RAMGOPAL & ANR. versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH on 29 September 2021

[2021] 6 S.C.R. 249

RAMGOPAL & ANR.

v.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

(Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012)

SEPTEMBER 29, 2021

[N. V. RAMANA, CJI AND SURYA KANT, J.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.482 and 320 –Quashing of criminal prosecution – On basis of compromise/settlement between the parties – Jurisdiction within framework ofs.320 CrPC vis-à-vis powers vested in High Court u/s.482 CrPCor in Supreme Court u/Art. 142 of the Constitution – Held: Limitedjurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of s.320CrPC is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by theHigh Court vested in it u/s.482 CrPC – As opposed to s.320 CrPCwhere the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between theparties in respect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutoryframework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Courtu/s.482 CrPC or vested in Supreme Court u/Art. 142 of theConstitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of s.320CrPC – Nonetheless, such powers of wide amplitude ought to beexercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings,bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the thesociety; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary natureof compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conductof the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of thepurported offence and/or other relevant considerations –Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 142.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing ofcriminal prosecution – On basis of compromise/settlement betweenthe parties – Scope of powers exercisable by High Court u/s.482CrPC – Held: High Court having regard to the nature of theoffence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their disputeand the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminalproceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherentpowers u/s.482 CrPC, even if the offences are non-compoundable– Criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where

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Athe offences are pre-dominantly of a private nature, can beannulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already beenconcluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction –However, the cases where compromise is struck post-conviction, theHigh Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keepingin view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion inBwhich the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regardto the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conductof the accused, before and after the incidence.

Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 142 – Quashing ofcriminal prosecution – Nature of powers vested in Supreme CourtCu/Art. 142 – Held: Plenary jurisdiction of Supreme Court to impartcomplete justice u/Art.142 cannot ipso facto be limited or restrictedby ordinary statutory provisions – Even in absence of an expressprovision akin to s.482 CrPC conferring powers on the SupremeCourt to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, jurisdictionDexercisable u/Art. 142 embraces the Supreme Court with scopiouspowers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to securecomplete justice – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

Conclusion

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD:1. True it is that offences which are ‘non-Ecompoundable’ cannot be compounded by a criminal court inpurported exercise of its powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Anysuch attempt by the court would amount to alteration, additionand modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusivedomain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity inthe language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its widerFinterpretation and include such offences in the docket of‘compoundable’ offences which have been consciously kept outas non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction tocompound an offence within the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C.is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the HighGCourt vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court,keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a caseand for justifiable reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aidto prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to securethe ends of justice. [Para 11][260-D-F]

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2. The High Court having regard to the nature of theoffence and the fact that parties have amicably settled theirdispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullificationof criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exerciseof its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if theoffences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitablyevaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the bodyof an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, toensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinkerwith or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminaljustice system.[Para 12][260-F-H]

3.1. Criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offencesor where the offences are pre-dominantly of a private nature,can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already beenconcluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction.Handing out punishment is not the sole form of deliveringjustice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subjectto lawful exceptions. The cases where compromise is struckpost-conviction, the High Court ought to exercise suchdiscretion with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstancessurrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromisehas been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature andseriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused,before and after the incidence. The touchstone for exercisingthe extra-ordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would beto secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast lineconstricting the power of the High Court to do substantialjustice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers underSection 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, whichin the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather leadto grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinousoffences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefitought to be extended.[Para 13][261-A-D]

3.2. Grave or serious offences or offences which involvemoral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moralfabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy,cannot be construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, forsuch offences have the potential to impact the society at large.Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would AB

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Anot only send a wrong signal to the community but may alsoaccord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professionaloffenders, who can secure a ‘settlement’ through duress, threats,social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. [Para 14][261-E-F]

B4. Given these settled parameters, the order of the HighCourt of Madhya Pradesh culminating into Criminal Appeal No.1489 of 2012, to the extent it holds that the High Court doesnot have power to compound a non-compoundable offence, is inignorance of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. andis, thus, unsustainable. However, the judgment and order of theCHigh Court of Karnataka, giving rise to Criminal Appeal No.1488 of 2012 cannot be faulted with on this count for the reasonthat the parties did not bring any compromise/settlement to thenotice of the High Court. [Para 15][261-G-H; 262-A]

