduct which has led to his convictionon a criminal charge, or

(ii) where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied for reasonsto be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonablypracticable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided inthese rules, or A

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(iii) where the President is satisfied that in the interest ofthe security of the State, it is not expedient to hold anyinquiry in the manner provided in these rules.

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The Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstancesof the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit:

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[Provided that the Government servant may be given anopportunity of making representation on the penaltyproposed to be Imposed before any order is made in acase under Clause (i):

Provided further that the Commission shall be consulted,Cwhere such consultation is necessary, [and the Governmentservant has been given an opportunity of representing theadvice of the Commission,] before any orders are made inany case under this rule.]”

12. The memorandum dated 6.1.2000 indicates compliance of theDrequisites for imposition of penalty under Rule 19(i) of the CCS(CCA)Rules. It is a matter of record that the appellant was convicted of offenceunder Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code for committing theft at apublic place. The said memorandum reveals that the conduct of theappellant of committing theft in a public place, while under suspensionEon the serious charge of embezzlement and misappropriation, for whichhe was convicted under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code was dulyconsidered. On such consideration the concerned authority foundretention of the appellant in the service of the respondent to be undesirable.

13. The appellant has apparently been given an opportunity ofhearing. The memorandum dated 6.1.2000 records that the appellantFhad submitted a written explanation which had duly been consideredbefore removing the appellant from the service of the respondent, fromthe date of his conviction.

14. According to the appellant, aggrieved by the said decision, theappellant appealed to the President of the respondent, to which thereGwas no response. The respondent claims that the appeal was rejected inthe same year, that is, in 2000. However, no order of rejection is traceable.

15. Over a decade after the appellant was removed from service,he entered into a settlement with the respondent, in terms whereof hecompensated the respondent for the loss caused by him to the CooperativeH

Society. As a consequence of the compromise, the first FIR, that is, FIRNo. 91 of 1991 was quashed by the High Court of Delhi on 2.11.2012.Thereafter, the appellant made a representation demanding Pension,Gratuity and Provident Fund with interest from the respondent. This isnot in dispute.

16. The appellant has also alleged that he made a request to therespondent for withdrawal and/or cancellation of the Memorandum dated6.1.2000, to which there was no response.

17. On or about 24.7.2013, that is, over thirteen years after theissuance of the Memorandum dated 6.1.2000, removing the appellantfrom service of the respondent, with retrospective effect from the dateof his conviction, the appellant filed Original Application No.3381 of 2013before the learned Tribunal, challenging the Memorandum dated 6.1.2000.

18. Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, whichprescribes the period of limitation for filing an application in anAdministrative Tribunal provides:

“21. LIMITATION.-

(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,- (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned inclause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made inconnection with the grievance unless the application is made,within one year from the date on which such final order hasbeen made;

(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as ismentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 hasbeen made and a period of six months had expired thereafterwithout such final order having been made, within one yearfrom the date of expiry of the said period of six months.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),where- (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is madehad arisen by reason of any order made at any time duringthe period of three years immediately preceding the date onwhich the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal A

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becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter towhich such order relates; and A

(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance hadbeen commenced before the said date before any High Court,the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it isBmade within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as thecase may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a periodof six months from the said date, whichever period expireslater.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) orCsub-section (2), an application may be admitted after theperiod of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) ofsub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six monthsspecified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies theTribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making theDapplication within such period.”

19. The pleadings of the appellant, in his application before theTribunal with regard to limitation, are extracted herein below :- “3 Limitation E

The application is within the period of limitation as prescribedin Section 21 of the A.T. Act, 1985. Moreover, the applicantchallenges a per se illegal order of removal from service withretrospective effect as well as his pension/GPF is withheldand thus are continuing wrongs.”

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20. Along with O.A. No.3381 of 2013 the appellant had filed anapplication seeking condonation of delay and an affidavit stating that theapplication for condonation of delay had been filed in exercise of abundantcaution and to comply with procedural requirements.

