COMPACK ENTERPRISES INDIA (P) LTD. versus BEANT SINGH on 17 February 2021

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 1 S.C.R.

ACOMPACK ENTERPRISES INDIA (P) LTD.

v.

BEANT SINGH

(Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 2224-2225 of 2021)

BFEBRUARY 17, 2021

[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR ANDVINEET SARAN, JJ.]

Decree – Consent decree – Review of – Suit for possessionand mesne profits filed by respondent against petitioner – PetitionerCdisputed the area in its possession – Trial court held that this issuehad been settled by High Court in an earlier litigation between theparties and thus, the same cannot be re-opened – Mesne profitsgranted – Cross-appeals for reduction/enhancement thereof – HighCourt passed consent decree – Petitioner filed review contendingDthat terms of the consent decree were recorded incorrectly –Dismissed – In challenge to the judgment in cross appeals and thereview petition, held: Question of area of possession was settled bythe High Court in the earlier litigation, decreeing the respondent’ssuit for possession for the entire suit property – Petitioner’s challengeto the said judgment before Supreme Court was dismissed – Thus,Ethis view attained finality – High Court correct in upholding theterms of the consent decree directing petitioner to hand overpossession of the entire suit property to the respondent – However,the consent decree erroneously recorded a 10% increase in mesneprofits every year, instead of every alternate year – This is an errorFapparent on the face of the record – Rectified – Mesne profits to betreated as increasing by 10% every alternate year, from 2009 tillthe date of handover of possession – Consent decree modified tothis extent – Suit – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XII, r.6.

Decree – Consent decree – Law of – Discussed.

GDisposing of the petitions, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Consent decrees are intended to createestoppels by judgment against the parties, thereby putting anend to further litigation between the parties. This Court has heldthat it would be slow to unilaterally interfere in, modify, substitute H

or modulate the terms of a consent decree, unless it is done withthe revised consent of all the parties thereto. However, thisformulation is far from absolute and does not apply as a blanketrule in all cases. The first impugned judgment of the High Courtdated 14.2.2019 recorded the terms of the compromise that thePetitioner had agreed to; and that the same Court hassubsequently upheld the validity of that consent decree in thesecond impugned judgment dated 25.07.2019. Thus, this Courtwould be cautious in exercising its inherent power to interferein this consent decree, except where there is any exceptional orglaring error apparent on the face of the record. [Paras 18-20][874-D-H; 875-A-B]

Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India & ors.(1992) 1 SCC 31 : [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 187 – reliedon.

Gupta Steel Industries v. Jolly Steel Industries Pvt. Ltd.& anr. (1996) 11 SCC 678 : [1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 669;Suvaran Rajaram Bandekar & ors. v. Narayan R.Bandekar & ors., (1996) 10 SCC 255 : [1996] 5 Suppl.SCR 439 – referred to.

1.2 On the question of area of possession:

The 2006 Agreement, which is the relevant agreement forthe present purposes, pertains to the entire suit property, anddoes not delimit the licensed area to a 2,200 sq. ft. portion. Thus,the 2006 Agreement effective from 1.04.2006 to 30.09.2008,licensed the total area of 5,472 sq. ft. to Petitioner. Hence, thematerial on record discloses that the Petitioner is presently inillegal possession of the entire suit property admeasuring 5,472sq. ft. Further, this question has already been settled by the HighCourt judgment dated 12.11.2014 in the earlier litigation betweenthe parties, decreeing the Respondent’s suit for possession forthe entire area of 5,472 sq. ft (and not only the 2,200 sq. ft. portionclaimed to be possessed by the Petitioner). In that order, theHigh Court had taken note of an admitted document on the recordwherein the Petitioner was stated to be in possession of the entiresuit property. The Petitioner’s challenge to this judgment dated12.11.2014 before the Supreme Court has been dismissed in AB

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ASLP(C) No. 7531/2015, and R.P.(C) No. 1494/2015 in SLP(C)No. 7531/2015, by orders dated 16.03.2015 and 15.07.2015respectively. Thus, this view has attained finality, and thePetitioner’s efforts to re-agitate this question in the presentproceedings is a waste of this Court’s time and an abuse of theprocess of law. Thus, the High Court was correct in upholdingBthe terms of the consent decree directing Petitioner to hand overpossession of the entire suit property of 5,472 sq. ft. to theRespondent, and there is see no reason to interfere withthis part of the consent decree. [Paras 21, 22 and 24][875-D-G;876-C-D]C1.3 On the question of mesne profits:

