THE STATE OF MANIPUR & ORS. versus SURJAKUMAR OKRAM & ORS. on 1 February 2022

THE STATE OF MANIPUR & ORS.

v.

SURJAKUMAR OKRAM & ORS.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 823-827 of 2022)

FEBRUARY 01, 2022

[L. NAGESWARA RAO, B. R. GAVAI ANDB. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]

Repeal: There is no question of repeal of a statute which hasbeen declared unconstitutional by the Court – In Bimolangshu Roy,Assam Act, 2004 was struck down as unconstitutional – The 2012Act was not the subject matter of consideration in Bimolangshu Roy– Thus, it is well within the competence of the Manipur Legislatureto repeal the 2012 Act, which has not been adjudged asunconstitutional by any Court till the Repealing Act, 2018 wasenacted – Manipur Parliamentary Secretary (Appointment, Salaryand Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2012 – AssamParliamentary Secretary (Appointment, Salary, Allowances andMiscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2004.

Manipur Parliamentary Secretary (Appointment, Salary andAllowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Repealing Act, 2018:Competence of Manipur Legislature to introduce a saving clause inthe Repealing Act, 2018 – Held: By means of the saving clause inthe Repealing Act, 2018, the Manipur Legislature could not haveinfused life into a legislation, which was recognised by thelegislature itself as unconstitutional and thereby a nullity, promptingits repeal – Thus, the Manipur Legislative cannot be said to havethe competence to enact the saving clause in the Repealing Act,2018.

Repeal: Power of legislative body to repeal a law – Held:The power of a legislative body to repeal a law is co-extensive withits power to enact a law – The effect of repealing of a statute is toobliterate it completely from the records of Parliament – Whilerepealing a statute, the Legislature is competent to introduce aclause, saving any right, privilege, liability, penalty, act or deedduly done and any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy arisingtherefrom, under the repealed statute.

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1058SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ARepeal: Distinction between declaration of a statute asunconstitutional by a Court of law and the repeal of a statute –Held: There is a distinction between declaration of a statute asunconstitutional by a Court of law and the repeal of a statute by theLegislature – On declaration of a statute as unconstitutional, itbecomes void ab initio – Saving past transactions are within theBexclusive domain of the Court – On the other hand, though theconsequence of repeal is also obliteration of the statute withretrospective effect on past transactions, the Legislature is empoweredto introduce a saving clause in the repealing act – Even in caseswhere a saving clause is not made, the provisions of the GeneralCClauses Act are applicable to central statutes and the principles ofthe General Clauses Act can be made applicable to statutes madeby the State Legislatures as well.

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Legislation: An unconstitutional law, be it either due to lackof legislative competence or in violation of fundamental rightsDguaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India, is voidabinitio – A statute which is made by a competent legislature is valid tillit is declared unconstitutional by a court of law – After declarationof a statute as unconstitutional by a court of law, it is non est for allpurposes – In declaration of the law, the doctrine of prospectiveoverruling can be applied by this Court to save past transactionsEunder earlier decisions superseded or statutes held unconstitutional– Relief can be moulded by this Court in exercise of its power underArt.142 of the Constitution, notwithstanding the declaration of astatute as unconstitutional – There is no question of repeal of astatute which has been declared as unconstitutional by a Court –FConstitution of India – Art.142.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

Conclusion

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. Article 164(1) of the Constitution of Indiaprovides that the Chief Minister shall be appointed by theGovernor and the other Ministers shall be appointed by theGGovernor on the advice of the Chief Minister, and that theMinisters shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor.Article 164(1-A) was inserted by the Constitution (Ninety-firstAmendment) Act, 2003. The said Article limited the number ofMinisters, including the Chief Minister, in the Council ofH

Ministers in a State to 15 percent of the total members in theLegislative Assembly of the State. Article 194(3) of theConstitution empowers the State Legislature to make laws inrespect of the powers, privileges and immunities of a House ofthe Legislature and of the members and the committees of aHouse of such Legislature. Article 246 of the Constitution confersthe Legislature of a State with exclusive powers to make laws forsuch State or any part thereof with respect to any of thematters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule.[Para 8][1070-B-D]

2. The Assam Legislature enacted the relevant statute in2004, providing for appointment of members of the AssamLegislative Assembly as Parliamentary Secretaries. The AssamAct, 2004 and the 2012 Act are undoubtedly in pari materia. ThisCourt in Bimolangshu Roy struck down the Assam Act, 2004 asunconstitutional. The appointments of Parliamentary Secretarieswere discontinued by the Chief Minister of Manipur around thetime the judgment in Bimolangshu Roy was delivered. Thereafter,the Repealing Act, 2018 was enacted and notified with effect from04.04.2018. The 2012 Act and the Repealing Act, 2018were challenged before the High Court of Manipur. [Para 9][1070-F-H]

3. This Court in Bimolangshu Roy observed that Article194(3) of the Constitution deals with powers, privileges andimmunities of the House of the Legislature and its members butdoes not authorize the State Legislature to create offices such asthose of Parliamentary Secretaries. It was noted that in somecases, the power to legislate was conferred by certain Articles inthe Constitution on matters specified therein withoutcorresponding entries in the lists in the Seventh Schedule, suchas in the case of Article 3 under which the Parliament is competentto create or extinguish a State but there is no corresponding entryin List I of the Seventh Schedule. In certain other cases,corresponding entries in the lists of the Seventh Schedule arefound with reference to the power to legislate as expresslyconferred in the text of some Articles of the Constitution, as isseen with entries 38, 39 and 40 of List II. With respect to thelatter category, this Court held that where the power to legislate AB

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Ais sourced to a dedicated Article in the Constitution, legislativeauthority with respect to a closely associated or the same topicas contained in the Article cannot be sought from thecorresponding entry in the list read with Article 246. Tosubstantiate, it was further elaborated that even if entries 38, 39and 40 in List II were not there in the Seventh Schedule, theBState Legislature would still be competent to make laws on topicsindicated in those three entries because of the authority containedin Articles 164(5), 186, 194, 195 etc. Therefore, any interpretationon legislative power sought to be given to these entries which isnot contemplated by the corresponding Article, was consideredCto be repugnant to the scheme of the Constitution, as the Articleexpressly conferring legislative authority is the source oflegislating power. Noticing that the text of both Articles 194(3)and the relevant portion of entry 39 are substantially similar, thisCourt was of the firm opinion that creation of new offices bylegislation would be outside the scope of Article 194(3). TheDpowers, privileges and immunities contemplated by Article 194(3)and entry 39 are those of the legislators qua legislators, asconcluded by this Court in Bimolangshu Roy. In view of the saidfinding, the Court did not find it necessary to examine the otherissues that had been identified. [Para 11][1071-E-H; 1072-A-D]EUjagar Prints & Ors. (II) v. Union of India & Ors. (1989)3 SCC 488 : [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 770 – referred to.