21. In the application for condonation of delay, it was contendedthat (i) the order of removal with retrospective effect being void abinitio, the law of limitation would not apply; (ii) Delhi High Court hadquashed the first FIR by an order dated 2.11.2012 and this order gaverise to a fresh cause of action; (iii) the respondent had filed an appealdated 21.01.2013 to the Appellate Authority, seeking review of the order G

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of removal, to which there had been no response; (iv) the appellant hadcontinuing cause of action as pension/provident fund amount had illegallybeen withheld; (v) the appellant being 67 years of age, had retired fromservice, and was in a state of penury.

22. By an order dated 29.2.2016, the learned Tribunal set asidethe Memorandum dated 6.1.2000 and granted all the benefits to theappellant. The Learned Tribunal held:-

“11. Having considered the matter, we are of the firm viewthat the OA was filed within the period of limitation. It is nota matter of dispute that the punishing authority hasretrospectively removed the applicant from service with effectfrom 16.09.1993, that being the date of his conviction in acriminal case by means of impugned order dated 06.01.2000.Such orders are illegal, void ab initio and can be challengedat any time. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a celebrated judgmentin the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Syed Qamarali1967(I) SLR 228, which was subsequently followed in manydecisions, has authoritatively ruled that the order of dismissalhaving been made in breach of mandatory provision of therules, such order of dismissal had, therefore, no legal existenceand it was not necessary for the respondents to have the orderset aside by the court. The defence of limitation which wasbased only on contention that the order has to be set aside bya court before it became invalid must, therefore, be rejected.

12. Not only that, the applicant claimed that he has filed theappeal on 23.02.2000 (Annexure A-5 Colly) to the AppellateAuthority which was received by the office of the President,AIIMS, on 25.02.2000. Subsequently, he moved arepresentation dated 21.01.2013 (Annexure A-6 Colly)claiming all the consequential benefits by ignoring theimpugned removal order.

13. The contesting respondents have neither specificallydenied nor produced any cogent record even to indicate thatapplicant has not filed any appeal (Annexure A-5 Colly)/representation (Annexure A-6 Colly) or the same were decidedby the Appellate Authority. Moreover, the applicant hasclaimed all consequential benefits along with amount of A

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pension and other emoluments along with interest, which toour mind, is recurring and continuing cause of action.

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14. Thus, seen from any angle, it cannot possibly be said thatthe OA filed by the applicant is barred by limitation as contraryurged on behalf of respondents. Hence, it is held that theBmain OA filed by the applicant is within the prescribed periodof limitation and the crux of law laid down in Syed Qamarali(supra) is fully applicable in the present case.

15. Once it is held that the main OA has been filed within theperiod of limitation, learned counsel for applicant thencontended with some amount of vehemence that there is noprovision of law/rules that the applicant can retrospectivelybe removed from his service with effect from 16.09.1993, thedate of his conviction, that too, simply on the ground of hisconviction in a criminal case by the impugned order dated06.01.2000 by the competent authority.”

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23. Aggrieved by the order dated 29.2.2016 passed by the learnedTribunal, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 5977 of 2016, which hasbeen allowed by the High Court of Delhi by the judgment and orderdated 24.7.2017 impugned in this appeal.

24. We have heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counselappearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Dushyant Parashar, learnedcounsel appearing for the respondent and perused the documents onrecord.

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25. Ms. Arora submitted that the learned Tribunal had rightly setaside the order of removal on the ground that the same could not haveFbeen passed with retrospective effect from 16.9.1993. Furthermore, amere conviction in a criminal case could not, as held by the learnedTribunal, justify an order under Rule 19, which postulates satisfaction bythe Disciplinary Authority, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that theconduct of the employee, which had led to his conviction in the criminalGtrial, was such that the punishment should be imposed.

26. Ms. Arora argued that the appellant had filed the OriginalApplication before learned Tribunal within limitation, which is alsosupported by the non obstante clause in sub-Section (3) of Section 21of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

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27. Sub-Section (3) of Section 21 has no application in the factsand circumstances of this case, since the appellant contended and thelearned Tribunal accepted that the Original Application had been filedwithin limitation. It was not the case of the appellant that there wassufficient cause for the delay of about thirteen years beyond the periodof limitation in filing the Original Application. Nor has the Tribunal arrivedat any finding that there was good and sufficient cause for the delay ofabout thirteen years, in filing the Application.

