CHANDAN BANERJEE & ORS. versus KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH & ORS. on 21 September 2021

[2021] 11 S.C.R.

ACHANDAN BANERJEE & ORS.

v.

KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 5582 of 2021)

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SEPTEMBER 21, 2021

[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, VIKRAM NATHAND HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]

Service Law: Promotion – Post of Assistant Engineer (AE) –CPromotion against supernumerary posts – Circular prescribingseparate conditions for diploma and degree holder Sub-AssistantEngineers (SAEs) for supernumerary appointments as AEs – Inpursuance thereof, publication of gradation list of SAEs promotedto the post of AE against the supernumerary posts – Writ petition byDthe appellants-diploma-holder SAEs, challenging the circular andgradation list – Allowed by the Single Judge holding that whenpersons having different educational qualifications are subject toa common recruitment process and are selected thereafter, asubsequent classification in that cadre would be in violation of Arts14 and 16 – However, the Division Bench of the High Court upheldEthe validity of the circular and gradation list – On appeal, held:The promotional policy of the Municipal Corporation forsupernumerary posts is not irrational or arbitrary or to the detrimentof diploma holder SAEs – While creating supernumerary posts, theMunicipal Corporation has not completely restricted the promotionalFavenues of diploma-holder SAEs who stagnated in their service – Ithas provided adequate opportunity, although on different terms andconditions – In matters of public policy and public employment, thelegislature or its delegate must be given sufficient room to decidethe quality of individuals it seeks to employ as against differentpositions – Circular indicates that the supernumerary posts wereGcreated for removal of stagnation amongst SAEs, thus, the circularand the gradation list do not suffer from the vice of arbitrarinessand discrimination – Order passed by the Division Bench upheld –Calcutta Municipal Corporation Services (Common Cadres)Regulations.H

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. While creating supernumerary posts, KolkataMunicipal Corporation-KMC has not completely restricted thepromotional avenues of diploma-holder SAEs who have stagnatedin their service. It has provided adequate opportunity to them toadvance in their career, although on different terms andconditions. Thus, the promotional policy of KMC forsupernumerary posts is not irrational or arbitrary or to thedetriment of diploma holder SAEs. In matters of public policyand public employment, the legislature or its delegate must begiven sufficient room to decide the quality of individuals it seeksto employ as against different positions. As long as these decisionsare not arbitrary, this Court must refrain from interfering in thepolicy domain. Thus, the impugned circular and the subsequentgradation list do not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness anddiscrimination. The decision of the Division Bench of the HighCourt is upheld. [Paras 42, 43][748-E-H; 749-A]

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2. The principles as regards classification made for purposeof promotion/selection of employees are as follows:

(i) Classification between persons must not produceartificial inequalities. The classification must beEfounded on a reasonable basis and must bear nexusto the object and purpose sought to be achieved topass the muster of Articles 14 and 16;

(ii) Judicial review in matters of classification is limitedto a determination of whether the classification isreasonable and bears a nexus to the object sought tobe achieved. Courts cannot indulge in a mathematicalevaluation of the basis of classification or replace thewisdom of the legislature or its delegate with theirown; F

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(iii) Generally speaking, educational qualification is a validground for classification between persons of the sameclass in matters of promotion and is not violative ofArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution; H

A(iv)Persons drawn from different sources and integratedinto a common class can be differentiated on groundsof educational qualification for the purpose ofpromotion, where this bears a nexus with theefficiency required in the promotional post; B(v)Educational qualification may be used for introducingquotas for promotion for a certain class of persons;or may even be used to restrict promotion entirely toone class, to the exclusion of others;

(vi) Educational qualification may be used as a criterionfor classification for promotion to increaseadministrative efficiency at the higher posts; and C

(vii) However, a classification made on grounds ofeducational qualification should bear nexus to thepurpose of the classification or the extent ofdifferences in qualifications. [Para 26][743-A-G]

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State of Mysore v. P Narasing Rao AIR 1968 SC 349;Ganga Ram v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 377 : [1970]3 SCR 481; Union of India v. Dr (Mrs) SB Kohli (1973)3 SCC 592; Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India AIRE1967 SC 1889; Mohammed Shujat Ali v. Union of India(1973) 3 SCC 76; Roop Chand Adlakha v. DelhiDevelopment Authority 1989 Supp (1) SCC 116; MRathinaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu (2009) 2 SCC (LS)101; State of Uttarakhand v. SK Singh (2019) 10 SCC49 : [2019] (10) JT 264; AS Iyer v. V BalasubramanyamF(1980) 1 SCC 634 : [1980] 1 SCR 1036; Union of Indiav. Atul Shukla (2014) 10 SCC 432:[2014] 14 SCR1151; Maharashtra Forest Guards and Foresters Unionv. State of Maharashtra (2018) 1 SCC 149 : [2017] 14SCR 446; Food Corporation of India v. Om Prakash(1998) 7 SCC 676 : [1998] 3 SCR 1193 – referred to.

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3.1 The appellants have not contested the fact thateducational qualification is not a valid ground for classification inmatters of public employment, or that promotional avenues are H

not available to diploma holder SAEs to the post of AE. Theappellants seek to challenge the impugned circular on the limitedground that the eligibility conditions for promotion to thesupernumerary posts of AE are different for diploma-holder SAEs,who require twenty-five years of experience to be eligible, asopposed to degree-holder SAEs, who require thirteen years ofexperience. [Para 28][744-A-C]

3.2 The reading of Trilokinath Khosa’s case as urged by theappellants is fundamentally flawed. In Trilokinath Khosa’s case,the Court had adverted to the well-established principle that oncedirect recruits and promotees are integrated into a common pool,they cannot be treated differently based on the ‘source ofrecruitment’. This however does not imply that they cannot beclassified on other reasonable grounds. Thus, whether there aretwo different streams of recruitment, or a single source ofrecruitment merged into a common pool, the classification thatwas upheld in Trilokinath Khosa’s case was based on educationalqualification which was linked to the purpose of enhancingadministrative efficiency in the organization. [Para 30][744-E,F-H]

State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Shri Trilokinath Khosa(1974) 1 SCC 19:[1974] 1 SCR 771 – relied on.

