MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION versus DILIP UTTAM JAYABHAY on 3 January 2022

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[2022] 1 S.C.R.

AMAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION

v.

DILIP UTTAM JAYABHAY

(Civil Appeal No. 7403 of 2021)

BJANUARY 03, 2022

[M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]

Maharashtra Recognition of trade unions and prevention ofunfair labour practices Act 1971: Departmental proceedings –Misconduct proved against respondent-driver of driving the vehicleCrashly and negligently due to which the accident occurred in whichfour persons died – Disciplinary authority passed order of dismissalfrom service – Labour Court did not interfere with the order ofdismissal by giving cogent reasons and after re-appreciating entireevidence on record including the order of acquittal passed by theDcriminal court – However, the Industrial Court though did notinterfere with the findings recorded by disciplinary authority onmisconduct proved, interfered with order of dismissal solely on theground that punishment of dismissal was disproportionate tomisconduct proved and the same was unfair labour practice as peritem No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the Act of 1971 – The same was notEinterfered with by the High Court – On appeal, held: The findingsof enquiry officer and order passed by Labour Court and IndustrialCourt showed that respondent-workman was driving the vehicle insuch a great speed and rashly due to which the accident hadoccurred in which four persons died – Even while acquittingFrespondent-driver who was facing the trial under ss.279 and 304(a)of IPC, Criminal Court observed that prosecution had failed to provethat the incident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of therespondent only and none else – Therefore, even if it is assumedthat driver of the jeep was also negligent, it can be said to be acase of contributory negligence – That does not mean that theGrespondent-workman was not at all negligent – Hence, it did notabsolve him of the misconduct – As per the cardinal principle oflaw an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance onthe disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof in both thecases are different and the proceedings operate in different fieldsHand with different objectives – Therefore, the Industrial Court erred in giving much stress on the acquittal of the respondent by thecriminal court – Applying clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the Act,1971, to instant case, it cannot be said that the dismissal of therespondent was for misconduct of a minor or technical character,without having any regard to the nature of the misconduct – Eventhe past record of service of the respondent was not considered bythe Industrial Court – As per case of the appellant, respondent-workman was in service for three years and during three years’service tenure he was punished four times – Therefore, it cannot besaid that the order of dismissal was without having any regard tothe past record of the service of the respondent – Therefore, in factsand circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court wrongly invokedclause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the Act, 1971, and wronglyinterfered with the order of dismissal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

Conclusion

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer inthe departmental enquiry and the judgment and order passed bythe labour court as well as the Industrial Court and even thejudgment and order of acquittal passed by the criminal court showthat when the respondent was driving the vehicle it met with anaccident with the jeep coming from the opposite side and in thesaid accident four persons died. From the material on record itemerges that the impact of the accident with the jeep comingfrom the opposite side was such that the jeep was pushed back25 feet. From the aforesaid facts it can be said that the respondent– workman was driving the vehicle in such a great speed andrashly due to which the accident had occurred in which fourpersons died. Even while acquitting the respondent-driver whowas facing the trial under Sections 279 and 304(a) of IPC, CriminalCourt observed that the prosecution failed to prove that theincident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the accused– respondent herein only and none else. Therefore, at the besteven if it is assumed that even driver of the jeep was alsonegligent, it can be said to be a case of contributory negligence.That does not mean that the respondent-workman was not at allnegligent. Hence, it does not absolve him of the misconduct.[Para 10.2][156-E-H; 157-A]

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A2.1 The Labour Court had in extenso considered the orderof acquittal passed by the criminal court and did not agree withthe submissions made on behalf of the respondent-workman thatas he was acquitted by the criminal court he cannot be held guiltyin the disciplinary proceedings. Even from the judgment andorder passed by the criminal court, it appears that the criminalBcourt acquitted the respondent based on the hostility of thewitnesses; the evidence led by the interested witnesses; lacunain examination of the investigating officer; panch for the spotpanchnama of the incident, etc. Therefore, criminal court heldthat the prosecution has failed to prove the case against theCrespondent beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary in thedepartmental proceedings the misconduct of driving the vehiclerashly and negligently which caused accident and due to whichfour persons died has been established and proved. As per thecardinal principle of law an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearingor relevance on the disciplinary proceedings as the standard ofDproof in both the cases are different and the proceedings operatein different fields and with different objectives. Therefore, theIndustrial Court has erred in giving much stress on the acquittalof the respondent by the criminal court. Even otherwise it isrequired to be noted that the Industrial Court has not interferedEwith the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority holdingcharge and misconduct proved in the departmental enquiry, andhas interfered with the punishment of dismissal solely on theground that same is shockingly disproportionate and thereforecan be said to be an unfair labour practice as per clause No.1(g)of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. [Paras 10.3F10.4][157-B-G]

