KIRPA RAM (DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES & ORS. versus SURENDRA DEO GAUR & ORS. on 16 November 2020

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2020] 13 S.C.R.

KIRPA RAM (DECEASED) THROUGH LEGALREPRESENTATIVES & ORS.

A

v.

SURENDRA DEO GAUR & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 8971 of 2010)

B

NOVEMBER 16, 2020

[L. NAGESWARA RAO, HEMANT GUPTA ANDAJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: s.9 – Jurisdiction of civil court,Cwhen not barred – Suit filed by respondents and for permanentinjunction claiming that the suit land situated in the revenue estateof Village Basai Darapur, Delhi was owned and possessed by them– Plea of appellant was that jurisdiction of civil court is barred asit is a boundary dispute between the village Basai Darapur andDvillage Shakarpur and such dispute has to be decided in terms ofs.28 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954 – Held: The boundarydisputes are between two revenue estates and does not include thedemarcation of the land of the parties – s.83 of the Land RevenueAct bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of : (a) thearrangement of area of the patwaris; (b) claims by any person toEany of the offices mentioned in ss.13 or 14 or to any emolument orfees appertaining to such office, or in respect of any injury causedby his exclusion therefrom, or claims by any person to nominatepersons to such offices; (c) the formation of the record of rights orthe preparation, signing, or attestation of any of the documentsFcontained therein, or the preparation of the annual register – Nosuch dispute arose for consideration in the present matter – Suitwas simplicitor for injunction based upon possession of the property– The said suit could be decided only by the civil court as there wasno mechanism prescribed under the Land Revenue Act for grant ofinjunction in respect of disputes relating to possession – Civil courtGhas plenary jurisdiction to entertain all disputes except in caseswhere the jurisdiction of the civil court is either expressly or impliedlybarred in terms of s.9 of the Code – Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954– s.28.

H

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: s.100 – Formulation ofsubstantial question of law or reformulation of the same in terms ofthe proviso arises only if there are some questions of law and not inthe absence of any substantial question of law – High Court is notobliged to frame substantial question of law, in case, it finds noerror in the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Or.XLI r.27 – Permission toproduce additional documents – Held: Additional documents cannotbe permitted to be produced if they are not relevant to the plearaised by the applicant.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

Conclusion

HELD: 1. The application under Order XLI Rule 27 of theCode was in respect of revenue documents in respect of VillageBasai Darapur. Admittedly, the appellants have no claim on anypart of the land of Village Basai Darapur. The appellants areasserting their possession relating to Khasra No. 79 of VillageShakarpur. The appellants have sought such revenue record inthe additional evidence as the same was not in their knowledgeand that no issue was also framed as to the correctness of thearea of Khasra No. 238 of Village Basai Darapur. The plaintiffshave asserted their possession and title over Khasra No. 238 ofVillage Basai Darapur whereas defendant No. 4 averred that theland in dispute bears Khasra No. 79 situated in Village Shakarpur,Delhi. It is to be noted that Issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were related toownership and possession of Khasra No. 238 and whether theland in dispute formed a part of Khasra No. 79 of VillageShakarpur. Therefore, the entire argument that no issue wasframed in respect of correctness of area of Khasra No. 238 isuntenable. The parties have understood the case about the areaof Khasra No. 238 falling in Basai Darapur or in Khasra No. 79 ofVillage Shakarpur. Once the parties have understood the saidcontroversy and had adduced evidence before the trial court, theappellant cannot be permitted to produce additional evidence inthe first appeal. Thus, the additional documents cannot bepermitted to be produced as they are not relevant to the plearaised by the appellant. [Para 17][1038-E-G; 1039-A-B]

