NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITYOF versus SAYEDABAD TEA COMPANY LTD. AND ORS. on 27 August 2019

[2019] 11 S.C.R. 725

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITYOF INDIA

v.

SAYEDABAD TEA COMPANY LTD. AND ORS.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 6958-6959 of 2009)

AUGUST 27, 2019

[N. V. RAMANA, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR ANDAJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]

National Highways Act, 1956: s.3G(5) – Arbitration andConciliation Act 1996 – s. 11 – Appointment of arbitrator –Application u/s. 3G(5) of the 1956 Act for appointment of anArbitrator by the Central Government – Allegation that CentralGovernment did not respond to the request for appointment –Thereafter, application filed u/s. 11 of the 1996 Act – Maintainabilityof application u/s. 11 of the 1996 Act, in view of s. 3G(5) of the1956 Act – Held: When the special law sets out a self-containedcode, the application of general law would impliedly be excluded –Scheme of 1956 Act, being a special law enacted for the purposeand for appointment of an arbitrator by the Central Governmentu/s. 3G(5) of the 1956 Act and sub-section (6) of s.3G itself clarifiesthat subject to the provisions of the Act 1956, the arbitrator maytake recourse in adjudicating the dispute invoking the provisionsof 1996 Act for the limited purpose – Thus, in view of the powerbeing vested exclusively with the Central Government to appointan Arbitrator u/s 3G(5) of the Act 1956, the application filed u/s11(6) of the Act 1996 for appointment of an Arbitrator notmaintainable and provisions of the Act, 1996 could not be invokedfor the purpose – Order by the High Court appointing an Arbitratorinvoking s. 11 of the 1996 Act, set aside – Arbitrator so appointedby the Central Government may adjudicate and decide the dispute.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The National Highways Act, 1956 is acomprehensive code and a special enactment which provides aninbuilt mechanism not only in initiating acquisition untilculmination of the proceedings in determining the compensationand its adjudication by the Arbitrator to be appointed by the

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ACentral Government and if still remain dissatisfied, by the Courtof law. In compliance of the mandate of Sections 3A to 3F of theAct, 1956, after the land is acquired, there shall be paid an amountof compensation which shall be determined by an order of thecompetent authority under sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 3Gof the Act, 1956 and any person who is aggrieved by the amountBso determined by the competent authority or what beingdetermined is not acceptable to either of the parties, on anapplication being filed by either of the parties, has to bedetermined by the Arbitrator to be appointed by the CentralGovernment in terms of sub-section (5) of Section 3G of the Act,C1956. After analysing the scheme, it can be assumed that thelegislature intended the Act, 1956 to act as a complete code initself for the purpose of acquisition until culmination includingdisbursement and for settlement of disputes and this conclusionis further strengthened in view of Section 3J of the Act which eliminates the application of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, toDan acquisition under the Act, 1956. [Para 16, 17, 18][734-G-H;735-A-D]

1.2 It is settled principles of law that when the special lawsets out a self-contained code, the application of general law wouldimpliedly be excluded. In the instant case, the scheme of Act,E1956 being a special law enacted for the purpose and forappointment of an arbitrator by the Central Government underSection 3G(5) of Act, 1956 and sub-section (6) of Section 3G itselfclarifies that subject to the provisions of the Act 1956, theprovisions of Act 1996 shall apply to every arbitration obviouslyFto the extent where the Act 1956 is silent, the Arbitrator maytake recourse in adjudicating the dispute invoking the provisionsof the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for the limitedpurpose. But so far as the appointment of an Arbitrator isconcerned, the power being exclusively vested with the CentralGovernment as envisaged under sub-section (5) of Section 3G ofGAct 1956, Section 11 of the Act 1996 has no application. [Para19][735-D-F]

1.3 The plea of the respondents that they have rightly takenrecourse in the facts and circumstances of Section 11 of the Act,1996 cannot be accepted for the reason that Section 3G(6) of theH

