STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CBI/ACB/BANGALORE versus B.A. SRINIVASAN AND ANR. on 5 December 2019

1. Leave granted.

2. This Appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 08.08.2018passed by the High Court[1] allowing Criminal Revision Petition No.834of 2015 preferred by the Respondent No. 1; and thereby discharging theRespondent No.1 of the offences punishable under Sections 419, 420,467, 468, 471 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860(‘IPC’, for short) and Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1988 (‘the Act’, for short).

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3. The Respondent No. 1 retired on 31.10.2012 as AssistantGeneral Manager, Vijaya Bank. On 28.10.2013, FIR being RC 12(A)/2013 was registered pursuant to complaint given by the General Manager,Vijaya Bank, Head Office, Bangalore against the Respondent No.1 inrespect of the offences mentioned hereinabove. After completion of G

1 The High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore H

Ainvestigation, charge-sheet was filed on 31.10.2014 against theRespondent No.1 and other accused in respect of said offences. It wasalleged inter alia :- “3. That Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) while working as AssistantGeneral Manager (AGM) and Branch Head, Vijaya Bank, MayoBHall Branch, Bangalore during the period from 11.01.2010 to20.10.2012 entered into a criminal conspiracy with ShriB.Lakshman (A-3), Smt. Shanta Gowda (A-4) and Shri S.V. Isloor(A-5) to cheat and defraud Vijaya Bank, Mayohall Branch,Bangalore and to extend undue financial accommodation toM/s. Nikhara Electronics and Allied Technics (A-2) on the basisCof fake and fabricated documents and in furtherance of the saidcriminal conspiracy, Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) sanctioned anddisbursed Rs.200 lakhs of Term Loan and Rs.100 lakhs of CashCredit Hypothecation (Working Capital) in favour of M/s. NikharaElectronics and Allied Technics (A-2) without proper due diligenceand in gross violation of all extant rules and regulations of VijayaDBank, and hence, facilitated A-3 and A-4 to divert the loan-fundsagainst the terms and conditions, thereby causing wrongful loss toVijaya Bank and corresponding gains to others.

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8. That Shri B. Lakshnian (A-3) and his wife Smt. Shanta Gowda(A-4) fraudulently created an agreement dated 10.06.2011 on thephotocopy of e-stamp paper having franking No.57724 dated08.06.2011 and submitted a copy of the same to Vijaya Bank tosupport their dishonest claim of taking over M/s. NikharaElectronics & Allied Technics, proprietary concern by making apayment of Rs.1.00 Crore as goodwill to Shri VenkataramanaBhat (A-6). Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) dishonestly accepted thephotocopy of the agreement intentionally omitting to ascertain itsgenuineness or authenticity. It is revealed that the above agreementwas fraudulently created on the photocopy of e-stamp paperfranked vide 57724 dated 08.06.2011 and the original stamp paperremained blank was seized from the office premises of Shri S.V.Isloor (A-5). It is thus established the fraudulent intentions of allthe accused persons to create forged documents as and whenrequired and to misrepresent that the proprietary unit was takenover by A-3 and A-4 from A-6.

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16. That Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) in furtherance of criminalconspiracy with the other accused dishonestly, by abusing hisofficial position as AGM & Branch Head of Vijaya Bank, MayohallBranch fraudulently considered the loan application, processedloan proposals in gross violation of the rules and regulations ofVijaya Bank in this regard in order to favour the accused persons.He intentionally accepted the inflated financial statementssubmitted by A-3 and A-4 even though they were not audited andconsidered them for working out the credit assessment of theborrower firm i.e., M/s. Nikhara Electronics and Allied Technics(A-2). He purposely did not exercise due diligence to analyse thefinancial statements submitted by the borrower firm whichcontained several inconsistencies. He also did not conduct themandatory pre-sanction verification at the address of the borrowerfirm to ascertain whether any business activities such asmanufacturing of electric equipment etc., were going on as claimedin the loan application. The criminal acts of Shri B.A. Srinivasan(A-1) facilitated the accused private persons to misrepresent theexistence of M/s. Nikhara Electronics and Allied Technics (A-2),which actually existed only on the forged partnership deed dated10.06.2011, created by A-3 and A-4.