4. Article 194(3) enables the Legislature to make lawrelating to powers, privileges and immunities of its members.This Court in Bimolangshu Roy categorically held that StateFLegislatures are competent to make law in respect of powers,privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature and itsmembers even in the absence of reference to entries 38, 39 and40 of List II. The stand of the State of Assam before this Court inBimolangshu Roy was that the Legislature had the competenceGto make the law in view of entry 39, which has to be given thebroadest possible interpretation. [Para 13][1073-D-F]

5. The Appellants in the present matter contended that thisCourt did not appreciate the relevance of entry 40 of List II while H

assessing the Assam Legislature’s competence to enact theAssam Act, 2004. Entry 40 which relates to salaries andallowances of the Ministers of the State cannot be resorted to,for the purpose of justifying the legislative competence in enactingthe Assam Act, 2004. The relevant entry is entry 39 whichcorresponds to Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India. Onthe other hand, entry 40 corresponds to Article 164 of theConstitution. In Bimolangshu Roy this Court has correctlyacknowledged and reiterated the need to be wary of the perils ofinterpreting entries in the lists of the Seventh Schedule asencompassing matters that have no rational connection with thesubject-matter of the entry. The judgment of this Court inBimolangshu Roy does not require reconsideration. After thejudgment of this Court in Bimolangshu Roy, the ParliamentarySecretaries resigned and the Repealing Act, 2018 was notifiedon 04.04.2018. The contention of the Appellants is that PIL Nos.7, 9 and 10 became infructuous after the 2012 Act was repealedand therefore, the High Court committed an error in declaringthe 2012 Act as unconstitutional. [Paras 14, 15][1074-A-E]

State of U.P. & Ors. v. Hirendra Pal Singh & Ors. (2011)5 SCC 305:[2010] 15 SCR 854 – relied on.

Kay v. Goodwin (1830) 6 Bing. 576 – referred to.

6. After enactment of the Repealing Act, 2018, the 2012Act did not survive and the High Court ought not to haveconsidered the constitutional validity of the same. To that extent,the High Court committed an error in declaring a non-existinglaw as unconstitutional. It is beyond question that this Court inBimolangshu Roy, while dealing with the Assam Act, 2004 whichis ad verbum to the 2012 Act, held that the Assam Act, 2004 wasvitiated due to lack of legislative competence. However, the 2012Act was not dealt with by this Court and the same continued tobe valid till it was repealed. Indeed, the 2012 Act was not declaredunconstitutional by any court before the High Court deliveredthe impugned judgment and therefore, it was well within thecompetence of the Manipur Legislature to repeal the 2012 Act.The High Court has committed an error in holding that the AB

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AManipur Legislature did not have the competence to enact the2012 Act as a result of which, the Repealing Act, 2018 could nothave been made. The law passed by the legislature is good lawtill it is declared as unconstitutional by a competent Court or tillit is repealed. There is no error committed by the ManipurLegislature in repealing the 2012 Act in light of the judgment ofBthis Court in Bimolangshu Roy. [Para 16][1075-B-E]

7.1 Where a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it isas if it had never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; contractswhich depend upon it for their consideration are void; itconstitutes a protection to no one who has acted under it and noCone can be punished for having refused obedience to it beforethe decision was made. [Para 18][1076-A-B]

Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1981)3 SCC 132: [1981] 3 SCR 474; Election Commissionof India & Anr. v. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy & Anr.D(1996) 4 SCC 104: [1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 637 – referredto.Norton v. Shelby County 118 US 425 (1886) – referredto.

E7.2 An unconstitutional law, be it either due to lack oflegislative competence or in violation of fundamental rightsguaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India, is void abinitio. [Para 19][1076-C]

Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay [1955]F1 SCR 613; Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh &Ors. [1959] Supp 2 SCR 8 – relied on.

8. The power of a legislative body to repeal a law is co-extensive with its power to enact a law. The effect of repealing ofa statute is to obliterate it completely from the records ofParliament. While repealing a statute, the Legislature isGcompetent to introduce a clause, saving any right, privilege,liability, penalty, act or deed duly done and any investigation, legalproceeding or remedy arising therefrom, under the repealedstatute. There is a distinction between declaration of a statute as H

unconstitutional by a Court of law and the repeal of a statute bythe Legislature. On declaration of a statute as unconstitutional,it becomes void ab initio. Saving past transactions are within theexclusive domain of the Court. On the other hand, though theconsequence of repeal is also obliteration of the statute withretrospective effect on past transactions, the Legislature isempowered to introduce a saving clause in the repealing act. Evenin cases where a saving clause is not made, the provisions of theGeneral Clauses Act are applicable to central statutes and theprinciples of the General Clauses Act can be made applicable tostatutes made by the State Legislatures as well. The ManipurLegislature enacted the Manipur General Clauses Act, 1966,which came into force on 30.03.1966, by which the provisions ofthe General Clauses Act, 1897 were made applicable to thestatutes of the Manipur Legislature. [Para 20][1077-A-E]

I.C. Golak Nath & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.[1967]2 SCR 762 – followed.

State of Punjab v. Harnek Singh (2002) 3 SCC481:[2002] 1 SCR 1060 – relied on.

