HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED versus SHAILENDRA BHATNAGAR on 20 April 2022

Conclusion

HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED

v.

SHAILENDRA BHATNAGAR(Civil Appeal No. 3001 of 2022)

APRIL 20, 2022

[VINEET SARAN AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]

Consumer Protection Act, 1986: s. 14(1) – Defect in respectof safety features of a vehicle – Award of punitive damages – Onfacts, non-deployment of air bags in the car at the time of accidentresulting in injuries to the complainant – Award of compensationby fora below – On appeal, held: Fora below rightly relied on theprinciple of Res Ipsa Loquitur to affix the liability of the manufactureras regards defect in the airbag system, having regard to the natureof the collision and took the view that expert evidence was notnecessary – They highlighted that there was significant damage tothe front portion of the vehicle – Ordinarily a consumer whilepurchasing a vehicle with airbags would assume that the same wouldbe deployed whenever there is a collision from the front portion ofthe vehicle – Deployment of the airbags ought to have preventedinjuries being caused to those travelling in the vehicle, particularlyin the front seat – Consumer is not meant to be an expert in physicscalculating the impact of a collision on the theories based on velocityand force – Thus, no error in the findings of the two fora as regardsthere being defect in the vehicle – As per the statute, the directioncould be for replacement of defective goods as also punitivedamages – In the facts of the case, direction for replacement of thevehicle is justified and the fact that the consumer has got the carrepaired on insurance money would not impact the quantum ofdamages, which is partly punitive in nature – Failure to provide anairbag system which would meet the safety standards to be subjectto punitive damages – Thus, the decision of the National Commissionnot interfered with – Sale of Goods Act, 1930 – ss. 2(7), 16.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Vehicles are goods within the meaning of Section2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and they carry impliedconditions as to their fitness. That is a statutory mandate and

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Athat mandate also operates in respect of goods, whose defect issubject of proceeding in a consumer complaint under theConsumer Protection Act, 1986. In the complaint, it has beenpleaded that the respondent had relied on the safety features ofthe vehicle projected by the manufacturer. In such a situation,the limitation will run from the day the defect surfaces in a case.BThere is no way by which the nature of defect complained againstcould be identified in normal circumstances at an earlier date,before the collision took place. In this case, the safety feature ofthe vehicle fell short of the quality of fitness as was representedby the manufacturer by implication. The National Commission’sCview is broadly based on the principle incorporated in Section 16of the 1930 Act. The defect in this case ought to be treated tohave had surfaced on the date of the accident itself. [Para 7][115-F-H; 116-A-B]

1.2 The question on privity of contract was raised on theDground that the dealer was not impleaded as a party and therewas no contract between the appellant and the respondentconsumer. This issue was rightly rejected by both the fora.[Para 8][116-H; 117-A]

1.3 There are findings of the two fora about the defect inEthe product sold, in this case being a vehicle. This was sold withfront airbags and there was frontal damage. The airbags did notdeploy. The accident caused injuries to the respondent. Theappellant referred to various portions from the owner’s manualto contend that the impact of the collision was not sufficient toactivate the sensor which in turn would have resulted inFdeployment of the airbags. The State Commission relied on theprinciple of Res Ipsa Loquitur to affix the liability of themanufacturer as regards defect in the airbag system, havingregard to the nature of the collision. The National Commissionaffirmed this finding referring to certain photographs of theGdamaged vehicle, which showed substantial frontal damage. Insuch circumstances, both the said fora took the view that expertevidence was not necessary in the subject case. Such view cannotbe faulted as being unreasonable, in the given facts. [Para 9][117-B-D]

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1.4 Ordinarily a consumer while purchasing a vehicle withairbags would assume that the same would be deployed wheneverthere is a collision from the front portion of the vehicle (in respectof front airbags). Both the fora, in their decisions, have highlightedthe fact that there was significant damage to the front portion ofthe vehicle. Deployment of the airbags ought to have preventedinjuries being caused to those travelling in the vehicle, particularlyin the front seat. A consumer is not meant to be an expert inphysics calculating the impact of a collision on the theories basedon velocity and force. In such circumstances, there is no error inthe findings of the two fora as regards there being defect in thevehicle. [Para 10][117-E-G]

