Case details

Court: Supreme Court of India
Decided: 4 December 2018
Bench: Ashok Bhushan, Indu Malhotra
Citations: 2018 INSC 1145[2018] 14 S.C.R. 1022
Type: Judgment (Dismissed)

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Citation: [2018] 14 S.C.R. 1022 (search it on the Supreme Court's e-SCR portal)

Supreme Court of India

SRI MAHABIR PROSAD CHOUDHARY versus M/S. OCTAVIUS TEA AND INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ANR. on 4 December 2018

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1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 14 S.C.R.[2018] 14 S.C.R. 1022

ASRI MAHABIR PROSAD CHOUDHARY

M/S. OCTAVIUS TEA AND INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ANR.

(Civil Appeal No. 8320 of 2011)

BDECEMBER 04, 2018

[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]

West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958:

rr. 20B(5) and 21 – Industrial dispute – Non-appearance ofCthe company-employer – Written Statement was filed by the workmanwithout serving a copy thereof to the Company – Tribunal passedex parte award in favour of the workman – Application of thecompany to recall ex parte award – Tribunal found that award waspassed in violation of principles of natural justice and in non-compliance of rr. 20B(5) and 21 – However, rejected the applicationDon the ground that the Tribunal had become functus officio as theapplication was filed after 30 days from publication of the award –Writ petition by the Company – High Court allowed the petitiondirecting the Tribunal to reconsider the issue between the parties –Writ Appeal was dismissed by Division Bench of High Court – OnEappeal, held: Tribunal was required to intimate date and time forreceiving Written Statement as per r.20B(5) – No such intimationwas given by the Tribunal and thus there is clear breach of s.20B(5)– Though notice u/s. 21 is not mandatory, but non-appearance onone day does not oblige the Tribunal to proceed ex-parte – HighCourt rightly set aside the ex-parte award.F

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 By sub-rule (5) of r. 20B of West BengalIndustrial Disputes Rules, 1958, duty has been cast on theIndustrial Tribunal to serve a copy of Written Statement orGstatement of case on either side. The use of word “shall beserved” in sub-clause (5) of Rule 20B, has to be given somemeaning and purpose. The provision obviously casts a duty onIndustrial Tribunal and the Court to ensure that service shouldbe completed within seven days. Another aspect, which isdecipherable from the Rule is that Tribunal has to ensure thatH

statement of case of Written Statement has to be served bymaking it available to the party concerned or its authorisedrepresentative in the office of the Industrial Tribunal/LabourCourt on a date and time fixed for the purpose. [Para 13][1033-F-H; 1034-A-B]

1.2 The last line of sub-rule (5) used the expression “on adate and time fixed for the purpose and intimated to the partyconcerned by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court”. The aboveexpression contains two requirements, firstly, the IndustrialTribunal/Labour Court has to fix a date for service of statementof case of Written Statement within 7 days, specially, fixed datefor the purpose and secondly date and time fixed for purpose hasto be intimated to the party concerned. Although sub-rule(5)does not contemplate issuing any second notice after receipt ofthe statement of a case or a Written Statement, i.e. date and timeis required to be fixed for the purpose of statement of case and adate and time, which is also required to be intimated to the partyconcerned for the purpose. [Para 13][1034-B-D, E]

1.3 In the facts of the present case, it has to be held thatthe Tribunal was required to intimate date and time for receivingof the Written Statement by the company. Neither the order sheetof Tribunal indicate that any date was fixed for such service ofWritten Statement nor any intimation was sent to the company.Thus, there was a clear breach of sub-rule(5) of Rule 20B, noerror has been committed by High Court in taking the view thatRule 20B(5) has been violated, resulting in violation of principlesof natural justice. [Para 13][1034-D-F]