Act, 1956 clearly stipulates that the provisions of the Act, 1996will apply subject to the provisions of the Act, 1956. The usage ofthe expression “subject to” clearly indicates that the legislatureintended to give overriding effect to the provisions of the Act,1956 where it relates to the disputes pertaining to determinationof the amount of compensation under the Act. The irresistibleconclusion is that the legislature in its wisdom intended toabrogate the power for appointment of an Arbitrator under theprovisions of the Act, 1996. [Para 20][735-G-H; 736-A]

1.4 The High Court was not holding its competence toappoint an Arbitrator invoking Section 11 of Act, 1996. [Para21][736-B]

1.5 In view of the power being vested exclusively with theCentral Government to appoint an Arbitrator under Section 3G(5)of the Act 1956, being a special enactment, the application filedunder Section 11(6) of the Act 1996 for appointment of anArbitrator was not maintainable and provisions of the Act, 1996could not be invoked for the purpose. [Para 23][736-F]

1.6 The submission that as the appellant failed to make anappointment of the Arbitrator pursuant to a letter dated 8[th]December, 2006 in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 withina period of 30 days, the High Court alone was holding itscompetence to appoint an Arbitrator and application was submittedby the respondent-applicant on 7[th] March, 2007 the right ofappointment of an Arbitrator by the Central Government standsforfeited is of without substance for the reason that there is nostatutory limitation provided under sub-section (5) of Section 3Gof Act 1956 for the Central Government to appoint an Arbitratorbut that may not give an unguided discretion to the authority andin the absence of any statutory limitation, it must be within thereasonable time and if the Central Government fails in dischargeof its statutory duty in appointing an Arbitrator on a request beingmade by either of the party aggrieved, it will be open to the partyto invoke either the writ jurisdiction of the High Court underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India or the Civil Court for thepurpose. But as long as the power is exclusively vested with the AB

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[2019] 11 S.C.R.

ACentral Government for appointment of an Arbitrator underSection 3G(5) of the Act 1956, the provision of Section 11 of Act1996 has no application. [Para 24][736-G-H; 737-A-C]

1.7 The Arbitrator who was appointed by the CentralGovernment subsequent to the filing of an application underBSection 11 of the Act 1996 in April, 2007 could not proceed afterthe Arbitrator was appointed pursuant to the Order impugned inthe instant proceedings, who too has later recused and almost 12years have rolled by now, it is deemed appropriate to observethat there is no need to file any application by the respondent-applicant and the Central Government shall consider and appointCan Arbitrator in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act 1956 within aperiod of 30 days with prior intimation to the respondents. Asthe litigation has consumed a sufficient long time, it is appropriateto further observe that the Arbitrator so appointed by the CentralGovernment may adjudicate and decide the dispute within aDreasonable time but in no case later than six months after therespondent-applicant record its presence in the proceedings.[Para 25][737-E-H]

1.8 The orders passed by the High Court are set aside.The Arbitrator may be appointed by the appellants in termsEindicated. [Para 26][738-A]

General Manager (Project), National Highways andInfrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. v. PrakashChand Pradhan & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 5250 of 2018decided on 16.05.2018 – relied on.

FDeep Trading Company v. Indian Oil Corporation andOthers (2013) (4) SCC 35 : [2013] 2 SCR 470 – heldinapplicable.

Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Limited2008 (4) SCC 755 : [2008] 4 SCR 822 – referred to.G

Case Law Reference

[2013] 2 SCR 470[2008] 4 SCR 822

held inapplicablePara 15referred toPara 22

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 6958-6959 of 2009

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 6965-6966 of 2009.

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.07.2007 and 27.08.2007of the High Court at Calcutta in A.P. No. 77 of 2007 and G.A. No. 2563of 2007

Vikas Goel, Abhishek Kumar, Rahul Shyam Bhandari, Ms. ArushiGupta, Ms. Bhavya Vijay T., A. Siva Kumar, Advs. for the Appellant.

Prashant Bhushan, Lal Pratap Singh, Ms. Vivya Nagpal, UmeshPratap Singh, Govind Jee, Ms. N. Annapoorani, Advs. for theRespondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RASTOGI, J.