5. The plenary jurisdiction of this Court to impart completeDjustice under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be limited orrestricted by ordinary statutory provisions. Even in the absenceof an express provision akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferringpowers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminalproceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 ofthe Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers toEquash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure completejustice. In doing so, due regard must be given to theoverarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justicesystem, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy ofmaintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale ofplacing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation.F[Para 18][264-F-H]

6. As opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court issquarely guided by the compromise between the parties inrespect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutoryframework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a HighCourt under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court underGArticle 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond themetes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, suchpowers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in thecontext of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i)Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society;H(ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; &(iv) Conductof the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of thepurported offence and/or other relevant considerations. [Para 19][265-A-C]

7. Having appraised the afore-stated para-meters andweighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instanttwo appeals, this Court is inclined to invoke powers underArticle 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequentlyset aside the conviction in both the appeals, for the followingreasons:

Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can becategorized as purely personal or having overtones of criminalproceedings of private nature; Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which theAppellants have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit theirmental depravity or commission of an offence of such a seriousnature that quashing of which would override public interest; Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it isimmaterial that the trial against the Appellants had beenconcluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed; Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without anycoercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buriedtheir differences and wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s); Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place wayback in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothingon record to evince that either before or after the purportedcompromise, any untoward incident transpired between theparties;

Sixthly, since the Appellants and the complainant(s) areresidents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, thequashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony,and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forgetand forgive any ill-will and have no vengeance against each other;and Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justicesystem would remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicablesettlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of theAppellants; more so looking at their present age.[Para 20][265-D-H; 266-A-B]

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AGian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 :[2012] 8 SCR 753 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. LaxmiNarayan & Ors. (2019) 5 SCC 688: [2019] 2 SCR864 ; Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.(2014) 6 SCC 466 : [2014] 4 SCR 1012 ; MonicaKumar & Anr. v. State of U.P. (2008) 8 SCC 781 :B[2008] 9 SCR 943 ; Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union ofIndia (2014) 2 SCC 532: [2013] 17 SCR 1099 ; andSupreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India(1998) 4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR 795 – relied on.

Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. v. Union of IndiaC& Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 584: [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 251-followed.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal AppealNo.1489 of 2012.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.11.2009 of the HighFCourt of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench at Gwalior in CriminalReview No.1010 of 2006

With

Criminal Appeal No.1488 of 2012.G

R. Anand Padmanabhan, Debarati Sadhu, Shashi BhushanKumar, Rajesh Srivastava, Ms. Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, Advs. for theAppellants.

Shubhranshu Padhi, Ashish Yadav, Rakshit Jain, Vishan Banshal,Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Palav Agarwal, Ashutosh Kumar, Ms.HMaitreyee Jagat Joshi, Advs. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SURYA KANT, J.

1. These two Criminal Appeals, No. 1489 of 2012 emanating fromthe judgment and order dated 27[th] November, 2009 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench and No. 1488 of 2012 arising outjudgment and order dated 9[th] January, 2009 passed by the High Courtof Karnataka, though, pertain to two different and distinct occurrences,but are proposed to be disposed of by way of a common order as theshort question of law involved in both these appeals is identical.

BRIEF FACTS OF CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1489 OF2012

2. The prosecution version, arising out of FIR dated 3[rd] November2000, Police Station Ambah, Morena, M.P. is that on account ofcertain monetary dispute, the Appellants abused and assaultedPadam Singh (Complainant). Appellant No.1 is alleged to have struckthe Complainant with a pharsa, which resultantly cut off the littlefinger of his left hand. Appellant No.2 also struck lathi blows onthe body of the Complainant. Appellants were thereafter committedfor trial under Sections 294, 323 and 326 read with 34 of IndianPenal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, ‘IPC’) and Section 3 of the Preventionof Atrocities (Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1989. Uponanalyzing the evidence, the Learned Judicial Magistrate(FC), Ambah,convicted the Appellants under Sections 294, 323 and 326 readwith 34 IPC with a maximum sentence of three years under Section326 read with 34 IPC. They were acquitted of the remaining charges.