The Single Judge, in noting that “this figure of mesne profitsof Rs.1 lakh will be increased by 10% after every 12 months, i.efrom 1.10.2009, 1.10.2011 etc etc” (emphasis supplied), hasconfused not only himself, but also the parties to the litigation.DThere is an inconsistency in so far there is a gap of every alternateyear, i.e. from 2009 to 2011, in the example used by the SingleJudge even though the decree notes an increase of 10% in mesneprofits after every 12 months. The said inconsistency in theunderlined extract of the consent decree is an error apparent onEthe face of the record. Hence this is a fit case to exercise inherentthe jurisdiction to correct the terms of the consent decree, tobring it in conformity with the intended compromise. Even thejudgment dated 23.09.2017 and the final decree dated 15.11.2017passed by the Trial Court also awards a 10% increase only oneach alternative year, i.e. 01.04.2011, 01.04.2013, 01.04.2015 andFso on. Further, the original terms of the license agreementbetween the parties also incorporated a 10% increase in licensefee once every 30 months/2.5 years. Thus, the Single Judge’sorder dated 14.02.2019 has given rise to a lot of confusion. Giventhis background, and looking at the preponderance ofGprobabilities, benefit of doubt is given to the Petitioner. Therefore,it is held that the intention of the compromise between the partieswas that there should be a 10% increase in mesne profits everyalternate year. The recording of a 10% increase after every 12months in the consent decree was an inadvertent error, which is H

now rectified. To this limited extent, the second impugnedjudgment dated 25.07.2019 is overturned, and the consent decreerecorded by the Single Judge’s judgment dated 14.02.2019 standsmodified. [Paras 27-29][876-F-H; 877-A-D]

1.4 The Petitioner made repeated and persistent efforts tore-agitate the question of delivery of possession to theRespondent, in an attempt to circumvent complying with the viewtaken by the High Court in the judgment dated 12.11.2014, whichhas now attained finality. Despite the clear direction in thatjudgment to vacate possession in favour of the Respondent,pending any adjudication on the separate proceedings forpossession and specific enforcement initiated by Mr. ‘G’ (to whom,as per the petitioner’s contention, the respondent had agree tosell the suit property), the Petitioner handed over possession toMr. ‘G’ in July, 2015. Possession has to this date not been handedover to the Respondent, who has been dragged to the court timeand again due to the Petitioner’s conduct. This is an instance ofblatant disregard for the Court’s orders, and an abuse of judicialprocess. Petitioner to take steps for handing over possession ofthe suit property measuring 5,472 sq. ft. to the Respondent withineight weeks from today, without fail. Further, the Registry isdirected to expeditiously release the arrears of mesne profits, ifany, already deposited by the Petitioner before this Court to theRespondent. The Petitioner is further directed to pay to theRespondent all arrears as directed in order dated 14.2.2019, withthe limited modification that the mesne profits are to be treatedas increasing by 10% every alternate year, from 2009 till thedate of handover of possession. The Petitioner is additionallydirected to pay costs of Rs. 1 lakh to the Respondent as stated inthe impugned order dated 25.7.2019. [Paras 30-32][877-E-H;878-A-B]

Case Law Reference

[1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 669[1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 439[1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 187

referred toreferred torelied on

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ACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition(Civil) Nos. 2224-2225 of 2021.

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.02.2019 of the High Courtof Delhi at New Delhi in RFA No. 253 of 2018 and Order dated25.07.2019 in RP No. 177 of 2019 in RFA No. 253 of 2018.

Mukul Rohatgi, Basava Prabhu S. Patil, Sr. Advs., MaheshAgarwal, Rajesh Banati, Ms. Aanchal Mullick, Ankit Banati, E. C.Agrawala, Harpreet Singh Uppal, Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, MukeshKumar Singh, Ms. Arushi Patil, Advs. for the appearing parties.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CMOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.