17. That Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) prepared the Credit ProcessNote himself and obtained the signatures of Shri Jyoti PrakashShetty, the then Asst. Manager in the column of appraising official.Shri Nabeel Ahmed, the then Probationary Manager was alsomade to put his initials in the process note, merely as a token ofhis training. It is revealed that A-1 prepared the proposals for anaggregate amount of Rs.300 lakh (term loan of Rs.200 lakhs andcash credit of Rs.100 lakhs) as against the request for Rs.350lakhs (term Loan of Rs.200 lakhs; working capital of Rs.130 lakhsand Bank Guarantee of Rs.20 lakhs) without there being anyclarification/justification for such reduction in the requirements ofthe applicant.

18. That Shri B. Lakshman (A-3) fraudulently submitted a forgedLetter No. REFREF: SP: QT: 155: 2011 dated 10.08.2011purportedly signed as JAK, Partners, M/s. V-Tech EngineeringEnterprises along with Quotations/Proforma Invoices for anaggregate amount of Rs.2,69,60,496/- which were purportedlyissued by M/s.V-Tech Engineering Enterprises.

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33. That Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) was also fully aware thatproperty offered as collateral security was in occupation of thirdparties (tenants). However, A-1 dishonestly and fraudulently choseto ignore this important fact, in spite of his field inspection andalso the observations made by the valuer in his Valuation Report.Concurrent Auditor of the Bank also pointed out this fact in herreport adding that the tenants in occupation of collateral securitywould adversely affect the interests of the bank, in the event ofnecessity, to enforce sale of the property to recover its dues. It isalso revealed that tenants were paying rents to Shri Nagesh s/olate Krishnappa, who sold the property to Shri Nilakanth Sanikop,from whom A-3 purchased the property. A-1 intentionally omittedto make any endeavour to ascertain the nature of rights of thetenants, despite the fact that in future it would affect theenforceability of the mortgaged property by the bank.

34. That Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) also violated the extant rulesof the bank by not obtaining the Legal Audit Report, on themortgaged property, prior to processing and sanctioning of loansto M/s. Nikhara Electronics and Allied Tekchnics. Shri B.A.Srinivasan (A-1) obtained this report only on 19.04.2012, morethan six months after the loan was sanctioned and disbursed.

35. By the above said acts, Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1), the thenAGM, Vijaya Bank, Mayo Hall Branch, Bangalore; M/s. NikharaElectronics and Allied Technics (A-2); Shri B. Lakshman @Lakshman Reddy (A-3); Smt. Shanta Gowda (A-4); Shri S.V.Isloor(A-5) and Shri Venkataramana Bhat (A-6) committed the offencesof cheating and personating as proprietor, M/s. V-TechEngineering Enterprises, committed forgery of documents suchas Quotations, Cash/Credit Bills, vouchers etc. for the purpose ofcheating, using the forged documents as genuine in pursuance ofthe criminal conspiracy among themselves, thereby causingwrongful loss to the bank and corresponding gains to themselvesand others. Investigation also establishes that Shri B.A. Srinivasan(A-1) committed the offence of criminal misconduct by gross abuseof his official position as the then AGM of Vijaya Bank, MayoHall Branch, Bangalore, and caused accrual of pecuniaryadvantage to the accused private persons, attracting the penalprovisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. That, the above acts of Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1), M/s. Nikhara Electronicsand Allied Technics (A-2), Shri B. Lakshman (A-3), Smt. ShantaGowda (A-4), Shri Shripad Vishwanath Isloor (A-5) and ShriVenkataramana Bhat (A-6) constitute offences punishable u/s 120-B r/w 420, 419, 468 & 471 IPC and 13(2) r/2 13(1)(d) of thePrevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

36. That Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) is retired from the servicesof Vijaya Bank on 31.10.2012; hence sanction for prosecutionu/s 19 of the PC Act, is not required.”