3.3 The Recruitment Regulations and their subsequentamendments by KMC suggest that the administration hascontinued to create a distinction between degree and diplomaholder SAEs for the purpose of promotion. In regular promotion,this distinction is made by way of a quota for degree-holder SAEs,while in terms of supernumerary promotion, it has been by wayof difference in eligibility conditions. Be it one way or the other,it is evident that the administration has sought to employ a highernumber of degree holders at the position of AE than diplomaholders. The reason for the increase in degree-holders for thepost of AEs could be due to circumstances such as the higherlevel of technical expertise required for the superior post, increasein managerial and technical workload, and enhancement insupervisory functions. It is not amiss to draw a conclusion that ahigher educational degree, coupled with stipulated years of ABC

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Aexperience, could bring in certain benefits to the position of anAE that the management desires. In any case, it is not for thisCourt to decide whether a higher educational qualification wouldfulfil the objectives of the management, as long as the nexusbetween the educational qualification and the need for higherefficiency is not absurd, irrational or arbitrary. The educationalBqualifications may be linked to higher administrative efficiencyand thus the classification on this basis is not in violation ofArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [Para 38][746-C-E, G-H;747-A-B]

3.4 The term “supernumerary” is defined as “present inCexcess of the normal or requisite number”, or “not belonging toa regular staff but engaged for extra work”. A “supernumerarypost” is defined as “a post exceeding the usual stated orprescribed number”. The impugned circular indicates that thesesupernumerary posts were created for removal of stagnationDamongst SAEs. It cannot be denied that SAEs once promoted tothe post of an AE in these supernumerary posts would beperforming the task and functions of an AE. Thus, it is not merelya change in the designation of an SAE to an AE, but involves anincrease in workload, supervisory functions, and performance ofthe regular functions of an AE. Since that is the case, there is noEreason why the rationale underlying the need for higher degree-holders in the AE cadre through regular promotion would not beapplicable in the case of supernumerary posts. In other words, achallenge to the impugned circular could not be sustained if,instead of providing different eligibility conditions, KMC hadFprovided for creation of a fixed number of supernumerary postsout of which a proportion was reserved for degree-holder SAEs.By the very reason that these posts are supernumerary anddepend on the number of eligible persons, a fixed number ofpositions could not have been anticipated. It is perhaps for this reason that KMC sought to digress from the regular method ofGgranting promotion and opted to introduce separate eligibilityconditions. Therefore, the separate eligibility conditions forpromotion to supernumerary AE posts on the basis of educationalqualification is in line with the past promotion practices of KMCand is not an unreasonable classification. [Para 40][747-D-G;H748-A-C]

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The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Judy Pearsalled., 10th ed, 1999); P. Ramanatha Aiyar, THE LAWLEXICON, THE ENCYLOPAEDIC LAWDICTIONARY p. 1838 – referred to.

3.5 Even otherwise, Clause 3 of the impugned circularprovides that these supernumerary posts would be adjusted asand when a vacancy becomes available within the sanctioned postsof an AE. Further, Clause 5 stipulates that there would be nochange in the Recruitment Regulations for the posts of AE. Whatthis means is that the regular promotion of degree or diplomaholder SAEs is not impacted by way of the impugned circular. Asand when vacancies arise in the sanctioned AE posts, the AEsholding supernumerary posts would be subject to the RecruitmentRegulations and the selection process for promotion of an SAEto an AE. The supernumerary posts are personal to the eligibleAEs and will lapse on their being promoted on a regular basis asAEs or ceasing to remain in service. [Para 41][748-C-E]

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Manas Kumar Sinha v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.Writ Petition 3720(W) of 2008; Union of India v. AtulShukla & Ors. (2014) 10 SCC 432 : [2014] 14 SCR1151; Co.AS Iyer & Ors. v. Bala Subramanyan & Ors.(1980) 1 SCC 634 : [1980] 1 SCR 1036; Punjab StateElectricity Board & Anr. v. Ravinder Kumar Sharma &Ors. (1986) 4 SCC 617 : [1987] 1 SCR 72; Roop ChandAdlakha v. Delhi Development Authority and others1989 Supp (1) SCC 116 : [1988] (3) Suppl. SCR 253;State of Uttarakhand v. SK Singh (2019) 10 SCC 49 :[2019] (10) JT 264 – referred to.

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Case Law Reference

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.5582 ofD2021.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.01.2019 of the High Courtof Judicature at Calcutta in F.M.A. No.782 of 2017.

Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, Sr. Adv., Achinta Bannerjee,Raghunath Chakraborty, Kunal Chatterji, Ms. Maitrayee Banerjee, Advs.Efor the Appellants.

Amit Sharma, Ms. Pallavi Barua, Dipesh Sinha, Sujoy Mondal,Ms. Reshmi Rea Sinha, Sukesh Ghosh, Sarvesh Ch. Shrivastava, Advs.for the Respondents.

FThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.

Index

AFacts.........................................................................2

GBSubmissions of parties..............................................9

CLegal Position............................................................12

DAnalysis..................................................................22

EConclusion..............................................................29

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1. The appeal arises from a judgment of the Division Bench ofthe High Court of Calcutta dated 25 January 2019. The Division Benchupheld a circular dated 3 July 2012 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation[1]which prescribed separate conditions for diploma and degree holder Sub-Assistant Engineers[2 ]for supernumerary appointments as AssistantEngineers[3]. The gradation list dated 5 July 2012 prepared in pursuanceof the impugned circular has also been upheld.

2. The appellants, who are SAEs possessing a diploma inengineering, instituted a writ petition before the High Court challengingthe circular dated 3 July 2012 and gradation list on the ground thatclassification within the same cadre of SAE for the purpose ofappointment to supernumerary posts violates Articles 14 and 16 of theConstitution of India. By a judgment dated 6 October 2015, the SingleJudge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and held the circular tobe arbitrary and unconstitutional. In a Letters Patent Appeal, the DivisionBench, reversed the decision of the Single Judge and held thatclassification made on the basis of educational qualifications forsupernumerary appointments to the higher post of Assistant Engineer, isvalid.