3. The Appellants assailed their conviction before the Court ofAdditional Sessions Judge, Ambah. During the pendency of that Appeal,the Appellants and the Complainant reconciled their difference(s) anda compromise ensued between them on 13[th] September 2006. LearnedSessions Judge took notice of the settlement, moved jointly by the parties,and compounded the offences under Sections 294 and 323 read with34 IPC, acquitting the Appellants of the same. The Court, nevertheless,maintained their conviction under Section 326 read with 34 IPC, sincethe said offence is ‘non-compoundable’ within the scheme of Section320 Cr.P.C. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, taking into considerationthe settlement between the parties, reduced the quantum of sentencefrom Rigorous Imprisonment of three years to one year. Still aggrieved, B

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Athe Appellants preferred a Criminal Revision before the High Court ofMadhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench, challenging their conviction andsentence. Alternatively, they sought compounding of offence underSection 326 IPC in light of the compromise. However, such a prayerwas not acceded to by the High Court, re-iterating that the offence is‘non-compoundable’. The High Court, even so, further reduced theBduration of imprisonment to the period already undergone by theAppellants. The Appellants are now before this Court, seekingcompounding of their Actus Reus under Section 326 IPC in view ofthe settlement between parties.

BRIEF FACTS OF CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1488 OFC2012

4. The incident is charted from FIR No. 24 of 1995, Police StationThirthahalli, Shimoga, Karnataka, dated 28[th] January 1995. As perthe allegations, the Appellants and the other accused persons, all ofwhom belong to the same family, were aggrieved against theDComplainant as he had imparted some inculpatory information to theForest Department officials, which had caused financial loss to them.The disgruntled Appellants lured the Complainant to their house andassaulted him with weapons after tying his hands to a window. It isfurther alleged that Accused Nos. 5 to 7 instigated the Appellants toassault the Complainant, besides kicking him with fists and legs. TheEComplainant’s family members found him semi-conscious lying in apit near their house.

5. The Appellants, together with Accused Nos. 5 and 7 were triedand convicted under Sections 143, 144, 147, 148, 342, 324 and 326 readwith 149 IPC and the maximum sentence awarded to them was twoFyears simple imprisonment under Section 326 IPC. The trial againstAccused No. 6 was split after filing of the chargesheet, since heremained absconding. The Appellants along with the co-accused,approached the High Court of Karnataka, challenging their convictionand sentence. The High Court acquitted Accused Nos. 5 & 7 findingGinsufficient evidence to sustain their involvement in the subject crime,but maintained the conviction and sentence qua the Appellants. In thiscase as well, the parties entered into a compromise. The saidcompromise was, however, not placed on record before the Trial Courtor the High Court. The Appellants are now seeking ‘compounding ofthe offences’ and their consequential acquittal on the basis of theHcompromise reached between them and the Complainant-victim.

6. When both these appeals came up for hearing, atwo-Judge Bench of this Court, vide common order dated 21[st]September 2012 granted leave to appeal. The Bench further directedthe appeals to be listed after the disposal of reference made in GianSingh vs. State of Punjab[1], where a 3-Judge Bench of this Court, atthat point in time, was considering the issue as to whether‘non-compoundable’ offences can be ‘compounded’ by a Court or inthe alternative, whether the High Court in exercise of its inherentpowers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could quash non-compoundableoffences, based on a compromise/settlement arrived at between theaccused and the victim-complainant, and if so, under what circumstances.

7. The Appellants, in both the appeals, thus seek the Court toinvoke powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do completejustice to them.