2.2 Applying clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU& PULP Act, 1971, to the present case it cannot be said that thedismissal of the respondent was for misconduct of a minor ortechnical character, without having any regard to the nature ofGthe misconduct. The respondent – workman has been held to beguilty for a particular charge and particular misconduct. Even thepast record of service of the respondent has not been consideredby the Industrial Court. As per case of the appellant – MSRTCthe respondent – workman was in service for three years andH

during three years’ service tenure he was punished four times.Therefore, it cannot be said that the order of dismissal was withouthaving any regard to the past record of the service of therespondent. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case,the Industrial Court wrongly invoked clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. [Para 10.5][158-E-H]

3. Even otherwise in the facts of the case when in thedepartmental enquiry, it has been specifically found that due torash and negligent driving on the part of the driver – respondent,the accident took place in which four persons died, when thepunishment of dismissal is imposed it cannot be said to beshockingly disproportionate punishment. In the departmentalproceedings every aspect has been considered. Even theIndustrial Court has not interfered with the findings recorded bythe enquiry officer in the departmental proceedings. Therefore,in the facts and circumstance of the case, the Industrial Courtcommitted a grave error and has exceeded in its jurisdiction whileinterfering with the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinaryauthority, which was not interfered by the Labour Court.[Para 11][159-A-C]

4. It is also required to be noted that before the IndustrialCourt the respondent-workman-driver admitted that after theorder of dismissal he has been gainfully employed. Thereforealso the reinstatement in service with continuity of service wasnot warranted. Even the directions issued by the High Courtdirecting the appellant to pay wages to the respondent-workmanfor the period from 01.11.2003 to 31.05.2018 also could not havebeen passed by the High Court in a writ petition filed by theappellant. It was not the petition filed by the workman-respondent.Therefore, even otherwise the directions issued in para 8 of theimpugned judgment and order cannot be sustained as the sameis beyond the scope and ambit of the controversy before the HighCourt. [Paras 12, 13][159-C-E]

Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2011) 9SCC 94 : [2011] 11 SCR 136; Union of India & Ors. v.Sitaram Mishra & Anr. (2019) 20 SCC 588 – referredto.

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[2022] 1 S.C.R.

ACase Law Reference

[2011] 11 SCR 136referred toPara 5.2(2019) 20 SCC 588referred toPara 5.2

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.7403 ofB2021.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.01.2020 of the High Courtof Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.8401 of 2003.

Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, Vyom Raghuvanshi, Ms. Purvat Wali,Advs. for the Appellant.C

Nishanth Patil, Ms. Malvika Kala, Advs. for the Respondent.The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. R. SHAH, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentDand order dated 23.01.2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature atBombay in Writ Petition No.8401 of 2003, by which the High Court hasdismissed the said writ petition preferred by the appellant – MaharashtraState Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “MSRTC”)in which it challenged the order passed by the Industrial Court in RevisionEApplication (ULP) No.13 of 2002, directing reinstatement of respondentwithout back wages but with the continuity of service, original writpetitioner – MSRTC has preferred the present appeal.