AB

C

DEFG

A2. The Land Revenue Act does not expressly bar thejurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of boundary disputes.The boundary disputes are between two revenue estates and doesnot include the demarcation of the land of the parties. Section 83of the Land Revenue Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courtin respect of : (a) the arrangement of area of the patwaris; (b)Bclaims by any person to any of the offices mentioned in section13 or 14 or to any emolument or fees appertaining to such office,or in respect of any injury caused by his exclusion therefrom, orclaims by any person to nominate persons to such offices; (c) theformation of the record of rights or the preparation, signing, orCattestation of any of the documents contained therein, or thepreparation of the annual register. No such dispute arises forconsideration in the present matter. Still further, the suit issimpliciter for injunction based upon possession of the property.The said suit could be decided only by the Civil Court as there isno mechanism prescribed under the Land Revenue Act for grantDof injunction in respect of disputes relating to possession. TheCivil Court has plenary jurisdiction to entertain all disputes exceptin cases where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is eitherexpressly or impliedly barred in terms of Section 9 of the Code.Since there is no implied or express bar of jurisdiction of theECivil Court in terms of Section 9 of the Code, the Civil Court hasplenary jurisdiction to decide all disputes between the parties.[Paras 18, 19, 20][1039-C-G]

3. The High Court did not commit any illegality in notframing any substantial question of law while dismissing the appealFfiled by the appellants. Sub-section (1) of Section 100 of the Codecontemplates that an appeal shall lie to the High Court if it issatisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Thesubstantial question of law is required to be precisely stated inthe memorandum of appeal. If the High Court is satisfied that

such substantial question of law is involved, it is required toGformulate that question. The appeal has to be heard on thequestion so formulated. However, the Court has the power tohear appeal on any other substantial question of law on satisfactionof the conditions laid down in the proviso of Section 100 of theCode. Therefore, if the substantial question of law framed by theH

KIRPA RAM (DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES v.SURENDRA DEO GAUR

A

appellants are found to be arising in the case, only then the HighCourt is required to formulate the same for consideration. If nosuch question arises, it is not necessary for the High Court toframe any substantial question of law. The High Court is notobliged to frame substantial question of law, in case, it finds noerror in the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court.[Paras 21, 23][1040-F; 1041-E-H]

B

Md. Mohammad Ali (dead) by LRs v. Jagadish Kalita &Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 271 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 325;HubliDharwar Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. H.S.Mohd. Khan (dead) by LRs. & Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 109;Madhavan Nair v. Ramankutty & Anr., (2000) 2 SCC356; N. Venkatareddy & Ors. v. Gopal & Ors. (2000)10 SCC 309; Chandragouda & Anr. v. ShekharagoudaS.Pittanagoudar (dead) by LRs. & Ors. (2000) 10 SCC617; Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh KumarPurkait & Ors., (1997) 5 SCC 438 : [1997] 1 Suppl.SCR 201; South Delhi Municipal Corporation & Anr.v. Today Homesand Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Etc. (2019)SCC OnLine SC 1052; Ashok Rangnath Magar v.Shrikant Govindrao Sangvikar (2015) 16 SCC 763 :[2015] 12 SCR 931 – referred to.

C

D

E

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.08.2008 of the High Courtof Delhi at New Delhi in RSA No. 5 of 1998.

H

ADhruv Mehta, K. P. Dandapani, Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Advs., AmanVachher, Dhiraj, Ashutosh Dubey, Ms. Anshu Vachher, AbhishekChauhan, Ms. Rajshree Dubey, Arun Nagar, P. N. Puri, Vishwa PalSingh, R. A. Kalia, Jagdish Prasad, Prateek Rai, Ashish Pandey,Ms. Kumud Nijhawan, Ms. Peeha Verma, Ashwani Kumar, M. M. Singh,Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs. for the appearing parties.B

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by HEMANT GUPTA, J.

1. The present appeal has been preferred by Defendant No. 4,against the concurrent findings of three Courts arising out of a suit forCpermanent injunction.

2. The plaintiffs, now represented as respondent Nos. 1 and 2,filed a suit for permanent injunction on 31.7.1971 claiming that KhasraNo. 238 measuring 4 Bighas 3 Biswas, situated in the revenue estateof Village Basai Darapur, Delhi is owned and possessed by them. Earlier,Dthe plaintiffs had filed a suit for declaration challenging the vesting ofthe said land in Gaon Sabha in a suit filed on 20.7.1959. The said suitwas decreed on 7.10.1960 holding that the plaintiffs are owners andBhumidars of land comprising in Khasra No. 238. The Union of Indiahad filed an application under Section 161-B of the Delhi Land ReformsEAct, 954[1] for setting aside the said decree dated 7.10.1960 but suchapplication was dismissed by Sub-Judge, First Class, Delhi on 24.5.1968.

