M/S APEX LABORATORIES PVT. LTD. versus DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LARGE TAX PAYER UNIT - II on 22 February 2022

1. Leave granted. The appellant (hereinafter, “Apex”) is aggrievedby a judgment of the High Court of Judicature of Madras[1], wherein theDivision Bench upheld an order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal[2](hereinafter, “ITAT”), which in turn upheld an order of the Commissionerof Income Tax (Appeals)[3] (hereinafter, “CIT(A)”).The CIT(A) had partlyallowed an appeal from an order of the respondent Deputy Commissionerof Income Tax[4], which partially allowed amounts claimedby Apexas‘business expenditure’ under Section 37(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961(hereinafter, “IT Act”).

2. The facts in brief are as follows: On 01.08.2012, the CentralBoard of Direct Taxes (hereinafter, “CBDT”) issued a circular[5], whichclarified that expenses incurred by pharmaceutical and allied health sectorindustries for distribution of incentives (i.e., “freebies”) to medicalpractitioners are ineligible for the benefit of Explanation 1 to Section37(1), which denies the application of the benefit for any purpose whichis an ‘offence’ or ‘prohibited by law’.

3. After the circular was issued, on 22.11.2012, Apex was issueda notice under Section 142(1) of the IT Act, to explain why the expenditureof 4,72,91,159/- incurred towards gifting freebies such as hospitality,conference fees, gold coins, LCD TVs, fridges, laptops, etc. to medicalpractitioners for creating awareness about the health supplement‘Zincovit’, should not be added back to the total income of Apex.

4. The reason for only a partial allowance by the authoritiesbelow was that an amendment[6] to the Medical Council Act, 1956 (now 1 Tax Case Appeal No. 723 of 2018, dated 18.03.2019.

2 IT ACT No. 1153/Mds/2014, dated 29.01.2018.

3 I.TA. No. 10/13-14/LTU(A), dated 29.01.2014.

4 G.I. No./PAN [REDACTED], dated 21.03.2013.

5 Circular No. 5/2012 [F. No. 225/142/2012-ITA.II].

6 No. MCI-211(1)/2009(Ethics)/5567.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Arepealed) through the Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct,Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 (hereinafter, “2002Regulations”), published in the Official Gazette on 14.12.2009,disallowed medical practitioners from accepting emoluments in the formof inter alia gifts, travel facilities, hospitality, cash or monetary grants.[7]Acceptance of such freebies could result in a range of sanctions againstBthe medical practitioners, from ‘censure’ for incentives received up to 5,000/-, to removal from the Indian Medical Register or State MedicalRegister for periods ranging from three months to one year.[8] Therefore,only the expenses incurred till 14.12.2009 were eligible for the benefitof Section 37(1), and not for the entirety of the Assessment Year 2010-C2011, as claimed by Apex.

Contentions of Apex

5. It was argued by the counsel for Apex, Mr. S. Ganesh, SeniorAdvocate, that the amended 2002 Regulations were not applicable toApex, i.e., pharmaceutical companies were not bound by them. WhileDmedical practitioners were expressly prohibited from accepting freebies,no corresponding prohibition in the form of any binding norm was imposedon the pharmaceutical companies gifting them. In the absence of anyexpress prohibition by law, Apex could not be denied the benefit ofseeking exclusion of the expenditure incurred on supply of such freebiesEunder Section 37(1).

6. Counsel placed reliance on rulings by different High Court toestablish that the 2002 Regulations were enforceable only againstmedical practitioners and not the donors, i.e., pharmaceuticalcompanies. In Max Hospital Pitampura v. Medical Council of India[9]F(hereinafter, “Max Hospital”) the Delhi High Court held that the MedicalCouncil of India (hereinafter, “MCI”) had no jurisdiction to pass anyorders against the appellant hospital, and adverse observations madeagainst the hospital by MCI were quashed. Equally, in Dr. Anil Gupta v.Addl. Commissioner of Income Tax[10], a Division Bench of the RajasthanHigh Court gave benefit of Section 37(1) to the appellant as ExplanationG

7 Id., Regulation 6.8, Code of Conduct for Doctors in their Relationship withPharmaceutical and Allied Health Sector Industry.

8 Regulation 6.8.1, inserted by Notification No. MCI-211(1)/2010(Ethics)/163013,issued on 01.02.2016.

9 W.P. (C) No. 1334/2014 / ILR (2014) 1 Delhi 620, dated 10.01.2014.

H10 Income Tax Appeal No. 485/2008, decided on 18.07.2017.

M/S APEX LABORATORIES PVT. LTD. v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OFINCOME TAX, LARGE TAX PAYER UNIT- II [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]

1 could not be raised by the respondent for the first time at an appellatestage, observing:

“Even otherwise in income tax proceedings the medical ethicswill not be taken into consideration. At the most even if it is aprofessional misconduct, it is to be dealt with by MedicalCouncil of India. The income tax authority cannot decide themedical ethics when the original authority has partly allowedthe expenses.”

The Counsel urged that as these decisions were not challengedby the revenue authorities, and thereby accepted by them, the presentmatter was not open for reconsideration.[11]

7. The Counsel further submitted that it was not open to therevenue to deny a tax benefit on the ‘nature’ of expenses incurred. ThisCourt, in T.A. Quereshi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhopal[12](hereinafter, “T.A. Quereshi”) allowed the appellant to deduct the costof heroin seized as a business loss, holding that:

“In our opinion, the High Court has adopted an emotionaland moral approach rather than a legal approach. We fullyagree with the High Court that the assessee was committing ahighly immoral act in illegally manufacturing and sellingheroin. However, cases are to be decided by the court on legalprinciples and not on one’s own moral views. Law is differentfrom morality, as the positivist jurists Bentham and Austinpointed out.”