2. Rule 21 empowers the Tribunal to proceed when anyparty to a proceeding fails to attend. The plain language of Rule21 does not indicate that it is necessary for Tribunal to issue anynotice to a party before proceeding ex-parte. However, theexpression used in Rule 21 is “may proceed”. Thus, on non-appearance on one day does not oblige the Tribunal to proceedex-parte. The Tribunal or arbitrator can exercise his discretionand may decide to send a notice before proceeding ex-parte infacts of each case, which may be required in facts of a particularcase. Even if it is accepted that no mandatory notice under Rule21 was required to be issued by the Tribunal to the company, A

Athere being violation of Rule 20B(5), the High Court committedno error in setting aside the order of the Tribunal’s ex-parte awardby directing the Tribunal to proceed afresh. [Para 14][1034-F-H]

Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi v. L.H. Patel and Another(2009) 2 SCC 81 : [2008] 16 SCR 490 – relied on.BGrindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government IndustrialTribunal and Others (1980) Supp. SCC 420 : [1981]SCR 341 ; Anil Sood v. Presiding Officer, Labour CourtII (2001) 10 SCC 534 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8320Dof 2011.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.2009 of the High Courtat Calcutta in F.M.A. No. 1187 of 2009.

Manoj Swarup, Hiren Dasan, Chand Qureshi, Ankur Raghav, UdayEGupta, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha , Advs. for the Appellant.

Chira Ranjan Addy Adv. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

F1. This appeal has been filed against the Division Bench judgmentdated 23.12.2009 of Calcutta High Court in F.M.A. No. 1187 of 2009 bywhich the appeal filed by appellant has been dismissed.

2. The issue involved in this appeal lies in a very narrow compass.The necessary facts of the case to be noticed for deciding the issueGare:- 2.1The appellant was working as Accountant in the respondentcompany since 1986. There had been change ofmanagement in the year 2004 in the company. The appellantwas not allowed to work w.e.f. 02.05.2005. The State ofHWest Bengal referred the industrial dispute between the company and the appellant to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal.The Tribunal framed the issue as to whether refusal ofemployment to Shri Mahabir Prosad Choudhary by themanagement w.e.f. 02.05.2005 is justified?

2.2After receiving the reference, the Industrial Tribunal on27.08.2007 issued summons upon the parties concerneddirecting them to appear on 19.09.2007. The workmanappeared on 19.09.2007 but no one appeared from thecompany, since the summons were received back with theremarks “left”. 11.10.2007 was again fixed by the Tribunal.On 11.10.2007, Tribunal noted that summons sent throughProcess Server has been served upon the company. Theadvocate for the workman appeared and filed W/S. TheW/S was filed without serving the copy of W/S to thecompany. On 05.11.2007, none of the parties had appearedand 27.11.2007 was fixed for W/S by the company. On29.11.2007, no one appeared on behalf of the company, theTribunal fixed for ex-parte hearing. 26.12.2007 was fixedfor documents of the workman. On 26.12.2007, documentswere filed, which were kept on record and 29.01.2008 wasfixed for ex-parte hearing. The Tribunal again on the requestof the workman deferred the case, which was fixed for exparte hearing for 26.02.2008. On 26.02.2008, none appearedfor the company, workman was heard and the award waspronounced. The Hon’ble Tribunal disposed of the awardex-parte by allowing the claim of reinstatement with fullback wages. The award was also published on 27.03.2008.

2.3The company filed an application on 02.05.2008 to recallthe ex-parte award. The company stated in its applicationthat as per the agreement dated 10.06.2004 with its erstwhilemanagement, the new management has no responsibility inrespect of senior executives and managerial staff of the oldmanagement including the appellant. The company statesthat ex-parte award was received on 22.04.2008 andthereafter an application has been filed for recall of the exparte award dated 26.02.2008. The Tribunal heard theparties on the application filed by the company. The tribunalalthough returned the finding that the award was passed in A

Aviolation of principles of natural justice and no notice underRule 20B(5) and Rule 21 of the West Bengal IndustrialDisputes Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “1958Rules”) were served on the company. The Tribunal,however, took the view that application being filed by thecompany after 30 days of publication of the award, theBTribunal has become functus officio, hence the applicationis rejected.