1. These petitions arise out of judgments of the High Court ofDelhi (hereinafter ‘High Court’) dated 14.02.2019 and 25.07.2019. Bythe first impugned judgment dated 14.02.2019, the High Court disposedof the regular first appeal RFA No. 253/2018 filed by the Petitioneragainst judgment and order of the Ld. Additional District Judge, RohiniD(‘Trial Court’) dated 23.09.2017 in Suit No. 58395/2016 filed by theRespondent. Whereas by the second impugned judgment dated 25.7.2019,the High Court disposed of Review Petition No. 177/2019 filed by thePetitioner against the judgment in RFA No. 253/2018.

I. Background Facts

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2. These cases concern a suit for possession and mesne profitsfiled by the Respondent/plaintiff against the Petitioner/defendant, withrespect to the ground floor of the property bearing No. B-60, GroundFloor, G.T. Karnal Road, Industrial Area, Delhi-110033, admeasuring 608sq. yards (or, 5,472 sq. ft.) (hereinafter ‘suit property’).F3. The Respondent, Beant Singh, is the owner of the suit property.

3. The Respondent, Beant Singh, is the owner of the suit property.He, through M/s Channa Auto Agencies (P) Ltd. (of which he is aDirector), executed a license agreement dated 1.11.2000 in respect of aportion of the suit property in favour of M/s Compack Enterprises (thePetitioner’s predecessor), for a period of 30 months in consideration forGa monthly license fee of Rs. 28,000/- (hereinafter, ‘2000 Agreement’).On 1.04.2003, Compack Enterprises merged with Compack EnterprisesIndia (P) Ltd. (i.e., the Petitioner herein), and the 2000 Agreementcontinued with mutual consent of parties. The license arrangement wasrenewed on 1.07.2003 for another 30 months, with a 10% increase inmonthly license fee to Rs.30,800/- (hereinafter, ‘2003 Agreement’). TheH2003 Agreement was renewed for the last time effective from 1.04.2006

and expiring on 30.09.2008, with a further 10% increase in monthly licensefee to Rs.33,900/- (hereinafter, ‘2006 Agreement’).

4. However, even after the expiry of the 2006 Agreement on30.9.2008, and non-renewal of the same, the Petitioner continued tooccupy the suit property. Consequently, the Respondent brought O.S.No. 58395/2016 against the Petitioner on 13.02.2009 for recoveringpossession of the entire suit property and mesne profits thereon from1.10.2008 till the vacation of the suit property.

Petitioner/Defendant’s Arguments in Original Suit No. 58395/

5. On the question of vacating possession, the Petitioneradmitted to having been in possession of only a portion of the suit propertymeasuring 2,200 sq. ft., averring that it was only this portion, not theentire suit property admeasuring 5,427 sq. ft., that was licensed to themby the Respondent.

6. Petitioner further contended that its continued possession ofthis portion of the suit property was lawful, since the Respondent hadconcealed the material fact of having entered into an agreement dated11.6.2008 to sell the suit property to one Mr. Ajay Gosain for a sum ofRs. 4 crores, of which the Respondent had already received a sum ofRs. 65 lakhs. The suit property was agreed to be sold to, and was thus inlawful possession of, Mr. Gosain before the expiry of the 2006 Agreementon 30.09.2008. Mr. Gosain is the husband of one of the Petitioner’sDirectors, and also the brother of another Director.

7. On the question of mesne profits, Petitioner contended thatit had been in possession of only 2,200 sq. ft. of the suit property and hadbeen paying license fee for it till July, 2015 as per the interim orderpassed by the Trial Court; and that they vacated the premises in July,2015 and handed over possession to Mr. Gosain, to whom the Respondenthad allegedly transferred possession of the suit property pursuant to theagreement to sell. Thus, the Petitioner claims that it is not liable to payany further sum to the Respondent.

Trial Court’s Judgment dated 23.09.2017

8. On the question of vacating possession, the Trial Courtheld that the issue had already been decided by the High Court in C.M.(M)No. 193/2013 by judgment dated 12.11.2014, and could not be re-opened.

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A9. The Respondent had earlier filed an application before the TrialCourt under Order XII, Rule 6, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(hereinafter, ‘CPC’), praying for a judgment on admission decreeing thesuit for possession in favour of the Respondent. Upon the Trial Court’sdismissal of this application, the Respondent approached the High Courtunder Article 227 of the Constitution in C.M.(M) No. 193/2013 prayingBfor the aforesaid relief. Therein, the High Court by its judgment dated12.11.2014 reversed the Trial Court’s dismissal, and held that theadmissions made by the parties justify decreeing the Respondent’s suitfor possession. It had thus directed that the possession of the entire suitproperty measuring 5,472 sq. ft. be handed over to the Respondent byCthe Petitioner.