8. It was argued that similarly, in Commissioner of Income Taxv. M/s Khemchand Motilal Jain[13], a Division Bench of the MadhyaPradesh High Court allowed ransom money paid to the kidnappers of anemployee of the respondent company on a business trip as businessexpenditure under Section 37(1), holding that:

“The aforesaid section provides that kidnapping a person forransom is an offence and any person doing so or compelling 11 See Berger Paints Ltd. v Commissioner of Income Tax,(2004)12 SCC 42 and SouthIndia Bank Ltd. v Commissioner of Income Tax, Civil Appeal No. 9606 of 2011 / 2021SCCOnline SC 692, dated 09.09.2021.12 (2007) 2 SCC 759.13 2011 (4) MPLJ 691.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

to pay is liable for the punishment as provided in the Section,but nowhere it is provided that to save a life of the person if aransom is paid, it will amount to an offence. No provision isbrought to our notice that payment of ransom is prohibitedby any law. In absence of it, the Explanation of sub-section(1), section 37 will not be applicable in the present case.”

A

B

***

“Sukhnandan Jain remained in custody for a period ofnearabout 20 days. The police were also informed and afterwaiting 20 days for the police action. If the respondents tosave his life paid the aforesaid amount, then the aforesaidamount cannot be treated as an action, which prohibitedunder the law. No provision could be brought to our noticethat payment of ransom is an offence. In absence of which,the contention of the petitioner that it is prohibited underExplanation of section 37(1) of the Income Tax Act has nosubstance. The entire tour of Sukhnandan Jain was forpurchase of Tendu leaves of quality and for this purpose,he was on business tour and during his business tour, hewas kidnapped and for his release the aforesaid amountwas paid.”

C

D

E

9. Counsel brought this Court’s attention to the MemorandumExplaining the Provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 1998 which statedthat the introduction of Explanation 1 to Section 37(1) would disallowFtax payers from claiming “protection money, extortion, hafta, bribes,etc.” as business expenditures,[14] from which it could be inferred that theintention of the Parliament was to only bring into the ambit of Explanation1 ‘illegal’ activities which were deigned as ‘offences’ under relevantstatutes. The IT Act not being a social reform statute, needed to beinterpreted strictly, and not in a wide manner so as to include in its scopeGan act by a pharmaceutical company not recognized as ‘illegal’ by anystatute – doing so would be against the canons of public law.

14 Memorandum Explaining the Provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 1998, Section15.Later adopted by CBDT Circular No. 772 ([1999] 235 ITR (St.) 35, 53), dated23.12.1998.H

10. Finally, Counsel submitted that the CBDT circular dated01.08.2012 enlarged the scope of the 2002 Regulations, and made itoperable beyond medical practitioners, i.e., to pharmaceutical companiesand allied health sector industries, which, in the absence of any enablingprovision, was outside its dominion. Arguendo, if the CBDT circularhad to be brought into effect, it could be done so only ‘prospectively’,and not ‘retrospectively’, i.e., from the date of publication of the CBDTcircular on 01.08.2012, and not the date of publication of the 2002Regulations on 14.12.2009. Reliance was placed on various decisions ofthis Court to show that beneficial circulars had to be appliedretrospectively, however oppressive circulars could only be appliedprospectively.[15]

Contentions of Revenue Authorities

11. Mr. Sanjay Jain, Additional Solicitor General appearing for therespondent revenue authorities, submitted that while the act ofpharmaceutical companies gifting freebies to medical practitioners forpromotion of their products may not be classified as an ‘offence’ underany statue, it was squarely covered within the scope of Explanation 1 toSection 37(1) by use of the words “prohibited by law”, as it wasspecifically prohibited by the amended 2002 Regulations. While Apexcould not be ‘punished’, it should not be allowed to benefit by claiming atax exemption on the freebies distributed.

12. Further, the ASG submitted that Parliament’s intention todisincentivize the practice of receiving extravagant freebies in exchangefor prescribing expensive branded medication over its equally effectivegeneric counterparts, thereby burdening patients with unnecessary costs,was apparent not only from the amended 2002 Regulations, but also thePrevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter, “PC Act”). A governmentdoctor receiving any illegal gratification amounting to malpractice or anyother offence was liable to be charged under PC Act and the IndianPenal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, “IPC”).[16]

13. In the present instance, the medical practitioners were providedexpensive gifts such as hospitality, conference fees, gold coins, LCDTVs, fridges, laptops, etc. by Apex to promote its nutritional health 15 See for e.g.,Director of Income-tax v. S.R.M.B Dairy Farming (P.) Ltd., (2018) 13SCC 239.

16 Kanwarjit Singh Kakkar v. State of Punjab, (2011) 13 SCC 158.

ABC

D

E

F

G

H

Asupplement ‘Zincovit’. It was argued that receiving these, clearly - inletter and spirit, constituted professional misconduct on part of the medicalpractitioner. The scope of the 2002 Regulations was not limited to afinite list of instances of professional misconduct, but broad enough tocover those instances not specifically enumerated as well.[17] The menaceof prescribing expensive branded medication as a quid pro quoBarrangement had a direct bearing on public policy, which was implicit inthe 2002 Regulations itself.

14. To elucidate the same, reliance was placed on two High Courtdecisions. In Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Kap Scan and DiagnosticCentre P. Ltd.,[18] a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana HighCCourt disallowed the benefit of the exemption for commission providedto doctors engaged in private practice for referring their patients to theassessee’s diagnostic centre, holding that:

“It, thus, emerges that an assessee would not be entitled todeduction of payments made in contravention of law. Similarly,Dpayments which are opposed to public policy being in thenature of unlawful consideration cannot equally berecognized. It cannot be held that businessmen are entitled toconduct their business even contrary to law and claimdeductions of payments as business expenditure,Enotwithstanding that such payments are illegal or opposed topublic policy or have pernicious consequences to the societyas a whole.”

***

***

“If demanding of such commission was bad, paying it wasFequally bad. Both were privies to a wrong. Therefore, suchcommission paid to private doctors was opposed to publicpolicy and should be discouraged. The payment of commissionby the assessee for referring patients to it cannot by any stretchof imagination be accepted to be legal or as per public policy.GUndoubtedly, it is not a fair practice and has to be termed asagainst the public policy.”

***

17 See regulation 8 of the 2002 Regulations.H18 (2012) 344 ITR 476 (P&H HC).

Further, the High Court referred to Section 23 of the ContractAct, 1872 (hereinafter, “Contract Act”) to hold the consideration or objectof the agreement between the assessee and private doctors as unlawful,and the agreement therefore void, as it was opposed to public policy.

