KIRAN PAL SINGH versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. on 17 May 2018

[2018] 4 S.C.R. 535

KIRAN PAL SINGH

v.

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 2622 of 2018)

MAY 17, 2018

[DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKARAND DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]

Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila PanchayatsAdhiniyam, 1961:

s. 15 (2) and (12) – Notice under s. 15(2) – For carrying outno confidence motion – Against Pramukh of the Kshettra Panchyat(Appellant) – No action taken on the notice – Another notice u/s.15(2) – Meeting of Panchayat convened by Competent Authorityfor consideration of no confidence motion – Resulting in passingof no confidence motion – Appellant filed writ petition u/Art. 226 ofConstitution challenging the second notice on the ground thatduring pendency of first notice second notice could not have beenissued in view of prohibition under sub-section (12) of s. 15 – HighCourt dismissed the petition – On appeal, held: s. 15(12) comesinto play when there is meeting and motion is not carried out as perprovisions of s.15 or meeting could not be held for want of quorum– In the present case, s. 15(12) would not be applicable as nomeeting was convened to consider the previous notice – Merereceipt of notice would not allow prohibition under s. 15(12) tocome into play.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. In the present case, there is no allegation thatthe meeting was convened to consider the previous notice dated9th October, 2017, as provided in Section 15 of Uttar PradeshKshettra Panchyats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961 and themotion was not challenged on any other ground or the lack ofquorum. What is singularly contended is that once a notice isgiven under Section 15(2), another notice of no confidence shallnot be received until after expiration of one year. The saidsubmission is without any substance inasmuch as the prohibition

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Aunder Section 15(12) would only come into play when there ismeeting and the motion is “not carried out” as per the provisionsof Section 15 or meeting could not be held for want of quorum.As the facts of the instant case would reveal that no meeting wasconvened to consider the previous notice dated 9th October, 2017,as per the provisions of the Act. Mere receipt of a notice by theBCollector will not allow the prohibition under Section 15(12) tocome into play. That is not the purpose of the provision.Therefore, sub-section 15(12) would not come into play. Neitherof the conditions precedent is satisfied to attract the prohibitionengrafted under Section 15(12) of the Act. [Para 20][545-D-G]

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2. The legislature being empowered by the Constitutionhas legislated to provide for the establishment of KshettraPanchayats and Zila Panchayats in the Districts of Uttar Pradeshto undertake certain Governmental functions at Kshettra andDistrict levels respectively in furtherance of the principles ofDdemocratic decentralisation of Governmental functions. It intendsto empower the Panchayats and that is why, Section 9 clearlyprovides that the term of the office of Pramukh is for five yearsfrom the date appointed for its first meeting. That brings stabilityto the administration of the Gram Panchayat. Simultaneously, italso provides that the democracy at the rural level must cherishEthe values of democracy and, therefore, a Pramukh can beremoved when a vote of no confidence is passed against him.Once the no confidence motion fails, it cannot be brought againfor one year. Sub-section (13) of Section 15 provides that nonotice of a motion under Section 15 shall be received within twoFyears of the assumption of office by a Pramukh. This is inconsonance with the principle of stability of rural governance.[Para 21] [545-H; 546-A-C]

Bhanumati etc. etc. v. State of U.P. and Others(2010) 12 SCC 1 : [2010] 7 SCR 585 ; The PunjabGUniversity, Chandigarh v. Vijay Singh Lamba andOthers (1976) 3 SCC 344 : [1976] Suppl. SCR 67 –referred to.

Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 74 ; Black’s LawDictionary (Second Edition) – referred to.

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KIRAN PAL SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH& ORS.

Case Law Reference

[2010] 7 SCR 585 referred toPara 3[1976] Suppl. SCR 67 referred toPara 16CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.2622of 2018.

From the Judgment and Final Order dated 22.11.2017 of the HighCourt of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ-C No.55499 of 2017.

Aditya Ranjan, Adv. for the Appellant.

Md. Shahid Anwar, Aamir Naseem, Gyanendra Singh, DeepakGoel, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DIPAK MISRA, CJI. 1. India, a vast country, lives in villages.The Gram Sabhas in the ancient era were conferred certain powers sothat there could be a feeling of participation in the societal and localissues and also to establish a socio-cultural amity among the membersof the collective. History records with satisfaction that panchayats wereable to settle disputes amongst the villagers and they had many a tool tofocus on unity. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the nation, emphasizedon many an occasion that people should go to the villages to realize thetrue character of real India. He had said with emphasis that ““Indialives in her seven hundred thousand villages” and “the soul of India livesin its villages”. The Constituent Assembly debates reflected on theimportance of the villages but it thought appropriate to incorporate theconcept of village panchayats in Article 40 of the Constitution whichoccurs in Chapter IV dealing with Directive Principles of State Policy.The said article provides that the State shall take steps to organize villagepanchayats and endow them with such powers and authorities as maybe necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government.The said article, as is evincible, only requires the State to take steps toconfer such powers.

