ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT. LTD. & ANR.V. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION versus CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION on 28 March 2018

[2018] 2 S.C.R. 1045

ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT. LTD. & ANR.

v.

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1375-1376 of 2013)

MARCH 28, 2018

[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, R. F. NARIMAN ANDNAVIN SINHA, JJ.]

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: s.19(3)(c) – Interpretationof – Order framing charge under the 1988 Act – Challenge to –Jurisdiction of High Court and power to grant stay in suchmatters – Whether an order on charge framed under the provisionsof 1988 Act, is an interlocutory order, and thereby in view ofs.19(3)(c), exercise of revisional power of High Court u/s.397(2),CrPC is barred – Also whether s.19(3)(c) which barsrevision would also bar exercise of inherent power of High Courtu/s.482, CrPC or u/Arts.226 and 227– Held: Per A. K. Goel, J. (forhimself and Navin Sinha, J.) Order framing charge is not purely aninterlocutory order nor a final order– Jurisdiction of High Court isnot barred either u/s.397 or u/s.482, CrPC or u/Art.227 of theConstitution – However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercisedconsistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposalof a trial without the same being in any manner hampered – Thus,challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest ofrare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not tore-appreciate the matter – Even where such challenge is entertainedand stay is granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basisso that stay does not operate for an unduly long period – Thoughno mandatory time limit may be fixed, the decision may not exceedtwo-three months normally – Mandate of speedy justice applies tothe PC Act cases as well – Per R. F. Nariman, J. (Concurring)Inherent power of a Court set up by the Constitution is a power thatinheres in such Court because it is a superior court of record, andnot because it is conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure –Section 19(3)(c) cannot be read as a ban on the maintainability ofa petition filed before High Court u/s.482,CrPC – Constitution ofIndia – Arts. 21, 215, 226 and 227 – Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 – ss.397(2), 482 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 –

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ACriminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 – Anti-Corruption Laws(Amendment) Act, 1964 – Stay.

Constitution of India: Art. 21 – Mandate of speedy justice incriminal cases – Delay in trials of corruption cases, due to grant ofstay – Directions issued – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 –BStay. [Per A.K. Goel, J. (for himself and Navin Sinha, J.)]

Stay: Duration of, in civil and criminal cases – Held: Wherestay against proceedings of a civil or criminal trial is operating, thesame will come to an end on expiry of six months – Administrationof justice. [Per A.K. Goel, J. (for himself and Navin Sinha, J.)]

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Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: s.19(3)(c) r/w ss.4(4)and 22 – Cases under the Act – Disposal of – Held: S.19(3)(c) readwith ss.4(4) and 22, make it clear that cases under the Act have tobe decided with utmost despatch and without any glitches on theway in the form of interlocutory stay orders. (Per R.F. Nariman, J.)

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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 482 – Inherent Powersof Court – Nature of – Discussed. (Per R.F. Nariman, J.)

Interpretation of Statutes: In case of ambiguity – Held: If thereis an ambiguity, and two views are possible, the view which mostaccords with the object of the Act, and which makes the ActEworkable, must necessarily be the controlling view. (Per R.F.Nariman, J.)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: s.19(3)(c) – “On anyother ground” – Plea of appellants that the expression “on anyother ground” is referable only to grounds which relate to sanctionFand not to all proceedings under the Act – Respondents contendedthat these are grounds referable to the proceedings under the Actand are not relatable to sanction only – Held: “On any otherground”, refers to and relates to all grounds that are available inproceedings under the Act other than grounds which relate to Gsanction granted by the authority. (Per R.F. Nariman, J.)

Gsanction granted by the authority. (Per R.F. Nariman, J.)

Answering the referred questions, the Court HELD: Per A.K. Goel, J. (for himself and Navin Sinha, J.)

1.1 Order framing charge may not be held to be purely aninterlocutory order and can in a given situation be interfered withH

under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of theConstitution which is a constitutional provision but the power ofthe High Court to interfere with an order framing charge and togrant stay is to be exercised only in an exceptional situation.The High Court has jurisdiction in appropriate case to considerthe challenge against an order framing charge and also to grantstay. [Paras 26, 27] [1072-E-F]

Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4SCC 551 : [1978] 1 SCR 749 – affirmed.

1.2 In the PC Act cases, the intention of legislature isexpeditious conclusion of trial on day-to-day basis without anyimpediment through the stay of proceedings and this concernmust be respected. The proviso to Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. addedby Section 22(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 statesthat a revisional court shall not ordinarily call for the record ofproceedings. If record is called, the Special Judge may not beable to proceed with the trial which will stand indirectly stayed.The right of the accused has to be considered vis-à-vis the interestof the society. Even constitutional power of the High Court underArticle 226 which was very wide ought to be used withcircumspection in accordance with judicial consideration and wellestablished principles. The power should be exercised sparinglyin rare and extreme circumstances. It is well accepted that delayin a criminal trial, particularly in the PC Act cases, has deleteriouseffect on the administration of justice in which the society has avital interest. Delay in trials affects the faith in Rule of Law andefficacy of the legal system. It affects social welfare anddevelopment. Even in civil or tax cases it has been laid downthat power to grant stay has to be exercised with restraint. Mereprima facie case is not enough. Party seeking stay must be put toterms and stay should not be incentive to delay. The order grantingstay must show application of mind. The power to grant stay iscoupled with accountability. [Paras 28, 29][1072-G-H; 1073-A-D]

1.3 Wherever stay is granted, a speaking order must bepassed showing that the case was of exceptional nature and delayon account of stay will not prejudice the interest of speedy trial ina corruption case. Once stay is granted, proceedings should notbe adjourned and concluded within two-three months. The AB

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Awisdom of legislature and the object of final and expeditiousdisposal of a criminal proceeding cannot be ignored. In exerciseof its power the High Court is to balance the freedom of anindividual on the one hand and security of the society on the other.Only in case of patent illegality or want of jurisdiction the HighCourt may exercise its jurisdiction. The acknowledged experienceBis that where challenge to an order framing charge is entertained,the matter remains pending for long time which defeats theinterest of justice. The judicial experience is that trial of corruptioncases is not permitted to proceed on account of challenge to theorder of charge before the High Courts. Once stay is granted,Cdisposal of a petition before the High Court takes long time.Consideration of the challenge against an order of framing chargemay not require meticulous examination of voluminous materialwhich may be in the nature of a mini trial. Still, the Court is attimes called upon to do so inspite of law being clear that at thestage of charge the Court has only to see as to whether materialDon record reasonably connects the accused with the crime. [Paras30-32] [1073-E-G; 1074-A-B]

Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92 :[2014] 2 SCR 1 – followed.E1.4 If at the stage of charge, the High Court adopts theapproach of weighing probabilities and re-appreciate the material,it may be certainly a time consuming exercise. The legislativepolicy of expeditious final disposal of the trial is thus, hampered.Thus, even while reiterating the view that there is no bar tojurisdiction of the High Court to consider a challenge against anForder of framing charge in an exceptional situation for correctinga patent error of lack of jurisdiction, exercise of such jurisdictionhas to be limited to rarest of rare cases. Even if a challenge toorder framing charge is entertained, decision of such a petitionshould not be delayed. Though no mandatory time limit can beGfixed, normally it should not exceed two-three months. If stay isgranted, it should not normally be unconditional or of indefiniteduration. Appropriate conditions may be imposed so that the partyin whose favour stay is granted is accountable if court finally findsno merit in the matter and the other side suffers loss and injustice.To give effect to the legislative policy and the mandate of ArticleH

21 for speedy justice in criminal cases, if stay is granted, mattershould be taken on day-to-day basis and concluded within two-three months. Where the matter remains pending for longerperiod, the order of stay will stand vacated on expiry of sixmonths, unless extension is granted by a speaking order showingextraordinary situation where continuing stay was to be preferredto the final disposal of trial by the trial Court. This timeline isbeing fixed in view of the fact that such trials are expected to beconcluded normally in one to two years. In view of above, situationof proceedings remaining pending for long on account of stayneeds to be remedied. Remedy is required not only for corruptioncases but for all civil and criminal cases where on account of stay,civil and criminal proceedings are held up. At times, proceedingsare adjourned sine die on account of stay. Even after stay is vacated,intimation is not received and proceedings are not taken up. Inan attempt to remedy this, situation, it is directed that in allpending cases where stay against proceedings of a civil or criminaltrial is operating, the same will come to an end on expiry of sixmonths from today unless in an exceptional case by a speakingorder such stay is extended. In cases where stay is granted infuture, the same will end on expiry of six months from the date ofsuch order unless similar extension is granted by a speakingorder. The speaking order must show that the case was of suchexceptional nature that continuing the stay was more importantthan having the trial finalized. The trial Court where order of stayof civil or criminal proceedings is produced, may fix a date notbeyond six months of the order of stay so that on expiry of periodof stay, proceedings can commence unless order of extension ofstay is produced. [Paras 33, 35] [1076-B-F; 1078-C-F]

1.5 Thus, the law is declared to be that order framing chargeis not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdictionof the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of apetition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 ofthe Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercisedconsistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditiousdisposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered.Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should beentertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent errorof jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter. Even where ABC

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1050SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Asuch challenge is entertained and stay is granted, the matter mustbe decided on day-to-day basis so that stay does not operate foran unduly long period. Though no mandatory time limit may befixed, the decision may not exceed two-three months normally.If it remains pending longer, duration of stay should not exceedsix months, unless extension is granted by a specific speakingBorder, as already indicated. Mandate of speedy justice applies tothe PC Act cases as well as other cases where at trial stageproceedings are stayed by the higher court i.e. the High Courtor a court below the High Court, as the case may be. In all pendingmatters before the High Courts or other courts relating to PCCAct or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedingsin a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse aftersix months from today unless extended by a speaking order onabove parameters. Same course may also be adopted by civil andcriminal appellate/revisional courts under the jurisdiction of the High Courts. The trial courts may, on expiry of above period,Dresume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimationunless express order extending stay is produced. The HighCourts may also issue instructions to this effect and monitor thesame so that civil or criminal proceedings do not remain pendingfor unduly period at the trial stage. [Paras 36, 37] [1078-G-H;E1079-A-D]

L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. (1997) 3SCC 261; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3SCC 569 : [1994] 2 SCR 375 – followed.

Imtiaz Ahmad v. State of U.P. (2012) 2 SCC 688 :F[2012] 1 SCR 779 – relied on.