15. A Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court decidedalong similar lines in Confederation of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry(SSI) v. Central Board of Direct Taxes[19](hereinafter, “Confederation”),holding:

“This regulation is a very salutary regulation which is in theinterest of the patients and the public. This court is notoblivious to the increasing complaints that the medicalpractitioners do not prescribe generic medicines and prescribebranded medicines only in lieu of the gifts and other freebiesgranted to them by some particular pharmaceutical industries.Once this has been prohibited by the Medical Council underthe powers vested in it, section 37(1) of the Income-tax Actcomes into play”

The High Court also upheld the legality of the CBDT circulardated 01.08.2012, stating that it was for the assessee to establish to theAssessing Officer that the expenditure incurred was not in violation of2002 Regulations:

“Shri Vishal Mohan, advocate, on behalf of the petitioner,contends that the circular goes beyond the section itself. Weare not in agreement with this submission. The Explanation tosection 37(1) makes it clear that any expenditure incurred byan assessee for any purpose which is prohibited by law shallnot be deemed to have been incurred for the purpose ofbusiness or profession. The sum and substance of the circularis also the same. In case the assessing authorities are notproperly understanding the circular then the remedy lies foreach individual assessee to file appeals under the Income-tax Act but the circular which is totally in line with section37(1) cannot be said to be illegal. In fact paragraph 4 of thecircular quoted hereinabove itself clarifies that the value ofthe freebies enjoyed by the medical practitioner is also taxable A

B

C

D

E

F

G

A

Aas business income or income from other sources dependingon the facts of each case. Therefore, if the assessee satisfiesthe assessing authority that the expenditure is not in violationof the regulations framed by the Medical Council then it maylegitimately claim a deduction, but it is for the assessee tosatisfy the Assessing Officer that the expense is not in violationBof the Medical Council Regulations referred to above”.

16. Lastly, the ASG submitted that had the Assessing Officerallowed Apex to claim tax benefit, the authorities would have beendeprived of revenue in the form of tax amount leviable on 4,72,91,159/-, which was a crucial omission. Thus, on a holistic reading of the statutesand regulations, Apex could not be allowed to claim deduction underSection 37(1).

C

Analysis and Conclusions

D17. Anexamination of the relevant provisions is first necessary.Section 37 of the IT Act states as follows:

Section 37.General.—(1) Any expenditure (not beingexpenditure of the nature described in Sections 30 to 36 andnot being in the nature of capital expenditure or personalEexpenses of the assessee), laid out or expended wholly andexclusively for the purposes of the business or professionshall be allowed in computing the income chargeable underthe head “Profits and gains of business or profession”.

[Explanation 1].—For the removal of doubts, it is herebydeclared that any expenditure incurred by an assessee for F

any purpose which is anoffence or which is prohibited by lawshall not be deemed to have been incurred for the purpose ofbusiness or profession and no deduction or allowance shallbe made in respect of such expenditure.]

G

Section 37 is a residuary provision. Any business or professionalexpenditure which does not ordinarily fall under Sections 30-36, andwhich are not in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses,can claim the benefit of this exemption. But the same is not absolute.Explanation 1, which was inserted in 1998 with retrospective effect fromH01.04.1962, restricts the application of such exemption for “any purpose M/S APEX LABORATORIES PVT. LTD. v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OFINCOME TAX, LARGE TAX PAYER UNIT- II [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]

which is an offence or which is prohibited by law”. The IT Act doesnot provide a definition for these terms. Section 2(38) of the GeneralClauses Act, 1897 defines ‘offence’ as “any act or omission madepunishable by any law for the time being in force”. Under the IPC,Section 40 defines it as “a thing punishable by this Code”, read withSection 43 which defines ‘illegal’ as being applicable to “everythingwhich is an offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishesground for a civil action”. It is therefore clear that Explanation 1contains within its ambit all such activities which are illegal/prohibited bylaw and/or punishable.

18. Regulation 6.8. of the 2002 Regulations states as follows:

“6.8. Code of conduct for doctors in their relationship withpharmaceutical and allied health sector industry.

6.8.1 In dealing with Pharmaceutical and allied health sectorindustry, a medical practitioner shall follow and adhere tothe stipulations given below:—

(a) Gifts: A medical practitioner shall not receive any giftfrom any pharmaceutical or allied health care industryand their sales people or representatives.

(b) Travel facilities: A medical practitioner shall not acceptany travel Facility inside the country or outside,including rail, road, air, ship, cruise tickets, paidvacation, etc. from any pharmaceutical or alliedhealthcare industry or their representatives for self andfamily members for vacation or for attendingconferences, seminars, workshops, CME Programme,etc. as a delegate.]

(c) Hospitality: A medical practitioner shall not acceptindividually any hospitality like hotel accommodationfor self and family members under any pretext.

(d) Cash or monetary grants: A medical practitioner shallnot receive any cash or monetary grants from anypharmaceutical and allied healthcare industry forindividual purpose in individual capacity under anypretext. Funding for medical research, study etc. canonly be received through approved institutions by A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Amodalities laid down by law / rules / guidelines adoptedby such approved institutions, in a transparent manner.It shall always be fully disclosed.”

The regulation further lays down corresponding action or sanctionwhich can be taken against, or imposed upon, the medical practitionerBfor violation of each stipulation, based on the monetary value of thesame. Thus, acceptance of freebies given by pharmaceutical companiesis clearly an offence on part of the medical practitioner, punishable withvarying consequences.

19. The CBDT circular dated 01.08.2012 is set out below:

C1.It has been brought to the notice of the Board that somepharmaceutical and allied health sector Industries areproviding freebees (freebies) to medical practitionersand their professional associations in violation of theregulations issued by Medical Council of India (the‘Council’) which is a regulatory body constituted underDthe Medical Council Act, 1956.

2. The council in exercise of its statutory powers amendedthe Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct,Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 (the regulations)on 10-12-2009 imposing a prohibition on the medicalpractitioner and their professional associations fromtaking any Gift, Travel facility, Hospitality, Cash ormonetary grant from the pharmaceutical and alliedhealth sector Industries.