A Facts

A Facts

3. KMC, the twentieth respondent, has two distinct service cadresin the Engineering Department : (i) Subordinate Engineering Serviceand (ii) Engineering Service. The entry post in the Subordinate EngineeringService is a Sub-ordinate Assistant Engineer (SAE), for which theminimum qualification is a diploma in engineering in civil/mechanical/electrical branches. Although the minimum requirement is that of adiploma, a person holding a degree in engineering is also eligible toparticipate in the selection process. The selection process involves awritten examination, followed by an interview conducted by the MunicipalService Commission. Pursuant to this, a merit list is prepared. The cadreof Subordinate Engineering Service comprises of persons holding adiploma or degree in engineering, many of the degree holders havingacquired the qualification after appointment. The first promotion fromthe post of SAE is as an Assistant Engineer (AE), after which an SAEcan aspire for successive promotions, right up to the post of Chief 1 “KMC”

2 “SAE”

3 “AE”

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AEngineer. The AE is the entry level post in the Engineering Service cadre,for which direct recruitment is conducted from persons holding anengineering degree. Thus, the post of AE may be filled through directrecruitment or through promotion of SAEs.

4. On 23 December 1994, the Calcutta Municipal CorporationBServices (Common Cadres) Regulations[4] were notified under Section20 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act 1980. The RecruitmentRegulations apply to the employees under all departments and officesand provide for the management and control of common cadres; seniorityand recruitment, among other conditions of service. Rule 9 of theRecruitment Regulations provides the method of recruitment for the postCof AE and SAE, which is contained in the table below:

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G5. The Recruitment Regulations were modified on 7 August 1997to provide three modes of appointment to the post of AE: (i) promotionof SAEs having at least 10 years’ experience in the post below AE; (ii)direct recruitment; and (iii) promotion by selection of SAEs from all H4 Circular No 69 of 1994-95; hereinafter “Recruitment Regulations”

disciplines having a degree. The quota for the above three streams wasfixed at 45% : 45% : 10%.The modified Regulations are produced below:

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6. The Recruitment Regulations for the post of AE were modifiedby KMC and notified by a circular[5] dated 20 February 2002, which statedthat:

(i) 50% of the total cadre strength of AE shall be filled up bypromotion from the posts borne in the common cadre forESAE having at least ten years’ experience as an SAE; (ii)15% of the post of total cadre strength of AE shall be filledup by promotion from amongst SAEs having an engineeringdegree or equivalent from a recognized University; andhaving at least ten years’ experience as an SAE, out ofwhich a minimum of five years should be as a degree (ofequivalent) holder SAE in respective streams; and F

(iii) 35% of the total cadre strength would be filled up by directrecruitment observing necessary formalities.

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7. This circular was challenged in a writ petition[6] before the HighCourt, which was disposed of with a direction to the petitioners in thatcase to make a representation before the KMC.

5 D.M.C.(P)’s Circular No./4/2001-2002

6 Manas Kumar Sinha v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., Writ Petition 3720(W) of2008

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A8. The KMC, in an effort to remove stagnation in promotion tothe next higher post of AE from the post of SAE, issued a circular[7]dated 17 June 2008. The circular, also known as the first careeradvancement scheme, stipulated awarding the basic scale of pay (Rs.8,000 - 275/-1000) of an AE to SAEs who have completed twenty yearsof satisfactory service in the KMC.B

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9. In 2012, a proposal was circulated by the Personnel Departmentof KMC for creation of supernumerary posts in the rank of AEs foropening promotional avenues for SAEs. The rationale for the proposalwas to rectify the stagnation faced by SAEs who, despite having completedtwenty to twenty-five years of service, had not been promoted and wereCthus, demotivated. In addition to this, some SAEs had acquired anengineering degree while in service, and yet had not been promoted.The proposal sought to create a distinction between SAEs holding adiploma and those holding a degree (acquired prior to joining KMC as anSAE, or during the service). The former would be promoted to the postDof an AE if they had completed twenty-five years of service, while thelatter would be if they had completed thirteen years of service or more,out of which five years were served as a degree holder.

10. The proposal, which was considered to be the second careeradvancement scheme, was implemented by the impugned circular datedE3 July 2012. The circular stipulates the creation of supernumerary AEposts for SAEs holding a diploma and having completed twenty-fiveyears of service and SAEs holding a degree and having completed thirteenyears of service (out of which five years were as a degree holder).Clause 3 of the impugned circular states that the supernumerary postswill be adjusted against the permanent vacancies as and when a vacancyFbecomes available within the sanctioned posts of AE. Further, Clause 5of the impugned circular provides that there is no change in the existingRecruitment Regulations for the posts of AE. In pursuance of theimpugned circular, an office order dated 5 July 2012 published a list ofSAEs who had been promoted to the post of AE against thesupernumerary posts. Both the impugned circular and the subsequentGgradation list have been challenged before the High Court and this Court.

11. The Single Judge of the High Court held that when personshaving different educational qualifications are subject to a common 7 D.M.C(P)’s Circular No. 06/IIIB/2008-09; hereinafter “First Career AdvancementHScheme”

recruitment process and are selected thereafter, a subsequentclassification in that cadre would be in violation of Articles 14 and 16 ofthe Constitution. The Single Judge also observed that the classificationfor promotion was not made to reward those SAEs who had improvedtheir educational qualification during service, but instead was a benefitgranted to all degree holders. On the contrary, in appeal, the DivisionBench of the High Court upheld the validity of the impugned circularand gradation list and while reversing the view of the Single Judgeobserved that:

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(i) The quota for promotion from SAEs to AEs on the basis ofeducational qualification and experience was created on 7August 1997, and not by the impugned circular. The previouscirculars making such a distinction have not been challengedand have remained in operation; C

(ii) Irrespective of their qualification, the SAEs are given thebasic pay scale of an AE on completion of twenty years ofDservice. The impugned circular by creating supernumeraryposts, merely designates SAE as AEs. No other benefit isgranted apart from this designation;

(iii) The impugned circular does not modify the existingpromotional avenues, but only supplements them byconferring the title of AE on certain eligible SAEs. TheseEsupernumerary posts are subject to adjustment againstpermanent vacancies on being created. Thus, the normalstrength of the AE cadre is not increased;

(iv) The impugned circular does not alter the promotionalavenues of an SAE holding a diploma, nor does it enhancethe promotional avenues of a degree holder. Thus, the quotaof posts created by the circular dated 20 February 2002(modified by circular dated 17 June 2008), has not beensuperseded by the impugned circular; and F

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(v) In State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Shri TrilokinathKhosa[8], this Court held that a classification made on thebasis of educational qualifications to achieve administrativeefficiency is not arbitrary or impermissible under Articles14 or 16 of the Constitution. The classification made by H

8 (1974) 1 SCC 19

AKMC to increase efficiency by removing frustration amongststagnated SAEs is also a similar policy decision, which mustnot be interfered with.