2.4After rejection of application, the company filed a writ petitionin the Calcutta High Court. Learned Single Judge vide itsjudgment and order dated 11.02.2009 allowed the writ petitionCsetting aside the award and the order dated 30.09.2008 ofthe Industrial Tribunal and the Tribunal was directed toreconsider the issue between the parties as expeditiously aspossible in accordance with law upon affording themopportunity of being heard. Against the judgment of learnedDSingle Judge, the appellant filed an appeal before the DivisionBench, which has been dismissed by the impugned judgmentof the Calcutta High Court.

3. Shri Manoj Swarup, learned counsel for the appellant in supportof the appeal contends that notice issued by the Industrial Tribunal inEForm D2 was served on the company, which has also been recorded bythe Industrial Tribunal, there was no cause for non-appearance of thecompany before the Tribunal. The Tribunal rightly proceeded ex-partedue to non-appearance of the company. He submits that the applicationfor recall of the ex-parte award was filed after 30 days from publicationof award, the Tribunal having become functus officio, the Tribunal hasFrightly taken the view that application for recall cannot be entertained.He further submits that the view of the High Court that there was violationof Rule 20B(5) and Rule 21 of 1958 Rules is erroneous. He submits thatRule 20B(5) contemplates that Tribunal, in event, if the W/S had beenfiled, the same shall be made available to the party concerned or itsGauthorised representative in the office of Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court.He submits that Rule 20B(5) does not contemplate that any notice hasto be issued to the other party for receiving the W/S. He submits thatthere is no non-compliance of Rule 20B(5). He submits that High Courtcommitted error in taking the view that notice was required to be servedunder Rule 21 to the company before hearing the case ex-parte. NoHone has appeared on behalf of the respondent.

4. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel forthe appellant and have perused the records.

5. Before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, mainsubmission, which was pressed by the appellant was that applicationfiled by the company for recall of the ex-parte order was after 30 daysof publication, hence, could not have been entertained. The DivisionBench of the High court has elaborately dealt with the said issue andrepelled the contention. There is no dispute regarding dates and events,which took place in the present case. The date of ex-parte award is26.02.2008, the publication of the award was made on 27.03.2008 andthe case of the company was that it came to know about the award on22.04.2008. The date of filing of application for recall of ex-parte awardis 02.05.2008, the application was clearly beyond 30 days from publicationof the award.

6. Before we proceed to consider the submissions raised by learnedcounsel for the appellant, it is relevant to notice certain Rules of 1958Rules. Rule 20B deals with Statement of case or written statement.Rule 20B is as follows:- 20B. Statement of case or written statement. - (1) TheIndustrial Tribunal/Labour Court shall, on the date fixed in thesummons for the appearance of the parties direct the party whichappears to the Tribunal/Labour Court to be the party at whoseinstance the reference has been initiated or where no such partycan be ascertained, the party, which, in the opinion of the IndustrialTribunal/Labour Court, ought to be required to state its case first(hereinafter referred to as the first party) to state its case, togetherwith the grounds upon which the claim for relief is founded, and alist of relevant documents which are in their possession and uponwhich they want to rely, in writing on a date fixed by the IndustrialTribunal/Labour Court which shall ordinarily be within two weeksfrom the date of the order.

(2) After the first party has complied with the order passed undersub rule (1), the other party (hereinafter referred to as the secondparty) shall be asked to file its written statement and a list ofrelevant documents which are in their possession and upon whichthey want to rely on a date fixed by the Industrial Tribunal/LabourCourt, which shall ordinarily be within two weeks from the dateof the order.

(3) Every statement of case and every written statement shall besigned and verified in the manner prescribed by rule 69 or rule 70,as the case may be.

(4) Each party shall file along with its statement of case or thewritten statement, as the case may be, as many copies thereof asBmay be directed by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court.

(5) A copy of the statement of case or the written statement shallbe served on the first party or the second party, as the case maybe, by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court within seven days fromthe date on which copies of the statement of case or the writtenstatement, as the case may be, are filed by making it over to theparty concerned or to its authorised representative in the Officeof the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court on a date and time fixedfor the purpose and intimated to the party concerned by theIndustrial Tribunal/Labour Court.