1. The moot question which arises before us is whether theapplication under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996(hereinafter being referred to as “Act 1996”) is maintainable inview of Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafterbeing referred to as “Act 1956”) which provides for appointment of anArbitrator by the Central Government.

2. The relevant seminal facts are that the subject land comprisedin “Sayedabad Tea Estate” situated at Mouza Purba Madati, J.L. No.108, Police Station Phansidewa, Dist. Darjeeling measuring 5.08 acreswas acquired by the appellant (National Highways Authority of India) inexercise of its powers under Section 3(D) of the Act 1956 vide notificationdated 22[nd] November, 2005 under L.A.P. Case No. 4/2004-05 for thepurpose of construction of the highways.

3. The Act, 1956 is a comprehensive code in itself and a speciallegislation enacted by the Parliament for acquisition and for determiningcompensation and its disbursement where there are several claimantsover the amount deposited towards compensation determined by thecompetent authority in accordance with the mechanism provided underSection 3G of the Act, 1956. If the amount so determined by thecompetent authority under sub-section(1) or sub-section (2) of Section3G is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on anapplication by either of the parties, be determined by the Arbitrator to beappointed by the Central Government under Section 3G(5) of the Act.

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AWhile determining the amount of compensation under sub-section(1) orsub-section(5), it is the duty of the Arbitrator to take into considerationthe relevant pointers envisaged under sub-section(7) of Section 3G ofthe Act, 1956. Where the amount determined by the Arbitrator is inexcess of the amount determined by the competent authority under Section3G of the Act, 1956, the Arbitrator may, at its discretion, award interestBat nine per cent per annum on the excess amount under sub-section (5)of Section 3H from the date of taking possession under Section 3D tillthe date of actual deposit.

4. The extract of the sections of the Act 1956 relevant for thepurpose are as under:-C

“3G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.—

(1) ………

(2) ………

D(3) ………

(4) ………

(5) If the amount determined by the competent authority undersub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to either ofthe parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of theEparties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by theCentral Government.

(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of theArbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall applyto every arbitration under this Act.

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(7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while determiningthe amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (5), as thecase may be, shall take into consideration—

(a) the market value of the land on the date of publication ofthe notification under section 3A; G

(b) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested atthe time of taking possession of the land, by reason of thesevering of such land from other land;

(c) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested atthe time of taking possession of the land, by reason of theH

acquisition injuriously affecting his other immovableproperty in any manner, or his earnings; (d) if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land, the personinterested is compelled to change his residence or placeof business, the reasonable expenses, if any, incidental tosuch change.

3H. Deposit and payment of amount.—

(1) …….

(2) …….

(3) …….

(4) …….

(5) Where the amount determined under section 3G by thearbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by the competentauthority, the arbitrator may award interest at nine per cent, per annumon such excess amount from the date of taking possession under section3D till the date of the actual deposit thereof.

(6) ……

…

…

12…………”

5. In the instant case, the respondent-applicant being dissatisfiedwith the award of compensation determined by the competent authorityunder sub-section(1) of Section 3G of the Act, 1956 filed application forappointment of an Arbitrator in terms of Section 3G(5) to the CentralGovernment on 8[th] December, 2006. As alleged, since the CentralGovernment has not responded to his request for appointment of anArbitrator in terms of letter dated 8[th] December, 2006 within a period of30 days from receipt of the request, application was filed on 7[th] March,2007 to the Chief Justice/his designate for appointment of an Arbitratorinvoking Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996. It reveals that the Arbitratorwas appointed by the Central Government sometime in April 2007.

6. The High Court of Calcutta taking note of the fact that theArbitrator has been appointed by the Central Government under Section A

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A3G(5) of the Act, 1956 after the respondent-applicant had moved anapplication to the Chief Justice/his Designate invoking its power underSection 11(6) of the Act, 1996 held that right of appointment of theArbitrator by the Central Government stands forfeited as it failed toappoint the Arbitrator until filing of the application under Section 11(6) ofthe Act, 1996 before the High Court of Calcutta and appointment ofBArbitrator during the pendency of proceedings, cannot be said to be avalid appointment and hence referred the matter to be placed before theChief Justice for naming an Arbitrator vide its Order dated 6[th] July, 2007.