3. The plaintiffs alleged that defendant No. 1 claimed that KhasraNo. 238 is part of the land allotted to it. The suit for permanent injunctionwas thus filed by the plaintiffs apprehending threat to their possession ofFland comprising Khasra No. 238, Village Basai Darapur, Delhi againstdefendant No. 1 i.e. The Refugees’ Co- operative Housing Society Ltd.,its President – defendant No. 2, Secretary – defendant No. 3 anddefendant No. 4, Kirpa Ram, predecessor in interest of the presentappellants. Two separate sets of written statements were filed beforethe Court, one by defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and another by defendant No. 4.GThe defendant Nos. 1 to 3 raised preliminary objection that the jurisdictionof the Civil Court relating to Bhumidari land is barred under Section 85of the Reforms Act. It was stated that defendant No. 4 threatened toencroach upon the land in the Society comprising of Khasra No. 1273which led to proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal H1 For short, the ‘Reforms Act’

Procedure, 1973. Such proceedings have nothing to do with landcomprising in Khasra No. 238.

4. The defendant No. 4 in written statement asserted that theplaintiffs were not in possession of the land in dispute and suit for injunctionwas therefore not maintainable. It was further stated that defendantNos. 1 to 3 were not concerned with the land in question and that landdid not belong either to plaintiffs or defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and they werenot in possession thereof. Such land was in fact only in the possessionof the defendant No. 4. It was also stated that the land in dispute doesnot bear Khasra No. 238 and that it is not situated in the revenue estateof Village Basai Darapur. Instead, the land in dispute bears Khasra No.79 and is situated in revenue estate of Village Shakarpur.

5. In view of the pleadings of the parties, the following issueswere framed by the trial court:

“1. Whether any notice u/s 70 of the Bombay Societies Act asextended to the Delhi was not necessary to be served on thedefendants no. 1 to 3 before instituting the present suit? If so,then to what effect? (Objected to).

2. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit as mentionedin the written statement?

3. Whether the plaintiffs are the owners in possession of the landin dispute bearing khasra no. 238 as alleged in the plaint?

4. Whether the land in dispute formed the part of khasra no. 238of village Basai Darapur, Delhi as alleged in the plaint?

5. Whether the land in dispute formed the part of khasra no. 79situated in village Shakar Pur as mentioned in the written statement?(objected to)

6. Whether this suit is properly valued for the purposes of courtfee and jurisdiction? If not, then to what effect?

7. Whether the suit is bad on account of mis-joinder of defendantsas mentioned in the written statement? If so, then to what effect?

8. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree for permanentinjunction claimed in the plaint?

9. Relief.”

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

6. With respect of Issue No. 2, the learned trial court held that thesuit was a simpliciter suit for injunction and the Court has the jurisdictionto find out in which khasra number the land in dispute falls. It was thusheld that suit land falls in Khasra No. 238 in Village Basai Darapur andis in the possession of the plaintiffs, therefore, the suit was decreed.

A

B7. Issue Nos. 4 and 5 were taken up for decision together. Theplaintiffs had produced site plan (Ex.PW-3/1) pertaining to the year 1953-54 when consolidation took place in Village Shakarpur. The plaintiffsalso produced site plan (Ex.PW-3/3) of Village Basai Darapur. The learnedtrial court held that the consolidation had taken place in Village Shakarpurand not in Village Basai Darapur. Therefore, the area of Khasra No.C238 could not be reduced from 4 Bighas 3 Biswas to 2 Bighas 6 Biswas.It was held by the trial court as under:

“18. …One thing remains certain that the present defendants haveno concern in Khasra no. 238 village Basai Darapur. Either itbelongs to the plaintiffs or it vests in the Gaon Sabha. The presentDdefendants, who are third parties, have no right to challenge thesaid judgment and decree passed in favour of the present plaintiffs.Therefore, I hold that plaintiffs are the owners of khasra no. 238,village Basai Darapur.”