9. Though Golak Nath applied the doctrine of prospectiveoverruling in the context of earlier decisions of this Court on thesame issues which had otherwise become final, the doctrine ofprospective overruling has been applied by this Court even wherethe issue was being decided by the Court for the first time. Whilelaying down the principles of prospective overruling, this Courtin Golak Nath dealt with the scope of Article 142 of theConstitution of India and held that the said provision enables theSupreme Court to pass such decree or make such order as isnecessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matterpending before it. [Paras 21 and 22][1078-B-D]

India Cement Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.(1990) 1 SCC 12 : [1989] 1 Suppl. SCR 692; OrissaCement Ltd. v. State of Orissa & Ors. 1991 Supp (1)SCC 430 : [1991] 2 SCR 105; Indra Sawhney & Ors.v. Union of India & Ors. 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217: [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; General Manager, AB

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ASouthern Railway v. Rangachari [1962] 2 SCR 586;Ashok Kumar Gupta & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1997)5 SCC 201: [1997] 3 SCR 269 – referred to.

10. A statute which is made by a competent legislature isvalid till it is declared unconstitutional by a court of law. AfterBdeclaration of a statute as unconstitutional by a court of law, it isnon est for all purposes. In declaration of the law, the doctrine ofprospective overruling can be applied by this Court to save pasttransactions under earlier decisions superseded or statutes heldunconstitutional. Relief can be moulded by this Court in exerciseof its power under Article 142 of the Constitution, notwithstandingCthe declaration of a statute as unconstitutional. Therefore, it isclear that there is no question of repeal of a statute which hasbeen declared as unconstitutional by a Court. The very declarationby a Court that a statute is unconstitutional obliterates the statuteentirely as though it had never been passed. The consequences Dof declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute have to be dealtwith only by the Court. [Para 23][1080-E-H; 1081-A-C]

11. The 2012 Act was not subject-matter of considerationby this Court in Bimolangshu Roy. In the said judgment, this Courtwas concerned only about the validity of the Assam Act, 2004. ItEis well within the competence of the Manipur Legislature torepeal the 2012 Act, which had not been adjudged asunconstitutional by any Court till the Repealing Act, 2018 wasenacted. Further, there can be no doubt that the Legislature hasthe power to include a saving provision while repealing a statute.However, we have been called upon to assess whether, in theFpeculiar facts of the present case, the Manipur Legislature hadthe competence to introduce a saving clause in the RepealingAct, 2018. The undisputed facts are that the 2012 Act and theAssam Act, 2004 are in pari materia. The Assam Act, 2004 wasdeclared as unconstitutional in Bimolangshu Roy. Public interestGlitigations were filed in the Manipur High Court challenging thevires of the 2012 Act. The Manipur Legislature decided to repealthe 2012 Act “in light of the judgment of this Court in” BimolangshuRoy and “in the process of being a responsible Government which H

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upholds the Rule of Law”, as have been categorically stated inthe preamble of the Repealing Act, 2018. In the normal course ofevents, the public interest litigations challenging the vires of the2012 Act would have been allowed and the 2012 Act would havebeen declared as unconstitutional, relying on Bimolangshu Roy.However, before these matters were taken up by the High Court,the Manipur Legislature, taking cognizance of the ramificationsof Bimolangshu Roy and acknowledging the inferableunconstitutionality of the 2012 Act, has enacted the RepealingAct, 2018. As is evident from the preamble of the Repealing Act,2018, the repeal of the 2012 Act is a procedural formality by theManipur Legislature to give the statute a logical conclusion, inlight of the pending public interest litigations challenging itsconstitutional validity before the High Court. Bearing in mindthese exceptional facts and circumstances, by means of the savingclause in the Repealing Act, 2018, the Manipur Legislature couldnot have infused life into a legislation, which was recognised bythe Legislature itself as unconstitutional and thereby, a nullity,prompting its repeal. In light of the above, the ManipurLegislature cannot be said to have the competence to enact thesaving clause in the Repealing Act, 2018. [Para 24][1081-D-H;1082-A-C]

12 Having held that the Manipur Legislature was notcompetent to introduce a saving clause in the Repealing Act,2018, what remains to be considered is the fate of the acts, deedsetc. undertaken by the Parliamentary Secretaries who wereappointed under the 2012 Act. Nullification of transactionsaffecting the public due to the acts done by the ParliamentarySecretaries appointed under the 2012 Act would cause seriousdamage to third parties and create significant confusion andirregularity in the conduct of public business. Therefore, inexercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,it is necessary to save only those acts, deeds and decisions dulyundertaken by the Parliamentary Secretaries under the 2012 Actduring their tenure. [Para 25][1082-C-E]

13. Manipur Legislature was competent to enact theRepealing Act, 2018. The saving clause in the Repealing Act, AB

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A2018 is struck down. However, this shall not affect the acts, deedsand decisions duly undertaken by the Parliamentary Secretariesunder the 2012 Act till discontinuation of their appointments,which are hereby saved. [Para 26][1082-F]

Bimolangshu Roy v. State of Assam & Anr. (2018) 14BSCC 408:[2017] 13 SCR 301; Keshavan MadhavaMenon v. State of Bombay [1951] SCR 228 – referredto.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 823-827 of 2022.G

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.09.2020 of the High Courtof Manipur at Imphal in W.P. (C) No.317 of 2018, PIL No.10 of 2017,PIL No.16 of 2018, PIL No.7 of 2017, PIL No.9 of 2017.

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 828-832 of 2022.

Tushar Mehta, SG, Lenin Singh Hijam, AAG, Narender Hooda,Rajiv Dhawan, Sr. Advs., Shivendra Dwivedi, Rajesh Mahale, Anish R.Shah, Abdulrahiman Tamboli, Rahul Joshi, Amit Sharma, Preetam Shah,K. Krishna Kumar, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

Leave granted.

1. The Manipur Parliamentary Secretary (Appointment, Salaryand Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2012 (Manipur ActNo. 10 of 2012) (hereinafter referred to as the “2012 Act”) was enactedby the Legislature of Manipur to provide for appointment, salary andallowances of Parliamentary Secretaries in Manipur. Section 3 read withSection 4 thereof, enabled the Chief Minister to appoint a member of theManipur Legislative Assembly as a Parliamentary Secretary, who shallhave the rank and status of a Minister of State. Section 7 of the 2012Act stipulated that a Parliamentary Secretary shall be entitled to suchsalary and allowances as are admissible to a Minister of State under theManipur Parliamentary Secretary (Salary and Allowances) Act, 1972.Appellants in Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 2386-2390 of2021 were appointed as Parliamentary Secretaries in 2017.