7. Immediately after passing of the order dated 6[th] July, 2007, theappellant moved an application for review and it was brought to theCnotice of the High Court that the Act, 1956 being a special enactmentlaying down a procedure for appointment of an Arbitrator where thepower is being exclusively vested with the Central Government underSection 3G(5) of the Act, 1956, the application made under Section 11(6)of the Act, 1996 is not maintainable but this was not considered to be aDvalid reason for invoking review jurisdiction by the High Court asenvisaged under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 of Code of CivilProcedure and the review application was dismissed vide Order datedAugust 27, 2007.

8. It may be relevant to note that the sole Arbitrator (Justice P.N.ESinha) who was appointed by the High Court of Calcutta pursuant toOrder dated 6[th] July, 2007 under Section 11 of the Act, 1996 beforeinitiation of the proceedings, sent the letter of his recusal dated 25[th]January, 2008 (Annexure P-12).

9. It is informed to this Court that the Arbitrator who was appointedFby the Central Government under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 inApril, 2007 could not have proceeded after the intervention was madeby the High Court of Calcutta in appointing the sole Arbitrator underSection 11(6) of the Act, 1996. That for all practical purposes, the disputeraised by the respondent-applicant aggrieved by the compensationawarded under sub-sections(1) or (2) of Section 3G of the Act, 1956 hasGso far not been adjudicated because of the competence of the authorityin appointing the Arbitrator remain pending decision as to whether itwould be under the Act, 1956 or Act, 1996 as invoked by the High Courtof Calcutta under the order impugned before us.

10. Mr. Vikas Goel, learned counsel for the appellant submits thatthe Act 1956 being a special enactment is a code in itself provide notonly the procedure of acquisition but also the mode of determiningcompensation by the competent authority and any person, if aggrievedby the compensation determined under sub-sections(1) or (2) of Section3G of Act 1956 can certainly move an application for appointment of anArbitrator to which a Central Government is under obligation to appointunder Section 3G(5) of the Act 1956. But before the matter could beproceeded, the respondent-applicant approached the High Court by filingan application under Section 11(6) of the Act 1996 which was notmaintainable and this being the settled principles of law that the speciallaw prevail over the general law, the provisions of Act 1996 could nothave been invoked at least for the appointment of an Arbitrator inabrogating the power of the Central Government in appointing theArbitrator as contemplated under Section 3G(5) of Act 1956 and thisbeing an apparent error in law committed by the High Court needs to beinterfered by this Court.

11. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellanthas placed reliance on the recent judgment of two Judges’ Bench of thisCourt in General Manager (Project), National Highways andInfrastructure Development Corporation Ltd.Vs. Prakash ChandPradhan & Ors. passed in Civil Appeal No. 5250 of 2018 decided on16[th] May, 2018 and taking assistance thereof submits that the order passedby the High Court of Calcutta in the appointment of an Arbitrator underSection 11(6) of Act 1996 is not legally sustainable and both the Orderspassed by the High Court, i.e. 6[th] July, 2007 and 27[th] August, 2007 deservesto be quashed and set aside.

12. Per contra, Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel for therespondents, while supporting the order passed by the High Court ofCalcutta impugned in the instant proceedings submits that sub-section(6)of Section 3G clearly postulates that subject to the provisions of the Act1956, the provisions of Act 1996 shall apply to every arbitration underthe Act, 1956. If the authority to whom application was filed forappointment of an Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of Act, 1956 has failedto discharge its obligations within 30 days of presentation of the applicationwhich indisputedly was December, 2006 or until filing of the applicationfor appointment of an Arbitrator to the Chief Justice/his Designate underSection 11(6) of the Act, 1996 i.e. 7[th] March, 2007, the respondent was A

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Ajustified in taking recourse to sub-section(6) of Section 3G of Act, 1956for appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of Act, 1996.