8. The first appeal was filed by defendant No. 4 only. The FirstEAppellate Court after reappreciating the evidence recorded the followingfindings:

“14. From the above discussion it is clear that appellant/defendantNo.4 has not been successful before the trial court to show thathe was in possession of Khasra No.79 of village Shakarpur soFhe cannot say that he is entitled to possession of the same underthe claim that this land forms part of Khasra No. 79 of villageShakarpur and not to Khasra No. 238 of village Basaidarapur.The claim of appellant/defendant No.4 stands falsifies upon hisown documents produced by him before.”

G9. In the memorandum of second appeal, the defendant No. 4alleged that the following substantial questions of law arise forconsideration:

“1. Whether the appellate court could in law dispose of the appealwithout deciding the Preliminary issue of jurisdiction of the civilHcourt.

2. Whether the appellate court could in law dispose of the appealwithout passing any order on the application dated 18[th] October,1984 of the appellant under order 41 rule 27 of the Civil ProcedureCode for permission to lead additional evidence?

3. Whether the appellate court in law was jurisdiction in notconsidering the provision of section 28 of the Delhi Land RevenueAct, 1974 which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertainboundary disputes?”

10. The first substantial question of law was based on an interimorder passed by the First Appellate Court on 9.5.1996 wherein the partieswere directed to first address the arguments on the issue of jurisdiction.It has also come on record that the High Court had directed reconstructionof the record of the First Appellate Court on 31.7.2007, as the samewas destroyed in an incident of fire during the year 1996.

11. The second substantial question of law raised was in respectof an application for additional evidence filed under Order XLI Rule 27of the Civil Procedure Code[2]. The defendant No. 4 sought to producethe revenue record, Khasra Girdawari for the years 1953-54, 1954- 55,1955-56, 1956-57, 1966-67 and 1983-84, Jamabandi for the year 1944-45 and mutation No. 2151, all of which pertained to Village Basai Darapurvide the said application.

12. Mr. Mehta, learned senior counsel for the appellants vehementlyargued that the jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred as it is a boundarydispute between the Village Basai Darapur and Village Shakarpur andsuch dispute has to be decided in terms of Section 28 of the Delhi LandRevenue Act, 1954 by the Commissioner.

13. The High Court vide judgment dated 25.8.2008 dismissed thesecond appeal filed by the appellants herein. Aggrieved by the findingsof the High Court, defendant No. 4 is in appeal before this Court.

14. The primary argument raised by learned counsel for theappellants is that the High Court has dismissed the appeal withoutframing any substantial question of law which is mandatory in terms ofSection 100 of the Code. It was submitted that since the High Court hasdismissed the appeal without framing substantial question of law, thematter should be remitted back to the High Court for determination of 2 For short, the ‘Code’

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Asuch substantial question of law framed by the appellants, as reproducedabove. In support of the arguments, the appellants relied upon variousjudgments[3].

15. It has been argued that the First Appellate Court had orderedthat the question of jurisdiction of Civil Court would be decided first,Bhowever the appeal was decided without dealing with the said issue. Itis, thus, said to have caused serious prejudice to the rights of theappellants. Similarly, the application under Order XLI Rule 27 of theCode was not decided which was again prejudicial to their rights.

16. We find that such substantial questions of law, in fact, do notCarise for consideration. The issue of jurisdiction was not an issue of factbut of law. Therefore, it could very well be decided by the First AppellateCourt while taking up the entire appeal for hearing. The trial court hadalso not treated issue No. 2 relating to the jurisdiction of the Civil Courtas a preliminary issue. Therefore, it cannot be said that any prejudicehas been caused to the appellants by not deciding the issue of jurisdictionDof the Civil Court in the first instance by the First Appellate Court. Itmay also be noticed that the plea of bar of jurisdiction was raised bydefendant Nos. 1 to 3 and not by the appellants.