2. The Assam Parliamentary Secretaries (Appointment, Salaries,Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2004 (hereinafter referredto as the “Assam Act, 2004”), which had provisions similar to that ofthe 2012 Act, was the subject matter of challenge before the GauhatiHigh Court. The writ petition filed before the Gauhati High Court wastransferred to this Court. On 26.07.2017, this Court in BimolangshuRoyv. State of Assam & Anr.[1] declared that the Legislature of Assamlacked competence to enact the Assam Act, 2004. The ManipurAssembly passed the Manipur Parliamentary Secretary (Appointment,Salary and Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Repealing Act,2018 (hereinafter referred to as the “Repealing Act, 2018”) whichwas notified on 04.04.2018. It was mentioned in preamble of the A

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ARepealing Act, 2018 that the 2012 Act was being repealed in light of thejudgment of this Court in Bimolangshu Roy (supra). The RepealingAct, 2018 contained a saving provision to the following effect:

“2. (1) XXX XXX XXX

(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Manipur ParliamentaryBSecretary (Appointment, Salary and Allowances andMiscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2012, the repeal shall notaffect –

(a) the previous operations of the repealed Act or anythingduly done in pursuance of the Act so repealed includingCanything done in official discharge of their duties by theParliamentary Secretaries; or (b) any right, privilege or obligation incurred under therepealed Act.”

D3. In the meanwhile, the Appellants in Civil Appeals arising out ofSLP (C) Nos. 2386-2390 of 2021 resigned from the post of ParliamentarySecretaries. It is also relevant to mention that PIL Nos. 7, 9 and 10 of2017 were filed in the High Court of Manipur challenging the validity ofthe 2012 Act. The validity of the Repealing Act, 2018 was assailed in theHigh Court of Manipur by way of Writ Petition (C) No. 317 of 2018 andEPIL No. 16 of 2018. The PILs and the Writ Petition (C) No. 317 of 2018were taken up together by the High Court of Manipur and disposed ofby judgment dated 17.09.2020. The 2012 Act and the Repealing Act,2018 were declared as unconstitutional by the High Court. Aggrieved bythe said judgement, the State of Manipur and the members of the ManipurFLegislative Assembly who were appointed as Parliamentary Secretarieshave filed the above appeals.

4. The writ petitioners contended before the High Court of Manipurthat the Manipur Legislature lacked competence to promulgate the 2012Act. It was further submitted before the High Court that the savingclause in the Repealing Act, 2018 is a devious method to justify theGillegal appointments made by virtue of the 2012 Act. The High Courtwas of the view that the power of a legislative body to repeal a law isco-extensive with the legislative body’s competence to enact such law.If the State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact the 2012Act, the State Legislature did not have the power to repeal the same byHway of the Repealing Act, 2018. The State Legislature could not have provided for a saving clause in the Repealing Act, 2018 to justify actsdone and rights, privileges and obligations incurred under the 2012 Act.

5. We have heard Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned Senior Counselappearing for the Appellants in Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C)Nos. 2386-2390 of 2021, learned Additional Advocate General appearingfor the State of Manipur in Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.2001-2005 of 2021 and Mr. Narender Hooda, learned Senior Advocateappearing for the Respondents in Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C)Nos. 2001-2005 of 2021.

6. Dr. Dhawan submitted that the Appellants resigned asParliamentary Secretaries on 04.08.2017, while remaining members ofthe Assembly, due to which PIL Nos. 7, 9 and 10 of 2017 filed before theHigh Court became infructuous. The declaration of the Assam Act, 2004as unconstitutional does not per se render the 2012 Act invalid. He arguedthat Bimolangshu Roy (supra) was wrongly decided and should beheld to be per incuriam for not considering the relevant entry in List IIof the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution while declaring that theAssam Legislature lacked competence to enact the Assam Act, 2004.In any event, according to Dr. Dhawan, striking down of the RepealingAct, 2018 should not result in invalidation of all the decisions taken bythe Parliamentary Secretaries appointed under the 2012 Act. Relying onjudgments of this Court, Dr. Dhawan submitted that the Repealing Act,2018 should not be disturbed in view of the express saving provisionthereof, the de facto doctrine and the principles underlying Section 6 ofthe General Clauses Act, 1897 (hereinafter referred to as the “GeneralClauses Act”).

7. Mr. Hooda, learned Senior Counsel, on the other hand, counteredthe submissions made on behalf of the Appellants by submitting thatthere was no error committed by this Court in deciding BimolangshuRoy (supra). The State of Manipur, accepting and following the judgmentin Bimolangshu Roy (supra), repealed the 2012 Act. Appointments madeto the post of Parliamentary Secretaries were discontinued after thejudgment in Bimolangshu Roy (supra). Applying the principles of thesaid judgment to the 2012 Act, the saving clause could not have beeninserted in the Repealing Act, 2018, especially after the State Governmenthas accepted the judgment. The saving clause is only to justify the illegalappointments that were made by virtue of the 2012 Act.

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A8. Before proceeding to deal with the submissions made on eitherside, it is necessary to take note of the relevant provisions in theConstitution of India that would arise for consideration in this case. Article164(1) of the Constitution of India provides that the Chief Minister shallbe appointed by the Governor and the other Ministers shall be appointedby the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister, and that the MinistersBshall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor. Article 164(1-A)was inserted by the Constitution (Ninety-first Amendment) Act, 2003.The said Article limited the number of Ministers, including the ChiefMinister, in the Council of Ministers in a State to 15 percent of the totalmembers in the Legislative Assembly of the State. Article 194(3) of theCConstitution empowers the State Legislature to make laws in respect ofthe powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature andof the members and the committees of a House of such Legislature.Article 246 of the Constitution confers the Legislature of a State withexclusive powers to make laws for such State or any part thereof withrespect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the SeventhDSchedule. The relevant entries in List II of the Seventh Schedule are asbelow:

“39. Powers, privileges and immunities of the LegislativeAssembly and of the members and the committees thereof, andEif there is a Legislative Council, of that Council and of themembers and the committees thereof; enforcement ofattendance of persons for giving evidence or producingdocuments before committees of the Legislature of the State.