Dharambir Khattar v. Central Bureau of Investigation159 (2009) DLT 636; R. C. Sabharwal v. CentralBureau of Investigation 166 (2010) DLT 362; CBI v.Ravi Shankar Srivastava (2006)7 SCC 188 : [2006] 4GSuppl. SCR 450; Dharimal Tobacco Products Ltd. andOrs. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. AIR 2009 SC1032 : [2008] 17 SCR 844; Krishnana v. Krishnaveni(1997) 4 SCC 241 : [1997] 1 SCR 511; Nagendra NathBora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals,HAssam AIR 1958 SC 398 : [1958] SCR 1240; Nihandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu AIR 1963 SC 1895 :[1963] Suppl. SCR 570;Sarpanch, LonandGrampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi and Anr. AIR 1968SC 222 : [1967] SCR 774; Maruti Bala Raut v. DashrathBabu Wathare and Ors. (1974) 2 SCC 615: [1975]1 SCR 899; Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R.Tarte and Anr. AIR 1975 SC 1297; Jagir Singh v. RanbirSingh and Anr. AIR 1979 SC 381 : [1979] 2 SCR 282;Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad AIR 1980 SC 892:[1980] 3 SCR 32; Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed v.Tufelhussein Samasbhai Sarangpurwala AIR 1988 SC184: [1988] 1 SCR 1057; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nathand Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1997; Ranjeet Singh v. RaviPrakash AIR 2004 SC 3892; Amarnath v. State ofHaryana (1977) 4 SCC 137 : [1978] 1 SCR 222;Mohanlal Maganlal Thacker v. State of Gujarat [1968]2 SCR 685; Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretaryand ors. (2014) 9 SCC 516 : [2014] 8 SCR 836; ShaliniShyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC329 : [2010] 8 SCR 836; State v. Navjot Sandhu (2003)6 SCC 641 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 130; V.C. Shukla v.State through CBI (1980)Suppl. SCC 92 :[1980] SCR 380; Girish Kumar Suneja v. CentralBureau of Investigation (2017) 14 SCC 809; S.Kuppuswami Rao v. The King (1947) 9 FCR 180; SatyaNarayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 8 SCC607 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 268; Chander ShekharSingh v. Siya Ram Singh (1979) 3 SCC 118 : [1979]1 SCR 947; Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Asstt. Collectorof Customs, Bombay and Anr. [1967] 3 SCR 926;Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu Das (1984) 2 SCC436 : [1984] 2 SCR 344; Assistant Collector of CentralExcise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal vs. Dunlop IndiaLtd. and Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 260 : [1985] 2 SCR 190;Union Territory of Pondicherry and Ors. vs. P.V. Sureshand Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 70 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 487;State of West Bengal and Ors. vs. Calcutta HardwareStores and Ors. (1986) 2 SCC 203 : [1986] 1 SCR 364 – referred to.

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AHELD: Per R.F.Nariman, J. (Concurring):

1.1 A perusal of Section 19(3) of the Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1988 would show that the interdict against stayof proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omissionor irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority is lifted ifBthe Court is satisfied that the error, omission or irregularity hasresulted in a failure of justice. Having said this in clause (b) ofSection 19(3), clause (c) says that no Court shall stay proceedingsunder this Act on any other ground. [Para 7] [1085-G-H]

1.2 The Respondents are correct in their submission thatC“on any other ground” are grounds referable to the proceedingsunder this Act and not relatable to sanction only, for the followingreasons:

(i) Section 19(3)(b) subsumes all grounds which are relatable tosanction granted. This is clear from the word “any” making itDclear that whatever be the error, omission or irregularity insanction granted, all grounds relatable thereto are covered.

(ii) This is further made clear by Explanation (a), which definesan “error” as including competency of the authority to grantsanction.

E(iii) The words “in the sanction granted by the authority” containedin sub-clause (b) are conspicuous by their absence in sub-clause(c), showing thereby that it is the proceedings under theAct that are referred to.

(iv) The expression “on any other ground”, therefore, refers toFand relates to all grounds that are available in proceedings underthe Act other than grounds which relate to sanction granted bythe authority.

(v) On the assumption that there is an ambiguity, and that thereare two views possible, the view which most accords with theGobject of the Act, and which makes the Act workable, mustnecessarily be the controlling view. It is settled law that evenpenal statutes are governed not only by their literal language,but also by the object sought to be achieved by Parliament.

(vi) The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Prevention ofHCorruption Act, 1988 makes it clear, Section 19(3)(c) is to be read with Section 4(4) and Section 22, all of which make it clearthat cases under the Act have to be decided with utmost despatchand without any glitches on the way in the form of interlocutorystay orders.

(vii) The subject matter of sub-section (4) of Section 19,Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is only in the nature of aproviso to Section 19(3)(a) and (b), making it clear that the groundfor stay qua sanction having occasioned or resulted in a failure ofjustice should be taken at the earliest, and if not so taken, wouldbe rejected on this ground alone.

(viii) Section 19(3)(c) became necessary to make it clear thatproceedings under the Act can be stayed only in the eventualityof an error, omission or irregularity in sanction granted, resultingin failure of justice, and for no other reason. It was for this reasonthat it was also necessary to reiterate in the language of Section397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that in all cases, otherthan those covered by Section 19(3)(b), no court shall exercisethe power of revision in relation to interlocutory orders that maybe passed. It is also significant to note that the reach of this partof Section 19(3)(c) is at every stage of the proceeding, that isinquiry, trial, appeal or otherwise, making it clear that, inconsonance with the object sought to be achieved, prevention ofcorruption trials are not only to be heard by courts other thanordinary courts, but disposed of as expeditiously as possible, asotherwise corrupt public servants would continue to remain inoffice and be cancerous to society at large, eating away at thefabric of the nation. [Para 8] [1086-B-H; 1087-A-D; 1088-A-E]

Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4SCC 551 : [1978] 1 SCR 749 – affirmed.

Ms. Eera through Dr. Manjula Krippendorf v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Anr. 2017 SCC Online SC787 – referred to.

1.3 The High Courts are established by the Constitutionand are courts of record which will have all powers of such courts,including the power to punish contempt of themselves (Article215). The High Court, being a superior court of record, is entitledto consider questions regarding its own jurisdiction when raisedbefore it. [Para 9] [1088-F-G]

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A1.4 It is thus clear that the inherent power of a Court setup by the Constitution is a power that inheres in such Courtbecause it is a superior court of record, and not because it isconferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is a powervested by the Constitution itself, inter alia, under Article 215 asaforestated. Also, as such High Courts have the power, nay, theBduty to protect the fundamental rights of citizens under Article226 of the Constitution, the inherent power to do justice in casesinvolving the liberty of the citizen would also sound in Article 21of the Constitution. This being the constitutional position, it isclear that Section 19(3)(c) cannot be read as a ban on theCmaintainability of a petition filed before the High Court underSection 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the non-obstanteclause in Section 19(3) applying only to the Code of CriminalProcedure. Insofar as petitions under Articles 226 and 227 areconcerned, they form part of the basic structure of theConstitution. [Paras 11, 18] [1089-H; 1090-A-C; 1097-E-F]DSatya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 8SCC 607 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 268 – overruled.

In re Special Reference 1 of 1964 [1965] 1 SCR 413;Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Assistant Collector of CustomsE[1967] SCR 3 926; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of Indiaand Ors. (1997) 3 SCC 261 : [1997] 2 SCR 1186;Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC569 : [1994] 2 SCR 375 – followed.

Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I. (2017) 14 SCC 809 –relied on.F

V. C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (1980) Supp. SCC92 : [1980] SCR 380;Poonam Chand Jain andanother v. Fazru (2004) 13 SCC 269 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 525; Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCCG137 : [1978] 1 SCR 222 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

In the Judgment of Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.:159 (2009) DLT 636referred toPara 6H166 (2010) DLT 362referred toPara 6

[2018] 2 S.C.R.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal AppealENos. 1375-1376 of 2013.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.03.2011 by the DivisionBench of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (Crl.) No. 352/2010.

WITH

FCrl. A. Nos. 1383, 1377, 1394, 1384, 1393, 1386-1387, 1385, 1406,1396, 1395, 1391, 1389, 1388, 1398, 1397, 1390, 1399, 1402, 1400, 1401,1404, 1403 and 1405 of 2013.

SLP (Crl.) Nos. 2610, 6835, 6834, 6837, 10050-10051 and 9652-9653 of 2013.G

Crl. A. Nos. 388 and 234 of 2014.

SLP (Crl.) Nos. 5678, 1451, 1399, 2508, 2970, 2507, 2939, 2977,4709, 6372, 6391 and 6691-6692 of 2014.

Crl. A. No. 9363 of 2017.

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Ms. Pinky Anand, ASG, Kapil Sibal, Mukul Rohatgi, Ms. MadhaviDivan, Sr. Advs., Arunabh Chowdhury, Anupam Lal Das, Sidharth Dave,Sarvesh Singh Baghel, Aditya Pujari, Raghav Tankha, Bhanoo Sood,Ms. Kalyani Lal, Tatni Basu, Siddhartha Dave, Ms. Jentiben Ao, AdityaRanjan, Anuj Chauhan, Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Aamir Naseem, Anuj Chauhan,Mohd. Farhan Khan, Farhan Hashmi, Md. Shahid Anwar, Amar Dave,Mrs. Nandini Gore, Mohit Mudgal, Akarsha Sahay, Sushil Jethmalani,Mrs. Manik Karanjawala (For M/s. Karanjawala), Anupam Lal Das,Anirudh Singh, Krishanu Barua, Rishi Malhotra, Bhavtosh Sharma, GopalJha, Sibo Sankar Mishra, S. P. Mehta, Mohit D. Ram, Ms. MonishaHanda, Amjid Maqbool, Kush Chatuvedi, Rohit Bhatt, Somay Kapoor,Priyashree Ph., Sushil Gupta, Manan Verma, Mridula Ray Bharadwaj,Yoginder Handoo, Nishant Kumar, Harish Pandey, Harsh Khanna, AmitT., Abhishek Tyagi, Nikhil Jain, R. P. Shukla, Vijay K. Jain, H. S. Bhullar,Ashwani Kumar, Ms. Iti Sharma, Ms. Shivali Chaudhary, AbhinavSharma, Ms. Sneha B., Kamal Mohan Gupta, Santosh Kumar – I,Ms. Binu Tamta, Ms. Kiran Bhardwaj, S. S. Shamshery, V. V. PattabhiRam, Ms. Rukmani Bobde, Hemant Arya, Sumit T., Mukesh KumarMaroria, P. Vinay Kumar, Ms. Prerna Mehta, V. N. Raghupathy, AshokK. Mahajan, Siddharth Aggarwal, Senthil Jagadeesan, Ms. Ruoali Samuel,Amarjit Singh Bedi, B. V. Balaram Das, Arunabh Chowdhury, AnupamLal Das, Sidharth Dave, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

Criminal Appeal Nos.1375-1376 OF 2013

1. These appeals have been put up before this Bench of threeJudges in pursuance of order of Bench of two Judges dated 9[th]September, 2013 as follows:

“Leave granted.

Learned counsel for the parties are agreed that there isconsiderable difference of opinion amongst differentBenches of this Court as well as all the High Courts. Mr.Ram Jethmalani, learned Senior Counsel appearing forpetitioner in Criminal Appeal arising out of Special LeavePetition (Criminal)No.6470 of 2012 submits that thesubsequent decisions rendered by the two-judge Benches are AB

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per incuriam, and in conflict with the ratio of law laid downin the Constitution Bench decision in Mohanlal MaganlalThacker v. State of Gujarat [(1968) 2 SCR 685].