1.5 This is a case where the 1986 Act was applicable andSection 14 of the said statute lays down the reliefs which may begranted. The directions as per the statute, could be forreplacement of defective goods as also punitive damages. Theappellant have also taken a point that so far as replacement ofthe vehicle is concerned, there was no substantive direction andno discussion either. The operative part of the order suffers froma shortcoming on this count, but that is not fatal. On a compositereading of the directions, it is found that such direction was made.The confusion, if any, arises because of construction defect inthe Order of the State Commission. A direction for replacementof the vehicle is justified in the facts of this case. The directionfor replacement of the vehicle would not be treated as non-esthaving regard to the State Commission’s Order. The fact that theconsumer has got the car repaired on insurance money wouldnot impact the quantum of damages, which is partly punitive innature in this case. [Para 11][117-H; 118-A-C]

1.6 The damages awarded against the appellant may havegone beyond the actual loss suffered by the respondent and maynot represent the actual loss suffered by him in monetary terms.But the provision of Section 14 of the 1986 Act permits awardingpunitive damages. Such damages can be awarded in the eventthe defect is found to have the potential to cause serious injuryor major loss to the consumer, particularly in respect of safetyfeatures of a vehicle. The manufacturer should be under strict AB

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Aand absolute liability in respect of the latter. Compensation inthe form of punitive damages ought to have a deterrent effect.[Para 13][118-F-H; 119-A]

1.7 In the instant case, the impact of the collision was suchthat it would have been reasonable for the respondent to assumeBthat there would have been deployment of the airbags. The safetydescription of the goods fell short of its expected quality. Thecontent of the owners’ manual does not carry any material fromwhich the owner of a vehicle could be alerted that in a collision ofthis nature, the airbags would not deploy. Purchase decision ofthe respondent-complainant was largely made on the basis ofCrepresentation of the safety features of the vehicle. The failureto provide an airbag system which would meet the safety standardsas perceived by a car-buyer of reasonable prudence should besubject to punitive damages which can have deterrent effect. Andin computing such punitive damages, the capacity of theDmanufacturing enterprise should also be a factor. There was nospecific exclusion clause to insulate the manufacturer from claimof damages of this nature. Even if there were such a clause, legalitythereof could be open to legal scrutiny. [Para 14][119-D-G]

1.8 If the reliefs granted in a consumer complaint fits anyEof the statutory provision contained in sub clause (1) of Section14 of the Act, it would be well within the power and jurisdiction ofthe Forum to pass directions irrespective of the fact as to whetherspecifically certain reliefs have been claimed or not, providedthat facts make out foundations for granting such reliefs. In anyevent, it is within the jurisdiction of the said forum to mould theFreliefs claimed to do effective justice, provided the relief comeswithin the stipulation of Section 14(1) of the Act. The relief grantedto the respondent comes within the statutory framework. Thedecision of the National Commission is not interfered with. Thereasoning of the Commission or the operative part of the orderGawarding damages are not perverse. The directions issued againstthe appellant by the State Commission and upheld by the NationalCommission cannot be said to have failed the test ofproportionality. The subject-defect is found to be of such naturethat the provisions relating to punitive damages ought to beattracted against the appellant. [Para 15][119-H; 120-A-D]H

HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED v. SHAILENDRABHATNAGAR

Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh & Others (2003) 2 SCC274 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 499; Sangita Arya andOthers v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited andOthers (2020) 5 SCC 327; Jitendra KhimshankarTrivedi and Others v. Kasam Daud Kumbhar and Others(2015) 4 SCC 237 : [2015] 2 SCR 120; M.C. Mehtaand Another v. Union of India and Others (1987) 1SCC 395 : [1987] 1 SCR 819 – referred to.

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.3001of 2022.

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From the Judgment and Order dated 05.01.2021 of the NationalConsumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in First AppealNo.850 of 2020.

Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr. Adv., Gaurang Kanth, Ms. Shivani Kher,Chandan Kumar, Advs. for the Appellant.

