RAM MURTI YADAV versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER on 10 December 2019

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2019] 14 S.C.R.

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RAM MURTI YADAV

v.

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER

(Civil Appeal No. 8875 of 2019)

BDECEMBER 10, 2019

[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND NAVIN SINHA, JJ.]

U.P. Fundamental Rules – r.56(c) – Compulsory Retirementof a Judicial Officer – Appellant while posted as a Chief JudicialCMagistrate granted acquittal to the accused u/ss.467, 468, 471,474, 420, 406 and 120B of IPC – A complaint was lodged againstthe appellant with regard to the acquittal – A vigilance enquirywas initiated and the report was adverse to the appellant – Acensure entry was recorded in his character roll and order ofpunishment was accepted by the appellant without any challengeD– Screening Committee recommended compulsory retirement of theappellant – Thereafter, appellant was compulsorily retired whichwas endorsed by the Full Court of the High Court – Held: Theservice records of the appellant were examined by the ScreeningCommittee, the Full Court as also by the Division Bench of the HighECourt – The scope for Judicial review of an order of compulsoryretirement based on the subjective satisfaction of the employer isextremely narrow and restricted – Only if it is found to be basedon arbitrary or capricious grounds, vitiated by malafides, overlooksrelevant materials, could there be limited scope for interference –FThe Full Court scrutinised the service records of the appellant andarrived at the conclusion that it was in public interest to compulsoryretire the appellant – Further, punishment of censure meted out tothe appellant was never assailed by him – Therefore, the order ofthe compulsory retirement of the appellant required no interference.

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GService Law – Judicial Services – Held: A judge holds theoffice of a public trust – Impeccable integrity, unimpeachableindependence with moral values embodied to the core are absoluteimperatives which brooks no compromise – A judge is the pillarof the entire justice system and the public has a right to demandvirtually irreproachable conduct from anyone performing aH

judicial function – Judges must strive for the highest standards ofintegrity in both their professional and personal lives.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The service records of the appellant have beenexamined by the Screening Committee, the Full Court as alsoby the Division Bench of the High Court. The scope for judicialreview of an order of compulsory retirement based on thesubjective satisfaction of the employer is extremely narrowand restricted. Only if it is found to be based on arbitrary orcapricious grounds, vitiated by malafides, overlooks relevantmaterials, could there be limited scope for interference. Thecourt, in judicial review, cannot sit in judgment over the sameas an Appellate Authority. Principles of natural justice have noapplication in a case of compulsory retirement. [Para 6] [824-H; 825-A-B]

2. The complaint against the appellant with regard to theacquittal granted by him was first considered by theAdministrative Judge, who was satisfied that it is a matter forfurther enquiry. The comments of the appellant were called for.A vigilance enquiry was recommended by the AdministrativeJudge, who obviously was not satisfied with the explanationfurnished. The officer holding the vigilance enquiry was also ajudicial officer who opined that the act of acquittal by theappellant was not above board. The comments of the appellantwere again called for. The Screening Committee consistingof three Hon’ble Judges, on an overall assessment of theappellant’s service record, recommended his compulsoryretirement. The Full Court scrutinised the service records ofthe appellant again while considering the recommendation of theScreening Committee and arrived at the conclusion that it wasin public interest to compulsory retire the appellant. It isundisputed that the punishment of censure meted out to theappellant was never assailed by him. [Para 8] [825-E-G]

3. A person entering the judicial service no doubt hascareer aspirations including promotions. An order of compulsoryretirement undoubtedly affects the career aspirations. Havingsaid so, it is also cautioned that judicial service is not like anyother service. A person discharging judicial duties acts on behalf A

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Aof the State in discharge of its sovereign functions. Dispensationof justice is not only an onerous duty but has been consideredas akin to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, is a veryserious matter. The standards of probity, conduct, integrity thatmay be relevant for discharge of duties by a careerist in anotherjob cannot be the same for a judicial officer. A judge holds theBoffice of a public trust. Impeccable integrity, unimpeachableindependence with moral values embodied to the core areabsolute imperatives which brooks no compromise. A judge isthe pillar of the entire justice system and the public has a rightto demand virtually irreproachable conduct from anyoneCperforming a judicial function. Judges must strive for the higheststandards of integrity in both their professional and personallives. [Para 13] [828-A-D]