In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that it wouldbe appropriate if the matters are referred to and heard by aBlarger Bench. Office is directed to place the matters beforethe Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

In the meantime, further proceedings before the trial Courtshall remain stayed.”

2. Since the question of law to be determined is identical in allCcases, we have taken up for consideration this matter. In the light ofanswer to the referred question this as well as all other matters may beconsidered for disposal on merits by the appropriate Bench.

3. Brief facts first. F.I.R. dated 7[th] March, 2001 has been recordedwith the Delhi Special Police Establishment: CBI/SIU-VIII/New DelhiDBranch under Section 120B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and477A of IPC and Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1988 (the PC Act) at the instance of MunicipalCorporation of Delhi (MCD) against the appellant and certain officersof MCD alleging causing of wrongful loss to the MCD by using fakeEinvoices of Oil Companies relating to transportation of Bitumen for use in“Dense Carpeting Works” of roads in Delhi during the year 1997 and 1998.

4. After investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellantand certain employees of MCD by the respondent-CBI before the SpecialJudge, CBI, New Delhi on 28[th] November, 2002. The appellants filed anapplication for discharge with the Special Judge, CBI. On 1[st] February,F2007, the Special Judge, CBI directed framing of the charges afterconsidering the material before the Court. It was held that there was aprima facie case against the appellant and the other accused. Theappellants filed Criminal Revision No. 321 of 2007 before the Delhi HighCourt against the order framing charge. The Revision Petition wasGconverted into Writ Petition (Criminal)No.352 of 2010.

5. Learned Single Judge referred the following question of lawfor consideration by the Division Bench:

“Whether an order on charge framed by a Special Judgeunder the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, being H

an interlocutory order, and when no revision against theorder or a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. lies, can beassailed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India,whether or not the offences committed include the offencesunder Indian Penal Code apart from offences underPrevention of Corruption Act?”

6. The learned Single Judge referred to the conflicting views takenin earlier two single Bench decisions of the High Court in DharambirKhattar versus Central Bureau of Investigation[1]and R.C. Sabharwalversus Central Bureau of Investigation[2]. It was observed :

“However, since there are two views, one expressed by theBench of Justice Jain in R.C. Sabharwal’s (supra) case andone held by the Bench of Justice Muralidhar in DharamvirKhattar’s case (supra) and by this Bench, I consider that itwas a fit case where a Larger Bench should set thecontroversy at rest.”

7. In Dharambir Khattar (supra), the view of learned SingleJudge is as follows :

“32. To conclude this part of the discussion it is held that inthe context of Section 19(3)(c) the words “no Court shallexercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutoryorder passed in any inquiry, trial...” includes an interlocutoryorder in the form of an order on charge or an order framingcharge. On a collective reading of the decisions in V.C.Shukla and Satya Narayan Sharma, it is held that in termsof Section 19(3)(c) PCA, no revision petition would bemaintainable in the High Court against order on charge oran order framing charge passed by the Special Court.

33. Therefore, in the considered view of this Court, thepreliminary objection of the CBI to the maintainability ofthe present petitions is required to be upheld....”

8. In R.C. Sabharwal (supra), another learned Single Judge heldthat even though no revision may lie against an interlocutory order, therewas no bar to the constitutional remedy under Articles 226 and 227 ofthe Constitution. At the same time, power under Section 482 could not 1 159 (2009) DLT 636

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Abe exercised in derogation of express bar in the statute in view ofdecisions of this Court in CBI versus Ravi Shankar Srivastava[3],Dharimal Tobacco Products Ltd. and Ors. versus State ofMaharashtra and Anr.[4], Madhu Limaye versus The State ofMaharashtra[5], Krishnan versus Krishnaveni[6] and State versusNavjot Sandhu[7].B

9. It was observed :

“37. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of theHon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Navjot Sandhu (supra),coupled with its earlier decisions in the case of MadhuLimaye (supra), it cannot be disputed that inherent powersof the High Court, recognized in Section 482 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, cannot be used when exercise of suchpowers would be in derogation of an express bar containedin a statutory enactment, other than the Code of CriminalProcedure. The inherent powers of the High Court have notbeen limited by any other provisions contained in the Codeof Criminal Procedure, as is evident from the use of the words?Nothing in this Code? in Section 482 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, but, the powers under Section 482 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised whenexercise of such powers would be against the legislativemandate contained in some other statutory enactment suchas Section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act.”

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“29. The fact that the procedural aspect as regards thehearing of the parties has been incorporated in Section 22does not really throw light on whether an order on chargewould be an interlocutory order for the purposes of Section19(3)(c) PCA. A collective reading of the two provisionsindicates that in the context of order on charge an orderdischarging the accused may be an order that would besubject-matter of a revision petition at the instance perhapsof the prosecution. Since all provisions of the statute haveto be given meaning, a harmonious construction of the three F

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provisions indicates that the kinds of orders which can bechallenged by way of a revision petition in the High Court isnarrowed down to a considerable extent as explained in thecase of Satya Narayan Sharma.”

Further, after referring to Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissionerof Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, AIR 1958 SC 398; NibaranChandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 SC 1895;Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi and Anr.,AIR 1968 SC 222; Maruti Bala Raut v. Dashrath Babu Wathareand Ors., (1974) 2 SCC 615; Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v.Laxmibai R. Tarte and Anr., AIR 1975 SC 1297; Jagir Singh v.Ranbir Singh and Anr., AIR 1979 SC 381; Vishesh Kumar v. ShantiPrasad, AIR 1980 SC 892; Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed v.Tufelhussein Samasbhai Sarangpurwala, AIR 1988 SC 184; M.C.Mehta v. Kamal Nath and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1997 and RanjeetSingh v. Ravi Prakash, AIR 2004 SC 3892, it was observed :

“25. It is well known fact that trials of corruption cases arenot permitted to proceed further easily and a trial ofcorruption case takes anything upto 20 years in completion.One major reason for this state of affairs is that the momentcharge is framed, every trial lands into High Court and orderon charge is invariably assailed by the litigants and the HighCourt having flooded itself with such revision petitions, wouldtake any number of years in deciding the revision petitionson charge and the trials would remain stayed. Legislaturelooking at this state of affairs, enacted provision thatinterlocutory orders cannot be the subject matter of revisionpetitions. This Court for reasons as stated above, in paraNo. 3 & 4 had considered the state of affairs prevalent andcame to conclusion that no revision against the order offraming of charge or order directing framing of chargewould lie. Similarly, a petition under Section 482 of Cr. P.C.would also not lie. I am of the opinion that once this Courtholds that a petition under Article 227 would lie, the resultwould be as is evident from the above petitions that everyorder on charge which earlier used to be assailed by way ofrevision would be assailed in a camouflaged manner underArticle 227 of the Constitution and the result would be samethat proceedings before the trial court shall not proceed.

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A26. The decisions on a petition assailing charge requiresgoing through the voluminous evidence collected by the CBI,analyzing the evidence against each accused and thencoming to conclusion whether the accused was liable to becharged or not. This exercise is done by Special Judgeinvariably vide a detailed speaking order. Each order onBcharge of the Special Judge, under Prevention of Corruptioncases, normally runs into 40 to 50 pages where evidence isdiscussed in detail and thereafter the order for framing ofcharge is made. If this Court entertains petitions under Article227 of the Constitution to re-appreciate the evidence collectedCby CBI to see if charge was liable to be framed or, in fact,the Court would be doing so contrary to the legislative intent.No court can appreciate arguments advanced in a case oncharge without going through the entire record. The issuesof jurisdiction and perversity are raised in such petitionsonly to get the petition admitted. The issue of jurisdiction isDrarely involved. The perversity of an order can be argued inrespect of any well written judgment because perversity issuch a term which has a vast meaning and an order which isnot considered by a litigant in its favour is always consideredperverse by him and his counsel. Therefore, entertaining aEpetition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an orderon charge would amount to doing indirectly the same thingwhich cannot be done directly, I consider that no petitionunder Article 227 can be entertained.”

(Emphasis added)

F10.The Division Bench in the impugned judgment[8] reframed thequestions as follows:

“(a) Whether an order framing charge under the 1988 Actwould be treated as an interlocutory order therebybarring the exercise of revisional power of this Court?

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(b) Whether the language employed in Section 19 of the1988 Act which bars the revision would also bar theexercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. forall purposes?

8 Anur Kumar Jain versus CBI 178(2011) DLT 501H

(c) Whether the order framing charge can be assailed underArticle 227 of the Constitution of India?”

11. After discussing the law on the point, the Bench concluded:

“(a) An order framing charge under the Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1988 is an interlocutory order.

(b) As Section 19(3)(c) clearly bars revision against aninterlocutory order and framing of charge being aninterlocutory order a revision will not be maintainable.

(c) A petition under Section 482 of the Code of CriminalProcedure and a writ petition preferred under Article 227 ofthe Constitution of India are maintainable.

(d) Even if a petition under Section 482 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure or a writ petition under Article 227 ofthe Constitution of India is entertained by the High Courtunder no circumstances an order of stay should be passedregard being had to the prohibition contained in Section19(3)(c) of the 1988 Act.

(e) The exercise of power either under Section 482 of theCode of Criminal Procedure or under Article 227 of theConstitution of India should be sparingly and in exceptionalcircumstances be exercised keeping in view the law laid downin Siya Ram Singh [(1979) 3 SCC 118], Vishesh Kumar [AIR1980 SC 892], Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed [AIR 1988 SC184, Kamal Nath and Ors. [AIR 2000 SC 1997 Ranjeet Singh[AIR 2004 SC 3892] and similar line of decisions in thefield.

(f) It is settled law that jurisdiction under Section 482 of theCode of Criminal Procedure or under Article 227 of theConstitution of India cannot be exercised as a “cloak of anappeal in disguise” or to re-appreciate evidence. Theaforesaid proceedings should be used sparingly with greatcare, caution, circumspection and only to prevent gravemiscarriage of justice.”

12. It was held that order framing charge was an interlocutoryorder and no Revision Petition under Section 401 read with Section 397(2)

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ACr.P.C. would lie to the High Court against such order. Reliance wasmainly placed on V.C. Shukla versus State through CBI[9]. Therein,Section 11A of the Special Courts Act, 1979 was interpreted by a Benchof four Judges of this Court. The Bench applied the test in S.Kuppuswami Rao versus the King[10]. Reliance was also placed onSatya Narayan Sharma versus State of Rajasthan[11], wherein SectionB19 (3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was the subjectmatter of consideration.

13. It was, however, held that a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.will lie to the High Court even when there is a bar under Section 397 orsome other provisions of the Cr.P.C. However, inherent power could beCexercised only when there is abuse of the process of Court or whereinterference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. Itmust be exercised very sparingly where proceedings have been initiatedillegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. The power should not beexercised against express provision of law. Even where inherent powerDis exercised in a rare case, there could be no stay of trial in a corruptioncase. Reliance in this regard was mainly placed on judgments of thisCourt in Satya Narayan Sharma (supra) and Navjot Sandhu (supra).