2. With the passage of time, it was realized that there had been noreal decentralization of powers. In the absence of basic decentralizationof powers travelling to the mores in one of the largest democracies likeIndia, it was felt that the real purpose of social transformation could not A

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Abe achieved. It was acknowledged and accepted that the people at thegrass root level deserved to be politically, economically and sociallyempowered and the Seventy Third Amendment was brought into theframework of our organic Constitution with the clear intent of havinglocal self-government. The vision, it can be said with certitude, is sacredand the same is explicit from the Statement of Objects and Reasons ofBthe Seventy Third Amendment to the Constitution. It reads as follows:- “Though the Panchayati Raj Institutions have been in existencefor a long time, it has been observed that these institutions havenot been able to acquire the status and dignity of viable andresponsive people’s bodies due to a number of reasons includingabsence of regular elections, prolonged supersessions, insufficientrepresentation of weaker sections like Scheduled Castes,Scheduled Tribes and women, inadequate devolution of powersand lack of financial resources.

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2. Article 40 of the Constitution which enshrines one of theDirective Principles of State Policy lays down that the State shalltake steps to organise village panchayats and endow them withsuch powers and authority as may be necessary to enable themto function as units of self-government. In the light of theexperience in the last forty years and in view of the short-comingswhich have been observed, it is considered that there is animperative need to enshrine in the Constitution certain basic andessential features of Panchayati Raj Institutions to impart certainty,continuity and strength to them.

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3. Accordingly, it is proposed to add a new Part relating toPanchayats in the Constitution to provide for among other things,Gram Sabha in a village or group of villages; constitution ofPanchayats at village and other level or levels; direct elections toall seats in Panchayats at the village and intermediate level, if any,and to the offices of Chairpersons of Panchayats at such levels;reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribesin proportion to their population for membership of Panchayatsand office of Chairpersons in Panchayats at each level; reservationof not less than one-third of the seats for women; fixing tenure of5 years for Panchayats and holding elections within a period of 6months in the event of supersession of any Panchayat; F

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disqualifications for membership of Panchayats; devolution by theState Legislature of powers and responsibilities upon thePanchayats with respect to the preparation of plans for economicdevelopments and social justice and for the implementation ofdevelopment schemes; sound finance of the Panchayats bysecuring authorisation from State Legislatures for grants-in-aid tothe Panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the State, as alsoassignment to, or appropriation by, the Panchayats of the revenuesof designated taxes, duties, tolls and fees; setting up of a FinanceCommission within one year of the proposed amendment andthereafter every 5 years to review the financial position ofPanchayats; auditing of accounts of the Panchayats; powers ofState Legislatures to make provisions with respect to elections toPanchayats under the superintendence, direction and control ofthe chief electoral officer of the State; application of the provisionsof the said Part to Union territories; excluding certain States andareas from the application of the provisions of the said Part;continuance of existing laws and Panchayats until one year fromthe commencement of the proposed amendment and barringinterference by courts in electoral matters relating to Panchayats.”

3. The amendment saw the introduction of Articles 243 to 243-Owhich are meant for the panchayats at different levels that include Article243(d) which defines ‘Panchayat’ to mean an institution (by whatevername called) of self-government (constituted under Article 243B) forthe rural areas. The said articles ignited the spirit of self-governance inthe pyramidical structure of local self government. The democraticallyorganized units have been conferred powers of governance and thepurpose as envisioned is to instill a sense of satisfaction in the people atthe grass root level. It has been so recognized in Bhanumati etc. etc. v.State of U.P. and others[1]. The two-Judge Bench in the said case hasexpressed thus with lucidity:- “32. What was in a nebulous state as one of Directive Principlesunder Article 40, through 73rd Constitutional Amendmentmetamorphosed to a distinct part of Constitutional dispensationwith detailed provision for functioning of Panchayat. The mainpurpose behind this is to ensure democratic decentralization onthe Gandhian principle of participatory democracy so that the 1 AIR 2010 SC 3796 : (2010) 12 SCC 1

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APanchayat may become viable and responsive people’s bodies asan institution of governance and thus it may acquire the necessarystatus and function with dignity by inspiring respect of commonman.”