ANALYSIS:

8. We have heard learned Counsels for the Appellants and theState(s) at a considerable length. The questions of law concerning thepower of a High Court to quash proceedings emanating from non-compoundable offences which have no impact or depraving effecton the society at large, on the basis of a compromise between theaccused and the victim-complainant, are no longer res integra andthe same have been authoritatively settled by this Court in affirmative.Learned Counsel for the Appellants and Complainant(s) in both theappeals have, therefore, heavily counted on the compromise/settlement between the parties and seek quashing of the criminalprosecution in its entirety, Learned State Counsel(s) withoutcontroverting the factum of compromise, vehemently opposed such arecourse and asserted that no substantial question of law is involved inthese appeals.

9. Before scrutinizing the facts of these cases and rephrasingthe scope of powers exercisable by a High Court under Section 482Cr.P.C., it would be apropos to illuminate the following principles laiddown by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh (Supra) case:

“61. …the power of the High Court in quashing a criminalproceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of itsinherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the 1 (2012) 10 SCC 303

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

power given to a criminal court for compounding theoffences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power isof wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to beexercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in suchpower viz. :

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B(i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse ofthe process of any court. In what cases power to quash thecriminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercisedwhere the offender and the victim have settled their disputewould depend on the facts and circumstances of each caseand no category can be prescribed. However, before exerciseCof such power, the High Court must have due regard tothe nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and seriousoffences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though thevictim or victim’s family and the offender have settledDthe dispute. Such offences are not private in nature andhave a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromisebetween the victim and the offender in relation to theoffences under special statutes like the Prevention ofCorruption Act or the offences committed by publicservants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannotEprovide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedingsinvolving such offences. But the criminal cases havingoverwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand ona different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularlythe offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile,Fcivil, partnership or such like transactions or the offencesarising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the familydisputes where the wrong is basically private or personal innature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. Inthis category of cases, the High Court may quash thecriminal proceedings if in its view, because of theGcompromise between the offender and the victim, thepossibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuationof the criminal case would put the accused to greatoppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would becaused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite fullHand complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In H

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other words, the High Court must consider whether it wouldbe unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continuewith the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminalproceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of lawdespite settlement and compromise between the victim andthe wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice,it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end andif the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative,the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quashthe criminal proceeding.”

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10. The compendium of these broad fundamentals structuredin more than one judicial precedent, has been recapitulated by another3-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. LaxmiNarayan & Ors.[2] elaborating:

“(1) That the power conferred under Section 482 of theDCode to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of theCode can be exercised having overwhelmingly andpredominantly the civil character, particularly thosearising out of commercial transactions or arising outof matrimonial relationship or family disputes andEwhen the parties have resolved the entire disputeamongst themselves;

(2) Such power is not to be exercised in thoseprosecutions which involved heinous and seriousoffences of mental depravity or offences like murder,rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private innature and have a serious impact on society; F

(3) Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for theoffences under the special statutes like thePrevention of Corruption Act or the offencescommitted by public servants while working in thatcapacity are not to be quashed merely on the basisof compromise between the victim and the offender; G

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(5) While exercising the power under Section 482 of theCode to quash the criminal proceedings in respectof non-compoundable offences, which are private innature and do not have a serious impact on society,Bon the ground that there is a settlement/compromisebetween the victim and the offender, the High Courtis required to consider the antecedents of theaccused; the conduct of the accused, namely,whether the accused was absconding and why hewas absconding, how he had managed with theCcomplainant to enter into a compromise, etc.”

11. True it is that offences which are ‘non-compoundable’ cannotbe compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powersDunder Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such attempt by the court would amountto alteration, addition and modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C, which isthe exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latentambiguity in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may justify itswider interpretation and include such offences in the docket of‘compoundable’ offences which have been consciously kept out asEnon-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compoundan offence within the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not anembargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested init under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view thepeculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasonsFcan press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the processof any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.

12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature ofthe offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their disputeand the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminalGproceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherentpowers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequentialeffects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafteradopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goesunpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of theHadministration of criminal justice system.

13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involvingnon-heinous offences or where the offences are pre-dominantly of aprivate nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial hasalready been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction.Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societalmethod of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions.It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struckpost-conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion withrectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident,the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with dueregard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conductof the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone forexercising the extra-ordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. wouldbe to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast lineconstricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. Arestrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts andcircumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On theother hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved againstperpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiouslyobserved by this Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. vs. State ofPunjab & Ors.[3] and Laxmi Narayan (Supra).

14. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences whichinvolve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moralfabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy, cannotbe construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, for such offenceshave the potential to impact the society at large. Effacing abominableoffences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signalto the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupuloushabitual or professional offenders, who can secure a ‘settlement’ throughduress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is wellsaid that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.”

15. Given these settled parameters, the order of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh culminating into Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of2012, to the extent it holds that the High Court does not have power tocompound a non-compoundable offence, is in ignorance of its inherentpowers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and is, thus, unsustainable. However, 3 (2014) 6 SCC 466, ¶ 29

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Athe judgment and order dated 9[th] January, 2009 of the High Court ofKarnataka, giving rise to Criminal Appeal No. 1488 of 2012 cannot befaulted with on this count for the reason that the parties did not bringany compromise/settlement to the notice of the High Court.

16. Let us now delve into the nature of powers vested in thisBCourt under Article 142 of the Constitution, with an intent to do completejustice. It would be ad rem to outrightly cite the Constitution Benchdecision in Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. vs. Union of India& Ors.[4], where this Court has ruled as follows:

“83. It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions inCthe arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Courtunder Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These issues arematters of serious public importance. The proposition that aprovision in any ordinary law irrespective of the importanceof the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limitthe powers of the apex Court under Article 142(1) is unsoundDand erroneous. In both Garg [1963 Supp 1 SCR 885,899-900 : AIR 1963 SC 996] as well as Antulay cases[(1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372] the point was oneof violation of constitutional provisions and constitutionalrights. The observations as to the effect of inconsistency withEstatutory provisions were really unnecessary in those casesas the decisions in the ultimate analysis turned on thebreach of constitutional rights. We agree with Shri Narimanthat the power of the Court under Article 142 insofar asquashing of criminal proceedings are concerned is notexhausted by Section 320 or 321 or 482 CrPC or all of themFput together. The power under Article 142 is at an entirelydifferent level and of a different quality. Prohibitions orlimitations or provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot,ipso facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on theconstitutional powers under Article 142. Such prohibitionsGor limitations in the statutes might embody and reflectthe scheme of a particular law, taking into account the natureand status of the authority or the court on whichconferment of powers — limited in some appropriate way— is contemplated. The limitations may not necessarily reflectH4 (1991) 4 SCC 584, 83

or be based on any fundamental considerations of publicpolicy. Sri Sorabjee, learned Attorney General, referring toGarg case [1963 Supp 1 SCR 885, 899-900 : AIR 1963 SC996] , said that limitation on the powers under Article 142arising from “inconsistency with express statutory provisionsof substantive law” must really mean and be understood assome express prohibition contained in any substantivestatutory law. He suggested that if the expression‘prohibition’ is read in place of ‘provision’ that would perhapsconvey the appropriate idea. But we think that suchprohibition should also be shown to be based on someunderlying fundamental and general issues of public policyand not merely incidental to a particular statutory schemeor pattern. It will again be wholly incorrect to say thatpowers under Article 142 are subject to such expressstatutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea thatstatutory provisions override a constitutional provision.Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that inexercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing theneeds of “complete justice” of a cause or matter, the apexCourt will take note of the express prohibitions in anysubstantive statutory provision based on some fundamentalprinciples of public policy and regulate the exercise of itspower and discretion accordingly. The proposition does notrelate to the powers of the Court under Article 142, but onlyto what is or is not ‘complete justice’ of a cause or matterand in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exerciseof the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullitycan arise.”