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10. On the question of mesne profits, the Trial Court notedthat it is an admitted fact between the parties that the possession of thesuit property has still not been handed over to the Respondent despitethe High Court’s order dated 12.11.2014. Instead, the Petitioner claimedDto have handed over possession to Mr. Gosain in July, 2015. The followingfurther observations of the Trial Court are relevant for our purposes:

a.What is the area of the suit property for which Petitioneris liable?

The High Court’s order dated 12.11.2014 had settled the disputeEqua the area that was in possession of the Petitioner, decreeing theRespondent’s suit for possession for the entire suit property area of5,472 sq. ft (and not only the 2,200 sq. ft. portion claimed to be possessedby the Petitioner). The view taken by the aforesaid order has attainedfinality as far back as on 12.11.2014 and is binding.Fb.

b.What is the quantum of compensation payable?

For the period between 1.10.2008 to 27.04.2009, the Respondentis entitled to license fee @ Rs. 37,290/- p.m., i.e., the license fee agreedupon in the 2006 Agreement (Rs. 33,900/-) with a hike of 10%. For theperiod of unlawful possession between 28.04.2009 till vacation ofGpossession, Petitioner shall pay mesne profits @ Rs.60,000/- p.m. with10% increase on the 1[st] April of each alternate year, till the suit propertyis handed over to Respondent.

11. Aggrieved by the decision on mesne profits, both the Petitionerand Respondent filed cross-appeals before the High Court against the H

judgment of the Trial Court dated 23.09.2017, seeking, respectively,reduction and enhancement in the quantum of mesne profits.

First Impugned Judgment of the High Court dated 14.02.2019in the above cross-appeals

12. The High Court passed a consent decree, directing that thePetitioner shall pay to the Respondent, by way of mesne profits, anenhanced sum of Rs.1,00,000/- p.m., with a 10% increase “after every12 months, i.e. from 1.10.2009, 1.10.2011 etc etc” w.e.f. 1.10.2008(i.e., the date on which the 2006 Agreement expired) till the date thePetitioner hands over actual possession of the suit property measuring5,472 sq. ft. to the Respondent.

13. Aggrieved that the terms of the consent decree were recordedincorrectly in the aforesaid order, the Petitioner filed Review PetitionNo. 177/2019, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Second Impugned Judgment of the High Court in the abovereview petition dated 25.07.2019

14. The Petitioner contended in its review petition that the HighCourt in the first appeal had erred in recording the terms of the consentdecree agreed to by the Petitioner. First, the judgment records that themesne profits be increased by 10% every 12 months, instead of recordinga 10% increase every 24 months. Second, the judgment erroneouslyrecords that the Petitioner will hand over possession of the entire suitproperty measuring 5,472 sq. ft., when the documents on record wouldshow that the Petitioner was only ever in possession of 2,200 sq. ft.

15. The High Court, rejecting the Petitioner’s contentions, heldthat there was no error apparent on the face of the record to justify itsreview jurisdiction, and that the Petitioner was dishonestly trying to wriggleout of the consent decree by attempting to overreach the Court. Thereview petition was dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs.1,00,000/-payable by the Petitioner to the Respondent.

II. Submissions made by the Petitioner in the present SLP

16. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner,contends that the High Court ought to have, while recording the terms ofthe consent decree, recorded a 10% increase in mesne profits every 24months, instead of 12 months. As per him, this typographical error is A

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Aborne out by the fact that a 10% increase every 24 months closely mirrorsthe terms of the license agreements where the license fee was increasedby 10% every 30 months. The reference to a 10% increase “after every12 months, i.e. from 1.10.2009, 1.10.2011 etc etc” in the first impugnedjudgment of the High Court dated 14.02.2019 (supra) also corroboratesthis.B

17. The learned senior counsel for the Petitioner has also contendedthat the first impugned judgment dated 14.02.2019 erred in recordingthat the Petitioner has consented to handing over possession of the entiresuit property area of 5,472 sq.ft., when the Petitioner has consistentlymaintained that only 2,200 sq.ft. was licensed to him and in his possession.CBoth these submissions are vehemently opposed by Shri Basava PrabhuS. Patil, learned senior counsel for respondent.