14. As regards a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, itwas held that the said power was part of basic structure of the ConstitutionEas held in L. Chandra Kumar versus Union of India and Ors.[12] andcould not be barred. But the Court would refrain from passing an orderwhich would run counter to and conflict with an express intendmentcontained in Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act. Reliance was also placedon Chandrashekhar Singh and Others versus Siya Ram Singh[13]and Ors.F

15. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the HighCourt was in error in holding that the order framing charge was aninterlocutory order. In any case, since petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.and under Article 227 of the Constitution has been held to be maintainable,there could be no prohibition against interference by the High Court orGthe power of the High Court to grant stay in spite of prohibition underSection 19(3)(c) of the PC Act.

9 (1980) Suppl. SCC 9210 (1947) FCR 18011 (2001) 8 SCC 60712 (1997) 3 SCC 261H13 (1979) 3 SCC 118

16. Learned counsel for the CBI, however, supported the view ofthe High Court.

17. We have given due considerations to the rival submissions andperused the decisions of this Court. Though the question referred relatesto the issue whether order framing charges is an interlocutory order, wehave considered further question as to the approach to be adopted bythe High Court in dealing with the challenge to the order framing charge.As already noted in para 10, the impugned order also considered thesaid question. Learned counsel for the parties have also addressed theCourt on this question.

18. It is not necessary to refer to all the decisions cited at the Bar.Suffice it to say that a Bench of three Judges in Madhu Limaye (supra)held that legislature has sought to check delay in final disposal ofproceedings in criminal cases by way of a bar to revisional jurisdictionagainst an interlocutory order under sub-Section 2 of Section 397 Cr.P.C.At the same time, inherent power of the High Court is not limited oraffected by any other provision. It could not mean that limitation onexercise of revisional power is to be set at naught. Inherent power couldbe used for securing ends of justice or to check abuse of the process ofthe Court. This power has to be exercised very sparingly against aproceeding initiated illegally or vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Thelabel of the petition is immaterial. This Court modified the view taken inAmarnath versus State of Haryana[14] and also deviated from the testfor interlocutory order laid down in S. Kuppuswami Rao (supra). Wemay quote the following observations in this regard:

“6. The point which falls for determination in this appeal issquarely covered by a decision of this Court, to which oneof us (Untwalia, J.) was a party in Amar Nath v. State ofHaryana. But on a careful consideration of the matter andon hearing learned Counsel for the parties in this appealwe thought it advisable to enunciate and reiterate the viewtaken by two learned Judges of this Court in Amar Nathcase but in a somewhat modified and modulated form. …..

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order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding,is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally.More often than not, the revisional power of the High Courtwas resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delayingthe final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in itswisdom decided to check this delay by introducing sub-section (2) in Section 397. On the one hand, a bar has beenput in the way of the High Court (as also of the SessionsJudge) for exercise of the revisional power in relation toany interlocutory order, on the other, the power has beenconferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898Code. On a plain reading of Section 482, however, it wouldfollow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, “shall be deemed to limit oraffect the inherent powers of the High Court”, But, if wewere to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exerciseof the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught oneof the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisionalpowers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious wayout? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem wouldbe to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of theHigh Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will haveno power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order.Then in accordance with one of the other principlesenunciated above, the inherent power will come into play,there being no other provision in the Code for the redress ofthe grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the orderassailed is purely of an interlocutory character which couldbe corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the HighCourt under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse toexercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned orderclearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of theprocess of the Court or for the purpose of securing the endsof justice interference by the High Court is absolutelynecessary, then nothing contained in section 397(2)can limitor affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court.But such cases would be few and far between. The HighCourt must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of, acriminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as beingwithout jurisdiction. Take for example a case where aprosecution is launched under the Prevention of CorruptionActwithout a sanction. then the trial of the accused will bewithout jurisdiction and even after his acquittal a secondtrial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrineof Autrefois Acquit. Even assuming, although we shallpresently show that it is not so, that in such a case an orderof the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is aninterlocutory order. does it stand to reason to say that inherentpower of the High Court cannot be exercised for stoppingthe criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead ofharassing the accused upto the end ? The answer is obviousthat the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of theprocess of the Court and/or to secure, the ends of justice.The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party isimmaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in anappropriate case under its inherent powers. The present caseundoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Courtin accordance with section 482of the 1973 Code, evenassuming, although not accepting, that invoking therevisional power of the High Court is impermissible.

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13. …..But in our judgment such an interpretation and theuniversal application of the principle that what is not a finalorder must be an interlocutory order is neither warrantednor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory therevisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Courtconferred on it by Section 397(1). On such a strictinterpretation, only those orders would be revisable whichare orders passed on the final determination of the actionbut are not appealable under Chapter XXIX of the Code.This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature whenit retained the revisional power of the High Court in termsidentical to the one in the 1898 Code. In what cases then theHigh Court will examine the legality or the propriety of anorder or the legality of any proceeding of an inferior criminal AB

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court? Is it circumscribed to examine only such proceedingwhich is brought for its examination after the finaldetermination and wherein no appeal lies? Such cases willbe very few and far between. …………….

…There may be an order passed during the course of aproceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed inKuppuswami case, but, yet it may not be an interlocutoryorder — pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall inbetween the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, wethink that the bar in sub-section (2) of Section 397 is notmeant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediateorders……”

19. Referring to the judgment in Mohanlal Maganlal Thackerv. State of Gujarat[15], it was held that the test adopted therein that ifreversal of impugned order results in conclusion of proceedings, suchorder may not be interlocutory but final order. It was observed :

“15. …….In the majority decision four tests were culled outfrom some English decisions. They are found enumerated atp. 688. One of the tests is “if the order in question is reversedwould the action have to go on?” Applying that test to thefacts of the instant case it would be noticed that if the pleaof the appellant succeeds and the order of the Sessions Judgeis reversed, the criminal proceeding as initiated and institutedagainst him cannot go on. If, however, he loses on the meritsof the preliminary point the proceeding will go on. Applyingthe test of Kuppuswami case such an order will not be afinal order. But applying the fourth test noted at p. 688 inMohan Lal case it would be a final order. The real point ofdistinction, however, is to be found at p. 693 in the judgmentof Shelat, J. The passage runs thus:

“As observed in Ramesh v. Gendalal Motilal Patni[(1966) 3SCR 198 : AIR 1966 SC 1445] the finality of that order wasnot to be judged by co-relating that order with thecontroversy in the complaint viz. whether the appellant hadcommitted the offence charged against him therein. The factthat that controversy still remained alive is irrelevant.”

20. The principles laid down in Madhu Limaye (supra) still holdthe field and have not been in any manner diluted by decision of fourJudges in V.C. Shukla versus State through CBI[16] or by recent threeJudge Bench decision in Girish Kumar Suneja versus Central Bureauof Investigation[17]. Though in V.C. Shukla (supra), order framing chargewas held to be interlocutory order, judgment in Madhu Limaye (supra)taking a contrary view was distinguished in the context of the statuteconsidered therein. The view in S. Kuppuswami Rao (supra), washeld to have been endorsed in Mohanlal Maganlal Thacker (supra)though factually in Madhu Limaye (supra), the said view was explaineddifferently, as already noted. Thus, in spite of the fact that V.C. Shukla(supra) is a judgment by Bench of four Judges, it cannot be held that theprinciple of Madhu Limaye (supra) does not hold the field. As regardsGirish Kumar Suneja (supra), which is by a Bench of three Judges,the issue considered was whether order of this Court directing that noCourt other than this Court will stay investigation/trial in Manohar LalSharma versus Principal Secretary and ors.[ 18][Coal Blockallocation cases] violated right or remedies of the affected partiesagainst an order framing charge. It was observed that the order framingcharge being interlocutory order, the same could not be interfered withunder Section 397(2) nor under Section 482 Cr.P.C.[19] It was furtherheld that stay of proceedings could not be granted in PC Act cases evenunder Section 482 Cr.P.C.[20] It was further observed that though powerunder Article 227 is extremely vast, the same cannot be exercised onthe drop of a hat as held in Shalini Shyam Shetty versus RajendraShankar Patil[21]as under :

“37. … This reserve and exceptional power of judicialintervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief inindividual cases but should be directed for promotion ofpublic confidence in the administration of justice in thelarger public interest whereas Article 226 of the Constitutionis meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore,the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise issubject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.”

16 (1980) Supp. SCC 9217 (2017) 14 SCC 80918 (2014) 9 SCC 51619 Paras 24,25, 2720 Para 3221 (2010) 8 SCC 329

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A21. It was observed that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. couldbe exercised only in rarest of rare cases and not otherwise.

38. The Criminal Procedure Code is undoubtedly a completecode in itself. As has already been discussed by us, thediscretionary jurisdiction under Section 397(2) CrPC is toBbe exercised only in respect of final orders and intermediateorders. The power under Section 482 CrPC is to be exercisedonly in respect of interlocutory orders to give effect to anorder passed under the Criminal Procedure Code or toprevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise toserve the ends of justice. As indicated above, this power hasCto be exercised only in the rarest of rare cases and nototherwise. If that is the position, and we are of the view thatit is so, resort to Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitutionwould be permissible perhaps only in the most extraordinarycase. To invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the HighDCourt when the Criminal Procedure Code restricts it in theinterest of a fair and expeditious trial for the benefit of theaccused person, we find it difficult to accept the propositionthat since Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution areavailable to an accused person, these provisions should beresorted to in cases that are not the rarest of rare but for Etrifling issues.

Etrifling issues.

22. Reliance was also placed on judgment by seven Judge Benchin Kartar Singh versus State of Punjab[22] laying down as follows:

“40.…If the High Courts entertain bail applicationsFinvoking their extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226and pass orders, then the very scheme and object of the Actand the intendment of Parliament would be completelydefeated and frustrated. But at the same time it cannot besaid that the High Courts have no jurisdiction. Therefore,we totally agree with the view taken by this Court in AbdulGHamid Haji Mohammed [(1994) 2 SCC 664] that if the HighCourt is inclined to entertain any application under Article226, that power should be exercised most sparingly and onlyin rare and appropriate cases in extreme circumstances.What those rare cases are and what would be the H22 (1994) 3 SCC 569

circumstances that would justify the entertaining ofapplications under Article 226 cannot be put in straitjacket.”

