WEST BENGAL SMALL INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. & ORS. versus M/S. SONA PROMOTERS PVT. LTD. & ORS. on 18 March 2020

[2020] 5 S.C.R. 209

WEST BENGAL SMALL INDUSTRIESDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. & ORS.

v.

M/S. SONA PROMOTERS PVT. LTD. & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 2201 of 2020)

MARCH 18, 2020

[S. ABDUL NAZEER AND DEEPAK GUPTA, JJ.]

West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act,1976 – ss.2(a),(b), (c) and 3(2) – Appellant-Corporation purchasedimmovable properties including a factory with land belonging toa company – For purpose of setting up a small-scale industrialzone, the Corporation constructed an administrative block, afterdemolishing the existing structure, divided the area into small plots– Respondent no.1 was allotted three plots of land – Prescribedauthority terminated the lease deed in accordance with s.3(2) of1976 Act r/w r.3(1), 1976 Rules for violation of lease deed, i.e.for not taking steps for construction of the factory building – Orderupheld by Appellate Authority – High Court held that the 1976 Actdid not apply to the premises in question as Corporation is not agovernment undertaking and the premises is not a governmentpremises – Held: Appellant is a “Government undertaking” asdefined in s.2(b) – Bare land has not been independently includedin the definition of “premises” – Thus, if bare land is let out bythe government and/or government undertaking to its tenant, theincidence of such tenancy cannot be governed by the provisionsof 1976 Act and as such a tenant cannot be evicted by taking aidof the provisions of the Act – Plots leased to respondent no.1 didnot contain any structures – When eviction proceedings wereinitiated, admittedly, the land in question did not contain anystructures – Material date is the date of initiation of evictionproceedings – Eviction proceeding was in respect of these plotsof land and not the entire property purchased by the Corporation– Premises in question does not come within the definition of s.2(a)– Eviction proceedings initiated by the appellant againstrespondent no.1 under the 1976 Act was without jurisdiction –Appellants at liberty to seek eviction of respondent nos. 1 & 2 fromthe land in question under 1962 Act – West Bengal Government

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APremises (Tenancy and Regulation) Rules, 1976 – r.3(1) – Transferof Property Act, 1882 – Companies Act,1956 – s.617 – West BengalPublic Land (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1962 –Interpretation of Statutes.

Dismissing the appeal, the CourtBHeld: 1.1 The appellant-company is a “Governmentundertaking” as defined in Section 2(b) of the West BengalGovernment Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976. The term“Government premises” is defined in Section 2(a) as anypremises which is owned by the State Government or by aCGovernment undertaking but does not include the officialresidence of any person authorized to occupy the premises inconsideration of the office which he holds under the StateGovernment or a Government undertaking for the time being.The expression “premises” is defined in Section 2(c) of the Act.Therefore, a premises can be regarded as “GovernmentDpremises” only when it satisfies the definition of “Governmentpremises” under Section 2(a) of the Act read conjointly with thedefinition of “premises” under Section 2(c) of the Act.Government premises defined in Section 2(a) cannot be read inisolation of the definition of “premises” under Section 2(c) ofEthe Act. If the definition of “Government premises” appearingin Section 2(a) of the Act is read conjointly with the definition of“premises” appearing in Section 2(c) of the said Act, it not onlyincludes a building or a part of it or a hut or a part of it but alsoincludes a seat in a room, let separately, and also includes thegardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant theretoFtogether with the furniture, all fittings and fixtures provided forthe use of the tenant in such building, hut or a seat in a roomlet separately. Thus, when a seat in a room of a Governmentpremises is let out to a tenant, certainly it will be a Governmentpremises. Again, if a seat in a room is let out together with theGgardens; grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to a seatin a room, such tenancy will be of a “Government premises”.The expression “includes” is used in two places of the definitionof “premises” in Section 2(c) and the expression “includes”which was used for the second time in the said definition withoutany doubt was included to expand the ambit of “GovernmentHpremises” so as to attract the provisions of the said Act. The expression “appurtenant to it” carries special significance. Thedefinition of “premises” cannot be read bereft of the expression“appurtenant to it”. The expression “appurtenant” in thecontext means ‘relating to’, ‘usually enjoyed’, ‘occupied with’or ‘adjoining’. Therefore, if a garden, ground, or an out-houseis let out along with building or hut or a seat in a room, such agarden, ground or an out-house becomes part of the “premises”.However, bare land has not been independently included in thedefinition of “premises”. Therefore, if bare land is let out by thegovernment and/or the government undertaking to its tenant,the incidence of such tenancy cannot be governed by theprovisions of the Act and as such a tenant cannot be evicted bytaking aid of the provisions of the Act. [Paras 22-26] [218-A-H;219-A-F]