B Submissions of parties

12. Mr Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, learned Senior CounselBappearing on behalf of the appellants who are diploma holder SAEs, hasmade the following submissions:

(i) The private respondents to the appealare persons possessingan engineering degree, who had joined the cadre of SAEdespite the minimum qualification for the said post being aCdiploma in engineering. These persons already have aseparate reservation of 15 per cent for the promotion to thepost of an AE according to circular dated 20 February 2002;

(ii) The impugned circular sought to provide an incentive tostagnating SAEs for promotion. However, KMC had failedto notify that an existing SAE could obtain a higherDqualification to avail of the benefit of promotion by creatingsupernumerary posts. In the absence of such a notice,differential treatment cannot be meted out to persons whohave been recruited through a common process;

(iii) The decisions of this Court in Union of India v. Atul ShuklaE& Ors.[9]; Co. AS Iyer & Ors. v. Bala Subramanyan &Ors.[10]; Punjab State Electricity Board & Anr. v.Ravinder Kumar Sharma & Ors.[11 ]indicate that oncepersons have become members of a service, they areequals and cannot be differentiated for the purpose of salary,Fseniority, promotion and conditions of service. A careeradvancement scheme is an incentive and a class amongst aclass cannot be created to grant this benefit;

(iv) The impugned order of the High Court failed to appreciatethe ratio of Trilokinath Khosa (supra), where this Courthad upheld separate channels of promotion for degreeGholders and diploma holders as they had been recruitedthrough different channels on the basis of their qualifications.In this case, the selection was through a common channel; 9 (2014) 10 SCC 43210 (1980) 1 SCC 634H11 (1986) 4 SCC 617

(v) During the pendency of the appeal, KMC has issued a draftAgradation list dated 4 March 2021, which indicates that theSAEs holding diplomas will have no effective promotionalavenue as those promoted against supernumerary postscreated will first occupy the substantive posts of AEs; and

(vi) The effect of the impugned circular will be that a juniorSAE, holding a degree, will be promoted faster than a seniorSAE holding a diploma and having more experience.

B

13. Opposing the submissions of Mr Bhattacharya, Mr SujoyMondal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of KMC, has submitted:

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(i) The Recruitment Regulations provide that educationalqualification is one of the criteria for recruitment as well aspromotion in the Engineering Service of KMC;

(ii) The purpose of the impugned circular was to openpromotional avenues for stagnating SAEs. However, by thiscircular, neither are SAEs given substantive promotionalDposts of AE, nor has any financial benefit been granted tothem. They have only been awarded with a designation ofAE for efficient administrative functioning;

(iii) As an employer, KMC is entitled to create a differentiationfor effective discharge of duty and to remove frustration ofEthe SAEs; and

(iv) In view of the decisions of this Court in Trilokinath Khosa(supra), Roop Chand Adlakha v. Delhi DevelopmentAuthority and others[12]; State of Uttarakhand v. SKSingh[13] and other cases, even where persons havingdifferent qualifications are given an opportunity forpromotion, absolute equality cannot be maintained as theadministration may consider giving the lesser qualified apromotional opportunity on different terms, rather thanprohibiting them altogether.

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14. Mr Amit Sharma, learned Counsel appearing on behalf second,fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth respondents who are degree-holdingSAEs, has supported the submissions of Mr Mondal and urged that:

12 1989 Supp (1) SCC 11613 (2019) 10 SCC 49

A(i)None of the contesting respondents held engineeringdegrees at the time of recruitment to the post of SAE, andhad acquired them during service;

(ii) The first circular providing a quota for promotion from SAEto AE on the basis of educational qualifications was datedB7 August 1997, which has remained unchallenged till date.Similarly, the circular dated 20 February 2002 waschallenged unsuccessfully and the circular dated 17 June2008 was not challenged; and

(iii) The present case is similar to the decision in Roop ChandCAdlakha (supra), where the category of Junior Engineerscomprised of both graduates and diploma holders and a ruleproviding for different length of qualifying service forpromotion was challenged. This Court upheld therule, holdingthat differences in educational qualifications could becompensated by difference in length of experience requiredDin the feeder post.

15. Having adverted to the submissions of the parties, we shallnow address the issue at hand.

C Legal PositionE

E16. The issue before the Courtlies in a narrow compass. Thequestion for consideration is whether persons drawn from a commonsource who have been integrated into a cadre can be differentiated onthe basis of educational qualifications for the purpose of promotion tosupernumerary posts.F17. The challenge to the classification made for the purpose of F17. The challenge to the classification made for the purpose ofpromotion rests on the ground of equality and equal treatment in mattersof public employment guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.The Constitution enshrines the principle of non-discrimination on the basisof religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or descent for appointment toany office under the State. Under this guarantee, similarly situated personsGare to be treated equally. Article 16 however does not a bar reasonableclassifications by the State for selection of employees.

18. The locus classicus on the question whether educationalqualifications can be used as a criteria for classification between personsintegrated into one class for the purpose of promotion is the decision ofH

a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Jammu & Kashmir v.Trilokinath Khosa[14]. In this case, the post of an Assistant Engineer inthe Engineering Service branch of the appellants was filled by way ofdirect recruitment or through promotion from the cadre of Sub-ordinateEngineering Service. A rule was introduced in 1970 restricting thepromotion to the next higher post of an Executive Engineer only to thoseAssistant Engineers who possessed a degree in engineering or held thequalification of A.M.I.E and had put in seven years of service. Therespondents, who were diploma holders and serving as AssistantEngineers, challenged the rule on grounds of discrimination. TheConstitution Bench dealt with the question of whether persons recruitedfrom different sources, that are integrated into one class, can then beclassified to permit preferential treatment to some persons on the basisof their educational qualifications. Justice YV Chandrachud (as thelearned Chief Justice then was), speaking for the Bench elaborated onthe extent of judicial review in matters of classification in publicemployment and observed that “32. Judicial scrutiny can therefore extend only to the considerationwhether the classification rests on a reasonable basis and whetherit bears nexus with the object in view. It cannot extend to embarkingupon a nice or mathematical evaluation of the basis of classification,for were such an inquiry permissible it would be open to the Courtsto substitute their own judgment for that of the legislature or theRule-making authority on the need to classify or the desirability ofachieving a particular object.