17. The afore-quoted precept has been consistently followed bythis Court in numerous subsequent decisions, including in MonicaKumar & Anr. vs. State of U.P.[5], Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Unionof India[6]and Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India[7],inter-alia, reiterating that:

5 (2008) 8 SCC 781, ¶ 456 (2014) 2 SCC 532, ¶ 43

7 (1998) 4 SCC 409, ¶ 47

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A“47. The plenary powers of this Court under Article 142of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and arecomplementary to those powers which are specificallyconferred on the Court by various statutes though are notlimited by those statutes. These powers also existBindependent of the statutes with a view to do completejustice between the parties. These powers are of very wideamplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers.This power exists as a separate and independent basis ofjurisdiction apart from the statutes. It stands upon thefoundation and the basis for its exercise may be put onCa different and perhaps even wider footing, to preventinjustice in the process of litigation and to do completejustice between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus,the residual source of power which this Court may draw uponas necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so andDin particular to ensure the observance of the due process oflaw, to do complete justice between the parties, whileadministering justice according to law. There is no doubt thatit is an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is freefrom the restraint of jurisdiction and operates as a valuableEweapon in the hands of the Court to prevent “clogging orobstruction of the stream of justice”…”

18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that the plenary jurisdictionof this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipsoFfacto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is alsonoteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin toSection 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme Court toabrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisableunder Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopiousGpowers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure completejustice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarchingobjective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is groundedon the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collectiveand that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed atHhis reformation.

19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise betweenthe parties in respect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutoryframework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court underSection 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of theConstitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wideamplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashingcriminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of theoffence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury,if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused andthe victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and afterthe occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevantconsiderations.

20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and weighingupon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals beforeus, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash thecriminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in boththe appeals. We say so for the reasons that:

Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can becategorized as purely personal or having overtones of criminalproceedings of private nature;

Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the Appellantshave been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity orcommission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing ofwhich would override public interest; Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it isimmaterial that the trial against the Appellants had been concluded ortheir appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed; Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any coercionor compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences andwish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s); Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way backin the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record toevince that either before or after the purported compromise, anyuntoward incident transpired between the parties; A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Sixthly, since the Appellants and the complainant(s) areresidents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, thequashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, andfellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgiveany ill-will and have no vengeance against each other; and A

Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice systemwould remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicable settlementbetween the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the Appellants; moreso looking at their present age.

B

CONCLUSION:CCRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1489 OF 2012

21. Consequently, and for the reasons stated above, read withthe settlement dated 13[th] September 2006, we find it appropriate toinvoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and quash thecriminal proceedings in the aforesaid case. As a sequel thereto, allDoffences emanating out of the FIR leading to Criminal Appeal No. 1489of 2012 stand annulled, and the judgment and orders passed by the trialcourt, appellate court and the High Court are set aside. Resultantly, theAppellants shall be deemed to have been acquitted of the chargedoffences for all intents and purposes.

ECRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1488 OF 2012

22. In so far as this appeal is concerned, we note that eventhough the Learned Counsel(s) for the Appellants and theComplainant-victim have jointly stated before this Court that the partieshave settled their dispute(s), but no formal settlement has either beenFbrought on record nor has it been even clarified that such a deed ofsettlement has been recorded. Admittedly, the factum of compromise/settlement between the parties has been raised for the first time beforethis Court. In the absence of any proof of settlement, we find ourselveshard-pressed to take cognizance of the asseverated compromise. We,therefore, direct both the Appellants as well as the complainant-victimGto appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimoga and submit theirsettlement, if any, in writing within a period of three months. TheC.J.M. shall send a Report to this Court immediately, recording hissatisfaction with regard to the genuineness of the compromise. In theevent, the said Report would reflect a bona-fide settlement betweenHthe parties, the present appeal shall also be deemed to have been disposed RAMGOPAL & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH[SURYA KANT, J.]

RAMGOPAL & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH[SURYA KANT, J.]

of in same terms as Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012, referredto above. Further, the incontrovertible corollary in such event wouldbe that the Appellants shall be treated to have been acquitted of all thecharged offences for all intents and purposes. On the other hand, if noformal settlement is placed before C.J.M., Shimoga within the stipulatedperiod or the Report reflects to the contrary, the criminal appeal shallstand as dismissed as no other substantial question of law is raised orinvolved in this appeal.

23. Both the Criminal Appeals are disposed of in above terms.

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose

Appeals disposed of.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H