D7. Rule 21, which empowers the Tribunal to proceed ex-parte isas follows:- “21. Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, or Arbitratormay proceed ex-parte. - If without sufficient cause being shown,any party to a proceeding before a Board, Court, Labour Court,ETribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board,Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as ifsuch party had duly attended or had been represented.

8. Rule 27 deals with the correction of errors and review of anaward, which is to the following effect:- F“27. Correction of errors and review of an award. - TheLabour Court, Industrial Tribunal or Arbitrator may -

(i) correct any clerical or arithmetical mistake arising from anaccidental slip or omission in any award made by it or him, and

(ii) review an award on the ground of some mistake or errorGapparent on the face of the record, either of its/his own motion oron the application of any of the parties ;

(iii) for sufficient cause set aside after notice to the opposite partyor parties as the case may be, the ex-parte award or an award onthe footing that the industrial dispute under reference is no longer H

in existence either of its/his own motion or on the application ofany of the parties :

Provided that no correction shall be made without previousnotices to the parties or opposite party, as the case may be.

Provided further that no application for review under clause(iii) shall be entertained on the expiry of the 15th day from thedate of the award.”

9. This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central GovernmentIndustrial Tribunal and Others, (1980) Supp. SCC 420, had occasionto consider Rule 22 of Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 as wellas Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957. Rule 22 of IndustrialDisputes (Bombay) Rules, are pari materia with Rule 21 of the WestBengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. This Court in the case ofGrindlays Bank Ltd. (supra) has held that Rule 22 and Rule 24Bwere sufficiently the source of power for the Industrial Courts to recallthe ex-parte award. Following was laid down in Paragraph 11:- “11. The language of Rule 22 unequivocally makes the jurisdictionof the Tribunal to render an ex parte award conditional upon thefulfilment of its requirements. If there is no sufficient cause forthe absence of a party, the Tribunal undoubtedly has jurisdictionto proceed ex parte. But if there was sufficient cause shownwhich prevented a party from appearing, then under the terms ofRule 22, the Tribunal will have had no jurisdiction to proceed andconsequently, it must necessarily have power to set aside the exparte award. In other words, there is power to proceed ex parte,but such power is subject to the fulfilment of the condition laiddown in Rule 22. The power to proceed ex parte under Rule 22carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there wassufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing.”

10. The submission which was pressed before the High Court inthe present case that application having been filed to recall after expiryof 30 days from publication of the award as per the judgment of thisCourt in Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra), the Tribunal has become functusofficio and could not have entertained the application. This Court hadoccasion to consider this very aspect in Radhakrishna Mani TripathiVs. L.H. Patel and Another, (2009) 2 SCC 81. This Court noticedthe observation made by this Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd.

1029

A(supra) in Paragraph No.14 as well as judgment of this Court in AnilSood Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II, (2001) 10 SCC 534in Paragraph Nos. 16, 17 and 18, this Court laid down following:- “14. In Grindlays Bank this Court held that Rules 22 and 24(b)were sufficiently the source of power for the Industrial Courts torecall an ex parte award. It was pointed out that in terms of Rule22 the Industrial Courts could proceed ex parte in the matter onlyin case a party to the proceeding failed to attend or be representedwithout showing sufficient cause. The Court held that power toproceed ex parte under Rule 22 carried with it the power to inquirewhether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of theparty at the hearing and in case the party was able to showsufficient cause for its non-appearance on the date the court hadproceeded ex parte against it, to recall the award. (Vide para 11of the decision.)

16. Coming now to the submission based on Section 17-A of theAct the Court in para 14 of the decision held and observed asfollows: (Grindlays Bank case, SCC pp. 425-26)

“14. The contention that the Tribunal had become functusofficio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the exparte award and that the Central Government alone could setit aside, does not commend to us. Sub-section (3) of Section20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before theTribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on whichthe award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. UnderSection 17-A of the Act, an award becomes enforceable onthe expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication underSection 17. The proceedings with regard to a referenceunder Section 10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed tobe concluded until the expiry of 30 days from thepublication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retainsjurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudicationand up to that date it has the power to entertain anapplication in connection with such dispute. That stage isnot reached till the award becomes enforceable underSection 17-A. In the instant case, the Tribunal made the exparte award on 9-12-1976. That award was published by theCentral Government in the Gazette of India dated 25-12-1976.