28. Sub-Section (3) of Section 21 is attracted when there issufficient cause for the delay in filing an appeal beyond the period oflimitation. The finding of the learned Tribunal that the Original Applicationhad been filed within limitation, as argued by the appellant, is patentlyerroneous and has rightly not been accepted by the High Court. It is wellsettled that successive representations do not save limitation and certainlydoes not justify delay of about thirteen years in approaching the Tribunal.The judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana HighCourt in Sardar Singh v. Union of India[1 ]was rendered in the specialfacts and circumstances of the case, where the claim of a soldier forpayment of disability pension was being denied only on the ground thatthe disability was not attributable to, or aggravated by, military service.

29. In support of her argument that the learned Tribunal was rightin entertaining and allowing the Original Application, Ms. Arora citedUnion of India and Others v. Tarsem Singh[2]where this Court held :- “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claimwill be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (whereremedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (whereremedy is sought by an application to the AdministrativeTribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is casesrelating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claimis based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even ifthere is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to thedate on which the continuing wrong commenced, if suchcontinuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. Butthere is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is inrespect of any order or administrative decision which relatedto or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the AB

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822SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aissue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then theclaim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relatesto payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may begranted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights ofthird parties. But if the claim involved issues relating toseniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay wouldBrender the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation willbe applied. …..”

30. The proposition of law laid down by this Court in TarsemSingh (supra) is unexceptionable. It is well settled that where there is acontinuing wrong in relation to a service related claim, relief may beCgranted notwithstanding delay, provided the granting of the relief doesnot unsettle matters settled and affect third parties. The judgment was,however, rendered in the context of discretionary relief in proceedingsunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for which there is nolimitation prescribed. Where the cause of action is not a continuing oneDthe High Courts refuse monetary claim on the ground of delay, speciallyarrears. In this context it would be pertinent to refer to the concludingpart of Paragraph (7) and Paragraph (8) of the judgment of this Court inTarsem Singh (supra) extracted hereinbelow:

“7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim willEbe rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy issought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy issought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One ofthe exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuingwrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuingwrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seekingFremedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrongcommenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing sourceof injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievanceis in respect of any order or administrative decision which relatedto or affected several others also, and if the reopening of theGissue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claimwill not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to paymentor refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite ofdelay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if theclaim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc.,affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine H

of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequentialrelief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, theprinciples relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As aconsequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential reliefrelating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to thedate of filing of the writ petition.

8. In this case, the delay of sixteen years would affect theconsequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not justifiedin directing payment of arrears relating to sixteen years, and thattoo with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief relating toarrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, orfrom the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever waslesser. It ought not to have granted interest on arrears in suchcircumstances.”

31. Ms. Arora argued that the appellant had not been paid pension,gratuity and general provident fund even though the appellant hadcompleted service of over 20 years from 1972 to 1993. The appellanthad otherwise, actually completed 28 years of service. Ms. Arora alsoattacked the direction on the appellant, in the Memorandum dated6.1.2000, to return the subsistence allowance with effect from 16.9.1993.

32. Removal under Rule 19(i) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965entails the consequence of forfeiture of retiral benefits such as pension.The order of 6.01.2000 necessarily had to be challenged before thelearned Tribunal within the period of limitation or alternatively the appellantwould have to show sufficient cause for the delay in filing the OriginalApplication beyond the period prescribed by limitation. The question ofentitlement, if at all, of the appellant to gratuity and provident fund,notwithstanding his removal by the Memorandum dated 6.01.2000 wasneither raised before nor considered by the learned Tribunal. Nor wasthe question considered by the High Court. The question cannot be raisedat the stage of this appeal.