23. It was further observed that no stay could be granted in PCAct cases in view of bar contained in Section 19(3)(c). The relevantobservations are :

“64. A reading of Section 19(3) of the PC Act indicates thatit deals with three situations: (i) Clause (a) deals a situationwhere a final judgment and sentence has been delivered bythe Special Judge. We are not concerned with this situation.(ii) Clause (b) deals with a stay of proceedings under thePC Act in the event of any error, omission or irregularity inthe grant of sanction by the authority concerned to prosecutethe accused person. It is made clear that no court shall granta stay of proceedings on such a ground except if the court issatisfied that the error, omission or irregularity has resultedin a failure of justice—then and only then can the court granta stay of proceedings under the PC Act. (iii) Clause (c)provides for a blanket prohibition against a stay ofproceedings under the PC Act even if there is a failure ofjustice [subject of course to Clause (b)]. It mandates thatno court shall stay proceedings “on any other ground” thatis to say any ground other than a ground relatable to theerror, omission or irregularity in the sanction resulting in afailure of justice.

65. A conjoint reading of clause (b) and clause (c) of Section19(3) of the PC Act makes it is clear that a stay ofproceedings could be granted only and only if there is anerror, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted for aprosecution and that error, omission or irregularity hasresulted in a failure of justice. There is no other situationthat is contemplated for the grant of a stay of proceedingsunder the PC Act on any other ground whatsoever, even ifthere is a failure of justice. Clause (c) additionally mandatesa prohibition on the exercise of revision jurisdiction in respectof any interlocutory order passed in any trial such as thosethat we have already referred to. In our opinion, theprovisions of clauses (b) and (c) of Section 19(3) of the PCAct read together are quite clear and do not admit of anyambiguity or the need for any further interpretation.”

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A24.We may also refer to the observations of the ConstitutionBench in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani versus Asstt. Collector of Customs,Bombay and Anr.[23] about the nature of inherent power of the HighCourt:

“The inherent powers of the High Court preserved by SectionB561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are thus vested init by “law” within the meaning of Art. 21. The procedure forinvoking the inherent powers is regulated by rules framed bythe High Court. The power to make such rules is conferred onthe High Court by the Constitution. The rules previously in forcewere contained in force by Article 372 of the Constitution.”C25.As rightly noted in the impugned judgment, a Bench of sevenJudges in L.Chandra Kumar (supra) held that power of the High Courtto exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 was part of the basic structureof the Constitution.

26. Thus, even though in dealing with different situations, seeminglyDconflicting observations may have been made while holding that the orderframing charge was interlocutory order and was not liable to be interferedwith under Section 397(2) or even under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the principlelaid down in Madhu Limaye (supra) still holds the field. Order framingcharge may not be held to be purely a interlocutory order and can in aEgiven situation be interfered with under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. or 482Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution which is a constitutional provisionbut the power of the High Court to interfere with an order framing chargeand to grant stay is to be exercised only in an exceptional situation.

27. We have thus no hesitation in concluding that the High CourtFhas jurisdiction in appropriate case to consider the challenge against anorder framing charge and also to grant stay but how such power is to beexercised and when stay ought to be granted needs to be consideredfurther.

28. As observed in Girish Kumar Suneja (supra) in the PC ActGcases, the intention of legislature is expeditious conclusion of trial onday-to-day basis without any impediment through the stay of proceedingsand this concern must be respected. This Court also noted the provisoto Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. added by Section 22(d) of the PC Act that arevisional court shall not ordinarily call for the record of proceedings. If H23 [1967] 3 SCR 926

record is called, the Special Judge may not be able to proceed with thetrial which will stand indirectly stayed. The right of the accused has tobe considered vis-à-vis the interest of the society. As already noted, thebench of seven Judges in Kartar Singh (supra) held that evenconstitutional power of the High Court under Article 226 which wasvery wide ought to be used with circumspection in accordance withjudicial consideration and well established principles. The power shouldbe exercised sparingly in rare and extreme circumstances.

29. It is well accepted that delay in a criminal trial, particularly inthe PC Act cases, has deleterious effect on the administration of justicein which the society has a vital interest. Delay in trials affects the faithin Rule of Law and efficacy of the legal system. It affects social welfareand development. Even in civil or tax cases it has been laid down thatpower to grant stay has to be exercised with restraint. Mere primafacie case is not enough. Party seeking stay must be put to terms andstay should not be incentive to delay. The order granting stay mustshow application of mind. The power to grant stay is coupled withaccountability[24].

30. Wherever stay is granted, a speaking order must be passedshowing that the case was of exceptional nature and delay on accountof stay will not prejudice the interest of speedy trial in a corruption case.Once stay is granted, proceedings should not be adjourned and concludedwithin two-three months.

31. The wisdom of legislature and the object of final and expeditiousdisposal of a criminal proceeding cannot be ignored. In exercise of itspower the High Court is to balance the freedom of an individual on theone hand and security of the society on the other. Only in case of patentillegality or want of jurisdiction the High Court may exercise its jurisdiction.The acknowledged experience is that where challenge to an order framingcharge is entertained, the matter remains pending for long time whichdefeats the interest of justice.

32. We have already quoted the judicial experience as noted in theearlier judgments in Para 9 above that trial of corruption cases is not 24 Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu Das (1984) 2 SCC 436 para 4; AssistantCollector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal vs. Dunlop India Ltd. andOrs. (1985) 1 SCC 260 para 5; Union Territory of Pondicherry and Ors. vs. P.V.Suresh and Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 70 para 15; and State of West Bengal and Ors. vs.Calcutta Hardware Stores and Ors. (1986) 2 SCC 203 para 5

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Apermitted to proceed on account of challenge to the order of chargebefore the High Courts. Once stay is granted, disposal of a petition beforethe High Court takes long time. Consideration of the challenge againstan order of framing charge may not require meticulous examination ofvoluminous material which may be in the nature of a mini trial. Still, theCourt is at times called upon to do so inspite of law being clear that atBthe stage of charge the Court has only to see as to whether material onrecord reasonably connects the accused with the crime. ConstitutionBench of this Court in Hardeep Singh versus State of Punjab[25]observed:

100. However, there is a series of cases wherein this CourtCwhile dealing with the provisions of Sections 227, 228, 239,240, 241, 242 and 245 CrPC, has consistently held that thecourt at the stage of framing of the charge has to apply itsmind to the question whether or not there is any ground forpresuming the commission of an offence by the accused. TheDcourt has to see as to whether the material brought on recordreasonably connect the accused with the offence. Nothingmore is required to be enquired into. While dealing with theaforesaid provisions, the test of prima facie case is to beapplied. The court has to find out whether the materialsoffered by the prosecution to be adduced as evidence areEsufficient for the court to proceed against the accused further.(Vide State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy[(1977) 2 SCC699], All India Bank Officers’ Confederation v. Union ofIndia[(1989) 4 SCC 90] Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v.Dilip Nathumal Chordia [(1989) 1 SCC 715] State of M.P. v.FKrishna Chandra Saksena [(1996) 11 SCC 439] and Stateof M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [(2000) 6 SCC 338]

101. In Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra [(2002)2 SCC 135] this Court while dealing with the provisions ofSections 227 and 228 CrPC, placed a very heavy relianceGon the earlier judgment of this Court in Union of India v.Prafulla Kumar Samal [(1979) 3 SCC 4] and held that whileconsidering the question of framing the charges, the courtmay weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of findingout whether or not a prima facie case against the accused H25 (2014) 3 SCC 92

has been made out and whether the materials placed beforethe court disclose grave suspicion against the accused whichhas not been properly explained. In such an eventuality, thecourt is justified in framing the charges and proceeding withthe trial. The court has to consider the broad probabilitiesof the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documentsproduced before the court but the court should not make aroving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weighevidence as if it is conducting a trial.

102. In Suresh v. State of Maharashtra[(2001) 3 SCC 703],this Court after taking note of the earlier judgments inNiranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra BhimrajBijjaya[(1990) 4 SCC 76] and State of Maharashtra v. PriyaSharan Maharaj[(1997) 4 SCC 393], held as under: (Sureshcase, SCC p. 707, para 9)

“9. … at the stage of Sections 227 and 228 the court isrequired to evaluate the material and documents on recordwith a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefromtaken at their face value disclose the existence of all theingredients constituting the alleged offence. The court may,for this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot beexpected even at that initial stage to accept all that theprosecution states as the gospel truth even if it is opposed tocommon sense or the broad probabilities of the case.Therefore, at the stage of framing of the charge the courthas to consider the material with a view to find out if there isground [**]for presuming that the accused has committed theoffence[**]or that there is not sufficient ground for proceedingagainst him and[**]not for the purpose of arriving at theconclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction[**].(Priya Sharan case, SCC p. 397, para 8)”

(emphasis in original)

103. Similarly in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh[(1997) 4SCC 39], while dealing with the issue, this Court held: (SCCp. 42, para 4)

“4. … If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes toadduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted A

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Abefore it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted bythe defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accusedcommitted the offence, then there will be no sufficient groundfor proceeding with the trial.”

33. If contrary to the above law, at the stage of charge, the HighBCourt adopts the approach of weighing probabilities and re-appreciatethe material, it may be certainly a time consuming exercise. The legislativepolicy of expeditious final disposal of the trial is thus, hampered. Thus,even while reiterating the view that there is no bar to jurisdiction of theHigh Court to consider a challenge against an order of framing charge inexceptional situation for correcting a patent error of lack of jurisdiction,Cexercise of such jurisdiction has to be limited to rarest of rare cases.Even if a challenge to order framing charge is entertained, decision ofsuch a petition should not be delayed. Though no mandatory time limitcan be fixed, normally it should not exceed two-three months. If stay isgranted, it should not normally be unconditional or of indefinite duration.DAppropriate conditions may be imposed so that the party in whose favourstay is granted is accountable if court finally finds no merit in the matterand the other side suffers loss and injustice. To give effect to the legislativepolicy and the mandate of Article 21 for speedy justice in criminal cases,if stay is granted, matter should be taken on day-to-day basis andconcluded within two-three months. Where the matter remains pendingEfor longer period, the order of stay will stand vacated on expiry of sixmonths, unless extension is granted by a speaking order showingextraordinary situation where continuing stay was to be preferred to thefinal disposal of trial by the trial Court. This timeline is being fixed inview of the fact that such trials are expected to be concluded normallyFin one to two years.

34. In Imtiaz Ahmad versus State of U.P.[26] this Court afterconsidering a report noted:

“(a) As high as 9% of the cases have completed more thantwenty years since the date of stay order.G(b) Roughly 21% of the cases have completed more than tenyears.

(c) Average pendency per case (counted from the date ofstay order till 26-7-2010) works out to be around 7.4 years.

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(d) Charge-sheet was found to be the most prominent stagewhere the cases were stayed with almost 32% of the casesfalling under this category. The next two prominent stagesare found to be ‘appearance’ and ‘summons’, with eachcomprising 19% of the total number of cases. If‘appearance’ and ‘summons’ are consideredinterchangeable, then they would collectively account forthe maximum of stay orders.”