40. Salaries and allowances of Minister for the State.”F9. There does not appear to be any dispute on the factual front.The Assam Legislature enacted the relevant statute in 2004, providingfor appointment of members of the Assam Legislative Assembly asParliamentary Secretaries. The Assam Act, 2004 and the 2012 Act areundoubtedly in pari materia. This Court in Bimolangshu Roy (supra)Gstruck down the Assam Act, 2004 as unconstitutional. The appointmentsof Parliamentary Secretaries were discontinued by the Chief Ministerof Manipur around the time the judgment in Bimolangshu Roy wasdelivered. Thereafter, the Repealing Act, 2018 was enacted and notifiedwith effect from 04.04.2018. The 2012 Act and the Repealing Act, 2018were challenged before the High Court of Manipur.H

10. The first submission of Dr. Rajeev Dhawan is thatBimolangshu Roy (supra) was wrongly decided and needsreconsideration. The following issues arose for consideration before thisCourt in the matter of Bimolangshu Roy (supra):

“I. Whether the Legislature of Assam is competent to makethe Act?

II. Whether the creation of the office of ParliamentarySecretary would amount to a violation of the constitutionallyprescribed upper limit of 15 % on the total number of theCouncil of Ministers?

III. Whether the concept of a “Responsible Government”envisaged under various provisions of the Constitution is inany way violated by the impugned enactment and thereforeunconstitutional as being violative of the basic structure ofthe Constitution.

IV. Whether the theory of basic structure could be invoked atall to invalidate an enactment which is otherwise notinconsistent with the text of the Constitution.”

11. This Court in Bimolangshu Roy (supra) observed that Article194(3) of the Constitution deals with powers, privileges and immunitiesof the House of the Legislature and its members but does not authorizethe State Legislature to create offices such as those of ParliamentarySecretaries. It was noted that in some cases, the power to legislate wasconferred by certain Articles in the Constitution on matters specifiedtherein without corresponding entries in the lists in the Seventh Schedule,such as in the case of Article 3 under which the Parliament is competentto create or extinguish a State but there is no corresponding entry in ListI of the Seventh Schedule. In certain other cases, corresponding entriesin the lists of the Seventh Schedule are found with reference to thepower to legislate as expressly conferred in the text of some Articles ofthe Constitution, as is seen with entries 38, 39 and 40 of List II. Withrespect to the latter category, this Court held that where the power tolegislate is sourced to a dedicated Article in the Constitution, legislativeauthority with respect to a closely associated or the same topic ascontained in the Article cannot be sought from the corresponding entryin the list read with Article 246. To substantiate, it was further elaborated A

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Athat even if entries 38, 39 and 40 in List II were not there in the SeventhSchedule, the State Legislature would still be competent to make lawson topics indicated in those three entries because of the authoritycontained in Articles 164(5), 186, 194, 195 etc. Therefore, anyinterpretation on legislative power sought to be given to these entrieswhich is not contemplated by the corresponding Article, was consideredBto be repugnant to the scheme of the Constitution, as the Article expresslyconferring legislative authority is the source of legislating power. Noticingthat the text of both Articles 194(3) and the relevant portion of entry 39are substantially similar, this Court was of the firm opinion that creationof new offices by legislation would be outside the scope of Article 194(3).CThe powers, privileges and immunities contemplated by Article 194(3)and entry 39 are those of the legislators qua legislators, as concluded bythis Court in Bimolangshu Roy (supra). In view of the said finding, theCourt did not find it necessary to examine the other issues that had beenidentified.D12. Dr. Dhawan submitted that the relevant entry empoweringthe Manipur Legislature to make the 2012 Act is entry 40 of List II,which was not considered in Bimolangshu Roy (supra). Placingreliance on the judgment of this Court in Ujagar Prints & Ors. (II) v.Union of India & Ors.[2], he argued that this Court committed an errorEin striking down the Assam Act, 2004, which was in the nature of acomposite legislation drawing upon several entries. As this Courtexamined the legislative competence only with reference to Article194(3) of the Constitution of India and entry 39 of List II, the judgmentis liable to be declared per incuriam. Arguing to the contrary, Mr.Hooda submitted that entry 40 of List II relates to salaries andFallowances of Ministers for the State and cannot be relied on to defendthe Assam Act, 2004. He argued that entry 39 which refers to powers,privileges and immunities of the Legislative Assembly and of themembers and the committees thereof corresponds to Article 194(3) ofthe Constitution of India. According to Mr. Hooda, the Legislature isGempowered to make laws, by virtue of Article 194(3) and entry 39, inrespect of powers, privileges and immunities of a House of theLegislature and of its members and communities, but this authoritydoes not extend to creation of new offices.

13. In Ujagar Prints (II) (supra), this Court held as follows:

“53. If a legislation purporting to be under a particularlegislative entry is assailed for lack of legislative competence,the State can seek to support it on the basis of any otherentry within the legislative competence of the legislature. It isnot necessary for the State to show that the legislature, inenacting the law, consciously applied its mind to the sourceof its own competence. Competence to legislate flows fromArticles 245, 246, and the other articles following, in Part XIof the Constitution. In defending the validity of a lawquestioned on ground of legislative incompetence, the Statecan always show that the law was supportable under anyother entry within the competence of the legislature. Indeedin supporting a legislation sustenance could be drawn andhad from a number of entries. The legislation could be acomposite legislation drawing upon several entries. Such a“ragbag” legislation is particularly familiar in taxation.”