E

3. Section 37(1) of Income Tax Act provides for deductionof any revenue expenditure (other than those failingunder sections 30 to 36) from the business Income ifsuch expense is laid out/expended wholly or exclusivelyfor the purpose of business or profession. However, theexplanation appended to this sub-section denies claimof any such expense, if the same has been incurred fora purpose which is either an offence or prohibited bylaw.

F

G

Thus, the claim of any expense incurred in providingabove mentioned or similar freebees in violation of theprovisions of Indian Medical Council (ProfessionalConduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 shall H

M/S APEX LABORATORIES PVT. LTD. v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OFINCOME TAX, LARGE TAX PAYER UNIT- II [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]

be inadmissible under section 37(1) of the Income TaxAct being an expense prohibited by the law. Thisdisallowance shall be made in the hands of suchpharmaceutical or allied health sector Industries orother assessee which has provided aforesaid freebeesand claimed it as a deductable expense in its accountsagainst income.

4. It is also clarified that the sum equivalent to value offreebees enjoyed by the aforesaid medical practitioneror professional associations is also taxable as businessincome or income from other sources as the case maybe depending on the facts of each case. The AssessingOfficers of such medical practitioner or professionalassociations should examine the same and take anappropriate action.

This may be brought to the notice of all the officers of thecharge for necessary action.

The CBDT circular being clarificatory in nature, was in effectfrom the date of implementation of Regulation 6.8 of the 2002 Regulations,i.e., from 14.12.2009.

20. In Dy. CIT 8(2) Mumbai v PHL Pharma P. Ltd.[20]the ITATreiterated Max Hospital’s(supra) decision to conclude that the 2002Regulations were inapplicable to pharmaceutical companies, and that inabsence of requisite jurisdiction, it could not be said that thepharmaceutical companies had violated any law or regulation. Further, itheld that there was no enabling provision to allow the CBDT to bringpharmaceutical companies within the fold of the 2002 Regulations, andeven if such an act were to be permitted, it could be only be done soprospectively:

“Adverting to the contention of the Ld. CIT DR that CBDT iswell empowered to issue such clarification, it is seen that theCBDT Circular dated 01.08.2012 (supra) in its clarificationhas enlarged the scope and applicability of ‘Indian Medical Council Regulation 2002’ by making it applicable to the A

B

C

D

E

F

G

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

pharmaceutical companies or allied health care sectorindustries. Such an enlargement of scope of MCI regulationto the pharmaceutical companies by the CBDT is without anyenabling provisions either under the provisions of IncomeTax Law or by any provisions under the Indian MedicalCouncil Regulations.The CBDT cannot provide casus omissusto a statute or notification or any regulation which has notbeen expressly provided therein. The CBDT can tone downthe rigours of law and ensure a fair enforcement of theprovisions by issuing circulars and by clarifying the statutoryprovisions. CBDT circulars act like ‘contemporanea expositio’in interpreting the statutory provisions and to ascertain thetrue meaning enunciated at the time when statute was enacted.However the CBDT in its power cannot create a newimpairment adverse to an assessee or to a class of assesseewithout any sanction of law. The circular issued by the CBDTmust confirm to tax laws and for purpose of givingadministrative relief or for clarifying the provisions of lawand cannot impose a burden on the assessee, leave alonecreating a new burden by enlarging the scope of a differentregulation issued under a different act so as to impose anykind of hardship or liability to the assessee. In any case, it istrite law that the CBDT circular which creates a burden orliability or imposes a new kind of imparity, same cannot bereckoned retrospectively. The beneficial circular may applyretrospectively but a circular imposing a burden has to beapplied prospectively only. Here in this case the CBDT hasenlarged the scope of ‘Indian Medical Council Regulation,2002’ and made it applicable for the pharmaceuticalcompanies. Therefore, such a CBDT circular cannot bereckoned to have retrospective effect. The same CBDT circularhad come up for consideration before the co-ordinate Benchof the ITAT, Mumbai Bench in the case of SyncomFormulations (I) Ltd. (in ITA Nos. 6429 & 6428/Mum/2012for A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12, vide order dated 23.12.2015),wherein Tribunal held that CBDT circular would not be notbe applicable in the A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12 as it wasintroduced w.e.f. 1.8.2012.”

M/S APEX LABORATORIES PVT. LTD. v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OFINCOME TAX, LARGE TAX PAYER UNIT- II [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]

21. PHL Pharma (supra) further discussed the High Courtdecisions of Kap Scan and Confederation (supra), holding the eventhough they were decided against the assessee, they did not lay down ablanket ban on pharmaceutical companies claiming tax benefit underSection 37(1), and made it subject to the satisfaction of the AssessingOfficer on a case-to-case basis. Subsequent decisions by ITATs acrossstates have placed heavy reliance on PHL Pharma to grant relief to theassessee pharmaceutical companies.

22. This Court is of the opinion that such a narrow interpretationof Explanation 1 to Section 37(1) defeats the purpose for which it wasinserted, i.e., to disallow an assessee from claiming a tax benefit for itsparticipation in an illegal activity. Though the memorandum to the FinanceBill, 1998 elucidated the ambit of Explanation 1 to include “protectionmoney, extortion, hafta, bribes, etc.”, yet, ipso facto, by no means isthe embargo envisaged restricted to those examples. It is but logical thatwhen acceptance of freebies is punishable by the MCI (the range ofpenalties and sanction extending to ban imposed on the medicalpractitioner), pharmaceutical companies cannot be granted the tax benefitfor providing such freebies, and thereby (actively and with full knowledge)enabling the commission of the act which attracts such opprobrium.