2. The respondent herein was serving as a driver and plyingpassenger buses. That on 23.10.1992 when he was driving the bus, itFmet with an accident with a jeep coming from the opposite direction. Itappears that instead of taking the bus to the left side, he took the bus tothe extreme right which was the wrong side and as a result, the jeep andthe bus collided. The accident resulted in death of four passengers onthe spot and six passengers were seriously injured. The jeep wascompletely damaged with its radiator and engine board broken andGdamaged and the inside of the jeep was completely crushed. The impactof the collision was so high that the jeep was pushed back by about 25feet. The bumper of the bus was also crushed. The driver of the jeepalso sustained injuries. The respondent was subjected to disciplinaryenquiry. On conclusion of enquiry he was dismissed from service. HeHwas also prosecuted for the offence under Section 279 of IPC. However, he came to be acquitted. (his acquittal shall be dealt with herein below).The respondent challenged the order of dismissal before the LabourCourt. The Labour Court upheld the order of dismissal. In a revisionapplication the Industrial Tribunal considering the acquittal of therespondent in criminal proceedings and observing that the drivers ofboth the vehicles were negligent (contributory negligence), the IndustrialTribunal exercised powers under item No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of theMaharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of UnfairLabour Practices Act, 1971. (“MRTU” and “PULP Act, 1971” for short),and held that the order of dismissal is disproportionate to the misconductproved. Before the Industrial Tribunal the respondent/workman did notpress for the back wages. The Industrial Tribunal directed hisreinstatement without back wages but with continuity of service.

3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated31.07.2003 passed by the Industrial Tribunal ordering reinstatementwithout back wages but with continuity of service, the appellant preferredwrit petition before the High Court. By the impugned judgment and orderthe High Court has not only dismissed the writ petition preferred by theappellant, but has also directed appellant to pay to the respondent backwages with effect from 01.11.2003 to 31.05.2018 i.e. which is the dateof his superannuation. The High Court has also directed that therespondent shall also be entitled to retiral benefits on the basis of continuityof service with effect from date of his dismissal and till his superannuation.

4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High Court, dismissing the writ petition andconfirming the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal setting aside theorder of dismissal and ordering reinstatement with continuity of serviceand back wages, the MSRTC has preferred the present appeal.

5. Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, learned counsel appearing on behalfof the appellant – MSRTC has vehemently submitted that in the factsand circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court committed a graveerror in interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinaryauthority on the ground that the same is shockingly disproportionate tothe misconduct proved.

5.1 It is submitted that both, the High Court as well as the IndustrialCourt have not at all considered and/or appreciated the differencebetween the disciplinary enquiry and the criminal proceedings.

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A5.2 It is submitted that the High Court as well as the IndustrialCourt had erred in relying upon the acquittal of respondent in criminalcase. It is submitted that the Industrial Court and the High Court havefailed to appreciate that the acquittal has no bearing or relevance on thedisciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases aredifferent and the proceedings operate in different fields and have differentBobjectives. Reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in cases ofSamar Bahadur Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (2011) 9 SCC 94and Union of India & Ors. Vs. Sitaram Mishra & Anr., (2019) 20SCC 588.

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5.3 It is further submitted that in fact the Labour Court rightlyCheld that acquittal in the criminal case would not come to the rescue ofthe respondent as the acquittal in the criminal case is on the failure ofthe prosecution to examine investigating officer, panch for spotpanchnama, etc., and to prove their case beyond doubt. It is submittedthat on the other hand in the departmental proceedings misconduct hasDbeen proved. It is therefore submitted that the Industrial Court and theHigh Court ought not to have given undue importance to the acquittal ofthe respondent in the criminal case.

5.4 It is further submitted that even otherwise in the facts andcircumstances of the case when in the vehicle accident four personsdied due to the negligence on the part of the respondent in driving theEvehicle carelessly and negligently and during his three years’ tenure hewas punished four times earlier, it cannot be said that the punishment ofdismissal was shockingly disproportionate. It is submitted that in the factsand circumstances of the case, the case would not fall under item No.1(g)of Schedule-IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.F

5.5 It is further submitted that even the Industrial Court specificallyobserved in the order that the misconduct is not of a minor or technicalcharacter. It is further submitted that the Industrial Court also observedthat there is no victimization and the action of the MSRTC cannot besaid to be not in good faith. The Industrial Court also observed that theGMSRTC has neither falsely implicated the complainant – respondent norhas it dismissed the respondent for patently false reasons and thereforerespondent failed to prove the alleged unfair labour practice as per theMRTU and PULP Act, 1971. It is submitted that however the IndustrialCourt has interfered with the order of punishment/dismissal imposed bythe disciplinary authority invoking clause 1(g) of Schedule-IV of MRTUHand PULP Act, 1971.

5.6 It is further submitted that even the respondent admitted thathe was gainfully employed after his dismissal. Therefore, the order ofreinstatement was not warranted at all.

