THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. versus N. GANGARAJ on 14 February 2020

1. The State is in appeal aggrieved against an order passed by theHigh Court of Karnataka on 25[th] August, 2011 whereby the challenge toan order passed by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal[1] on 12[th] March,2009 setting aside the punishment of dismissal from the service imposedupon the respondent remained unsuccessful.D

2. The respondent was working as a Police Inspector at Mysorefrom 31[st] July, 1997 to 31[st] October, 1998. On the complaint of oneNirmala, the Lokayukta Police had laid a trap. On the basis of a criminalcomplaint lodged, Crime No. 15/1998 was registered against respondentin Mysore Lokayukta Police Station under Section 7, 13(1)(d) read withESection 13(2) under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998. A chargesheet against the respondent was filed in the Court of Special Judge,Mysore for the offences punishable under the Prevention of CorruptionAct, 1988. The said criminal trial resulted in the acquittal of the respondent.

3. In addition to the criminal trial, the respondent was alsoFproceeded against for the misconduct in departmental proceedings. Therespondent was served with a charge sheet.The respondent faceddepartmental proceedings on the following two charges:

“1. You, the Accused Police Officer, Sri. N. Gangaraj, whileworking as Police Inspector in City Crime Record Bureau ofGthe office of the Commissioner of Police, Mysore City from31/07/97 to 31/10/98, one Miss. Chandrika resident ofNandanavana, Ulsoor, Bangalore City, has lodged a complaintdated 08/08/98 with Sri. Kempaiah, Commissioner of Police,Mysore City, against one Mr. Mahendra of Indiranagar, H1 for short, ‘Tribunal’

Bangalore, stating that he promised to marry her and takenher in car No. KA-05-9795 along with his friends and rapedher. She has requested therein to take action against Mr.Mahendra and his friends. The Commissioner of Police, MysoreCity has sent the said petition to Police Inspector, City CrimeBranch, Mysore for enquiry and to send the report. You beinga responsible Police Officer, shown utter misconduct inmanaging to obtain a Xerox copy of the said petition throughillegal means and contacting the wife of the Driver of abovesaid vehicle demanded illegal gratification of Rs.40,000/- andnegotiating the deal for Rs.20,000/- with instructions to theparty to pay the amount on 27/08/98 at your residence.

2. Even though the petition of Miss. Chandrika, lodged withthe Commissioner of Police, Mysore City was not at allconcerned to you, you managed to get it’s copy with ulteriormotto through illegal means and contacted Mrs. B.J. Nirmalawife of Mr. Sampathkumar, Driver of car No. KA-05-9795 bysending Mr. Puttaraju CHC 141 and Mr. Shivakumar CPC 22to Bangalore and also contacted the above parties overtelephone and demanded Rs.40,000/- as illegal gratification fornot including the car in the case. When the parties were notagreed to pay, you negotiated the amount to Rs.20,000/-. Beinga responsible Police Officer and knowing fully well thataccepting illegal gratification is against to Rule 7, 13(1)(d) and13(2) of P.C. Act, you behaved in a way to bring down theprestige of the department, showing dereliction of duty, uttermisconduct and an at of unbecoming of a Police Officer aswell as a Government Servant.”

4. The respondent denied the charges. The Deputy Superintendentof Police, West Circle, Mangalore was appointed as the Inquiry Officer(IO). The IO returned a finding that the charges levelled against therespondent have been proved. Thereafter, a second show-cause noticewas issued to the respondent. Considering the contentions of therespondent, the Director General and the Inspector General of Policepassed an order of dismissal of the respondent from service on 30[th]September, 2005. The period of suspension was ordered to be treated asthe period of suspension only. The respondent filed an appeal before theGovernment which came to be dismissed on 8[th] September, 2006.

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A5. Aggrieved against the order of punishment, the respondentinvoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the orderof punishment by holding that the criminal court on the same set of factshas not placed reliance on the deposition of the witnesses, therefore, itwas not proper on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to rely uponsuch evidence to come to the conclusion that the respondent has demandedBan amount of Rs.40,000/- and he settled for Rs.20,000/-. The Tribunalfurther did not agree with the findings of the IO or the DisciplinaryAuthority that the charges have been proved as there is no charge onrecord of receipt of Rs.20,000/-. The Tribunal further held that the waterin which the hands of the respondent were washed, turned pink due toCthe ink of the pen, as deposed by PW-3 Balaraju in his statement. TheHigh Court found that similar evidence has not been accepted in criminaltrial and that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesseswhich make it unreliable. The High Court recorded the following fourdiscrepancies in the departmental proceedings:

“(i) In the complaint Smt. Nirmala says that on 26.08.1998 forDthe first time she met the applicant in his house at Mysore butin the deposition, she states that she went to the house of theapplicant on 27.08.1998 for the first time along with panchwitness Saroja and the money was offered;

(ii) If the evidence of PW.4 Puttaraju CHC 141 is to be believed,Ehe and PW.5 Shivakumar CPC 22 went to the house ofcomplainant Nirmala on 13.08.1998, whereas the evidence ofPW.5 shows that both of them went to the house of thecomplainant on 14.08.1998. According to the complaint bothof them had gone to the complainant’s house on 24.08.1998Fand not earlier;

(iii) According to the complainant she had given complaint inthe first instance in English Written by her and later the presentcomplaint, marked in the inquiry was got typed; the originalcomplaint given in English has been suppressed.