Article 194(3) enables the Legislature to make law relating topowers, privileges and immunities of its members. This Court inBimolangshu Roy categorically held that State Legislatures arecompetent to make law in respect of powers, privileges and immunitiesof a House of the Legislature and its members even in the absence ofreference to entries 38, 39 and 40 of List II. The stand of the State ofAssam before this Court in Bimolangshu Roy (supra) was that theLegislature had the competence to make the law in view of entry 39,which has to be given the broadest possible interpretation. In its affidavit,the State of Assam contended that the legislative entry should not beread in a narrow or pedantic sense but must be given its fullest meaningand widest amplitude. It was further stated that the making of lawproviding for creation of the post of Parliamentary Secretary was withinthe competence of the State Legislature as a Parliamentary Secretary isa member of the Legislative Assembly. It is no doubt true that this Courtin Ujagar Prints (II) (supra) held that the State Government can alwaysresort to more than one entry to defend the legislation, when it ischallenged on the ground of legislative competence. However, it is to benoted that the State of Assam did not seek to take the support of anyother entry, apart from entry 39, to substantiate its legislative competencebefore this Court in Bimolangshu Roy (supra).

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A14. The Appellants in the present matter contended that this Courtdid not appreciate the relevance of entry 40 of List II while assessingthe Assam Legislature’s competence to enact the Assam Act, 2004. Weare of the considered view that entry 40 which relates to salaries andallowances of the Ministers of the State cannot be resorted to, for thepurpose of justifying the legislative competence in enacting the AssamBAct, 2004. The relevant entry is entry 39 which corresponds to Article194(3) of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, entry 40corresponds to Article 164 of the Constitution and we are in completeagreement with Bimolangshu Roy (supra), wherein this Court hasacknowledged and reiterated the need to be wary of the perils ofCinterpreting entries in the lists of the Seventh Schedule as encompassingmatters that have no rational connection with the subject-matter of theentry. Therefore, we do not see any force in the submission of Dr.Dhawan that the judgment of this Court in Bimolangshu Roy (supra)needs reconsideration.

D15. After the judgment of this Court in Bimolangshu Roy (supra),the Parliamentary Secretaries resigned and the Repealing Act, 2018 wasnotified on 04.04.2018. The contention of the Appellants is that PIL Nos.7, 9 and 10 became infructuous after the 2012 Act was repealed andtherefore, the High Court committed an error in declaring the 2012 Actas unconstitutional.E

In Kayv. Goodwin[3], Tindal, C.J. stated:

“I take the effect of repealing a statute to be to obliterate itas completely from the records of Parliament as if it had neverbeen passed; and it must be considered as a law that neverFexisted except for the purpose of those actions which werecommenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst it was anexisting law.”

In the case of State of U.P. & Ors.v. Hirendra Pal Singh &Ors.[4], this Court was of the following opinion:G“22. It is a settled legal proposition that whenever an Act isrepealed, it must be considered as if it had never existed. Theobject of repeal is to obliterate the Act from the statutory 3 (1830) 6 Bing. 576, at p. 582H4 (2011) 5 SCC 305

books, except for certain purposes as provided under Section6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Repeal is not a matter ofmere form but is of substance. Therefore, on repeal, the earlierprovisions stand obliterated/abrogated/wiped out wholly...”

16. The aforesaid judgments leave no room for doubt that afterenactment of the Repealing Act, 2018, the 2012 Act did not survive andthe High Court ought not to have considered the constitutional validity ofthe same. To that extent, the High Court committed an error in declaringa non-existing law as unconstitutional. It is beyond question that thisCourt in Bimolangshu Roy (supra), while dealing with the Assam Act,2004 which is ad verbum to the 2012 Act, held that the Assam Act,2004 was vitiated due to lack of legislative competence. However, the2012 Act was not dealt with by this Court and the same continued to bevalid till it was repealed. Indeed, the 2012 Act was not declaredunconstitutional by any court before the High Court delivered theimpugned judgment and therefore, it was well within the competence ofthe Manipur Legislature to repeal the 2012 Act. The High Court hascommitted an error in holding that the Manipur Legislature did not havethe competence to enact the 2012 Act as a result of which, the RepealingAct, 2018 could not have been made. The law passed by the legislatureis good law till it is declared as unconstitutional by a competent Court ortill it is repealed. There is no error committed by the Manipur Legislaturein repealing the 2012 Act in light of the judgment of this Court inBimolangshu Roy (supra).

17. The crucial point that arises next for our consideration is thevalidity of the saving clause in the Repealing Act, 2018. It was submittedby the Appellants that any act done or decision taken during the currencyof the Repealing Act, 2018 required to be saved to avoid any confusion.Dr. Dhawan submitted that decisions made by persons appointed underthe 2012 Act can be saved by virtue of (a) the de facto doctrine; (b) theexpress saving provision of the Repealing Act, 2018; and (c) Section 6of the General Clauses Act. He placed reliance on the judgments of thisCourt in Gokaraju Rangarajuv. State of Andhra Pradesh[5], State ofPunjabv. Harnek Singh[6 ]and Election Commission of India & Anr.v. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy & Anr.[7] in support of his submissions.

5 (1981) 3 SCC 132

6 (2002) 3 SCC 481

7 (1996) 4 SCC 104

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A18. Where a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if ithad never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; contracts whichdepend upon it for their consideration are void; it constitutes a protectionto no one who has acted under it and no one can be punished for havingrefused obedience to it before the decision was made[8]. Field, J. in Nortonv. Shelby County[9], observed that “an unconstitutional act is not law,Bit confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection, itcreates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative asthough it had never been passed”.