23. The illogicality and completely misconceived nature of suchan interpretation was dealt with in a similar interpretation of the provisionsof PC Act, by a Constitution Bench of this Court in P.V. Narasimha Raov. State (CBI/SPE)[21]. Prior to the 2018 amendment[22], the PC Act onlypunished the bribe-taker who was a public servant, and not the bribe-giver. Reliance was placed on this to acquit the appellant bribe-giver.Rejecting such an interpretation, this Court held:

“145. Mr Rao submitted that since, by reason of theprovisions of Article 105(2), the alleged bribe-takers hadcommitted no offence, the alleged bribe-givers had alsocommitted no offence. Article 105(2) does not provide thatwhat is otherwise an offence is not an offence when it iscommitted by a Member of Parliament and has a connectionwith his speech or vote therein. What is provided thereby isthat a Member of Parliament shall not be answerable in a 21 (1998) 4 SCC 626.

22 Subs. Section 8, Act 16 of 2018, w.e.f. 26.07.2018.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

court of law for something that has a nexus to his speech orvote in Parliament. If a Member of Parliament has, by hisspeech or vote in Parliament, committed an offence, he enjoys,by reason of Article 105(2), immunity from prosecutiontherefor. Those who have conspired with the Member ofParliament in the commission of that offence have no suchimmunity. They can, therefore, be prosecuted for it.

***

147. Mr Rao submitted that the alleged bribe-givers hadbreached Parliament’s privilege and been guilty of its contemptand it should be left to Parliament to deal with them. By thesame sets of acts the alleged bribe-takers and the allegedbribe-givers committed offences under the criminal law andbreaches of Parliament’s privileges and its contempt. Fromprosecution for the former, the alleged bribe-takers, Ajit Singh-excluded, enjoy immunity. The alleged bribegivers do not.-The criminal prosecution against the alleged bribegiversmust, therefore, go ahead. For breach of Parliament’sprivileges and its contempt, Parliament may proceed againstthe alleged bribe-takers and the alleged bribe-givers.

***

150. To repeat what we have said earlier, Mr Rao is right,subject to two caveats, in saying that Parliament has the powernot only to punish its Members for an offence committed bythem but also to punish others who had conspired with themto have the offence committed : first, the actions that constitutethe offence must also constitute a breach of Parliament’sprivilege or its contempt; secondly, the action that Parliamentwill take and the punishment it will impose is for the breachof privilege or contempt. There is no reason to doubt that theLok Sabha can take action for breach of privilege or contemptagainst the alleged bribe-givers and against the alleged bribe-takers, whether or not they were Members of Parliament, butthat is not to say that the courts cannot take cognizance of-the offence of the alleged bribegivers under the criminallaw.

24. Even if Apex’s contention were to be accepted - that it did notindulge in any illegal activity by committing an offence, as there was nocorresponding penal provision in the 2002 Regulations applicable to it -there is no doubt that its actions fell within the purview of “prohibitedby law” in Explanation 1 to Section 37(1).

25. Furthermore, if the statutory limitations imposed by the 2002Regulations are kept in mind, Explanation (1) to Section 37(1) of the ITAct and the insertion of Section 20A of the Medical Council Act, 1956[23](which serves as parent provision for the regulations), what is discernibleis that the statutory regime requiring that a thing be done in a certainmanner, also implies (even in the absence of any express terms), thatthe other forms of doing it are impermissible.

26. In this regard the decision of this Court in Jamal Uddin Ahmadv. Abu Saleh Najmuddin & Anr[24]is of some relevance. There, thescope of Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 wasexamined in the light of powers of the High Court to administer electionpetitions by invoking the rule of implied prohibition. The Court observedthat:

“Dealing with “Statutes conferring power; implied conditions,judicial review”, Justice G.P. Singh states in the Principles ofStatutory Interpretation (Eight Edition 2001, at pp.333, 334)that a power conferred by a statute often contains expressconditions for its exercise and in the absence of or in additionto the express conditions there are also implied conditionsfor exercise of the power. An affirmative statute introductiveof a new law directing a thing to be done in a certain waymandates, even if there be no negative words, that the thingshall not be done in any other way. This rule of impliedprohibition is subserved to the basic principle that the Courtmust, as far as possible, attach a construction whicheffectuates the legislative intent and purpose. Further, therule of implied prohibition does not negative the principlethat an express grant of statutory power carries with it bynecessary implication the authority to use all reasonable 23 Inserted vide Medical Council (Amendment) Act, 1964.

24 (2003) 4 SCC 257.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

G

means to make such grant effective. To illustrate, an Act ofParliament conferring jurisdiction over an offence implies apower in that jurisdiction to make out a warrant and secureproduction of the person charged with the offence; powerconferred on Magistrate to grant maintenance under Section125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 to preventvagrancy implies a power to allow interim maintenance; powerconferred on a local authority to issue licences for holding‘hats’ or fairs implies incidental power to fix days therefore;power conferred to compel cane growers to supply cane tosugar factories implies an incidental power to ensure paymentof price. In short, conferment of a power implies authority todo everything which could be fairly and reasonably regardedas incidental or consequential to the power conferred.

***

Herbert Broom states in the preface to his celebrated workon Legal Maxims—”In the Legal Science, perhaps morefrequently than in any other, reference must be made to firstprinciples.” The fundamentals or the first principles of lawoften articulated as the maxims are manifestly founded inreason, public convenience and necessity. Modern trend ofintroducing subtleties and distinctions, both in legal reasoningand in the application of legal principles, formerly unknown,have rendered an accurate acquaintance with the firstprinciples more necessary rather than diminishing the valuesof simple fundamental rules. The fundamental rules are thebasis of the law; may be either directly applied, or qualifiedor limited, according to the exigencies of the particular caseand the novelty of the circumstances which present themselves.In Dhannalal vs. Kalawatibai and Ors.[25] this court has heldthat:

“When the statute does not provide the path and theprecedents abstain to lead, then sound logic, rationalreasoning, common sense and urge for public good play asguides of those who decide”.”

27. It is also a settled principle of law that no court will lend its aidto a party that roots its cause of action in an immoral or illegal act (exdolo malo non oritur action) meaning that none should be allowed toprofit from any wrongdoing coupled with the fact that statutory regimesshould be coherent and not self-defeating. Doctors and pharmacists beingcomplementary and supplementary to each other in the medicalprofession, a comprehensive view must be adopted to regulate theirconduct in view of the contemporary statutory regimes and regulations.Therefore, denial of the tax benefit cannot be construed as penalizingthe assessee pharmaceutical company. Only its participation in what isplainly an action prohibited by law, precludes the assessee from claimingit as a deductible expenditure.