17. Furthermore, the application under Order XLI Rule 27 of theCode was in respect of revenue documents in respect of Village BasaiEDarapur. Admittedly, the appellants have no claim on any part of theland of Village Basai Darapur. The appellants are asserting theirpossession relating to Khasra No. 79 of Village Shakarpur. The appellantshave sought such revenue record in the additional evidence as the samewas not in their knowledge and that no issue was also framed as to theFcorrectness of the area of Khasra No. 238 of Village Basai Darapur.The plaintiffs have asserted their possession and title over Khasra No.238 of Village Basai Darapur whereas defendant No. 4 averred that theland in dispute bears Khasra No. 79 situated in Village Shakarpur, Delhi.It is to be noted that Issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were related to ownershipand possession of Khasra No. 238 and whether the land in dispute formedG3 Md. Mohammad Ali (dead) by LRs v. Jagadish Kalita & Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 271;Hubli Dharwar Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. H.S. Mohd. Khan (dead) by LRs. &Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 109; Madhavan Nair v. Ramankutty & Anr., (2000) 2 SCC 356; N.Venkatareddy & Ors. v. Gopal & Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 309; Chandragouda & Anr. v.Shekharagouda S. Pittanagoudar (dead) by LRs. & Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 617 andHKshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors., (1997) 5 SCC 438

a part of Khasra No. 79 of Village Shakarpur. Therefore, the entireargument that no issue was framed in respect of correctness of area ofKhasra No. 238 is untenable. The parties have understood the caseabout the area of Khasra No. 238 falling in Basai Darapur or in KhasraNo. 79 of Village Shakarpur. Once the parties have understood the saidcontroversy and had adduced evidence before the trial court, the appellantcannot be permitted to produce additional evidence in the first appeal.Thus, the additional documents cannot be permitted to be produced asthey are not relevant to the plea raised by the appellant.

18. The Land Revenue Act does not expressly bar the jurisdictionof the Civil Court in respect of boundary disputes. The boundary disputesare between two revenue estates and does not include the demarcationof the land of the parties. Section 83 of the Land Revenue Act bars thejurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of : (a) the arrangement of areaof the patwaris; (b) claims by any person to any of the offices mentionedin section 13 or 14 or to any emolument or fees appertaining to suchoffice, or in respect of any injury caused by his exclusion therefrom, orclaims by any person to nominate persons to such offices; (c) theformation of the record of rights or the preparation, signing, or attestationof any of the documents contained therein, or the preparation of theannual register. No such dispute arises for consideration in the presentmatter.

19. Still further, the suit is simpliciter for injunction based uponpossession of the property. The said suit could be decided only by theCivil Court as there is no mechanism prescribed under the Land RevenueAct for grant of injunction in respect of disputes relating to possession.The Civil Court has plenary jurisdiction to entertain all disputes except incases where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is either expressly orimpliedly barred in terms of Section 9 of the Code.

20. Since there is no implied or express bar of jurisdiction of theCivil Court in terms of Section 9 of the Code, the Civil Court has plenaryjurisdiction to decide all disputes between the parties. The issue ofjurisdiction of the civil court has been considered by this Court in SouthDelhi Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Today Homes andInfrastructure Pvt. Ltd. etc.[4]wherein this Court held as under:

AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

A“11. Any person having a grievance that he had been wronged orhis right has been affected can approach a civil court on the principleof ‘ubi jus ibi remedium’ - where there is a right, there is aremedy. As no internal remedy had been provided in differentstatutes creating rights or liabilities, the ordinary civil courts had toexamine the grievances in the light of those statutes. With theBadvent of a ‘Welfare State’, it was realised that enactments creatingliabilities in respect of payment of taxes, obligations after vestingof estates and conferring rights on a class of citizens, should becomplete codes by themselves. With that object in view, forumswere created under the Acts themselves where grievances couldCbe entertained on behalf of the persons aggrieved (Shiv KumarChadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1993) 3 SCC 161).

A

12. Wherever a right or liability, not pre-existing in common law iscreated by a statute and that statute itself provides a machineryfor enforcement of such right or liability, both the right/liabilityDand the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality isintended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even inthe absence of an exclusionary provision the jurisdiction of thecivil court is impliedly barred. (Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava(Dead) By LRs v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 681).