13. Learned counsel further submits that the appellant under theAct, 1956 has forfeited its right to appoint an Arbitrator after presentationof the application under the Act, 1996 before the High Court of CalcuttaBand in the given circumstances, there was no legal impediment beforethe High Court of Calcutta in appointment of an Arbitrator invokingSection 11(6) of Act 1996 and in support of his submission placed relianceon the judgment of this Court in Deep Trading Company Vs. Indian1Oil Corporation and Others.

C14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with theirassistance perused the material available on record.

15. At the very outset, we may notice that the two Judge Benchof this Court in the recent judgment in General Manager (Project),National Highways and Infrastructure Development CorporationLtd. case(supra), while dealing with the scope of sub-sections (5) andD(6) of Section 3G of the Act 1956 with reference to Section 11 of theAct, 1996 has held that the Act 1956 being a special enactment andSection 3G in particular provides an inbuilt mechanism for appointmentof an Arbitrator by the Central Government. Hence Section 11 of theAct, 1996 has no application and the power is exclusively vested withEthe Central Government under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 forappointment of an Arbitrator and if the Central Government does notappoint an Arbitrator within a reasonable time, it is open for the party toavail the remedy either by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of theConstitution of India or a suit for the purpose but the remedy of Section11 of Act 1996 is not available for appointment of an Arbitrator.F

16. We are in full agreement with the legal position stated by atwo Judge Bench of this Court inGeneral Manager (Project), NationalHighways and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd.case(supra) but like to add further that the Act, 1956 has been enactedunder Entry 23 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule of theGConstitution with the exclusive power to legislate with respect tohighways, which are declared to be national highways by or under lawby the Parliament. It is a comprehensive code and a special enactmentwhich provides an inbuilt mechanism not only in initiating acquisitionuntil culmination of the proceedings in determining the compensation H1 2013(4) SCC 35

and its adjudication by the Arbitrator to be appointed by the CentralGovernment and if still remain dissatisfied, by the Court of law.

17. In compliance of the mandate of Sections 3A to 3F of the Act,1956, after the land is acquired, there shall be paid an amount ofcompensation which shall be determined by an order of the competentauthority under sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 3G of the Act, 1956and any person who is aggrieved by the amount so determined by thecompetent authority or what being determined is not acceptable to eitherof the parties, on an application being filed by either of the parties, has tobe determined by the Arbitrator to be appointed by the CentralGovernment in terms of sub-section (5) of Section 3G of the Act, 1956.

18. After analysing the scheme, it can be assumed that thelegislature intended the Act, 1956 to act as a complete code in itself forthe purpose of acquisition until culmination including disbursement andfor settlement of disputes and this conclusion is further strengthened inview of Section 3J of the Act which eliminates the application of theLand Acquisition Act, 1894, to an acquisition under the Act, 1956.

19. It is settled principles of law that when the special law setsout a self-contained code, the application of general law would impliedlybe excluded. In the instant case, the scheme of Act, 1956 being a speciallaw enacted for the purpose and for appointment of an arbitrator by theCentral Government under Section 3G(5) of Act, 1956 and sub-section(6) of Section 3G itself clarifies that subject to the provisions of the Act1956, the provisions of Act 1996 shall apply to every arbitration obviouslyto the extent where the Act 1956 is silent, the Arbitrator may takerecourse in adjudicating the dispute invoking the provisions of Act, 1996for the limited purpose. But so far as the appointment of an Arbitrator isconcerned, the power being exclusively vested with the CentralGovernment as envisaged under sub-section (5) of Section 3G of Act1956, Section 11 of the Act 1996 has no application.

20. The plea of the respondents that they have rightly takenrecourse in the facts and circumstances of Section 11 of the Act, 1996cannot be accepted for the reason that Section 3G(6) of the Act, 1956clearly stipulates that the provisions of the Act, 1996 will apply subject tothe provisions of the Act, 1956. The usage of the expression “subjectto” clearly indicates that the legislature intended to give overriding effectto the provisions of the Act, 1956 where it relates to the disputes pertainingto determination of the amount of compensation under the Act. The A

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Airresistible conclusion is that the legislature in its wisdom intended toabrogate the power for appointment of an Arbitrator under the provisionsof the Act, 1996.