G(iv) The complaint was registered on 27.08.1998 whereas theevidence shows that panch witness had been informed to comeon 26.08.1998. The complaint does not say anywhere that shehad gone to the office of the Lokayukta Police on 26.08.1998.”

6. The Disciplinary Authority has taken into consideration theHevidence led before the IO to return a finding that the charges levelledagainst the respondent stand proved.

7. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by theTribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error. Thepower of judicial review is confined to the decision-making process.The power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional court or onthe Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority.

8. In State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao[2], athree Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not acourt of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmentalenquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whetherthe enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and accordingto the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules ofnatural justice are not violated. The Court held as under:

“7. …The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding underArticle 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decisionof the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a publicservant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is heldby an authority competent in that behalf, and according to theprocedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of naturaljustice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which theauthority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has acceptedand which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion thatthe delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the functionof the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 toreview the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding onthe evidence….”

9. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors.[3], again, a threeJudge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is notan appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which thedecision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that theindividual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusionwhich the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of thecourt. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act asan appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at itsown independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under:

“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a reviewof the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial 2 AIR 1963 SC 17233 (1995) 6 SCC 749

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Areview is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatmentand not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reachesis necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry isconducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was heldby a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice areBcomplied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based onsome evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to holdinquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding offact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on someevidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proofCof fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinaryproceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence andconclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authorityis entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge.The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act asappellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive atDits own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunalmay interfere where the authority held the proceedings againstthe delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules ofnatural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the modeof inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by theEdisciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion orfinding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached,the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding,and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts ofeach case.

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13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Whereappeal is presented. The appellate authority has co- extensivepower to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment.In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence andfindings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidenceor reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassedbefore the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964)4 SCR 781], this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion,upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinaryauthority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face ofthe record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari couldbe issued.”

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10. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay through itsRegistrar v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr.[4], this Court held thatinterference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted ifsuch authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of naturaljustice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode ofsuch enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of theConstitution. It was held as under:

“16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to haveapproached the case as though it was an appeal against the orderof the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court.Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can bepermitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of theConstitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation ofthe principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulationsprescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of theauthority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidenceand merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority,on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that noreasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, orgrounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook thatthe departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committeeof the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry hasbeen properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if thereis some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, thenadequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter forcanvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed underArticle 226 of the Constitution.”

11. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi ChandNalwaya[5], this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellatecourt and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfereon the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. Ifthe enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are basedon evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliablenature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findingsin departmental enquiries. The Court held as under:

4 (2000) 1 SCC 416

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“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as anappellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domesticenquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possibleon the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly andproperly held and the findings are based on evidence, thequestion of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature ofthe evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findingsin departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interferewith findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, exceptwhere such findings are based on no evidence or where theyare clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to seewhether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at suchconclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts willhowever interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, ifprinciples of natural justice or statutory regulations have beenviolated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, malafide or based on extraneous considerations. (vide B. C.Chaturvedi vs. Union of India- 1995 (6) SCC 749, Union ofIndia vs. G. Gunayuthan- 1997 (7) SCC 463, and Bank ofIndia vs. Degala Suryanarayana- 1999 (5) SCC 762, HighCourt of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shahsi Kant S Patil - 2001(1) SCC416).

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12. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted therespondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in anyway render a completed disciplinary proceedings invalid noraffect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequentialpunishment. The standard of proof required in criminalproceedings being different from the standard of proof requiredin departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence maylead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, findingof guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by givingbenefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more sowhen the departmental proceedings are more proximate to theincident, in point of time, when compared to the criminalproceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have noeffect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employeewho allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment bythe disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the groundthat subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him.”

13. In another judgement reported as Union of India v. P.Gunasekaran[6], this Court held that while reappreciating evidence theHigh Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinaryproceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Courtshall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings:

“13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the HighCourt shall not:

(i) re-appreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the samehas been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findingscan be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks itsconscience.”

14. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent reliesupon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna NarayanTewari[7], wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority recordsa finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a findingwhich is unreasonably arrived at, the Writ Court could interfere with thefinding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even ontouchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interferewith the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the caseof no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that therespondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on theground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department.The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence.The Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a findingthat the respondent is guilty of misconduct.

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A15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of theenquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal beforethe State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has beenaccepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicialreview, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findingsof facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the Courts are theBAppellate Authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticedlarger bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi asmentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and theHigh Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained inlaw. Accordingly, appeal is allowed and orders passed by the TribunalCand the High Court are set aside and the order of punishment imposed isrestored.

Devika Gujral

Appeal allowed.

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