III. This Court’s Analysis

18. Before adverting to the specific contentions raised by theDlearned senior counsel for the Petitioner, it may be useful to brieflysummarise the law governing consent decrees that shall inform ourconclusions on the present matter. It is well-settled that consent decreesare intended to create estoppels by judgment against the parties, therebyputting an end to further litigation between the parties. Resultantly, thisCourt has held that it would be slow to unilaterally interfere in, modify,Esubstitute or modulate the terms of a consent decree, unless it is donewith the revised consent of all the parties thereto. (Gupta Steel Industriesv. Jolly Steel Industries Pvt. Ltd. & anr., (1996) 11 SCC 678; SuvaranRajaram Bandekar & ors. v. Narayan R. Bandekar & ors., (1996)10 SCC 255).F19. However, this formulation is far from absolute and does not

19. However, this formulation is far from absolute and does notapply as a blanket rule in all cases. This Court, in Byram PestonjiGariwala v. Union Bank of India & ors., (1992) 1 SCC 31, has heldthat a consent decree would not serve as an estoppel, where thecompromise was vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake. Further,Gthis Court in the exercise of its inherent powers may also unilaterallyrectify a consent decree suffering from clerical or arithmetical errors,so as to make it conform with the terms of the compromise.

20. The present Petitions thus must be answered in light of theabove-stated position of law. It is relevant at this juncture to note thatthe first impugned judgment of the High Court dated 14.2.2019 recordedH

the terms of the compromise that the Petitioner had agreed to; and thatthe same Court has subsequently upheld the validity of that consentdecree in the second impugned judgment dated 25.07.2019. Thus, keepingin line with this Court’s jurisprudence, we would be cautious in exercisingour inherent power to interfere in this consent decree, except wherethere is any exceptional or glaring error apparent on the face of therecord. We now refer to and answer the specific contentions raised bythe parties.

On the question of area of possession:

21. Having undertaken a close perusal of the License Agreementsexecuted between the Petitioner and Respondent, we reject learnedsenior counsel Mr. Rohatgi’s contention that the Petitioner was only inpossession of and licensee to a 2,200 sq.ft. portion of the suit property. Itis evident that, unlike the 2000 Agreement and 2003 Agreement, the2006 Agreement, which is the relevant agreement for the presentpurposes, pertains to the entire suit property, and does not delimit thelicensed area to a 2,200 sq. ft. portion. Thus, the 2006 Agreement effectivefrom 1.04.2006 to 30.09.2008, licensed the total area of 5,472 sq. ft. toPetitioner. Hence, the material on record discloses that the Petitioner ispresently in illegal possession of the entire suit property admeasuring5,472 sq. ft.

22. Further, this question has already been settled by the HighCourt judgment dated 12.11.2014 (supra) in the earlier litigation betweenthe parties, decreeing the Respondent’s suit for possession for the entirearea of 5,472 sq. ft (and not only the 2,200 sq. ft. portion claimed to bepossessed by the Petitioner). In that order, the High Court had takennote of an admitted document on the record wherein the Petitioner wasstated to be in possession of the entire suit property. The Petitioner’schallenge to this judgment dated 12.11.2014 before the Supreme Courthas been dismissed in SLP(C) No. 7531/2015, and R.P.(C) No. 1494/2015 in SLP(C) No. 7531/2015, by orders dated 16.03.2015 and15.07.2015 respectively. Thus, this view has attained finality, and thePetitioner’s efforts to re-agitate this question in the present proceedingsis a waste of this Court’s time and an abuse of the process of law. In anycase, since the Petitioner claims no right or interest in the remaining3,272 sq. ft. of the suit property, there is no prejudice caused to thePetitioner by the order to vacate the entire suit property since he is notthe owner of property to that extent also.

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A23. It is further an admitted position, as recorded by the TrialCourt, that the Petitioner has not handed over possession to theRespondent – having claimed to have handed over possession to Mr.Gosain instead in July, 2015. This is despite the High Court’s judgmentdated 12.11.2014 decreeing the suit for possession in favour of theRespondent. Mr. Gosain’s right in the suit property is a question pendingBin separate specific performance proceedings filed by him. Thus, at thisstage, the Respondent is entitled to get possession of the suit property,pending adjudication of Mr. Gosain’s claims. This view attained finalityas far back as on 12.11.2014, and it is high time that the Petitioner stopsmaking efforts to circumvent delivering possession of the suit propertyCto the Respondent.