4. After the cognizance was taken by the concerned court, anapplication was moved by the Respondent No.1 seeking discharge interms of Sections 227 and 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(‘the Code’, for short). This application was rejected by the AdditionalCity Civil and Sessions Judge and Principal Special Judge for CBI cases,Bangalore, vide order dated 13.04.2015. It was observed:- “…As can be seen from the charge sheet and statement ofwitnesses, accused No.1 has deliberately violated the rules andregulations and bank norms of the bank while processing the loanapplication of accused No.2 firm and thereby he had entered intocriminal conspiracy with accused Nos.3 to 6 and accepted thefabricated and forged vouchers, invoices inflated financialstatements in order to facilitate accused Nos.3 and 4 to avail theterm loan of Rs. Two Crores cash credit and Rs. One Crore.The said term loan and cash credit of Rs.Three Crores weremisutilised for the purpose other than for which the loan wassanctioned. Thus, all materials clearly go to show that there wasdishonest intention on the part of the accused No.1 from theinception itself. The said circumstances and materials collectedby the Investigating Officer clearly reveal that accused No.1 hadentered into criminal conspiracy with accused Nos. 3 to 6 and hehad accepted the forged, fabricated invoices and inflated financialstatement knowingly fully well that they were forged. …

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Though accused No.1 was public servant, it is alleged that he hasretired from the service from Vijaya Bank on 31.10.2013.Therefore, sanction as required u/s 19 of PC Act, 1988 to prosecuteaccused No.1 is not required. The discharge application filed by A

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Aaccused No.1 is devoid of merits and on the contrary, there aresufficient materials against accused No.1 for framing charge forthe offences punishable u/s 120B, 420, 471 IPC and u/s. 13(2)r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988….”

5. The Respondent No.1, being aggrieved, preferred CriminalBRevision Petition No. 834 of 2015 in the High Court, which was allowedby the judgment and order presently under appeal. The High Court, thusset aside the order dated 13.04.2015 as regards the Respondent No.1and discharged him of the offences with which he was sought to becharged.

C6. While dealing with the submission that the allegations againstthe Respondent No.1 could, at best, be administrative lapses, the HighCourt observed:- “10… …These aspects of administrative lapses, it is to be stated,cannot be considered at the time of framing charge. Unless thewitnesses are subjected to cross-examination, no finding can beDgiven whether the omission in following the procedure amounts toadministrative lapse or was deliberate. Therefore, this point ofargument cannot be a ground for discharging accused No.1.Therefore, given a conclusion, it can be opined that the materialson record are sufficient to frame a charge against accused no.1,Ethe findings of the Special Court in this regard do not indicatenon-application of mind or, any infirmity or illegality in coming toan opinion that accused no.1 cannot be discharged on this ground.This finding needs to be sustained.

On the issue of sanction, the High Court, however, stated:- F

“11. However, another finding regarding sanction cannot besustained. The special court has held that the sanction is notnecessary as accused no.1 has retired by the time charge-sheetwas filed. But the argument of petitioner’s counsel is that sanctionin accordance with Section 197 CrPC is necessary. Beforeadverting to this point, I think it necessary to opine that the offencestriable by Special Judge related to time when an accused was inservice as a public servant. Sanction under Section 19 ofPrevention of Corruption Act is necessary to see that a publicservant is not entangled in a frivolous and false case. Sanctioninsulates a public servant from a false or vexatious or frivolousprosecution. Therefore, a protection available to a public servant G

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while in service should also be available after his retirement.Itcannot be forgotten that even after retirement, he is prosecutedfor offences under prevention of Corruption Act. Indeed, theretirement removes one from the garb of a public servant; butjustice requires that same protection should be available even afterone’s retirement. …”

Thereafter, while dealing with submissions based on the decisionsof this Court in Kalicharan Mahapatra vs. State of Orissa[2], R.Balakrishna Pillai vs. State of Kerala[3], State of Punjab vs. LabhSingh[4] and N.K. Ganguly vs. CBI, New Delhi[5], thematter wasconsidered as under:- “The learned standing counsel for CBI submitted insofar asoffences under Indian Penal Code are concerned, they cannot besaid to have been committed in discharge of official duty; sanctiontherefore is not necessary even under Section 197 CrPC. If theallegations levelled against the first accused are seen, andparticularly with reference to conspiracy, it is to be stated at thestage of framing charge, it is difficult to discern whether offencescan be connected to official capacity or not. Thorough trial requiresto be held. If facts in N.K. Ganguly (supra) are seen, there alsothe accused were sought to be prosecuted for the offences underPrevention of Corruption Act in addition to some of the offencesunder Indian Penal Code. Thus seen, the first accused should getthe benefit of discharge for absence of sanction under Section197 of CrPC. …”

Thus, it was concluded that the material on record was sufficientto frame a charge against Respondent No.1. The benefit of dischargewas however granted on the issue of absence of sanction under Section197 of the Code.