The application for setting aside the ex parte award was filedby Respondent 3, acting on behalf of Respondents 5 to 17 on19-1-1977 i.e. before the expiry of 30 days of its publicationand was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal. It hadjurisdiction to entertain it and decide it on merits.”

(emphasis added)

From the above quotation it would appear that in Grindlays Bankthe recall application was filed within thirty days from the date ofpublication of the award and hence, the objection raised on thebasis of Section 17-A did not arise in this case. In GrindlaysBank this Court did not say that the Industrial Courts would haveno jurisdiction to entertain an application for setting aside an awardmade after thirty days of its publication. Nevertheless, on the basisof the passage marked in italics in the above quotation Ms Issarstrongly contended that that is the true import of the judgment.

17. We are unable to accept. The position is made clear in thelater decision in Anil Sood v. Labour Court. In Anil Soodinterestingly the Labour Court had rejected the recall applicationon the very same ground that after making the award it becamefunctus officio in the matter. The order of the Labour Court waschallenged before the High Court but the High Court also tookthe same view. In appeal this Court noted that the award wasmade on 11-9-1995 and the application for its recall was filed on6-11-1995. The Court referred to the earlier decision in GrindlaysBank and the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 11of the Act and in paras 6, 7 and 8 of the decision observed andheld as follows: (Anil Sood case, SCC p. 536)

“6. The aspect that the party against whom award is to bemade due opportunity to defend has to be given is a matter ofprocedure and not that of power in the sense in which thelanguage is adopted in Section 11. When matters are referredto the tribunal or court they have to be decided objectively andthe tribunals/courts have to exercise their discretion in a judicialmanner without arbitrariness by following the general principlesof law and rules of natural justice.

7. The power to proceed ex parte is available under Rule 22 ofthe Central Rules which also includes the power to inquire A

Awhether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of aparty at the hearing, and if there is sufficient cause shownwhich prevented a party from appearing, then if the party isvisited with an award without a notice which is a nullity andtherefore the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed andconsequently, it must necessarily have power to set aside theBex parte award.

8. If this be the position in law, both the High Court and theTribunal (sic Labour Court) fell into an error in stating that theLabour Court had become functus officio after making theaward though ex parte. We set aside the order made and theaward passed by the Labour Court and affirmed by the HighCourt in this regard, in view of the fact that the learned counselfor the respondent conceded that application filed by theappellant be allowed, set aside the ex parte award and restorethe reference.”

18. In light of the decision in Anil Sood we find no substance inthe appellant’s submission based on Section 17-A of the Act. Therebeing no substance in the first limb of the submission there is noquestion of any conflict between Rule 26(2) of the Bombay Rulesand Section 17-A of the Act.”

11. This Court in Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi’s case (supra)has clearly held that the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra)did notsay that the Industrial Courts would have no jurisdiction to entertain anapplication for setting aside an award made after thirty days of itspublication. This Court’s judgment in Radhakrishna Mani TripathiF(supra) is clearly applicable in the present case. Furthermore, in thepresent case, the Tribunal, which rejected the application of the companyto recall the ex-parte award had itself returned the finding that therewas violation of principles of natural justice since a copy of W/S was notsent to the company. The High Court after considering the submissionof the parties had made following observations:- G

“On a perusal of the order dated 30.09.2008 it is difficult for thisCourt to accept the contention raised on behalf of the workman.It appears from the said order that the Tribunal had accepted theposition that notice under Rule 21 of the said Rules had not beenserved upon the company before placing the case for ex-parte H

hearing. It has also accepted that Written Statement filed theworkman had not been served upon them in accordance withprovisions contained in Rules 20B(5) of the said Rules. On theface of such finding recorded by the Tribunal, it is absolutely clearthat proceedings were conducted before it, leading to the impugnedaward, in clear violation of principles of natural as well asmandatory provisions of law. The award passed on 26.2.2008 isliable to be set aside only on this ground.”