After noting the above scenario, the Court directed :

“55. Certain directions are given to the High Courts for bettermaintenance of the rule of law and better administration ofjustice:

While analysing the data in aggregated form, this Courtcannot overlook the most important factor in theadministration of justice. The authority of the High Court toorder stay of investigation pursuant to lodging of FIR, ortrial in deserving cases is unquestionable. But this Court isof the view that the exercise of this authority carries with itthe responsibility to expeditiously dispose of the case. Thepower to grant stay of investigation and trial is a veryextraordinary power given to the High Courts and the samepower is to be exercised sparingly only to prevent an abuseof the process and to promote the ends of justice. It is thereforeclear that:

(i) Such an extraordinary power has to be exercised withdue caution and circumspection.

(ii) Once such a power is exercised, the High Court shouldnot lose sight of the case where it has exercised itsextraordinary power of staying investigation and trial.

(iii) The High Court should make it a point of finallydisposing of such proceedings as early as possible butpreferably within six months from the date the stay order isissued.

56. It is true that this Court has no power of superintendenceover the High Court as the High Court has over DistrictCourts under Article 227 of the Constitution. Like this Court, AB

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Athe High Court is equally a superior court of record withplenary jurisdiction. Under our Constitution the High Courtis not a court subordinate to this Court. This Court, however,enjoys appellate powers over the High Court as also someother incidental powers. But as the last court and in exerciseof this Court’s power to do complete justice which includesBwithin it the power to improve the administration of justicein public interest, this Court gives the aforesaid guidelinesfor sustaining common man’s faith in the rule of law and thejustice delivery system, both being inextricably linked.”

35. In view of above, situation of proceedings remaining pendingCfor long on account of stay needs to be remedied. Remedy is requirednot only for corruption cases but for all civil and criminal cases where onaccount of stay, civil and criminal proceedings are held up. At times,proceedings are adjourned sine die on account of stay. Even after stayis vacated, intimation is not received and proceedings are not taken up.DIn an attempt to remedy this, situation, we consider it appropriate todirect that in all pending cases where stay against proceedings of a civilor criminal trial is operating, the same will come to an end on expiry ofsix months from today unless in an exceptional case by a speaking ordersuch stay is extended. In cases where stay is granted in future, the samewill end on expiry of six months from the date of such order unlessEsimilar extension is granted by a speaking order. The speaking ordermust show that the case was of such exceptional nature that continuingthe stay was more important than having the trial finalized. The trialCourt where order of stay of civil or criminal proceedings is produced,may fix a date not beyond six months of the order of stay so that onFexpiry of period of stay, proceedings can commence unless order ofextension of stay is produced.

36. Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge isnot purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of theHigh Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it underGSections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution. However,the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policyto ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in anymanner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of chargeshould be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patenterror of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter. Even whereHsuch challenge is entertained and stay is granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basis so that stay does not operate for an undulylong period. Though no mandatory time limit may be fixed, the decisionmay not exceed two-three months normally. If it remains pending longer,duration of stay should not exceed six months, unless extension is grantedby a specific speaking order, as already indicated. Mandate of speedyjustice applies to the PC Act cases as well as other cases where at trialstage proceedings are stayed by the higher court i.e. the High Court ora court below the High Court, as the case may be. In all pending mattersbefore the High Courts or other courts relating to PC Act or all othercivil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial isoperating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unlessextended by a speaking order on above parameters. Same course mayalso be adopted by civil and criminal appellate/revisional courts underthe jurisdiction of the High Courts. The trial courts may, on expiry ofabove period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any otherintimation unless express order extending stay is produced.

37. The High Courts may also issue instructions to this effect andmonitor the same so that civil or criminal proceedings do not remainpending for unduly period at the trial stage.

38. The question referred stands answered. The matter along withother connected matters, may now be listed before an appropriate Benchas first matter, subject to overnight part-heard, on Wednesday, the 18[th]April, 2018.

A copy of this order be sent to all the High Courts for necessaryaction.

Note: Highlighting in quotations is by us

R. F. NARIMAN, J. (Concurring) 1. The cancer of corruptionhas, as we all know, eaten into the vital organs of the State. Cancer is adreaded disease which, if not nipped in the bud in time, causes death. InBritish India, the Penal Code dealt with the cancer of corruption bypublic servants in Chapter IX thereof. Even before independence, theseprovisions were found to be inadequate to deal with the rapid onset ofthis disease as a result of which the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,was enacted. This Act was amended twice – once by the Criminal Law(Amendment) Act, 1952 and a second time by the Anti-Corruption Laws(Amendment) Act, 1964, based on the recommendations of the AB

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ASanthanam Committee. A working of the 1947 Act showed that it wasfound to be inadequate to deal with the disease of corruption effectivelyenough. For this reason, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 wasenacted (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The Statement of Objectsand Reasons for the Act is revealing and is set out hereinbelow:

“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

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1. The Bill is intended to make the existing anti-corruption lawsmore effective by widening their coverage and by strengtheningthe provisions.

2. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, was amended in 1964based on the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee.There are provisions in Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code todeal with public servants and those who abet them by way ofcriminal misconduct. There are also provisions in the CriminalLaw Amendment Ordinance, 1944, to enable attachment of ill-gotten wealth obtained through corrupt means, including fromtransferees of such wealth. The Bill seeks to incorporate all theseprovisions with modifications so as to make the provisions moreeffective in combating corruption among public servants.

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3. The Bill, inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definitionof the expression “public servant”, incorporation of offencesunder Sections 161 to 165-A of the Indian Penal Code,enhancement of penalties provided for these offences andincorporation of a provision that the order of the trial courtupholding the grant of sanction for prosecution would be final ifit has not already been challenged and the trial has commenced.In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-daytrial of cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant ofstay and exercise of powers of revision on interlocutory ordershave also been included.

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4. Since the provisions of Sections 161 to 165-A are incorporatedin the proposed legislation with an enhanced punishment, it is notnecessary to retain those sections in the Indian Penal Code.Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with thenecessary saving provision.

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5. The notes on clauses explain in detail the provisions of theBill.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

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2. Section 2(c) defines “public servant”. The definition isextremely wide and includes within its ken even arbitrators or otherpersons to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision orreport by a court of justice or by a competent public authority – (SeeSection 2(c)(vi)). Also included are office bearers of registered co-operative societies engaged in agriculture, industry, trade or banking,who receive financial aid from the Government – (See Section 2(c)(ix)).Office bearers or employees of educational, scientific, social, cultural orother institutions in whatever manner established, receiving financialassistance from the Government or local or other public authorities arealso included (see Section 2(c)(xii)). The two explanations to Section2(c) are also revealing - whereas Explanation 1 states that in order to bea public servant, one need not be appointed by Government, Explanation2 refers to a de facto, as opposed to a de jure, public servant, discountingwhatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that “situation”.

3. Section 4(4) is of great importance in deciding these appeals,and is set out hereinbelow:

“4. Cases triable by special Judges.—

(1) - (3) xxx xxx xxx

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973, a special Judge shall, as far as practicable,hold the trial of an offence on day-to-day basis.”

Section 22 applies the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, subject tomodifications which ensure timely disposal of cases, under this specialAct. Section 22 reads as under:

“22. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to apply—subject to certain modifications.

The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, shall intheir application to any proceeding in relation to an offencepunishable under this Act have effect as if,—

(a) in sub-section (1) of Section 243, for the words “The accusedshall then be called upon,” the words “The accused shall then berequired to give in writing at once or within such time as thecourt may allow, a list of the persons (if any) whom he proposesto examine as his witnesses and of the documents (if any) onwhich he proposes to rely and he shall then be called upon” hadbeen substituted; A

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A(b) in sub-section (2) of Section 309, after the third proviso, thefollowing proviso had been inserted, namely: —

“Provided also that the proceeding shall not be adjourned orpostponed merely on the ground that an application under Section397 has been made by a party to the proceeding.”; B

(c) after sub-section (2) of Section 317, the following sub-sectionhad been inserted, namely:—

“(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) orsub-section (2), the Judge may, if he thinks fit and for reasons tobe recorded by him, proceed with inquiry or trial in the absenceof the accused or his pleader and record the evidence of anywitness subject to the right of the accused to recall the witnessfor cross-examination.”; C

(d) in sub-section (1) of Section 397, before the Explanation, thefollowing proviso had been inserted, namely:—

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“Provided that where the powers under this section are exercisedby a court on an application made by a party to such proceedings,the court shall not ordinarily call for the record of theproceedings—

(a) without giving the other party an opportunity of showing causeEwhy the record should not be called for; or (b) if it is satisfied that an examination of the record of theproceedings may be made from the certified copies.”

Under Section 27, powers of appeal and revision, conferred by the CodeFof Criminal Procedure, are to be exercised “subject to the provisions ofthis Act”. Section 27 reads as follows:

“—27. Appeal and revision.

Subject to the provisions of this Act, the High Court may exercise,so far as they may be applicable, all the powers of appeal andGrevision conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, ona High court as if the Court of the special Judge were a Court ofSession trying 12 cases within the local limits of the High Court.”

4. The bone of contention in these appeals is the true interpretationof Section 19(3)(c) of the Act, and whether superior constitutional courts, H

namely, the High Courts in this country, are bound to follow Section19(3)(c) in petitions filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitutionof India. An allied question is whether the inherent powers of High Courtsare available to stay proceedings under the Act under Section 482 of theCode of Criminal Procedure. Section 19 reads as follows:

“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—

(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable underSections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed bya public servant, except with the previous sanction, [save asotherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013] —

(a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection withthe affairs of the Union and is not removable from his officesave by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of thatGovernment; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection withthe affairs of a State and is not removable from his office saveby or with the sanction of the State Government, of thatGovernment;

(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent toremove him from his office.

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as towhether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1)should be given by the Central Government or the StateGovernment or any 9 other authority, such sanction shall be givenby that Government or authority which would have beencompetent to remove the public servant from his office at thetime when the offence was alleged to have been committed.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973 —

(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shallbe reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation orrevision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission,irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unlessin the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has, in fact, beenoccasioned thereby; A

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(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on theground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction grantedby the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission orirregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;

(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on anyBother ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revisionin relation to any interlocutory order passed in inquiry, trial, appealor other proceedings.

(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absenceof, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction hasCoccasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the Court shall haveregard to the fact whether the objection could and should havebeen raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.

Explanation. — For the purposes of this section, — (a) errorincludes competency of the authority to grant sanction;

D(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to anyrequirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of aspecified authority or with the sanction of a specified person orany requirement of a similar nature.”

5. On a reference made to a 2-Judge Bench in the Delhi HighECourt, the learned Chief Justice framed, what he described as, “threefacets which emanate for consideration”, as follows:

“(a) Whether an order framing charge under the 1988 Act wouldbe treated as an interlocutory order thereby barring the exerciseof revisional power of this Court?

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(b) Whether the language employed in Section 19 of the 1988Act which bars the revision would also bar the exercise of powerunder Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for all purposes?

(c) Whether the order framing charge can be assailed underArticle 227 of the Constitution of India?”