5.7 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the appellant that even otherwise the directions issued by theHigh Court in the impugned judgment and order in para 8 directing theappellant – MSRTC to pay to the respondent back wages with effectfrom 1[st] November, 2003 to 31[st] May, 2018, could not have been passedin a petition filed by the appellant – MSRTC. It is submitted thereforethat such an order is as such beyond the scope of the writ petition beforethe High Court.

6. Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the presentappeal.

7. Shri Nishanth Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of therespondent has supported the judgment and order passed by the IndustrialCourt and confirmed by the High Court.

7.1 It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the casewhen the Industrial Court found the order of dismissal disproportionateto the misconduct proved, the same can be said to be an unfair labourpractice as per item No. 1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULPAct, 1971. Thus the Industrial Court rightly interfered with the order ofdismissal and the same is rightly confirmed by the High Court.

7.2 It is contended that in the present case as such it was not thefault on the part of the respondent – driver. That the jeep driver comingfrom the opposite side was on the wrong side of the road and therespondent tried to avoid the accident. It is submitted that the criminalcourt found that even the jeep driver was also negligent and consideringthe fact the criminal court acquitted the respondent – driver, the judgmentand order passed by the Industrial Court, ordering reinstatement withoutback wages but with continuity of service does not warrant anyinterference. It is submitted therefore that the High Court rightly did notinterfere with the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Courtordering reinstatement without back wages.

8. Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the presentappeal.

9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of therespective parties at length.

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A10. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the departmentalproceedings the misconduct alleged against the respondent – driver ofdriving the vehicle rashly and negligently due to which the accidentoccurred in which four persons died has been proved. Thereafter, thedisciplinary authority passed an order of dismissal, dismissing therespondent – workman from service. The Labour Court did not interfereBwith the order of dismissal by giving cogent reasons and after re-appreciating the entire evidence on record including the order of acquittalpassed by the criminal court. However, the Industrial Court though didnot interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority onthe misconduct proved, interfered with the order of dismissal solely onCthe ground that punishment of dismissal is disproportionate to themisconduct proved and the same can be said to be to be unfair labourpractice as per item No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULPAct, 1971. The same is not interfered with by the High Court.

10.1 Therefore, the short question which is posed for theDconsideration of this Court is whether in the facts and circumstances ofthe case the punishment of dismissal can be said to be an unfair labourpractice on the ground that the same was disproportionate to themisconduct proved and therefore the Industrial Court was justified ininterfering with the order of dismissal and ordering reinstatement withcontinuity of service.E

10.2 Having gone through the findings recorded by the enquiryofficer in the departmental enquiry and the judgment and order passedby the labour court as well as the Industrial Court and even the judgmentand order of acquittal passed by the criminal court, it emerges that whenthe respondent was driving the vehicle it met with an accident with theFjeep coming from the opposite side and in the said accident four personsdied. From the material on record it emerges that the impact of theaccident with the jeep coming from the opposite side was such that thejeep was pushed back 25 feet. From the aforesaid facts it can be saidthat the respondent – workman was driving the vehicle in such a greatGspeed and rashly due to which the accident had occurred in which fourpersons died. Even while acquitting the accused – respondent – driverwho was facing the trial under Sections 279 and 304(a) of IPC CriminalCourt observed that the prosecution failed to prove that the incidentoccurred due to rash and negligent driving of the accused – respondentherein only and none else. Therefore, at the best even if it is assumedH

that even driver of the jeep was also negligent, it can be said to be a caseof contributory negligence. That does not mean that the respondent –workman was not at all negligent. Hence, it does not absolve him of themisconduct.

10.3 Much stress has been given by the Industrial Court on theacquittal of the respondent by the criminal court. However, as such theLabour Court had in extenso considered the order of acquittal passed bythe criminal court and did not agree with the submissions made on behalfof the respondent – workman that as he was acquitted by the criminalcourt he cannot be held guilty in the disciplinary proceedings.