28. This Court also notices that medical practitioners have a quasi-fiduciary relationship with their patients. A doctor’s prescription isconsidered the final word on the medication to be availed by the patient,even if the cost of such medication is unaffordable or barely within theeconomic reach of the patient– such is the level of trust reposed indoctors. Therefore, it is a matter of great public importance and concern,when it is demonstrated that a doctor’s prescription can be manipulated,and driven by the motive to avail the freebies offered to them bypharmaceutical companies, ranging from gifts such as gold coins, fridgesand LCD TVs to funding international trips for vacations or to attendmedical conferences. These freebies are technically not ‘free’ – thecost of supplying such freebies is usually factored into the drug, drivingprices up, thus creating a perpetual publicly injurious cycle. The threatof prescribing medication that is significantly marked up, over effectivegeneric counterparts in lieu of such a quid pro quo exchange was takencognizance of by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health andFamily Welfare[26] which made the following observations:

“The Committee also notes that despite there being a code ofethics in the Indian Medical Council Rules introduced inDecember 2009 forbidding doctors from accepting any gift,hospitality, trips to foreign and domestic destinations etc fromhealthcare industry, there is no let-up in this evil practice andthe pharma companies continue to sponsor foreign trips of 26 45th Report on Issues Relating to Availability of Generic, Generic-Branded and BrandedMedicines, their Formulation and Therapeutic Efficacy and Effectiveness), dated04.08.2010.

AB

C

D

E

FG

H

Amany doctors and shower with high value gifts like airconditioners, cars, music systems, gold chains etc. to obligingprescribers who then prescribe costlier drugs as quid pro quo.Ultimately all these expenses get added up to the cost of drugs.The Committee’s attention was drawn to a news item in Timesof India dated July 1, 2010 by Reema Nagarajan givingBspecific instances of violations of MCI code. The Committeecalls upon the Government to take strict and speedy actionon such violations. Since MCI has no jurisdiction over drugcompanies, the Government should take parallel actionthrough DCGI and the Income Tax Department to penalizeCthose companies that violate MCI rules by cancelling drugmanufacturing licences and/or disallowing expenses onunethical activities.”

Interestingly, a similar conclusion was arrived at by the USDDepartment of Health and Human Services Office of the AssistantSecretary for Planning and Evaluation, in a report called SavingsAvailable Under Full Generic Substitution of Multiple Source BrandDrugs in Medicare Part D (dated 23.07.2018).[27] The report noticedinter alia, that an empirical study conducted in respect of 20 odd (out of

Ethe 600 drugs which were the subject matter of the research paper)brand medications dispensed for a particular period, were capable ofgeneric substitution and would have resulted in substantial benefit to thepatients:

27 Extracted from https://aspe.hhs.gov/reports/data-point-savings-available-under-full-Fgeneric-substitution-multiple-source-brand-drugs-medicare accessed at 16:37on13.02.2022. The report states, inter alia, that:“More 600 brand name drugs were dispensed and paid for by Part D plans in 2016,despite the presence of generic competition. Plans and beneficiaries paid $8.7 billion formultiple source brands and $34.0 billion for generics. Full substitution of multiplesource brands would have resulted in total spending on generic drugs of $39.9 billion,saving the Part D program and its beneficiaries $2.8 billion in 2016. These estimates doGnot account for manufacturer rebates paid to Part D plans or pharmacy benefit managers(PBMs) or statutory discounts paid by manufacturers for brand name drugs, and thusmay overstate savings to the program after accounting for the effects that rebates oftenhave on premiums. See Figure 1.***********

Of this $2.8 billion, $2.25 billion is for brand name drugs that have faced genericHcompetition for at least a full year (e.g. the first generic was available in 2015 or “Beneficiaries could have saved over $600 million in out ofpocket payments had they been dispensed generic equivalentdrugs. A significant amount of this spending occurred amongthe top 20 multiple source brands. Substituting these drugsfor generic competitors at their median prices would havesaved the program and beneficiaries $1.8 billion.”

Likewise, in a previous study by ProPublica (an independent, non-profit newsroom that does investigative journalism) titled “Dollars forDoctors: Now There’s Proof: Docs who Get Company Cash Tend toPrescribe More Brand-Name Meds” (dated 17.03.2016)[28] stated that:

“…doctors who receive payments from the medical industrydo indeed tend to prescribe drugs differently than theircolleagues who don’t. And the more money they receive, onaverage, the more brand-name medications they prescribe.”

earlier). A further $584 million in savings is estimated for substituting generics thatwere first launched in 2016 and therefore on the market for less than a full year. These12 Single source includes payments for brand drugs prior to generic entry, e.g. $1.13billion of Crestor spending in the example used in the Methods section. savings arelikely to grow as additional generic competitors enter the market. Beneficiaries spent$1.1 billion out-of-pocket in cost-sharing for brand drugs with comparable generics,averaging twice as much out-of-pocket than for comparable generics. In 2016, multiplesource brand drug cost-sharing averaged $39.15, while generic cost-sharing forsubstitutable products was $17.04. Beneficiaries could have saved over $600 million inout of pocket payments had they been dispensed generic equivalent drugs. A significantamount of this spending occurred among the top 20 multiple source brands. Substitutingthese drugs for generic competitors at their median prices would have saved the programand beneficiaries $1.8 billion. See Appendix Table A for these drugs, and figure 2 belowfor an example. In terms of beneficiary cost-sharing, we find similar results as for theoverall calculation. Average per beneficiary spending is significantly higher for thesebrands than for the substitutable generics. (See Appendix Table A, also.) Brand drugcost-sharing averaged $30.69, compared to $22.41 for their generic equivalents. For17 of the top 20 drugs, the ratio of brand to comparable generic out-of-pocket spendingranges from 117% (Namenda) to 1,476% (Lamictal) indicating significant per-drugsavings are available for beneficiaries. In three cases (Abilify, Lovenox, and Tricor),beneficiary out-of-pocket costs are marginally higher for the generic than the branddrug. We believe this is due to the interaction of total drug costs and plan coverage in thecoverage gap for generics (42% in 2016), meaning patients paid 58% coinsurance forgenerics that year. This compares to 25% plan coverage and a 50% statutorymanufacturer discount for brand drugs in 2016.”