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Ms. Binu Tamta, Dhruv Tamta, Advs. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

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1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant are manufacturers of vehicles and the presentappeal arises out of a complaint made by the respondent concerningdefect in a vehicle, particularly in relation to its safety features originatingfrom the appellant, of the model Creta 1.6 VTVT SX+. The vehiclecame with two front airbags. Purchase of the vehicle was made on 21[st]August 2015. It met with an accident on the Delhi-Panipat highway on16[th] November 2017 resulting in substantial damage to its RH front pillar,RH front roof, side body panels, front RH door panels and LH frontwheel suspension. The initials RH and LH appears to be used as short G

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Aforms of Right Hand and Left Hand sides of the vehicle. At that point oftime, the complainant (being the respondent herein), his mother anddaughter were in the vehicle. The airbags of the vehicle did not deployat the time of collision. The complainant suffered head, chest as alsodental injuries. He attributes such injuries to non-deployment of airbagsat the time of accident. The appellant themselves obtained an investigationBreport which has been referred to as SRS report. The remarks andconclusion of the said SRS Investigation Report, as it appears from pages53 and 54 of the paperbook were:- “Remarks:

C•Vehicle found with major damage on RH front pillar, RHSide body panels and LH front wheel suspension.

•Under ride & Angular impact found on the RH Front Pillar,Roof and Front RH Door panel.

•Grazing damages found on the RH side panels due to theDscratch against truck while moving towards left.

Findings:

•No crash info recorded in SRSCM, hence no air bagsdeployed.

E•No impact damage observed on both side chassis members,damages found away from impact sensors.

•Vehicle found completely dismantled and mid-repaircondition during inspection.

Conclusion:F

•The major impact to the vehicle from RH pillar resulted inunder ride and angular condition.

•Both front chassis member found unaffected by the frontalimpact, hence no impact sensed by the front impact sensorsGand not triggered any signal to SRSCM (No crash inforecorded in SRSCM for frontal impact).

•After thorough study, it is confirmed that the condition wasnot met for the air bag deployment, hence no air bagsdeployed. The air bag system was working proper at thetime of accident.H

HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED v. SHAILENDRABHATNAGAR [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]

Accident description:

•As per customer verbatim, while he was driving at 100 kmphspeed on Gannaur highway. A front going truck appliedsudden brake, his car hit to the truck from the right side tothe left rear corner of the Truck. Further his car scratchedagainst the truck while moving towards left side of the roadand finally hit to some stones on the left front wheel andvehicle stopped.”

(quoted verbatim)

3. The Delhi State Consumer Redressal Commission, in acomplaint raised by the respondent, upheld his claim. The main theme ofhis complaint was that the main reason for his purchase decision of themodel was because of its safety features including the airbags and theinjury was suffered by him because of non-deployment of the airbags.The State Commission granted relief to the following effect:- “19. Keeping in view of the facts and circumstances of the presentconsumer complaint, we direct the opposite party to:

a. Compensate the complainant an amout of Rs.2,00,000/- formedical expenses and loss of income.

b. Compensate the complainant an amount of Rs.50,000/- formental agony.

c. Pay to the complainant an amount of Rs.50,000/- as cost oflitigation.

20. The aforesaid payment shall be made by opposite party withintwo months from the date of this order by way of demand draft.Failure of opposite party in paying the said amount in stipulatedperiod will attract an interest of 7% per annum from the date ofdefault. Furthermore, failure in replacing the vehicle of theappellant will also attract an interest of 7% per annum of thevalue of the vehicle from the date of default.”