4. The singular purpose of so stating is that the source of powerBhas been incorporated in the Constitution which requires the States tomake law to carry out the constitutional command. The structure of thepanchayats, the concept of Gram Sabha, the composition of panchayats,reservation of seats, duration of panchayats, disqualification formembership, powers, authority and responsibility of panchayats andconferment of power on the panchayats to impose taxes, duties, tollsCand fees, election to the panchayats, and creation of bar for courts tointerfere in electoral matters clearly show the distinct identity carvedout for the panchayats. The legislations made by the State legislatures,inter alia, have fixed the tenure of the panchayats and also grantprotection for continuance of the elected members subject to theDdisqualifications and further the method for vote of no confidence. Weshall dwell upon the said aspect after delineation of the facts of thecase.

5. In the instant case, the appellant was elected as Pramukh,Kshettra Panchayat Vikash Khand Gulawati, District, Bulandshahr inEthe election held in the year 2015. Some of the members of the saidpanchayat moved an application under Section 15(2) of the Uttar PradeshKshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961 (for brevity,“the Act”) before the District Magistrate/Collector, District Bulandshahrfor carrying out a no confidence motion against the Pramukh. As noaction was taken by the District Magistrate/Collector, one of the moversFof the motion preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 49013 of 2017 inthe High Court of Judicature at Allahabad seeking direction to thecompetent authority to accept the notice dated 09.10.2017 under Section15(2) of the Act and to take appropriate steps for bringing logical end tothe no confidence motion.G

6. The Division Bench of the High Court on 24.10.2017 asked thelearned Additional Chief Standing Counsel to obtain instructions and postedthe matter on 01.11.2017. On the date fixed, the Writ Petition wasdismissed as not pressed. It is not necessary to advert under whatcircumstances the said writ petition was dismissed as not pressed.

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7. As the facts would further uncurtain, on 31.10.2017 anotherwritten notice of intention to make the motion of no confidence wasdelivered to the District Magistrate/Collector, Bulandshahr with signatureof 35 members. The District Magistrate/Collector issued notice on07.11.2017 to convene a meeting of Kshettra Panchayat for considerationof the motion of no confidence at 10.30 a.m. on 27.11.2017 in the officeof Kshettra Panchayat. On the said date, in the presence of the authorizedofficer, the vote of no confidence motion was considered and, eventually,after casting of votes, the no confidence motion was passed by 32 votesagainst the appellant.

8. In pursuance of the said proceedings, the post of Pramukh fellvacant and a public notice was issued on 21.02.2018 for holding theelection on 09.03.2018 and the respondent No.11 was elected. We mayhasten to add that we are really not concerned with the passing of voteof no confidence motion or the election of the respondent No.11 in thesubsequent election.

9. Suffice it to state that the appellant knocked at the doors of theHigh Court under Article 226 of the Constitution assailing the secondnotice for want of confidence on the foundation of statutoryimpermissibility. It was contended before the High Court that underSection 15(2) of the Act, the District Magistrate/Collector had completelyerred in accepting the notice of intention to convene a meeting and,therefore, the ultimate result of the said meeting is sans effect. TheHigh Court, by the impugned order dated 22.11.2017, negatived the saidcontention and dismissed the writ petition. Hence, the present appeal byway of special leave.

10. Presently, we shall scrutinize the relevant statutory scheme.Section 8 of the Act provides for the term of Kshettra Panchayat and itsmembers. Section 9 deals with the term of Pramukh. It lays the postulatethat save as otherwise provided in the Act the term of office of a Pramukhof a Kshettra Panchayat shall commence upon his election and shallextend up to the term of the Kshettra Panchayat. Section 11 deals withresignation of Pramukh or a member. Section 13 deals withdisqualification for membership of Kshettra Panchayat. Section 15 dealswith motion of non-confidence in Pramukh. Sub-section (1) of Section15 stipulates that a motion expressing want of confidence in the Pramukhof a Kshettra Panchayat may be made and proceeded with in accordance A