4. It has to be kept in mind that a person seeking justice,has the first exposure to the justice delivery system at the levelDof subordinate judiciary, and thus a sense of injustice can haveserious repercussions not only on that individual but can haveits fall out in the society as well. It is therefore absolutelynecessary that the ordinary litigant must have complete faith atthis level and no impression can be afforded to be given to aElitigant which may even create a perception to the contrary asthe consequences can be very damaging. The standard oryardstick for judging the conduct of the judicial officer thereforehas necessarily to be strict. Having said so, it is also observedthat not every inadvertent flaw or error that will make a judicialofficer culpable. The State Judicial Academies undoubtedly hasFa stellar role to perform in this regard. A bona fide error mayneed correction and counselling. But a conduct which creates aperception beyond the ordinary cannot be countenanced. For atrained legal mind, a judicial order speaks for itself. [Para 14][828-E-G]GUnion of India & Ors. v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC56 : [1993] 1 SCR 296 ; Union of India & Ors. v. DuliChand, (2006) 5 SCC 680 [2003] 3 Suppl. PyareMohan Lal v. State of Jharkhand and Ors., (2010) 10SCC 693 : [2010] 11 SCR 216 ; Syed T.A. NaqshbandiH& Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2003) 9

RAM MURTI YADAV v. STATE OF UTTARPRADESH AND ANOTHER

SCC 592 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 114 ; Rajendra SinghVerma (D) thr. Lrs. v. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi),(2011) 10 SCC 1 : [2011] 12 SCR 496 ; High Courtof Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr.,(2000) 1 SCC 416 : [1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 205 – reliedon.

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Ram Ekbal Sharma v. State of Bihar and Anr., (1990)3 SCC 504 : [1990] 2 SCR 679 ; P.C. Joshi v. State ofU.P. and Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 491 : [2001] 1 Suppl.SCR 369 ; Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Courtof Allahabad and Anr., (2007) 4 SCC 247 : [2007]3 SCR 198 – distinguished.

Baikuntha Nath Das and Anr. v. Chief District MedicalOfficer, Baripada and Anr., (1992) 2 SCC 299 : [1992]1 SCR 836 ; Nawal Singh v. State of U.P. and Another,(2003) 8 SCC 117 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 1046 ; R.C.Chandel v. High Court of M.P. and Anr., (2012) 8 SCC58 : [2012] 7 SCR 205 ; Punjab State Power Corpn.Ltd. and Ors. v. Hari Kishan Verma, (2015) 13 SCC156 : [2015] 3 SCR 555 ; Registrar General, PatnaHigh Court v. Pandey Gajendra Prasad and Ors.,(2012) 6 SCC 357 : [2012] 5 SCR 994 – referred to.

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8875of 2019.B

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.05.2018 of the HighCourt of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in WritPetition (SB) No. 16040 of 2016.

R. Basant, Sr. Adv., Lokesh Kumar, Arun, Kuldip Singh,CAdvs. for the Appellant.

Sunny Choudhary, Adarsh Upadhyay, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by NAVIN SINHA, J.D

1. The appellant, a judicial officer of the rank of Additional Districtand Sessions Judge, assails his order of compulsory retirement dated03.05.2016 at 56 years of age under Rule 56 (C) of the U. P.Fundamental Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’).