33. Judged from this point of view, it seems to us impossible toaccept the respondents’ submission that the classification ofAssistant Engineers into degree-holders and diploma-holders restson any unreal or unreasonable basis. The classification,according to the appellants, was made with a view toachieving administrative efficiency in the Engineeringservices. If this be the object, the classification is clearlyco-related to it, for higher educational qualifications are atleast presumptive evidence of a higher mental equipment.This is not to suggest that administrative efficiency can beachieved only through the medium of those possessingcomparatively higher educational qualifications but that is A

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Abeside the point. What is relevant is that the object to beachieved here is not a mere pretence for an indiscriminateimposition of inequalities and the classification cannot becharacterized as arbitrary or absurd. That is the farthestthat judicial scrutiny can extend.

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34. On the fact of the case, classification on the basis of educationalqualifications made with a view to achieving administrativeefficiency cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstanceand one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstancesof the case in order to judge the validity of a classification.”

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On the issue whether educational qualifications can be recognisedas a criterion for classification, the judgment referred to the decisions ofthis Court in State of Mysore v. P Narasing Rao[15]; Ganga Ram v.Union of India[16], Union of India v. Dr (Mrs) SB Kohli[17]and RoshanDLal Tandon v. Union of India[18] and noted that:

“41. We have drawn attention to three decisions of this Court(Narasing Rao case, Ganga Ram case and Dr (Mrs) Kohli case)in which classification on the basis of educational qualificationswas upheld. In Narasing Rao case, Tracers doing equal workEwere classified into two grades having unequal pay, the basis ofthe classification being higher educational qualifications. In Dr(Mrs) Kohli case, as refined a classification as between anF.R.C.S. in general surgery and an F.R.C.S. in Orthopaedics wasupheld in relation to appointment to the post of a Professor ofFOrthopaedics. But these cases are sought to be distinguished onthe authority of the decision of this Court in Roshan LalTandon v. Union of [I]ndia [AIR 1967 SC 1889 : (1968) 1 SCR185 : (1968) 1 SCJ 746] . That case is crowded with facts andrequires a careful consideration for its proper understanding.

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15 AIR 1968 SC 34916 (1970) 1 SCC 37717 (1973) 3 SCC 59218 AIR 1967 SC 1889H

45. Thus, all that Roshan Lal case lays down is that direct recruitsand promotees lose their birth-marks on fusion into a commonstream of service and they cannot thereafter be treated differentlyby reference to the consideration that they were recruited fromdifferent sources. Their genetic blemishes disappear once theyare integrated into a common class and cannot be revived so as tomake equals unequals once again.

46. Roshan Lal case is thus no authority for the proposition that ifdirect recruits and promotees are integrated into one class, theycannot be classified for purposes of promotion on a basis otherthan the one that they were drawn from different sources. In theinstant case, classification rests fairly and squarely on theconsideration of educational qualifications: Graduates alone shallgo into the higher post, no matter whether they were appointed asAssistant Engineers directly or by promotion. The discriminationtherefore is not in relation to the source of recruitment as in RoshanLal case.

50. We are therefore of the opinion that though personsappointed directly and by promotion were integrated into acommon class of Assistant Engineers, they could, forpurposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers,be classified on the basis of educational qualifications. TheRule providing that graduates shall be eligible for suchpromotion to the exclusion of diploma-holders does notviolate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and must beupheld.”

19. The dictum in Trilokinath Khosa (supra) was furtherexpounded on by a subsequent decision of a Constitution Bench of thisCourt in Mohammed Shujat Ali v. Union of India[19].In Mohd. Shujat(supra), the Court was faced with a challenge to a quota reserved inpromotion to the higher post of Assistant Engineers for the graduateSupervisors as opposed to the non-graduate Supervisors. Justice PNBhagwati (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for the Bench,held that AB

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A“28. […]But from these decisions it cannot be laid down asan invariable rule that whenever any classification is madeon the basis of variant educational qualifications, suchclassification must be held to be valid, irrespective of thenature and purposes of the classification or the quality andextent of the differences in the educational qualifications.BIt must be remembered that “life has relations not capable alwaysof division into inflexible compartments”. The moulds expand andshrink. The test of reasonable classification has to be applied insuch case on its peculiar facts and circumstances. It may beperfectly legitimate for the administration to say that having regardCto the nature of the functions and duties attached to the post, forthe purpose of achieving efficiency in public service, only degreeholders in engineering shall be eligible for promotion and notdiploma or certificate holders. That is what happened in State ofJammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa and a somewhatsimilar position also obtained in Union of India v. Dr (Mrs.) S.B.DKohli. But where graduates and non-graduates are both regardedas fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion, it is difficult to seehow, consistently with the claim for equal opportunity, anydifferentiation can be made between them by laying down a quotaof promotion for each and giving preferential treatment toEgraduates over non-graduates in the matter of fixation of suchquota. The result of fixation of quota of promotion for each of thetwo categories of Supervisors would be that when a vacancyarises in the post of Assistant Engineer, which, according to thequota is reserved for graduate Supervisors, a non-graduateSupervisor cannot be promoted to that vacancy, even if he is seniorFto all other graduate Supervisors and more suitable than they. Hisopportunity for promotion would be limited only to vacanciesavailable for non-graduate Supervisors. That would clearly amountto denial of equal opportunity to him.

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But even so, we do not think we can be persuaded to strikedown the Andhra Pradesh Rules insofar as they makedifferentiation between graduate and non-graduateSupervisors. This differentiation is not something broughtabout for the first time by the Andhra Pradesh Rules. It hasHalways been there in the Engineering Services of the Hyderabad and the Andhra States. The graduateSupervisors have always been treated as a distinct andseparate class from non-graduate Supervisors both underthe Hyderabad Rules as well as the Andhra Rules and theyhave never been integrated into one class. Under theHyderabad Rules, the pay scale of graduate Supervisors was Rs176-300, while that of non-graduate Supervisors was Rs 140-300and similarly, under the Andhra Rules, the pay, scale of non-graduate Supervisors was Rs 100-250, but graduate Supervisorswere started in this pay scale at the stage of Rs 150 so that theirpayscale was Rs 150-250. Graduate Supervisors and non-graduateSupervisors were also treated differently for the purpose ofpromotion under both sets of rules. In fact, under the AndhraRules a different nomenclature of Junior Engineers was given tograduate Supervisors. The same differentiation into two classesalso persisted in the reorganised State of Andhra Pradesh. Thepayscale of Junior Engineers was always different from that ofnon-graduate Supervisors and for the purpose of promotion, thetwo categories of Supervisors were kept distinct and apart underthe Andhra Rules even after the appointed day. The commongradation list of Supervisors finally approved by the Governmentof India also consisted of two parts, one part relating to JuniorEngineers and the other part relating to non-graduate Supervisors.The two categories of Supervisors were thus never fused intoone class and no question of unconstitutional discrimination couldarise by reason of differential treatment being given to them.Contention E cannot, therefore, prevail and must be rejected.”