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Awith the procedure laid down in the subsequent sub-sections. Sub-section(2) of Section 15 requires the written notice of intention to make themotion in such form as may be prescribed, signed by at least half of thetotal number of elected members of Kshettra Panchayat for the timebeing together with a copy of the proposed motion, to be delivered inperson, by any one of the members signing the notice, to the CollectorBhaving jurisdiction over the Kshettra Panchayat. Sub-section (3) ofSection 15, by employing the word ‘shall’, makes it obligatory for theCollector, upon receiving a written notice as aforesaid, to convene ameeting at the office of Kshettra Panchayat for consideration of themotion within 30 days from the date on which the notice under SectionC15(2) is delivered to the Collector. Further, the Collector is also obligatedto give to the elected members of the Kshettra Panchayat a notice, insuch a manner as may be prescribed, at least 15 days prior to the meetingwhich he is required to convene. That apart, the explanation appendedto sub-section (3) to Section 15 stipulates that for the purposes ofcalculating 30 days specified in this sub-section, the period during whichDany stay order issued by a competent court on a petition filed against themotion is in force plus such further time as may be required for issuingof fresh notices of the meeting to the members, shall be excluded.

11. Sub-section (4) of Section 15 postulates that the sub-divisionalofficer of the sub-division in which the Kshettra Panchayat exercisesEjurisdiction shall preside over the meeting convened for consideration ofthe motion at the office of the Kshettra Panchayat. The subsequentsub-sections of Section 15 stipulate that no debate on the motion underSection 15 shall be adjourned and the Presiding Officer shall not speakon the merits of the motion. Also, he is not entitled to vote in the motion.F

12. Sub-section (11)(a) of Section 15 provides that if the motion iscarried with the support of more than half of the total number of electedmembers of the Kshettra Panchayat, the Presiding Officer shall causethis fact to be published by affixing a notice on the notice board of theoffice of the Kshettra Panchayat and also by notifying the same in theGGazette. Sub-section (11)(b) of Section 15 stipulates the consequencesof a successful motion being carried out to the effect that the Pramukhof the Kshettra Panchayat ceases to hold office and is required to vacatethe same on and from the date next following that on which the saidnotice is fixed on the notice board of the office of the KshettraPanchayat.H

13. Sub-section (12) of Section 15 deals with the situation when amotion is not carried as contemplated by the aforesaid sub-sections ofSection 15. For our purposes, sub-section (12) of Section 15, beingpertinent, is reproduced below:- “(12) If the motion is not carried as aforesaid or if the meetingcould not be held for want of quorum, no notice of any subsequentmotion expressing want of confidence in the same Pramukh shallbe received until after the expiration of one year from the date ofsuch meeting.”

14. The aforesaid provision is absolutely clear and unambiguous.The conditions precedent for stipulation of the period of one year afterthe expiration from the date of such meeting are dependent on threesituations, namely, (i) if the motion is not carried out as contemplatedunder sub-section (11), (ii) if the meeting would not be held for want ofthe quorum and, (iii) the notice of no confidence motion should be inrespect of the same Pramukh.

15. To appreciate the controversy, we have to understand thescheme engrafted under Section 15 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section15 provides that a written notice of intention to make the motion in suchform as may be prescribed, signed by at least half of the total number ofelected members of the Kshettra Panchayat for the time being togetherwith a copy of the proposed motion, shall be delivered in person, by anyone of the members signing the notice, to the Collector having jurisdictionover the Kshettra Panchayat. Sub-section (3) requires the Collector toconvene a meeting. At this stage, the only jurisdiction that the Collectorhas to scan the notice to find out whether it fulfills the essentialrequirements of a valid notice. The exercise of the said discretion, as weperceive, has to be summary in nature. There cannot be a detailedinquiry with regard to the validity of the notice. We are obliged to thinkso as sub-section (3) mandates that a meeting has to be convened notlater than 30 days from the date of delivery of the notice and furtherthere should be at least 15 days’ notice to be given to all the electedmembers of the Kshettra Panchayat. The Collector, therefore, shouldnot assume power to enter into an arena or record a finding on seriouslydisputed questions of facts relating to fraud, undue influence or coercion.His only duty is to determine whether there has been a valid notice ascontemplated under Sub-section (2) of Section 15. His delving deep toconduct a regular inquiry would frustrate the provision. He must functionwithin his own limits and leave the rest to be determined in the meeting.