19. An unconstitutional law, be it either due to lack of legislativecompetence or in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under PartCIII of the Constitution of India, is void ab initio. In Behram KhurshidPesikakav. State of Bombay[10], it was held by a constitution bench ofthis Court that the law-making power of the State is restricted by awritten fundamental law and any law enacted and opposed to thefundamental law is in excess of the legislative authority and is thus, aDnullity. A declaration of unconstitutionality brought about by lack oflegislative power as well as a declaration of unconstitutionality broughtabout by reason of abridgement of fundamental rights goes to the root ofthe power itself, making the law void in its inception. This Court in DeepChand v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.[11] summarised the followingpropositions:E“(a)Whether the Constitution affirmatively confers power onthe legislature to make laws subject-wise or negatively prohibitsit from infringing any fundamental right, they represent onlytwo aspects of want of legislative power; (b) The Constitution in express terms makes the power of aFlegislature to make laws in regard to the entries in the Lists ofthe Seventh Schedule subject to the other provisions of theConstitution and thereby circumscribes or reduces the saidpower by the limitations laid down in Part III of theConstitution; G(c) It follows from the premises that a law made in derogationor in excess of that power would be ab initio void…”

8 Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, Volume I, page 3829 118 US 425 (1886)10 (1955) 1 SCR 613H11 1959 Supp (2) SCR 8

[L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

20. The power of a legislative body to repeal a law is co-extensivewith its power to enact a law. The effect of repealing of a statute is toobliterate it completely from the records of Parliament.[12] While repealinga statute, the Legislature is competent to introduce a clause, saving anyright, privilege, liability, penalty, act or deed duly done and anyinvestigation, legal proceeding or remedy arising therefrom, under therepealed statute. There is a distinction between declaration of a statuteas unconstitutional by a Court of law and the repeal of a statute by theLegislature. On declaration of a statute as unconstitutional, it becomesvoid ab initio. Saving past transactions are within the exclusive domainof the Court. On the other hand, though the consequence of repeal isalso obliteration of the statute with retrospective effect on pasttransactions, the Legislature is empowered to introduce a saving clausein the repealing act.[13] Even in cases where a saving clause is not made,the provisions of the General Clauses Act are applicable to central statutesand the principles of the General Clauses Act can be made applicable tostatutes made by the State Legislatures as well (See: State of Punjabv.Harnek Singh (supra)). It is relevant to state at this point that the ManipurLegislature enacted the Manipur General Clauses Act, 1966, which cameinto force on 30.03.1966, by which the provisions of the General ClausesAct, 1897 were made applicable to the statutes of the Manipur Legislature.

21. Elaborating on the point relating to the exercise of powers bythe Court to save past transactions, it is necessary to refer to the lawlaid down by this Court. Following American jurisprudence, the doctrineof prospective overruling was applied in I.C. Golak Nath & Ors. v.State of Punjab & Anr.[14]. In Golak Nath (supra), this Court held thatthe power of the amendment under Article 368 of the Constitution ofIndia did not allow the Parliament to abridge the fundamental rightsenshrined in part III of the Constitution. Realising that there would beconfusion and chaos if the judgment is given retrospective effect, thisCourt evolved a “reasonable principle to meet this extraordinarysituation”. The following propositions were laid down by this Court inGolak Nath (supra):

“(1) The doctrine of prospective overruling can be invokedonly in matters arising under our Constitution; 12 Kay v. Goodwin (supra)

13 Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay 1951 SCR 228

14 (1967) 2 SCR 762

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A(2) it can be applied only by the highest court of the country,i.e., the Supreme Court as it has the constitutional jurisdictionto declare law binding on all the courts in India;

(3) the scope of the retroactive operation of the law declaredby the Supreme Court superseding its earlier decisions is leftBto its discretion to be moulded in accordance with the justiceof the cause or matter before it.”

Though Golak Nath (supra) applied the doctrine of prospectiveoverruling in the context of earlier decisions of this Court on the sameissues which had otherwise become final, the doctrine of prospectiveCoverruling has been applied by this Court even where the issue wasbeing decided by the Court for the first time.

22. While laying down the principles of prospective overruling,this Court in Golak Nath (supra) dealt with the scope of Article 142 ofthe Constitution of India and held that the said provision enables theSupreme Court to pass such decree or make such order as is necessaryDfor doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. Theconundrum in India Cement Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu &Ors.[15] related to the levy of cess on royalty being within the competenceof the State Legislature. A constitution bench of this Court declared thecess imposed by the State of Tamil Nadu as ultra vires. However, thisECourt observed that the State of Tamil Nadu shall not be liable for anyrefund of cess already paid or collected. Validity of levy of cess basedon royalty was raised again in Orissa Cement Ltd. v. State of Orissa &Ors.[16]. An argument was advanced in the said case on behalf of theStates that declaration of levy as invalid need not automatically result ina direction for refund of amounts collected earlier. Relying upon theFearlier judgments of this Court in Golak Nath (supra) and India Cement(supra),this Court declared the levy of cess as unconstitutional. However,this Court refused to give any direction for refund of any amounts collectedtill the date on which the levy in question has been declaredunconstitutional. In Indra Sawhney & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.[17],Gthis Court overruled its earlier judgment in General Manager, SouthernRailway v. Rangachari[18] and held that reservation in promotions cannot 15 (1990) 1 SCC 1216 1991 Supp (1) SCC 43017 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217H18 (1962) 2 SCR 586

be provided under Article 16 of the Constitution of India but directed thedecision to be operative from five years from the date of the judgment.The points raised by the appellants in Ashok Kumar Gupta & Anr. v.State of U.P. & Ors.[19], inter alia, were: (a) that the reservation inpromotion having been declared unconstitutional in Indra Sawhney(supra) was void ab initio and vitiated the promotion of the respondentsand therefore, operation of the unconstitutional direction could not bepostponed by prospective overruling of the ratio of Rangachari (supra);(b) that the said prospective overruling, even if assumed to be the majorityjudgment, was violative of the fundamental rights of the appellants/petitioners under Articles 14 and 16 and therefore, the power underArticle 142 of the Constitution could not be exercised to curtailfundamental rights. The said points were answered by this Court in thefollowing terms:

“60. It would be seen that there is no limitation under Article142(1) on the exercise of the power by this Court. The necessityto exercise the power is to do “complete justice in the causeor matter”. The inconsistency with statute law made byParliament arises when this Court exercises power underArticle 142(2) for the matters enumerated therein.Inconsistency in express statutory provisions of substantivelaw would mean and be understood as some expressprohibition contained in any substantive statutory law. Thepower under Article 142 is a constituent power transcendentalto statutory prohibition. Before exercise of the power underArticle 142(2), the Court would take that prohibition(sic provision) into consideration before taking steps underArticle 142(2) and we find no limiting words to mould therelief or when this Court takes appropriate decision to meteout justice or to remove injustice. The phrase “completejustice” engrafted in Article 142(1) is the word of widthcouched with elasticity to meet myriad situations created byhuman ingenuity or cause or result of operation of statutelaw or law declared under Articles 32, 136 and 141 of theConstitution and cannot be cribbed or cabined within anylimitations or phraseology. Each case needs examination inthe light of its backdrop and the indelible effect of the decision.