20. The Court observed that the service rules for the EngineeringDepartment had consistently maintained a differentiation betweengraduate Supervisors and non-graduate Supervisors and they were nevermerged into one class.

21. In Roop Chand Adlakha v. Delhi DevelopmentAuthority[20], a two judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question ofwhether different conditions of eligibility for promotion could be providedbetween diploma holders and degree holders. In the facts of the case,the initial recruitment to the cadre of Junior Engineer in the Public Works AB

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ADepartment of the respondent was made from two different sources-that is degree holders with no experience and diploma holders havingtwo years of experience or more. For promotion to the cadre of AssistantEngineers, Junior Engineers holding a degree were required to havethree years of experience, while Junior Engineers holding a diploma wererequired to have eight years of experience. Following the decision ofBthis Court in Trilokinath Khosa (supra), Justice MN Venkatachaliah(as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that “29. In Triloki Nath case [(1974) 1 SCC 19 : 1974 SCC (L&S)49 : (1974) 1 SCR 771] diploma-holders were not consideredeligible for promotion to the higher post. Here, in the present case,Cthe possession of a diploma, by itself and without more, does notconfer eligibility. Diploma, for purposes of promotion, is notconsidered equivalent to the degree. This is the point of distinctionin the situations in the two cases. If diploma-holders — of courseon the justification of the job requirements and in the interest ofDmaintaining a certain quality of technical expertise in the cadre —could validly be excluded from the eligibility for promotion to thehigher cadre, it does not necessarily follow as an inevitablecorollary that the choice of the recruitment policy is limited toonly two choices, namely, either to consider them “eligible” or“not eligible”. State, consistent with the requirements of theEpromotional posts and in the interest of the efficiency ofthe service, is not precluded from conferring eligibility ondiploma-holders conditioning it by other requirements whichmay, as here, include certain quantum of service experience.In the present case, eligibility determination was made byFa cumulative criterion of a certain educational qualificationplus a particular quantum of service experience. It cannot,in our opinion, be said, as postulated by the High Court,that the choice of the State was either to recognise diploma-holders as “eligible” for promotion or wholly exclude themas “not eligible”. If the educational qualification by itselfGwas recognised as conferring eligibility for promotion, then,the superimposition of further conditions such as aparticular period of service, selectively, on the diploma-holders alone to their disadvantage might becomediscriminatory. This does not prevent the State fromHformulating a policy which prescribes as an essential part of the conditions for the very eligibility that the candidatemust have a particular qualification plus a stipulatedquantum of service experience. It is stated that on the basis ofthe “Vaish Committee” report, the authorities considered theinfusion of higher academic and technical quality in the personnelrequirements in the relevant cadres of Engineering Servicesnecessary. These are essentially matters of policy. Unlessthe provision is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or to bringabout grossly unfair results, judicial policy should be oneof judicial restraint. The prescriptions may be somewhatcumbersome or produce some hardship in their applicationin some individual cases; but they cannot be struck downas unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary. The High Court, inour opinion, was not justified in striking down the rules as violativeof Articles 14 and 16.

22. In another decision in M Rathinaswami v. State of TamilNadu[21], directly recruited Assistants were placed above the promoteeAssistants in the list for promotion to the post of Deputy Tehsildar. Theminimum qualification for direct recruitment to an Assistant was agraduation degree, while promotee Assistants, who were promoted fromthe rank of Junior Assistant, were usually non-graduates. The Courtobserved that the classification made by the executive must have arational basis. Thus, although the respondents could create a distinctionbetween direct recruit graduate Assistants and non-graduate promoteeAssistants on the basis of educational qualifications, those promoteeAssistants who were graduates could not be discriminated against forthe purpose of promotion.

23. A decision relevant for the purpose for this case is State ofUttarakhand v. SK Singh[22]. Similar to the present case, the minimumeligibility requirement for the feeder post of a Junior Engineer was thatof a diploma, not a degree, however, degree holders were consideredeligible. 60 per cent of appointments to the higher post of an AssistantEngineer were made through promotions from the cadre of JuniorEngineer, while the balance 40 per cent were through direct recruitment.

21 (2009) 2 SCC (LS) 10122 (2019) 10 SCC 49

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AOut of the said 60 per cent, 7.33 per cent was reserved for acceleratedpromotion where Junior Assistants holding a degree were entitled topromotion after three years of service, as against the normal promotionwhich required ten years of service. The High Court had held that if thehigher qualification of a degree was not contemplated as a requirementfor being appointed to the feeder post, then two different periods ofBexperience could not be provided later for promotion to the next higherpost. In reversing the decision of the High Court, a two judge Bench ofthis Court speaking through Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, upheld thedifferent eligibility conditions for accelerated promotions for graduateJunior Assistants. The Court also went as far as to suggest that even ifCthe non-graduates were completely shut out of promotion, or if the timeperiods (that is the experience) required for normal promotions weredifferent between degree and diploma holders, those classifications wouldalso be valid under law.

24. The appellants in their submissions have strongly urged thisDCourt to follow a separate line of precedent, such as in the decisions inAS Iyer v. V Balasubramanyam[23]; Union of India v. Atul Shukla[24],Maharashtra Forest Guards and Foresters Union v. State ofMaharashtra[25]. The decisions of this Court in AS Iyer (supra) andAtul Shukla (supra) upheld the proposition of law that differentiationon the basis of ‘source of recruitment’ cannot be a valid ground ofEclassification. Similarly, in Maharashtra Forest Guards and ForestersUnion (supra), this Court struck down a rule prescribing micro-classification for promotion from a Forest Guard to a Forester, as promotionof non-graduate Forest Guards was entirely restricted.