7. In this appeal challenging the view taken by the High Court, weheard Mrs. Sonia Mathur, learned Senior Advocate, in support of theappeal and Mrs. V. Mohana, learned Senior Advocate for the RespondentNo.1.

2 AIR 1998 SC 25953 (1996) 1 SCC 4784 (2014) 16 SCC 8075 (2016) 2 SCC 143

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A8. Mrs. Sonia Mathur, learned Senior Advocate, submitted thatthe protection under Section 19 of the Act is available to a public servantonly till he is in the employment and no sanction is necessary after thepublic servant has demitted office or has retired from service. As regardssanction under Section 197 of the Code, it was submitted that for anaction to come within the purview of Section 197 of the Code, it must beBintegrally connected with the official duties or functions of a public servantand that if the office was merely used as a cloak to indulge in activitieswhich result in unlawful gain to the beneficiaries, the protection undersaid Section 197 would not be available.

It was also submitted that the decision of this Court in N.K.CGanguly vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi[5] was in thecontext of the peculiar facts involved therein.

On the other hand, Mrs. V. Mohana, learned Senior Advocate,submitted that the Respondent No. 1 retired in the year 2012; that theallegations levelled against him would, at best, amount to administrativeDlapses on his part and there was certainly no criminal intent so as toattract the charges under the relevant sections; and that this Court maynot in its jurisdiction under Article 136(1) of the Constitution interfere inthe matter.

9. In S.A. Venkataraman vs. The State[6 ]while dealing with theErequirement of sanction under the pari materia provisions of thePrevention of Corruption Act, 1947, it was laid down that the protectionunder the concerned provisions would not be available to a public servantafter he had demitted his office or retired from service. It was stated:- “… …if an offence under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code wasFcommitted by a public servant, but, at the time a court was askedto take cognizance of the offence, that person had ceased to be apublic servant one of the two requirements to make s. 6of theAct applicable would be lacking and a previous sanction would beunnecessary. The words in s. 6(1) of the Act are clear enoughGand they must be given effect to. There is nothing in the wordsused in s. 6(1) to even remotely suggest that previous sanctionwas necessary before a court could take cognizance of theoffences mentioned therein in the case of a person who had ceasedto be a public servant at the time the court was asked to take cognizance, although he had been such a person at the time theoffence was committed. … …”

The law so declared by this Court has consistently been followed.For example, in Labh Singh[4] it was observed:-

“9. In the present case the public servants in question had retiredon 13-12-1999 and 30-4-2000. The sanction to prosecute themwas rejected subsequent to their retirement i.e. first on 13-9-2000and later on 24-9-2003. The public servants having retired fromservice there was no occasion to consider grant of sanction underSection 19 of the PC Act. The law on the point is quite clear thatsanction to prosecute the public servant for the offences underthe PC Act is not required if the public servant had already retiredon the date of cognizance by the court. In S.A. Venkataraman v.State[6] while construing Section 6(1) of the Prevention of CorruptionAct, 1947 which provision is in pari materia with Section 19(1) ofthe PC Act, this Court held that no sanction was necessary in thecase of a person who had ceased to be the public servant at thetime the court was asked to take cognizance. The view taken inS.A. Venkataraman[6] was adopted by this Court in C.R. Bansi v.State of Maharashtra[7] and in Kalicharan Mahapatra v. Stateof Orissa[2] and by the Constitution Bench of this Court inK. Veeraswami v. Union of India[8]. The High Court was nottherefore justified in setting aside the order passed by the SpecialJudge insofar as charge under the PC Act was concerned.”