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AIn the ultimate analysis, it is for this Court to exercise its powerto do complete justice or prevent injustice arising from theexigencies of the cause or matter before it. The question oflack of jurisdiction or nullity of the order of this Court doesnot arise. As held earlier, the power under Article 142 is aconstituent power within the jurisdiction of this Court. So,Bthe question of a law being void ab initio or nullity or voidabledoes not arise.

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61. Admittedly, the Constitution has entrusted this salutaryduty to this Court with power to remove injustice or to docomplete justice in any cause or matter before this Court.CThe Rangachari [(1962) 2 SCR 586 : AIR 1962 SC36] ratio was in operation for well over three decades underwhich reservation in promotions were given to several personsin several services, grades or cadres of the Union of India orthe respective State Governments. This Court, with a view toDsee that there would not be any hiatus in the operation of thatlaw and, as held earlier, to bring about smooth transition ofthe operation of law of reservation in promotions, by a judicialcreativity extended the principle of prospective overrulingapplied in Golak Nath case [(1967) 2 SCR 762 : AIR 1967SC 1643] in the case of statutory law and of the judicialEprecedent in Karunakar case [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC(L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] and further elongated theprinciple postponing the operation of the judgment in Mandalcase [1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 :(1992) 22 ATC 385] for five years from the date of theFjudgment. This judicial creativity is not anathema toconstitutional principle but an accepted doctrine as anextended facet of stare decisis. It would not be labelled asproviso to Article 16(4) as contended for.”

23. The principles that can be deduced from the law laid down byGthis Court, as referred to above, are:

I.A statute which is made by a competent legislature is validtill it is declared unconstitutional by a court of law.

II.After declaration of a statute as unconstitutional by a courtof law, it is non est for all purposes.H

III.In declaration of the law, the doctrine of prospectiveAoverruling can be applied by this Court to save pasttransactions under earlier decisions superseded or statutesheld unconstitutional.

IV.Relief can be moulded by this Court in exercise of its powerunder Article 142 of the Constitution, notwithstanding thedeclaration of a statute as unconstitutional.

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Therefore, it is clear that there is no question of repeal of a statutewhich has been declared as unconstitutional by a Court. The verydeclaration by a Court that a statute is unconstitutional obliterates thestatute entirely as though it had never been passed. The consequencesof declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute have to be dealt withonly by the Court.

24. The 2012 Act was not subject-matter of consideration by thisCourt in Bimolangshu Roy (supra). In the said judgment, this Courtwas concerned only about the validity of the Assam Act, 2004. It is wellwithin the competence of the Manipur Legislature to repeal the 2012Act, which had not been adjudged as unconstitutional by any Court tillthe Repealing Act, 2018 was enacted. Further, there can be no doubtthat the Legislature has the power to include a saving provision whilerepealing a statute. However, we have been called upon to assesswhether, in the peculiar facts of the present case, the Manipur Legislaturehad the competence to introduce a saving clause in the Repealing Act,2018. The undisputed facts are that the 2012 Act and the Assam Act,2004 are in pari materia. The Assam Act, 2004 was declared asunconstitutional in Bimolangshu Roy (supra). Public interest litigationswere filed in the Manipur High Court challenging the vires of the 2012Act. The Manipur Legislature decided to repeal the 2012 Act “in lightof the judgment of this Court in” Bimolangshu Roy (supra) and “inthe process of being a responsible Government which upholds theRule of Law”, as have been categorically stated in the preamble of theRepealing Act, 2018. In the normal course of events, the public interestlitigations challenging the vires of the 2012 Act would have been allowedand the 2012 Act would have been declared as unconstitutional, relyingon Bimolangshu Roy (supra). However, before these matters weretaken up by the High Court, the Manipur Legislature, taking cognizanceof the ramifications of Bimolangshu Roy (supra) and acknowledgingthe inferable unconstitutionality of the 2012 Act, has enacted the Repealing D

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AAct, 2018. As is evident from the preamble of the Repealing Act, 2018,the repeal of the 2012 Act is a procedural formality by the ManipurLegislature to give the statute a logical conclusion, in light of the pendingpublic interest litigations challenging its constitutional validity before theHigh Court. Bearing in mind these exceptional facts and circumstances,we are of the considered view that by means of the saving clause in theBRepealing Act, 2018, the Manipur Legislature could not have infused lifeinto a legislation, which was recognised by the Legislature itself asunconstitutional and thereby, a nullity, prompting its repeal. In light of theabove, the Manipur Legislature cannot be said to have the competenceto enact the saving clause in the Repealing Act, 2018.

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25. Having held that the Manipur Legislature was not competentto introduce a saving clause in the Repealing Act, 2018, what remains tobe considered is the fate of the acts, deeds etc. undertaken by theParliamentary Secretaries who were appointed under the 2012 Act.Nullification of transactions affecting the public due to the acts done byDthe Parliamentary Secretaries appointed under the 2012 Act would causeserious damage to third parties and create significant confusion andirregularity in the conduct of public business. Therefore, in exercise ofpowers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we consider itnecessary to save only those acts, deeds and decisions duly undertakenby the Parliamentary Secretaries under the 2012 Act during their tenure.

EIn view of the relief provided, it is not necessary to refer to the de factodoctrine pleaded by Dr. Dhawan.

26. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Manipur Legislaturewas competent to enact the Repealing Act, 2018. The saving clause inthe Repealing Act, 2018 is struck down. However, this shall not affectFthe acts, deeds and decisions duly undertaken by the ParliamentarySecretaries under the 2012 Act till discontinuation of their appointments,which are hereby saved.

27. The Civil Appeals are disposed of accordingly.

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Devika Gujral

Appeals disposed of.

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