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A16. We may now note the stand that was put forth before theHigh Court. It was contended that during the pendency of the 1[st] notice,the 2[nd] notice could not have been issued. There was no assertion thatthe meeting was convened pursuant to the 1[st] notice in the manner inwhich the statute provides for the same. The words “not carried out”as aforesaid are of immense significance. The meeting has to beBconvened as per the provisions of the said Section. The second partrelates to want of the quorum. Though the quorum has not been definedunder the Act, yet in the context, it would mean the quorum that requiresthe number of members to be present for the purpose of voting. Forexample, if the notice of intention is given to the Collector by more thanChalf of the total members in Kshettra of 40 members but on the date ofthe meeting, there are only 10 members, indubitably there is a lack ofquorum. Similarly, when the quorum is there and voting takes place, buteventually the vote of no confidence fails then the motion is not carriedout as per the provisions contained in Section 15. To understand the concept of quorum, we may refer with profit to the authority in TheDPunjab University, Chandigarh v. Vijay Singh Lamba and othres[2],wherein while discussing about quorum, the Court had held:-

“7. …‘Quorum’ denotes the minimum number of members of anybody of persons whose presence is necessary in order to enablethat body to transact its business validly so that its acts may beElawful. …”

17. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 74, the word ‘quorum’

has been defined as follows:-

“The word ‘quorum’, now in common use, is from the Latin andFhas come to signify such a number of officers or members of anybody, as is competent by law or constitution to transact business;…Quorum of a body is an absolute majority of it unless the authorityby which the body was created fixes it at a different number.”

18. In Black’s Law Dictionary (Second Edition), the wordG‘quorum’ is defined as under:- “When a committee, board of directors. meeting of shareholders,legislative or other body of persons cannot act unless a certainnumber at least of them are present, that number is called a 2 (1976) 3 SCC 344H

“quorum.” Sweet. In the absence of any law or rule fixing thequorum, it consists of a majority of those entitled to act. See Exparte Willcocks, 7 Cow. (N.Y.) 409, 17 Am. Dec. 525; State v.Wilkesville Tp.. 20 Ohio St. 293; Heiskell v. Baltimore, 65 Md.125, 4 Atl. 136, 57 Am. Rep. 308; Snider v. Rinehart, 18 Colo. 18,31 Pac. 716.”

19. In this context, reference to sub-section (6) of Section 15 isfruitful. It reads thus:- “(6) As soon as the meeting convened under this sectioncommences, the Presiding Officer shall read to the KshettraPanchayat the motion for the consideration of which the meetinghas been convened and declare it to be open for debate.”

It is quite clear that only when the number of persons are presentand the meeting takes place, the debate under sub-section (6) comesinto play. Thus, in the absence of quorum, the said provision will notcome into play.

20. In the case at hand, there is no allegation that the meeting wasconvened to consider the previous notice dated 9[th] October, 2017, asprovided in Section 15 and the motion was not challenged on any otherground or the lack of quorum. What is singularly contended is that oncea notice is given under Section 15(2), another notice of no confidenceshall not be received until after expiration of one year. The said submissionis without any substance inasmuch as the prohibition under Section 15(12)would only come into play when there is meeting and the motion is “notcarried out” as per the provisions of Section 15 or meeting could not beheld for want of quorum. As the facts of the instant case would revealthat no meeting was convened to consider the previous notice dated 9[th]October, 2017, as per the provisions of the Act. Mere receipt of a noticeby the Collector will not allow the prohibition under Section 15(12) tocome into play. That is not the purpose of the provision. That being theposition, the ground urged by the learned counsel for the appellant thatsub-section 15(12) would come into play is sans substratum. Neither ofthe conditions precedent is satisfied to attract the prohibition engraftedunder Section 15(12) of the Act.

21. As we have stated earlier, the legislature being empoweredby the Constitution has legislated to provide for the establishment of A

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AKshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats in the Districts of Uttar Pradeshto undertake certain Governmental functions at Kshettra and Districtlevels respectively in furtherance of the principles of democraticdecentralisation of Governmental functions. It intends to empower thePanchayats and that is why, Section 9 clearly provides that the term ofthe office of Pramukh is for five years from the date appointed for itsBfirst meeting. That brings stability to the administration of the GramPanchayat. Simultaneously, it also provides that the democracy at therural level must cherish the values of democracy and, therefore, a Pramukhcan be removed when a vote of no confidence is passed against him.Once the no confidence motion fails, it cannot be brought again for oneCyear. It is worthy to note here that sub-section (13) of Section 15 providesthat no notice of a motion under Section 15 shall be received within twoyears of the assumption of office by a Pramukh. This is in consonancewith the principle of stability of rural governance. There are provisionsfor removal in case of misconduct and certain other situations with which we are not concerned. We have referred to this aspect to highlight howDthe legislature has visualized the democracy at the grass root level.22. In view of the premised reasons, the appeal, being devoid ofmerit, stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

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Appeal dismissed.

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