4. The appellant preferred appeal before the National ConsumerDispute Redressal Commission (“National Commission”). The NationalCommission dismissed the appeal sustaining the compensation awardedby the State Commission. The Order of the National Commission, whichwas passed on 5[th] January 2021, is under appeal before us. Neither the A

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AState Commission nor the National Commission accepted the justificationsought to be made by the appellant referring to the said investigationreport, having regard to the fact of non-deployment of the airbags. It hasbeen, inter-alia, held by the National Commission:-

“11.... Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Opposite Party submittedBthat the airbags deploy only when there is severe impact of forceand airbags may not deploy if the vehicle collides with objects likepoles and trees, when full force of the impact is not delivered tothe sensors. Learned Counsel for the Appellant argued that theSRS Investigation report dated 01.12.2017 clearly stated that theimpact of the accident was such that the minimum threshold forceCrequired for the deployment of the airbags was not delivered tothe front sensors installed in the engine compartment and hence,the airbags did not deploy. No expert evidence was produced bythe Respondent to substantiate any manufacturing defect. TheComplainant contended that he purchased the car for its safetyDfeatures highlighted by the Manufacturer, but the airbags did notfunction when required, due to which he sustained serious injuriesas can be seen from the medical prescriptions and bills furnishedby the Complainant. The impact/force required for triggering thefront airbags was not made known to the Complainant. Nowherehas the minimum threshold force been quantified and this defence E

can never be refuted. Highlighting safety features including airbagswhile selling the car and not elaborating and disclosing the thresholdlimits for their opening is by itself an unfair trade practice.Complainant, however, had filed photographs of the accidentalcar. Major damage to RH front pillar, RH front roof, side bodyFpanels front RH door panels and LH front wheel suspension isseen in the photographs of the car. Without forceful impact, thecar would not have been so badly damaged. The accident was amajor accident in which the entire deriver side of the car, the sidepart and even the front mirror of the car got smashed and broken.The impact of the accident was so intense that the front bumperGgrill, dash board and the radiator got totally damaged. The StateCommission rightly observed “that expert evidence need not berelied upon where the facts speak for themselves. This is a caseof Res Ipsa Loquitur where the photographs of the damagedvehicle placed on record clearly show the impact of the accidentHon the vehicle.”

5. One of the points argued on behalf of the appellant by Mr.Huzefa Ahmadi, learned Senior advocate, is that the order forreplacement of the vehicle ought not to have been passed. The respondenthad not asked for replacement of the vehicle as part of the reliefs claimedbefore the State Commission. He has otherwise questioned legality ofthe decisions of the two fora citing certain clauses from the owner’smanual. His argument on this count has been that if force generated bythe collision is lesser than a certain degree, there would not be deploymentof the airbags. Thus, there was no defect in the security system accordingto him. He also highlighted that impact of the accident was from the sideand it was not a frontal hit.

6. It is the case of the appellant that the airbag deployment dependson a number of factors including vehicle speed, angle of impact, densityand stiffness of vehicles or objects which the vehicle hits in the collision.The vehicle is designed to deploy the front airbags only when an impactis sufficiently severe and when the impact angle is less than 30 degreesfrom the forward longitudinal axis of the vehicle. Mr. Ahmadi hassubmitted that the front airbags are not intended to deploy if the impactis from the side or in cases of rear impact or roll over crashes. He hasreferred to a variety of circumstances in a collision which may not resultin deployment of the airbags. He has cited the investigation report towhich we have already referred to.

7. Before the Commission, point of limitation was also taken andthe appellant wanted the limitation to run from the date of purchase ofthe vehicle and not the date of the accident. This objection onmaintainability has been rightly rejected by both the State Commissionand the National Commission. We do not find any error in the view ofthe respective Commissions on this point. Vehicles are goods within themeaning of Section 2(7) of The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and they carryimplied conditions as to their fitness. That is a statutory mandate andthat mandate also operates in respect of goods, whose defect is subjectof proceeding in a consumer complaint under the Consumer ProtectionAct, 1986. In the complaint, it has been pleaded that the respondent hadrelied on the safety features of the vehicle projected by the manufacturer.In such a situation, the limitation will run from the day the defect surfacesin a case. There is no way by which the nature of defect complainedagainst could be identified in normal circumstances at an earlier date,before the collision took place. In this case, the safety feature of the AB

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Avehicle fell short of the quality of fitness as was represented by themanufacturer by implication. The National Commission’s view is broadlybased on the principle incorporated in Section 16 of the 1930 Act. Thedefect in this case ought to be treated to have had surfaced on the dateof the accident itself. We quote below the provisions of Section 16 ofThe Sale of Goods Act, 1930:-B