12. Shri Manoj Swarup, learned counsel for the appellant hasstrenuously contended that present is not a case of any breach of Rule20B(5) as held by the High Court. The relevant order of the IndustrialTribunal has been brought on the record by the appellant, i.e., of11.10.2007, where workman had appeared and filed Written Statement.It has been noted in the order that copy of the W/S cannot be servedupon the another party as none appeared on behalf of the company.Sub-rule (5) of Rule 20B, which is relevant for present case is reproducedfor ready reference:- 20B. Statement of case or written statement. –

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

20B. Statement of case or written statement. –

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

13. A perusal of sub-rule(5) of Rule 20B indicates that the copyof the statement of the case or the W/S is to be served on the first partyor the second party, as the case may be, by the Industrial Tribunal/LabourCourt within seven days from the date on which copies of the statementof case or the written statement, as the case may be, are filed, by makingit over to the party concerned or to its authorised representative in theOffice of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court on a date and time fixedfor the purpose and intimated to the party concerned by the IndustrialTribunal/Labour Court. The duty, thus, has been cast on the Tribunal to AB

Aserve a copy of W/S or statement of case on either side. The use ofword “shall be served” in sub-clause (5) of Rule 20B has to be givensome meaning and purpose. The provision obviously cast a duty onIndustrial Tribunal and the Court to ensure that service should be completedwithin seven days. Another aspect, which is decipherable from the Ruleis that Tribunal has to ensure that statement of case of W/S has to beBserved by making it available to the party concerned or its authorisedrepresentative in the office of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court on adate and time fixed for the purpose. The last line of the sub-rule (5)used the expression “on a date and time fixed for the purpose and intimatedto the party concerned by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court”. TheCabove expression contains two requirements, firstly, the IndustrialTribunal/Labour Court has to fix a date for service of statement of caseof W/S within 7 days, specially, fixed date for the purpose and secondlydate and time fixed for purpose has to be intimated to the party concerned.Although sub-rule(5) does not contemplate issuing any second notice

after receipt of the statement of a case or a W/S, i.e. date and time isDrequired to be fixed for the purpose of statement of case and a date andtime, which is also required to be intimated to the party concerned forthe purpose. In the facts of present case, it has to be held that the Tribunalwas required to intimate date and time for receiving of the writtenstatement by the company. Neither the order sheet of Tribunal indicateEthat any date was fixed for such service of W/S nor any intimation wassent to the company. Thus, there was a clear breach of sub-rule(5) ofRule 20B, no error has been committed by High Court in taking the viewthat Rule 20B(5) has been violated, resulting in violation of principles ofnatural justice.F14. Now coming to Rule 21, which empowers the Tribunal toproceed when any party to a proceeding fails to attend. Learned counselfor the appellant is right in his submission that the plain language of Rule21 does not indicate that it is necessary for Tribunal to issue any noticeto a party before proceeding ex-parte. However, the expression used inRule 21 is “may proceed”. Thus, on non-appearance on one day doesGnot oblige the Tribunal to proceed ex-parte. The Tribunal or arbitratorcan exercise his discretion and may decide to send a notice beforeproceeding ex-parte in facts of each case, which may be required infacts of a particular case. But even otherwise accepting, the submissionof the learned counsel for the appellant that no mandatory notice underHRule 21 was required to be issued by the Tribunal to the company, there being violation of Rule 20B(5), the High Court committed no error insetting aside the order of the Tribunal’s ex-parte award by directing theTribunal to proceed afresh.

15. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that appellanthas already attained the age of superannuation in July, 2018.

16. In view of the foregoing discussions, we do not find any errorin the judgment of the High Court. The appeal being devoid of any meritis dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.

Kalpana K. Tripathy

Appeal dismissed.