21. In our considered view, the High Court of Calcutta was notholding its competence to appoint an Arbitrator invoking Section 11 ofBAct, 1996.

22. This very question earlier arose before this Court whether theapplication under Section 11(6) of the Act 1996 is maintainable in viewof statutory provisions of Electricity Act, 2003 adjudicating the disputebetween the licencees and the generating companies of the specialCenactment and Section 86(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003 in particular,this Court in Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd.Vs. Essar PowerLimited2 in para 28 observed as under:-

28. Section 86(1)(f) is a special provision and hence will overridethe general provision in Section 11 of the ArbitrationDand Conciliation Act, 1996 for arbitration of disputes between thelicensee and generating companies. It is well settled that the speciallaw overrides the general law. Hence, in our opinion, Section 11 ofthe Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has no application tothe question who can adjudicate/arbitrate disputes betweenlicensees and generating companies, and only Section 86(1)(f) shallEapply in such a situation.

23. We are also of the considered opinion that in view of thepower being vested exclusively with the Central Government to appointan Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of the Act 1956, being a specialenactment, the application filed under Section 11(6) of the Act 1996 forFappointment of an Arbitrator was not maintainable and provisions of theAct, 1996 could not be invoked for the purpose.

24. The submission of learned counsel for the respondents that asthe appellant failed to make an appointment of the Arbitrator pursuant toa letter dated 8[th] December, 2006 in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act,G1956 within a period of 30 days, the High Court of Calcutta alone washolding its competence to appoint an Arbitrator and application wassubmitted by the respondent-applicant on 7[th] March, 2007 the right ofappointment of an Arbitrator by the Central Government stands forfeitedand has relied on the Judgment of this Court inDeep Trading Company H2 2008(4) SCC 755

case(supra) is of without substance for the reason that there is nostatutory limitation provided under sub-section (5) of Section 3G of Act1956 for the Central Government to appoint an Arbitrator but that maynot give an unguided discretion to the authority and in the absence ofany statutory limitation, it must be within the reasonable time and if theCentral Government fails in discharge of its statutory duty in appointingan Arbitrator on a request being made by either of the party aggrieved,it will be open to the party to invoke either the writ jurisdiction of theHigh Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the CivilCourt for the purpose. But as long as the power is exclusively vestedwith the Central Government for appointment of an Arbitrator underSection 3G(5) of the Act 1956, the provision of Section 11 of Act 1996has no application. The judgment in Deep Trading Companycase(supra) on which learned counsel has placed reliance is of noassistance for the reason firstly that controversy there was not inreference to the appointment of an Arbitrator under the special enactmentas in the instant case under Act 1956 and secondly, if one party fails toexercise its power of appointment in terms of Clause 29 of the agreementin vogue, the provisions of Act 1996 would apply and the question forconsideration was whether the rights of the party stand forfeited to appointan Arbitrator after the party has invoked Section 11(6) of the Act 1996which, as already observed by us, is not the question for consideration inthe instant case.

25. It is indeed true that the Arbitrator who was appointed by theCentral Government subsequent to the filing of an application underSection 11 of the Act 1996 in April, 2007 could not proceed after theArbitrator was appointed pursuant to the Order impugned in the instantproceedings, who too has later recused and almost 12 years have rolledby now, we deem it appropriate to observe that there is no need to fileany application by the respondent-applicant and the Central Governmentshall consider and appoint an Arbitrator in terms of Section 3G(5) of theAct 1956 within a period of 30 days with prior intimation to therespondents. As the litigation has consumed a sufficient long time, weconsider it appropriate to further observe that the Arbitrator so appointedby the Central Government may adjudicate and decide the dispute withina reasonable time but in no case later than six months after therespondent-applicant record its presence in the proceedings.

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738SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2019] 11 S.C.R.

A26. The appeals accordingly succeed and are allowed. The orderspassed by the High Court dated 6[th] July, 2007 and 27[th] August, 2007 arehereby set aside. The Arbitrator may be appointed by the appellants interms indicated above. No costs.

27. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

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Appeals allowed.

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