28 https://www.propublica.org/article/doctors-who-take-company-cash-tend-to-prescribe-more-brand-name-drugsaccessed at 16:45 on 13.02-2022

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

AData is now available publicly, in the United States, by reason ofthe Physician Payment Sunshine Act, 2010 i.e., Section 6002 of theAffordable Care Act, 2010. This law compels manufacturers of drugs,devices, biologics, and medical supplies covered by Medicare, Medicaid,or the Children’s Health Insurance Program to report to the Centers forMedicare & Medicaid Services on three broad categories of paymentsBor “transfers of value”. These categories cover general payments ortransfers of value such as meals, travel reimbursement, andconsulting fees. These include expenses borne by manufacturers, suchas speaker fees, travel, gifts, honoraria, entertainment, charitablecontribution, education, grants and research grants, etc.C

29. The impugned judgment, along with the judgments of Punjab& Haryana High Court (Kap Scan) and Himachal Pradesh High Court(Confederation) (supra) have correctly addressed the important publicpolicy issue on the subject of allowance of benefit for supply of freebies.The impugned judgment’s reasoning is quoted as follows:

D“A perusal of the decision of Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunalin the assessee’s own case as also the decision of the Hon’bleHimachal Pradesh High Court clearly shows that the basicintention of the decision was that the receiving of the gifts/freebies by Professionals is against public policy as also againstEthe law in so far as the amendment by the Medical Council Act,1956 to the Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct,Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002, once receiving of suchgifts have been held to be unethical obviously the corollary tothis would also be unethical, being giving of such gifts or doingsuch acts to induce such Doctors and Medical ProfessionalsF”to violate the Medical Council Act, 1956.

30. Thus, one arm of the law cannot be utilised to defeat the otherarm of law – doing so would be opposed to public policy and bring thelaw into ridicule.[29] In Maddi Venkataraman & Co. (P) Ltd. v. CIT[30], aGfine imposed on the assessee under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 was sought to be deducted as a business expenditure. ThisCourt held:

29 Biharilal Jaiswal v. CIT, (1996) 1 SCC 443.H30 (1998) 2 SCC 95.

“Moreover, it will be against public policy to allow the benefitof deduction under one statute, of any expenditure incurredin violation of the provisions of another statute or any penaltyimposed under another statute.In the instant case, if thedeductions claimed are allowed, the penal provisions of FERAwill become meaningless”.

31. It is crucial to note that the agreement between thepharmaceutical companies and the medical practitioners in gifting freebiesfor boosting sales of prescription drugs is also violative of Section 23 ofthe Contract Act, 1872 (as also noted by the Punjab and Haryana HighCourt in Kap Scan (supra)). The provision is as follows:

“23. What considerations and objects are lawful, and whatnot.—The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful,unless—

it is forbidden by law; or

is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat theprovisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another;or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy.

In each of these cases, the consideration or object of anagreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of whichthe object or consideration is unlawful, is void.

32. Before us, Apex has continually stressed on the need todivorce interpretation of tax provisions from a perceived immorality /violation of public policy. Apex repeatedly relied on T.A. Quereshi(supra), M/s K.M. Jain (supra) and CIT v. Pt. Vishwanath Sharma[31].We find that none of these judgments find much favour with the caseof the appellant. T.A. Quereshi addressed a business ‘loss’, not abusiness ‘expenditure’ as envisioned under Section 37(1). In M/s K.M.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

AJain, the ransom money paid to kidnappers of the employee of theassessee company was allowed deduction primarily based on the factthat the assessee was helpless and coerced to pay the amount in orderto save its employee’s life. Thus, the assessee was not a wilfulparticipant in commission of an offence or activity prohibited by law.The same is not applicable to the present facts. PharmaceuticalBcompanies have misused a legislative gap to actively perpetuate thecommission of an offence. In Pt. Vishwanath Sharma, a Division Benchof the Allahabad High Court was faced with the question of whetherpayment of commission to government doctors could be exemptedunder Section 37(1). At the time, there was no statutory provisionCprohibiting doctors engaged in private practice from accepting suchcommission. Hence, the High Court held that while the Assessing Officerhad correctly allowed such deduction for private doctors, the samecould not be allowed for Government doctors:

“In the present case, payment of commission to GovernmentDDoctors cannot be placed on the same pedestal. A distinctionhas already been made by the authorities while allowingdeduction to the assessee in respect to commission which theassessee has paid to private doctors since in their case,payment of commission cannot be said to be an offence underany statute but in respect to Government doctors such paymentEcould not have been allowed as it is an offence under theStatutes as stated above.”

***

“We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that payment asFcommission to Government doctors for obtaining a favourtherefrom by prescribing medicines in which the assessee wasdealing cannot be said to be a “business expenditure” and”no deduction can be allowed thereof under the Act.

GThe 2002 Regulations, applicable to all medical practitioners(including doctors in private practice), was introduced w.e.f. 14.12.2009.

33. Thus, pharmaceutical companies’ gifting freebies to doctors,etc. is clearly “prohibited by law”, and not allowed to be claimed as adeduction under Section 37(1). Doing so would wholly undermine publicHpolicy. The well-established principle of interpretation of taxing statutes M/S APEX LABORATORIES PVT. LTD. v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OFINCOME TAX, LARGE TAX PAYER UNIT- II [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]

– that they need to be interpreted strictly – cannot sustain when it resultsin an absurdity contrary to the intentions of the Parliament. A Bench ofthis Court in C.W.S. (India) Ltd. v. CIT[32]held as follows:

“While a literary construction may be the general rule inconstruing taxing enactments, it does not mean that it shouldbe adopted even if it leads to a discriminatory or incongruousresult. Interpretation of statutes cannot be a mechanicalexercise. Object of all the rules of interpretation is to giveeffect to the object of the enactment having regard to thelanguage used”.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes had once said:

“A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is theskin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour andcontent according to the circumstances and the time in whichit is used.”[33]

Holmes thus summed up the elusive nature of words, which liesat the heart of the many issues concerning interpretation of statutes.