GAnswers given to the “three facets” are in paragraph 33 asfollows:

“33. In view of our aforesaid discussion, we proceed to answerthe reference on following terms:

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(a) An order framing charge under the Prevention of CorruptionAct, 1988 is an interlocutory order.

(b) As Section 19(3)(c) clearly bars revision against aninterlocutory order and framing of charge being an interlocutoryorder a revision will not be maintainable.

(c) A petition under Section 482 of the Code of CriminalProcedure and a writ petition preferred under Article 227 of theConstitution of India are maintainable.

(d) Even if a petition under Section 482 of the Code of CriminalProcedure or a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitutionof India is entertained by the High Court under no circumstancesan order of stay should be passed regard being had to theprohibition contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the 1988 Act.

(e) The exercise of power either under Section 482 of the Codeof Criminal Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitutionof India should be sparingly and in exceptional circumstances beexercised keeping in view the law laid down in Siya Ram Singh(supra), Vishesh Kumar (supra), Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed(supra), Kamal Nath & Others (supra) Ranjeet Singh (supra)and similar line of decisions in the field.

(f) It is settled law that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Codeof Criminal Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitutionof India cannot be exercised as a “cloak of an appeal in disguise”or to re- appreciate evidence. The aforesaid proceedings shouldbe used sparingly with great care, caution, circumspection andonly to prevent grave miscarriage of justice.”

6. The arguments on both sides have been set out in the judgmentof brother Goel, J. and need not be reiterated.

7. A perusal of Section 19(3) of the Act would show that theinterdict against stay of proceedings under this Act on the ground of anyerror, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority islifted if the Court is satisfied that the error, omission or irregularity hasresulted in a failure of justice. Having said this in clause (b) of Section19(3), clause (c) says that no Court shall stay proceedings under thisAct on any other ground. The contention on behalf of the Appellantsbefore us is that the expression “on any other ground” is referable only A

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Ato grounds which relate to sanction and not generally to all proceedingsunder the Act. Whereas learned counsel for the Respondents arguesthat these are grounds referable to the proceedings under this Act andthere is no warrant to add words not found in sub-section (c), namely,that these grounds should be relatable to sanction only.

B8. We are of the view that the Respondents are correct in thissubmission for the following reasons:

(i) Section 19(3)(b) subsumes all grounds which are relatableto sanction granted. This is clear from the word “any”making it clear that whatever be the error, omission orCirregularity in sanction granted, all grounds relatable theretoare covered.

(ii) This is further made clear by Explanation (a), which definesan “error” as including competency of the authority to grantsanction.

D(iii) The words “in the sanction granted by the authority”contained in sub-clause (b) are conspicuous by their absencein sub-clause(c), showing thereby that it is the proceedingsunder the Act that are referred to.

(iv) The expression “on any other ground”, therefore, refers toEand relates to all grounds that are available in proceedingsunder the Act other than grounds which relate to sanctiongranted by the authority.

(v) On the assumption that there is an ambiguity, and that thereare two views possible, the view which most accords withFthe object of the Act, and which makes the Act workable,must necessarily be the controlling view. It is settled lawthat even penal statutes are governed not only by their literallanguage, but also by the object sought to be achieved byParliament. (See Ms. Eera through Dr. ManjulaKrippendorf v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Anr.,G2017 SCC Online SC 787 at paragraphs 134-140).

(vi) In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4SCC 551 at 558, this Court held, “It has been pointed outrepeatedly, vide for example, The River WearCommissioners v. William Adamson (1876-77) 2 AC 743

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and R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India,AIR 1957 SC 628, that although the words occurring in aparticular statute are plain and unambiguous, they have tobe interpreted in a manner which would fit in the context ofthe other provisions of the statute and bring about the realintention of the Legislature”. As the Statement of Objectsand Reasons extracted hereinabove makes it clear, Section19(3)(c) is to be read with Section 4(4) and Section 22, allof which make it clear that cases under the Act have to bedecided with utmost despatch and without any glitches onthe way in the form of interlocutory stay orders.[1]

(vii) It has been argued on behalf of the Appellants that sub-section (4) of Section 19 would make it clear that the subjectmatter of Section 19, including sub-section (3), is sanctionand sanction alone. This argument is fallacious for the simplereason that the subject matter of sub-section (4) is only inthe nature of a proviso to Section 19(3)(a) and (b), making

1 Under Section 22(a), Section 243(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is tightened upby requiring the accused to give in writing, at once or within such timeas the Court mayallow, a list of persons whom he proposes to examine as witnesses and documents onwhich he proposes to rely, so as to continue with the trial with utmost despatch.Similarly, in sub-clause (b) of Section 22, under Section 309 a fourth proviso is insertedensuring that there shall be no adjournment merely on the ground that an applicationunder Section 397 has been made by a party to the proceedings. Under sub-clause (c)of Section 22, a Judge may, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 317(1) and(2), if he thinks fit and for good reason, proceed with the enquiry or trial in the absenceof the accused or his pleader and record the evidence of any witness, subject to the rightof the accused to recall the witness for cross-examination. This again can be done sothat there is no delay in either the enquiry or trial proceedings under the Act. Insofar assub-clause (d) is concerned, this Court in Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I., (2017) 14SCC 809 at 847 has held:

“By adding the proviso to Section 397(1) CrPC, Parliament has made itclear that it would be appropriate not to call for the records of the casebefore the Special Judge even when the High Court exercises its revisionjurisdiction. The reason for this quite clearly is that once the records arecalled for, the Special Judge cannot proceed with the trial. With a viewto ensure that the accused who has invoked the revision jurisdiction ofthe High Court is not prejudiced and at the same time the trial is notindirectly stayed or otherwise impeded, Parliament has made it clearthat the examination of the record of the Special Judge may also bemade on the basis of certified copies of the record. Quite clearly, theintention of Parliament is that there should not be any impediment inthe trial of a case under the PC Act.”

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

it clear that the ground for stay qua sanction havingoccasioned or resulted in a failure of justice should be takenat the earliest, and if not so taken, would be rejected on thisground alone.

(viii) Section 19(3)(c) became necessary to make it clear thatproceedings under the Act can be stayed only in theeventuality of an error, omission or irregularity in sanctiongranted, resulting in failure of justice, and for no otherreason. It was for this reason that it was also necessary toreiterate in the language of Section 397(2) of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, that in all cases, other than thosecovered by Section 19(3)(b), no court shall exercise thepower of revision in relation to interlocutory orders thatmay be passed. It is also significant to note that the reachof this part of Section 19(3)(c) is at every stage of theproceeding, that is inquiry, trial, appeal or otherwise, makingit clear that, in consonance with the object sought to beachieved, prevention of corruption trials are not only to beheard by courts other than ordinary courts, but disposed ofas expeditiously as possible, as otherwise corrupt publicservants would continue to remain in office and be cancerousto society at large, eating away at the fabric of the nation.

9. The question as to whether the inherent power of a High Courtwould be available to stay a trial under the Act necessarily leads us to aninquiry as to whether such inherent power sounds in constitutional, asopposed to statutory law. First and foremost, it must be appreciated thatthe High Courts are established by the Constitution and are courts ofrecord which will have all powers of such courts, including the power topunish contempt of themselves (See Article 215). The High Court, beinga superior court of record, is entitled to consider questions regarding itsown jurisdiction when raised before it. In an instructive passage by aConstitution Bench of this Court in In re Special Reference 1 of 1964,(1965) 1 SCR 413 at 499, Gajendragadkar, C.J. held:

“Besides, in the case of a superior Court of Record, it is for thecourt to consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdictionor not. Unlike a Court of limited jurisdiction, the superior Court isentitled to determine for itself questions about its own jurisdiction.“Prima facie”, says Halsbury, “no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown tobe so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior courtunless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings thatthe particular matter is within the cognizance of the particularcourt” [Halsbury’s Law of England, Vol. 9, p. 349].”

10. Also, in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Assistant Collector ofCustoms, 1967 SCR (3) 926 at 930-931, this Court had occasion to dealwith the inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A of theCode of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which is equivalent to Section 482 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was held that the said Sectiondid not confer any power, but only declared that nothing in the Codeshall be deemed to limit or affect the existing inherent powers of theHigh Court. The Court then went on to hold:

“The proviso to the article is not material and need not be read.The article enacts that the jurisdiction of the existing High Courtsand the powers of the judges thereof in relation to administrationof justice “shall be” the same as immediately before thecommencement of the Constitution. The Constitution confirmedand re-vested in the High Court all its existing powers andjurisdiction including its inherent powers, and its power to makerules. When the Constitution or any enacted law has embracedand confirmed the inherent powers and jurisdiction of the HighCourt which previously existed, that power and jurisdiction hasthe sanction of an enacted “law” within the meaning of Art.21 as explained in A. K. Gopalan’s case (1950 SCR 88). Theinherent powers of the High Court preserved by Sec. 561-A ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure are thus vested in it by “law”within the meaning of Art. 21. The procedure for invoking theinherent powers is regulated by rules framed by the High Court.The power to make such rules is conferred on the High Court bythe Constitution. The rules previously in force were continued inforce by Article 372 of the Constitution. The order of the HighCourt canceling the bail and depriving the appellant of his personalliberty is according to procedure established by law and is notviolative of Art. 21.”

11. It is thus clear that the inherent power of a Court set up by theConstitution is a power that inheres in such Court because it is a superiorcourt of record, and not because it is conferred by the Code of Criminal A

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AProcedure. This is a power vested by the Constitution itself, inter alia,under Article 215 as aforestated. Also, as such High Courts have thepower, nay, the duty to protect the fundamental rights of citizens underArticle 226 of the Constitution, the inherent power to do justice in casesinvolving the liberty of the citizen would also sound in Article 21 of theConstitution. This being the constitutional position, it is clear that SectionB19(3)(c) cannot be read as a ban on the maintainability of a petition filedbefore the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of CriminalProcedure, the non-obstante clause in Section 19(3) applying only to theCode of Criminal Procedure. The judgment of this Court in SatyaNarayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 8 SCC 607 at paragraphsC14 and 15 does not, therefore, lay down the correct position in law.Equally, in paragraph 17 of the said judgment, despite the clarificationthat proceedings can be “adapted” in appropriate cases, the Court wenton to hold that there is a blanket ban of stay of trials and that, therefore,Section 482, even as adapted, cannot be used for the aforesaid purpose.

This again is contrary to the position in law as laid down hereinabove.DThis case, therefore, stands overruled.

12. At this juncture it is important to consider the 3-Judge benchdecision in Madhu Limaye (supra). A 3-Judge bench of this Courtdecided that a Section 482 petition under the Code of Criminal Procedurewould be maintainable against a Sessions Judge order framing a chargeEagainst the appellant under Section 500 of the Penal Code, despite theprohibition contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.This was held on two grounds. First, that even if Section 397(1) was outof the way because of the prohibition contained in Section 397(2), theinherent power of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of CriminalFProcedure would be available. This was held after referring to AmarNath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137, which was a 2-JudgeBench decision, which decided that the inherent power contained inSection 482 would not be available to defeat the bar contained in Section397(2). The 3-Judge referred to the judgment in Amar Nath (supra)and said:G“7. For the reasons stated hereinafter we think that the statementof the law apropos Point No. 1 is not quite accurate and needssome modulation. But we are going to reaffirm the decision ofthe Court on the second point.”