10. Consequently, there was no occasion or reason to entertainany application seeking discharge in respect of offences punishable underthe Act, on the ground of absence of any sanction under Section 19 ofthe Act. The High Court was also not justified in observing ‘that theprotection available to a public servant while in service, shouldalso be available after his retirement’. That statement is completelyinconsistent with the law laid down by this Court in connection withrequirement of sanction under Section 19 of the Act.

11. Again, it has consistently been laid down that the protectionunder Section 197 of the Code is available to the public servants whenan offence is said to have been committed ‘while acting or purporting 7 (1970) 3 SCC 5378 (1991) 3 SCC 655

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Ato act in discharge of their official duty’, butwhere the acts areperformed using the office as a mere cloak for unlawful gains, suchacts are not protected. The statements of law in some of the earlierdecisions were culled out by this Court in Inspector of Police andanother vs. Battenapatla Venkata Ratnam and another[9] as under:- B“7. No doubt, while the respondents indulged in the alleged criminalconduct, they had been working as public servants. The questionis not whether they were in service or on duty or not but whetherthe alleged offences have been committed by them “while actingor purporting to act in discharge of their official duty”. That questionis no more res integra. In Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State ofCU.P.[10], at para 5, this Court held that: (SCC p. 328)

“5. The question is when the public servant is alleged to havecommitted the offence of fabrication of record or misappropriationof public fund, etc. can he be said to have acted in discharge ofhis official duties. It is not the official duty of the public servant toDfabricate the false records and misappropriate the public funds,etc. in furtherance of or in the discharge of his official duties. Theofficial capacity only enables him to fabricate the record ormisappropriate the public fund, etc. It does not mean that it isintegrally connected or inseparably interlinked with the crimeEcommitted in the course of the same transaction, as was believedby the learned Judge. Under these circumstances, we are of theopinion that the view expressed by the High Court as well as bythe trial court on the question of sanction is clearly illegal andcannot be sustained.”

F8. In Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab[11], at para 20 thisCourt held that: (SCC pp. 22-23)

“20. The principle of immunity protects all acts which the publicservant has to perform in the exercise of the functions of theGovernment. The purpose for which they are performed protectsGthese acts from criminal prosecution. However, there is anexception. Where a criminal act is performed under the colour ofauthority but which in reality is for the public servant’s own pleasure 9 (2015)13 SCC 8710 (1997) 5 SCC 326H11 (2007) 1 SCC 1

or benefit then such acts shall not be protected under the doctrineof State immunity.”

and thereafter, at para 38, it was further held that: (Parkash SinghBadal case[11], SCC p. 32)

“38. The question relating to the need of sanction under Section197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as thecomplaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. Thisquestion may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The questionwhether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determinedfrom stage to stage.”

9. In a recent decision in Rajib Ranjan v. R. Vijaykumar[12] atpara 18, this Court has taken the view that: (SCC p. 521)

“18. … even while discharging his official duties, if a publicservant enters into a criminal conspiracy or indulges incriminal misconduct, such misdemeanour on his part is not tobe treated as an act in discharge of his official duties and,therefore, provisions of Section 197 of the Code will not beattracted.”

(emphasis already supplied)

12. It has also been observed by this Court that, at times, the issuewhether the alleged act is intricately connected with the discharge ofofficial functions and whether the matter would come within theexpression ‘while acting or purporting to act in discharge of theirofficial duty’, would get crystalized only after evidence is led and theissue of sanction can be agitated at a later stage as well. In P.K. Pradhanvs. State of Sikkim represented by the Central Bureau ofInvestigation[13], this Court stated:- “15. Thus, from a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions, it will beclear that for claiming protection under Section 197 of the Code,it has to be shown by the accused that there is reasonableconnection between the act complained of and the discharge ofofficial duty. An official act can be performed in the discharge ofofficial duty as well as in dereliction of it. For invoking protectionunder Section 197 of the Code, the acts of the accused complained 12 (2015) 1 SCC 513