33. The question of retrospective discharge and removal cannotbe raised after lapse of thirteen years. Whether the judgment of thisCourt in Union Bank of India and Others vs. C.G. Ajay Babu andAnother[3] cited by Ms. Arora, at all has any application, cannot beexamined at the stage of this appeal.

3 (2018) 9 SCC 529

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A34. As recorded by the High Court, as early as on 5.03.1991, FIRNo.91 (the first FIR) had been registered against the appellant who hadbeen elected Executive Member of the Cooperative Society. That FIR,as observed above, was under Sections 406/420/468/471/477A/120B ofthe IPC for causing, as Treasurer, pecuniary loss to the tune of Rs.5lakhs to the Society, by forging signatures of its members.B

35. The appellant was arrested on 5.06.1991 and had remained incustody till 12.06.1991. By an order dated 7.08.1991 the appellant wasplaced under deemed suspension from the date of his arrest i.e., 5.06.1991and paid subsistence allowance. The High Court has very rightly takennote of the fact that the first FIR had been quashed pursuant to aCsettlement between the parties in terms whereof the appellant paid anamount of Rs.2 lakhs and another amount of Rs.2,46,130/- by way ofbankers’ cheque, by way of compensation for the loss caused to theCooperative Society.

36. The judgment and order under appeal records that the appealDfiled by the appellant to the President, AIIMS was rejected in 2000.However, a copy of the rejection order is not available and was notbrought on record.

37. Be that as it may, the order of dismissal dated 6.1.2000 underRule 19(i)of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1985 was challenged on 2013 after almostE13 years. Even assuming that the appeal was never decided, the causeof action for filing an application before the Tribunal would have arisenon expiry of six months from the date of filing the appeal, in view ofSection 20(2)(b) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 set outhereinbelow:-F“20. Application not to be admitted unless otherremedies exhausted:

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall bedeemed to have availed of all the remedies available to himunder the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances;-G(a) …..

(b) where no final order has been made by the Governmentor other authority or officer or other person competent to passsuch order with regard to the appeal preferred or representationmade by such person, if a period of six months from the date on H

which such appeal was preferred or representation was made hasexpired.”

The application to the Tribunal would have to be filed within theperiod of limitation as prescribed in Section 21(1)(b) of the AdministrativeTribunals Act, which would start running from the date of expiry of sixmonths from the date of filing of appeal. The contention of the appellantthat the quashing of the first FIR gave rise to afresh cause of action iscompletely misconceived.

38. In S.S. Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh[4], a ConstitutionBench of this Court held:- “21. It is appropriate to notice the provision regarding limitationunder Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Sub-section(1) has prescribed a period of one year for making of the applicationand power of condonation of delay of a total period of six monthshas been vested under sub-section (3). The civil court’s jurisdictionhas been taken away by the Act and, therefore, as far asgovernment servants are concerned, Article 58 may not beinvocable in view of the special limitation. Yet, suits outside thepurview of the Administrative Tribunals Act shall continue to begoverned by Article 58.

22. It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform.Therefore, in every such case only when the appeal orrepresentation provided by law is disposed of, cause of actionshall first accrue and where such order is not made, on the expiryof six months from the date when the appeal was filed orrepresentation was made, the right to sue shall first accrue.Submission of just a memorial or representation to the head of theestablishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matterof fixing limitation.”

39. In our considered opinion, the High Court rightly declined toaccept the finding of the Tribunal that the O.A. was within the period oflimitation.

40. The learned Tribunal opined that the O.A. had been filed withinlimitation, relying on a judgment of this Court in State of Madhya Pradeshvs. Syed Qamarali[5 ]and held that orders such as the order of removalof the appellant which were illegal or void ab initio could be challenged 4 (1989) 4 SCC 582

5 (1967) 1 SLR 228

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Aat any time. As such orders had no legal existence, it was not necessaryfor the respondent to have the order set aside by Court. The learnedTribunal has misconstrued the law laid down by this Court in SyedQamarali (supra).