2. The appellant while posted as a Chief Judicial MagistrateEgranted acquittal to the accused on 17.09.2007 in Criminal CaseNo.4670 of 2005 “State vs. Mohd. Ayub” under Sections 467, 468, 471,474, 420, 406 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. A complaint waslodged against the appellant with regard to the acquittal. After callingfor comments from the appellant, and perusing the judgement and theForder of reversal in appeal, the Administrative Judge on 24.02.2009recommended an enquiry. A vigilance enquiry, V.B. Enquiry No.26/2009,was held by the OSD, Enquiry, High Court of Allahabad. The enquiryreport dated 10.05.2012 was adverse to the appellant. His commentswere called for on 28.06.2012. On 20.12.2012, the appellant wasinformed that on basis of the enquiry, a censure entry had been recordedGin his character roll. The order of punishment was accepted by theappellant without any challenge. On 01.04.2016, a committee of threeHon’ble Judges constituted for screening of judicial officers forcompulsorily retirement under the Rules recommended the compulsoryretirement of the appellant which was endorsed by the Full Court onH14.04.2016 leading to the impugned order of compulsory retirement. The challenge laid out by the appellant to his order of retirement before theHigh Court was unsuccessful and thus the present appeal.

3. Learned senior counsel Shri R. Basant, appearing on behalfof the appellant, submitted that since joining the service in 1996-97 asa Civil Judge (Jr. Division) his Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) till2014-15 certify his integrity. The quota of cases allocated to theappellant being inadequate, his percentage of work was consideredadequate. The adverse remark in 1996-97 for below performance hadbeen expunged. An error of judgment in deciding a criminal case, whiledischarging judicial functions, cannot ipso facto lead to an inferenceof dishonesty. There was in fact no material to infer dishonesty or lackof integrity on part of the appellant in granting acquittal in the criminalcase. Merely because a different view was possible does not justifythe extreme step of compulsory retirement. The order of compulsoryretirement being stigmatic in nature, the failure to hold departmentalenquiry vitiates the same. The appellant was promoted to the post ofAdditional District and Sessions Judge on the basis of merit-cum-seniority and was confirmed in 2013. He had also crossed theefficiency bar. The punishment of censure therefore stands obliteratedand was irrelevant for the purpose of compulsory retirement. Theconclusion that the appellant had lost his utility and efficiency as a judicialofficer to be declared deadwood was unsustainable without adequateconsideration of his ACRs in the recent past years before retirement,at least from 2012 to 2015. Reliance in support of the submissions wasplaced on Ram Ekbal Sharma vs. State of Bihar and Anr., (1990) 3SCC 504; Baikuntha Nath Das and Anr. vs. Chief District MedicalOfficer, Baripada and Anr., (1992) 2 SCC 299; P.C. Joshi vs. Stateof U.P. and Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 491, and Ramesh Chander Singhvs. High Court of Allahabad and Anr., (2007) 4 SCC 247.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the adverseremarks against the appellant for the year 1996-97 was never expungedas the explanation furnished was not found satisfactory by the DistrictJudge which was informed to the appellant on 12.10.1998. His disposalwas also found to be inadequate in subsequent years. The complaintagainst the appellant for granting acquittal was examined at severallevels before the impugned action followed. The appellant neverquestioned the punishment of censure in connection with the very sameorder of acquittal. The entire service record of the appellant wasconsidered by the Screening Committee and again by the Full Court.

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AThe fact that the appellant may have been promoted subsequently isirrelevant for the purpose of consideration of compulsory retirement.Reliance in support of the submissions was placed on Baikuntha NathDas (supra); Union of India & Ors. vs. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC56; Union of India & Ors. vs. Duli Chand, (2006) 5 SCC 680; NawalSingh vs. State of U.P. and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 117; Pyare MohanBLal vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 693; R.C.Chandel vs. High Court of M.P. and Anr., (2012) 8 SCC 58, andPunjab State Power Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Hari Kishan Verma,(2015) 13 SCC 156.

5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the partiesCand also the precedents sought to be relied upon by them respectively.The High Court also noticed that another vigilance enquiry VB No.06of 2009 had also been initiated but was dropped. The enquiry whichfollowed on the complaint against acquittal manifests that the appellantwas provided proper opportunity of his defence at every stage. QuiteDapart from the scrutiny of his service records by the ScreeningCommittee and again by the Full Court, the Division Bench againperused his ACRs and opined as follows:

“We have perused the expunged portion of the annual remarksof the petitioner and found that rating of the petitioner as fairofficer has not been expunged. Likewise, in the year 2008-09,E2009-10, 2010-11, the petitioner was posted as Additional District& Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.8, Pratapgarh and hisdisposal of work prescribed as Additional District Judge, FastTrack Court was found inadequate. Censure entry, recordedagainst the petitioner and considered by the Screening CommitteeFand Full Court, still has not been expunged. The petitioner hasnever challenged the said censure entry, therefore, there is nosubstance in the arguments of the learned counsel for thepetitioner that single censure entry relating to integrity could notbe considered by the Screening Committee and Full Court. Theexpositions of law relied upon by the learned counsel for petitionerGare of no help for the petitioner. The expositions of law reliedupon by the learned counsel for the respondent is squarelyapplicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.”