1.2 When the eviction proceedings were initiated,admittedly, the land in question did not contain any structures.If the bare land is let out by the government undertaking and itcontinues to be a bare land as on the date of initiation of evictionproceedings, the incidence of such tenancy cannot be governedby the provisions of the Act and such a tenant cannot be evictedby taking aid of the provisions of the Act. The material date isthe date of initiation of the eviction proceedings. The subjectmatter of this appeal continues to be a bare land as on the dateof initiation of the proceedings. The plots leased did not containany structures. The eviction proceedings was in respect of theseplots of land and not the entire property purchased by theCorporation from Bengal Potteries Limited. The lease was inrespect of three plots of land which did not contain any buildingand these plots of land do not satisfy the requirements ofdefinition of “Government premises” within the meaning ofSection 2(a) read with Section 2(c) of the Act. The evictionproceedings initiated by the Corporation against respondent No.1under the Act was without jurisdiction. The appellant-Corporation is a government undertaking within the meaning ofSection 2(b) of the Act. The premises in question does not comewithin the definition of Section 2(a) of the Act. The appellantsare reserved liberty to seek eviction of respondent Nos.1 and2 from the land in question under West Bengal Public Land(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1962. [Paras 29, 31-34] [220-C-H; 221-A-E]

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ACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2201of 2020.

From the Judgment and Order dated 19.9.2014 of the CalcuttaHigh Court in A.P.O.T. No. 175 of 2014.

Bhaskar P. Gupta, Debal Banerjee, Sr. Advs., AvijitBBhattacharjee, Kunal Chatterjee, Ms. Upma Shrivastava, Abhay KantMishra, Ms. Debjani Das Purkayastha, R. N. Ghose, Santanu Ghosh,S. K. Verma, Sujoy Mondal and Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Advs. forthe appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered byCS. ABDUL NAZEER, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 19.09.2014 inG.A. 1172/2014, A.P.O.T. No.175/2014 with Writ Petition No. 36 ofD2014, whereby the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court hasallowed the Writ Petition and has quashed the order of eviction passedby appellant No.5 against respondent No.1.

3. Appellant No.1 herein, namely, the West Bengal SmallIndustries Development Corporation Ltd. (for short ‘the Corporation’)is a government of West Bengal undertaking engaged in developing,Eassisting and encouraging growth of small-scale industries within theState of West Bengal. It is a government company as defined underSection 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. The entire shareholding ofthe Corporation is held by the State Government and/or its nominees.The Directors appointed by the Corporation are the nominees of theFState Government. The other appellants are the functionaries of thefirst appellant-Corporation.

4. Registered small-scale industries apply to the Corporation forallotment of industrial plots which are allotted at concessional rates toassist the small-scale industries to set up factories and to operateGthereon. The Corporation acts as an arm of the State Government inproviding industrial plots to small-scale industries. Whenever an allotteeremains a non-starter or its production closes down, after givingreasonable opportunity to re-start/re-open, the plots of land and in somecases the structures, are resumed by the Corporation. The resumedplots/structures thereafter are re-allotted to other small-scale industriesHwhich are in the waitlist.