“16. Implied conditions as to quality or fitness.— Subject tothe provisions of this Act and of any other law for the time beingin force, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the qualityor fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under acontract of sale, except as follows:—C

(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known tothe seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required,so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment,and the goods are of a description which it is in the course of theseller’s business to supply (whether he is the manufacturer orDproducer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shallbe reasonably fit for such purpose:

Provided that, in the case of a contract for the sale of a specifiedarticle under its patent or other trade name, there is no impliedcondition as to its fitness for any particular purpose.E

(2) Where goods are bought by description from a seller who dealsin goods of that description (whether he is the manufacturer orproducer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shallbe of merchantable quality:

FProvided that, if the buyer has examined the goods, there shall beno implied condition as regards defects which such examinationought to have revealed.

(3) An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for aparticular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade.

G(4)An express warranty or condition does not negative a warrantyor condition implied by this Act unless inconsistent therewith.”

8. The question on privity of contract was also raised before theState as also the National Commission and from the decision under appealwe find that this point was raised on the ground that the dealer was notHimpleaded as a party and there was no contract between the appellant and the respondent consumer. This issue was rejected by both theconsumer fora. No argument has been advanced before us on this pointand we do not find any error in the reasoning of the National Commissionon this point.

9. There are findings of the two fora about the defect in the productsold, in this case being a vehicle. This was sold with front airbags andthere was frontal damage. The airbags did not deploy. The accidentcaused injuries to the respondent. The appellant referred to variousportions from the owner’s manual to contend that the impact of thecollision was not sufficient to activate the sensor which in turn wouldhave resulted in deployment of the airbags. We would not like to revisitthe facts on which findings have been returned by the two fora againstthe appellant. The State Commission relied on the principle of Res IpsaLoquitur to affix the liability of the manufacturer as regards defect inthe airbag system, having regard to the nature of the collision. The NationalCommission affirmed this finding referring to certain photographs of thedamaged vehicle, which showed substantial frontal damage. In suchcircumstances, both the aforesaid fora took the view that expert evidencewas not necessary in the subject case. Such view cannot be faulted asbeing unreasonable, in the given facts.

10. We do not find any reason to interfere with the finding of theNational Commission. We would like to add here that ordinarily aconsumer while purchasing a vehicle with airbags would assume thatthe same would be deployed whenever there is a collision from the frontportion of the vehicle (in respect of front airbags). Both the fora, in theirdecisions, have highlighted the fact that there was significant damage tothe front portion of the vehicle. Deployment of the airbags ought to haveprevented injuries being caused to those travelling in the vehicle,particularly in the front seat. A consumer is not meant to be an expert inphysics calculating the impact of a collision on the theories based onvelocity and force. In such circumstances, we do not find that there isany error in the findings of the two fora as regards there being defect inthe vehicle.

11. We shall now turn to the reliefs granted by the StateCommission and upheld by the National Commission. The first pointargued in this regard is that there was no prayer in the petition forreplacement of the vehicle. This is a case where the 1986 Act wasapplicable and Section 14 of the said statute lays down the reliefs which A

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Amay be granted. The directions as per the statute, could be for replacementof defective goods as also punitive damages. The appellant have alsotaken a point that so far as replacement of the vehicle is concerned,there was no substantive direction and no discussion either. The operativepart of the order suffers from a shortcoming on this count, but that is notfatal. On a composite reading of the directions, we find from paragraphB20 of the Order of the State Commission that such a direction was made.The confusion, if any, arises because of construction defect in the Orderof the State Commission. Considering the fact that the dispute is pendingfor a reasonably long period of time, we have ourselves applied our mindon this issue and our view is that a direction for replacement of theCvehicle is justified in the facts of this case. The direction for replacementof the vehicle would not be treated as non-est having regard to paragraph20 of the State Commission’s Order. The fact that the consumer has gotthe car repaired on insurance money would not impact the quantum ofdamages, which is partly punitive in nature in this case.