6. The service records of the appellant have been examined bythe Screening Committee, the Full Court as also by the Division BenchHof the High Court. The scope for judicial review of an order of compulsory retirement based on the subjective satisfaction of theemployer is extremely narrow and restricted. Only if it is found to bebased on arbitrary or capricious grounds, vitiated by malafides, overlooksrelevant materials, could there be limited scope for interference. Thecourt, in judicial review, cannot sit in judgment over the same as anAppellate Authority. Principles of natural justice have no application ina case of compulsory retirement.

7. The performance chart, as furnished by the appellant,demonstrates that his assessment from 1996-97 till 2014-15 rates himas a “fair” or “good officer” only, except for one entry of “very good”in the year 2011-12. The submission that his integrity was certified oneach occasion leaves us unimpressed. There can hardly be any directevidence with regard to integrity as far as a judicial officer is concerned.It is more a matter of inference and perceptions based on the conductof the officer. The inadequacy of the present system of writing ACRsof judicial officers has deficiencies in several ways, was noticed inRegistrar General, Patna High Court vs. Pandey Gajendra Prasadand Ors., (2012) 6 SCC 357.

8. The complaint against the appellant with regard to the acquittalgranted by him was first considered by the Administrative Judge, whowas satisfied that it is a matter for further enquiry. The comments ofthe appellant were called for. A vigilance enquiry was recommendedby the Administrative Judge, who obviously was not satisfied with theexplanation furnished. The officer holding the vigilance enquiry was alsoa judicial officer who opined that the act of acquittal by the appellantwas not above board. The comments of the appellant were again calledfor. The Screening Committee consisting of three Hon’ble Judges, onan overall assessment of the appellant’s service record, recommendedhis compulsory retirement. The Full Court scrutinised the service recordsof the appellant again while considering the recommendation of theScreening Committee and arrived at the conclusion that it was in publicinterest to compulsory retire the appellant. It is undisputed that thepunishment of censure meted out to the appellant was never assailedby him.

9. The submission of Shri Basant that compulsory retirementcould not have been ordered for mere error of judgment in decisionmaking merits no consideration in view of K.K. Dhawan (supra) andDuli Chand (supra). Likewise, what has been euphemistically described AB

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Aas “washed-off theory” by reason of any subsequent promotion afteradverse entry being relevant for further promotion but not forcompulsory retirement has to be rejected in view of Pyare Mohan Lal(supra). A single adverse entry could suffice for an order of compulsoryretirement as held in Pyare Mohan Lal (supra) as follows :

B“29. The law requires the authority to consider the “entire servicerecord” of the employee while assessing whether he can be givencompulsory retirement irrespective of the fact that the adverseentries had not been communicated to him and the officer hadbeen promoted earlier in spite of those adverse entries. MoreCso, a single adverse entry regarding the integrity of an officereven in remote past is sufficient to award compulsory retirement.The case of a judicial officer is required to be examined, treatinghim to be different from other wings of the society, as he isserving the State in a different capacity. The case of a judicialofficer is considered by a committee of Judges of the High CourtDduly constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and then thereport of the Committee is placed before the Full Court. A decisionis taken by the Full Court after due deliberation on the matter.Therefore, there is hardly any chance to make the allegations ofnon-application of mind or mala fides.”