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“10. As pointed out in Amar Nath case the purpose of putting abar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory orderpassed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding, is to bringabout expeditious disposal of the cases finally. More often thannot, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to inrelation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of theproceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom decided to checkthis delay by introducing sub-section (2) in Section 397. On theone hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (asalso of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of the revisional powerin relation to any interlocutory order, on the other, the power hasbeen conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898Code. On a plain reading of Section 482, however, it would followthat nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) ofSection 397 also, “shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherentpowers of the High Court”, But, if we were to say that the saidbar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all,it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed uponthe exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what isthe harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of thisproblem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2)of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional powerof the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court willhave no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order.Then in accordance with one of the other principles enunciatedabove, the inherent power will come into play, there being noother provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance ofthe aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of aninterlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise ofthe revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, theHigh Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But incase the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which isan abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securingthe ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutelynecessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit oraffect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. Butsuch cases would be few and far between. The High Court mustexercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would A

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be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiatedillegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take forexample a case where a prosecution is launched under thePrevention of Corruption Act without a sanction, then the trial ofthe accused will be without jurisdiction and even after his acquittala second trial, after proper sanction will not be barred on thedoctrine of autrefois acquit. Even assuming, although we shallpresently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order ofthe Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutoryorder, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of theHigh Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminalproceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accusedup to the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operateto prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to securethe ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrievedparty is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter inan appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present caseundoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court inaccordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming,although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of theHigh Court is impermissible.

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(at pages 555-556)

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13. The second ground on which this case was decided was thatan order framing a charge was not a purely interlocutory order so as toattract the bar of Section 392(2), but would be an “intermediate” classof order, between a final and a purely interlocutory order, on theapplication of a test laid down by English decisions and followed by ourFCourts, namely, that if the order in question is reversed, would the actionthen go on or be terminated. Applying this test, it was held that in anorder rejecting the framing of a charge, the action would not go on andwould be terminated and for this reason also would not be covered bySection 397(2).GV.C. Shukla

14. This judgment was affirmed by a 4-Judge Bench in V.C. Shuklav. State through C.B.I. (1980) Supp. SCC 92 at 128-129, where it washeld that under Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979, the schemebeing different from the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Sectionopening with the words “notwithstanding anything in the Code”, theH“intermediate” type of order would not obtain, and an order framing a charge would, therefore, not be liable to be appealed against, being purelyinterlocutory in nature. While holding this, this Court was at pains topoint out:

“On a true construction of Section 11(1) of the Act and takinginto consideration the natural meaning of the expression‘interlocutory order’, there can be no doubt that the order framingcharges against the appellant under the Act was merely aninterlocutory order which neither terminated the proceedings norfinally decided the rights of the parties. According to the test laiddown in Kuppuswami’s case the order impugned was undoubtedlyan interlocutory order. Taking into consideration, therefore, thenatural meaning of interlocutory order and applying the nonobstante clause, the position is that the provisions of the Code ofCriminal Procedure are expressly excluded by the non obstanteclause and therefore s. 397(2) of the Code cannot be called intoaid in order to hold that the order impugned is not an interlocutoryorder. As the decisions of this Court in the cases of Madhu Limayev. State of Maharashtra and Amar Nath & v. State of Haryanawere given with respect to the provisions of the Code,particularly s. 397(2), they were correctly decided and wouldhave no application to the interpretation of s. 11(1) of the Act,which expressly excludes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure by virtue of the non obstante clause.”

In Poonam Chand Jain and another v. Fazru, (2004) 13 SCC 269 at276-279, this Court was at pains to point out that the judgment in V.C.Shukla (supra) was rendered in the background of the special statuteapplicable (See paragraph 13).

15. It is thus clear that Madhu Limaye (supra) continues to holdthe field, as has been held in V.C. Shukla (supra) itself. How MadhuLimaye (supra) was understood in a subsequent judgment of this Courtis the next bone of contention between the parties.

16. In Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I., (2017) 14 SCC 809, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court was asked to revisit paragraph 10 of its earlierorder dated 25[th] August, 2014, passed in the coal block allocation cases.While transferring cases pending before different courts to the Court ofa Special Judge, this Court, in its earlier order dated 25[th] August, 2014,had stated:

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A“10. We also make it clear that any prayer for stay or impedingthe progress in the investigation/trial can be made only beforethis Court and no other Court shall entertain the same.”

Several grounds were argued before this Court stating that paragraph10 ought to be recalled. We are concerned with grounds (i), (ii) andB(vii), which are set out hereinbelow:

“(i) The right to file a revision petition under Section 397 of theCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the Cr.P.C. as wellapproaching the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.has been taken away; C

(ii) The order passed by this Court has taken away the right ofthe appellants to file a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of theConstitution and thereby judicial review, which is a part of thebasic structure of the Constitution, has been violated which evenParliament cannot violate; D

(vii) The prohibition in granting a stay under Section 19(3)(c) ofthe PC Act is not absolute and in an appropriate case, a stay ofproceedings could be granted in favour of an accused personparticularly when there is a failure of justice. Any restrictivereading would entail a fetter on the discretion of the High CourtEwhich itself might lead to a failure of justice.”

This Court referred to the judgment in Amar Nath (supra) and then tothe Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing 397(2) of theCode of Criminal Procedure which, inter alia, stated as follows:

“(d) the powers of revision against interlocutory orders are beingFtaken away, as it has been found to be one of the main contributingfactors in the delay or disposal of criminal cases;”

After referring to Madhu Limaye (supra) and the difference betweeninterlocutory and intermediate orders, this Court held in paragraphs 25,29, 30 and 32 as follows:G

“25. This view was reaffirmed in Madhu Limaye when thefollowing principles were approved in relation to Section 482 ofthe Cr.P.C. in the context of Section 397(2) thereof. The principles are:

“(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specificprovision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of theHaggrieved party;

(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuseof process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends ofjustice;

(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express barof law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.”

Therefore, it is quite clear that the prohibition in Section 397 ofthe Cr.P.C. will govern Section 482 thereof. We endorse thisview.

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29. This leads us to another facet of the submission made bylearned counsel that even the avenue of proceeding under Section482 of the Cr.P.C. is barred as far as the appellants are concerned.As held in Amar Nath and with which conclusion we agree, if aninterlocutory order is not revisable due to the prohibition containedin Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. that cannot be circumvented byresort to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. There can hardly be anyserious dispute on this proposition.

30. What then is the utility of Section 482 CrPC? This wasconsidered and explained in Madhu Limaye [MadhuLimaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC(Cri) 10] which noticed the prohibition in Section 397(2) CrPCand at the same time the expansive text of Section 482 CrPCand posed the question: In such a situation, what is the harmoniousway out? This Court then proceeded to answer the question inthe following manner: (SCC pp. 555-56, para 10)

“10. … In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out?In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to saythat the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operatesonly in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court,meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power ofrevision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordancewith one of the other principles enunciated above, the inherentpower will come into play, there being no other provision in theCode for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.But then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutorycharacter which could be corrected in exercise of the revisionalpower of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court A

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will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case theimpugned order clearly brings about a situation which is anabuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securingthe ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutelynecessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limitor affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court.But such cases would be few and far between. The High Courtmust exercise the inherent power very sparingly.”

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32. In Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan this CourtCconsidered the provisions of the PC Act and held that there couldbe no stay of a trial under the PC Act. It was clarified that thatdoes not mean that the provisions of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.cannot be taken recourse to, but even if a litigant approaches theHigh Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and that petition isentertained, the trial under the PC Act cannot be stayed. TheDlitigant may convince the court to expedite the hearing of thepetition filed, but merely because the court is not in a position togrant an early hearing would not be a ground to stay the trialeven temporarily. With respect, we do not agree with theproposition that for the purposes of a stay of proceedings recourseEcould be had to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Our discussion abovemakes this quite clear.”

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However, thereafter, this Court stated the law thus in paragraph 38:

“38. The Criminal Procedure Code is undoubtedly a completecode in itself. As has already been discussed by us, thediscretionary jurisdiction under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. isto be exercised only in respect of final orders and intermediateorders. The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to beexercised only in respect of interlocutory orders to give effect toan order passed under the Cr.P.C. or to prevent abuse of theprocess of any Court or otherwise to serve the ends of justice.As indicated above, this power has to be exercised only in therarest of rare cases and not otherwise. If that is the position, andwe are of the view that it is so, resort to Articles 226 and 227 ofthe Constitution would be permissible perhaps only in the most F

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extraordinary case. To invoke the constitutional jurisdiction ofthe High Court when the Cr.P.C. restricts it in the interest of afair and expeditious trial for the benefit of the accused person,we find it difficult to accept the proposition that since Articles226 and 227 of the Constitution are available to an accused person,these provisions should be resorted to in cases that are not therarest of rare but for trifling issues.”

17. According to us, despite what is stated in paragraphs 25, 29and 32 supra, the ratio of the judgment is to be found in paragraph 38,which is an exposition of the law correctly setting out what has beenheld earlier in Madhu Limaye (supra). A judgment has to be read as awhole, and if there are conflicting parts, they have to be reconciledharmoniously in order to yield a result that will accord with an earlierdecision of the same bench strength. Indeed, paragraph 30 of thejudgment sets out a portion of paragraph 10 of Madhu Limaye (supra),showing that the Court was fully aware that Madhu Limaye (supra)did not approve Amar Nath (supra) without a very important caveat –and the caveat was that nothing in Section 397(2) can limit or affect theexercise of the inherent power by the High Court. We, therefore, readparagraph 38 as the correct ratio of the said judgment not only in termsof the applicability of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,but also in terms of how it is to be applied.

18. Insofar as petitions under Articles 226 and 227 are concerned,they form part of the basic structure of the Constitution as has been heldin L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others, (1997) 3 SCC261 at 301. Here again, the judgment of a Constitution Bench in KartarSingh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 at 714, puts it very wellwhen it says:

“Though it cannot be said that the High Court has no jurisdictionto entertain an application for bail under Article 226 of theConstitution and pass orders either way, relating to the casesunder the Act 1987, that power should be exercised sparingly,that too only in rare and appropriate cases in extremecircumstances. But the judicial discipline and comity of courtsrequire that the High Courts should refrain from exercising theextraordinary jurisdiction in such matters.”

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AThis aspect of Kartar Singh (supra) has been followed in Girish KumarSuneja (supra) in paragraph 40 thereof and we respectfully concur withthe same. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the DelhiHigh Court judgment’s conclusions in paragraph 33 (a), (b) and (d) mustbe set aside.

B19.I agree with Goel, J. that the appeals be disposed of inaccordance with his judgment.

Divya Pandey Referred questions answered.

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