25. In Food Corporation of India v. Om Prakash[26], this CourtFadjudicated on the validity of a rule providing for different eligibilityconditions between graduates and matriculates for promotion from thepost of Assistant Grade II (AG II) to Assistant Grade I (AG I) as atypist or telephone operator. While the former were eligible for promotionafter three years of service, the latter would be eligible after five yearsGof service. The Court struck down the rule as there was no material toshow that the nature of work in the posts of AG I or AG II required 23 (1980) 1 SCC 63424 (2014) 10 SCC 43225 (2018) 1 SCC 149H26 (1998) 7 SCC 676

higher efficiency which could only be expected from graduates and notnon-graduates. Thus, the nexus between the rule and the objective ofachieving higher efficiency was absent.

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26. The principles which emerge from the above line of precedentscan be summarised as follows:

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(i) Classification between persons must not produce artificialinequalities. The classification must be founded on areasonable basis and must bear nexus to the object andpurpose sought to be achieved to pass the muster of Articles14 and 16;

(ii) Judicial review in matters of classification is limited to adetermination of whether the classification is reasonableand bears a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Courtscannot indulge in a mathematical evaluation of the basis ofclassification or replace the wisdom of the legislature or itsdelegate with their own; C

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(iii) Generally speaking, educational qualification is a valid groundfor classification between persons of the same class inmatters of promotion and is not violative of Articles 14 and16 of the Constitution;

(iv) Persons drawn from different sources and integrated intoEa common class can be differentiated on grounds ofeducational qualification for the purpose of promotion, wherethis bears a nexus with the efficiency required in thepromotional post;

(v) Educational qualification may be used for introducing quotasfor promotion for a certain class of persons; or may evenbe used to restrict promotion entirely to one class, to theexclusion of others; F

(vi) Educational qualification may be used as a criterion forclassification for promotion to increase administrativeefficiency at the higher posts; and G

(vii) However, a classification made on grounds of educationalqualification should bear nexus to the purpose of theclassification or the extent of differences in qualifications.

27. We shall now proceed to examine the facts of the presentcase within the legal framework laid out above.

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AD Analysis

28. At the outset we must point out that the appellants have notcontested the fact that educational qualification is not a valid ground forclassification in matters of public employment, or that promotionalavenues are not available to diploma holder SAEs to the post of AE. TheBappellants seek to challenge the impugned circular on the limited groundthat the eligibility conditions for promotion to the supernumerary posts ofAE are different for diploma-holder SAEs, who require twenty-five yearsof experience to be eligible, as opposed to degree-holder SAEs, whorequire thirteen years of experience.

C29. The crux of the case of the appellants is that unlikeTrilokinath Khosa (supra), where recruitment was through twodifferent sources of recruitment (direct recruitment and throughpromotion) after which graduates and diploma holders were integratedinto a class, in the present case there was a common examination forrecruitment of SAEs. It has been urged that once the graduates andDdiploma holders have qualified at the common examination, that is asingle source of recruitment and any differentiation on the basis ofeducational qualification would be invalid. Thus, it has been submittedthat the decision of this Court in Trilokinath Khosa (supra) would beinapplicable to the present case.E30. In our view, the reading of Trilokinath Khosa (supra) as

E30. In our view, the reading of Trilokinath Khosa (supra) asurged by the appellants is fundamentally flawed. The appellants havesought to lay emphasis on the fact that the decision in Trilokinath Khosa(supra) was dependent on the existence of two different sources ofrecruitment, while in the present case there is a single source ofrecruitment. To read the decision in this light is to miss the wood for theFtrees. In Trilokinath Khosa (supra), the Court had adverted to thewell-established principle that once direct recruits and promotees areintegrated into a common pool, they cannot be treated differently basedon the ‘source of recruitment’. This however does not imply that theycannot be classified on other reasonable grounds. Thus, whether thereGare two different streams of recruitment, or a single source of recruitmentmerged into a common pool, the classification that was upheld inTrilokinath Khosa (supra) was based on educational qualification whichwas linked to the purpose of enhancing administrative efficiency in theorganization. We are unable to agree with the submission of the appellantsthat the decision in Trilokinath Khosa (supra) is not applicable in theHpresent case.

31. We shall now address the question of whether the classificationmade by KMC based on educational qualification was reasonable giventhe objective sought to be achieved.

32. The unamended Recruitment Regulations for KMC formulatedin December 1994 provided that 50 per cent of the total cadre strengthof AEs shall be filled through promotion from SAEs, while the remaining50 per cent would be filled by direct recruitment. The SAEs in turn wereto be recruited from candidates who had achieved the qualification of adiploma in engineering or above. Thus, the Recruitment Rules initiallydid not stipulate different conditions for promotion between diploma-holder SAEs or degree-holder SAEs.

33. On 7 August 1997, the Recruitment Regulations were modifiedand a quota was introduced for the promotion of degree-holder SAEs.By this amendment, 45 per cent of AEs were to be directly recruited; 45per cent were to be promoted from SAEs (either diploma or degreeholder) having ten years of experience and 10 per cent was reserved fordegree-holders SAEs who had served for ten years. A classificationwas made between degree-holder SAEs and diploma-holder SAEs, givingthe former a preference over the latter. However, the promotional avenuesfor diploma-holder SAEs were not completely restricted.

34. The Recruitment Regulations were modified again by a circulardated 20 February 2002. By this amendment, the proportion of AEs tobe recruited directly was reduced from 45 per cent to 35 per cent. Theadvantage of this 10 per cent reduction was given to both sets ofpromotees, that is, the reservation for degree-holder SAEs was enhancedto 15 per cent, while the balance 50 per cent was to be filled by promotionfrom SAEs (either diploma or degree holders) having ten years ofexperience. This circular was challenged unsuccessfully before the HighCourt.

35. The amendments made to the Recruitment Regulations indicatethat in matters of promotion, KMC has repeatedly sought to create adistinction between degree-holder SAEs and diploma-holder SAEs since1997, by introducing a quota for the promotion of the former. In doing so,it did not foreclose promotional avenues for diploma holder SAEs. Infact, in 2002, the promotional avenues were fairly enhanced for bothdegree and diploma-holder SAEs, while maintaining a preference forthe former.