E 10. This Court in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi & Ors. vs State ofJammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2003) 9 SCC 592, considering the scopeof judicial review of an assessment of the conduct of a judicial officerapproved by a Full Court, observed as follows:

F “7. … As has often been reiterated by this Court, judicial reviewis permissible only to the extent of finding whether the processin reaching the decision has been observed correctly and not thedecision itself, as such. Critical or independent analysis orappraisal of the materials by the courts exercising powers ofjudicial review unlike the case of an appellate court, would neitherGbe permissible nor conducive to the interests of either the officersconcerned or the system and institutions of administration ofjustice with which we are concerned in this case, by going intothe correctness as such of ACRs or the assessment made bythe Committee and approval accorded by the Full Court of theHHigh Court.”

11. The question was again considered in Rajendra SinghVerma (D) thr. Lrs. vs. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 10 SCC1, reiterating the principle laid down in High Court of Judicature atBombay vs. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 416, this Courtobserved as follows:

“191. … in case where the Full Court of the High Courtrecommends compulsory retirement of an officer, the High Courton the judicial side has to exercise great caution andcircumspection in setting aside that order because it is acomplement of all the Judges of the High Court who go into thequestion and it is possible that in all cases evidence would notbe forthcoming about integrity doubtful of a judicial officer….”

It was further observed that:

“192. … If that authority bona fide forms an opinion that theintegrity of a particular officer is doubtful, the correctness of thatopinion cannot be challenged before courts. When such aconstitutional function is exercised on the administrative side ofthe High Court, any judicial review thereon should be made onlywith great care and circumspection and it must be confined strictlyto the parameters set by this Court in several reported decisions.When the appropriate authority forms bona fide opinion thatcompulsory retirement of a judicial officer is in public interest,the writ court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32would not interfere with the order.”

12. P.C. Joshi (supra) was a case relating to an order ofpunishment in a departmental proceeding held to be vitiated for wantof any legally acceptable or relevant evidence in support of the chargesof misconduct. Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) related to an orderof bail dealing with exercise of discretionary powers specially when aco-accused had been granted bail by the High Court. An order ofcompulsory retirement not been a punishment, much less stigmatic inthe facts and circumstances of the present case. Ram Ekbal Sharma(supra) was dealing with the issue that the form of the order was notconclusive and the veil could be lifted to determine if it was ordered aspunishment more so in view of the stand taken in the counter affidavitwith regard to grave financial irregularities, again has no relevance tothe present controversy.

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A13. A person entering the judicial service no doubt has careeraspirations including promotions. An order of compulsory retirementundoubtedly affects the career aspirations. Having said so, we mustalso sound a caution that judicial service is not like any other service.A person discharging judicial duties acts on behalf of the State indischarge of its sovereign functions. Dispensation of justice is not onlyBan onerous duty but has been considered as akin to discharge of a piousduty, and therefore, is a very serious matter. The standards of probity,conduct, integrity that may be relevant for discharge of duties by acareerist in another job cannot be the same for a judicial officer. A judgeholds the office of a public trust. Impeccable integrity, unimpeachableCindependence with moral values embodied to the core are absoluteimperatives which brooks no compromise. A judge is the pillar of theentire justice system and the public has a right to demand virtuallyirreproachable conduct from anyone performing a judicial function.Judges must strive for the highest standards of integrity in both theirprofessional and personal lives.D

14. It has to be kept in mind that a person seeking justice, hasthe first exposure to the justice delivery system at the level ofsubordinate judiciary, and thus a sense of injustice can have seriousrepercussions not only on that individual but can have its fall out in thesociety as well. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the ordinaryElitigant must have complete faith at this level and no impression can beafforded to be given to a litigant which may even create a perceptionto the contrary as the consequences can be very damaging. Thestandard or yardstick for judging the conduct of the judicial officertherefore has necessarily to be strict. Having said so, we must also Fobserve that it is not every inadvertent flaw or error that will make ajudicial officer culpable. The State Judicial Academies undoubtedly hasa stellar role to perform in this regard. A bona fide error may needcorrection and counselling. But a conduct which creates a perceptionbeyond the ordinary cannot be countenanced. For a trained legal mind,a judicial order speaks for itself.G

15. In conclusion, we are of the considered opinion that the orderof compulsory retirement of the appellant calls for no interference. TheAppeal is dismissed.

HAnkit Gyan