D12. Three cases arising out of motor accident claims were citedbefore us. In Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh & Others. [(2003) 2 SCC274], it was held that there is no restriction that the Tribunal or Courtcannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. Twoother authorities were cited before us, by Ms. Tamta, learned counselfor the respondent, being the cases of Sangita Arya and Others v.EOriental Insurance Company Limited and Others [(2020) 5 SCC327] and Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi and Others v. Kasam DaudKumbhar and Others [(2015) 4 SCC 237]. These two cases lay downthe principle of just and reasonable compensation that may be paid. Theratio of these authorities, however, do not directly apply in the facts ofFthis case.

13. The damages awarded against the appellant may have gonebeyond the actual loss suffered by the respondent and may not representthe actual loss suffered by him in monetary terms. But the provision ofSection 14 of the 1986 Act permits awarding punitive damages. SuchGdamages, in our view, can be awarded in the event the defect is found tohave the potential to cause serious injury or major loss to the consumer,particularly in respect of safety features of a vehicle. For instance,defective safety feature in a vehicle has to be distinguished from adysfunctional “courtesy light”. The manufacturer should be under strictand absolute liability in respect of the latter. Compensation in the form ofH

HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED v. SHAILENDRABHATNAGAR [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]

punitive damages ought to have a deterrent effect. We also refer to theprinciples detailing the factors guiding quantification of liability laid downby a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of M.C. Mehta andAnother v. Union of India and Others [(1987) 1 SCC 395]. In thiscase it has been opined:- “32. We would also like to point out that the measure ofcompensation in the kind of cases referred to in the precedingparagraph must be corelated to the magnitude and capacity of theenterprise because such compensation must have a deterrenteffect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greatermust be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harmcaused on account of an accident in the carrying on of thehazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise.”

14. The aforesaid decision arose out of a case involving the deathof an individual and injuries to several others in an industrial accident.But in our opinion, in the subject dispute also the same principle can beextended. We are dealing with a case where in a collision, the airbagsdid not deploy. The complainant, driving the vehicle, suffered substantialinjuries as a result thereof. The impact of the collision was such that itwould have been reasonable for the respondent to assume that therewould have been deployment of the airbags. The safety description ofthe goods fell short of its expected quality. The content of the owners’manual does not carry any material from which the owner of a vehiclecould be alerted that in a collision of this nature, the airbags would notdeploy. Purchase decision of the respondent-complainant was largelymade on the basis of representation of the safety features of the vehicle.The failure to provide an airbag system which would meet the safetystandards as perceived by a car-buyer of reasonable prudence, in ourview, should be subject to punitive damages which can have deterrenteffect. And in computing such punitive damages, the capacity of themanufacturing enterprise should also be a factor. There was no specificexclusion clause to insulate the manufacturer from claim of damages ofthis nature. Even if there were such a clause, legality thereof could beopen to legal scrutiny. But there is no reason for dilating on that aspect inthis case. That question doesn’t arise here.

15. If the reliefs granted in a consumer complaint fits any of thestatutory provision contained in sub clause (1) of Section 14 of the Act,it would be well within the power and jurisdiction of the Forum to pass A

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Adirections irrespective of the fact as to whether specifically certain reliefshave been claimed or not, provided that facts make out foundations forgranting such reliefs. In any event, it is within the jurisdiction of the saidforum to mould the reliefs claimed to do effective justice, provided therelief comes within the stipulation of Section 14(1) of the Act. We findthat the relief granted to the respondent comes within the statutoryBframework. We accordingly do not want to interfere with the decisionof the National Commission. We do not find the reasoning of theCommission or the operative part of the order awarding damages to beperverse. We do not need the aid of the ratio of the three authoritiescited before us pertaining to motor accident claim to sustain the decisionCunder appeal. We are also of the view that the directions issued againstthe appellant by the State Commission and upheld by the NationalCommission cannot be said to have failed the test of proportionality. Wehold so as we find the subject-defect to be of such nature that theprovisions relating to punitive damages ought to be attracted against theappellant.D16. We accordingly dismiss the appeal. Interim order passed inthis matter shall stand dissolved.

17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

18. There shall be no order as to costs.

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Appeal dismissed.

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