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24. Thus, the High Court was correct in upholding the terms ofthe consent decree directing Petitioner to hand over possession of theentire suit property of 5,472 sq. ft. to the Respondent, and we see noreason to interfere with this part of the consent decree.

DOn the question of mesne profits:

25. As referred to supra, Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counselfor the Petitioner has contended that the High Court ought to have, whilerecording the terms of the consent decree, recorded a 10% increase inmesne profits every alternate year, instead of every year.

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26. On the contrary, Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned seniorcounsel for the Respondent wants us to construe the observations of thelate learned Single Judge appearing in para 1 of the first impugnedjudgment dated 14.02.2019 to mean that the mesne profits payable areto be increased by 10% every year.F27. The learned Single Judge, in noting that “this figure of mesne F27. The learned Single Judge, in noting that “this figure of mesneprofits of Rs.1 lakh will be increased by 10% after every 12 months,i.e from 1.10.2009, 1.10.2011 etc etc” (emphasis supplied), hasconfused not only himself, but also the parties to the litigation. There isan inconsistency in so far there is a gap of every alternate year, i.e. from2009 to 2011, in the example used by the learned Single Judge evenGthough the decree notes an increase of 10% in mesne profits after every12 months. The aforementioned inconsistency in the underlined extractof the consent decree is an error apparent on the face of the record.Hence we find that this is a fit case to exercise inherent the jurisdictionto correct the terms of the consent decree, to bring it in conformity withHthe intended compromise.

28. At this stage, it is relevant to note that even the judgmentdated 23.09.2017 and the final decree dated 15.11.2017 passed by theTrial Court also awards a 10% increase only on each alternative year,i.e. 01.04.2011, 01.04.2013, 01.04.2015 and so on. Further, the originalterms of the license agreement between the parties also incorporated a10% increase in license fee once every 30 months/2.5 years. Thus, thelearned Single Judge’s order dated 14.02.2019 has given rise to a lot ofconfusion. Given this background, and looking at the preponderance ofprobabilities, we are inclined to give benefit of doubt to the Petitioner.Therefore, we hold that the intention of the compromise between theparties was that there should be a 10% increase in mesne profits everyalternate year. The recording of a 10% increase after every 12 monthsin the consent decree was an inadvertent error, which we have nowrectified.

29. To this limited extent, the second impugned judgment dated25.07.2019 is overturned, and the consent decree recorded by the learnedSingle Judge’s judgment dated 14.02.2019 stands modified.

III. Final Conclusions

30. At this stage, this Bench would like to register its displeasureat the Petitioner’s repeated and persistent efforts to re-agitate the questionof delivery of possession to the Respondent, in an attempt to circumventcomplying with the view taken by the High Court in the judgment dated12.11.2014, which has now attained finality. Despite the clear directionin that judgment to vacate possession in favour of the Respondent,pending any adjudication on the separate proceedings for possessionand specific enforcement initiated by Mr. Gosain, the Petitioner handedover possession to Mr. Gosain in July, 2015. Possession has to this datenot been handed over to the Respondent, who has been dragged to thecourt time and again due to the Petitioner’s conduct. This is an instanceof blatant disregard for the Court’s orders, and an abuse of judicialprocess.

31. Hence the present petitions are disposed of, with direction tothe Petitioner to take steps for handing over possession of the suit propertymeasuring 5,472 sq. ft. to the Respondent within eight weeks from today,without fail. Further, the Registry is directed to expeditiously release thearrears of mesne profits, if any, already deposited by the Petitioner beforethis Court to the Respondent. The Petitioner is further directed to pay to A

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Athe Respondent all arrears as directed in order dated 14.2.2019, with thelimited modification that the mesne profits are to be treated as increasingby 10% every alternate year, from 2009 till the date of handover ofpossession.

32. The Petitioner is additionally directed to pay costs ofBRs. 1 lakh to the Respondent as stated in the impugned order dated25.7.2019.

33. The Special Leave Petitions stand disposed of accordingly.

CDivya Pandey

Petitions disposed of.

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