5. Bengal Potteries Limited, a company registered under theCompanies Act, owned land with factory standing thereon situated atTangra in the city of Calcutta. The company went into liquidation andall its immovable properties, including the factory with land were putup for auction by the Calcutta High Court on “as is where is basis”.The Corporation participated in the auction and its bid was acceptedby the company court. The Corporation became the owner of all thebuildings and structures along with all lands appurtenant thereto and allassets therein.

6. After purchase of the said property, the Corporation decidedto set up a small-scale industrial zone according to the site plan whichwas sanctioned by the concerned authorities.

7. Thereafter, the Corporation, after demolition of the existingstructure, wherever necessary, constructed an administrative block, setup adequate infrastructure, divided the area into small plots and invitedapplications from small-scale industrial units for leasing out of such plotsand for construction of small-scale industrial units.

8. On an application by respondent No.1, the Corporationexecuted a first lease deed dated 14.12.2007 in favour of the saidrespondent in respect of plot Nos. 7 and 15 being part of TangraIndustrial Estate, Phase-II for setting up of a small-scale industry onthe terms and conditions mentioned therein. On 17.01.2008, thepossession of these two plots was handed over to respondent No.1.Another lease deed dated 04.03.2009, in respect of plot No.8 wasexecuted in the same industrial area in favour of respondent No.1.Mutation process of the said three plots was completed on 26.09.2012by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation.

9. On 10.10.2012, the Corporation issued a notice calling uponrespondent No.1 to show-cause as to why the tenancy should not beterminated for violation of the terms of the lease. This notice wasissued invoking clause 3 of the lease deed. Respondent No.1 submitteda reply dated 06.11.2012 to the show-cause notice. After hearing,respondent No.1 was informed by a letter dated 12.12.2015 that threemonths’ time had been extended to commence construction work atthe plots. Since nothing was done, the prescribed authority, by noticedated 09.11.2013, terminated the lease deed in accordance with Section3(2) of the West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation)Act, 1976, (for short ‘the Act’) read with Rule 3(1) of the West Bengal AB

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AGovernment Premises (Tenancy and Regulation) Rules, 1976 (for short‘the Rules’). The ground of termination was violation of clauses 2(c)and (g) of the lease deed, i.e. for not taking steps for construction ofthe factory building. By the said notice, respondent No.1 was directedto vacate the premises within 30 days.B10. Respondent No.1 preferred an appeal before the ManagingDirector of the Corporation, who is the designated Appellate Authorityagainst the order of the prescribed authority.

11. While the appeal was pending, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filedthe writ petition in the High Court seeking, inter alia, setting aside ofCthe termination notice dated 09.11.2013. The Appellate Authority byorder dated 16.01.2014, upheld the order of the prescribed authority.By this order, respondent No.1 was asked to vacate the plots in questionby 15.02.2014.

12. Being aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority,Drespondent No.1 filed a general application in the pending writ petition,inter alia, seeking to set aside and/or quash the order of the AppellateAuthority dated 16.01.2014.

13. The learned Single Judge, considering the writ petition alongwith general application, passed ad-interim order restraining theECorporation from taking any steps for eviction of the writ-petitionersfrom the disputed plots of land until the disposal of the application. Whilepassing the impugned order, the Learned Single Judge recorded thatthe issue involved in the writ petition relates to the applicability of theprovisions of the Act in respect of the lease executed by the Corporationfor plots of land without any structure thereon. It was therefore, heldFthat there was, prima facie, case made out by the writ-petitioners andthe balance of convenience lay in granting interim protection.

14. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order of thelearned Single Judge, the Corporation and its functionaries preferredan appeal before the Division Bench. In addition, they sought stay ofGthe order of the learned Single Judge by filing a separate application.

15. The Division Bench disposed of the appeal, as well as thewrit petition by the impugned order holding that the Corporation is nota government undertaking and further held that the premises is not agovernment premises. Therefore, on both counts the Division BenchHconcluded that the Act did not apply to the premises in question.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the writ petition wasallowed.