E13. We find that a liability for payment of tax is created by theDelhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. Further, a remedy by wayof an appeal against an order of assessment, before an appropriateforum or authority, has been provided by the same statute.”

21. In view of the above, we find that the High Court did notFcommit any illegality in not framing any substantial question of law whiledismissing the appeal filed by the appellants.

22. The argument of Mr. Mehta is that substantial question oflaw is required to be framed by the High Court while deciding the secondappeal. We don’t find any merit in the argument. Section 100 of theCode reads as under:G

“100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expresslyprovided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the timebeing in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from everydecree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High H

Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves asubstantial question of law.

(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decreepassed ex parte.

(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appealshall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in theappeal.

(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question oflaw is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.

(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated andthe respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed toargue that the case does not involve such question:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to takeaway or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to berecorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, notformulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves suchquestion.”

23. Sub-section (1) of Section 100 of the Code contemplates thatan appeal shall lie to the High Court if it is satisfied that the case involvesa substantial question of law. The substantial question of law is requiredto be precisely stated in the memorandum of appeal. If the High Courtis satisfied that such substantial question of law is involved, it is requiredto formulate that question. The appeal has to be heard on the questionso formulated. However, the Court has the power to hear appeal on anyother substantial question of law on satisfaction of the conditions laiddown in the proviso of Section 100 of the Code. Therefore, if thesubstantial question of law framed by the appellants are found to bearising in the case, only then the High Court is required to formulatethe same for consideration. If no such question arises, it is not necessaryfor the High Court to frame any substantial question of law. Theformulation of substantial question of law or re- formulation of the samein terms of the proviso arises only if there are some questions of law andnot in the absence of any substantial question of law. The High Courtis not obliged to frame substantial question of law, in case, it finds noerror in the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A24. Still further, we find that none of the judgments referred to bythe learned counsel for the appellants mandate the High Court toframe substantial questions of law while upholding the findings recordedby the First Appellate Court. All the judgments referred to by the learnedcounsel for the appellants except in Md. Mohammad Ali are thejudgments wherein the High Court has set aside the findings of the FirstBAppellate Court without framing substantial questions of law. In Md.Mohammad Ali, this Court found that the High Court erred in dismissingthe appeal without formulation of substantial question of law which arisesfor consideration. This Court held as under:

“33. The proposition of law relating to ouster of a co- sharer vis-Cà-vis adverse possession had been overlooked by the High Court.There are also certain other aspects of the matter which couldnot be overlooked and probably would require closer examinationby the High Court.

34. The High Court while determining the question should haveDformulated substantial questions of law in terms of Section 100of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In absence of formulationof such substantial questions of law, probably the High Courtcommitted the errors as pointed out hereinbefore.”

25. In a judgment reported as Ashok Rangnath Magar v.EShrikant Govindrao Sangvikar[5], this Court held that the second appealcan be dismissed without even formulating the substantial question oflaw. The Court held as under:

“18. In the light of the provision contained in Section 100 CPCand the ratio decided by this Court, we come to the followingFconclusion:

(i) On the day when the second appeal is listed for hearing onadmission if the High Court is satisfied that no substantial questionof law is involved, it shall dismiss the second appeal without evenformulating the substantial question of law;G(ii) In cases where the High Court after hearing the appeal issatisfied that the substantial question of law is involved, it shallformulate that question and then the appeal shall be heard on KIRPA RAM (DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES v.1043SURENDRA DEO GAUR [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

those substantial question of law, after giving notice and opportunityof hearing to the respondent;

(iii) In no circumstances the High Court can reverse the judgmentof the trial court and the first appellate court without formulatingthe substantial question of law and complying with the mandatoryrequirements of Section 100 CPC.”

26. In view of the above findings, we do not find any error in thejudgment and order of the High Court dismissing the Second Appeal.The present appeal is thus dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shallstand disposed of.

A

B

C

Devika Gujral

Appeal dismissed.

D

E

F

G

H