34. Interpretation of law has two essential purposes: one is toclarify to the people governed by it, the meaning of the letter of the law;the other is to shed light and give shape to the intent of the law maker.And, in this process the courts’ responsibility lies in discerning the socialpurpose which the specific provision subserves. Thus, the cold letter ofthe law is not an abstract exercise in semantics which practitioners arewont to indulge in. So viewed the law has birthed various ideas such asimplied conditions, unspelt but entirely logical and reasonable obligations,implied limitations etc. The process of continuing evolution, refinementand assimilation of these concepts into binding norms (within the body oflaw as is understood and enforced) injects vitality and dynamism tostatutory provisions. Without this dynamism and contextualisation, lawsbecome irrelevant and stale.

35. In Bihari Lal Jaiswal & Ors. v. Commissioner of IncomeTax & Ors[34], the issue of what is “prohibited by law” was consideredby this Court, in the context of interpretation of a condition in a statutory 32 1994 Supp (2) SCC 296.

33 Tomne v. Eispzer, 245 U.S. 418 (1918).

34 (1995) Supp (5) SCR 285.

A

B

C

D

EF

G

H

Alicense (for vending liquor) which prohibited transfer of the license byway of sub-letting or entering into a partnership agreement. While dealingwith the recognition of such a partnership under the IT Act, this Courtheld that allowing the same would attract the very mischief sought to beavoided:

B“This object will be defeated if the licencee is permitted tobring in strangers into the business, which would mean thatinstead of the licencee carrying on the business, it would becarried on by others - a situation not conducive to effectiveimplementation of the excise law and consequently deleteriousto public interest. It is for this very reason that transfer orCsub-letting of licence is uniformly prohibited by several StateExcise enactments. It, therefore, follows that any agreementwhereunder the licence is transferred, sub-let or a partnershipis entered into with respect to the privilege/business underthe said licence, contrary to the prohibition contained in theDrelevant excise enactment, is an agreement prohibited by law.The object of such an agreement must be held to be of such anature that if permitted it would defeat the provisions of theexcise law within the meaning of Section 23 of the ContractAct. Such an agreement is declared by Section 23 to beunlawful and void. The question is whether such an unlawfulEor void partnership can be treated as a genuine partnershipwithin the meaning of Section 185(1) and whether registrationcan be granted to such a partnership under the provisions ofthe Income Tax Act and the Rules made thereunder. We thinknot. When the law prohibits the entering into a particularFpartnership agreement, there can be in law no partnershipagreement of that nature. The question of such an agreementbeing genuine cannot, therefore, arise.

It is also a known principle that what cannot be done directly,cannot be achieved indirectly. As was said in Fox v. Bishop of Chester[35]Gthat it is a:

“Well-known principle of law that the provisions of an Act ofParliament shall not be evaded by shift or contrivance”

35 (1824) 2 B&C 635, quoted and applied in Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh & Ors. 1979H(2) SCR 282.

And that:

“To carry out effectually the object of a Statute, it must beconstrued as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, inan indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibitedor enjoined”

This Court, in an appeal arising from an action for specificperformance, in G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju (D) by L. Rs & Ors[36],held that giving the relief would imply doing something prohibited by law(bar against conveyance, for a specific period) – it had the effect ofdefeating the provisions of the law. It was held that:

“Taking the agreement as it is, it necessarily would be in theteeth of the obligation in law of the first Respondent to put upthe construction. The agreement to sell involved clearly termswhich are impliedly prohibited by law in that the first Defendantwas thereunder to deliver title to the site and prevented fromacting upon the clear obligation under law. This is a clearcase at any rate wherein enforcing the agreementunambiguously results in defeating the dictate of the law. The‘sublime’ object of the law, the very soul of it stood sacrificedat the altar of the bargain which appears to be a real estatetransaction. It would, in other words, in allowing the agreementto fructify, even at the end of ten-year period of non-alienation,be a case of an agreement, which completely defeats the lawfor the reasons already mentioned.

78. Going by the recital in the agreement entered into betweenthe Plaintiff and the first Defendant, possession is handedover by the first Defendant to the Plaintiff. The originalPossession Certificate is also said to be handed over to thePlaintiff. The agreement, even according to the Plaintiff,contemplated that within three months of conveyance of thesite in favour of the first Defendant, the first Defendant wasto convey her rights in the site to the Plaintiff. It is quite clearthat the parties contemplated a state of affairs which iscompletely inconsistent with and in clear collision with themandate of the law. On its term, it stands out as an affront tothe mandate of the law.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

A79. The illegality goes to the root of the matter. It is quiteclear that the Plaintiff must rely upon the illegal transactionand indeed relied upon the same in filing the suit for specificperformance. The illegality is not trivial or venial. Theillegality cannot be skirted nor got around. The Plaintiff isconfronted with it and he must face its consequences. TheBmatter is clear. We do not require to rely upon anyparliamentary debate or search for the purpose beyond theplain meaning of the law. The object of the law is set out inunambiguous term. If every allottee chosen after a process ofselection under the Rules with reference to certain objectiveCcriteria were to enter into bargains of this nature, it willundoubtedly make the law a hanging (sic laughing) stock.”

A

36. In the present case too, the incentives (or “freebies”) givenby Apex, to the doctors, had a direct result of exposing the recipients tothe odium of sanctions, leading to a ban on their practice of medicine.DThose sanctions are mandated by law, as they are embodied in the codeof conduct and ethics, which are normative, and have legally bindingeffect. The conceded participation of the assessee- i.e., the provider ordonor- was plainly prohibited, as far as their receipt by the medicalpractitioners was concerned. That medical practitioners were forbiddenfrom accepting such gifts, or “freebies” was no less a prohibition on theEpart of their giver, or donor, i.e., Apex.

37. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned judgmentcannot be faulted with. The appeal is dismissed without order on costs.Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

F

Devika Gujral

Appeal dismissed.

G

H