16. Appearing for the appellants, Shri Bhaskar P. Gupta, learnedSenior Counsel submits that the High Court has committed grave errorin holding that the Corporation is not a Government undertaking. Hesubmits that the appellant-Corporation is a Government companyregistered under the Companies Act, 1956. Hence, it owes its statusas a body corporate to the Companies Act, 1956. The Memorandumand Article of Association of the Corporation demonstrated that it isfully under the administrative and financial control of the StateGovernment. It is further contended that the High Court was not rightin holding that the premises in question is not a Government premiseswithin the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act. The plot leased out torespondent No.1 was a part of the larger premises which included officebuilding, etc. The entirety of the land, as well as the building must beconstrued as one unit which clearly falls within the definition of“Government premises”.

17. On the other hand, Shri Debal Banerjee, learned SeniorCounsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submits that theappellant-Corporation does not satisfy the definition of “Governmentundertaking” in Section 2(b) of the Act. Secondly, it is contended thatthe premises which is the subject matter of this appeal is not coveredunder the provisions of the Act. Bare land was leased out by theCorporation to respondent No.1. The said plot of land did not containany structure. The expression “any premises” in Section 2(a) wouldby itself be wide enough to cover even bare land but since the term“premises” is defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, that definition wouldhave to be inserted into the expression “Government premises” inSection 2(a). Otherwise, there would be repugnancy between Sections2(a) and 2(c), which is to be avoided. Therefore, he prays for dismissalof the appeal.

18. Before considering the rival contentions of the parties, let usfind out the object and purpose of the Act. Normally, the rights of thelessor and the lessee and the incidence of tenancy are governed bythe Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The provision relating to terminationof tenancy in case of breach of the conditions of the lease and recoveryof possession from the lessee under the Transfer of Property Act isvery time-consuming. Even, the execution of decree for possession is AB

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Aa complicated and time-consuming process. In order to avoid all thesehurdles and to expedite the recovery of possession, the Legislature hasenacted the Act. The preamble of the Act makes it clear that it hasbeen enacted to provide for regulation of certain incidences of tenancyin relation to government premises in West Bengal and for mattersconnected therewith or incidental thereto.B

19. Section 3 of the Act provides for termination of tenancy,which is as under:

“3. Termination of tenancy.- (1) Every tenancy held by atenant in respect of a Government premises shall standCterminated upon the expiry of the period referred to in a noticeto quit served upon such tenant in the prescribed manner.

(2) A tenancy in respect of a Government premises shall standautomatically terminated without any notice to quit where thetenant has,- D

(i) violated the terms of the lease, or

[(ia) subsequently built a house or acquired (by purchase, gift,inheritance, lease, exchange or otherwise) a house or anapartment, either in his own name or in the name of any memberEof his family, within a reasonable distance from such Governmentpremises.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section and section 3A,- (a) “apartment” shall have the same meaning as in the WestFBengal Apartment Ownership Act, 1972; (b) “family” shall include parents and other relations of thetenant who ordinarily reside with him and are dependanton him;

(c) “reasonable distance” shall mean any distance notGexceeding twenty-five kilometers, or]

(ii) made default in payment of rent for three consecutivemonths”.

Provisos to Section 3 and the other sub-sections are not relevantHfor the purpose of this case.

WEST BENGAL SMALL INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORP LTD.v. M/S. SONA PROMOTERS PVT. LTD. [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

20. The definition of the expressions “Government Premises”,“Government undertaking” and “Premises” are relevant. They are asunder:

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“2. Definitions.-

(a) “Government premises” means any premises which isBowned by the State Government or by a Governmentundertaking but does not include the official residenceof any person authorized to occupy and premises inconsideration of the office which he holds under theState Government or a Government undertaking for thetime being;C

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(b) “Government undertaking” means a body corporateconstituted by or under a Central or State Act which isunder the administrative control of the State Governmentor in which the State Government has exclusiveproprietary interest; D

(c) “premises” means any building or hut and includes partof a building or hut and a seat in a room, let separately,and also includes,-

(i) the gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any,appurtenant thereto, E

(ii) any furniture supplied or any fittings or fixturesaffixed for the use of the tenant in such building, hutor seat in, as the case may be.”