41. The High Court rightly found that, in Syed Qamarali (supra)Bthe suit challenging the order of termination, which was held to be invalid,had been filed within the prescribed period of limitation of six yearsunder Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which was the residuaryarticle. In Syed Qamarali’s case the appeal had been rejected on9.04.1947 and the suit filed on 8.12.1952. The period of six years hasbeen reduced to three years under Article 113 of the Limitation Act,C1963.

42. On the other hand, in the State of Punjab and Others vs.Gurdev Singh[6]referred to and relied upon by the High Court, this Courtheld:- “8. But nonetheless the impugned dismissal order has at leastDa de facto operation unless and until it is declared to be voidor nullity by a competent body or court. In Smith v. East ElloeRural District Council [1956 AC 736, 769 : (1956) 1 All ER855, 871] Lord Radcliffe observed: (All ER p. 871)

“An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capableEof legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on itsforehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at lawto establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed orotherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensiblepurpose as the most impeccable of orders.”

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9. Apropos to this principle, Prof. Wade states [See Wade:Administrative Law, 6th edn., p. 352] : “the principle must beequally true even where the ‘brand’ of invalidity” is plainlyvisible; for there also the order can effectively be resisted inlaw only by obtaining the decision of the court. Prof. WadeGsums up these principles: [ Ibid.]

“The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate anorder only if the right remedy is sought by the right person inthe right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the court may refuse to quash itbecause of the plaintiff’s lack of standing, because he doesnot deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waivedhis rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such casethe ‘void’ order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. Itfollows that an order may be void for one purpose and validfor another; and that it may be void against one person butvalid against another.

10. It will be clear from these principles, the party aggrievedby the invalidity of the order has to approach the court forrelief of declaration that the order against him is inoperativeand not binding upon him. He must approach the court withinthe prescribed period of limitation. If the statutory time limitexpires the court cannot give the declaration sought for.”

43. In this case the order of removal was passed on 6.01.2000.The respondent had filed an appeal on 23.02.2000 Even assuming, ascontended by the appellant that the appeal was not disposed of, thelimitation started running upon expiry of six months from 23.2.2000, thatis, around 23.8.2000. The Original Application was patently barred bylimitation, there being delay of 13 years in approaching the learnedTribunal. Such inordinate delay could not have been condoned.

44. The High Court rightly held that the law of limitation is foundedon public policy. The object of limitation is to put a quietus on stale anddead disputes. A person ought not to be allowed to agitate his claim aftera long delay. There can be no doubt that when retiral benefits are withheldwithout cause, there would be a continuing cause of action. However,when retirement benefits are withheld by way of disciplinary action, theorder would necessarily have to be challenged within the period oflimitation or alternatively there would have to be sufficient cause for thedelay. Once there is cessation of employer-employee relationship by anorder of termination, the cause of action would necessarily arise whenthe order of termination is passed. The forfeiture of pensionary benefitsby reason of a punitive order of termination is not a continuing cause ofaction.

45. We are unable to accept Ms Arora’s submission that this Courttake a sympathetic view of the plight of the appellant considering thatthe first FIR was quashed and after the conviction pursuant to the second AB

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AFIR the appellant was released on probation of good conduct after whichthere was no further complaint against him.

46. It is reiterated, at the cost of repetition that the first FIR wasquashed pursuant to a settlement between the appellant and therespondent in terms whereof the appellant compensated the pecuniaryBloss caused by him to the Cooperative Society. The FIR was not quashedon the ground that the same did not disclose any offence or was otherwisefrivolous, vexatious or harassive. While under suspension in contemplationof disciplinary proceedings for misconduct related to the first FIR, theappellant committed theft of a bag containing money at a public placefor which he was convicted under Section 379 of the IPC. It cannot beCsaid that absolute penury led him to commit the offence as argued byMs. Arora since the appellant was receiving subsistence allowance whileunder suspension. Any sympathy for the appellant would, in our view, becompletely misplaced.

47. The judgment and order of the High Court under appeal doesDnot call for any interference. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and thejudgment and order of the High Court, under appeal is affirmed.

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