13 (2001) 6 SCC 704

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of must be such that the same cannot be separated from thedischarge of official duty, but if there was no reasonable connectionbetween them and the performance of those duties, the officialstatus furnishes only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, thenno sanction would be required. If the case as put forward by theprosecution fails or the defence establishes that the act purportedto be done is in discharge of duty, the proceedings will have to bedropped. It is well settled that question of sanction under Section197 of the Code can be raised any time after the cognizance;maybe immediately after cognizance or framing of charge or evenat the time of conclusion of trial and after conviction as well. Butthere may be certain cases where it may not be possible to decidethe question effectively without giving opportunity to the defenceto establish that what he did was in discharge of official duty.Inorder to come to the conclusion whether claim of the accusedthat the act that he did was in course of the performance of hisduty was a reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful,can be examined during the course of trial by giving opportunityto the defence to establish it. In such an eventuality, the questionof sanction should be left open to be decided in the main judgment”which may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial.

13. The offences involved in the case of N.K. Ganguly[5] wereunder Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of theAct i.e. relating to conspiracy to commit offences punishable under theprovisions of the Act. Secondly, the conclusion was drawn in the contextof the facts available therein which is evident from the following: - “35. From a perusal of the case law referred to supra, it becomesclear that for the purpose of obtaining previous sanction from theappropriate Government under Section 197 CrPC, it is imperativethat the alleged offence is committed in discharge of official dutyby the accused. It is also important for the Court to examine theallegations contained in the final report against the appellants, todecide whether previous sanction is required to be obtained bythe respondent from the appropriate Government before takingcognizance of the alleged offence by the learned Special Judgeagainst the accused. In the instant case, since the allegations madeagainst the appellants in the final report filed by the respondent that the alleged offences were committed by them in discharge oftheir official duty, therefore, it was essential for the learned SpecialJudge to correctly decide as to whether the previous sanctionfrom the Central Government under Section 197 CrPC wasrequired to be taken by the respondent, before taking cognizanceand passing an order issuing summons to the appellants for theirpresence.”

14. We now turn to the cases relied upon by Mrs. V. Mohana,learned Senior Advocate. In Rishipal Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradeshand another[14 ]this Court observed:- “13. What emerges from the above judgments is that when aprosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test tobe applied by the court is as to whether the uncontrovertedallegations as made in the complaint prima facie establish the case.The courts have to see whether the continuation of the complaintamounts to abuse of process of law and whether continuation ofthe criminal proceeding results in miscarriage of justice or whenthe court comes to a conclusion that quashing these proceedingswould otherwise serve the ends of justice, then the court canexercise the power under Section 482 CrPC. While exercisingthe power under the provision, the courts have to only look at theuncontroverted allegation in the complaint whether prima faciediscloses an offence or not, but it should not convert itself to thatof a trial court and dwell into the disputed questions of fact.”

This decision thus dealt with the parameters which ought to beconsidered while entertaining an application under Section 482 of theCode and is not a decision directly on the point. The decision in AnilKumar Bose vs. State of Bihar[15] pertained to a case which had arisenafter a full fledged trial, where, as regards offence punishable underSection 420/34 IPC, it was observed that the essential ingredient beingmens rea, mere failure on part of the concerned employees to performtheir duties or to observe the rules/procedure may be administrative lapsesbut could not be said to be enough to attract the penal provisions underSection 420 IPC. The matter was considered after the facts had 14 (2014) 7 SCC 215

15 (1974) 4 SCC 616

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Acrystalized in the form of evidence before the court and as such, thisdecision is of no relevance for the present purposes.

15. Having considered the matter in entirety, in our view, the HighCourt clearly erred in allowing Criminal Revision Petition and acceptingthe challenge raised by the Respondent No.1 on the issue of sanction.BWe, thus, allow this Appeal, set aside the view taken by the High Court,restore the order passed by the Trial Court and dismiss the applicationseeking discharge preferred by the Respondent No.1.

16. It is made clear that we have adverted to the facts and theallegations only for the purpose of considering the basic issue pertainingCto issue of sanction and we shall not be taken to have expressed anyview on merits which shall be considered independently. It has beenstated by the learned counsel that the matter is listed before the SpecialCourt on 11.12.2019. The Respondent No.1 shall appear before theSpecial Court on that day and the matter shall, thereafter, be proceededin accordance with law.D

17. This Appeal is allowed in aforestated terms.

Devika Gujral

Appeal allowed.

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