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A36. KMC also sought to provide career incentives to reducestagnation amongst SAEs. The First Career Advancement Scheme wasintroduced in 2008 which stipulated increasing of the scale of basic payof an SAE to that of an AE. In matters of pay, no distinction was madebetween degree or diploma-holder SAEs as the duties and workperformed by both sets of SAEs remained the same.B

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37. The Second Career Advancement Scheme introduced by theimpugned circular sought to create supernumerary AE posts. Promotionto these posts was made available to both SAEs holding degrees anddiplomas. However, the eligibility conditions, in terms of the years ofCservice of these SAEs in KMC, are different. A challenge has beenraised against these conditions.

38. The Recruitment Regulations and their subsequentamendments by KMC suggest that the administration has continued tocreate a distinction between degree and diploma holder SAEs for theDpurpose of promotion. In regular promotion, this distinction is made byway of a quota for degree-holder SAEs, while in terms of supernumerarypromotion, it has been by way of difference in eligibility conditions. Be itone way or the other, it is evident that the administration has sought toemploy a higher number of degree holders at the position of AE thandiploma holders. In 1994, when the Recruitment Regulations wereEintroduced, 50 per cent of posts were for direct recruits, who were degree-holders and in the balance 50 per cent which was to be filled by promoteesit can be presumed that there must be some SAEs who were holdingdegrees. Thus, in total more than 50 per cent of AEs were to be degree-holders. When these Regulations were modified in 1997, 45 per cent ofFAEs were to be direct recruits holding degrees, 10 per cent of AEs wereto be degree-holding SAEs, and the balance 45 per cent of posts were tobe filled by degree/diploma holding SAEs. Thus, it was stipulated thatmore than 55 per cent of AEs would be degree holders. Similarly, in2002, more than 50 per cent of the AE posts were to be filled by degreeholders (35 per cent of AEs were direct recruits holding degrees, 15 perGcent of AEs were to be filled by degree-holding SAEs and the balance50 per cent were to be filled by degree/diploma holding SAEs). Thereason for the increase in degree-holders for the post of AEs could bedue to circumstances such as the higher level of technical expertiserequired for the superior post, increase in managerial and technicalHworkload, and enhancement in supervisory functions. It is not amiss to draw a conclusion that a higher educational degree, coupled with stipulatedyears of experience, could bring in certain benefits to the position of anAE that the management desires. In any case, it is not for this Court todecide whether a higher educational qualification would fulfil theobjectives of the management, as long as the nexus between theeducational qualification and the need for higher efficiency is not absurd,irrational or arbitrary. In a line of decisions, this Court has held thateducational qualifications may be linked to higher administrative efficiencyand thus classification on this basis is not in violation of Articles 14 and16 of the Constitution.

39. The challenge before us however is not related to theclassification made in matters of regular promotion. In fact, as the recordindicates, the SAEs have not challenged the initial circulars dated 7 August1997, or 20 February 2002 (which was challenged unsuccessfully beforethe High Court in another petition). The issue before us solely deals withthe restrictions imposed for promotion to supernumerary AE posts.

40. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term“supernumerary” as “present in excess of the normal or requisitenumber”, or “not belonging to a regular staff but engaged for extrawork”[27]. A “supernumerary post” is defined as “a post exceeding theusual stated or prescribed number”[28]. The impugned circular indicatesthat these supernumerary posts were created for removal of stagnationamongst SAEs. Although that may be the stated goal of the impugnedcircular, KMC has urged before this Court that the distinction in educationqualification for promotion has been made for the purpose of enhancingadministrative efficiency. It cannot be denied that SAEs once promotedto the post of an AE in these supernumerary posts would be performingthe task and functions of an AE. Thus, it is not merely a change in thedesignation of an SAE to an AE, but involves an increase in workload,supervisory functions, and performance of the regular functions of anAE. Since that is the case, we do not find any reason why the rationaleunderlying the need for higher degree-holders in the AE cadre throughregular promotion would not be applicable in the case of supernumeraryposts. In other words, could a challenge to the impugned circular be 27 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Judy Pearsall ed., 10th ed, 1999)

28 P. Ramanatha Aiyar, The Law Lexicon, The Encylopaedic Law Dictionary p. 1838(Justice YV Chandrachud (Former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of India) ed., 1997)

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Asustained if, instead of providing different eligibility conditions, KMChad provided for creation of a fixed number of supernumerary posts outof which a proportion was reserved for degree-holder SAEs? We do notthink so. By the very reason that these posts are supernumerary anddepend on the number of eligible persons, a fixed number of positionscould not have been anticipated. It is perhaps for this reason that KMCBsought to digress from the regular method of granting promotion andopted to introduce separate eligibility conditions. Therefore, we find thatthe separate eligibility conditions for promotion to supernumerary AEposts on the basis of educational qualification is in line with the pastpromotion practices of KMC and is not an unreasonable classification.C

41. Even otherwise, we note that Clause 3 of the impugned circularprovides that these supernumerary posts would be adjusted as and whena vacancy becomes available within the sanctioned posts of an AE.Further, Clause 5 stipulates that there would be no change in theRecruitment Regulations for the posts of AE. What this means is thatDthe regular promotion of degree or diploma holder SAEs is not impactedby way of the impugned circular. As and when vacancies arise in thesanctioned AE posts, the AEs holding supernumerary posts would besubject to the Recruitment Regulations and the selection process forpromotion of an SAE to an AE. The supernumerary posts are personalEto the eligible AEs and will lapse on their being promoted on a regularbasis as AEs or ceasing to remain in service.

42. Another aspect to be considered is that while creatingsupernumerary posts, KMC has not completely restricted the promotionalavenues of diploma-holder SAEs who have stagnated in their service. ItFhas provided adequate opportunity to them to advance in their career,although on different terms and conditions. Thus, the promotional policyof KMC for supernumerary posts is not irrational or arbitrary or to thedetriment of diploma holder SAEs. In matters of public policy and publicemployment, the legislature or its delegate must be given sufficient roomto decide the quality of individuals it seeks to employ as against differentGpositions. As long as these decisions are not arbitrary, this Court mustrefrain from interfering in the policy domain.

E Conclusion

43. Based on the discussion above, it is our view that the impugnedHcircular dated 3 July 2012 and the subsequent gradation list do not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and discrimination. Accordingly, we upholdthe decision of the Division Bench of the High Court and dismiss theappeal.

44. Pending applications, if any, shall stand dismissed.

Nidhi Jain

Appeal dismissed.

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