21. In the present case, the premises in question are not ownedby the government. It is owned by the appellant-Corporation, which isa government company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956.Therefore, the first question for consideration is whether the Corporationcan be regarded as a “Government undertaking” so as to attract theapplicability of the provisions of the Act in respect of the premises heldby it.

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22. It is an admitted position that the Corporation is registeredunder the Companies Act, 1956. The Corporation is under theadministrative control of the State Government and almost all the sharesof the Corporation, are held by the State Government, apart from afew shares which are held by IAS officers in their official capacity. It H

Aowes its status as a body corporate to the Companies Act enacted bythe Parliament. In our considered view, the appellant-company is a“Government undertaking” as defined in Section 2(b) of the Act.

23. The second question for consideration is whether the premisesowned by the Corporation and let out to respondent No.1 areBgovernment premises within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act.The term “Government premises” is defined in Section 2(a) as anypremises which is owned by the State Government or by a Governmentundertaking but does not include the official residence of any personauthorized to occupy the premises in consideration of the office whichhe holds under the State Government or a Government undertaking forCthe time being. It is clear from this definition that, it refers to anypremises owned by the Government or a Government undertakingexcept those which are official residences of the persons authorized tooccupy the said premises in consideration of the office which thegovernment official holds under the State Government or under anyDGovernment undertaking for the time being.

24. The expression “premises” is defined in Section 2(c) of theAct. Therefore, a premises can be regarded as “Government premises”only when it satisfies the definition of “Government premises” underSection 2(a) of the Act read conjointly with the definition of “premises”Eunder Section 2(c) of the Act. Government premises defined in Section2(a) cannot be read in isolation of the definition of “premises” underSection 2(c) of the Act. In order to give complete meaning to theexpression “Government premises”, we should first implant the definitionof “premises” under Section 2(c) in the place of the “premises”appearing in Section 2(a) and then consider as to whether a premisesFis a Government premises or not. It is an undisputable canon ofconstruction that when an expression is defined in the statute, unlessthere is anything repugnant in the subject or context, the expressionhas to be construed as having the same meaning assigned to it in thedictionary clause of the statute. Therefore, the definition “premises”Gunder Section 2(c) has to be read into the definition of “Governmentpremises” under Section 2(a).

25. Thus, if we read the definition of “Government premises”appearing in Section 2(a) of the said Act conjointly with the definitionof “premises” appearing in Section 2(c) of the said Act, it not onlyHincludes a building or a part of it or a hut or a part of it but also includes a seat in a room, let separately, and also includes the gardens, groundsand out-houses, if any, appurtenant thereto together with the furniture,all fittings and fixtures provided for the use of the tenant in such building,hut or a seat in a room let separately. Thus, when a seat in a room ofa Government premises is let out to a tenant, certainly it will be aGovernment premises. Again, if a seat in a room is let out together withthe gardens; grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to a seat in aroom, such tenancy will be of a “Government premises”.

26. The point for consideration before us is when neither a buildingnor a part of the building nor a hut nor a part of the hut nor a seat ina room is let out to a tenant but only bare land is let out to a tenant,can such tenancy be regarded as relating to a “Government premises”to attract the provisions of the Act. The expression “includes” is usedin two places of the definition of “premises” in Section 2(c) and theexpression “includes” which was used for the second time in the saiddefinition without any doubt was included to expand the ambit of“Government premises” so as to attract the provisions of the said Act.The expression “appurtenant to it” carries special significance. Wecannot read the definition of “premises” bereft of the expression“appurtenant to it”. The expression “appurtenant” in the context means‘relating to’, ‘usually enjoyed’, ‘occupied with’ or ‘adjoining’. Therefore,if a garden, ground, or an out-house is let out along with building or hutor a seat in a room, such a garden, ground or an out-house becomespart of the “premises”. However, bare land has not been independentlyincluded in the definition of “premises”. Therefore, we have no hesitationto hold that if bare land is let out by the government and/or thegovernment undertaking to its tenant, the incidence of such tenancycannot be governed by the provisions of the Act and as such a tenantcannot be evicted by taking aid of the provisions of the Act.

27. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that theCorporation had purchased immovable properties including a factorywith land belonging to the Bengal Potteries Ltd. The Corporation hadbecome the owner of all the building and structures along with the landappurtenant thereto belonging to the said company. After purchase ofthe land, the Corporation decided to set up a small-scale industrial zoneaccording to the site plan. The Corporation constructed an administrativeblock after demolition of the existing structure and wherever necessary,it divided the area into small plots. Respondent No.1 was allotted threeplots of land, which did not contain any structure at the time of lease.

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A28. The lease in respect of these three plots of land wasterminated for violation of clauses 2(c) and 2(g) of the lease deed. Itis alleged in the show-cause notice at Annexure P-3 dated 10.10.2012,that respondent No.1 failed to take any steps for construction of thefactory building as per clause 2(c) of the lease deed since taking overpossession of the said plot. By letter dated 19.12.2012 (Annexure P-B5), three months’ further time was extended for starting constructionwork on the plots in question. However, respondent No.1 failed to startthe construction of the factory building even during this extended period.Consequently, the tenancy in respect of these plots of land wasterminated.C

29. Thus, when the eviction proceedings were initiated, admittedly,the land in question did not contain any structures. If the bare land islet out by the government undertaking and it continues to be a bareland as on the date of initiation of eviction proceedings, the incidenceof such tenancy cannot be governed by the provisions of the Act andDsuch a tenant cannot be evicted by taking aid of the provisions of theAct. The material date is the date of initiation of the evictionproceedings. Had respondent No.1 put up the construction on the plotsof land leased to it, and if the eviction is sought under Section 3 of theAct for violation of some other clauses of the lease deed or uponsatisfaction of the conditions mentioned in sub-sections (1) and (2) ofESection 3, the proceedings would have been maintainable. As notedabove, the subject matter of this appeal continues to be a bare land ason the date of initiation of the proceedings.

30. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has laid emphasison the fact that the plots leased to respondent No.1 were a part of theFlarger premises which included office building etc. and that the plotsleased cannot be treated separately since it is a part of larger plot ofland including building. The entirety of the land as well as building mustbe construed as one unit which clearly falls within the definition of“Government premises”. Hence, the eviction proceedings clearly fallGwithin the ambit of the Act.

31. It is true that, after purchase of the property from BengalPotteries Limited, the old buildings were demolished, wherever it wasnecessary, and the administrative block was constructed. Rest of thearea was divided into small plots of land. Three such plots were leasedHto respondent No.1. The plots leased did not contain any structures.

The eviction proceedings was in respect of these plots of land and notthe entire property purchased by the Corporation from Bengal PotteriesLimited. Therefore, we are not in agreement with the learned seniorcounsel for the Corporation that the entire land as well as building areto be construed as one unit because the entire land with the buildinghas not been leased to respondent No.1. The lease was in respect ofthree plots of land which did not contain any building and these plotsof land do not satisfy the requirements of definition of “Governmentpremises” within the meaning of Section 2(a) read with Section 2(c)of the Act.

32. Therefore, we hold that the eviction proceedings initiated bythe Corporation against respondent No.1 under the Act was withoutjurisdiction.

33. The High Court, in the concluding paragraph of the impugnedjudgment, has held that the Corporation has to seek eviction ofrespondent No.1 from the premises in question under the provisions ofthe West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)Act, 1962. We are entirely in agreement with this view of the HighCourt.

34. To conclude, while holding that the appellant-Corporation isa government undertaking within the meaning of Section 2(b) of theAct, we further hold that the premises in question does not come withinthe definition of Section 2(a) of the Act. Reserving liberty to theappellants to seek eviction of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from the land inquestion under West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of UnauthorizedOccupants) Act, 1962, we dismiss this appeal. However, there will beno order as to costs.

Divya Pandey

Appeal dismissed.

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