10.4 Even from the judgment and order passed by the criminalcourt it appears that the criminal court acquitted the respondent basedon the hostility of the witnesses; the evidence led by the interestedwitnesses; lacuna in examination of the investigating officer; panch forthe spot panchnama of the incident, etc. Therefore, criminal court heldthat the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the respondentbeyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary in the departmentalproceedings the misconduct of driving the vehicle rashly and negligentlywhich caused accident and due to which four persons died has beenestablished and proved. As per the cardinal principle of law an acquittalin a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinaryproceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are different andthe proceedings operate in different fields and with different objectives.Therefore, the Industrial Court has erred in giving much stress on theacquittal of the respondent by the criminal court. Even otherwise it isrequired to be noted that the Industrial Court has not interfered with thefindings recorded by the disciplinary authority holding charge andmisconduct proved in the departmental enquiry, and has interfered withthe punishment of dismissal solely on the ground that same is shockinglydisproportionate and therefore can be said to be an unfair labour practiceas per clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971.

10.5 Now so far as the order passed by the Industrial Court orderingreinstatement with continuity of service by invoking clause No.1(g) ofSchedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 is concerned, as perclause No. 1(g) only in a case where it is found that dismissal of anemployee is for misconduct of a minor or technical character, withouthaving any regard to the nature of the particular misconduct or the pastrecord of service of the employee, so as to amount to a shockingly A

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Adisproportionate punishment. Clause No.1 of Schedule-IV of the MRTU& PULP Act, 1971 reads as under:- “Schedule IV

1. To discharge or dismiss employees-

(a) by way of victimisation;

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(b) not in good faith, but in the colourable exercise of theemployer’s rights;

(c) by falsely implicating an employee in a criminal caseon false evidence or on concocted evidence; C

(d) for patently false reasons;

(e) on untrue or trumped up allegations of absencewithout leave; (f)in utter disregard of the principles of natural justiceDin the conduct of domestic enquiry or with unduehaste; (g)for misconduct of a minor or technical character,without having any regard to the nature of theparticular misconduct or the past record of serviceEof the employee, so as to amount to a shockinglydisproportionate punishment.”

Applying clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULPAct, 1971, to the present case it cannot be said that the dismissal of therespondent was for misconduct of a minor or technical character, withoutFhaving any regard to the nature of the misconduct. The respondent –workman has been held to be guilty for a particular charge and particularmisconduct. Even the past record of service of the respondent has notbeen considered by the Industrial Court. As per case of the appellant –MSRTC the respondent – workman was in service for three years andduring three years’ service tenure he was punished four times. Therefore,Git cannot be said that the order of dismissal was without having anyregard to the past record of the service of the respondent. Therefore, inthe facts and circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court wronglyinvoked clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP Act,1971.

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11. Even otherwise in the facts of the case when in the departmentalenquiry, it has been specifically found that due to rash and negligentdriving on the part of the driver – respondent, the accident took place inwhich four persons died, when the punishment of dismissal is imposed itcannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate punishment. In thedepartmental proceedings every aspect has been considered. At the costof repetition, it is observed that even the Industrial Court has not interferedwith the findings recorded by the enquiry officer in the departmentalproceedings. Therefore, in the facts and circumstance of the case, theIndustrial Court committed a grave error and has exceeded in itsjurisdiction while interfering with the order of dismissal passed by thedisciplinary authority, which was not interfered by the Labour Court.

12. It is also required to be noted that before the Industrial Courtthe respondent – workman – driver admitted that after the order ofdismissal he has been gainfully employed. Therefore also thereinstatement in service with continuity of service was not warranted.

13. Even the directions issued by the High Court in para 8 in theimpugned judgment and order directing the appellant to pay wages tothe respondent – workman for the period from 01.11.2003 to 31.05.2018also could not have been passed by the High Court in a writ petition filedby the appellant. It was not the petition filed by the workman –respondent. Therefore, even otherwise the directions issued in para 8 ofthe impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained as the same isbeyond the scope and ambit of the controversy before the High Court.

14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, thepresent Appeal Succeeds. The judgment and order passed by theIndustrial Court in Revision Application (ULP) No.13 of 2002 and theimpugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in Writ PetitionNo.8401 of 2003 are hereby quashed and set aside and the judgmentand Award passed by the Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No.96 of1993 is hereby ordered to be restored. Consequently, the order ofdismissal passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the respondent– workman from service is hereby upheld. The present appeal is allowedto the aforesaid extent. There shall be no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.

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